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CHAPTER- II
UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
CHAPTER-II
UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The mass conversiOn of politicians and political thinkers to the
cause of democracy has been the most dramatic and significant
events in political history. Democracy today is not just regarded as
the best form of political order for stability as well as development
but also an international cause. Everyone is a democrat these days
- liberals, conservatives, socialists, communists, anarchists and
even fascists are eager to proclaim the virtues of democracy and to
demonstrate their own democratic credentials. No doubt, with the
collapse of Soviet Union, democracy has emerged as perhaps the
only stable and enduring principle in the post-modern political
landscape. A host of democratic governments and parties, as well
as non-governmental organizations dedicated to human rights and
development are working to press autocratic regimes to change.
Various international agencies like the · World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation require a democratic system as a
condition for membership or aid. Similarly, Organisations like
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International keep check on the
regimes on the violation of human rights.
The unanticipated collapse of Soviet Union which led to the
independence of Central Asian republics is, no doubt, the most
23
dramatic change in the landscape of the Asia in the post-Cold War
period. The Central Asian states, which are distinguished from most
of the former Soviet Union by comparatively traditional social
structure, declared themselves to be democratic republics as soon
as they became independent. The declaration was followed by
serious efforts to create democratic institutions and in some
instances the progress has been impressive. Uzbekistan, the
geographical center and a potential leader of the region, makes an
interesting case study where democracy is accepted as a future goal
and commitment to protect human rights of its citizen.
In order to understand democracy and human right in Uzbekistan
it is important to trace the evolution of these concepts, their
meaning and various theoretical frameworks and their suitability.
While doing so, this chapter will simultaneously trace the evolution
and different models of democracy.
Democracy
Democracy is a very old word but its meanings have always been
complex. The word democracy came into English in the sixteenth
cetttury from the Greek word demokratia, which means rule (kratosj
by the people (demos). However, the simple notion of rule by the
people does not get us very far. The meaning of democracy then
depends on what constitutes "people" and what one means by "to
rule" and people should rule and how far popular rule should
extend.
24
In ancient times democracy was understood in various ways such
as 'rule of many', 'rule of poor' and even 'mob rule'. In Politics,
Aristotle wrote: "a democracy is a state where the freemen and the
poor, being in the majority, are invested with the power of the
state."1 In Republic, Plato made Socrates say that "democracy comes
into being after the poor have conquered their opponents,
slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they
give an equal share of freedom and power."2
Ancient democratic theory is the study of democracy in Greek and
Roman history by thinkers like Thucydides, Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle, Xenophon and Cicero. Works of these thinkers are limited
to mere historical interest, as they do not teach us any thing about
modern democracy. After all what we understand by democracy was
unknown to the ancient societies. Moreover, the ancient thinkers
did not believe in democracy as a just and good political order. In
fact they were deeply critical of democracy. Aristotle went so far as
to classify democracy among the corrupted political order. Similarly,
Cicero thought undiluted democracy a disaster. The only common
thread running between the ancient and modern democracy is the
rule of people.
Medieval political theory gives a mixed treatment to democracy. The
early medieval age did not explicitly criticized democracy. The
Quoted in, Raymond Williams, KeYwords, cited in Philip Green, Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory, Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1993,p 19.
ibid, pl9.
25
situation changed with the recovery of Aristotle's Politics. Thomas
Aquinas rejected democracy in favor of limited monarchy. He
defined democracy as popular power, where ordinary people, by
force of numbers, governed - oppressed - the rich; the whole people
acting like a tyrant.3 In On Kingship, he extols rule by one: just as
God rules the universe and the queen bee rules the hive, so the
monarch must rule the multitude. Democracy was against the
natural order. Dante drew on this analogy even more emphatically
in his On World Monarchy. Like the ancient age, democracy was
seen in very poor light or as bad political order in medieval times. 4
The beginning of modern political thought is a break point for
democracy. The first modern political thinker Nicolo Machiavelli,
despite his reputation for being an apologist for tyranny, wrote in
the Prince that there is some truth in the proverb "the voice of the
people is the voice of God". It was in the hands of Social Contract
theorists the contemporary meaning of democracy started taking
concrete shape. By arguing ·that the ultimate source of all
governmental authority lay in individuals possessed of both natural
liberty and natural rights, social contract theory established the
foundations for later democratic government and delegitimized once
and for all traditional dictatorship and divine right of kings. s
ibid., p20.
David Held, Models of Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987, p 68.
Benjamin R. Barber, Democracy, in David Miller (ed), Tile Blackwell E11cyclopaedia of Political Tllougllt, Blackwell Pub, Oxford, 1994, p115.
26
Thomas Hobbes, though a supporter of monarchy, defined
democracy as a regime in which sovereign power resides in an
assembly of all citizens. John Locke tried to reverse Hobbes by
rejecting monarchy and grounded government on the original and
continuous consent of the people. In other words, democracy came
to mean a system of government by consent operating through the
mechanism of a representative assembly. In both, Hobbes and
Locke, the focus was on the need to protect individual rights and
interests. The Utilitarian (Jeremy Bentham and James Mill) case for
democracy was also based on the need to protect or advance
individual interest. Bentham believed that universal franchise was
the only way of promoting the 'greatest happiness for the greatest
number'. This model of democracy, that is based on the principle
that 'citizens require protection from governors, as well as from
each other, to ensure that those who govern pursue policies that
are commensurate with citizen's interest as a whole', is termed as
protective democracy.6 Democracy is seen less as a mechanism
through which people can participate in political life and more as a
device through which people could protect themselves from the
encroachment of the government.
In short, protective democracy is but a limited and indirect form of
democracy. The consent of the governed is exercised through
regular and competitive elections. This ensures the accountability of
6 Op. Cit. no. 4, p70.
27
those who governs. Political equality thus means equal voting
rights. Liberty is guaranteed by separation of power and by
maintenance of basic rights and freedom. It is a constitutional
democracy. Ultimately, protective democracy aims to give the widest
possible scope to live their lives as they choose and thus tends to be
associated with minimum government intervention. 7 It is thus
compatible with laissez-faire capitalism. Protective democracy
therefore appealed to classical liberals and in modern politics to the
supporters of the New Right.
In the thoughts of Jean Jacques Rousseau there emerges an
alternative concern for development of human individual and the
community emerged. This gave rise to a new model, which is
referred as developmental democracy. For him, democracy was
ultimately a means through which human beings could achieve
freedom or autonomy, in the sense of obedience to a law one
prescribes to oneself.B In other words, citizens are free only 'free'
when they participate directly and continuously in shaping the life
of their community. Rousseau celebrated the notion of an active,
involved citizenry and was advocate of direct democracy. Although
not a supporter of common ownership, Rousseau stressed that
such a system of radical developmental democracy required
relatively a high level of economic equality. His theories have helped
Andrew Heywood, Politics, Macmillan, London, 1997, p72.
ibid., p72.
28
to shape the modern idea of participatory democracy taken up by
New Left in the 1960s and 1970s.
However, John Stuart Mill advanced a more modest form of
developmental democracy, which is compatible with the liberal
model of representative democracy. For him, the central virtue of
democracy was that it promotes the 'highest and harmonious'
development of individual capacities. He sought to defend a
conception of political life marked by enhanced individual liberty,
more accountable government and an efficient governmental
administration unhindered by corrupt practices and excessively
complex regulations. 9 Mill proposed the broadening of popular
participation that all educated including women should be
enfranchised. He was a supporter of parliamentary democracy or
deliberative democracy.
Though democratic ideas m the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries were the product of liberalism, liberal's attitudes towards
it were distinctly ambivalent. This model of democracy had its own
problems, which Alexis de Tocqueville famously described as 'the
tyranny of majority'. This arises from the fact that 'the people' are
not a single but rather a collection of individuals and groups,
possessing different opm10ns and opposing interests. The
democratic procedure is recourse to the application of majority rule,
the principle that the will of the majority or greatest number should
9 op. cit., no. 4, p85.
29
prevail over the minority. Thus there is a danger of suppr-ession of
minority rights and individual liberty. James Madison articulated
similar concern at the US Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
in 1787. Madison argued that the best defense against majoritarian
tyranny is a network of checks and balances that would make
government responsive to competing minorities and also safeguard
~he propertied few from property less masses.1o
However liberal theories about democracy in the twentieth century
tends to focus less on consent and participation and more on the
need for consensus in society. This can be seen in Schumpeter's
· 'realistic' model of democracy that defined democracy as "the
democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide
by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" .11 For
Schumpeter democracy is the rule of the politicians. Its importance,
however, is in no way diminished: electoral competition creates a
political market that forces politicians to take account of the
various interests operating in society. 12 Pluralists like Robert Dahl
and Charles Lindblom have termed modern democratic system as
'polyarchy', which means rule by many as distinct from rule by all
people. A polyarchy is characterized by the extension of citizenship
10 Andrew Haywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1992,p43.
11 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Allen & Unwin, London, 1976, p269.
12 Andrew Haywood, op.cit, no.l 0, p45.
30
to a relatively high proportion of adults and the right of those
citizens to oppose government officials by voting them out of
office. 13 Elitist theorists like Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and
Robert Michels have differently argued that democracy often is only
a camouflage for the oligarchic tendencies of power and that
representation guarantees little more than a circulation of ruling
elites.
A v1ew of democracy from the West usually means Linz and
Stepan's version of consolidated liberal democracy. 14 This definition
includes five factors: "a free and lively civil society ... a relatively
autonomous and valued political society ... a rule of law ... a state
bureaucracy ... [and] an institutionalized economic society."15
This definition is a far cry from other interpretations of democracy
such as illiberal democracy or past versions such as Schumpeter's
elite model. In Schumpeter's "elite theory of democracy,"16 the
central basis. for democracy is simply '"free competition among
would-be leaders for the vote of the electorate. "'17 This "minimalist
definition" has been expanded slightly today to include free and fair
elections, accountabilitv. the rule of law and a limited executive . -''
13 ibid., p45. 14 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, The
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, p. 7. 15 'b'd 7 • I I , p .. 16 John Nagle and Alison Mahr, Democracy and Democratization, Sage Publications, London,
1999, pp. 8-9. 17 • op.c1t., no I I, p9
31
branch. 18 However, Matveeva admits, "There is something lacking in
this definition, something related to the democratic process and the
values which accompany it." 19 Although many authors attempt to
pin down a tangible definition of democracy, the minimalist
definition points to an important feature: beyond these fundamental
items mentioned above, the "something lacking" is arguable, based
on cultural values and trends of the time.
Illiberal democracy is one example of how cultural values can
change certain definitions of democracy. Bell and Jayasuriya, Write
that "our claim is that democratisation in East and Southeast Asia
can be interpreted as a grafting of democratic practices and
institutions on to societies with an alternative cultural baggage."20
Therefore, Asian democracy exists today based on preferences for
"hierarchy and harmony as against liberal notions of equality and
pluralism," the bases of western liberal democracy. 21
Linz and Stepan bring up another important point, vital also to
Central Asian democratisation: that of presidential versus
parliamentarian forms of democratic government. Although whether
rl · ~' · 1 1 · · · r a_ state runs un'-er a presraent1a.1 or par.l1amentar1an vers1011 01
government does not preclude it from being a democracy, Linz and
Stepan argue that it can easily help or hurt the development of a
18 Anna Matveeva, "Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia," in lntemational Affairs 75, I (I 999), p. 31.
19 ibid, p. 31 20 Daniel A. Bell and Kanishka Jayasuriya, "Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework,"
in Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, St. Martin's Press: New York, 1995, p. 2 21 ibid, p. 9
32
democratic government in an emerging democratic state.22 In South
America, for example, strong presidential systems without the
checks and balances of a strong parliament, often lead to an
authoritarian ruler. As will be shown below, the five Central Asian
states have also fallen victim to this problem.
Any discussion on democracy will be incomplete without people's
democracy, which is a model of democracy generated in the Marxist
tradition. It was an attack on the liberal models of democracy as
well. Marxists have tended to be dismissive of liberal or '
parliamentary democracy, seeing it as a form of bourgeois or
capitalist democracy. It was taken to be no more than a mask for
protecting the property interests. People's democracy was used in
particular to designate the goal of social equality brought about
through the common ownership of wealth (social democracy in
original sense), in contrast to political democracy, which establishes
only a facade of equality. Marx believed that the overthrow of
capitalism would be a trigger that would allow genuine democracy
to flourish. The form of democracy that was developed in twentieth
century communist states, however, owed more to the ideas of V.I.
Lenin than it did to those of Marx. Later on thinkers like Jean Paul
Sartre, Maurice Marleau Ponty, Herbert Marcuse and Louis
Althusser contributed to Marxian model of democracy. But the
22 Op.cit, no.l4, p 141.
33
experience of the USSR has clearly weakened arguments favouring
people's democracy as being a superior model of democracy.
Although it is still a continuous debate about which is the most
desirable form of democracy, much of cotemporary debate revolves
around how democracy works in practice. However, there is a
broad, even worldwide, acceptance of a particular model of
democracy, generally termed as liberal democracy. Despite the
existence of competing tendencies within this broad category,
certain central features can be drawn. Liberal democracy is an
indirect and representative form of democracy in that political office
is gained through success in regular elections that are conducted
on the basis of universal adult franchise. It is based on competition
and electoral choice. These are achieved through political pluralism,
tolerance of a wide range of contending beliefs and the existence of
conflicting social philosophies and rival political movements and
parties. An important aspect of liberal democracy is that there is a
clear distinction between the state and civil society. This distinction
is maintained through the existence of autonomous groups and
interests and the market or capitalist Organisation of economic life.
The theory of liberal democracy has suffered from the limitation of
interpreting democracy primarily as a regime form of the state or a
principle of representative government, rather than as a way of
constituting collective life of society. As Bhikhu Parekh has argued,
'if liberalism has provided the theory of the liberal-democratic state,
34
democracy has supplied only its theory of government. Trapped
within the confines of liberalism, democratic impulse has been kept
in check by its dominant partner, liberalism.' 23
Democracy has clearly advanced in recent years. According to the
Freedom House's first Annual Survey of Freedom in 1972-73, nearly
28.27percent of states could be considered 'free', while 46.21
percent could be considered 'not free'; the 1999-2000 report, by
contrast, shows 44.27 percent of states 'free', with 25.00 percent
of states not free.24 In essence, the proportion of free states (what
Larry Diamond would call liberal democracies) to not free states
(which are generally consolidated autocracies) has inverted in the
last 27 years.2s However, the rise of democracy noted above does
not necessarily mean that autocracy is in the midst of an inexorable
decline. Indeed, as Huntington's analogy of waves would suggest,
there is the distinct possibility that once the current wave of
democratisation is through, we will see a resurgence of autocratic
states. Diamond points out that the 'third reverse wave' may
already be occurring, since democracy has made little progress
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.26 More often than not, the
relation between the state and democracy is believed to be a
derivative of the nature of the economic Organisation of the state. It
23 Bhikhu Parekh, The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy, in David Held (ed.), Prospect for Democracy, Polity Press, Oxford, 1993,pl65.
24 data are at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/ratings.pdf; 1999-2000 data are at http://www .freedomhouse.org/news/table l.html.
25 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1999,p 25.
26 ibid., pp 60-61
35
IS thus no accident that the transition from command to market
economy in post-Soviet states corresponds also to a transition to
democracy. But, many third world states do not follow this rule as
there are democracies with command economy and likewise many
market economies are not democracies. These democracies have
been defined as 'illiberal democracies'. We will discuss this aspect of
democracy at end of the work, but before that we will try to
understand another aspect of democracy, namely human right,
which is considered as integral to it.
Human Rights
The idea of human rights developed out of the natural rights
theories of the early modern period. Since December 1948, after the
proclamation of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there is no
denying the fact tha:t there is almost universal recognition that
respect for human rights is absolutely essential for achieving the
agreed global priorities of peace, development and democracy.
Article 21 of the declaration clearly states that 'everyone· has the
right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives' and 'the will of the people
shall be the basis of the authority of government'. Thus, it makes
democracy a human right. Along with this, there is another agreed
notion that among all forms of government it is only democracy that
ensures complete human rights. So to say, democracy and human
rights have become complementary to each other in today's world.
36
To simplify, human right means rights possessed by human beings
as human beings. The term has only come to the fore in this
century. Earlier it was commonly called as 'natural rights' or the
'rights of man'. Human rights are a modern and secular version of
'natural' rights, which were believed to be God-given.
Twentieth-century doctrine of human rights are direct descendent
of the liberal theory of natural rights. Many people use the terms
'natural right' and 'human right' interchangeably. The idea of
human right remains that of a right which is natural in that it is
conceived as a moral entitlement which human being possess in
their natural capacity as humans and not in virtue of any special
arrangement in to which they have entered or any particular system
of law under whose jurisdiction they fall. 27
Human rights are therefore universal, fundamental and absolute.
They are universal in a sense that they belong to all humans
everywhere, regardless of nationality, ethnic or racial origin, social.
background and so on. They are fundamental in that they are
inalienable as human rights can be denied or violated but a human
being's entitlement to them cannot be removed. They arc absolute - .
in that, as the basic grounds for living a genuinely human life, they
cannot be qualified. Human rights can be distinguished from civil
rights, in the sense that the former are moral principles that claim
universal jurisdiction, while the latter depend upon the freedoms
27 Peter Jones, 'Human Rights', in David Miller (ed), Tlte Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Tltougltt, Blackwell Pub, Oxford, 1994, p223.
37
and status accorded to citizens in a particular country. However,
the notion of civil liberties often rest upon an underlying belief in
human rights and are viewed as moral principles given legal
expression in the form of citizenship.
Human rights are regarded as the basic grounds for freedom,
equality and justice and embody the idea that all human lives are
worthy of respect. As such they have been accepted as one of the
cornerstone of international law, sometimes being used to justify
humanitarian and even military intervention. The most
authoritative definition of human right is found in the United
Nations Declaration of Human Right (1948), although other
documents, such as the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms ( 1953), have also been influential.
Judging from the formal declarations, human rights can be roughly
classified in to six categories. First and often foremost, is the right
to life. It consists of various rights as the right not to be murdered
or physically assaulted, right to have material essentials of life and
a minimum health care. Second, right to freedom of thought,
expression1 religion, association and movement. Third, right to
property. Fourth, there are rights concerning the individual's status
as citizen such as the right to nationality and democratic rights.
Fifth are the rights concerning the conduct of government, in
particular rights concerning the 'rule of law' and the administration
of justice such as the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest
38
and right to fair trial. Finally, human rights are claimed to certain
social, economic and cultural goods. The UN Declaration, for
example, asserts human rights to education, work, social security,
rest and leisure and a standard of living adequate for one's health
and well-being.28
The past few decades have witnessed the continued rise of the
application of international human rights law as well as the
extension of a wider public discourse on human rights, to a point
where human rights could be seen as one of the most globalised
political value of our times. The language of liberal human rights
has moved in to fill the vacuum created by the demise of grand
political narratives m the aftermath of the Cold War.
Notwithstanding disputes over their conceptuaiization and
application, human rights are common among the few utopian
ideas left, there is still a remarkable degree of consensus by the
governments on the principle at least that these rights be protected.
Nevertheless, the concept of human right has been challenged from
various corners. At present, the most important controversy is the
discussions of cross-cultural applicabilir; of human rights revolving
around the universalism / relativism debate and the importance of
culture. It involves two main issues: first, what concept of human
ontology is to be used and what rights naturally extend from that
view of human nature; and second, what significance should be
28 ibid., p223.
39
g1ven to the notion of 'culture' in the construction of a normative
moral order and to what degree does global diversity in system of
justice undermine any basis for the universality of human rights.29
Despite the demonstration of ethnocentrism in the field of human
rights, certain aspects of Universalist's case need to be considered,
at least as future possibilities. Due to communications and media,
tourism, finance capital, consumer images, transport technologies,
migration and so on, the world's societies are increasingly
integrated into global networks. Human rights Organisations form
one such network, which in turn makes it a universal ideology.
Clearly, the constitution of Uzbekistan also adheres to this notion of
human right.
In recent times, analyses of legal and normative orders have become
too involved in discussions of whether or not human rights exist in
the legal codes of 'traditional societies'. Attempts are being made to
search for conceptual similarities in different moral traditions and
particularly in Islamic sharia. There may exist certain conceptual
similarities, but one can never know how they will articulate until
the concepts are brought into a concrete relationship in a particular
socio-historical context. Jack Donnelly argues that 'what is being
compared with human rights are notions of human dignity, or
limitations on the arbitrary exercise of power. These are not rights
in strict sense since they are obligations constituted between rulers
29 Richard A. Wilson, Human Rights, Culture and Context: Antltropological Perspective, Pluto Press, London, 1999, p3.
40
and the divine authority, not between rulers and ruled. They are
therefore not human rights in the sense of being special
entitlements to protection, which derive from the mere fact of being
human.'30
Now, commg back to the democracy and its relationship with
human rights, there seems to be a near consensus that they share
a relationship of complimentarity. Human rights can be best
safeguarded in a democracy and a state, which ensures human
rights, is a democracy of some form or the other.
Transition to Democracy
The wave of democratisation since the '70s makes it possible to look
at the democracy-building. This has led to a shift away from the
broad modernisation and historical approaches. Now the focus is
not on. the underlying conditions of democracy but on the
immediate tactics of transition. The intellectual problem here is to
understand how the choices made by the politician in the move
from authoritarianism affect the pace, form and outcome of the
regime change.
Dankwart Rustow established the field of 'transitology', the study of
democratic transitions. Rustow's question was not, what factors
encourage democratic stability? Rather he asked: how do politicians
bring a democracy into being in the first place? And his answer,
broadly, was that democracy is a bargain reached by conflicting
30 ibid., p 14.
41
groups which come to recognize the inevitability of power-sharing.
Groups which recognize the impossibility of monopolizing power
make do with a settlement which at least offers the chance to win
office through elections. 31 Although Rustow's approach was ve:ry
different from Lipset's, he reached a similar conclusion: democracy
is compromise. South Africa's transition from white rule is textbook
example. As Johnson and Schlemmer comment, 'the three main
parties hammered out an essentially liberal democratic constitution
although none of them much believed in it'.32 Democracy's success,
in South Africa and elsewhere, rested on being eve:ryone's second
choice: optimal for no one, acceptable to eve:ryone.33
A major finding of 'transitology' is the central role played by political
elites. Even if democracy is made for the people, it is rarely made by
them. Democracy is 'imposed' from above. On Latin America, Little
suggests that 'pressure from below was only rarely a· factor in the
democratisation process. Where this took radical form (as in
Guatemala and El Salvador) it led to a tightening of authoritarian
control and only in Nicaragua in 1979 did popular protest
succeeded in overthrowing authoritarianism. '34
31 Rod Hague, Martin Harrop and Shaun Breslin, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, (41
h ed), Macmillan Press, 1998, p30. 32 Johnson,R. and Schlemmer, L. (eds), Launching Democracy in south Africa: The First Open
E/ection,April/994, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. And London, 1996. p 9 33 ibid., p9 34 W. Little, 'Democratisation in Latin America 1980-95' in D. Potter (eds), Democratization,
Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997, p181.
42
Indeed, Diamandouros even advocate 'a strategic demobilisation of
the masses during elite negotiations' so the elites can agree the
transition in a calm atmosphere.35
We can divide democratisation into three phases: liberalisation,
transition and consolidation. In the liberalization phase, the
authoritarian regime relaxes its controls, eases repression and
permits more open political competition. Political prisoners may be
released and media censorship reduced. For instance, in South
Africa the White regime legalised the African National Congress and
released Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990. Liberalisation most
often triggered by a sense of failure within the authoritarian
coalition itself as existing rulers recognize that the regime is
declining in both effectiveness and legitimacy.
Liberalisation creates its own momentum. As political space opens,
so the opposition gains strength; finally, the existing rulers realize
their time is over. In South Africa, president de Klerk soon found
his power leaking away to Nelson Mandela and the ANC. Mikhail
Gorbachev may have set out to reform communism in the Soviet
Union but he ended as its undertaker, overwhelmed by the
reforming force he himself had unleashed.Thus the scene is set for
the transition proper to begin.
35 P.Diamandouros, 'Conclusion'; in R. Gunther, P.Diamandouros and H. Puhle(eds), The Politics of Democratic consolidation: Southem Europe in ComparativePerception, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1995, p 403.
43
In the transition phase, the old regime is dismantled and
democratic institutions are established. A democratic transition is
complete when a freely elected government is installed with
sovereign authority. Transitions occur in two main ways. The most
common is reform, which means the exsiting elite takes the lead in
initiating peaceful change. Examples include Spain after Franco
( 197 5), Brazil after the army decided to step down ( 1985) and
Hungary and others in East Europe (1989). The other mode of
transition is called rupture. Here, the opposing takes the initiative
and the old regime rather than collapsing form within, is destroyed
form without, if necessary by violence. Rupture IS an uncommon
and uncertain road to democracy. In Romania, for instance, the
Ceaucescu dictatorship was overthrown by violence in 1989. But
ex-communists captured the revolution and their leader Ion Iliescu
remained in power as President until defeated in an election in
1996-a lengthy transition indeed. 36
Consolidation is the final phase of democratisation. A democracy
has consolidated when it provides an accepted framework for
political competition. As Przeworski put it, democracy is
consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a
particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town
36 Op. cit . no. 31, p 30
44
and when no one can 1magme acting outside the democratic
institutions. 37
To consolidate, a democracy must offer the real prospect of an
election victory for the opposition. This gives the opponents of the
current ruler an incentive to accept the political system as a whole.
And the acid test comes on the first occasion when an election does
lead to defeat for the government. If the losers accept the voters'
verdict, removing their hands from the power, then the democracy
is well on its way to consolidation.
Thus the extent of democratic consolidation in South Korea was
confirmed by the presidential election of 1997 ,which saw the first
peaceful transfer of power to the center-left in the country's history.
The virtue of a peaceful transfer, once it has been achieved, it that
it establishes the distinction between the system of government and
the present incumbents. The outcome of consolidation is a system,
which is permanent precisely because rulers come and go by
regular means. The requirement is that all powerful actors must
abide by the rules of the game even though they may not believe in
them. Thus the object of consolidators is not so much to win the
hearts and minds of the antidemocrats. Rather the idea is to
confine these dangerous tendencies to their as far as possible.38 In
these circumstances, opposition fades because it is unable to
37 A.Przeworski, Democracy a11d tile Market: Political a11d Eco11opmic Reform ill Eastem Europe alld Latill America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1991. p.26
38 op.cit., no. 31, p32.
45
express itself. So consolidation is, in Rustow's apt term, a matter of
'habituation': 'democratic ruler must be not so much believed in as
applied'.39
Historical experience of transitions to democracy varies. The first
wave of democracies, such as Britain, Scandinavia and the United
States, enjoyed a leisurely transformation, with the gap between
liberalization and consolidation stretching over centuries. The
extension of the suffrage occurred gradually, often without any
clear notion that the outcome would be a representative democracy
based on universal suffrage. Democracy was a result rather than an
intention. But later waves of democratisation expected quicker
results; and they had a democratic objective in mind from the start.
After their defeat in the Second World War, for instance, Japan and
West Germany moved rapidly from dictatorship to democracy.
Modern transitions are compressed: managed revolution more than
unplanned evolution. In view of this, it is remarkable that the new
democracies so rapidly established smce the 1970s have
consolidated so successfully. 40
A major explanation of this accomplishment was a favorable global
and regional context. The end of the Cold War meant dictators
could not longer hide under the skirts of a superpower. The collapse
of communism destroyed the credibility of the major alternative to
39 ibid., p 32. 40 ibid., p 32.
46
liberal democracy. Leading players such as the United State and the
European Union and sympathetic institutions such as the World
Bank, began to promote democracy. Often, a favorable regional
context also eased transition. Greece, Portugal and "Spain - and
more recently Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic -
undoubtedly benefited from their position close to the heartland of
European democracy. Indeed Diamond suggests that 'the greatest
regional force for democratic consolidation in the Americas may well
be the move towards regional free trade'.41
The ease of a transition to democracy is influenced by the nature of
the previous regime. The shift from communist rule is particularly
fraught because it involves a triple move: from communism to
democracy, from a planned to a market economy and from arbitrary
power to the rule of law. More than military regimes, communist
rulers controlled all aspects of society. As a result, their post
communist successors must encourage social institutions as well
as consolidating a new political and economic order. They must aim
to develop social capital at a time of political change, economic
dislocation and nationalist assertion, a challenging project indeed.42
While we are focusing on transitions to democracy, we must not
forget that history also provides some instances of transitions from
democracy. The classic democratic breakdowns were Germany, Italy
41 L. Diamond, " Democracy in Americas", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vo1.550, p39
42 op. cit. no. 31, p33.
47
and Spain in interwar Europe. Military coups in Latin American
during the 1970s are other instances. However, it is rare for
consolidated democracies to disintegrate, the democracies most
likely to fall apart are ones that were never fully legitimate in the
first place. For example, military coups in postcolonial Africa
replaced liberal democratic forms which departing colonialists had
constructed in haste, with little concern for long-term effectiveness.
Similarly, in interwar Germany, the Weimar Republic overthrown by
Hitler was never fully legitimate nor particularly effective.43
When democracies do collapse, the underlying cause is often the
same as for authoritarian regimes. The crucial factor is the inability
of the government to resolve pressing problems, economic or
military. This suggests that the prognosis for democracy over the
next few decades is favourable but not guaranteed.
The future health of democracy depends on the continuing capacity
of rulers to prevent or resolve social, economic and military
problems. In the twenty-first century, there may be no coherent
alternative to liberal democracy and the market economy. But this
will not be enough to prevent demagogu.es from seeking to exploit
the opportunities provided by disillusioned citizens, particularly in
ethnically-divided societies where national boundaries remain
contested. Democracy may be partly 'self-legitimizing' in that people
who help to shape decisions then feel obliged to abide by them. But
43 Op. cit., no. 31, p33
48
democracy, like any other form of rule, will also continue to be
judged by results.
Central Asia
Unlike many independent states that fought and won their freedom
from various forms of colonial or invading powers, the five states of
Central Asia-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
'llo and Uzbekistan -were all handed their independence in 1991 by
the crumbling Soviet Union and only hesitantly accepted it. "Few
peoples of the world have ever been forced to become independent
nations. Yet that is precisely what happened to the five Central
Asian republics .... "44 So far all the five Central Asian states have
managed to wade through the transition and form independent
nations in the post-Soviet era.
Among the numerous issues facing the newly independent states
were: governmental institutions, constitutions and overall
government structures; declining economies and the challenges of
economic transitions; cultural and minority groups, including the
large "minorities" of Russians, especially in Kazakhstan; developing
disrupted and often destroyed environments; using but not wasting
the large deposits of natural resources such as natural gas and oil;
and building foreign relations that would take advantage of the
44 Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Summer) 1992. Also see Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996, pp 3-20.
49
region's natural resources and central geographical location without
allowing outside actors to e:xploit them.
Most experts agree that the current state of democracy in Central
Asia, eight years after independence,· is bleak. "The emergent
regimes appear at their best as a hybrid between authoritarianism
and democracy, at their worst as offering a choice between state
disintegration and totalitarianism."45
In May 1992, Tajikistan government forces turned violent against a
peaceful public demonstrations in favor of democratic reforms and
civil war quickly followed. In December 1992, the hard-liners
regained power and any fledgling democratic institutions or ideas
were quickly stifled.46 The victorious parties, however, soon split
among themselves.47 Today, a "fragile coalition with the Islamic
opposition"48 and the secular ruling hard-line party and economic
dependence on Russia and Uzbekistan49 hinder further democratic
development. so
The large minority of Russian - speakers in Kazakhstan has raised
the issue that many other former - Soviet states are presently
45 Anna Matveeva, "Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia," in International Affairs 75, I, 1999, p31
46 Muriel Atkin, "Thwarted Democratization in Tajikistan," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds), Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p 290.
47 ibid., p 30 48 The Economist, "Likely Lads," February 7, 1998. 49 Najam Abbas, "Tajik Fingers Pointing North: Rakhmanov's Rare Display Of Resentment Over
'Uzbek Interference,'" http://eurasianews.com/1117taj.htm. 50 Op.cit., no.45, p 44.
50
dealing with-the nature of a "nation-state." Language laws, single-
citizenship laws {having to choose between Russian or Kazakh
citizenship) and the "transfer of power and wealth" from the
Russians to the Kazakhs since independence have all threatened
the traditional superior positions of the Russians in Kazakhstan
and strengthened possibilities for ethnic conflict.s1 Kazakh
President Nursultan Nazarbaev, who led the country during Soviet
times as well, has managed to keep ethnic strife to a minimum
since independence. However, this issue is a constant threat to
stability in the region.
By 1994, Kyrgyzstan began showing anti-democratic signs.
Newspapers were banned, elections rigged, corruption uncovered
and presidentialism carried out through constitutional changes. 52
Although it is still considered by the West to be the most
"outwardly" democratic nation of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan seems to
be falling into the same anti-democratic traps as its neighbors, with
little to offer the world in return for vital foreign investment.
Many experts believe that Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov is
the quintessentiaJ example of "presidentialism."53 The fact that
Uzbekistan houses the largest Islamic population of any of the
51 Martha Brill Olcott, "Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in Kazakstan," in op.cit. no.46, p 216.
52 Martha Brill Olcott, Ce11tral Asia's New States: llldepelldellce, Foreign Policy a11d Regio11al Security, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996, pp 92-94.
53 Gregory Gleason, "Uzbekistan: The Politics of National Independence," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds), New States New Politics: Buildi11g tile Post-Soviet Nations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p 581
51
Central Asian states remains a constant threat to Karimov.54 He
walked relatively softly around this issue in the short time after
independence but soon enough began to talk about what he termed
"extremist" threats.
Turkmenistan resembles its Central Asian neighbors 1n its
Presidential-authoritarian government structure, tampered
elections, economic crisis and, like Kazakhstan an.d Uzbekistan, its
abundant reserves of natural gas and oil. Although ethnic strife
does not control the actions of the state, there has been an explicit
movement towards "Turkmenisation" of public and cultural
society.ss
In general, there has been no substantial structural reforms to
foster democracy in Central Asia. Ochs, referring to such
"stagnation" as "consciously arrested development," states simply
that Turkmenistan "is probably the least transformed former Soviet
republic."56 While other Central Asian states have made at least
nominal progress towards privatization and other market reforms in
the economic arena, for example, Turkmenistan has advocated slow
progress and implemented practically nothing.s7
As mentioned above, presidentialism and authoritarianism rule
Central Asian governments. The Economist goes as far as simply
54 op.cit., no.52, p 117 55 David Nissman, "Turkmenistan: Just Like Old Times," in ibid., p 644. 56 Michael Ochs, "Turkmenistan: The Quest for Stability and Control," in op.cit., no.8, p 348. 57 ibid., p 312
52
stating, "Broadly, the Caucasus has strong presidents, whereas
Central Asia has dictators." ss Zakaria even refers to Kazakhstan as
being a "near-tyranny."59 The main reasons for such observations
are due to · following reasons. Political parties are generally only
allowed to register selectively and their power is often rendered null
due to corrupt elections, government-controlled press and physical
threats and oppression. Four of the five states' constitutions
(Turkmenistan is the exception) proclaim democratic, multi-party
politics, but few live up to this. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan come
the closest to upholding the promises their Constitutions make.
According to the 1998 Freedom House report, 60 twelve legalized
political parties existed in Kazakhstan by 1996 and eighteen
currently exist in Kyrgyzstan6 1• These two states have been awarded
the label of "transitional" in their polity and economy, as opposed to
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan that were labeled
"consolidated autocracy" in their polity and "consolidated statist" in
their economy.62
Thus, even in such uncertain atmospheres as in Central Asia, some
positive sign for democracy cannot be ruled out. Slow but certain
growth of civil society is taking place, which is good for democracy.
New NGOs, both domestic and foreign, are coming up. But, many
58 Tile Economist, "Likely Lads," February 7, 1998. 59 Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs, (November/December)
1997,p.24. 6° Freedom House, Nations in Transit 1998, http://freedomhouse.org/nit98. 61 Op.cit., no.51, pp 210-212. 62 ibid., p 212.
53
foreign observers reduced the question of the five republics' future
development to the simple question of whether they would move
toward the Turkish model of secular democracy or toward Iranian
style theocracy. But the past three years have shown that,
especially in Tashkent and the other capitals of the region, there is
a strong inclination to neither copy any model nor to throw
themselves into the arms of a new "big. brother," but rather to strive
for development on the foundation of Central Asia's own cultural
heritage.63
63 Swiss Review of World Affairs, "New Contours for an Old Region," May 2, 1995.
54
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