heidegger y wittgenstein
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International Phenomenological Society
Philosophy after Wittgenstein and HeideggerAuthor(s): Charles GuignonSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Jun., 1990), pp. 649-672Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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PhilosophyandPhenomenological esearchVol. L, No. 4, June i990
Philosophy f t e r ittgenstein
n d eidegger
CHARLES GUIGNON
Universityof Vermont
1. Philosophy's"LegitimateHeir"
RichardRorty begana seriesof lectures n the early seventiesby saying,
"Justas no one in the nineteenthcenturycouldgo on doing philosophy
withoutcomingto termswith Kant,so no one in ourcenturycango on
doing philosophywithout comingto terms with Wittgensteinand Hei-
degger."Thoughnot everyonewould agreewith this judgment, t doespose an interestingquestionaboutwhat it is we aresupposed o come to
termswithinthewritingsof thesetwo figures.How arewe to understand
the upshotof theirthoughtforphilosophy?Rortyhimselfseemsto hold
that Wittgensteinand Heideggerare masterdiagnosticians f the tradi-
tion whose"therapies"nd "de-structions" aveenabledus to stop doing
philosophy.In contrast,CharlesTaylorclaims that theirwritingsopen
thewayto a newtypeof inquiry ntotheconditions or thepossibilityof
intentionality.nhis view, whattheyoffer sa "critique f epistemology nwhich we discoversomethingdeeperand more validabout ourselves as
agents], . . somethingof our deepor authenticnatureas selves."'Rorty
replies hat Taylorhasgone onlyhalfway ngraspingheconsequences f
Wittgenstein'sand Heidegger's hought.For if humanbeingsare truly
"self-interpretingnimals," f theyare"interpretationll thewaydown"
(inthe phraseTaylorborrows romH. L.Dreyfus), hen "thereare ots of
waysto describe,andthusto study,humanbeings,"and hence"there s
no metaphysicalprivilegeattached o [the] way of describing hem"as
agentsthat Tayloradvocates.'Taylor,for his part, thinksRortyis too
precipitousn takingthecollapseof foundationalismo meantheend of
philosophy.WhatWittgenstein ndHeidegger how us is not how to shut
I "Overcoming pistemology,"n K. Baynes,J. Bohman,andT. McCarthy, ds., After
Philosophy: End or Transformation? (Cambridge: The MIT Press, i987), pp. 482-83
(henceforth OE").2"AbsolutelyNon-Absolute,"TimesLiterary upplement,December , i985, p. 1379.
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 649
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philosophydown, but how to open upa new, nonfoundationalist ind of
inquiry hat can shore up our views on politics and society.
Behind his debate s thesharedassumption hat Wittgenstein ndHei-
deggerhaveunderminedwhatRortycalls"epistemology-centeredhilos-
ophy,"andso have permanentlyhifted hegroundon whichphilosophymoves.In what follows, I want to examinesomeof the convergencesn
the writingsof Wittgenstein ndHeidegger hatjustify his assumption,
focusingespeciallyon theirdescriptions f oureverydaypredicament s
agents nthe worldandon theirvisionsof the role of languagenour lives.
But there s a deeperquestionIwant to address,andthat is the question:
Whatdirectiondoes their houghtpointfor thefutureof philosophy? s it
purely negative, undermining raditionalphilosophical questions and
puttingnothingnewintheirplace?Or is it positive nthe senseof paving
thewayto a refurbished nd transformed hilosophy?Wittgenstein nce
spoke of the "legitimateheir" of the subject which used to be called
"philosophy."" he question, hen, is: What, if anything, s philosophy's
legitimateheir? Although t will be impossible o argue for it here, my
hunch s that Taylor'spositivevision of the futureof philosophy s more
defensible.
At firstsight it mightseem bizarre o thinkthat Wittgenstein nd Hei-deggercan be comparedat all. Heidegger'sBeingand Timeannounces
itself asa work of "fundamental ntology"whoseaimis to laya founda-
tion for the regionalsciencesby posing"thequestionof the meaningof
Being."Itsturgidproseandheavy-handed rchitectonicmark t asawork
in the grandtraditionof metaphysics.The writingsof the laterWittgen-
stein,in contrast,consistof sprightlyaphorisms,piecemeal herapies or
"whatwe aretempted o say,"andoften inconclusive xchangeswithan
unidentifiednterlocutor.Where Heidegger s steepedin the history ofphilosophyandwantsto "de-structurehe historyof ontology,"Wittgen-
Wittgenstein,TheBlue and BrownBooks (NewYork:HarperTorchbooks, 95 8), pp.
28, 62 (hereafter ited as BB). In the text I also use the followingabbreviations:rom
works by Wittgenstein, hilosophical nvestigations,rans.G. E. M. Anscombe New
York:Macmillan,967) =
PI; On Certainty,rans.D. PaulandG. E. M. Anscombe(New York: Harper Torchbooks, i969) = OC; Philosophical Remarks, trans.
R. Hargreaves nd R. White (Oxford:BasilBlackwell, 975) = PR; Remarks n the
Foundationsof Mathematics, rans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Cambridge:MIT Press,
i983) = RFM;Zettel, trans.G. E. M. Anscombe Berkeley:University f California
Press,967) = Z; by Heidegger, einundZeit (Tubingen:Max Niemeyer,972) = SZ,
with translationsromBeingand Time,trans.J. Macquarrie nd E. Robinson New
York:Harper& Row, i962), which contains he Germanpaginationn the margins.
Unlessotherwisenoted, quotesfromWittgenstein's orksrefer o sectionsrather han
page numbers.
650 CHARLES GUIGNON
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steinconcentrates n naturalassumptionshatarisewhendoingphiloso-
phy and generally gnoresthe historyof philosophy.
Yet despitethese importantdifferences, hereare also some striking
affinities n their thought.Both writersfocus on our practical ives and
criticizeattemptsto justifythose practicesby appealto timeless truthsaboutthe natureof reasonorto factsabout he world.Bothchallenge ep-
resentationalist ccountsof ourrelation o theworld Wittgensteinby
criticizingraditional heoriesof meaninganddesignation,Heideggerby
questioninghe primacyaccorded"mere eeing" nthetradition.Bothare
"contextualists"n the senseof holding hat,sincewe haveno clearaccess
to formsand categoriesof purereasonor to intuitionsof essences,our
startingpoint must be a descriptionof our everydaysituationsin the
world, or a phenomenologyy f everydayness."4The source of these similarities,I believe, is to be found in the
"philosophies f life" that dominated o muchof German houghtat the
turnof thecentury.5With thecollapseof Idealism,andwith thegrowing
senseof a "loss of meaning"accompanyinghe ascendancy f positivist
science,a naturalresponsewas to interprethe role of philosophyas try-
ingto articulatewhatis contained nthecontingentandtemporal low of
life itself.So we findSchopenhauer'semand hatphilosophybeginwitha"hermeneutic" f concrete life-forms,Herder'sand Humboldt'streat-
mentof languageas anexpressionof life, Lotze's"teleologicaldealism"
which definesthe "real" n terms of what is valuable for life, Marx's
emphasison the basic needsof life, Nietzsche'scall for life-affirmation,
and the Neo-Kantians'definitionof truthin terms of its value for life
("truth-values"). hevitalisms,energismsand biologismsof the turnof
the century, ogetherwith the immensely nfluentialLebensphilosophie
movement,which evolvedin the twentiesinto the "philosophyof exis-tence"andlater nto "existentialism,"lltestifyto the appealof this con-
cern with rooting philosophy n life.6
4 The expressions Heidegger's, ut see T. R. Schatzki's aluablediscussion f Wittgen-
stein'smethodas a "phenomenologyf the everyday"n "ThePrescriptions Descrip-
tion: Wittgenstein's iewof the HumanSciences,"n S. MitchellandM. Rosen,eds.,
The Need for InterpretationAtlanticHighlands,New Jersey:Humanities,983).
5 NicholasF. Gierhas madea convincing asefor Wittgenstein'sffinitieswith ife-philos-
ophy in Wittgenstein nd Phenomenology Albany:SUNY UniversityPress,1981),
Chapter3. I discussHeidegger's ebt to life-philosophyn Heidegger nd the Problem
of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett, I983), section 4.
6 See Herbert Schnadelbach's Philosophy n Germany: 831-1933 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridgeUniversity ress,984) for adiscussion f the crucial onceptof "life" n German
thought.
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 651
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AlthoughHeideggercame to feel that "philosophyof life . . . says
aboutas much as 'thebotanyof plants"'(SZp. 46) and needsa deeper
grounding,his early interestin examiningLeben-in-der-Weltnd the
meaning"inherentn factical ife"7 still shows through n his projectof
discoveringhe "roots,""origins,""wellsprings,"nd"soil" romwhichour conceptsoriginate. f it is to avoidBodenlosigkeit groundlessness),
philosophymuststartfrom our own personalor "existentiell" raspof
what life is all aboutin ourordinarybeing-in-the-world.n order o find
the existentiall" or essentialstructures f humanbeing(Dasein) n gen-
eral,wemustbegin romour own concrete ives:"therootsof theexisten-
tial analytic, orits part,areultimately xistentiell" SZp. 13). WhenHei-
degger says that the question of Being is "nothing other than the
radicalization f an essential endency-of-being hichbelongs o Dasein
itself- the pre-ontological nderstandingf Being" SZp. 14), hemeans
that ontologystarts rom heeveryday,pretheoretical raspof lifeembod-
iedin our practicalagency.Similarly,Wittgensteinellsus to get outof the
Luftgebdudecastles loating ntheair)of theorizing,andto get "back o
the rough ground" PI ii8, 107) of ourconcrete,ordinarygraspof lan-
guage nuse.Ourwords have meaningonlyin "thestreamof life" (PRp.
8i), in the whole "tapestry f life" (PI,p. 174), not in a "sublime" ogicbeyond ife.Whenwe lookforjustificationsorourpractices,we findthat
whatwe simplydo inliving s "bedrock"PI2I7); there snothingdeeper
than life which could explainor justify t.
The affinitieswith life-philosophyhelp to clarifythe similarities n
Wittgenstein's pdHeidegger'sproceduresn dealingwithphilosophical
problems.Bothsuggest hat these problemsarisefroma stanceof disen-
gaged,theoreticalreflection, nd both tryto dissolvethese problemsby
providingdescriptions f how thingsshow up for us in the courseof our
ordinary, prereflective ives. Heidegger begins with a descriptionof
"average everydayness"where one is caught up in ja "nonthematic
absorption"n ordinaryaffairsand "losesoneself" n what one encoun-
tersin the world(SZp. 76). His goal is to capture heway we encounter
things"inthe concernwhichmakes use of themwithoutnoticingthem
explicitly"(SZ p. 74). Wittgenstein'smethod is also descriptive:"We
must do awaywith all explanation,anddescriptionalone must take itsplace"(PI o9). The aim is to bringout the "aspectsof thingsthat are
mostimportant orus [which]arehiddenbecauseof theirsimplicityand
familiarity,"hosethingsone is "unable o notice . . . because theyare]
alwaysbeforeone's eyes"(PI 29). His frequent eferenceso the "prim-
7 See Heidegger nd the Problemof Knowledge,p. 59.
652 CHARLES GUIGNON
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itive" (ursprunglich r primitiv) erveas reminders f the unnoticed ea-
tures of ordinary ife that makeour practices ntelligible.
The descriptionof everydayness ervesas a basis for articulating ea-
turesof our agency hat aregenerally iddenandonly implicit neveryday
life. From his phenomenologyof everydayness,Heidegger arrives at"transcendentaleneralizations"bout the conditions or thepossibility
of agencyin general:those "fundamental xistential" which are the
"basison which every interpretation f Dasein whichis ontical [that s,
particular ndconcrete]andbelongsto a world-viewmust move . . ."
(SZp. zoo). Suchstructures f being-in-the-worlds involvementn prac-
ticalconcerns, uture-directedness,ndsituatedness re said to be "more
primordial" ursprunglich)han theoreticalreflection n the sense that,
whereas heorycanbe seen as a derivative r foundedmode of being-in-
the-world,practicalactivitiescannotbe accounted or solelyin termsof
the representationalistpicture assumed by the theoretical attitude.
AlthoughWittgenstein fficially schewsany "cravingorgenerality" BB
p. i8), hisprocedurehas often been compared o a transcendental rgu-
ment8 n the way it moves fromplain featuresof our lives to the back-
groundconditions hat makethose activitiespossible.The notionsof lan-
guage-games, rammar, ndformsof lifemaybe seen asidentifyinghosegeneral ifnot exactly "essential")haracteristicsf our liveswhichmake
our activities possible.
BothWittgenstein ndHeidegger ejectargumentnthefamiliar ense.
In struggling o conveya sense of our humansituation hatprovidesan
alternative o the traditional,"commonsense" ictureof representation-
alism, heyconcentrate ndescription ndclaimsabout he conditions or
thepossibilityof ourdailyactivities.Since he traditional epresentation-
alistpicture s so deeply ngrainednourthinkingandlanguage,both also
deploydetailedtherapiesand de-structurings, ften loadedwith meta-
phorsandneologisms, o help-usbypass he assumptions hat arisewhen
language s "idling"or when we adopta theoretical tance toward life.
Whatemergesntheirwritings sanunderstandingf humanexistenceas
finite, contingent,and contextualized,a picturewhich undermines he
For instance,by Rortyin "Verificationismnd Transcendental rguments,"Nofus5
(1971): 3-14; by Taylor n "TheOpeningArguments f Hegel'sPhenomenology"n
A. MacIntyre, d., Hegel:A Collectionof Essays (GardenCity, New York: Anchor,
1972); andmorerecently yLynnRudderBakern"On heVery deaof a FormofLife,"
Inquiry 27 (i984): 277-89. To note this similarity to the procedure of transcendental
argumentss not to suggest hatWittgensteins developinga "transcendentalhiloso-
phy."The differences etweenWittgensteinnd transcendentalhilosophy re clarified
in SusanneThiele'sexcellentbook, Die Verwicklungenm DenkenWittgensteinsFrei-
burg: Karl Alber, i983).
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 653
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assumptionsof traditionalphilosophyand paves the way for the recent
thought of such figuresas Rorty andTaylor.
2. Everydayness,Understanding, ndMeaning
The representationalistictureof our humansituationwe haveinheritedfromDescartes ixes nadvancehowthingscanappear o us "likeapairof
glasseson our nosethroughwhichwe see whateverwe look at"(PI103).
When we aredoingphilosophy,we tend to think of ourselvesas essen-
tiallyminds set overagainsta collectionof independentphysicalobjects
which our ideasrepresent ndour wordsdesignate.Thegoalof philoso-
phy, then, s to show how ourordinary ompetenceninteractingwith the
world ispossibleandjustified. notherwords,philosophy ries o accountfor the familiarntelligibility f thingsas theyshowupin ourday-to-day
lives.The intractable uzzlesof traditional pistemology-centeredhilos-
ophyarisepreciselybecauseof theassumptions f therepresentationalist
model. Forit seems thatwhat is "given" n ordinaryexperienceon this
model (sensory nputand possiblysome inbuiltrules)is too limited to
groundor make senseof our full-blownunderstanding f ourselvesand
our world. Our graspof things appears o be underdeterminedy the
"data"and capacitiesavailable o us.The way Wittgensteinand Heideggerhandle these traditionalphilo-
sophicalproblemss to suggest hattheyarise npartbecauseof therepre-
sentationalist ortrayal f theselfasa "subject"et overagainstanobjec-
tive externalreality. By describingeverydaynessn detail, they lead us
awayfromthetendency o thinkof ourselvesassubjectsormindsdistinct
from a world of bruteobjects,and they therebysuggesta new way of
grasping he sourcesofintelligibility
hat arealreadypresent
nour livesas agents.
Heidegger's phenomenology of human agency starts out from a
descriptionof lifeas a "happening" aughtupin "dealings"withequip-
mentin ordinarycontexts.Inourprereflective ctivities,he suggests,we
findourselvesabsorbed n handling hings,andin copingwith situations
we encounteras "significant"nthe sensethatthingsmatteror countfor
us in specificways.Whatshowsupforus in such contexts s not a collec-
tion of bruteobjects o berepresented, uta totalityof equipment rgan-ized intoaweb of means/ends elationsbyourprojects.Heidegger'swell-
knownexampleof theworkshopshowshow,wheneverythingsrunning
smoothly,the hammerappears n hammering,n orderto fastenboards
together,which sforbuildingabookcase.Such amiliar ontextsof activ-
ity are encountered as holistic fields of involvements - the
"ready-to-hand" organizedaroundourundertakings"what t'sfor"),
andultimatelyaroundourself-interpretationssagents n theworld(the
654 CHARLES GUIGNON
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"forthesake of which"of our concerns).Given his pictureof everyday-
ness,there s simplyno way to drive n a wedgebetween herepresenting
subjecton the one hand,andmereobjects o berepresented n the other.
The equipmentalcontext gains its significanceand structure rom my
senseof whatIam doing n that setting.Yet,at the same ime,whoIamasan agentthere is definedby the context in which I am engaged: n the
workshop, or instance, canbe a craftsman r an amateur,butnot a line-
backeror anayatollah.The ability o see thingsas mereobjectson hand o
be represented as "present-at-hand" requiresa "change-over"n
our stance towardthingswhichHeideggercalls "the disworldingof the
world."
The description f everydayness lso bringsout the way in whichour
livesarealwaysnestedin the wider context of a historicalculture.Our
possibilities f self-interpretationnd our concreteways of actingaregen-
erallyguided n advanceby thepublic roles,standards,andconventions
weallabsorb ngrowingupinto a communal ife-world.For hemostpart
we arenot so muchunique ndividualsas we areparticipants ndplace-
holders nwhatHeidegger allsthe"They" dasMan):"We akepleasure
andenjoyourselvesas theytakepleasure;we read,see, andjudgeabout
literature nd art as theyseeandjudge.. . . The 'They'. . . which[we]all are,thoughnot as the sum, prescribeshe kind of Beingof everyday-
ness" SZpp. i26-27). Thisattunemento publicwaysof acting theingrainedendency o respondaccording o social standards,o fall into
stepwiththecrowd,to enact standardizedoles definesouridentity n
everydaynesswithoutresidue.Forthis reasonHeidegger aysthat being
theThey s a "primordialhenomenon"which "belongs o Dasein'sposi-
tive constitution"SZp. I29). WhatI amdoingatanytime,as well as my
thoughtsandfeelings,hasa pointand makessenseonly against heback-groundof practices ndinstitutions f mycommunity as, for example,
talking o a groupof peoplecounts as an academic ectureonly giventhe
background f the university ystem.Heidegger'sdescriptionof every-
daynesseadsus to see theworld asa fieldof significanceaid outbycom-
munalpractices:"the They itself articulates he referential ontext of
significance"SZ p. i29). Inthissensewe exist as a shared"clearing"n
whichthingscan show up as relevant n relationto our lives.The description f humanexistenceas boundup with a publicworld
provides he basis foridentifying hreefundamental tructures f human
agency.First,we find ourselves"thrown"or situatedwithina familiar
worldwhere hings"matter"o us becauseof ourpriorattunementStim-
mung) (SZ p. I37). Because hingsalwaysshowup as mattering o us in
somewayorother, here s no horizonless antagepointfor theapprehen-
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 655
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sion of brute "facts."Second,as agentswe are"outsideof ourselves"n
addressing he concernsof dailylife according o our culture'ssense of
what is important.In dealingwith equipment,according o Heidegger,"Dasein addressesitself to the objects of its concern," and thereby
"expressestselftoo; thatis to say,it expresses tsbeingat homewith theready-to-hand"SZpp. 407-8). Aswe shallsee, theway inwhichDasein
"expresses tself [sprichtsich aus] as a beingtowardentities" (SZ pp.
2z3-z4) is focusedby the possibilitiesof interpretation rticulatedby a
public anguage.Finally,we arealways "aheadof ourselves,"organizing
and interpreting urrent situationsin the light of futurepossibilities.
Understood s "projection," uman ife is teleological,apurposive hrust
toward the futurewhich Heideggercalls "Being-toward-the-end."his
futurityunfolds not so muchin consciousgoal-settingor planningas in
simply driftingalong into the routines and undertakingsdefinedby
socially approved asksandobligations.Ourbeingtoward the future s
the sourceof the "forestructuref understanding"whichpreshapes he
ways thingscan show up for us in our everyday ives together.
Heidegger's laim, then, is that explicitawarenessof mereobjectsis
possibleonly forbeingswho havesomepriorcompetencen copingwith,
what he calls an "as structure" of practical involvements. Thisprereflectivemasteryof the "hermeneutics"of equipment theability
to handle hings nfamiliarwaysinmeaningful ituations is madepos-
siblebyourparticipationnthepublic ife-worldopenedup bytheThey.
It follows that we are always caughtup in a "hermeneutic ircle":our
dealingswith what we find aroundus arepreshapedby our culturally-
definedoverviewof how thingscancountforourcommunity,while that
backgroundunderstandings itselfconstantlyrevised n the lightof our
encounterswith what showsup in our activities.Andso therecanbe noaccess to raw facts independentof our pre-understanding:f one is
engaged n interpretation ndone wantsto appealto what just "stands
there,"Heidegger ays,"thenone finds hat what'stands here' nthe first
instance s nothingotherthanthe obviousundiscussed ssumption f the
personwho does the interpreting"SZp. I50). Inotherwords,whatcan
countas arelevant"fact" salwayspreshaped ythebackground f intel-
ligibilityembodiedin our skilledpractices.For this reasonHeideggerpoints out that fundamentalontology - the inquiry nto what makes
thingsthe thingsthey are - asks "aboutBeingitself insofar as Being
enters ntotheintelligibility f Dasein.Themeaningof Beingcan neverbe
contrastedwithentities,or withBeingasthe'ground'whichgivesentities
support; or a 'ground'becomesaccessibleonlyas meaning,even if it is
itself the abyss[Abgrund] f meaninglessness"SZp. I 5z). TheBeingof
65 6 CHARLES GUIGNON
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things s therefore onstitutedbyour sharedbackground f attuned ntel-
ligibility,abackgroundwhich tselfhasnodeeperground hanthe contin-
gent practices hat haveemerged n our historicalculture.WhereHeidegger's henomenology ocuseson ourinvolvementswith
equipment,Wittgenstein's hilosophical nvestigations eginsby inquir-ing into how we refer o things with words. ButWittgenstein's oncerns
may be seen as congruentwith Heidegger's o the extent that the basic
questionfor both is how we are able to understand he world, or how
intentionality s possible. A commonsenseway of accountingfor our
understandingf the worldpresupposes"themodelof 'objectanddesig-
nation"' PI293).According o thismodel,westartout inlife findingour-
selves surroundedby objects;we then learnthe namesfor thoseobjects
through"ostensiveraining" someonepointsto apieceof paperandsays
"paper");and thereafterwe know what objects of that type are. Our
understandingf theworld is builtupfromsuch nstancesof learning he
significations f words.This traditionalaccountof languagepresupposes
the representationalist ictureof ourselvesas mindsrelated to objects,
and thentries to explain ourunderstandingn termsof mentalprocesses
linkingwords to things,that is, knowing the meaningsof words.
Wittgenstein hallenges veryaspectof this accountof thebasisforourunderstanding.How, he asks,would a preverbal hildknow whatpoint-
ing is, or that the teacher spointing o the paperandnot to its color, size
or shape?How does the child learntheuse of the word (asa mass term,
say,rather hanas a countnoun)?Does the childstartout with our under-
standingof objects n the world, so that the only issue is graspingwhat
conventional oundswe associatewith thoseobjects?Orisn't it the case
that the childfirst indsout howwe articulate heworld into "objects"by
learningourlanguage?Ostensive raining eems o explainhow we cometo understand hings because it is seen on the model of "ostensive
definition," .e., caseswheresomeonealreadyknows ourlanguage can
ask,forinstance,"What olor is that?" andso understandshereply
"That'scalled 'sepia"'(PI30). But ostensivedefinitions ucceedbecause
the learneralreadyknows "what place in language,in grammar,we
assign o the word,""thepost at which we station the word" (PI 29). In
otherwords, some understanding f language s necessarybeforethiskind of ostensioncan succeed:"One hasalready o know (orbe ableto
do) somethingnorder o becapableof askingathing'sname," ustasone
mustalreadyhave mastered hegameof chessto some extent in order o
understandhewords,"This s theking,"when shown a particular iece
(PI3 i). The traditionalaccount of how we come to understandwords
thereforepresupposesheveryunderstandingt wassupposed o explain.
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 657
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"We may say: only someone who alreadyknows how to do something
with it can significantly sk a name" (PI3I).
Wittgenstein's eflectionshere lead to an inversionof the traditional
orderof explanation.Thequestionaskedwas, "How can we explainour
ordinary ompetencendealingwiththingsandgrasping heworld?"andthephilosophical esponsewas to show howunderstandingouldbe built
up from particular asesof grasping he meaningsof words. What Witt-
genstein uggests,however, s that we can learnwords(and,hence,grasp
whatobjectsare)only if we alreadyhaveanunderstandingf the world,
an understandingtself rooted in a priormasteryof language.What is
basic s the"preunderstanding"mbodied nour know-how:our"ability
to do"things,our "mastery" f standardpatternsof discrimination nd
articulationas competent agents in a familiar ife-world.Items in the
worldcan stand out as countingfor us in certainwaysonly becausewe
have some masteryof what Wittgensteincalls the "significance" r
"importance"of the ordinary situationsin which we find ourselves:
"What s happeningnow hassignificancenthesesurroundings. hesur-
roundings ive it itsimportance"PI583). Wordshavemeaningsand can
be understood nlywithin "intelligibleituations" Z I7). But nthatcase
the intelligibility f thingscannot be explainedatomisticallyn termsofisolated dentifications.Rather,"[I]ightdawnsgradually verthewhole"
(OC I4I).
It follows fromthe priorityof this holisticbackground f understand-
ing thatwe can pickout or identify"facts"onlyagainst hebackdrop f a
priorsense of how thingscan count as significantn our lives. Wittgen-
steinasks,"Butwhatthingsare facts'?Do youbelieveyoucan showwhat
fact is meantby, e.g., pointingto it with your finger?Does that of itself
clarify he partplayedby'establishing' fact?"Suppose t takesagraspofthe practicesconstitutiveof someregionof our life-world"to define he
characterof what you are callinga 'fact"'(RFMp. 38i). The world in
which we find ourselvesis always already organized nto intelligible,
meaningful ontextswhich determinewhat facts therecanbe, andso, as
for Heidegger, here is no way to see our understanding f the world as
built up from discriminations f originallymeaningless, solated facts.
WhenWittgenstein sks,"Whatarethesimpleconstituents f a chair?The bitsof wood of which tis made?Or the molecules,ortheatoms?" PI
47), he makes it clear that the simple component parts of things are
specifiable nly byreference o ourinterestsandpurposes n dealingwith
them.
Wittgenstein's ndermining f thetraditional onceptionof grounding
is summedupin the familiar logan,"Whathasto beaccepted, hegiven,
65 8 CHARLES GUIGNON
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is - so one couldsay - forms of life" (PIp. zz6). The full meaningof
thiscan bebroughtout by consideringwhatWittgenstein aysaboutfol-
lowing rules.Thetradition ries to explainthe orderliness ndregularity
in ouractivities n termsof underlying"mental" ules.Without hemen-
tal, it seems,therewould be not "action"but merephysicalmovement.Wittgensteincriticizes he assumption hat theremust be innermental
rulesguidingour actionsby, amongotherthings,showingthatruleshave
to beinterpreted,hatevery nterpretationf a rulerelieson anotherrule,
andconsequently hat the appeal o rules eadsto anendlessregress.Gen-
erally,whereverwe mightfeel thatthementalwouldexplainouractions,
Wittgensteinundercuts hatnotionbyshowingthat appeal o themental
is pointless.If meaningfulhumanagencycan be accounted or neither n termsof
mentalprocessesnorsolelyintermsof physicalmovement,how is it pos-
sible?HereWittgenstein's escription f oureveryday ctivitiesgivesusa
new way of looking at our agencyand, indeed, at our own identityas
humans."Toobeyarule,"hesays,"to makeareport, o giveanorder, o
play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).. . . To understand
a languagemeans to be masterof a technique" PI i99). What comes
acrosshere s thatactiongains its meaningnot from"inner"accompani-ments,but from tsplacewithinthebackground f regularpractices,ech-
niquesandcustomsof acommunity.Aswe are nitiated nto a communal
life-world,we become uned n to thosewaysof respondinghat makeup
the background f intelligibility mbodied n the "commonwaysof act-
ing"(Handlungsweise)f ourculture.Consider, orexample,how bow-
ingis learned nJapan.Fromanearlyage Japanesenfantsaretappedon
the backof the head when someoneenters he room.Through hiscondi-
tioning theybegin to "duck" n the appropriate ircumstances, nd this
duckingevolves into the formalJapanesebow. It would be a mistake,
however, to think that bowing is nothing other than the conditioned
reflexof ducking, or a bow is a profoundlymeaningfulgesture nJapa-
nese society. Yet the meaningof the bow does not dependon something
"mental"behindthe movement;anything,or nothing, mightbe "going
throughone'smind"whenone bows. Rather, hegesturegains tsmean-
ingfrom ts placewithin hebackground f practices, ustomsand nstitu-tions of the entireculture.Generally, hen,what is "given"as thesource
of intelligibilityof our actions is the attunement the "agreementn
judgments" Ubereinstimmung, PI242) - we pick up bybecomingpar-
ticipants n a publicworld. As Wittgenstein ays,what "determines ur
judgment,ourconceptsandreactions, s not whatone manis doing now,
an individualaction, but the whole hurly-burly f humanactions,the
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 659
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backgroundagainstwhich we see any action"(Z 567). Ouractions are
"rule-governed,"oherentandmeaningful ecauseof theirposition n the
entirefabricof socialpractices hat makeup our form of life.
This conceptionof sharedformsof life as the basis for our practices
pointsto a way of envisioninghe self whichprovidesanalternativeo therepresentationalist odel. According o thisviewpoint,what definesour
identityashumanagents s not our capacity orconsciousrepresentation,
but ratherour mode of "presentation" our ways of expressingour-
selvesin the meshof a publicworld.9Wittgenstein dvisesus to think of
the languageof the mentalnot as designating omething"inner,"but as
anexpressionof natural ife-processes:orexample,theword "pain"as
connected with a "primitive,naturalexpression"(PI z44); the words
"We mourn . . ." at a funeral as "an expression of mourning" (PI p.
i89); the exclamation,"Now I know how to go on " as "aninstinctive
sound,a gladstart"(PI 3z3); the utterance"Ihopehe'll come" not as a
"report bout [one's]stateof mind,"but as "an expression Ausserung]
of [one's]hope" (PI585);andthesentence"Iam inpain"as likemoaning
-an "expression" f pain,not a reporton a mentalstate (BBpp.68-69).
The force of these suggestions s to lead us to shift from thinkingof the
mentalassomething"inner" epresented y our wordsto thinkingof it aswhatis presented r expressed n ourcommunal ives. It is somethingwe
embody, somethingwe "body forth"in makingmanifestour attuned
being-in-the-world ogether. Seen from this perspective,we exist as
"meaningfulxpressions"na shared ife-world ather hanas mindsrep-
resenting objects.
Wittgenstein's escription f our everydayivesoverlaps hepicturewe
findin Heidegger.The self, regardedas agency,appearsas an ongoing
"happening"mbeddedn a public ife-worldwhose actionsandself-un-
derstandingdraw theirsignificance rom their locationin the practices
and customsof the "They."Given hisportrayal f our humansituation,
thepictureof theself as a mindrepresentingbjectssimplyhasno role to
play. For both thinkers,to graspthe situatednessof our liveswithin a
background f life-expressions f a community s to see that the mental
canbe made ntelligiblewithoutrecourse o a "yetuncomprehendedro-
cessinthe yet unexploredmedium" PI3o8). AsWittgenstein ays,"Onlysurroundedby certainnormalexpressionsof life [Lebensausserungen]s
theresucha thingas an expressionof pain. Onlysurrounded yaneven
morefar-reaching xpressionof life, sucha thing asthe expressionof sor-
row or affection" Z 5 34). And,for both thinkers, he contextualization
9 This accountdrawson JamesC. Edwards'EthicsWithoutPhilosophy Tampa:Univer-
sity of Florida, I 9 82), pp. i 83 ff.
66o CHARLES GUIGNON
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of our livesin a communalworld our existenceas, so to speak, com-
mentarieson the text of our culture'sways of interpreting hings -
implies hat therecan be no accessto brute,uninterpreted facts"about
independently xisting objectsto be usedin justifyingor explainingour
practices.At the sametime, however, he description f everydaynessetsus see thatour livesandthe worldarealreadyntelligible, ndthereforedo
not need any philosophicalexplanationor grounding.
3. Languageand Truth
In the writingsof both Wittgenstein nd Heidegger, anguageplays a cru-
cial role in articulatingour shared sense of ourselvesand the world
aroundus. We saw that, for Heidegger,Dasein "expresses tself"in itseverydaydealingswith equipment.Theseordinaryways of articulating
oursurroundingsnto a fieldof significance re focusedand organized n
advance by a background of intelligibility opened by discourse:
"Intelligibilityhas always been articulated,even before there is any
appropriativenterpretation f it. Discourse[Rede] s the articulation f
intelligibility.Therefore t underliesboth interpretation nd assertion"
(SZ p. i6i).
To understandwhatHeideggermeansbydiscoursehere,we mustkeepin mind hat the term"Dasein does not simplydesignate solated ndivid-
ual humanbeings.Dasein, as we have seen,is essentially"Being-with,"
communalbeingwhose senseof reality s initiallypreshapedby the way
the "They"articulates ignificance.Accordingly, anguages the medium
in which a community's"clearing" its understanding f itself and its
world) is opened up and maintained."Inlanguage,as a way in which
thingshavebeen
spoken out,there is hiddena way in whichthe under-
standingof Dasein has beeninterpreted.. . . Proximally,andwith cer-
tain limits, Dasein is constantlydeliveredover to this interpretedness,whichcontrolsanddistributes hepossibilitiesof averageunderstanding
andof the situatednessbelonging o it" (SZ pp. i67-8). Seenfromthis
standpoint,Daseinasa clearingsmadepossiblebythearticulations uilt
intoapublic anguage."For he mostpart,discoursesexpressedby being
spokenout, and hasalreadybeen so expressed;t is language.Butin that
caseunderstanding ndinterpretation lready ie in what has thus beenexpressed" SZ p. i67). Heideggerelsewherecalls this linguisticback-
ground he "projectiveaying"of apeople, he linguistically ttunedgoal-
directednessnwhich"theconceptsof ahistoricalpeople'sessence, .e.,of
its belonging o world history, are preformed or that people."'"
t" "TheOriginof the Work of Art," in Heidegger, Basic Writings,ed. D. Krell (New York:
Harper, 1977), p. i85.
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 66i
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Our everydayalkcontributes o sustaining hissharedbackground f
intelligibility. In talking, Heidegger says, our "Being-withbecomes
'explicitly'shared";throughtalk "the articulationof being with one
anotherunderstandinglys constituted" SZ p. i62). In otherwords, the
centralrole of languageuse is to "express"or "make manifest"oursharedattunement o a publicworld:"Intalking,Daseinexpresses tself
not because t has, in the first nstance,been encapsulated s something
'internal'over against somethingoutside when it understands.What is
expressed s precisely hisbeing-outside. . ." (SZp. i 62). CharlesTaylor
has discussed he role of language n expressingor makingmanifestour
shared"being-outside" ith one another."AsTaylorpointsout, the tra-
ditiongenerally egarded anguageas a tool at ourdisposalfordesignat-
ing and communicatingnformationabout objects.In contrast to this
kind of "designative"iewof language,Taylorproposeswe see language
asprimarily medium n whicha "public pace" sopenedup.Totakehis
example, f Igetontoa crowdedbus on ahotdayandsay to a fellow-pas-
senger,"Hot,isn't t?"myutterance either onveys nformation or asks
aquestion. nstead,ts role sto makemanifestoursharedpredicament,o
"getsomethingout intotheopen betweenus," to fine uneour senseof the
existentialspacein whichwe stand.Similarly, or Heidegger,communicationinis neveranything ike a
conveyingof experiences, uch asopinionsorwishes,fromtheinteriorof
onesubject nto the interiorof another.Dasein-with s already ssentially
manifest n a co-situatedness nd a co-understanding"SZp. i62). Itfol-
lowsthatlanguages notprimarily tool forrelayingdeasfromone sub-
ject to another,but is instead the medium n which our sharedunder-
standingof ourselvesand our worldis depositedandmaintained.Thisis
why Heidegger aysthat t is not humanswhospeak,butrather"languagespeaks" - "Humansspeak only insofar as they corespondto lan-
guage. i Becauseour shared ense of realityandthepublicspaceof our
practical life-world are constituted by language, "essenceand Being
expressthemselves n language."'3Languages the "dwelling"n which
our sense of who we areemerges,and so "wehumanbeingsremaincom-
mitted o andwithin he essenceof language,andcannever tepoutsideof
it in order to look at it fromsomewhereelse."'4
""Language nd HumanNature"and "Theories f Meaning," eprintedn his Human
Agencyand Language,Philosophical apers,Vol. I (Cambridge: ambridgeUniversity
Press, 985).
I ThePietyof Thinking, rans.J. G. Hart and J. C. Maraldo (Bloomington:ndiana
UniversityPress,1976), p. 25.
'3 Introduction o Metaphysics,rans.R. Manheim GardenCity: Doubleday, 96I), p.
44.
662 CHARLES GUIGNON
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Correlatedwith Heidegger's escription f the self as a place-holdern
the public ife-world,and of languageasmakingmanifesta sharedback-
ground of intelligibility, s a transformedway of looking at "truth."
Accordingto this outlook, "primordial"ruth is the "disclosedness"
which makes t possiblefor thingsto emerge-into-presence,nd truth as
"correspondence" r "correctrepresentation"s derivativefrom thismoreprimordial ruth.The notionof primordial ruth s clarifiedn Hei-
degger'sattempt o show thatwhatusually s assumed o be the primary
locus of truth, the subject/predicatessertion, s derivative rom a more
basic involvementn practicalaffairs(SZsec. 33). Inour normaltrans-
actionswithequipment,we layoutandappropriate quipment ccording
to ouraimsandneeds.Language,when it hasaroletoplay, usually peaks
into these concerns, ightingup aspectsof the "hermeneutic s" of taking
somethingas something n our concernfuldealings.Forexample,calling
out "Tooheavy Handme the otherhammer "nthe midstofhammering
makesmanifesthow thingsstand ntheworkshop: t shows how the work
is going, and lets things become manifest as they are in our clearing.
Through his expression, he entirecontext of significance elations s lit
up.
Whenwe shiftfromusing anguagen order o expressourabsorption
in a fieldof significanceo using t to make "apophantic ssertions," hereis a change-overn our mode of comportment o the world.In a subject/
predicate ssertion uch as "Thehammerweighs fourpounds,"we focus
on the hammeras a present-at-handbjectwith a property, upposedly
severed romany particular ontext of practical ignificance."In ts func-
tion of appropriatingwhat is understood,"Heidegger ays, "the 'as'no
longerreachesout into a totalityof involvements.. . . [I]thas been cut
off fromthat significancewhich, as such, constitutesenvironmentality"
(SZp. I58). The baresubject/predicatessertion s disengaged romits
rolein disclosinghow thingsstand with our activities,and is regarded s
merelyrepresenting "fact"abouta meaningless, resent-at-handhing.
Onlywhen therehas been this kind of change-over o decontextualized
assertions anquestionsabout "correctness" r "correspondenceo the
facts"arise,and now standardsorts of checkingand confirmationget
underway. What this account of assertionshows, however, is that
encountering hings as mere objects representedby subject/predicateassertionss parasiticon the "clearing" pened n advancebythoseprac-
tical concernsand involvementshroughwhichthingsare discoveredas
meaningfuln our lives.
14 On the Wayto Language,rans.P. D. Hartz(New York:Harper& Row, 1971), p.
'34.
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 663
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Heidegger's erivation f the traditional onceptof truthascorrespon-
dencefroma "moreprimordial" xperience f truthas disclosednessSZ
sec. 44) follows the samepattern.The claim sthatonly because he world
and the thingsin it are alreadyopened up by our discursivepreunder-
standing s it possiblefor a conceptionof thingsas mereobjects o arise.Ourpracticalactivitiesdisclose the arena n which questionsabout the
correctness f beliefs or the truth of statementsget off the ground.And
within this clearing, "'things tand in different ruths"'5dependingon
our interestsand our concerns forexample,acrucifixwouldplayadif-
ferentrole withinthe "truths"of science,aesthetics,or religiousexperi-
ence. But it is only because Dasein in general "is 'in the truth,"'and
becausedisclosedness"belongsto its existentialconstitution"(SZ p.
zzi), that these "different ruths"and the standard ypes of regionalinquirycorrelatedwith them are possible.
Wittgenstein lso seesourlanguageandpracticesas openinga fieldof
intelligibility n which the issue of truth as correspondence an arise
(though, o besure,he wouldnot callthisbackgroundtself"truth").As
the medium n which our understanding f ourselvesand our world is
maintained, anguagearticulatesand shapesour attunement o shared
forms of life and definesour own beingas meaningful xpressions.Ourordinaryanguage-gamesmakemanifestour attunedparticipationn the
customsandpracticesof our publicworld. But language-games o not
merelyformulatean understandingwe could just as well havewithout
language.Forlanguageconstitutesourwaysof encountering hings and
interpreting urselves.WhenWittgenstein ays that a dog can "feel fear
but not remorse,"and that this is so because t "can't alk"(Z 5i8), he
means that, althougha dog can react to physical danger,it lacks the
capacity to grasp public standards of conduct, to recognize thesignificanceof the situation in relation to those standards, o contrast
remorsewith shame or regret, o revise ts self-evaluationn the lightof
redescriptionsf the situation all thoselanguage-dependentapacities
thatconstituteourability o feelremorse.We areableto havecertain orts
of feelingsand to identify hings n ourenvironment s significant, hen,
becauseof the masteryof whatWittgenstein alls the "grammar" the
backgroundarticulationof our possibilitiesof understanding thatprestructureshe language-games e learn n growingupintoa linguistic
community. For this reason he says, "Essence is expressed
[ausgesprochen]y grammar," nd"grammarells us whatkindof object
anything s" (PI37I, 373).
" What sa Thing?,rans.W. B.Barton, r.andVeraDeutsch Chicago:HenryRegnery,I967), p.
14-
664 CHARLES GUIGNON
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I take Wittgenstein's onceptof "grammar" s referring o what he
sometimescalls the "system"of standard connections and relations
organizingour languageuse which is embodied n the regularpractices
and contextsof communalife.Thus, t seems o be partof thegrammar f
obtainingand reporting esultsof measuringhatthere s "acertaincon-stancyin the resultsof measuring" PI242). Similarly, t is part of the
grammatical"framework n which the workingof language s based"
that disputests do not breakout (amongmathematicians,ay)overthe
questionof whetherarulehas beenobeyedor not"(PI 40, myemphasis).
The "framework"r "scaffolding"hat makesthe activityof mathemat-
ics possibleis found not by conceptualanalysis,but by describing he
familiar ife-expressionsf mathematicians. his contextof familiarprac-
tices is referred o (perhapsmisleadingly) s "agreementn judgments":"If anguage s to bea meansof communicationheremust beagreement
not only in definitionsbutalso . . . in judgments"PI242). Theattune-
mentto regular,orderlypracticesmakesupthe "grammaticalmultiplic-
ity"of our language,butit cannotbe thoughtof asjustifyingor explain-
ing our language-games: I have not said why mathematicians o not
quarrel,butonly thattheydo not" (PIp. zz6). Nevertheless, urattune-
mentconstitutes heconceptswe have:"If herewerenotcompleteagree-ment [in the calculationsmadeby mathematicians],hen neitherwould
humanbeingsbe learning he techniquewhich we learn"(PI p. 226).
Ifthisway of readingWittgenstein's otion of "grammar"s right, hen
grammarmight be thoughtof as a web of practiceswhich,likea grid or
template,guidesourwaysof speakingandtakingthings n ordinaryan-
guage-games.Wittgenstein ompares his background f understanding
to a "world-picture"ra "mythology"hatmakesupthetacit,"inherited
background gainstwhichI distinguish rueand false"(OC94-95), andto "asystem,astructure" f taken-for-grantedonvictions OCIo2) that
makes dentifications nd discriminations ossible.But this background
of understandings not a "webof beliefs"(asthe term"judgments"ug-
gests); t is something hat is embodied nthose sharedpracticeswe come
to expressas we become nitiated nto theformsof life of our culture.For
thisreason,Wittgensteinaysthatgivinggroundsdoes not cometo an end
in aproposition hat one justseesas true:"itis nota kindof seeingon our
part; t is ouractingwhichlies at thegroundof thelanguage-game"OC
204). Thegroundof our beliefsandpractices"is not anungrounded re-
supposition:t is anungroundedway of acting"(OCzio; myemphasis).
ForWittgenstein,hen, languageembodiesa grammarwhichconsti-
tutesour senseof realityandgroundsour beliefsandwaysof doingthings.
But,as is trueof Heidegger'sbackground f intelligibility, rammar an-
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 665
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not itselfbe groundedby appeal o any extra-linguisticacts.Accordingo
Wittgenstein'swell-known"autonomyof grammar" rgument,"I can-
not use language o get outsideof language" PRp. 54). That is, to put it
roughly, since every attemptto justify grammarby appeal to "facts"
about realityonly succeeds n makinguse of somedescriptionof realitywhich itselfpresupposeshe correctness f thegrammarn question,any
such attempted ustificationbegs the question.Insofaras our grammar
constituteswhatcancount asreality orus,there s noexit from anguage
to non-linguistic"facts" about ourselvesor our world which could
ground he grammarwe have.But neither s it correct o thinkwe create
our language-games r theirgrammar:"alanguage-game oes not have
its origin in consideration orreflection].Consideration or reflection] s
part of a language-game" Z 39i). Hence, though languagemay look"arbitrary"o the extent that "the use of language s in a certainsense
autonomous" Z 320), in anothersenseit is not somethingwe cook up
ourselves itis "notasifwechosethisgame" OC3 17]). Alanguage-game
"is not basedon grounds. t is not reasonableor unreasonable).tis there
like our life" (OC559).
In the picture of our situation that emerges from Wittgenstein's
reflections,we come to see ourselvesas participantsn public language-gameswhich are not groundedon anythingoutsideour lives, and yet,
insofaras they constituteour lives, theyarenot somethingwe createor
can fullymaster.The background f intelligibility pened by our gram-
mar is neithertrue nor false ("Ifthe true is what is grounded, hen the
ground s not true,noryet false"[OC 205]). Yet,as the "scaffolding f
our thoughts"(OC z ii), it is what makes t possibleto believeand say
thingsthat countaseither rueor false.Forlanguageas a whole, "we see
that the idea of 'agreementwithreality'does not haveanyclearapplica-tion" (OC 2I5). Thus, althoughWittgensteinwouldeschewHeidegger's
talk of "primordial ruth,"the view he presentsparallelsHeidegger's
notion of a linguistically onstituted"clearing" r "disclosedness" s the
backdropwhich makespossibleoureveryday ssertions nddenials, est-
ing and disconfirming, xplanationsand justifications.
4. The Legacyof Wittgensteinand HeideggerThe question posed at the outset was: What is the impactof Wittgen-
stein's andHeidegger's houghtfor traditionalphilosophy? n this con-
cludingsectionIwant to summarize he resultsof thecomparisons have
made,andsketchout someof the issues n the debatebetweenRortyand
Taylor.Wemightsumupthe outcomeof thethoughtof Wittgenstein nd
Heideggerby saying hat it is holistic,anti-dualist, ndnonfoundational-
ist. The holismappears n theirconvergentpicturesof our transactions
666 CHARLES GUIGNON
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with theworld as constitutedby a background f understandingmbod-
iedin ourpractices ndshapedbyour language.ForHeidegger, ur deal-
ingswithequipmentmake t possible or theworldto showup forus asan
interrelated web of "significance" where what anything is is
"ontologicallydefined"by its relation to our goals and practices.Therelationsof "inorder o," "4for hich,"and "forthe sake of which"that
defineour life-worldare not properties ackedonto pre-existent bjects.
As "relationshipsnwhichconcernfulknow-howas suchalreadydwells"
(SZ p. 88), they definenot only the "worldhoodof the world"but our
own identityasagents ntheworldas well.Similarly,orWittgenstein,he
"essence" f anything whatmakes t theobject t is- is definedbythe
"grammaticalmultiplicity"of our language-games.What thingsare is
inseparablerom theirplacein the contextsof significance penedup by
the linguisticcustoms,conventions,andpracticesof our life-world.
One consequence f thisholism is thatunderstanding lwaysoperates
withinahermeneuticircle.Ourwaysof encounteringhings nthe world
are sketchedout in advanceby what Heideggercalls a "blueprint" r
"groundplan"'f preunderstanding,while that understandings con-
stantlyredefinedas a resultof ourongoingtransactionswith the world.
Thereis consequentlyno way to gain access to brute factsor raw dataindependentof some frameworkof understanding. n Wittgenstein's
example,a chemist's nvestigations remadepossibleby the fact thathe
"hasgot hold of a definiteworld-picture not of course one that he
invented:he learned t as a child."This world-picture"isthe matter-of-
coursefoundation or his researchand as such also goes unmentioned"
(OC i67). Yet, since a world-picture r mythology"maychangeback
into a stateof flux, theriver-bed f thoughtsmay shift" (OC97), there s
no unchanging oundation hat underwriteshe grammarwe have.
A second affinitybetweenWittgenstein ndHeideggers found in the
way theyundercut raditionaldualisms. t should be evident, irstof all,
thattheir hought ubvertsheCartesian ppositionsof subjectandobject
or mindandmatter.If our actions are understoodas expressions nter-
wovenintoa public"tapestry f life,"then thenotionsof mind and con-
sciousnesshaveno necessary oleto playin describing ndgraspingour
everydayness.One can "divide hrough"by the mental;"itcancelsout,whatever t is" (PI293). Yet, at the sametime,neitherWittgensteinnor
Heideggereels hatdisplacinghemental hereby ommitsus to physical-
ism or behaviorism. n theirpictureof our livesas boundup with a life-
worldwhere hingsshowupassignificantnrelation o ourpurposesand
needs, here snoplace nthedescription f everydaynessorthe notion of
brute,meaninglessphysicalobjectsor "mere"physicalmovement.In
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 667
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fact, since both thinkerssuggestthat the naturalsciencesarederivative
from and parasiticon a "moreprimordial"way of understanding ur-
selvesand our worldas participantsn themeaningful ontextsof every-
daylife,there s no reason o assume hat theconceptionof realitywe get
from physics has any privilegedstatus in tellingus what the world is"really" ike.
Deflating he oppositionbetween ubjectandobjectshouldalso under-
mine the traditionaldistinctionbetween dealismand realism.This dis-
tinctionhasalwaysbeenparasitic or its sense on the representationalist
pictureof oursituation,according o whichreality s either "outthere,"
independent f us, or "inhere,"within the mind.Butif the representa-
tionalistmodel s discarded, o is the dilemma: itherrealismor idealism.
Thus, t seemsmisleadingo suggest hat,since "our anguage . . shows
us everything s it appears o-our nterests,ourconcerns,ouractivities,"
andsincetheseare"thingswhich areexpressions f mind," his"provides
grounds. . . for calling such a view a kind of idealism... ."'s For the
verynotion that ourinterests, oncernsandactivitiesare"expressions f
mind" s exactlywhatWittgenstein ndHeideggerhaveblocked.Wecan-
not explainouractivitiesby recourse o extra-linguisticacts,but neither
can we considerthe possibilitythat all thereis is languageor mind asopposedto gettingin touch with the facts. It also seemswrong to say,
"Horsesandgiraffes,colors andshapes the existenceof these is not [a
productof human inguisticpractice].. . . Butthe metaphysical ecessi-
tiesbelonging o the natureof suchthings theseseemto beregarded y
[Wittgenstein]as 'grammatical ules.""7For, on the one hand, since
what we meanwhenwe try to affirm he existenceof horsesandgiraffess
always constitutedby the linguisticarticulationsmadepossible by the
background f our "grammar,"here s no wayto getout of language n
orderto assert he existenceof thesetypesof thingsas theyarein them-
selvesindependentof any grammar.And, on the otherhand, since the
"metaphysical ecessities"of suchthingsareindistinguishableromthe
concreteways those thingsshow up for us in our languageandactions,
talkaboutmetaphysical ecessityseemsto be a wheelin a machine hat
turns when nothingelse is moving.
Finally,Wittgenstein's ndHeidegger's isionof oursituation s non-foundationalisto the extentthatit underminesheprospectsof findinga
finalexplanationor justification or our lives. ForHeidegger,our exis-
z6 BernardWilliams,"Wittgenstein ndIdealism,"n his MoralLuck(Cambridge: am-
bridgeUniversityPress, 98I), p. 153.
7 G. E. M. Anscombe,"TheQuestionof Linguisticdealism,"n her FromParmenides
to Wittgenstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, I98I), p. I2z.
668 CHARLES GUIGNON
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tence as a "happening," s a "thrownprojection," s finite,contingentandhistorical n the sense of beinganongoingdialoguewith thepast forthepurposesof the future.As the sourceof all intelligibility,heclearingthat we are is itselfsuspended ver "theabyssof meaninglessness"SZp.
152z). AndWittgenstein onstantlyremindsus of "thegroundlessness four believing" (OC i66), the transience of even our most central
"mythology" OC 96-99), and the seemingly"arbitrary" atureof our
core beliefs.
But forboththinkers hisgroundlessness oesnot leadto skeptical es-ignation or perpetualuncertainty.As Wittgenstein ays, "Thedifficult
thing here is not to dig down to the ground;no, it is to recognize heground hat liesbeforeus as theground" RFMp. 33 3). Recognizing he
rootednessof ourbeliefsandactivities n our shared ormsof life and inthe "commonbehaviorof mankind" PIzo6) canthrow us backonto the
groundswe do have- our patternsof upbringing,natural"primitive"
responses,capacitiesfor pickingup skills, and so on - with a deeperrespectfor theirdependability nd bindingness.To acknowledge,with
Seabright,hatmeaningsnsarenot inthe headbutintheworld"'8wouldbeto see ourpracticesasguidedbythesteadyandregular"expressions f
life" of ourculturalworld, and to realize hat,since ourshared ormsoflife constituteour identity,there is no way to regard hem as arbitraryimpositionsoras mereexcessbaggagewith no realconnection o who wereallyare. Ina relatedway, Heidegger hinksthat facing up to ourown
finitudecanthrow us backonto our livesin a fullerway. Inhis view, toclear-sightedlycknowledge hatwe arecaught nthe hermeneutic ircleis also to realize hatthis circularity s an enablingconditionwhichfirstgives us access o ourlives,with theresult hat our aimshouldbe "not to
getout of the circlebut to comeinto it in therightway" (SZp. 153). Andhis discussionof "authentichistoricity" SZsecs. 74-77) proposesthatonce we fullyrecognize he finitudeandtemporality f ourpossibilities f
self-interpretation, e will take over the "happening" f our communi-
ty's historywith deepercommitmentandrespect,appropriatinghepastas a "heritage" ndorientingourgoals forthe futureas partof a shared
"destiny."What this nonfoundationalism oes implyis that there is nofinalexplanation or our formsof life that wouldput an end to inquiry,andconsequently hat attempts o understandourselvesand our worldare an open-ended,ongoingproject.
8 Paul Seabright, "Explaining Cultural Divergence: A Wittgensteinian Paradox," Journal
of Philosophy84 (I987): 11-27, p. 22.
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 669
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The divergent eadingsof the significance f the writingsof Wittgen-
stein andHeidegger ound nRortyandTaylormightbe seen asresulting
fromemphasizing ifferent trandsof thesethinkers'work. Rorty ocuses
on the anti-foundationalism nd contextualismof their writings and
draws he conclusion hattheyhaveputanend to traditional pistemolo-gy-centeredphilosophyas a searchfor finaltruths about ourselvesand
ourworld.OnRorty'sreading, hewritingsof Wittgenstein reprimarily
therapeutic ndnegative, learingawaythepresuppositionsf traditional
philosophyand offeringnothingnewin theirplace: "WhenWittgenstein
is at his best, he resolutelyavoids . . constructive riticismandsticks o
pure satire.He just shows, by examples,how hopelessthe traditional
problemsare; . . he justmakes unof the whole ideathat there s some-
thinghereto beexplained."'9Andthelegacyof the laterHeidegger who
threwoff thevestigesof "fundamentalntology"still foundin his early
work) is not a new pictureof humans,but "theendless,repetitive, iter-
ary-historicaldeconstruction' f the Westernmetaphysics f presence"
(CP p. xxii).
The outcome of Wittgensteinand Heidegger,according o Rorty, is
"epistemological ehaviorism,"he pragmatistattitude that is content
withexplaining ationality ndepistemicauthority"byreference o whatsocietylets us say""0ather hanby privileged epresentationsr by cri-
teriadictatedby purereason. And "behaviorismwhich dispenseswith
foundations s in a fairway towardsdispensingwith philosophy.""To
see a humanbeingas a self-interpretingnimal s to see "manas a self-
changing being, capable of remaking himself by remaking his
speech.""The lesson to be drawnfromthe insight nto "theubiquityof
language" s that "one cannot see language-as-a-wholen relation to
somethingelse to which it applies,or forwhichit is a meansto an end"
(CPp. xix). Wittgenstein ndHeidegger, hen,are"making nlynegative
points"thatthere s nothingbehind anguagewhich couldground t (CP
p. xx). Graspinghe outcomeof the development f thought nthe twenti-
eth century hould lead us to a new attitudeof ironyandplayfulness:o
"abjure he notion of 'the trulyhuman"'and to "become ncreasingly
9 Consequencesf PragmatismMinneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, I982), p.
34 (henceforth "CP").
10 Philosophyand theMirror f Nature(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p.
'74.
"Epistemological Behaviorism and the De-transcendentalization of Analytic Philoso-
phy," in R. Hollinger, ed., Hermeneutics and Practice (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Uni-
versityPress, 985), p. ioz.
m Ibid., p. 104.
670 CHARLES GUIGNON
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ironic,playful,free,and inventive n ourchoice of self-descriptions." A
certain"ethnocentrism," hichacknowledgeswe cannever"stepoutside
our skins" or escape from "the 'merelyconventional'and contingent
aspectsof one's life" (CPp. xix), iscombinedwith the ability o "seeevery
human ife as a poem"b4 createdby individuals hrough maginative elf-descriptions.
Taylor,in contrast,emphasizes heway in which the phenomenology
of everydaynessprovidesus with an alternativeway of understanding
who we are. For Taylor,the fact that we are self-interpretingnimals
insures hat we havewhat he calls"agent'sknowledge" OEp. 475), that
is, insight nto whatwe aredoing nsofaras our own self-descriptionson-
stituteour movementsas actions.Althougha person'sown self-under-
standingmaybe shot throughwith self-deception,t provides he expla-
nandum romwhich any accountof the agentmustbegin,andit therefore
has a privileged tatus n graspinghis orher action. Taylor'shope is that
our agent's knowledgewill also providea basis for uncoveringdeeper
insights nto theunderlyingtructures f agency ngeneral.Rorty, ncon-
trast,thinks this beliefin something"deep"or "moreauthentic"about
ourselves sjusta remnant f the"cravingormetaphysicalomfort" hat
Wittgensteinand Heideggerhave undermined.The faith that we have"privileged ccess" o ourselves that we can "readour own program"
(CP p. i65) - presupposesa now untenableessentialism.
Thoughit is impossible o adjudicatehisdisputehere,I want to sug-
gestthatTaylor'sreadingof the"legitimate eir"of philosophy smore n
line with the overalldirectionof Wittgenstein's nd Heidegger's hought.
Taylor correctly criticizes Rorty's view that all language-gamesare
optionalandupforgrabs.BothWittgenstein ndHeideggerhave shown
usthat, althoughourself-descriptionsreungrounded,heyareneverthe-lessconstitutiveof who we are,and so cannotbe takenup or abandoned
at will. As Taylor says, Rorty's pictureof all vocabulariesas optional
makes sense only if we can think of ourselves as "in fact at home
nowhere,"and this assumption eemsto relyon a "notionof thesubject
as disengaged"which is itself "generatedby the epistemological radi-
tion" Rortyseeks to overcome.15If we recognize hat,as agents,we are
alwaysenmeshedn aconcrete ultural ontext,we will see thatthere snovantagepointfor the stanceof global ronyandplayfulnessRortyrecom-
mends.
13 "Freudand Moral Reflection," n J. H. Smith and W. Kerrigan, ds., Pragmatism's
Freud:The MoralDispositionof PsychoanalysisBaltimore: ohnsHopkins,I986), p.
I2.
24 "The Contingency f Selfhood,"London Reviewof Books, May 8, I986, p. 14.
25 "Philosophy nd Its History," n Rorty,Schneewind, nd Skinner, ds., Philosophy n
History:Essayson the Historiography f Philosophy Cambridge: ambridgeUniver-sity Press,I984), p. 30.
PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 671
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Withinour own background f understanding,hen, we cantry to for-
mulate he typesof "transcendentaleneralization"bout the conditions
for agencyHeidegger ought such pervasive eaturesas situatedness,
futuredirectedness,nvolvementnsignificant ituations,andlinguistical-
ity - while holdingonto Wittgenstein'sdistrustof totalizationandhisinsistence on detailed, case-by-casedescription.The results of such a
quasi-transcendentalnquirywill be defeasiblegivenour embeddedness
in an ongoinghistoricalculture,and they can be defendedonly by local
skirmisheswith specificobjections ather hanbyknock-downarguments
starting rom ndubitable remises.But,to the extentthatthis search or a
deeperself-understandinghroughthe critique of representationalism
points to a transformedoutlook on pressingpuzzlesabout our human
situation, t reveals he potentialof a post-Wittgensteinian/Heideggerianphilosophy.Z6
26 Researchor thispaperwassupported ya UniversityResearchGrant rom he Univer-
sityof Vermont nd anNEHSummer eminar rant.Iamgratefulo KathleenEmmett,
MarkBickhard, ndLynnRudderBaker orcomments n an earlierdraftof thisessay.
672 CHARLES GUIGNON
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