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SUBMISSION No 15
1039
I ~!'(! 617
C.A.V. Bourne
Yours sincerely
G. P. CAPT. C.A.V. BOURNEMBE AE (ret'd)86 Wattle StreetTUART HILL WA 6060Telephone: 0893442248
'lr/ l/ !Q7
I. "The Fairey Battle Cover-up"2. "The Trocas Cover-up"3. "A Packet of Lucky Strikes?"4. The DVA Involvement.5. The R.S.L. Involvement.
Please find enclosed the following papers which I submit as evidence to theInquiry into the Circumstances of the Sinking ofHMAS Sydney:
Dear Ms Towner
~. Joa~~wner(~~. ~etary\~~~ence Sub-Committee on\ Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade
Parliament HouseCANBERRA ACT 2600
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PINQ.SUBS.005.0080
THE LOSS OF HMAS SYDNEY
THE FAIREY BATTLE COVER-U~
BY GP CAPT C.A.V. BOURNE
2
(1) RAAF Pearce had its own two yellow and black Fairey Battles and did
not need any extra help from Geraldton.
(II) To carry a crew of two; as stated it would be necessary to remove the
winch, boom and metal drum holding 100 yards of steel cable with the
aid of a light crane. Without this equipment, it could not tow drogues.
My accusations are based on the following facts:
The Unit History Sheet (Commanding Officer's Monthly Report) for the month
of November 1941 of No 4 Service Flying Training School (No 4 SFTS) based
at Geraldton, Western Australia during World War II shows the following
entries:
Future researchers of the loss of HMAS Sydney would probably accept these
entries at face value unless they were familiar with target towing Fairey Battles
and the military circumstances pertaining at that time. In this regard, I wish to
point out that I have flown Fairey Battles and towed drogues in Hudsons using
identical equipment and techniques. I also served in No 14 Sqn Pearce and
took part as a pilot in air searches firstly for the raider Steirmark, then HMAS
Sydney and finally for the survivors of the alleged battle between these two
ships and I unequivocally aver that these entries are false and an attempt at
deliberately covering up the real purpose of this flight on this day.
23.11.97
27.11.41
FlO DALY Battle aircraft L5175 Crew 2, departed to
Pearce on target towing duties.
and
FlO DN DALY Battle aircraft L5775 returned from
duty at Pearce.
(III) According to the C.O. of No. 14 Sqn Wg Cdr Lightfoot's Monthly
Report for November 1941 No. 14 Sqn had completed its air to air firing
training in the period of 11-22 November 1941. It was common practice
for No. 25 Sqn to complete its air to air training at the same time to
make maximum use of the target towing Fairey Battle during the
gazzetted and media publicised period of using the Lake Pinjar Air to
Air Gunnery Range for live firing so there was no RAAF Pearce
requirement in the forthcoming week. In addition all 14 Sqn's Hudsons
and 25 Sqn's Wirraways were absent in Geraldton, Carnarvon and
Onslow. At this time there was only one unserviceable Hudson and one
unserviceable Wirraway at Pearce. FIt Lt. (Flaps) McDonald was busy
recovering a crashed Wirraway and the only other No. 25 Sqn pilot Sgt
Pilot Gordon White was in Station Sick Quarters.
(IV) HMAS Wyrallah, Yandra, Heros and Olive Cam sailed on the HMAS
Sydney search on the night of 24/2S1h November so they were
unavailable to undergo AiA firing at sea if it was so desired.
(V) The fleet auxiliary tanker HMAS Karumba and the small HMAS Alfie
Cam were the only two naval vessels remaining in Fremantle, Alfie Cam
was undergoing repairs and was unseaworthy at the time. John Doohan,
a seaman on the Karumba. said that neither was ship put to sea during
the week of 23_301h November 1941.
1040 1041
PINQ.SUBS.005.0081
3
(VI) Targets were never towed for heavy NA practice. Falling nose cones
and shrapnel over built up areas precluded this and it was two dangerous
for the aircraft. Heavy AlA fire was notoriously inaccurate.
(VIl) The Volunteer Defence Corps in the Perth Metropolitan area did not
receive and train on Bofors guns until after Japan entered the War, so
they too are ruled out.
What then did this yellow and black Fairey Battle do on this day?
In his interrogation Capt Detmers said that on Sunday morning the 23rd
November 1941 he and the crew of his lifeboat saw the Aquitania 5 nms away.
Lt Bunje in Gosseln's lifeboat saw the Aquitania 8 runs away. Both Detmers
and Bunje said that in the afternoon both lifeboats were circled by a strange
yellow and black aircraft. Bunje said that it was a bomber. This aircraft had
red, white and blue RAAF roundels prominently pointed above and below each
wing and or each side of the fuselage aft of the cockpit so it was obviously a
military aircraft.
This event occurred 318.5 nms on a bearing of 322°T from Geraldton or 149.5R~ 0
ms on a be~ng of 277 T from Carnarvon.. In the absence of any Search and
Rescue facilities, single engined aircrafts did not fly so far out to sea for fun on
a Sunday afternoon. The implication is that when the Aquintania stopped to
pick up 26 German survivors at that position, having been thus alerted and by
the use of the lookout's big binoculars, the bridge telescope and the powerful
optics in its range finder, it sighted both lifeboats and broke radio silence to
report their presence and South Western Area Combined Headquarters had
dispatched this Fairey Battle secretly to confirm their presence in this position.
The ACNB had steadfastly denied that Aquitania broke radio silence. The
ACNB stand condemned from the mouths of these German officers. If the
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4
ACNB and Australian Government accepted the German version of the alleged
battle between the HMAS Sydney and the HSK Kormoran then they must also
accept their account of being circled on that afternoon by an obviously military
aircraft.
There are other anomalies in this same Unit History Record. It shows that Fit
Lt Payne took off from Geraldton in Avro Anson W2129 at 9545 hrs WST on
the 2ih November 1941 on Track NoiofSearch G1/27 with a Datum ofLat 270
"32'S Long 1130 53'E on a leg of 150 nms. The report goes onto state that FLT
LT Payne landed in aircraft W2124 at 1025rs WST and reported an "oil stain"
between datum 270 00' - 1130 32'E and Coast. The odd thing is that he landed
in a different aircraft number to that which he took off - tricky business in mid
air. There is no record of him landing and changing aircraft at Carnarvon.
Similarly, there is no record in SWACH,ACH or Intelligence Reports of FLT
LT Payne's "oil stain" sighting. All three documents record the oil patch
sighting by the two Catalinas but not its sighting by Wg Cdr Lightfoot in
Hudson A16-62 which saw HMAS Wyrallah searching 30 runs South of the oil
patch on Friday 28th November 1941. This is recorded only in No.1 4 Sqns
Operations Record Book for November 1941. I believe it is possible that this
_"oil stain" entry was imposed to cloud the oil patch issue. The ACH report
says that the Captain of HMAS Wyrallah when he couldn't find the oil patch
considered that it could have been a cloud shadow. Both 2 RAAF pilots and 1
USN pilot who saw this oil patch were very experienced maritime
reconnaissance pilots who had seen many oil patches in their time and also
knew what cloud shadows on the ocean looked like, whereas Lt Cdr
Levingstone was a RANR officer, who had possibly limited experience in
command of a small ship 200 nms to seaward.
This report was signed on the last page by Gp Capt Heffernan, whom I knew.
He would not be averse to maintaining secrecy on this Fairey Battle Flight but
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PINQ.SUBS.005.0082
5
being aware of all the circumstances above he would have been reluctant to
sign a report containing such an easily contradicted story. He was probably
acting on the personal telephoned orders of Air Cdre De La Ru early on Sunday
morning the 23rd November 1941. Telephones fitted with scramblers ie
"secraphone" were commonly used in the absence of any wrr facility at No 4
SFTS, HQWA SWACH and ACH. The need for secrecy would have been
stressed but "Paddy Heffernan" would not have signed such a woeful Unit
History Sheet. The format for the Commanding Officer's Monthly Report was
laid down in Air Board Administrative Orders (ABO "A's") which were an
extension of Air Force Orders (AFO's). This No 4 SFTS report did not meet
these requirements.
In conclusion, I submit that this report was "doctored" at a later date by a very
ill informed person in an effort to conceal the revealing flight by a Fairey Battle
on Sunday 23rd November 1941. It would be necessary to make some record of
the flight because there would be other records elsewhere ego Flight
Authorisation Book, Daily Servicing Schedule Form ££/77 and Pilots Flying
Log Book.
C.A.V. Bourne
I~/I//97
1044
THE LOSS OF HMAS SYDNEY
THE TROCAS COVER-UP
BY GP CAPT C.A.V. BOURNE
AT 1500 hrs WST on Monday 24 th November 1941 the Shell tanker Trocas
rescued a raft at Lat 24°06' Long 111°40' with 25 Germans aboard. This
position was 321 runs on a bearing of 330° from Geraldton or 119 nms on a
bearing of293° from Carnarvon.
Captain Sam Bryant sent First Mate R.V. Robson to supervise the transfer of
these POW's from raft to ship. They were brought on board singly and
searched singly for arms only and were allowed to keep other possessions
including diaries. They were then immediately confined under guard in an
empty oil tank which had flooring made up of wooden planks.
Barbara Winter at page 147 of her book "HMAS Sydney Fact, Fantasy and
Fraud" relates the above details which I accept only because they are
con'oborated by official Australian documentation and she interviewed the
Germans involved but 1 do not accept her other comments here or elsewhere in
her book on this incident.
"HOW DID TROCAS HAPPEN TO HAVE AN EMPTY OIL TANK WITH
FLOORING OF WOODEN PLANKS READY FIT AND SAFE FOR
IMMEDIATE HUMAN HABITATION AT THIS TIME?"
"HAD SHE BEEN FOREWARNED BY SIGNAL FROM THE ACNB OF
THE PRESENCE OF 25 ENEMY IN A LIFE RAFT IN THIS PRECISE
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PINQ.SUBS.005.0083
2
LOCATION AND THUS BEEN ASSURED OF A CERTAIN RESCUE TO
JUSTIFY ALL THIS PREPARATOR WORK?"
Before examining these questions let us look at the booklet, "No Survivors"
published by the West Australian. A photograph of this area of the Trocas
shows a German sailor being carried by an Australian soldier from the oil tank.
John Doohan who served as a merchant seaman on board the RAN oil tanker
HMAS Karumba has closely examined this photograph and concludes that this
was a wing tank, not a central tank. The Trocas also had a starboard fly over
bridge and was riding fairly high in the water which meant she was sailing
"light".
When Trocas sailed from Palembang her oil load would have been evenly
distributed through all tanks to ensure stability under all sea conditions. It is
most unlikely that she would have one empty wing tank even if counter
balanced by an empty wing tank on the opposite side of the ship. Such an
arrangement could place undue structural stress on the bulk heads.
Winter goes on to say that two inured men Marwinski and Lensch were placed
in the sick quarters leaving 23 men in the oil tank. It would require a wooden
platfonn of approximately 16ft by 18 feet allowing a space of 6ft by 2ft for
each man. They were going to spend 3 nights sleeping in this area and spend
daylight hours sitting and eating on this platform. Food and water would have
been supplied in buckets and buckets used for toilet purposes.
To empty an oil tank on the Trocas would require hundreds of tons of oil to be
transferred by pumping to top up part filled tanks of the same type of oil and
obtain a even distribution throughout the ship. Under normal circumstances an
empty tank would be chipped and scraped at this stage to remove rust and dirt
sediment before thoroughly hosed out and washed with sea water. Due to the
urgency of the situation on this occasion the scraping and chipping of the tank
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3
undoubtedly would have been dispensed with but the tank would still have to
be thoroughly washed out to remove all oil traces. It would then be necessary
to place sails on the ventilators of the empty tank to allow the wind to remove
all toxic fumes from the tank before crew could enter to to lay the wooden
platform. The Trocas like all ships would have carried stout wooden planks
about 12-15ft long, 10-12 ins wide and 2 ins thick, bound at each end by steel
straps. These were normally used hung over the side to scrap and paint the
hull.
Only now would the tank be ready for human habitation and it is estimated that
the whole procedure would take about 10-12 hours. To counter balance the
ship it was probably necessary to empty a wing tank on the opposite side but
this could be done at leisure.
Of course, the oil could simply have been dumped at sea and there were no
"Greenies" or Environmentalists to protest over such action but this was
Wartime and every drop of oil was precious. In fact, it was unusual for a
tanker to sail not fully laden, although, it could have been carrying a specific
order for the RAN or for a civilian buyer.
How then could the Trocus have been forewarned by the ACNB to take all this
action necessary 10-12 hours before the rescue and also be directed to the exact
position. of a life raft several hundreds of miles fonn the WA Coast.
I have told in my booklet "HMAS Sydney Forum 1997 - The Bourne Papers"
of a secret Dutch Military Signals Unit based in the Port Hotel Carnarvon
which was listening into all the radio traffic in the north eastern Indian Ocean.
In my paper, "Detmers' Contingency Plan", I have told how the Gennan rafts,
life boats. cutters and motor torpedo boat were communicating with each other
by radio advising their positions with the common goal of capturing a ship.
10·17
PINQ.SUBS.005.0084
4
rounding up all the survivors at sea or ashore and sailing to a safe haven such
as the Carolines. This information was being passed by the NEI listening post
to the ACNB by secure means not by radio transmissions.
I allege that the ACNB through the agency of the NEI listening post was aware
of the up to date position of each German raft and boat (see my papers, "A
Packet ofLucky Strikes").
I further allege that in a series of signals that the ACNB was communicating
with the Trocas in merchant shipping code before the rescue and that the
ADNB using naval code and a naval frequency requested C in C China
(Singapore) to dispatch a signal advising:
PICKED UP 25 GERMANS 0700Z
24 II 24065 11140E
which the ACNB received at 1816K, ie, 1616 WST.
Officially, this was to be known as the first information that the ACNB had
received of naval action in this area and was a cover up for the fact that the
ACNB had received signals from HMAS Sydney on the evening of Wednesday
19th
November 1941 and were aware that Sydney and her crew were destroyed.
My paper ("A Bad Radio Area") covers the myth created by Barbara Winter
and subsequently by Journalists, Historians and Authors. This was purely a
smoke screen to cover the supposed failure of Coastal Radio OTC Geraldton
and other radio stations to pick up the signals of Trocas and the two QQQQ
signals of Kormoran and Sydney's final signal "Calling Darwin on fire fozt'and
aft abandoning ship". The preliminary signals of the ACNB and Trocas
together with Geraldton's copying of those signals are either buried in the
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morass of signals still held unsorted by the Australian Archives in Melbourne
or even destroyed at that time.
Leading writer Mason, in his papers placed in the Mitchell Library 1981, tells
that the destruction of signals at the ship to shore radio station HMAS Harman
Canberra began on the morning ofThursday 20th November 1941 following the
receipt of signals received from HMAS Sydney the previous evening.
Finally, I allege that all this Trocas activity was to cover up the fact that
Aquitania had broken radio silence some 33 hours earlier to advise that she too
had picked up a raft (see my paper HMT Aquitania 2nd Edition) and had not
ordered an immediate large scale sea and air search on Sunday 23rd November
1941. This wasting and filling in of time since the actual sinking of HMAS
Sydney on the evening of Wednesday 19th Novmeber 1941 is a complex issue
best told by SRG researcher John Doohan in his "Scenario". In brief nothing
was to be seen or discovered to prevent the sailing of the Japanese Fleet on
Wednesday the 26th November 1941 for the attack on Pearl Harbour which
would bring the USA into World War 2 as planned by Churchill and
Rooseveldt.
Preservation of the secrecy of the breaking of the Japanese Main Fleet Code
JN25 was paramount and absolute and remained so for all of World War 2.
The sinking ofHMAS Sydney was just a small hiccup in the strategic planning
of these two World War 2 leaders. She and her 645 Australian crew were
expendable in their eyes and in the "Grand Design" as were the 3000 men in
Hawaii and the Australian Slh Division in Malaya.
1049
PINQ.SUBS.005.0085
THE LOSS OF HMAS SYDNEY
"A PACKET OF LUCKY STRIKES?"
BY GP CAPT C.A.V. BOURNE
Appendices: Pages 8, 9, & 10 - No 14 Squadron Pearce Operation Record Book
Senior RAAF Maritime pilots and officials of the Search and Rescue
Organisation, Canberra will know only too well the difficulties of aerial and sea
searches for lifeboats and rafts several hundred miles from a remote coastline
with little or no knowledge of their approximate positions. This was the
situation at the beginning and for most of the time of the search for HMAS
Sydney in November 1941, the greatest search in Australian history involving
21 ships and 33 aircraft.
They could also assist in any inquiry into the loss of HMAS Sydney assessing
the statistical possibilities and probabilities of the allegations I am about to
make in this paper which aims to show that luck played no part in the
interceptions and rescues of German rafts and lifeboats but that their up to the
minute exact locations were known to the RAAF and RAN enabling rescue
ships and aircraft to "hit the nail on the head". Each case will be dealt with in
detail later but they are summarised here as a preliminary guide:
2
Throughout this paper I must refer to previous papers printed in my booklet,
"HMAS Sydney Forum 1997 - The Bourne Papers". These are held in the
Australian Archives in all States, Australian War Museum, RAN and RAAF
Historical Sections, W.A. Battye Library, W.A. Maritime Museums and all
W.A. Port Libraries. They have also been submitted as evidence to the 1997
"Inquiry into the circumstances of the sinking ofHMAS Sydney" by the "Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign affairs, Defend and Trade - Defence Sub
Committee".
For preliminary reading, it is necessary to read my papers "RAAF, PMG and
Allies Direction Finding and Radio Intercept" and "Detmers Contingency
Plan". It is emphasised that powerful RAAF MIF and HFfDF stations based at
RAAF Pearce Darwin Townsville and Sale were reading and taking bearings
on all German and Japanese maritime radio signals transmitted from the
Eastern and North Eastern Indian Ocean during 1940-41. In all the books and
media articles written on the loss of HMAS Sydney and in all the official
records, all mention of this subject has been taboo. There is one mention and
one mention only of Direction Finding in the South Western Area Combined
Headquarters (SWACH) Operations Record Logbook at page 110 is the
following entry, "Nothing sighted during the afternoon air search which was
cut short when Trocas reported her position (.) DIF bearing supported position
(.)".
(1) 23.11.41
(2) 24.11.41
(3) 25.11.41
(4) 25.11.41
(5) 27.11.41
(6) 27.11.41
(7) 28.11.41
"Aquitania" rescued a life raft.
"Trocas" rescued a life raft.
FIt Lt Goode sighted Gosseln's lifeboat.
FIt Lt Cook sighted lifeboats ashore.
"Koolinda" rescued on lifeboat.
"Centaur" rescued lifeboat.
"HMAS Yandra" rescued a lifeboat.
1050
My same papers tell of a powerful secret NEI Military Signals Radio Listening
Post located in the Port Hotel Carnarvon. This was manned by six well
educated Javanese WIT Operators who were multi-lingual. They could all
read, write and speak English, Dutch, German and Japanese. These six
Warrant Officers were under the command ofW. Off. Soena~.
The next paper to be read should be "Detmers Contingency Plan", in which it is
alleged that the rafts, lifeboats, cutters and motor torpedo boat were
communicating with each other by radio in their plan to capture a ship. recover
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3
as many German survivors as possible and sail to a safe haven such as the
Japanese Carolines.
It is alleged that the NEI Signals Post was picking up these German messages
giving details of their positions at sea or ashore and their rescues and passing
this information to the ACNB. At the same time this intelligence was being
duplicated by the RAAF DIF stations and confirmed by their bearings. The
secret PMG DIF station in Sydney was closed down after the Kormoran was
sank and played no part in this aftermath.
THE AQUITANIA RESCUE
This has been well covered in my paper lIMT Aquitania (2nd
Edition). In brief,
this giant 45000 ton troopship sailed under standing orders never to stop at sea
yet she did stop to pick up 26 survivors from a life raft at Lat 240
35'S Long
1100 57'E. There were two German lifeboats fully loaded 5 - 8 oms away,
which made no effort to attract attention. It is alleged that the Aquitania was
diverted by ACNB radio to this nest of German survivors whose position was
known from radio intercepts ordered to stoop and rescue the raft only. It is
further alleged that the ACNB and the Aquitania were in radio communication
from then on until her arrival in Sydney on the 28th
November 1941.
THE TROCUS RESCUE
The Shell tanker Trocas stopped at Lat 24° 06'8 Long 1110
40'E to pick up a
raft containing 25 survivors. They came on board singly and searched before
being confined immediately in an empty oil tank with a prepared wooden
platform serving as a clean floor. The question is, how did the Trocas happen
to have an empty tank prepared in this manner ready for secure confinement of
German survivors? My paper "The Trocas Cover Up" deals with this question.
It is alleged that the ACNB was in radio communication with the Trocas 10-12
hours before the rescue to enable her to make the necessary preparations for a
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4
virtually guaranteed rescue at an exact time and position. It is also submitted
that this was a situation contrived with the Trocas and C in C China
(Singapore) to cover-up Aquitania's breaking radio silence between 6 - 7 am
WST the previous day, Sunday 23 rd November 1941.
FLT LT GOODE'S SIGHTING OF GOOSELNS LIFEBOAT
The attached pages 8, 9 and 10 of No 14 Sqn's Operations Logbook can be
confusing as the entries are not in chronological order and there are many
anomalies. I believe this was intended to cloud several cover-ups in these three
pages. It is dangerous for the uninformed reader or researcher to accept these 3
and all other pages of this Operations Logbook at face value. I only intend to
deal with cover-ups and vital features because "I was there" and know the
facts.
Hudson Search P1I25 was carried out on Tuesday, 25th November 1941 fromSF'7'S
No 4.tf:¥S Geraldton. I present the following table of data in a simplified form
extracted from the attached three pages:
TROC/S A1CNo PILOT T.O. LDG
PI I A16-7 Wg Cdr Lighfoot 0445 0910 WST
PI2 A16-45 Fit Lt Learmonth 0505 0940 WST
P13 A16-62 Fit Lt Goode 0430 0915 WST
** PI4 A16-30 Fit Lt Fletcher 0425 0625 WST
** PI5 A16-12 FIt Lt Cook 0615 1215 WST
* PI6 A16-36 FIt Lt Nichols 0415 1930 WST
* Pl7 A16·60 Fit Lt Forman 0410 0800 WST
* Both ale had engine failure, returned to Geraldton but completed Tracks 6
and 7 later.
** Did not complete Tracks 4 and 5. A16-30 made two attempts but
returned to Geraldton with engine failure. Cook A 16-12 flew direct to
Red Bluff(see account later). This entry is a blatant cover up.
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PINQ.SUBS.005.0087
5
It will be seen from the above table that only Wg Cdr Lighfoot, Fit Lt
Leannonth and Fit Lt Goode on Tracks 1,2 and 3 on the extreme western or
seaward search legs completed the search according to schedule. The eastern
Tracks 6 and 7 were completed later. The two middle Tracks 4 and 5 were
never completed leaving a vast gap in the search pattern although all tracks
were shown on the official RAAF Track Chart (Australian Archives Victoria
File No MP 1049/5 RAAF File 2026/2/451). My paper, "RAN and RAAF
Search Charts", reports cover-ups in these charts.
So that Fit Lt Goode in A16-62 CIS P13 Track 3 was the only searcher nearest
the middle of the search pattern. The entries on page 106 of the SWACH
Operations Record Book are significant:
QUOTE
0724 [WST] Received NR6 fr Pearce = Pl3 sighted lifeboat 24°52'S
111 0 09'E.
0725 [WST] SIN Darnels phone Pearce = instructed them to call for
amplifYing report.
0745 [WST] Signaled CWR lifeboat sighted 24°52'S lIl o09'E at 2307Z!24
= 23422.
NOTE: It is considered that the Herstein sighted in position 26°08'S
II1 0 50'E at 22372 should be diverted to pick up the lifeboat.
There were no naval officers on duty to arrange this.
0825 WST Received NRI2 fr Pearce = Pl3P lifeboat full using white coats
as sails have lost touch vis bad searching am returning to base
Carnarvon 00092/25 00.
9839 WST Received NRI6 fr Pearce P13 P lifeboat course East 3 knots =
00322/25.
UNQUOTE
1054
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6~1!:
This then was Goode's sighting. It was obvious that 4be only had a brief
sighting in bad weather possiblrin a rainsquall and then lost the lifeboat again.
On the adjacent leg, PI2 Fit Lt Learmonth was reporting visibility 8 oms
negative sightings.
According to Barbara Winter, the Herstein was directed to Goode's signaled
original sighting position but Goode then amended this position and Herstein
was not so informed. I can find no detailed reasoning in RAAF records for
this. The normal procedure for RAAF patrols to seaward was to check the
position of landfall and back plot to any sighting position and then amend it if
necessary. He landed at 0915 hrs WST and probably made land fall 10 - 15
.minutes earlier south of Steep Point or on Dirk Hartog Island but the actual
spot is unknown.
The original lifeboat position would no doubt have been based on Dead
Reckoning and Astro-Navigation. Once having found a lifeboat in bad weather
conditions the sensible thing to do would be to call for D/F bearings which
would have fixed his then position to within about I nm then back plot theet:
distant to the lifeboat and send a more accurate position report.
My query, at this stage, is how did Goode find a lifeboat in such bad weather
conditions that he lost it again. I speculate that he was instructed to search a
certain position. I cannot prove this as the RAAF Pearce Signals Log prior to
the 151 December 1941 is missing. I suggest the reader return to this conjecture
after reading this paper and assessing the situation as a whole.
FLT LT COOK'S SIGHTING OF TWO LIFEBOATS ON COAST
The entry of Fit Lt Cook, double starred above, is a most obvious and blatant
cover-up. Records show that about 9 am Tuesday 25 November 1941 he
sighted Lt Cdr Bretschneider's lifeboat at Red Bluff and soon after he sighted
CPO Kohn's lifeboat at the 20 mile wel1 near Quobba. Upon landing Fit Lt
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PINQ.SUBS.005.0088
7
Sharp contacted the local Manager of Dalety's, Herbert Sharp, who organised 3
trucks and informed Police Sergeant Anderson. Soon after Cook joined
Sergeant Anderson, Dr Piccles and Mr Snook in a utility, heading northward.
About an hour later Keith Baston from Quobba stopped the utility told Fit Lt
Cook he had been recalled to the airfield and then drove him back there.
There can be no doubt that Cook was not flying on a 6 hour flight on leg 5 of
Search PII25 but this involves another cover up involving the departure from
Geraldton. Whilst all other aircraft took off between 0410 and 0505 hrs WST,S
Cook waited until 061,4 hrs.
Page 8 attached shows that Fit Lt Nicholas took off from Pearce at 0345 hrs
WST on the 25th and landed at Geraldton at 0500 hrs. In addition, to the crew
shown this aircraft was carrying FIt Lt Menear, the Senior RAAF Pearce
Operations Officer, a clerk, an airframe and engine fitters plus operations
equipment. It is alleged that at some time during the night Gp Cpt Heffeman or
Wg Cdr Lightfoot received an urgent telephone call from either Air Cdre De La
Rue, Wg Cdr Mclean or Wg Cdr Fleming giving instructions that either he, Wg
Cdr Lighfoot, or a Fit Cdr should await the arrival of Fit Lt Nicholas' aircraft
as they were carrying special instructions which, for security reasons, could not
be passed and explained over the telephone. Pure conjecture, of course, at this
stage.
But the fact is that Fit Cook in Hudson A16-22 took off at 0615 and flying at
140 kts reached Red Bluff either directly or along a coastal search in a flight
time of 2 hrs 15 minutes, probably making land fall on the coastline north of
Red Bluff and then flying southward and "luckily" found two lifeboats. The
information received by him at Geraldton was obviously so important that he
never carried out his Search Track No 5 even though, at that stage, three
aircraft had returned to Geraldton with engine trouble and might be unable to
continue possibly leaving 4 search legs missing. Quite obviously, Cook was
informed that there were two lifeboats ashore north of Carnarvon.
, 105(;
8
From whence did this information come. There were 3 possible sources:
(I) The NEI Signals Unit at the Port Hotel Carnarvon had received their
radioed landing message to the other German boats.
(II) RAAF DIF had fixed their positions by bearings taken on these positions
by bearings taken on these radioed landing signals.
(III) Someone saw both boats, reported their presence through Intelligence
channels, possibly Army Intelligence. It is known that they had white
four-wheel drive vehicles with powerful radio receivers and transmitters
patrolling the coastal strip as far north as the Kimberleys, avoiding
civilisation but making rendezvous with small army patrols and
informers. These units were highly secret. It is significant when the
Navy were interrogating the German POW's a Senior Naval Captain
made the comment, "Keep the Army out of this."
However, the cover-up in the 14 Sqn Operations Log continues on page 9. Fit
Nicholas in Hudson A16-95 is shown taking off at 0510 Le. 10 minutes after he
had landed at Geraldton heading cross country for Carnarvon a 2 hour flight.
He then retumed to Geraldton and FIt Lt Fletcher and I saw him at lunchtime in
the Officer's mess. The record shows him as landing at 1700 a ridiculous
figure i.e. officially he carried out a 12 hour-flight, whereas the normal planned
endurance flight time of a Hudson was 6 hours and none of the aircraft were
using internal long-range tanks. They were all in storage at Pearce.
At page 10, attached, it will be seen that at 1305 hrs WST Fit Lt Fletcher and I
took off in Hudson A16-30 on a square search but for the tanker Trocas not to
locate HMAS Sydney and ship's boats as shown in the remarks column. For
the third time that day, we returned unserviceable on one engine: this was
becoming a habit. Then at 1520 hrs the same day Fit Lt Nicholas took off on a
square search for the Tanker Trocas, once again not to locate HMAS Sydney
and ship's boats. He was recalled to Geraldton before reaching the datum
point. Unbeknown. to us, the Trocas had radioed its position.1057
PINQ.SUBS.005.0089
9
The point is that the Trocas should have been sighted earlier that morning by
Hudsons on Search P/25, but it was at the southern end of Tracks 4 & 5, which
were not carried out by Fletcher and Cook. Why disguise the fact by false
entries that we were to square search for the Trocas not the Sydney. The
ACNB was obviously worried that the German paws might have captured the
Trocas before HMAS Wyrallah had reached and placed an armed guard aboard.
She had obviously missed an agreed radio schedule.
KOOLINDA RESCUES LIFEBOAT
In my paper titled, "Detmers Contingency Plan", I wrote of how Fit Lt Cook in
Hudson A16-62 CIS P24 whilst on Search P2/26 sighted Kuhl's lifeboat at
0734 hrs WST on Wednesday 26th November 1941 in position Lat 20° 14'S
Long ll2° 24'E steering 07SOT at about 1.7 kts. At 1405 hrs WST, it was
picked up by the Koolinda at Lat 24° 07'S Long 112° 47'E. So that in about 11
hrs after altering Course 4° to Port it had covered 22.15 nms and a course of
071or. Koolinda in fact picked her up only 3-4 nms north ofwhere Kuhl's boat
would have been had she maintained as course of 0750T but this was in near
darkness. Before Captain John Airey would take them aboard he made the
Germans throw a considerable number of arms overboard. They came on
board singly and were searched singly for arms and an Atlas confiscated and
they were confined under guard in No 2 orlop deck.
Later in the darkness at 2215 hrs Koolinda challenged an unknown ship which
did not reply. This recovery is reasonable, Kuhl's latest lifeboat position could
have been calculated closely by DNOWA and Koolinda directed to it. On the
other hand if it had been transmitted by radio to other German craft both the
NEI Military Signals Listening Post at Carnarvon and the RAAF DIF Stations
could have fixed its position exactly.
THE CENTAUR LIFEBOAT RESCUE
1058
10
This is the most powerful and damming evidence that the lifeboats were
communicating by radio and that their signals were being picked up by the NEI
Signals Listening Post at Carnarvon and by RAAF DIF stations. These boats
were using modem powerful Tele-funken portable radios. Fit Lt Cook sighted
Detmers' lifeboat at 0648 H126 at Lat 24° 39'S 112° 02'E on a course of 090T
i.e. due east travelling at 1.7 kts. Fit Lt Learmonth in a Hudson. Fit Lt Wintert/v--(CHIN$c)N
in a Gannet and Lt Gftrfiifler DSN in a Catalina failed to relocate this lifeboat
particularly because of the foul weather in this area and they were searching
eastward of Detmers last seen position based on his sighted heading. But
Detmers had carried out a 'D' tum after Cook~ aircraft had left the area and
headed due west on a course of 2700r for a period of IS % hours at a speed of
1.7 kts so that he was at a distance of 26.2 nm west of his sighting by Cook.
Had he continued on his easterly course at the same speed he would have been
26.2 nms east of his sighted position as plotted by DNOWA. So that Centaur
picked up Detmers' lifeboat 52 Y2 runs west of where it was calculated to have
been. Such a move could never have been foreseen by the Navy and the only
way of knowing his actual position in the darkness at 10:30 pm was by RAAF
DlFandtheNEI.vNI-r~ IN'1'~~Ci::P1' f>F De1'mI!R'S Rfl./)IO"f'R,qN&Il7IS~10N'f>
In his book, "The Raider Kormoran", Detmers wrote that he fired two red flares
to attract attention. Barbara Winter in her book copied this statement. Both 2nd
mate Eric Greenwood and ship's Doctor Habberfield are still alive and I have
interviewed and corresponded with them. Both said they were on the poop
deck and did not see any red flares but that the Centaur came alongside the
lifeboat in the darkness and heard voices.
Military intereept of Detmers radio trtmsmissj€}fis a.ul Gosseln's lifeboat was
still at large. A capture of the Centaur by Detmers was still possible or of a
tanker by Gosseln was also possible. It would only take a seaman with a knife
at a Captain or seaman's throat to take a hostage and the ship would be theirs.
1059
PINQ.SUBS.005.0090
II
Detmers' lifeboat rescue provides clear intentions of their plan to evade rescue
and to capture a ship. They were thwarted by allied interception of their radio
signals. which are thus confirmed.
HMAS YANDRA'S RESCUE OF A LIFEBOAT
Fit Lt Goode orignally sighted Gosseln's lifeboat 160-180 nms out to sea and
lost it in bad weather conditions before it was eventually re-sighted by FIt Lt
Rooke in Anson W2049 on search Gl/27 at 1015H/27 at Lat 25°S 04'S Long
112 04°E and thus had covered a distance of 108.8 nms in 58.25 hrs at 1.87 kts
on a track of096"T since Goode's sighting.
Goode flew to HMAS Yandra and the tanker Herstein some 15 nms away and
signaled his instruction to follow him in the direction of the boats by the
traditional way of repeating low level flights in the direction and waggling his
wings till they got the message and this would have eventually got them in
about 1 Y:z hours at 10 knots to the sighted position.
But Yandra picked up Gosseln's lifeboat at 1157HJ27 at Lat 24° 59°8 Long 112
OO'E which meant it had altered course 23° to Starboard and increased her speed
from 1.87 kts to 10.06 kts and this in a clinker built boat with only a lug sail in
the face ofa fresh south east wind with only a few inches of freeboard and with
72 men aboard.
In his initial sighting report at 1I34HJ28 Rooke had mentioned another small
patrol vessel steering a course approximately to position. Rooke was a flying
instructor unskilled in maritime reconnaissance and ship recognition. It is
claimed that this small patrol vessel was in fact the German torpedo boat still'10
afloat, which towed Gosseln's lifeboat at 10 kts for 4!5 minutes, transferred 20 -
30 survivors aboard the lifeboat. and was then, scuttled. Normal torpedo crews
were aboard this lifeboat.
1060
12
The Centaur, Yandra and Trocas rescues provide the strongest evidence that the
German boats and rafts were communicating by radio and that their messages
were being intercepted and the information used to direct allied ships and
aircraft to intercept them. The Aquitania, Koolinda rescues and Goode's
intercept also support this theory when all rescues are regarded as whole.
Mr Makin, the Navy Minister at the time of the loss of HMAS, is reported as
saying, "The Germans were the only eye witnesses of the battle". These words
may be politically correct, but there were other witnesses. They wore
earphones, listened to loud speakers and gazed into Cathode Ray Tubes. This
was electronic warfare, all knowledge of which has been suppressed and
withheld from researchers and the Australian public. This secrecy was
necessary and acceptable in Wartime, but is not fifty-six years after the event.
C.A.V. Bourne
/3{ "(q7
lOG 1
PINQ.SUBS.005.0091
i\pl'endi:c "A tI
OPERATIONS RECORD DOOK
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Appendix _~~~~'-__
OPEHATIONS HECORD DOOK
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PINQ.SUBS.005.0092
'. ('~. ,. ~. ~ ... 't' .- " ... " lin ' •
THE LOSS OF HMAS SYDNEY
At the first meeting of the HMAS Sydney Forum 1997 Committee I was
appointed to approach the Department of Veteran Affairs to seek their
assistance in mounting the Forum.
Accordingly, in October 1997 I approached Jim Dalton the W.A. DeputyA.
Director and mad~ tentative request for assistance. I pointed out that the topic
was controversial and had possibly sensitive, political implications. I said this
because I did not wish him to prejudice his personal position by such an
involvement. However, I guessed that he might wish to confer with his
colleagues in Canberra and may be get the pennission of his Secretary and even
that of the Minister of OVA.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRSINVOVLEMENT
BY GP CAPT C.A.V. BOURNE
At a second meeting a few weeks later Jim Dalton agreed to provide assistance
and it was agreed that a third meeting would take place at which one of his
officers Paul DuDumas would be present as would John Doohan the Secretary
of the Forum 1997 Committee when a broad idea of our requirements would be
presented. At this meeting it was agreed that either Mike Scaffidi or Mike
Wade would assist in the provision of materials for a static display of
documents, photographs and the model of HMAS Perth. a Leander Class
Cruiser, identical to the Sydney.
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It was also agreed that the OVA representative would make an audio recording
of the proceedings of both days of the Forum to be held on Saturday and
10C5
PINQ.SUBS.005.0093
2
Sunday the 1st and 2nd February 1997 and would provide a typed transcript of
these proceedings.
Later on Dr Mike McCarthy Curator of the Fremantle Maritime museum
promised to make 15 copies of this transcript together with copies of the papers
submitted by speakers at the Forum. This would provide for a limited
distribution, which was to have included in several Federal Government
Departments particularly that of the Minister of Defence. In January and
March 1997 John Doohan corresponded with the Minister's staff who indicated
the Minister would welcome a copy and the Forum Committee was anxious
that this should be forwarded at an early date.
Mike Wade subsequently gave wonderful assistance in the provision of a
collapsible mobile screen with documents and photographs suitably titled and
with explanatory notes. He also made an audio recording of the first day's
proceedings, which occupied 6 hours. The Sunday proceedings last only 5
hours when the Chairman, Gwynne Williams, closed the meeting at 3 pm as a
result of a preplanned attempt to hijack the Forum by associates and members
of the HMAS Sydney Foundation Trust Inc who were scattered strategically
throughout the audience of some 200 researchers and interested public (This is
a non air-conditioned hall with a temperature of41°C).
The meeting concluded in disarray, as a result, no question period took place
and no resolutions or recommendations were made thus achieving the aim of
the mischief makers. Only 5 hours of audio recording was thus completed on
the second day.
Time passed by with John Doohan making occasional requests to Mike Wade
as to the progress of the transcript. Neither he nor I were prepared to press
strongly to expedite proceedings as although we had kept DVA involvement
low key media-wise to avoid any possible incrimination of DVA in the inter-
10GB
3
faction squabbling, we were both extremely grateful to DVA for the valuable
assistance they gave the Forum Committee.
In April 1997, I asked Mike Wade, "how things were going" on the transcript
and he replied that he was having difficulty in finding someone to do it (there
are many firms in Perth capable of this transcription of tapes).
Shortly after, Stephen Smith MHR supported by Paul Filing MHR had
presented a motion on HMAS Sydney in the House Representatives, I again
kept an appointment with Jim Dalton and asked him whether the prolonged
delay in producing the transcript was due to any external influences; eg:
pressure form the HMAS Sydney Foundation Trust. He thought that I was
being overly suspicious and said that he would "look into it" and he then
rushed off to a conference. This last meeting lasted about one minute.
However, about 3 weeks later, John Doohan received the typed transcripts of
61 pages from Mike Wade. After examining the document, John Doohan
infonned me by telephone that much of the vital evidence given at the Forum
was missing from the typed manuscript and that in effect all the transcript
covered was "dregs". In brief some of the following important presentations
were missing:
(I) Commodore Trotter's opening address - all record of his presence and
views were thus erased from the record.
(2) My presentation as covered in "The Bourne Papers" which were
supported by photographs and documents on display;
(3) John Doohan's tabling of Reg Landers' Statutory Declaration on his HIF /
DIF tracking of the raider Kormoran from a secret PMG D/F station in
Sydney and the presentation of the (ate Gordon Laffer's papers which
studied the murder ofHMAS Sydney survivors;
10G7
PINQ.SUBS.005.0094
4
(4) Richard Summerall's presentation of the Australian Archives
involvement;
(5) Journalist David Kennedy's presentation, with the aid of a video of his
interview with the late leading writer, Mason, a few days prior to the
latter's death; and
(6) Dr Bye's presentation of his drift card experiment relating to the
Christmas Island raft and corpse.
And so the list goes on. John Doohan then asked Mike Wade for the tapes,
which I picked up from DVA on VJ Day and passed to John Doohan that day.
He rang me to say that there were only 4 tapes in the packet with a~ hr reading
on each side ofeach tape; ie: a total of 6 hours whereas there should have been
a total of II hours recording needing at least 8 tapes. It became obvious to
both of us that the tapes and transcripts had been edited somewhere by
someone or organisation that was well informed on the historical political value
of the evidence given at the Forum 1997.
The incongruous situation now arises that, although the Minister for Defence
was awaiting receipt of the transcripts and the Forum Committee was anxious
to forward them to him, the prolonged delay was apparently caused by another
Federal Government Department; ie: the Department of Veteran Affairs.
My personal belief is that after consultation with the Defence Department,
DVA Canberra gave the WA Deputy Director, Jim Dalton approval to assist in
the Forum 1997 with instructions that the transcript tapes were to be forward~~'A
the Department of Defence. It is in fact possible that the original tapes are still
held there together with a typed transcript. After editing, the "doctored" tapes
were returned to DVA of WA for a local transcript to be made.
lOC8
5
When passing the transcripts to John Doohan Mike Wade, on the telephone,
was apologetic over the whole affair. If for example he had sent 8 audio tapes
to Canberra and received only 4 in return, he would realise that some
skullduggery had taken place and he had been left "holding the baby".
Possibly, he shares this view and feeling with his Deputy Director.
Both John Doohan and I feel betrayed by DVA over the whole affair but bear
no malice to Jim Dalton and Mike Wade. Both are Public Servants with
families and mortgages and must do as they are told in the belief that they are
serving the nation's interest.
In fact, all is not lost. The Forum 97 Committee enlisted the help of John
Henry (his Australian name, a relative of a German seaman lost on the
Kormoran) and paid him to make both audio and video records of the whole
Forum with before and after scenes and special shots. These are now held in
secure storage and will be used as and when the End Secrecy on Sydney Group
(ESOS) see the greatest advantage to be gained.
C.A.V. Bourne
lO£;9
PINQ.SUBS.005.0095
THE LOSS OF HMAS SYDNEY
THE R.S.L. INVOLVEMENT
BY GP CAPT C.A.V. BOURNE
Trevor Lloyd, a trustee of the Executive of the R.S.L. W.A. Branch, was
appointed as a trustee of the HMAS Sydney Foundation Trust (Inc) when it was
originally founded by Wayne Borne in 1965 and remained in that capacity
when it was reconstituted by Graham Edwards MLC after Wayne Borne's
sudden death in 1996. Paul Filing MLA was also a trustee of this original
Sydney Trust and remains so today.
When the End Secrecy on Sydney Group (ESOS) formed the HMAS Forum
1997 Committee, Trevor Lloyd acted as a liaison officer between the Forum 97
Committee and the HMAS Sydney Foundation Trust Inc. All members of the
Forum 1997 Committee were RSL members and the regular meetings took
place in Anzac House Club rooms.
At the 8151
Annual State Congress of the R.S.L W.A. Branch held the 13-1Slh
June 1997 Agenda Items No 46 and 47 (copies attached) were both passed
unanimously.
Both motions were then referred as W.A. Agenda Items to the R.S.L. National
Congress held in Adelaide during the week and both items were again carried
with Agenda Item No 46 being accepted as Standing Policy.
This means that by accepting the need to search for the truth on the loss of
HMAS Sydney, the Returned and Services League of Australia does not
1070
I,
2
believe the official account of the alleged battle between HMAS Sydney and
HSK Kormoran on the 19th November 1941 off the W.A. Coast.
A copy of my letter dated / ~/sjcJ7 to the then National President, Major
General "Digger" James is also attached. This demonstrates the difficulties of
researchers speaking publicly on the subject and the reluctance of those in
authority to listen to and accept a contrary and possibly embarrassing viewpoint
whereas the Australian public are keen to hear and learn researched facts and
not just media speculation.
CAY. Bourne
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·71 •
YANCHEP-1WO ROCKS SUB-BRANCH
ITEM NO. 46
....
·72·
It is for these reasons that the following motion Is ~ut:
GENERAL: HMAS SYDNEY· SEARCH FOR THE TRU'-H
PREAMBLE
HMAS Sydney was lost with all hands (645) on the 19th November 1941. The PrimeMinister, John Curtin, made two brief statements on her sinking on the 1st and 3rd ofDecember 1941. These were based primarily on the earlier interrogation of Lt.Bunje, who was assessed as being one of the more truthful of the German survivors.
Mr. F A Eldridge, MA, a senior master on the teaching staff of the Royal AustralianNaval College acting in a voluntary capacity produced a "Report on the Loss ofHMAS Sydney" based entirely on his examination of the material gathered frominterrogations of the German survivors. It was handed to Commander Long, Directorof NavallnteJligence, on the 28th of January 1942, some 10 weeks after the sinking.
In his covering minute to the DCNS the DNI state that "the report had been checkedthrough. There appear to be no errors." It was sighted by the CNS, 2nd navalmember and the DCNS. Mr. Eldridge was commended for his work in a voluntarycapacity.
The Eldridge Report was conceived in haste and secrecy. It did not becomeavailable for pUblic access until after 1972. ~~AN\/}tY\.lM1 Jo,&1'
In January 1997, Richard Summerrell, Assistant Director, National Office, AustralianArchives, confirmed that there had never been an official inquiry into the sinking ofthe HMAS Sydney.
Historians, researchers, authors and journalists over the y~ars have cast doubts onthe truthfulness of many of the German survivors' accounts of the action.
The WA Maritime Museum held a HMAS Sydney Forum in 1991, the general themebeing ''The Search for the Wreck of the Sydney." On the 1st and 2nd February 1997,the HMAS Sydney Forum 1997 Committee, convened by the "End Secrecy onSydney Group" held a Forum to present new evidence on its theme, ''The Search forthe Truth on HMAS Sydney" which revealed t[1at the Germans were telling lies onmany aspects of the battle. Doubt was thus cast on the credibility of the EldridgeReport, which had remained unchallenged for fifty-five years. The transcripts of bothForums are held in the Australian National Archives, the WA Maritime Museum andthe WA Battye Library.
Nearly 200 historians, researchers and interested public attended the 1997 Forumand voted overwhelmingly in favour of continuing the search for the truth on thesinking of HMAS Sydney. It is vital for historical correctness that future generationsof Australians learn the true story of the sinking of HMAS Sydney.
RESOLUTION
THAT THE RETURNED AND SERVICES LEAGUE SUPPORTS THE SEARCH FORTHE TRUTH ON THE SINKING OF HMAS SYDNEY AND THAT THIS BEADOPTED AS NATIONAL STANDING POLICY.
Ja:cngrss97:ENTITLE 1072 ....Ja:cngrss97:ENTITLE
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PINQ.SUBS.005.0097
-73·...•
GERALDTON CITY, DONGARA, NORTHAMPTON SUB-BRANCHES
ITEM No. 47
GENERAL: HMAS SYDNEY·FOR ACTION BY THE NATIONAL exECUTIVE
PREAMBLE
56 years have passed since the sinking of HMAS Sydney with little attempt orapparent desire by successive Governments to locate the wreck to put at rest theminds of the relatives of the 645 crew that perished with their ship. The NorthernSub-Branches are particularly concerned with the doubts remaining as to the fate ofthis warship since it is probably located off our section of the coast and constantinquiries are directed to Sub-Branches by the general commur.ity and the manyvisitors that come to our towns and cities. We believe that the time for action is longoverdiie and that the Australian Taxpayers will support the expenditure necessary tolocate'lhe ship.
RESOLUTION
"THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INITIATIVEAND FUNDS, AS PROPOSED BY THE LATE SENATOR JOHN PANIZZA, TO FINDTHE HMAS SYDNEY LOST IN 1941."
1074Ja:cngrss97:ENTITi..E
Gp. CAPT. C.A.V. Bourne86 Wattle St
Tuart Hill W.A.6060
TEL: 08 9344 2248FAX; 08 93094902
lih August 1997
MAl. GEN. W.B. James AD. MBE, MCNational PresidentR.S.L. National HeadquartersP.O. Box 303CANBERRA A.C.T. 260 I
Dear General
NATIONAL CONGRESS HMAS SYDNEY
~?IlO\Vi~f normal procedure undOUbtedly Agenda Items Nos. 46 and 47 of thef .A
h, 8; Annu~1 State Congress will be submitted for inclusion on the Aoenda
or t e 10rthcomlOg National Congress. '"
I think it essential to keep the record straioht that the ~ II "d' '" 10 O\'dng account ofprocee lOgS an.d events be recorded as the official minutes "viII no~ tell the fullstory although It can be veritied from the audio tapes made at the time,
As delegate for the Yanchep/Two Rocks R S L S b B I ...... -S d , -lh ' '. u - runc 1 at .J .J "pm on~n ay ) June '.997. I rose to present Item No 46. I had spoken to; onl .... 4
mmutes when Chairman Len Turner interrupted and said' "All ve .' t :bU~, cut it short:' I .rep.~ied. ,"I thought I had '0 minutes:: He the;o~~:;:~t:;~o pr~sent the molton which I did immediately and it was seconded, Withiness t an one second. he then called for "Those in favour" and .
ap " . b unanImousprova . was glve.n y a show of hands. So that following "the gao" no
OPP?rtUntty was given for anyone to speak for or aoainst 0; to am~ "'d thmotion. '" en e
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PINQ.SUBS.005.0098
Maj, Gen. W. B. James AO, MBE, Me 3 II August 1997
Paragraph 6 of Congress Rules of Debate states. "\Vhen a motion has been dulyproposed and seconded. the Chairman shall at once proceed to take the \'otesthere on unless some delegate rises to oppose it or propose an amendment",
Earlier during the lunch break [ had discusM:d Item No 47 with the Geraldtonspokesman who sat next to me for both daysACongress. [showed him a writtencopy of an amendment I proposed to make to Item No 47 and he generallyagreed to it. I also showed this proposed amendment to Trevor Lloyd. a StateExecutive Trustee and also [he appointed R.S.L. trustee on the HMAS SydneyFoundation Trust and he als0 appe:lred happy \\ith it. At le:lst he \vas aware ofmy intentions.
Obviously the Chairman acted within the strict letter of Rule 6 in calling forvotes within one second of the seconding and possibly considered this wassmarr chairmanship but he onl:: applied this "sudden death" procedure inrespect of the two H~l--\S S:: dney motions and not to any other motion duringCongress. I consider this to be malproctice under the circumstances. TheChoirman \vas well aware from my earlier speech and personal acquaintancethot I was severely disabled and unable to rise quid:l:: to my feet. Although Iraised m:: hand and called ~"\ut. this actiL)n was unnoticed amidst the \'ct:ngprocedure.
Yours sincerely
It could be said that Congress was running behind time and time saving wasnecessary except that 6 or 7 more lengthy motions and several speechesfollowed before the Congress closed at 4.20 pm.
It could also be said that the passing of Agenda Item No 47 was invalid becauseit had earlier been withdrawn and the Geraldton delegate only proceeded with itunder duress. Had he refused to do so he could have been deemed in contemptof the Chair and disciplined.
It is most important that the implications of Agenda Item 47 be examinedcarefully because it means that millions of taxpayer's dollars could be fundedto meet this recommendation.
MLA. Stephen Smith recently moved a motion on this subject in FederalParliament and at the relayed suggestion of the Minister for Defence, to whichMr Smith agreed, it was referred to a Sub Committee of the joint standingCommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.
P.S You may gather that I feel strongly on this subject. As a young Hudsonpilot I carried out aerial searches for German raider Steiermark(Kormoran) know to be operating off the W.A coast. then for Hi\tlASSydney and finally for the survivors of their alleged battle, I haveresearched this matter for the past 56 years. I lost a mate on HMASSydney!!!
c.A.V, Bourne
•
11 August 1997:'vlaj. Glln. \\. B. James AO. MBE. ~IC
Following completion of Agenda Item 46 the Geraldton delegate rose andannounced. "In view of the previous item. I wish to withdraw Item 4T and hesat down. It appeared that \vas the end of the matter but the Chairman LenTurner. then said. "You cannot withdraw the motion as it is different to theprevious motion. Proceed with your motion". The Geraldton delegate thenrose and spoke for about 15 seconds and then said. "I present the motion'" andit was seconded. Within one second the Chairman said "Those in favour" andagain received a unanimous show of hands. He followed immediately with··those against". then "Carried".
O\'erall I had no opP0rrunit:. lL) ful:: present Item lei in the allo\\ able i l~
minutes and 5 minutes right of Repl:.. \:0 one \\ as given the opporrunit:: It)speak for. agoinsl or to amend either Items -+0 and -t"". \Vorse still. IheGeraldton delegate \\ os forced to present Item :--';0 -+., despite his withdr:m al ofit. Thus any meaningful debate on the loss of the HMAS Svdne\ \\ aseffectively gagged swiftl:: and purposel::. I must admit that I was n~t su;Prisedby this turn of e\~nts. This has b~en the stor\ on th~ loss of HMAS Svdne\ for56 years - nothing said. nothing done.' . .
··LEST WE FORGET"
A 1~/197
107G 1077
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