islamic higher education in indonesia

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Islamic higher education and social cohesion in Indonesia

Richard G. Kraince

Published online: 11 April 2008� UNESCO IBE 2008

Abstract This study explores the role of public Islamic higher education in promoting

better relations between various religious communities in post-authoritarian Indonesia.

Based on field research conducted between December 2005 and March 2006, it documents

how progressive Islamic education leaders have advanced a tradition of critical intellec-

tualism in efforts toward the ‘‘renewal’’ of Islamic thought. This report provides an

analysis of how this tradition has served as a foundation for educators seeking to promote

democratization and address issues of social cohesion. It examines some of the core values

expressed by educational leaders as they have aspired to transform the most prominent

State Institutes for Islamic Studies (IAIN) into genuine universities. The study also

highlights the conservative backlash against public Islamic higher education and other

purveyors of progressive ideas within Indonesian society.

Keywords Southeast Asia � Indonesia � Islam � Higher education � Islamic education �Universities

Introduction

Colleges and universities significantly affect social relations. As one of the main pathways

to influence in a modern society, higher education brings future societal leaders into close

contact with one another during a formative stage of their lives. For this reason alone,

policies affecting who is accepted into universities, which students are encouraged to

succeed, and how suitable campus environments are for various segments of a population

have an impact on inter-group relations far beyond the campus gates. Yet, beyond questions

of access and diversity, the content of education and how it is delivered can also shape

interactions between social groups (Heyneman et al. 2006). In particular, policy decisions

affecting the social relevance of curricula, the objectivity of scholarship, and the norms of

academic debate have important implications for nations afflicted by social conflict.

R. G. Kraince (&)Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 225 Yamada House, Athens, OH 45701, USAe-mail: kraincer@ohio.edu

123

Prospects (2007) 37:345–356DOI 10.1007/s11125-008-9038-1

This study examines how public Islamic colleges and universities have endeavoured to

affect social cohesion in Indonesia, where inter-communal clashes have marred the

nation’s otherwise impressive transition from authoritarian rule over the course of the last

decade. Prominent educators from Indonesia’s public Islamic higher education sector have

introduced curricular reforms designed to engage students in dialogue on issues affecting

inter-group relations. They have also moved to promote better understanding of how

citizens can relate to one another within the context of a pluralistic democracy. These

efforts represent a major shift from the former regime’s policy of suppressing education

and other forms of public discourse on issues that might inflame ethnic, religious, racial or

inter-group passions. They also run counter to the views of some Islamic conservatives

who have endeavoured to exclude minorities from public policymaking and dominate

debates on social and political affairs.

Because Indonesia is home to the world’s largest population of Muslims and has

recently achieved the distinction of being its third largest democracy, efforts to bridge

democratic theory and traditions of Islamic thought have become vital to social stability.

Indonesia’s public Islamic higher education system has distinguished itself through dec-

ades of scholarship, teaching, and public outreach in this area. Only recently, however, has

the full extent of the system’s social role become clear. Through its conceptualization and

development of a new civic education programme designed to broaden inter-group dia-

logue, its success in convincing scores of Islamic institutions to adopt its civics model, and

its commitment to supporting inclusive, objective, and rational approaches to the study of

social phenomena—including the study of Islam—public Islamic higher education has

demonstrated the important role that colleges and universities can play in the promotion of

social cohesion.

The legacy of authoritarianism

Social cohesion can be described as the ability of members of a society to find mutually

agreeable solutions to the problems they face. Sharon Siddique (2001) asserted that, during

the era of authoritarianism, social cohesion in Southeast Asia was generally regarded as a

function of stakeholder commitment to a given social order. She observed that sustained

economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s made it possible for the Indonesian gov-

ernment to design social and economic policies to maximize constituent group buy-in,

while employing strenuous forms of social control to minimize dissent.

Indonesian higher education policy largely reflected these strategies before the current

period of reform. On one hand, access to higher education was extended to members of

numerous social groups in order that the government could attain a broad base of support.

However, true social integration was impeded by campus controls that made it nearly

impossible for students and faculty to address any of the social, political, environmental,

and human rights issues that affected inter-communal relations.

Instead of teaching students how to engage in civil debate, through which inter-group

tensions might have been lessened and simmering conflicts diffused, the former regime

instituted a political education programme consisting of a series of required courses on the

fundamentals of Pancasila, Indonesia’s national ideology.1 The overall objectives of

1 As a ‘‘Pancasila state’’, the Republic of Indonesia is based on five guiding principles: (1) a belief ina monotheistic god, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) national unity, (4) representative democracy, and(5) social justice.

346 R. G. Kraince

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Pancasila education were to provide a basis for social integration and promote national

unity. In practice, however, Pancasila education was used as a test of loyalty. Access to

college, the military, the civil service, and other institutions was commonly dependent, in

part, on one’s willingness to embrace national ideals.

Throughout the education system, the authorities made it clear that Pancasila education

was to be considered a source of moral guidance rather than an opportunity to interpret

Pancasila itself (Watson 1987). For that reason, education that addressed social concerns

tended to be monological and hostile to criticism. The intent appears to have been to place

national ideology beyond the realm of public debate, while employing a tightly controlled

discourse on Pancasila to legitimize government policy. The result of this manipulation of

the academic enterprise was that Pancasila education became a form of ideological

indoctrination through which the government suppressed critical thinking, restricted the

exchange of ideas, and ultimately impoverished its own understanding of social dynamics.

One of the most destructive aspects of campus controls was the banning of elected

student councils. Until the late 1970s, students obtained direct experience with the

workings of democratic institutions through involvement with representative bodies on

campus. Under authoritarian policies, students were allowed to elect leaders to represent

them within their departments, as well as through university-wide senates. Candidacy for

such positions, however, relied on the consent of university officials (Indonesian Ministry

of Religious Affairs 1978). In this way, a consensus model of governance was imposed on

student groups, while the ability to experiment with democratic decision-making was

eliminated.

As state domination of the economic, political, and social sectors became the hallmark

of the former regime in the 1990s, student opposition to campus restrictions grew. Nev-

ertheless, it was not until the Asian economic crisis that widespread disillusion with the

government became apparent. The collapse of Indonesia’s currency in early 1998 led to the

eruption of a nationwide, student-led protest movement calling for the restoration of basic

rights and an end to the ruling elite’s monopolization of power. Demonstrations reached a

climax with the student takeover of the national parliament, the forced resignation of

President Soeharto, and the transfer of power to the Vice-President, B. J. Habibie, on May

21, 1998. Student protests continued until November, however, when Indonesia’s parlia-

ment formally agreed to hold a democratic national election in the following year.

Indonesia has made significant progress toward the institutionalization of democracy

since 1998. Reformists have effected a complete overhaul of the electoral system. The

nation has conducted two national elections (in 1999 and 2004) with high levels of par-

ticipation and voter satisfaction (The Asia Foundation, 2003; Ananta et al. 2005). Since

2005, direct elections have been instituted at the provincial, district, and sub-district levels,

resulting in the widespread embrace of democratic practices through which voters hold

government officials more accountable.

In spite of these successes, efforts to attain the kind of economic prosperity that might

lead to long-term stability have been hampered by ongoing tensions among various reli-

gious communities. Between 1998 and 2003, over 10,000 people were killed and hundreds

of thousands displaced in conflicts between Christian and Muslim groups in many parts of

eastern Indonesia. The violence severely damaged relations between religious communities

throughout the country and encouraged the proliferation of Islamic militancy. Extremist

groups promoting Islamic sectarian interests have subsequently been able to attain a high

level of exposure and influence. Although the major eruptions of inter-religious violence

were quelled after the Malino Peace Accords in 2001 and 2003, social harmony—as well

Islamic higher education and social cohesion in Indonesia 347

123

as Indonesia’s attractiveness to foreign investors—continues to be affected by the propa-

gation of intolerant rhetoric and the persistence of religious violence.

In June 2005, for example, the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) issued a fatwa, or

religious opinion, condemning the Ahmadiyya, a tiny sect or offshoot of Islam that has

survived for over a century in the Indonesian archipelago. Within a month, members of an

Islamic militia group known as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) began staging attacks

on Ahmadiyya facilities in West Java. They eventually succeeded in destroying the

Ahmadiyya congregation headquarters near the city of Bogor as well as numerous

Ahmadiyya mosques in other parts of the province. The authorities did not arrest those

responsible for the violence, responding instead by formally banning the Ahmadiyya

within the district. In light of the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators and the success of

their efforts, it was unsurprising that similar attacks were carried out on Ahmadiyya

followers on the island of Lombok in 2006 (U.S. Department of State 2006).

Islamic militias have also tried to intimidate Muslim groups that have promoted

alternative approaches to Islamic thought. After another MUI fatwa explicitly condemned

‘‘liberalism, pluralism, and secularism’’ in 2005, truckloads of militia members issued

threats in front of the offices of the Liberal Islam Network, an Islamic civil society

organization founded by Islamic university graduates. While the MUI made little effort to

define these terms, their condemnation served as a pretext for militants seeking to eliminate

opposition to their efforts to forcibly impose conservative interpretations of Islam on the

Indonesian populace.

As these incidents demonstrate, there is a direct relationship between intolerant rhetoric

and religious violence. Indonesia’s failure to address the violence points to serious prob-

lems within its legal and security sectors. However, the inability of Indonesian civil society

groups to effectively counter expressions of religious intolerance points to problems in

education. While analyses of the former regimes’ educational failures are helpful to

understand the problem, the question remains as to what role colleges and universities can

play in supporting the development of a more tolerant and inclusive society.

Universities and social cohesion

Since the period of Indonesia’s struggle for independence in the mid-1940s, state-spon-

sored Islamic higher education has maintained a significant position within the nation’s

rapidly expanding university system. Having progressed through several early configura-

tions, the system is composed today of six National Islamic Universities (UIN), nine

autonomous, four-year colleges, known as the State Institutes for Islamic Studies (IAIN),

and 32 other degree-granting Islamic studies institutes (STAIN) scattered across the major

islands of the archipelago. Funded through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the system

provides an Islamic alternative to the secular institutions of higher learning supported by

the Ministry of Education, as well as a counterbalance to the numerous private Islamic

institutions operated by various Muslim groups.

With approximately 150,000 students or 18% of all public university students, state-

administered Islamic higher education has considerable influence in Indonesian society. Its

impact is felt in three important ways. First, Islamic colleges and universities prepare

Islamic studies teachers for the nation’s public schools, where basic courses on Islam are

mandatory for all Muslim students. Second, graduates frequently find employment in the

traditional Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) that proliferate in rural areas. Third,

Islamic public higher education plays a consequential role in the preparation of the

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ulama—the religious scholars who provide leadership in mosques throughout the country.

In light of the sector’s vast influence, the way in which it interprets Islamic teachings, the

manner in which it addresses debates over Islamic issues, and the values it chooses to

promote are of particular relevance to social cohesion.

The effect of higher education on social cohesion is often described in terms of social

capital. With respect to Indonesia’s Islamic higher education system, two major forms of

social capital are relevant. First, Islamic colleges and universities provide access for tens of

thousands of Islamic boarding school students who would not otherwise be able to attend

an institution of higher learning. While not as prestigious as some of the nation’s secular

institutions, Islamic colleges and universities offer students modest opportunities for social

mobility. In this way, they help integrate rural communities with markets and the state—a

phenomenon described as vertical social capital (Colletta and Cullen 2000).

A number of studies have highlighted the importance of balancing various group

interests within the context of policies affecting university access and student success. For

example, Harold Crouch’s (2001) analysis of Malaysia’s relatively successful affirmative

action policies provides an excellent illustration of how colleges and universities can help

balance ethnic interests in a diverse society. Malaysia’s achievements can be contrasted

with the experience of Sri Lanka, where less balanced efforts to redress social inequity had

a disastrous effect on inter-communal relations (de Silva 1979).

The second form of social capital that Islamic higher education helps develop is hori-

zontal social capital, which refers to the nature and relative strength of social bonds both

within and among communities. Since Muslims from a wide variety of backgrounds share

a common experience on public Islamic university campuses, the institutions act to bridge

various streams of Islam. Affiliation with any of Indonesia’s major Islamic organizations is

avoided—at least with regard to the interpretation of Islamic teachings and the curricula

followed. The institutions thus play an important role in building cohesion within Indo-

nesian Muslim society, which represents between 85% and 90% of the general population.

As others have described, social capital is not always necessarily ‘good’ for social

cohesion (Print and Coleman 2003). For example, if an Islamic institution fostered a high

level of bonding social capital, or trust, among various Muslim groups, but created distrust

between Muslims and non-Muslims, social cohesion would likely deteriorate. For this

reason, the character of the institution itself is crucial.

Since very few non-Muslims are present on Indonesia’s Islamic campuses, the insti-

tutions have inherent shortcomings in terms of their ability to bridge Muslim and non-

Muslim communities. Nevertheless, several Islamic colleges and universities have initiated

or have helped to sustain wider efforts to build relationships among various religious

communities. By promoting student and faculty involvement in activities that bring

members of different religious groups together, institutions have consciously sought to

create the kinds of ‘‘networks of engagement’’ that tend to strengthen inter-group relations

more widely in society (Varshney 2002). Such relationships, often referred to as bridginghorizontal social capital, can make societies more cohesive by creating higher levels of

inter-communal trust as well as avenues of cooperation through which conflict manage-

ment efforts can proceed in the event of crisis.

Colletta and Cullen (2000) asserted that beyond concepts of social capital, cohesive

societies tend to have two other features: (1) Effective mechanisms of social control such

as those provided by reliable security forces and a functioning legal system, and (2)

institutions that provide ‘‘reinforcing channels of socialization’’ necessary for the forma-

tion of shared values (p. 13).

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123

In terms of influencing mechanisms of social control, intellectuals associated with

Islamic universities—like their counterparts in secular institutions—play an important role

in criticizing public policy. The numerous research institutes and small civil society

organizations that have sprung up on and around Islamic university campuses have helped

focus attention on potential sources of conflict such as social injustice, economic disparity,

and inequality in political representation. Public Islamic universities have also expanded

their ability to conduct social research in order to affect how social conflict is understood,

interpreted, and addressed.

As Mathews (2005) described, universities can help communities in the midst of conflict

by analysing and framing the parameters of the conflict so that specific issues can be better

understood and effective solutions perhaps more easily found. As has been observed in

conflicts throughout the globe, inter-group clashes at the local level can turn into major

human rights catastrophes when the legal, security, or governance sectors have broken

down at higher administrative levels (Meyer 2003). Academics cannot fill such gaps, but

they can call attention to the sources of conflict and highlight problems with those bodies

responsible for conflict management.

Another way in which Islamic colleges and universities affect social cohesion is by

helping to construct the reinforcing channels of socialization that are necessary for the

formation of shared values in a society (Colletta and Cullen 2000). Institutions of higher

learning serve as important conduits through which social values can be transmitted to

younger generations. Although the theoretical treatment of issues relating to social values

can be helpful, the implicit function of a university as an agency of acculturation is likely

more important (Fischer 1964). For this reason, how the faculty handles education on

sensitive social problems, how matters pertaining to academic freedom are addressed by

the institution, and how the norms of scholarly debate are decided upon and enforced can

have a significant bearing on the values that students learn to understand and appreciate

during their college experience.

Intellectual values

Since the general expansion of education in the 1960s, leaders of Indonesia’s public

Islamic higher education system have gradually implemented policies designed to integrate

secular disciplines with traditional studies of Islamic theology, culture, and law. Central to

this effort has been an embrace of what Zamakhsyari Dhofier (1992), the former rector of

IAIN-Semarang, referred to as Muslim intellectualization—the critical reassessment of

religious doctrines and previous theological interpretations in an effort to increase the

social relevance of Islam in light of the challenges of modernity. The actualization of this

goal within the Islamic higher education system reflects the conviction of many progres-

sive Muslim intellectuals that Islamic sciences and Western disciplines may be reciprocally

informed and elevated through closer exchange.

Fazlur Rahman of the University of Chicago, who co-directed the Ford Foundation’s

Islamic Education project in the late 1970s, was influential in promoting these ideas among

Indonesian students. Rahman (1982) asserted that the essence of Islamic higher education

is not the ‘‘...instruments of instruction such as the books taught or the external educational

structure...,’’ but rather, what he called ‘‘Islamic intellectualism.’’ He argued that it is the

growth of a ‘‘genuine, original, and adequate Islamic thought that must provide the real

criterion for judging the success or failure of an Islamic educational system’’ (p. 1). For this

reason, Rahman argued, Islamic higher education must develop and sustain an environment

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within which Islam may be contextualized and perpetually reinterpreted by each successive

generation of Muslims.

Within Indonesia’s Islamic colleges and universities, support for this perspective is

evidenced by the emergence of prolific discourse directed towards the reassessment of

personal and social issues vis-a-vis religion. Islamic scholars and educational leaders have

played a central role in efforts to reconcile aspects of societal change with the traditional

values of Islamic culture. Through an introspective analysis of core values shared

throughout the nation, and by experimentation with the accommodation of external

influences, a progressive approach to Islamic studies has emerged on a number of Islamic

university campuses. Islamic intellectualism, which can be defined as openness to the

reinterpretation or contextualization of Islamic thought, can thus be considered one of the

primary values that animate Indonesia’s public Islamic colleges and universities.

A second value associated with public Islamic higher education is enthusiasm for

critical inquiry. Rahman (1982) identified two basic approaches to the acquisition of

‘modern’ knowledge that have been employed by Muslim thinkers. The first approach

maintains that involvement with secular disciplines be limited to purely technological

fields. The second contends that Muslims should pursue all areas of study, and accept not

only Western technology, but also its methods of social inquiry and analysis.

Indonesian Muslims have long been divided along this philosophical fault line. Uni-

versities operated privately by Muhammadiyah—a 28 million-member ‘modernist’

Muslim organization founded in 1912—have generally adhered to the first strategy with

their emphasis on technical training. Educational leaders associated with the public Islamic

universities, on the other hand, have tended to embrace the latter approach.

Prominent Indonesian Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Harun

Nasution who were based at the IAIN in Jakarta, and former Ministers of Religious Affairs,

Abdul Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali, were leading forces for institutional change within

the Islamic higher education system throughout the past three decades. Their policy of

encouraging the integration of secular disciplines into Islamic studies is based on the

observation that the early Muslims of the Middle Ages dominated Eurasia intellectually

while making no separation between religious and secular knowledge (see Nasution 1982;

Madjid 1985, 1996). They argued that since all knowledge may be considered to fall within

divine providence, then all fields and disciplines could be considered appropriate for

Muslims. Based upon this reasoning they encouraged student and faculty exchanges with

Western universities, and broadened curricular offerings by introducing a variety of studies

into the IAIN system.

Current leaders have built upon this reputation for openness and have emphasized the

importance of understanding the social science methodologies developed in the West. In

spite of hostile criticisms voiced by conservatives who view western intellectual traditions

as a threat to religious authority, public Islamic higher education leaders have not been shy

about forging links with Western universities and have generally sought to promote

understanding of critical inquiry among students and faculty.

Public Islamic higher education leaders have made it clear that they treat Islam not

simply as a religion, but also as an ‘‘historical phenomenon that has evolved and been

adapted to many societies and cultures and that can be subjected to empirical analysis... An

empirical, rather than an emotional, normative, or ideological approach is emphasized.

Exclusivity and aggressiveness, rigid orthodoxy, and serving the roles of apologist or

missionary become inappropriate’’ (Azra 2005).

Another value emphasized by the Islamic higher education sector is tolerance of other

faith traditions as well as of other interpretations of Islam. Educators at the nation’s leading

Islamic higher education and social cohesion in Indonesia 351

123

Islamic universities have promoted an inclusive approach to the analysis of religious

issues. For this reason, Islamic colleges and universities have frequently emphasized the

importance of dialogue among religious groups and encouraged both students and staff to

take on leadership roles in facilitating dialogue between groups in conflict over religious

matters.

In reflecting on the role of religious intellectuals, Azyumardi Azra (1999), Rector of

UIN Jakarta, pointed out that there are two fundamental problems associated with dialogue

between religious groups: Doctrinal incompatibilities that preclude agreement on certain

issues, and historical events such wars and other types of conflict that result in a tense

relationship between adherents of various religions. Azra argued that religious function-

aries—those who are involved in religion in some kind of official or professional

capacity—usually hold a much better understanding of the potential for compatibility

between religions, as well as an awareness of the historical precedents for peaceful

coexistence. He observed, however, that many religious functionaries see themselves

strictly as ‘‘guardians of the faith’’ and commonly choose to emphasize the incompatible

aspects of their respective religious traditions (p. 58). For that reason, he argued, even

though religious functionaries are normally better prepared to discuss inter-religious issues,

the task of facilitating inter-religious dialogue often falls to lay practitioners. Azra thus

asserted that it is the role of aspiring intellectuals not only to deepen their understanding of

their religions and share their insights with less studied adherents, but also to engage in

dialogue with those of other religions, with the good of all humanity in mind.

A broader social role

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Indonesian government maintained a policy toward

Islamic higher education that can be described as benign neglect. While the institutions

were not given nearly as much financial support as public universities affiliated with the

Ministry of Education, their growth and development occurred with somewhat less

political intrusion. For this reason, numerous civil society organizations sprung up around

Islamic university campuses. As a vital synergy developed between Islamic intellectuals,

NGO activists, and nascent pro-democracy student groups, ideas associated with Islamic

renewal (pembaruan) came to play a considerable role in debates on Indonesia’s future

(Barton 1997).

A number of Islam-oriented journals concerned with civil society themes were estab-

lished with Islamic university support in the 1990s. Several research centers began to

conduct empirical research on concepts pertaining to Islam and democracy. Study clubs

that encouraged students to write about democratization and various social issues also

flourished. By the late 1990s, as a new generation of progressive intellectuals began to

assume positions of leadership within the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Islamic higher

education sector was well prepared to expand its social role.

On May 19, 1998, Indonesia’s Minister of Religious Affairs filed a formal request with

senior government officials seeking agreement with a plan to develop the study of social

sciences alongside traditional religious studies disciplines within the nation’s three most

prominent State Institutes for Islamic Studies. The idea was presented as a step toward

preparing the entire public Islamic higher education system to face future challenges by

transforming its ‘‘guiding institutions’’ in the cities of Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Bandung

into genuine universities. While the idea had been debated for several years within

intellectual circles, the Ministry’s decision to move the proposal forward at this time—two

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days before President Soeharto’s resignation—reveals the foresight and enthusiasm with

which progressive Muslim higher education leaders seized the momentum of reform in

order to affect change within their sector the moment authoritarian governance began to

crumble. The move also provided an early indication of just how revolutionary the idea of

an Islamic university would be within Indonesian Muslim circles.

As authoritarianism collapsed, the progressive leadership of Indonesia’s Islamic higher

education sector moved quickly to communicate ideas about educational reform.

Azyumardi Azra, who became Rector of IAIN Jakarta soon after Soehart’s fall, began

talking about alternative models of political education early in the reform period. Azra

(2001, p. 7) cited two reasons for change: First, the authoritarian style of political edu-

cation, which emphasized indoctrination and regimentation, was outmoded within the

context of Indonesia’s new democracy. Second, lecturers trained under authoritarianism

tended to employ non-participatory teaching techniques that undermined critical thinking.

Azra proposed to develop a new model of civic education at UIN-Jakarta. From the outset,

he expected that Pancasila education courses would be replaced by a new civic education

model, designed to prepare the next generation of Indonesians for participation in a plu-

ralistic, democratic society. However, Azra insisted that such a course could only be

developed through an inclusive, bottom-up approach to the idea.

The Research Center (Pusat Penelitian) at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta began

developing a pilot programme in the year 2000. The Center took a participatory approach by

involving numerous faculty and students in the process of course planning and evaluation.

In fact, university leaders gathered more than 200 student leaders representing 46 institu-

tions around the country to discuss the idea before finalizing plans for a nationwide pilot

programme. They also convened forums involving educators from numerous institutions

outside the Islamic university system and recruited talent from across the country to develop

course texts. As a result of these efforts, the civics course encountered little resistance.

With funding from the Asia Foundation and other international donors, IAIN Jakarta

then developed a formal curriculum, published textbooks and other teaching materials, and

provided training for course instructors. The course was then taught in 46 of Indonesia’s 47

public institutions of Islamic higher learning, beginning in September 2001. The following

year, after comprehensive evaluation, the Ministry of Religious Affairs made the civic

education compulsory for all students enrolled in public Islamic higher education.

Far from the stereotypical view of Islamic education as a stagnant tradition character-

ized by outmoded teaching techniques and irrelevant curricula, these civic education

efforts have introduced active learning pedagogies designed to engage students in demo-

cratic decision-making and stimulate critical thinking on social issues. As this model of

civic education has replaced the former regime’s ideological indoctrination courses on

campuses throughout the country, it has become one of the major features of the

democratization process in the world’s most populous Muslim society.

Numerous private Islamic colleges and universities subsequently adopted the pro-

gramme. Most significantly, the Muhammadiyah higher education system, which operates

over a hundred colleges and universities around the country, spent months observing the

public Islamic university programme before developing its own civic education pro-

gramme based on that model. It too experimented with a pilot programme, developed its

own course materials, and then expanded the programme within its network of institutions.

Overall, after five years of expansion, the civic education course has grown far beyond the

bounds of the public Islamic higher education community. Currently, over 100,000 stu-

dents per year from several Islamic higher education networks are enrolled in some version

of the civic education course (Asia Foundation 2006).

Islamic higher education and social cohesion in Indonesia 353

123

Conclusion

Given the politicization of religious issues and the tendency for social conflicts to take on

religious overtones in Indonesia, the fact that educators from an Islamic studies institute

provided the leadership to transform the very nature of political education throughout the

country is significant. Moreover, the widespread adoption of a civic education model that

prepares students for participation in a pluralistic democracy underscores the degree to

which democratization has been embraced by Indonesia’s largely Muslim society.

These facts draw attention to the influential role of progressive Islamic thought within

the public higher education sector. Had the values of intellectualism, critical inquiry,

objective scholarship, tolerance, and rationalism not been nurtured within Islamic studies

disciplines in Indonesia, it appears unlikely that the Islamic higher education sector would

have produced the same dynamic leadership that is determined to improve social cohesion

through innovative civics programming.

Increasing levels of diversity in societies across the globe present a fundamental

challenge to colleges and universities: How can higher education, as one of the major

components of civil society, promote good relations between social groups while pre-

venting the association of such efforts with the political powers and class structures that

reflect social divides? The resurgence of religious and ethic integralism in recent years

underscores this imperative. Policymakers must decide how to respond to extremists who

seek to deepen divides between social groups both on campus and in society at large.

Moreover, in order to truly improve social cohesion, policymakers must inspire those who

have access to university education to address the needs and concerns of more margin-

alized social groups.

The successes of Indonesia’s public Islamic higher education sector underscore the

potential for universities to make a significant contribution to social cohesion. It must be

noted, however, that the institutionalization of civic education within Indonesia’s Islamic

higher education sector has coincided with the striking growth of conservative Islamic

student groups on campuses across the country. Against the backdrop of ongoing inter-

religious tensions, university campuses have become one of the primary sites of contes-

tation between those seeking inter-group accord and those seeking to marginalize minority

groups in favour of an exclusivist interpretation of majority values. Although Islamic

educators across Indonesia now talk about building resilience between social groups by

exposing youth from various communities to each other’s viewpoints on relevant social

problems, it remains unclear whether civic educators will ultimately succeed in their

efforts to advance tolerance, pluralism, gender equity and other civil society values.

Acknowledgements Research for this study was conducted under the auspices of the Fulbright NewCentury Scholars Programme, the Council for the International Exchange of Scholars, and the IndonesianInstitute of Sciences. The author expresses his gratitude to these institutions as well as to his colleagues inthe New Century Scholars Programme. He alone, however, bears responsibility for the nature and content ofthis study.

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Author Biography

Dr. Richard G. Kraince directs Ohio University’s Inter-Religious Dialogue Project. He conducted fieldresearch on Islamic higher education in Indonesia as a Fulbright New Century Scholar in 2006. He waspreviously a visiting Fulbright research fellow at Syarif Hidayatullah State Institute for Islamic Studies inJakarta as well as a Program Officer for the Asia Foundation’s Islam and Civil Society program. He recentlycompleted a two-year study of Islamic education in Malaysia for the National Bureau of Asian Research.Dr. Kraince is currently finishing a book on the impact of Islamic social and political activism onIndonesia’s democracy movement. He is a United States citizen and has an academic background in the fieldof higher education.

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