cultural bequest values for ecosystem service flows among

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Cultural bequest values for ecosystem service flows

among indigenous fishers: a discrete choice

experiment validated with mixed methods

KLL Oleson1,2, M Barnes-Mauthe1*, L Brander3, T Oliver1, I van Beek4,

B Zafindrasilivonona2 and P van Beukering3

1U. of Hawaii, 2Blue Ventures Conservation, 3VU Amsterdam, 4Wageningen U.

IIFET 2014, Brisbane Australia

Bequest Value

Photos (clockwise): national geographic, fotokanal.com, fineartamerica.com, wallsev.com

Bequest Value

Photos (clockwise): national geographic, fotokanal.com, fineartamerica.com, wallsev.com

Photo

: tr

opic

smag.o

verb

log.c

om

Total Economic Value

USE VALUE

DIRECT INDIRECT OPTION BEQUEST EXISTENCE

NON-USE

VALUE

(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005)

Total Economic Value

USE VALUE

DIRECT INDIRECT OPTION BEQUEST EXISTENCE

NON-USE

VALUE

(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005)

Photos (clockwise): Garth Brooks, Jody Macdonald, Frans Lanting

Bequest Values in Indigenous

Communities(O’Garra 2009, Garibaldi and Turner 2004)

Study Goals

1. Quantify bequest

values for indigenous

fishers using a discrete

choice experiment

(DCE)

2. Use DCE to estimate

discount rates

3. Validate DCE

Locally Managed

Marine Area

“To Live With The Sea”

50 KmN S

24 Villages

7,563 People

The Vezoolo mitolo rano sy olo mipetsaky andriaky

people who ‘struggle with the sea and live by the coast’

- Astuti (1995)

Severe Poverty and Resource

Dependence

Severe Poverty and Resource

Dependence

o Average per capita income – $1 USD/day

o 90% of income from resource-dependent

activities (82% from fishing/gleaning)

o 87% of adults are fisher or gleaners

Threats to Vezo Culture

o Chronic political instability

o Population growth

o Increased migration to coast

o Escalation of extreme weather events

o Habitat degradation

o Declining fisheries

Threats to Vezo Culture

Data

Focus GroupsN = 7

Key Informant InterviewsN = 26

DCE

N = 301

16 villages (of 21)

stratified (geographic & habitat)

random household

representative respondents (age, sex)

(Applying DCEs in Developing Countries: Bennet and Birol 2010)

o Stated choice method

o Willingness to pay for a marginal change– e.g., $1 for 10 extra minutes of sleep

o Hypothetical Scenario: Strengthened Management

Measures – e.g., strict enforcement of destructive fishing methods ban,

expansion of no-take zones, increasing # of octopus reserves,

limiting destruction of mangroves and coral reefs

Discrete Choice Experiment

(Louviere 1982, 1983)

Choice model (Pearce 2006)

Select ES

Shoreline ProtectionYears without home damage

BequestGenerations able to live as Vezo

Commercial Fisheries$ per spring tide in year 2 -10

Short-term Income $ per spring tide in year 1

Social Cohesion# people attending meetings

Discrete Choice Experiment

Discrete Choice Experiment

Choice model (Pearce 2006)

Select ES

Assign levelsShoreline ProtectionYears without home damage

BequestGenerations able to live as Vezo

Commercial Fisheries$ per spring tide in year 2 -10

Short-term Income $ per spring tide in year 1

Social Cohesion# people attending meetings

Discrete Choice Experiment

Choice model (Pearce 2006)

Select ES

Assign levels

Discrete Choice Experiment

Choice model (Pearce 2006)

Select ES

Assign levels

Verifying Results

o Multi-method comparison

– Preference statements

– Ranking and rating game

• Beans as weights, rate services using 5 beans in 4 rounds

Photo

: re

efd

octo

r.org

Results?

Willingness to Pay

WTP [$000 MGA] For…

3.07…2 additional people from each

village attending meetings

4.13…1 additional year without storm

damage

6.18…moderate increase in long-term

commercial fisheries

24.42 …1 additional generation Vezo

Willingness to Pay

WTP [$000 MGA] For…

3.07…2 additional people from each

village attending meetings

4.13…1 additional year without storm

damage

6.18…moderate increase in long-term

commercial fisheries

24.42 …1 additional generation Vezo= 624/yr, or 75-95% of income

Willingness to Pay

WTP [$000 MGA] For…

3.07…2 additional people from each

village attending meetings

4.13…1 additional year without storm

damage

6.18…moderate increase in long-term

commercial fisheries

24.42 …1 additional generation Vezo= 624/yr, or 75-95% of income

Discount rate = 38%

Rating and Ranking

Preference Statements

Bequest

Primary motivation: 70%

Storm Cohesion

9% 1%Income

20%

Preference Statements

73%

disagree or

strongly

disagree

(n=259)

Short-term Long-term

“I do not want my income from seafood sales this year to

decline, even if it means my sales next year would increase”

Significance

Bequest was prioritized, despite poverty and

difficult tradeoffs

Significance

Bequest values can play a crucial role in policy &

management

Vezo aho – ‘I am Vezo’

the sea is my heritage and that of my descendants(Adriamalala et al. 2013)

Funding for this project was provided by NSF

grant #0853086, Blue Ventures Conservation, The

Waterloo Foundation, The MacArthur Foundation,

and Network for Social Change

A special thanks to Garth Cripps for all the

wonderful photos (all those without a citation)

KLL Oleson: koleson@hawaii.edu

M Barnes-Mauthe: barnesm@hawaii.edu

Misaotra bevata!(Thank you very much)

For more information: Oleson et al.

in review – Ecological Economics

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