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Independent Task Force Report on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Presentation to Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Dr. Charles D. FergusonPhilip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology
July 21, 2009
Council on Foreign Relations
Outline of Presentation• Why did CFR sponsor this report?
• What did the report initially intend to do and why did this change?
• What are the major findings and recommendations of the report—many are directly relevant to the national labs?
• What are the likely future next steps for U.S. nuclear weapons policy?
• What are the remaining challenges?
Council on Foreign Relations
What originally motivated the report? Wall Street Journal op-ed in January
2007 signed by George Shultz, William Perry, Sam Nunn, and Henry Kissinger
They called for the vision of a nuclear weapon free world
They believed that nuclear weapons have become--for the United States--more of a liability than an asset because of: Proliferation to other statesPotential terrorist acquisition of
nuclear weapons But they still accepted a role for
nuclear deterrence.
Council on Foreign Relations
Report’s Original Intentions Mini-Nuclear Posture
Review to help guide incoming administration
Congress requires new administration to conduct an NPR within first year of office
Last NPR in 2001 with only parts revealed in early 2002
Many misconceptions of Bush administration NPR
Council on Foreign Relations
Primary Objective Urged in the Report Prevent nuclear use by any state or non-state actor Does not imply elimination of nuclear weapons Does not imply no-first-use policy But does imply reevaluation of the purposes of U.S. nuclear
weapons
Council on Foreign Relations
Five Pillars of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
1. Reenergizing political relationships with major nuclear-armed states with emphasis on reinvigorating arms control with Russia and revitalizing strategic dialogue with China
2. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and know-how to more states and non-state actors
3. Reaffirming and maintaining U.S. extended deterrence commitments to allies
4. Ensuring that the U.S. nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable to maintain the credibility of the U.S. arsenal
5. Implementing best security practices on nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide
Council on Foreign Relations
U.S.-Russia Major Recommendations Premise any new arms control agreement on
shared understanding of mutual interests Urge legally binding, verifiable follow-on
treaty to START Include in strategic dialogue: non-deployed
warheads, missile defense, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and advanced conventional weapons
Build on success of CTR and related programs (WSSX, Megatons-to-Megawatts, etc.) to form a true partnership with Russia on nuclear security projects
Reinvigorate technical cooperative projects with U.S. and Russian technical experts
Council on Foreign Relations
U.S.-China Major Recommendations Relationship not ripe for formal
nuclear arms control But important to renew strategic
dialogue Conduct frequent dialogue on nuclear
security Be transparent about U.S. intentions
and capabilities on missile defense. Offer an agreement on formal transparency and confidence building measures
Propose a trilateral ban (U.S.-China-Russia) on tests of kinetic anti-satellite weapons. Discuss how to expand to global ban
Council on Foreign Relations
Strengthening Nonproliferation Prepare high level diplomatic team
for NPT RevCon Provide for multiple levels of
assurances on nuclear fuel Freeze construction of new national
enrichment and reprocessing facilities
Set up a fuel leasing program Make the Additional Protocol a
prerequisite for obtaining nuclear supplies
Council on Foreign Relations
Strengthening Nonproliferation (continued) Develop and implement improved safeguards
techniques Provide adequate funding and resources for
the IAEA Correct weaknesses in the NPT that allow
easy withdrawal Ratify the CTBT and renew international
efforts for entry into force Phase out use of civilian highly enriched
uranium (HEU) Renew U.S. pledge to pursue nuclear
disarmament Call for global moratorium on fissile material
production for weapons
Council on Foreign Relations
Extended Deterrence Reaffirm U.S. commitment to security
assurances, including extended deterrence Consult with allies to determine their
views about the credibility of the nuclear component of extended deterrence
Keep the small U.S. nuclear stockpile in Europe as long as it supports NATO political objectives and acts as a disincentive for NATO allies to build their own arsenals
Council on Foreign Relations
Safe, Secure, and Reliable Nuclear Arsenal Ensure stockpile stewardship program has
adequate resources Maintain a readiness to modernize or replace
the arsenal, as necessary Be transparent about any proposed changes to
the weapons complex Couple these changes to arms control and
strategic dialogue with Russia and China Conduct comprehensive cost vs. benefit
assessment of proposed complex transformation
Implement an integrated approach to the complex
Exercise the intellectual capacity of the technically talented people at the labs
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Best Security Practices Meet the president’s goal of securing all
vulnerable nuclear material by 2012 Increase transparency about the status of the
U.S. nuclear weapons inventory, e.g., publish an annual report on dismantlement activities
Dispose, as much as possible, excess fissile material into non-weapons usable forms
Share information with other nuclear-armed states about best security practices, consistent with U.S. laws
Move the IAEA’s nuclear security budget into the regular budget
Redouble efforts to bring the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material into force
Council on Foreign Relations
Next Steps for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy• Complete Nuclear Posture Review
(December 2009)
• Complete negotiations on START follow-on treaty (December 2009)
• Submit follow-on treaty to Senate for advice and consent (end of 2009?)
• Ask Senate to reconsider CTBT (2010?)
• Convene global nuclear security conference (March 2010)
• Convene NPT RevCon (May 2010)
• Push for more action on FMCT (ongoing, no definite deadline)
• Complete major goals of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (2012)
Council on Foreign Relations
Remaining Challenges• Desirability and feasibility of nuclear
disarmament
• Linkage between nuclear and conventional disarmament (Article VI of the NPT)
• Technical verification issues
• Political confidence building measures
• Geopolitical conditions that would be necessary to move seriously toward nuclear disarmament
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