buyer-seller watermarking (bsw) protocols

Buyer-Seller Watermarking (BSW) Protocols

Geong Sen Poh

31 Oct 2006

2

Outline

Introduction Motivation Development of BSW Goals, Methodology and Assumptions

Protocols Memon-Wong Protocol (MW) Lei et al. Protocol (Lei) Zhang et al. Protocol (Zhang)

Analysis of Zhang et al. Protocol Summary

3

Motivation

How can the seller identifies buyers that illegally distributed songs, movies etc.? The seller can embeds unique watermarks…

songs, movies etc.

£££££ £££££

Seller

Buyer

Distributes copies

4

Motivation BUT…

The seller is the entity that generates and embeds the watermark into a digital work

If illegal copies are found and a buyer is identified through the embedded watermark, the buyer can claim that he/she is framed by the seller since the seller can embed the buyer’s watermark into any digital work.

SO…

Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol

5

Development of BSW

MW

Choi Attack I Goi Attack I

Choi II Goi Attack II

Lei

Zhang

1998

2003 2004

2005 2005

2004

2006

IWDW

ACNS ACNS

IEEE

EUC

IEEE

IEE

Ju

2003 ICISC

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Goals No Framing

An honest buyer should not be falsely accused by a malicious seller or other buyers

No Repudiation The buyer accused of reselling an unauthorised copy should not be

able to claim that the copy was created by the seller or a security breach of the seller’s system

Traceability A buyer who has illegally distributed digital works can be traced

Collusion Tolerance An attacker should not be able to find, generate, or delete the

fingerprint by comparing the marked copies, even if they have access to a large number of copies

Anonymity A buyer should be able to buy anonymously

Unlinkability Given two marked digital works, no one can decide whether or not

they were bought by the same buyer

B. M. Goi, R. C.-W. Phan, Y. Yang, F. Bao, R. H. Deng and M. U. Siddiqi, Cryptanalysis of Two Anonymous Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocols and an Improvement for True Anonymity, ACNS 2004, LNCS 3089, pp. 369-382, 2004

7

Methodology

Interactive Protocol Registration Buy and Sell Identification and Arbitration

Seller does not know the watermarkBuyer does not know the embedded

watermark

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Principals Involved

Buyer (B)Seller (S)Certificate Authority (CA)

Fully trusted Issues certificates to WCA, A, B, and S

Watermark Certificate Authority (WCA) Fully trusted Issues and certifies buyer’s watermark

Arbiter (A) Fully trusted Resolves dispute between B and S

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Assumptions

Each of the principals involved (e.g. buyer and seller) has a CA certified public and private key pair, (PKi, SKi) for i the identity of the principal

The public-key encryption algorithm is homomorphic

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Homomorphic Encryption

E(x) + E(y) = E(x + y) E(x) E(y) = E(x y) Example: RSA

Paillier homomorphic encryption (in Zhang Protocol):E(x) E(y) = E(x + y)If the public key is: n,e then:

E(x1) E(x2) = x1

ex2e mod n

= (x1x2)e mod n= E(x1 x2)

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MW Protocol

WCA

S B

O’ = O * WS

σ(EPKB(WB)) = EPKB(σ(WB))EPKB(O’) * EPKB(σ(WB)) = EPKB(O’ * σ(WB))

Request watermark

EPKB (W

B ), SignW

CA (EPKB (W

B ))

B = BuyerS = SellerWCA = Watermark Certificate AuthorityO = Original WorkO’ = Marked WorkWk = k’s Watermark

EPKB(WB), SignWCA(EPKB(WB))

σ = Random permutation of degree n* = Embedding algorithmEk(.) = Encrypt with k’s public keySignk(.) = Sign with k’s private key

EPKB(O’ * σ(WB))

DSKB(EPKB(O’ * σ(WB))) = O’ * σ(WB)

• Generate WB

Registration, Buy and Sell

S does not know the watermark

B does not know the embedded watermark

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MW Protocol

A

S B

Request private key

Private key

σ, EPKB

(WB),

Sign WCA(E PKB

(WB)),

Y

B = BuyerS = SellerA = ArbiterWCA = Watermark Certificate AuthorityO = Original WorkO’, O” = Marked WorkY = Illegal copyWk = k’s Watermark

σ = Random permutation of degree n* = Embedding algorithmEk(.) = Encrypt with k’s public keySignk(.) = Sign with k’s private key

On discovering an illegal copy of O’, say Y, S can determine B by detecting σ(WB)

embedded using a watermark detection algorithm and search the buyer details from his database.

Identification and Arbitration

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Issue with MW

MW Protocol achieved: No Framing No repudiation Traceability

But… No anonymity, No unlinkability for the buyers

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Lei Protocol

CA BpkB

CertCA(pkB)

• Generate (skB,pkB)• Generate certCA(pkB)

B = BuyerS = SellerO = Original WorkO’, O” = Marked WorkWk = k’s Watermark

ARG = An agreement between the buyer and the seller* = Embedding algorithmEk(.) = Homomorphic encrypt with k’s public keyDk(.) = Homomorphic decrypt with k’s private keySignk(.) = Sign with k’s private key(skB,pkB), (sk’, pk’) = Buyer generated random key pair

Registration

Anonymous key pair

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Lei Protocol

WCA

S B

• Generate (sk’,pk’) for this transaction• s = Signsk’(ARG)• Generate CertpkB(pk’)

B = BuyerS = SellerWCA = Watermark Certificate AuthorityO = Original WorkO’, O” = Marked WorkWk = k’s Watermark

ARG = An agreement between the buyer and the seller* = Embedding algorithmEk(.) = Homomorphic encrypt with k’s public keyDk(.) = Homomorphic decrypt with k’s private keySignk(.) = Sign with k’s private key(skB,pkB), (sk’, pk’) = Buyer generated random key pair

CertCA(pkB), CertpkB(pk’), ARG, s

• O’ = O * WS

Epk’(O’ * WB)

• Epk’(O’) * Epk’(WB) = Epk’(O’ * WB)

Cert pkB(pk’), A

RG, s, O’

E pk’(WB), E WCA

(W B), S WCA

, pk’, s

• Generate WB

• SWCA= SignWCA(WB)

Dsk’(Epk’(O’ * σ(WB))) = O’ * σ(WB)

Buy and Sell

Unlinkable key pair

S & B do not know the watermark

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Lei ProtocolIdentification and Arbitration

S = SellerA = ArbiterWCA = Watermark Certificate AuthorityO = Original WorkO’, O” = Marked WorkY = Illegal CopyWk = k’s Watermark

ARG = An agreement between the buyer and the seller* = Embedding algorithmDet(. , .) = Detection algorithmEk(.) = Homomorphic encrypt with k’s public keyDk(.) = Homomorphic decrypt with k’s private keySignk(.) = Sign with k’s private key(skB,pkB), (sk’, pk’) = Buyer generated random key pair

A

S

WCAEWCA(WB)

WB

O’, Y, C

ert CA(pk B

), Cert pkB

(pk’), ARG, s,

E pk’(WB), E WCA

(W B), S WCA

• W’ = Det(Y)• W’ = WB ?

On discovering an illegal copy of O’, say Y, S carries out the following steps:

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Zhang Protocol

Similar to Lei Protocol except that there is no WCA No need WCA to generate and certify watermark:

S generates his part of the watermark B generates his part of the watermark The final watermark embedded in the digital work is the

combination of S and B’s watermarks

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Zhang Protocol

CA BpkB

CertCA(pkB)

• Generate (skB,pkB)• Generate certCA(pkB)

B = BuyerCA = Certificate AuthorityO = Original WorkO’, O” = Marked WorkOf = Illegal CopyWk = k’s Watermark

ARG = An agreement between the buyer and the sellerSECi = Secret string of i* = Embedding algorithmEk(.) = Homomorphic encrypt with k’s public keyDk(.) = Homomorphic decrypt with k’s private keySignk(.) = Sign with k’s private key(skB,pkB), (sk’, pk’) = Buyer generated random key pair

Registration

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Zhang Protocol

S B

• Generate (sk’,pk’) for this transaction• Generate a secret SECB

• e = Epk’(SECB)• s = Signsk’(Epk’(SECB), ARG)• Generate CertpkB(pk’)

B = BuyerS = SellerO = Original WorkO’, O” = Marked WorkOf = Illegal CopyWk = k’s Watermark

ARG = An agreement between the buyer and the sellerSECi = Secret string of i* = Embedding algorithmEk(.) = Homomorphic encrypt with k’s public keyDk(.) = Homomorphic decrypt with k’s private keySignk(.) = Sign with k’s private key(skB,pkB), (sk’, pk’) = Buyer generated random key pair

CertCA(pkB), CertpkB(pk’), ARG, e, s

• O’ = O * WS

• Epk’(WB) = Epk’(SECS)(Epk’(SECB) = Epk’(SECS + SECB)• Epk’(O’) * Epk’(WB) = Epk’(O’ + WB)

Epk’(O’ * WB)

Dsk’(Epk’(O’ + WB)) = O’ + WB

Buy and Sell

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Zhang Protocol

B = BuyerS = SellerA = ArbiterCA = Certificate AuthorityO = Original WorkO’ = Marked WorkY = Illegal CopyWk = k’s Watermark

ARG = An agreement between the buyer and the sellerSECi = Secret string of i* = Embedding algorithmDet(. , .) = Detection algorithmEk(.) = Homomorphic encrypt with k’s public keyDk(.) = Homomorphic decrypt with k’s private keySignk(.) = Sign with k’s private key(skB,pkB), (sk’, pk’) = Buyer generated random key pair

A

S

CACertCA(pkB), CertpkB(pk’), e

SECB

O’, Y, C

ert CA(pk B

), Cert pkB

(pk’), ARG, e, s,

SEC S

• Found Y

• Compute WB = SECS + SECB

• W’ = Det(Y)• W’ = WB ?

B

e =

Epk’ (S

EC

B )

SE

CB

• Dsk’(Epk’(SECB)) = SECB

Identification and Arbitration

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Analysis of Zhang et al. Protocols

Issues Buyer can remove his part of the watermark

easily since… O’ + WB = O’ + SECS + SECB and Buyer knows SECB, to remove… O’ + SECS + SECB – SECB

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Summary

The motivation of BSW The proposals to date

MW, Lei and Zhang The issues

No formal security model, protocols designed in ad hoc manner

Current focus To continue analyse other proposals (Ju, Choi,

Goi), with issues when parties collude with each others (Seller colludes with WCA etc.)

Thank You