lijphart c7: exec-legislative relations c8: electoral systems

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LijphartC7: Exec-legislative relations

C8: Electoral Systems

Presidential V. Parliamentary Major Differences

Separation and confidence Nature of election Collegial v. noncollegial

Other Differences Separation of powers means that executive officers cannot

serve in the legislature (there are some exceptions in some parliamentary systems)

Presidents cannot dissolve the legislature Head of State v. Head of Government

Simple Models: Parl v. PresSource: http://dss.ucsd.edu/~mshugart/semi-presidentialism.pdf

Veto Gates: UK v. US UK: One veto gate: House of Commons

(ignoring House of Lords, which is not powerless, but is definitely weaker than House of Commons)

US has three elected veto gates Presidency House of Representatives Senate

Veto Gates: UK v. US

US: Separate origin and survival of each institution: --must transact Inter-branch transactions, even if the same party has

presidency and congressional majorities

Parliamentary Systems with Minority or Coalitional Governments Still hierarchical relationship of cabinet to

parliament …cabinet survives only so long as it does not lose the “confidence” of the legislative majority

But absence of a majority means inter-party transactions (i.e., among multiple veto players)

Presidential Systems: US v. BrazilCompared to the US, Brazil’s presidency is

“stronger”: Decree power

And “weaker”: Veto can be overridden by 50%+1 (not two thirds)

Note: Lula’s PT won 19.2% of the vote for Senate in 2006, electing 6 of the 27 senators up for election and 15% of the vote for deputies, winning 83 out of 513 seats

Hybrid/Semi-Presidential/Mixed Systems President elected by the public Appoints a PM and Cabinet Subject to

Parliamentary Approval “Cohabitation” Examples: France, Russia (many others)

Semi-Presidential Systems

On Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism

France (a Premier-Presidential System) France 1981: François Mitterrand, Socialist

Party, elected President in May, 1981 But National Assembly (474 seats, five-year

term), elected in 1978:Mitterrand’s alliance:

Socialists 102 Communists 86

OppositionGaullists 178UDF 124

France 1981: President Mitterrand exercised his constitutional authority to dissolve parliament

1978 1981 (14 June)Mitterrand’s alliance:

Socialists 102 268Communists 86 43

OppositionGaullists 142 80 UDF 124 59

…able to appoint a Socialist premier and cabinet (Pierre Mauroy)

1986 National Assembly election

Mitterrand’s alliance:Socialists 198

Communists 32

OppositionGaullists 146

UDF 128

Cohabitation!Mitterrand had to appoint a premier from the

Gaullist–UDF alliance (Jacques Chirac)

France 1988: Mitterrand reelected, dissolved parliament again

1986 1988Mitterrand’s alliance:

Socialists 198 260Communists 32 24

OppositionGaullists 146 123 UDF 128 130

…Mitterrand able to appoint a Socialist premier again (Michel Rocard)

France 1997 President is now Jacques Chirac, elected

1995 Chirac dissolved parliament in 1997

France 19971993 1997

Chirac’s allianceGaullists 243 132UDF 209 161

Left oppositionSocialists 67 244Communists 24 35

…Chirac must appoint a Socialist premier (Lionel Jospin). Cohabitation again!

Semi-Presidentialism in Poland is Confusing

President Lech Kaczyński

PM Jarosław Kaczyński

Electoral Formula: Plurality/Majority Systems v. PR Types of Plurality/Majority

SMD/FPTP True majority systems

2-Round run-off systems often used in presidential races like in AL primaries

French System Alternative Vote

Electoral Formula: Plurality/Majority Systems v. PR PR Systems

List PR lists are closed (signif?) differing PR formulae

Mixed Member Proportional STV

Political Effect of Electoral Rules Mechanical Effects: how do the rules impact

the translation of votes into seats? Psychological Effects: how do those impacts

influence the choices of voters?

Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis Duverger’s Law: “Plurality rule tends to

reduce the number of parties to two, regardless of the number of issue dimensions” (Taageperga and Shugart 1989:65)

Duverger’s Hypothesis: “PR rules tend not to reduced the number of parties, if the number of issue dimensions favors the existence of many parties” (ibid., 65).

Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis(Source: Taagepera and Shugart, 1989:143)

Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis(Source: Taagepera and Shugart, 1989:144)

Source: Lijphart 1994:154-155

Source: Lijphart 1994:154-155

Ballot Example: Closed List-PR

Source: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/BeginnningReading/PRsystems.htm

Ballot Example: Open List-PR

Source: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/BeginnningReading/PRsystems.htm

STV Example: IrelandSource: Mair 1986: 292

Ireland and STV See:

http://electionsireland.org/counts.cfm?election=2002&cons=57&ref=

Mixed Member Systems

Source: http://www.gnb.ca/0100/Doc/fact7mixed-e.pdf

Mixed Member Systems

German elections: http://www.electionresources.org/de/

A MMP Sample Ballot

German Bundestag Ballot

Source: Lijphart, et al. 1986:160

SourcesNote: material on veto gates and France via

Matthew Shugart (personal correspondence)

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