intentionality as creativity: a communicological critique...
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Language and Semiotic StudiesVol. 5 No. 1 Spring 2019
Intentionality as Creativity: A CommunicologicalCritique of Muddle-Headed Mindfulness in Pragmatics of Human Communication
Richard L. LaniganInternational Communicology Institute, USA
Abstract
Jürgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson were dedicated to the research paradigm that asserts
the successful Axiom of Communication Theory: The Intentionality Code of “You Both
Can And Cannot Communicate” (Make up Your Mind and Change Your Mind—You can
Learn!). Ruesch and Bateson’s axiomatic view of Codes critiques the failed Intentionality
Messages, i.e., the failed Postulate of Information Theory: The Behavior of “You Cannot
Not Communicate” raised to the status of a fetish in the American speech communication
discipline by the publication of Paul Watzlawick, Janet Helmick Beavin, and Don J.
Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns,
Pathologies, and Paradoxes (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1967). Although
dedicated “To Gregory Bateson, Friend and Mentor”, this book (hereafter cited as WBJ)
is not co-authored by Bateson and its publication was vigorously opposed by him for
many reasons, including the argument of the present analysis that shows a fundamental
misunderstanding and gross misapplication of Information Theory (Shannon & Weaver) in
place of Communication Theory (Weiner & Bateson) and the mathematical logic (Edmund
Husserl & Bertrand Russell) upon which the distinction is based.
Keywords: Bateson, Watzlawick, Communicology, creativity, Double Bind, pragmatics
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Intentionality as Creativity: A Communicological Critique of Muddle-Headed Mindfulness in Pragmatics of Human Communication
There is little doubt that the founders of the Communicology discipline in the United
States are Jürgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson (1951) who set the disciplinary
paradigm with the publication of their Communication: The Social Matrix of
Psychiatry. This volume was contextualized later by a massive, virtual encyclopedia
of theory construction and applied research from both Ruesch (1972, p. 195; Ruesch
& Kees, 1972) and Bateson (1972, 1970, 1991; Riebar, 1989; Harries-Jones, 2003).
And, the pioneering semiotic influence in Signs, Language and Behavior by Charles
Morris (1946, pp. 195-198) is surely unknown to this day (Lanigan, 2018d). My
analysis in this present article is contextual to the account of Gregory Bateson’s logic
that I present in the present journal (Lanigan, 2018a)1.
Before starting the logical analysis of the WBJ claim “You cannot not
communicate” or its cousin, “You cannot not choose”, we should be clear that the
claim is simply nonsense. The current version of the nonsense is “My alternative facts
are not fake news” (Trump). The nonsense occurs where you understand these examples
as cases of pragmatic fallacy [post hoc ergo propter hoc = After This, Therefore, Because
of This] committed by believing General Grammar names actuality (the error exposed
by Michel Foucault): (1) a Noun state / category [communication] is not a Verb process
/ relationship [communicate], or, (2) a double-negative [cannot not] does not make a
positive [can]. The more exciting error is to eliminate names altogether which is Bertrand
Russell’s mistake that Bateson recognized, but Watzlawick did not! The Russell error
is discussed in plain English in Lanigan (1972, pp. 60-65), whereas the contextual
history will be found in Wilder (1978, 1979), Leeds-Hurwitz (2005), and Harris-Jones
(2003).
Human communicating fails , just like it succeeds; communication is
misunderstood, just like it is understood (recall I. A. Richards: “Communication is the
study of misunderstanding.”). Alternatively, the failure to choose is paradox; if you
count paradox as a “choice”, then you create ambiguity, which is still no “choice”.
If you combine paradox and ambiguity you create a Gregory Bateson “double-
bind”, and, if the communication context persists, you suffer psychosis by “having
no choice”. Yet, you can exercise a “veto” (Ashby, 1956, p. 233)—if you choose a
new context for choosing, you both escape paradox and ambiguity. Such an “escape”
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is being “clever” and is the foundation of all human learning as creativity (M. C.
Bateson, 2005; Lanigan, 2018a).
1. The Problematic: Informatics—The Theory of Information
Ruesch and Bateson were dedicated to the research paradigm that asserts the
successful Axiom of Communication Theory: The Intentionality Code of “You Both
Can And Cannot Communicate” (Makeup Your Mind and Change Your Mind—
You can Learn to Create!). Ruesch and Bateson’s axiomatic view critiques the failed
Intentionality Message, failed Postulate of Information Theory: The Behavior of
“You Cannot Not Communicate” raised to the status of a fetish2 by the publication of
Paul Watzlawick, Janet Helmick Beavin, and Don J. Jackson, Pragmatics of Human
Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1967). Although dedicated “To Gregory
Bateson, Friend and Mentor”, this book (hereafter cited as WBJ) is not co-authored
by Bateson and its publication was opposed by him for many reasons (mostly
theoretical to WBJ misunderstandings related to cybernetics), including the argument
of the present analysis (Figure 1) that shows a fundamental misunderstanding of
Information Theory (Shannon & Weaver; Morris’s “communi z ation”) versus
Communication Theory (Weiner & Bateson; Morris’s “communi c ation”), and, the
cybernetic-mathematical logic upon which the analogue difference (Edmund Husserl,
Norbert Weiner, Gregory Bateson) with digital distinction (Bertrand Russel, Claude
Shannon) is based (Ashby, 1956, pp. 177-180; Lanigan, 2013; Marcus, 1974; Morris,
1946; Venancio, 2017; Wiener, 1948, 1950; Wilden, 1972, 1980, 1987).
Richard L. Lanigan
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Figure 1. Comparison of Communication Theory and Informations Theory
Intentionality as Creativity: A Communicological Critique of Muddle-Headed Mindfulness in Pragmatics of Human Communication
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1.1 WBJ Information Theory hypostatization’s (postulates)
We must begin with the key propositions asserted in the WBJ text (1967, page
references as indicated) for both clarity of presentation and subsequent critique.
The evidence taken for analysis are the very stated definitions of WJB. Gregory
Bateson’s phenomenological method, used without attribution, is shown in brackets
(see Bateson, 1979, pp. 76-79). Be warned in advance that each of these numbered
statements states a fundamental error in fact (evidence as sufficient condition of
truth) and in theory (logic as necessary condition of truth). When Bateson pointed out
these errors, he was ignored by WBJ (Wilder, 1978). The correct account of Gregory
Bateson’s published work is reviewed in Lanigan (2013, 2018a, d), where accurate
accounts of key concepts/terms such as “Schismogenesis”, “Play”, “Double-Bind”,
“Ambiguity”, “Paradox”, “Communication Theory”, and “Information Theory” are
given.
1. “The two terms communication and behavior are used virtually synonymously.” (p. 22).
Recall Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary definition for virtually: “being such in essence
or effect, though not formally recognized or admitted”.
2. “We would prefer to focus less on the sender-sign or receiver-sign relations and more
on the sender-receiver relation, as mediated by communication.” (p. 22)
In the interest of simple coherence, we must note, with emphasis, the international
acceptance of Louis Helmslev’s (1943) definitions for describing the logic of linguistic
human communication [Glossematics], in which “relation” is a combinatory both/
and logic function, whereas, “correlation” is an oppositional either/or logic function.
Thus, “sign relations” are prior to, and define “sender-receiver” correlations. The
double use by WBJ of “relation” demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding and
error in application of basic logic (Philosophy) in both language (Linguistics) and
communication (Communicology).
Richard L. Lanigan
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3. “For an observer who is in possession of all the necessary information any reference to
the past (and, therefore, to the existence of memory in the system) is unnecessary.” (pp.
25-26).
(3a.) Semiotic Phenomenology Methodology: “(1) a relationship is established
[Description], (2) tested over a wide range as a given contingency allows [Reduction
“tautology”], and (3) an abstraction is eventually gained that, we hold is identical
with the mathematical concept of function [Interpretation “explanation”].” (p. 28; my
numbering and italics) [cites R & B, on perception, p. 173]
(3b.) Communication as behavior is counterposed to “Psychoanalytic Theory”: “There
is a crucial difference between the psychodynamic (psychoanalytic) model on
the one hand and any conceptualization of organism-environment interaction on
the other…”; Fn.1: “The so-called ‘Neo-Freudians’ have, of course, placed much
more emphasis on individual-environment interaction.” (p. 29) [kick dog example,
information, not energy, is transferred]
4. “Whether message sent equals message received is an important but different order of
analysis, as it must rest ultimately on evaluation of specific, introspective, subject-
reported data, which we choose to neglect for the exposition of a behavioral-theory of
communication.” (p. 49)
5. “In the foregoing, the term ‘communication’ has been used in two ways: as the generic
title of our study, and as a loosely defined unit of behavior.” (p. 50) [Major Error: This
definition adopts Russell’s Paradox: a class cannot contain itself.]
6. “Axiom I”: “To summarize, a meta-communicational axiom of the pragmatics of
communication can be postulated: one cannot not communicate.” (p. 51)
7. “What is important for our consideration is the relation existing between the content
(report) and the relationship (command) aspects of communication. In essence … a
Intentionality as Creativity: A Communicological Critique of Muddle-Headed Mindfulness in Pragmatics of Human Communication
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computer needs information (data) and information about this information (instruction).
Clearly, then, the instructions [code] are of a higher logical type that the data [message];
they [codes] are meta-information since they are information about information, and
any confusion between the two would lead to a meaningless result. … If we now return
to human communication, we see that the same relation exists between the report
[message] and the command [code] aspects: the former conveys the ‘data’ [message] of
the communication, the latter [code] how this communication is to be taken [capta].” (pp.
52-53, my emphasis and inserts to specify the error in evidence typology)
8. Axiom II: “Another axiom of our tentative calculus: Every communication has a
content [message] and a relationship [Code] aspect such that the latter classifies the
former and is therefore a meta-communication.* *Fn. 3: We have chosen, somewhat
arbitrarily, to say that [Information Theory; Shannon and Weaver] the [Either / Or
digital choice] relationship classifies, or subsumes, the content aspect, although it
is equally accurate in logical analysis to say that [Communication Theory; Weiner
and Bateson] the class is defined by its members and therefore the content aspect
can be said to define the relationship aspect [Both / And binary analogue choice].
Since our primary interest is not information exchange [Information Theory] but
the pragmatics of communication [Communication Theory], we will use the former
approach [sic Information Theory; erratum, Communication Theory is meant,
but Information Theory is being used!].” (p. 54; my inserts) [The authors make a
fundamental error by equivocating Information Theory and Communication Theory
(Figure 1)]
9. Axiom III. “Human beings communicate both digitally and analogically. Digital
language has a highly complex and powerful logical syntax but lacks adequate
semantics in the field of relationship, while analogic language possesses the
semantics but has no adequate syntax for the unambiguous definition of the nature
of relationships.” (pp. 66-67) [Major Error: The statement is contrary to fact (Ashby,
1956, pp. 177-180; see Wilder, 1979)]
Richard L. Lanigan
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10. “Analogic communication, we suggest, has its roots in far more archaic periods
of evolution and is, therefore, of much more general validity than the relatively
recent, and far more abstract, digital mode of verbal communication. What then
is analogic communication? The answer is relatively simple: it is virtually all
nonverbal communication … [all semiotic systems] as well as the communicational
clues unfailingly present in any context in which interaction takes place.” (p. 62; my
emphasis)
11. “Schismogenesis [is] a process of differentiation in the norms of individual behavior
resulting from cumulative interaction between individuals.” (p. 67) Complimentary
Schismogenesis: continuing cycle of assertion, then submission by individuals or
groups in interaction; Symmetrical Schismogenesis: continuing cycle of behavior that
progressively changes (expands) because of individual or group interaction. “… now
usually referred to simply as symmetrical and complimentary interaction. They can
be described as relationships based on either equality or difference. … Symmetrical
interaction, then, is characterized by equality and the minimization of difference,
while complementary interaction is based on the maximization of difference.” (pp.
68-69)
1.2 Definitions (Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary)
Axiom:
(1) a proposition, principle, rule, or maxim that has found general acceptance or is
thought worthy thereof whether by virtue of a claim to intrinsic merit or on the basis
of an appeal to self-evidence [Hypothesis];
(2) Baconianism: an empirical rule or generalization based on experience;
Kantianism: [an eidetic rule] or an immediately certain [judgment by] synthetic a
priori proposition;
(3) A self-consistent statement about the primitive terms or undefinable objects
that form the basis for discourse, Postulate: To assume or claim as true, existent, or
necessary [Hypostatization].
Double Bind: Dilemma: equally unsatisfactory alternatives.
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Paradox: statement contradictory to common sense, yet perhaps true in fact.
Ambiguity: two or more meanings being understood or referring to two or more
things at the same time.
Equivocation: two or more significations.
2. The Thematic: Communicology
2.1 Aristotle’s Laws of Thought (Modernity Model: Rationality)
1. Law of Identity ( p = p ); A Thing Is [continues in space/time to be] the Same
Thing.
2. Law of Contradiction ( p ≠ q ); A Thing is Not an Other Thing.
3. Law of Excluded Middle ( either p or q ); Either a Thing Is Or It Is Not.
4. Law of Non-Contradiction (not both p and —q ); A Thing Cannot Be Both a
Thing And Not a Thing.
Post-Modern Logic Caveat to the Four Laws:
A Symbol is Not a Thing; “The Map is Not the Territory” (Hampden-Turner,
1981);
Presentation [Vorstellung] is Not Representation [Darstellung] (Lanigan, 2017b).
2.2 Aristotle’s Logic Syllogism (Modernity Model: Rationality as Predicate
Implication)
1. Modus Ponens [method of affirming] { [ ( p q ) p ] q } :
Major Premise:You cannot both communicate and not communicate.
Minor Premise: You communicate.
Conclusion: You cannot not communicate.
2. Modus Tollens [method of denying] { [ (p q) q] p } :
Major Premise:You cannot both communicate and not communicate.
MinorPremise: You cannot not communicate.
Conclusion: You communicate.
Richard L. Lanigan
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2.3 Aristotle’s Rhetoric Enthymeme (Modernity Model: Rationality as
Phenomenalism / Behaviorism)
Hypostatization: The major premise in Modus Ponens or Modus Tollens (II above)
is assumed because “communication” is defined as “behavior” [sensate action =
object; physical referent; why is predicated] and is hypostatized as given [data]. This
argument assumes behavior is a pure referent in “nature”(“object”), thus no paradox
or ambiguity of meaning is possible as contingency, i.e., the Law of Identity is
assumed to begin with the “true proposition”: Behavior is Behavior. The proposition
“You Communicate” is missing in both modus ponens [minor premise] and modus
tollens [conclusion], hence an enthymeme! Therefore, the Law of Non-Contradiction
is derived: Behavior cannot both be behavior and not behavior. Communication
is behavior, always, every where, for anyone. The “intentionality” axiom is Either
absolutely true Or false. Although logical, the Phenomenalism is not a useful
conclusion for depicting human communication. This is a classic case of a logical
proof that simply does not describe pragmatic actuality. Demonstrated by Bertrand
Russell in Principia Mathematica (Lanigan, 1972, pp. 606-665).
2.4 Michel Foucault’s Enthymeme (Post-Modernity Model: Reasonableness as
Phenomenology / Semiotics)
In this section I am dealing with a specific application of postmodern logic (often
called “non-Aristotelian” logic, especially in General Semantics scholarship) that
continues a more general epistemological discussion of the communication context
that is found in Lanigan (2007). In phenomenological logic as used by Edmund
Husserl and Roman Jakobson, this approach is known as founding implication logic
(Holenstein, 1974, pp. 35-36).
Hypothesis: The major premise in Modus Ponens or Modus Tollens (II above) is
not assumed because “communication” is defined as “discourse” [symbolic action
form = language; exchange; translation] and is hypothesized as taken [capta]. This
argument asserts that discourse is a relation (structure) in “culture”, thus paradox
and ambiguity are possible and prescient as contingency, i.e., human beings have the
embodied conscious experience [material truth] that the Law of Non-Contradiction
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is an incorrect assumption when it comes to symbols: Symbols are Both a thing
And not a thing always, everywhere, for anyone. Humans start with the experiential
failure of the Law of Non-Contradiction and work Aristotle’s hierarchy backwards
to arrive at the functional, foundational, grounded, and pragmatic Law of Identity,
e.g., Gertrude Stein: A rose (discourse) is a rose (symbol) is a rose (thing). Language
is itself an empirical demonstration that Aristotle’s “laws of thought” [logic] do not
function as “laws of discourse” [rhetoric]. The “intentionality” axiom is neither true
nor false, yet—more importantly— it is illegitimate to conscious experience, i.e.,
it does not meet the standard of practical logic which is reasonableness (eulogos)
judged as “right” (correct) and “wrong” (incorrect). Although rhetorical and tropical
(Figure 2), the Semiotic Phenomenology is a quite useful conclusion for practical
logic (rhetoric) describing [this is the voice/subjectivity] of human communication
as intersubjectivity/dialogue, and, for explaining the semiotic exchange of perception
and expression (Figure 3). Recall Roman Jakobson’s conclusion: “Human language
is primarily differentiated from other sign systems, including ‘animal languages’ [and
machine languages], by these trans-associative laws [rhetoric /tropic logic, especially
metaphor and metonymy] of combination and substitution [chiasm]” (Holenstein
1976: 140, 145; my insert; see Lanigan 2018a,b). The eidetic and empirical proof
is Jakobson’s model of “marked / unmarked terms” (Figures 4 and 5), and, a
confirmation of Karl Bühler’s (1934) theory of anaphoric [forward pointing] and
cataphoric [backward pointing] deixis in linguistic communication. The medieval
Scholastics summed up this analysis with the the proposition: “We speak, therefore
we are” [ loquens ergo sumus ].
Richard L. Lanigan
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Figure 2. Tropic logic and learning to communicate
Figure 3. The Dynamics of Consciousness and Experience in Communicology
Intentionality as Creativity: A Communicological Critique of Muddle-Headed Mindfulness in Pragmatics of Human Communication
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Figure 5. The Symbolic Marking as Tropic Logic
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Anthony Wilden (1987) provides a parallel critique of the base assumption (WBJ’s
phenomenalism) of the experiential failure of the Law of Non-Contradiction. This is
to say, we human beings can make mistakes, we can change our mind, we can fail to
communicate—even science believes in trail-and-error! A grammatical rule (double
negative verb) does not “fix” such situations by a “positive” choice; it is just a way of
saying “Maybe—I do not know yet”. Every human being knows that the reasonable
answer to the question “Will you marry me?” is not to invoke the same rule: “I am not
uncertain about marrying you”. So, ambiguity is the way out of paradox, but it is also
the way we refuse to communicate! [insert your favorite trump-the-donald example
here.]
So, we come to Wilden’s explication of the WBJ failure to understand
the difference between Information Theory (analytic logic; difference) and
Communication Theory (dialectic logic; difference with distinction), and, why
Gregory Bateson could not support the WBJ research hypostatization suggested in
Pragmatics of Human Communication. Wilden describes the logic problematic this
way:
BOTH—AND, EITHER / OR
Dialectic is not simply a way of knowing; it is the way of life itself. The dialectic way
includes the analytical way as its necessary complement, and neither of them violates the
principle of non-contradiction.
When Analytic Logic [Digital] says “either A or not-A”, it means this:
either A or not-A
— a choice. When analytic logic says “both A and not-A”, it means this:
both A and not-A
— a contradiction.
When Dialectical Logic [Analogue] says “both A and not-A”, it means this:
Richard L. Lanigan
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not-A
both ┏────────────┓
A
and ┏───────┓
— a dependent hierarchy between open system [ Choice] and
environment [Context].
Analytic Logic is single-level and static logic, outside time and change. It is the
symmetrical logic of classical physics.
Dialectical Logic is a multi-leveled and dynamic logic, within time—and dependent,
like learning, or duration.
The both—and of Analytic Logic is secondary relationship derived by addition from
its basic [primary] operation of division, either / or. The perspective of analytic logics is
thus [subtraction]
“Either either/or Or both/and“.
The both—and of Dialectical Logic is a primary relationship derived by connection
[its basic operation of combination], from [secondary] relations between levels such as
the both—and relation between open-system and environment. The perspective of the
dialectical logic is thus [addition]:
“Both both/and And either/or”.
_______________________
Amid the seeming confusion of our mysterious world, individuals are so nicely adjusted to
a system, and systems to one another and to a whole, that, by stepping aside for a moment,
a man exposes himself to a fearful risk of losing his place forever.
NATHANIEL HAWRHORNE: Wakefield (1835)
(Wilden, 1987, pp. 276-277; inserts are mine for parallel articulation; see Wilden, 1972,
Intentionality as Creativity: A Communicological Critique of Muddle-Headed Mindfulness in Pragmatics of Human Communication
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1980; confirmed by Ashby, 1956, pp. 177-180)
3. Conclusion: “You Cannot Not Communicate” Is an Illegitimate Axiom of Human Communication
We are confronted with the “intentionality” axiom. In this axiom (Wiener, 1915, 1948,
1950), “You” is surely an embodied human being whose action decision habits are
“here and now” behavior and “there and then” comportment as a unique symbolic
capacity (Figure 6). On this minimal basis, we may discount animal and machine
communication systems as part of the problematic. I discount them since they are
digital and analogue signal systems [informatics] which truly display “behavior”
[referent signal presence and/or absence], but only that. There is no displacement in
time and space which is the condition of the symbolic. Also, an “axiom” is simply
an idea held to be self-evident to humans. “Intentionality” does mean “embodied
conscious experience” and includes “the prescient motivation, comportment,
and contingency” [anaphoric deixis (Bühler, 1934/1982)] that structures [codes]
expression / presentation, and, perception / representation [messages] (Dreyfus, 1992,
2001; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). Gregory Bateson, like Merleau-Ponty and Foucault
for example (Lanigan, 2017a, 2018a), suggests this new tautology process is the
postmodern logic that Charles Peirce was first to describe as Abduction:
An explanation has to provide something more than a description provides and, in the end,
an explanation appeals a tautology which, I have defined it, is a body of propositions so
linked together that the links between propositions are necessarily valid.
The simplest tautology is “If P is true, then P is true”.
A more complex tautology would be “If Q follows from P, then Q follows from P”.
From there, you can build up into whatever complexity you like. But you are still within
the domain of the if clause provided, not by data, but by you [Capta]. That is a tautology.
[Husserl and Jakobson’s Foundedness (Fundierung), see the account of founding
implication logic in Holenstein (1974, pp. 35-36)]
We now flesh out our explanations by the process which the American logician C.
Richard L. Lanigan
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S. Peirce called abduction, that is, by finding other relevant phenomena and arguing that
these, too, are cases under our rule and be mapped onto the same territory [Acta]. (Bateson,
1979, pp. 76-79; see Harries-Jones, 1995; my inserts)
What is self-evident to humans is that their discourse is a symbolic form
(Lanigan, 2018b, c): (1) an embodied consciousness [the eidetic] as symbolized
expression / presentation of (2) experience as perception / representation [the
empirical]. Hence, there is a Kantian immediate and certain judgment by synthetic
a priori proposition (Lanigan, 2017b). Expressing and perceiving codes (language
and other semiotic systems) requires messages taken in preseantia (capta) as
both the process (communication encode) of symbol understanding (data) and the
product (exchange decode) of symbol use in absentia (acta). It is quite possible and
prescient that codes can, and will, fail as frequently as any of the messages produced
by human beings in their complexity systems of speech and language. Symbols are
both codes and messages (double articulation as both meta-communication and
meta-meta-communication). When you perceive this fact as a human being, you
can communicate. If you do not perceive the relation between codes and messages,
you cannot communicate. QED: The WBJ hypostatization of their Axiom I is
both false and illegitimate, thus according to Ernst Cassirer and Chaim Pereleman,
unreasonable. The great cybernetic mathematician, Norbert Wiener (1915, p. 570; my
emphasis), joined with Gregory Bateson saying that for human beings, communication
is an embodied self-observation such that “The life of every branch of mathematics
lies in a habit” (Figure 6). Therefore, I join Gregory Bateson in critiquing the book
Pragmatics of Human Communication to be Muddle-Headed Mindfulness! Despite
his best efforts, Gregory Bateson’s name is still in the book that creates double-binds
for its unsuspecting readers!
Intentionality as Creativity: A Communicological Critique of Muddle-Headed Mindfulness in Pragmatics of Human Communication
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Notes1 The full citation is “Communicology Chiasm: The Play of Tropic Logic in Bateson and
Jakobson” (Special Issue: The Play of Signs / The Signs of Play), Language and Semiotic
Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2018a), pp. 67-92.
2 The latest instance of the fetish is Joseph A. DeVito, “Making Choices”, ETC.: A Review
of General Semantics, 73(2), (April 2016), pp. 173-179. “Living is a process of making
choices. Much as you cannot not communicate, you cannot not makes choices. Making
choices is inevitable—even as William James noted ‘When you have to make a choice
and don’t make it that is in itself a choice’” (p. 173). The logic failure [violating the
law of non-contradiction] here is “have to”, since humans clearly do not have to choose
and someone else calling the absence of behavior a “choice” is also clearly “fake news”
perceived by the person who is merely observing that something did not happen!
Acknowledgement
The present paper began life as a one page handout for a lecture discussion of the then
notorious thesis “You Cannot Not Communicate”. The handout was titled “Intentionality”
Axiom HandChart © Prof. Richard L. Lanigan, Ph.D. “(School of Communication,
Southern Illinois University, Faculty Proseminar, September 1991; Updated 1
December 2016 at the request of colleagues at Duquesne University, Department of
Communication & Rhetoric Studies). A narrative textual version first draft was presented
at the Philosophy of Communication Division, Eastern Communication Association
Conference, 25-29 April 2018, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA. The present article
is a revision based on subsequent discussion at the conference. I am indebted to my
colleagues for their constructive and supporting comments at the conference.
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About the author
Richard L. Lanigan (rlanigan@mac.com) is Distinguished University Scholar and
Professor of Communicology (Emeritus) at Southern Illinois University, and, Director
and Laureate Fellow of the International Communicology Institute, Washington, DC,
USA. He is an elected member of Polish Academy of Science (Philology), Senior
Fulbright Fellow (China 1996, Canada 2008), Fellow of International Academy for
Intercultural Research, Past President of The Semiotic Society of America, Editor of
The American Journal of Semiotics, Past Vice President International Association
for Semiotic Studies, and elected member American Philosophical Association. His
research focus is the Philosophy of Communicology (phenomenology, semiotics) and
Intercultural Communicology (China-USA relations).
Intentionality as Creativity: A Communicological Critique of Muddle-Headed Mindfulness in Pragmatics of Human Communication
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