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From self-‐evalua.on to metarepresenta.on: two representa.onal systems?
Joëlle Proust
Ins.tut Jean-‐Nicod, ENS, Paris
hBp://dividnorm.ens.fr hBp://joelleproust.org
The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology 2016
Louisville, Kentucky
EPISTEMIC SELF-‐EVALUATION
AKA « METACOGNITION »: = the ability to predict success in a cogni.ve first-‐order task, such as:
– Categorizing perceived paBerns – Remembering a name or an icon – Learning – Solving a problem
Why would a philosopher care? 3 reasons (at least)
• Discern what is specific to human ra.onality and what is shared with other vertebrates.
• Update our no.on of a representa.onal mind in the light of findings in cogni.ve science.
• Refine the no.on of epistemic evaluability by focussing on its representa.onal condi.ons.
Outline
1. Metacogni.on in young children: Developmental dissocia.ons
2. Metacogni.on in monkeys: evidence, implica.ons
3. Evalua.ve vs proposi.onal abtude representa.ons
1. Metacogni.on in young children
Developmental dissocia.ons between aBribu.on and self-‐evalua.on
• Young children are unreliable in repor.ng their underlying knowledge states (Smar.es task, Gopnik & As.ngton 1988, par.al knowledge, Rohwer et al. 2012, lexical knowledge: Marazita & Merriman, 2004)
• However, they can reliably monitor their percep.on & memory in implicit decisions, e.g. – op.ng out from a task. (Balcomb & Gerken, 2008) Bernard et al.( 2014, 2015)
– Fixa.on paBerns on a confidence scale (Paulus, Proust & Sodian, 2013).
Kim, Paulus, Sodian, Proust (subm.): sensi.vity to own ignorance
This study examines 3 and 4 year-‐olds‘ performances • in an explicit mc task (do you know or not where the object is?) replica.ng Rohwer et al. 2012
• In an implicit mc task (Do you want or not to inform Max about where the object is?)
• in each task, three condi.ons: – Full knowledge: children saw one toy and watched its being hidden in an opaque box
– Par.al knowledge condi.on: children saw two toys and the empty box & were told that one of them would be hidden in the box, but did not see which one.
– Ignorance condi.on: children did not see any object, and were merely told that a toy would be hidden in the box behind the screen. Then the screen opened, revealing the opaque box.
Explicit knowledge report Rohwer et al.(2012)
On this basis,
• One might hypothesize that children correctly aBribute knowledge to themselves only when they have acquired a full-‐blown concept-‐based theory of mind.
• However ..
We added an informing task
• The exact same procedure as in the explicit task except that children were asked whether or not they would choose to inform another person whose view to the box was blocked in all condi.ons
Informing/knowledge self-‐aBribu.on in 4 yr-‐olds: accurate responses
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Full Par.al Ignorance
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* p < .001 *
Decisions to inform in 3 and 4 yr-‐olds (correct or not)
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Uncertainty gestures
• In addi.on, we recorded the gestures produced in each condi.on of the repor.ng/informing tasks.
• We found a linear increase in gesture produc9on from full to par.al and to ignorance condi.ons, with a steeper slope in the informing than in the repor.ng task.
Uncertainty gestures in 3 and 4 Year olds
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• Children over-‐reported their knowledge in the explicit verbal judgment task
• When asked to inform another person – they were more accurate in conveying their ignorance by declining to inform
– They also produced gestures of uncertainty as a func.on of the informa.on they had.
Evidence compa.ble with a dissocia.on informing/repor.ng
• 3 and 4 yr-‐olds are able to "implicitly" monitor their knowledge and control their epistemic decision when informing another person.
• They are, however, unable to reliably report whether they know where the toy is before 6-‐7 years of age
Two types of explana.on
1. Addi.onal execu.ve demands in verbal tasks?
2. Different types of representa.onal processes involved?
The strategic importance of comparative studies
Allow fully dissociating Ø A metarepresentational capacity (assumed
not present in non-humans except apes) Ø A metacognitive capacity (arguably
present in several nonhuman species) Ø A motor control capacity (present in most
moving animals)
2. Non-‐human metacogni.on: evidence, implica.ons
Examples of Animal metacogni.on
• Rhesus monkeys and rats can evaluate their own perceptual access to s.muli.
• Rhesus monkeys, pigeons, chimpanzees and orangutans have been shown to flexibly search for needed informa.on and to reliably monitor their memory.
• Rhesus monkeys can wager on their cogni.ve responses.
Main types of tasks eliciting Judgments of uncertainty
• Seeking for informa.on (SI) tasks: Will an animal ask for informa.on only when needed ? (Call & Carpenter, 2001)
• Buying hints when learning (Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007) .
• Choose-‐or-‐decline-‐to-‐respond (« opt out ») paradigm (Smith et al., 2006, Beran et al. 2010)
• Wagering tasks (risk icons for bebng on a given response ater it has been made).
• Ac.on control based on internal vs external confidence feedback (Beran et al. 2015)
Smith and/or coll. on metacognition in monkeys
• Rhesus monkeys decline most the most difficult trials in visual discrimination tasks (Shield, Smith & Washburn, 1997) and in memory tasks (Hampton, 2001).
• They generalize their U- responses to new tasks. (Washburn, Smith & Shields, 2006)
• Macaques also use U-responses with blocked feedback (Beran, Smith, Redford & Washburn, 2006)
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Sparse Dense
Uncertain
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1250 1650 2050 2450 2850 Box Density (pixels)
Macaque
Sparse Dense
Uncertain
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1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100Pitch Height (Hz)
A. Dolphin
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Dolphin
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Humans Sparse
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Monkey
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Metacognition in Phylogeny: Yes No
• Primates: – chimps and orangutans
search for info (SI) – Chimps have MC control – Rhesus macaques (SI & U-
R)
• Marine mammals: – Bottle-nosed dolphins U-R
• Pigeons, bantams (Fujita & al, 2011): retrospective U-R
• Rats: Kepecs et al. 2008
• Pigeons: no prospective U-R (Sutton & Shettleworth, 2008)
• Capuchin monkeys: no SI, no U-R (Beran et al. 2006)
What are the processes underlying animal metacogni.on?
1. Metarepresenta.ons? 2. Reinforcement learning? 3. Execu.ve, goal-‐directed abili.es? 4. Specialized heuris.cs for predic.ng cogni.ve
outcome?
1 -‐ Does mc require represen.ng one’s own mental states?
It is some.mes claimed that nonhuman and human metacogni.on both require thinking about one’ own mental contents through metarepresenta.ons. (Smith et al. 2003) The seman.c structure of metarepresenta.ons is proposi.onal embedding.
Proposi.onal structure Based on the contrast between an object being subsumed under a concept. • Cons.tuents in a proposi.on can be combined at will
• Conceptual structure enables deduc.ve inferences.
• This structure is adequate for both verbally expressing and repor.ng abtude contents
Proposi.onal abtude ascrip.on
• Abtude verbs, rela.ve clauses, etc. allow embedding proposi.ons in proposi.ons.
• Whether self-‐ or other-‐directed, an abtude ascrip.on has the form:
• S believes (desires, hopes, etc.) that [A is F]
Is mc based on proposi.onal thinking?
• Nonhumans can – iden.fy others’ emo.ons and predict their reac.ons.
– select a food container that a dominant cannot see (Hare et al. 2001).
• They might form beliefs (Allen, 2012, Proust, 1997).
• But they are unable to aBribute false beliefs to others or to self.
• If non-‐mindreaders such as rhesus monkeys can evaluate their memory, then doing so does not require possessing a concept of memory.
2 . Is metacogni.on based on reinforcement learning?
• First-‐order associa9onism: The informa.on that animals use when performing tasks qualified as "metacogni.ve" are of a behavioral nature
• Op.ng out, and the other “mc” tasks reviewed above, can be solved on the basis of operant condi.oning: they are merely cogni.ve (Le Pelley 2014)
• An animal’s willingness to opt out from a cogni.ve task, from this viewpoint, depends on a state of the world represented as worth producing, rather than on an internal evalua.on of the agent's own uncertainty.
4 difficul.es
1. Suppression of direct reinforcement does not influence metacogni.on (Smith et al. 2006)
2. The difference observed between trials with
free and forced cogni.ve decisions shows that animals are sensi.ve to endogenous cues rather than merely to states of the world. (Hampton, 2001, Smith et al. 2014)
4 difficul.es
3. Computer simula.ons based on behavioral cues have failed to track MC response paBerns (Smith et al. 2008, 2014).
4. Single cell recordings in rats and monkeys show that the cues guiding decision are neither related to s.mulus informa.on, nor to behavior, but are ac.vity-‐dependent neural paBerns. (Kiani & Shadlen 2009, Kepecs & Mainen (2012).
3. Is animal MC an execu9ve ability?
Execu.ve capaci.es are involved in selec.ng a behavior as a func.on of one's goal, in inhibi.ng it, shiting it, and upda.ng it. On this view, the informa.on that animals use when performing tasks wrongly called "metacogni.ve" are of an appe--ve nature (based on feelings an.cipa.ng reward or cost).
Carruthers & Ritchie (2012)
Is MC an execu.ve, goal-‐driven ability?
• Grain of truth: mc requires control, ie ability to select a cogni5ve ac.on (media.ng an ac.on on the world).
• Incen.ve affects the amount of effort expended, hence likely success.
-‐-‐> But metacogni.ve control is not merely driven by the distal goal.
MC is also data-‐driven
Subjec.ve feedback from the task similarly affects decision across incen.ve levels. (Koriat et al. 2006, 2014)
à incen.ve-‐based control and cogni.ve monitoring (data-‐driven confidence) have each their separate independent effect on mc. (Zakrzewski et al. 2014)
Fourth op.on: implicit metacogni.on taps on an evalua.ve
form of thinking
3 -‐ Associa.ve vs proposi.onal evalua.ve abtudes
This op.on is an elabora.on of Koriat’s Dual process view (Koriat & Levy-‐Sadot, 1999)
• “experience-‐based” self-‐evalua.on depends on noe.c feelings, such as the feeling of ease of processing, or the feeling of knowing à Procedural, or implicit metacogni.on (system 1)
• “informa9on-‐based” self-‐evalua9on depends on various kinds of beliefs about task, competence, etc.
à Analy.c, or concept-‐based metacogni.on (system 2) See also: Jacoby & Brooks (1984), Schwarz (2004)
What is an ‘experience-‐based’ evalua.on?
Several authors (philosophers and psychologists) have independently hypothesized that an evalua.ve nonconceptual, affect-‐based mode of representa.on is shared by humans and nonhumans.
• Bermudez's frames (2009), • Cussins' NASAS, (2012), • Dreyfus & Kelly's affordance sensings, (2007), • Gawronski & Bodenhausen's associa.ve evalua.ons (2006),
• Gendler's aliefs, (2008), • Griffiths & Scaran.no's emo.onal representa.ons (2009),
• Millikan’s pushmipullyu representa.ons (1995)
• Nanay's pragma.c representa.ons, (2013). • Strawson’s feature placings (1959)
Main features
• These representa.ons are based on predic.ve cues and associated feelings.
• Their func.on is to guide ac.on. • They have an associa.ve rather than a proposi.onal structure.
• They are rela.onal and subjec.ve rather than detached and objec.ve.
The seman.c structure of evalua.ve abtudes (affordance sensings)
• Affordancea [Place=here],[Time= Now/soon], • [Valencea], • [Intensitya (on a scale 0 to 1)], • [mo.va.on of degreed to act according to ac.on programa].
à All the cons.tuents are associa.vely related to perceptual cues in the affordance sensing
à A subset may ac.vate the full representa.on
Contrast of evalua.ve vs proposi.onal abtudes
No contrast between an object and a concept No combinatorial ability No deduc.ve power No embedding possible But s9ll structure: • Predic.ve ability connected with reac.ve ac.on schemas
• Graded sensi.vity to affordances • Graded « control precedence »
Role of feelings in the seman.c structure of affordance sensings.
Affordance-‐valence -‐ intensity in this predic.ve/ evalua.ve structure, taken together, cons.tute a feeling , whether • « affec.ve » (social-‐affec.ve) • Agen.ve • Propriocep.ve
(Proust 2015)
Noe.c feelings represent cogni.ve affordances
Examples:
• Affordance familiar/ rememberable, clear, [Time= present task],
• [Valencea], posi.ve • [Intensitya (on a scale 0 to 1)], • [mo.va.on to act of degreed according to ac.on programa]. Iden.fy! Remember! Accept!
• New cues can be added over .me
Informational source of noetic feelings?
Not thought content, but the dynamic signature of the neural vehicle: • Processing onset, • intensity ( amplitude of ac.va.on) • coherence of cogni.ve ac.vity over .me • Latency to reach threshold (fluency) predict together likely cogni.ve success of a given decision.
(Kiani & Shadlen, 2009,Kepecs & Mainen, 2012).
In summary: noe.c feelings • Express a rela.on, not a state of affairs § Indicate a subjec.vely relevant condi.on and mo.vate an ac.on
§ Are evalua.ve and graded à Nonproposi.onal à Do not conceptualize, but categorize affordances by mere associa.ve paBern matching
Why should two representa.onal-‐evalua.ve systems coexist in the human
mind?
Because of the differen.al needs of human agency (in both its motor and cogni.ve kinds)
A Dual-‐store view of MC
• One system has the func.on of expressing (not repor.ng) evalua.ve abtudes (in humans and nonhumans)
• Another has the func.on of expressing and repor.ng proposi.onal abtudes, ie jus.fying one’s decisions. (in humans only)
Type of representa.on to use depends on the constraints applying to mental ac.ons
• Reac.ve (Impulsive and rou.ne) metacogni.on have an evalua.ve, feeling-‐based representa.onal structure.
• Strategic metacogni.on takes advantage of transmiBed concepts, such as knowledge, plausibility (and the associated deduc.ons).
(Proust, 2015)
Wrapping it up
Heuris.cs & feelings are involved in the implicit metacogni.on results in Kim et al, subm.
• In the informing task: Children express their uncertainty about object’s iden.ty & loca.on in their decision to opt in or out
• They might opt in or out as a func.on of feeling gradiency.
.
• These implicit metacogni.ve decisions do not guide children’s explicit judgments of knowing. WHY??
• Two difficul.es for children : – dichotomize in a conceptual judgment what their implicit mc treats as con.nuous.
– Resist the socially reinforced phrase “I know”. Same dissocia.on between gesture and verbal response in Goldin-‐Meadow’s Piage.an task, 1988
Heuris.cs & feelings might be involved in the implicit metacogni.on results
in Kim et al, subm.
• TASK IN FOCUS : cues are associated (the toys, the box, as perceived) cons.tu.ng a cogni.ve affordance in this task;i.e. a graded “feeling of knowing”.
• SELF IN FOCUS “I know/ don’t know in which box the toy is”: the affordance is related to the social self, and not merely task-‐dependent.
• « Analy.c », proposi.onal metacogni.on can be used to describe procedural metacogni.on (through the concept of knowing).
• acquiring the proper concept, however, requires developmental matura.on.
E.g. I feel quite certain that P, (..) hence I may report that I know that P.
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