1 alarp recover hemp identify assess control hemp and alarp training
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2
Objectives of HEMP & ALARP Training
• Increase Awareness of HEMP Concepts
• Develop a common understanding of ALARP Principles
These topics are covered in more detail in:HSE 0026 – Hazards and Effects Management Process
(HEMP and ALARP)
4
HSE Management System
Policy and Strategic Objectives
Organization, Responsibilities, Resources, Standards and Doc.
Hazards & Effects Management
Planning & Procedures
Implementation & Monitoring
Audit
Review
LEADERSHI P AND COMMI TMENT
Element 8
Element 7
Element 6
Element 5
Element 4
Element 3
Element 2
Element 1
Corrective Action
5
Individual HEMP Responsibilities
All Employees
Responsible and accountable for conducting their work in such a manner which reduces to ALARP or eliminates risk to their own personal health and safety and that of their fellow employees and that ensures the protection of the environment, company assets, and company reputation.
Technical Staff
Participate in HEMP efforts for your Area, including asset integrity
Achieve a competent level of understanding concerning your Area’s HSE Case and Activity Specification Sheets
Comply with strict adherence to the organization’s MOC policy
6
Hazards and Effects Management Process
When a hazard is released, what are the recovery measures in place? How can the consequences be mitigated or minimized?
Recover
How are the hazards and their risks managed? What are the controls and barriers? How effective are the barriers and controls?
Control
Can the hazard be eliminated or minimized? What are the threats that can release the hazard? What are the credible scenarios and how likely are they? What are the potential consequences? What is the potential likelihood of the hazardous event? What is the risk?
Assess
What hazards are present? Are people, the environment, Shell’s reputation, or assets exposed to these hazards?
Identify
When a hazard is released, what are the recovery measures in place? How can the consequences be mitigated or minimized?
Recover
How are the hazards and their risks managed? What are the controls and barriers? How effective are the barriers and controls?
Control
Can the hazard be eliminated or minimized? What are the threats that can release the hazard? What are the credible scenarios and how likely are they? What are the potential consequences? What is the potential likelihood of the hazardous event? What is the risk?
Assess
What hazards are present? Are people, the environment, Shell’s reputation, or assets exposed to these hazards?
Identify
Recover
HEMP
Identify
Assess
Control
What are the Hazards?
How likely is it?
Risk Reduction Ideas
HSE Critical Procedures, Equipment
& Tasks
What could happen?
How serious will it be?
Is there a better way?
What if it happens?
How to recover?
How to prevent it?
Recover
HEMP
Identify
Assess
Control
Recover
HEMP
Identify
Assess
Control
What are the Hazards?
How likely is it?
Risk Reduction Ideas
HSE Critical Procedures, Equipment
& Tasks
What could happen?
How serious will it be?
Is there a better way?
What if it happens?
How to recover?
How to prevent it?
7
CONSEQUENCES INCREASING LIKELIHOOD
A B C D E
Se
ver
ity
Peo
ple
As
sets
En
viro
n-
me
nt
Re
pu
tati
on
Neverheard of
in EPindustry
Heard ofin EP
industry
Incidenthas
occurredin
SEPCo
Happensseveral
times peryear inSEPCo
Happensseveral
times peryear in alocation
0 No healtheffect/injury
No damage No effect No impact
1 Slight healtheffect/injury
Slightdamage
Slight effect Slightimpact
2 Minor healtheffect/injury
Minordamage
Minor effect Limitedimpact
3 Major healtheffect/injury
Localiseddamage
Localisedeffect
Consider-able impact
LowRisk
4 PTD* or 1 to3 fatalities
Majordamage
Major effect Nationalimpact
MediumRisk
5 Multiplefatalities
Extensivedamage
Massiveeffect
Internationalimpact
HighRisk
PTD = Permanent Total Disability
Risk Assessment Matrix & Major Hazards
A5 B5
Major Hazards are those that have high risk or high potential consequences
8
Major Hazards & HSE Cases
SEPCo Policies require that operations and facilities with Major Hazards have documented HSE Cases.
An HSE Case is a facility or operation-specific demonstration that the HSE risks from Major Hazards are managed to As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and a description of how SEPCO’s HSE Management System is applied to HSE hazards.
Management Summary_____________________
9
Bow Tie Terminology
Threat 1Overpressure
Threat 2 Top Event
Threat 3
UNDER
PRESSURE
HYDROCARBONS
PSVsSSDS
Hydro testing
Material Construction Consequence 1
Fire/Explosion
Consequence2
Consequence3
Detection Systems
Surveillance
Design
Fire-fighting Equipment
Barriers Recovery Measures
Term Definition
Top Event the loss of control or release of the hazard.
Threats “release mechanisms” of the hazard.
Barriers •prevent the release of a hazard (i.e. top event) and act directly on the threat •are the hardware and procedures in place to prevent the threat from leading to the top event. •appear on the left hand side of the bow-tie.
Consequences •the effects of a hazard once it has been released. •appear on the right hand side of the bow-tie.
Recovery Measures
•mitigate a hazard’s potential to cause harm, damage, and environmental impacts. •are similar to barriers, but act on the consequences•appear on the right hand side of the bow-tie.
10
Bow-Tie Example
Loss of Containment
Threat: Corrosion
H-
01
.06 H
ydro
carb
on
Gas
Threat 2
Threat 3
Consequence 2
Consequence 3
Consequence: Explosion
ESCALATION FACTOR
ESCALATION FACTOR CONTROLS
Change in operating
environment
MOC Process
Inspection Program
Co
rrosio
n
Ma
na
gem
en
t P
roc
es
s
BARRIER
Installation of
Temporary Equipment
Temporary Equipment Standard
Field Inspection
Ign
ition
S
ou
rce
C
on
trol
ESCALATION FACTOR CONTROLS
FACTOR
RECOVERY MEASURE
Loss of Containment
Threat: Corrosion
H-
01
.06 H
ydro
carb
on
Gas
H-
01
.06 H
ydro
carb
on
Gas
Threat 2
Threat 3
Consequence 2
Consequence 3
Consequence: Explosion
ESCALATION FACTOR
ESCALATION FACTOR CONTROLS
Change in operating
environment
MOC Process
Inspection Program
Co
rrosio
n
Ma
na
gem
en
t P
roc
es
s
BARRIER
Installation of
Temporary Equipment
Temporary Equipment Standard
Field Inspection
Ign
ition
S
ou
rce
C
on
trol
ESCALATION FACTOR CONTROLS
ESCALATION FACTOR
RECOVERY MEASURE
11
Best Practice Bow Ties
There will be a single bow tie for each major hazard in SEPCo that sets the minimum required barriers/recovery measures to manage risks.
These are Best Practice Bow Ties.
Each Asset or Operation will:
• review applicable best practice bow ties to consider and document any unique threats/consequences that may exist at their location.
• benchmark the effectiveness of the barriers at their location against the performance expectation included in the best practice bow ties.
• Identify gaps and implement remedial actions to improve the barriers / recovery measures and reduce the risk to ALARP.
12
Hazard Description Potential Consequences
Sources of expsoure
Health People - Safety
Assets Environment
Reputation
Overall Risk
Controls
H-01.01 Crude oil under pressure
unignited releasefirespill / environmental impactpersonnel injuries/fatalitiesloss of asset / asset damageproduction loss
for health effects of flammable hydrocarbons, see the listings under H-21/22 General Chemicals
Mmajor H Mmajor M H For locations where this is a major hazard, see the HSE Case. For other locations, see Table 5.1 in SEPCo HSE MS Part 5.
H-19.07A Carbon monoxide (Gas)
Acute: chemical asphyxiant causing carboxyhaemoglobin Chronic: Category 1 Teratogen, may cause harm to unborn child, unconsciousness, fatality
Power generation unit; engine exhausts, emergency generators, boilers, fired equipment
M L N N N M 1. CO monitor in temporary quarters where combustion emission may occur.
H-20.01 H2S (hydrogen sulphide, sour gas)
personnel injury / fatalityminor environmental impactHealth:Acute: Irritant to eyes, skin and respiratory tract. Chemical asphyxiant causing respiratory paralysis, irritant; unconsciousness, fatality Chronic: prolonged contact may lead to dermatitis
Raw Material. Sour crude.
Examples include rich and fat DEA, sour water, fuel gas streams, sour hydrogen, acid gas, spent caustic stripper overhead
Mmajor
M L N M Mmajor For locations where this is a major hazard, see the HSE Case. For other locations, see Table 5.1 in SEPCo HSE MS Part 5.
For Health, Refer to generic Chemical Minimum Controls in Table 5.1 of SEPCo HSE MS Part 5.
1. MMS Contingency Plan for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)2. Local Emergency Response Plan
Hazard Register
Those items with an Environment rating are E-aspects. Those that are Major in the Environment column are “Significant E-aspects”
The Hazard Register describes hazards, their associated risks, and how the hazards are managed.
Those items with in the Health column were identified during health risk assessments, and consider chronic and acute health exposures
13
HEMP Tools
Tool Acronym
Concept Risk Assessment CRA
Dropped Object Assessment DOA
Emergency Response Plans ERP
Environmental Impact Assessment
EIA
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FMEA
Fire, Explosion and Escape Assessment
FEEA
Hazard Identification HAZID
Health Impact Assessment HIA
Health Risk Assessment HRA
HSE Performance Criteria (minimum standards) Assessment
Human Factors Engineering Tools
HFE
Tool Acronym
Instrumented Protective Function
IPF
Job Safety Analysis JSA
Performance Standards PS
Permit to Work (See JSA) PTW
Physical Effects Modeling PEM
Process Hazards Analysis PHA HAZOP What If Check List
Quantitative Risk Assessment QRA
Risk-based Corrective Action RBCA
Risk Reduction Idea (RRI) Ranking Tool
Social Impact Assessment SIA
Sustainable Development 3-D Tool
3DSD
Wells Hazard Analysis WHA
The most commonly used HEMP tools are highlighted
14
Risk Management Hierarchy
1) Eliminate – remove the risk altogether
2) Substitute – use a lower risk alternative
3) Isolate / Separate – keep the hazard
away from where it can cause harm
4) Engineering Controls – Prevention –
design such that the risk of an incident is
minimal
5) Engineering Controls – Mitigation –
design such that if an incident occurs, it
is mitigated
6) Procedural Controls – provide
procedures to reduce risk
7) Personnel Protective Equipment –
provide protection to reduce potential for
injury
In order of preference:
Recover
HEMP
Identify
Assess
Control
15
HEMP Study Interactions
HEMP Study
MOCProcess
HSE Case
Audits
Variances
Incident Investigation
Project HSE Plan
Regulations
Designs
Procedures
16
Asset Responsibilities for HEMP Studies
• The owner of the HEMP study is the accountable party for the asset or operation covered by the study. The owner is accountable for:– Maintaining the study– Updating the study at the requisite frequency– Making sure actions from the study are documented and
closed• Studies done for design considerations are kept by
engineering.• Studies done for operational considerations are kept
by Operations. • Action items resulting from SEPCo HEMP studies
shall be tracked and closed out using IMPACT.
17
Human Factors Engineering
Organizational Structure(job design, communication, task)
Work Environment(lighting, noise, chemical exposures, climate)
Individual Constraints(age, size, training, skills, intelligence)
Human
Displays Controls
Sensory Information Action
TASK
InputOutput
Machine
Organizational Structure(job design, communication, task)
Work Environment(lighting, noise, chemical exposures, climate)
Individual Constraints(age, size, training, skills, intelligence)
Human
Interfaces - Displays Interfaces - Controls
Sensory Information Action
TASK
InputOutput
Machine
The Group Minimum Health Management Standard states: Human factors engineering principles are to be considered and applied during the early design stage of new facilities projects where design can have a critical impact on equipment usability and user safety or health.
The following picture illustrates how a human interacts with a technical component and the factors that can influence his/her performance.
19
ALARP TRIANGLE
T h e le v e l o f H S E r is k is g e n e r a l ly s u f f ic ie n t ly lo w th a t s o c ie t y w i l l n o t h a v e c o n c e r n s a n d r e s o u r c e s r e q u ir e d to r e d u c e r is k a r e l ik e ly to b e g r o s s ly d is p r o p o r t io n a te t o th e b e n e f i t s .
H S E r is k s a r e to le r a b le i f f u r th e r r is k r e d u c t io n is im p r a c t ic a l o r r e q u ir e s a c t io n th a t is g r o s s ly d is p r o p o r t io n a te in t im e , t r o u b le a n d e f f o r t to th e r is k r e d u c t io n a c h ie v e d .
T h e g r e a te r th e r is k , th e g r e a te r th e b e n e f i t s th a t a r e l ik e ly to r e s u l t f r o m r is k r e d u c t io n m e a s u r e s , h e n c e th e m o r e l ik e ly th a t e f f o r ts w i l l n o t b e d is p r o p o r t io n a te . T h e m a jo r i t y o f th e H S E r is k s a s s o c ia te d w ith S E P C o ’s a c t iv i t ie s l ie in th is r e g io n .
H S E r is k s a r e to o h ig h to n o r m a l ly b e to le r a te d . F u n d a m e n ta l im p r o v e m e n ts n e e d e d a n d r is k s o n ly c o n s id e r e d w h e n th e r e a r e n o a l te r n a t iv e s a n d p e o p le a r e w e l l in f o r m e d .
T h e le v e l o f H S E r is k is g e n e r a l ly s u f f ic ie n t ly lo w th a t s o c ie t y w i l l n o t h a v e c o n c e r n s a n d r e s o u r c e s r e q u ir e d to r e d u c e r is k a r e l ik e ly to b e g r o s s ly d is p r o p o r t io n a te t o th e b e n e f i t s .
H S E r is k s a r e to le r a b le i f f u r th e r r is k r e d u c t io n is im p r a c t ic a l o r r e q u ir e s a c t io n th a t is g r o s s ly d is p r o p o r t io n a te in t im e , t r o u b le a n d e f f o r t to th e r is k r e d u c t io n a c h ie v e d .
T h e g r e a te r th e r is k , th e g r e a te r th e b e n e f i t s th a t a r e l ik e ly to r e s u l t f r o m r is k r e d u c t io n m e a s u r e s , h e n c e th e m o r e l ik e ly th a t e f f o r ts w i l l n o t b e d is p r o p o r t io n a te . T h e m a jo r i t y o f th e H S E r is k s a s s o c ia te d w ith S E P C o ’s a c t iv i t ie s l ie in th is r e g io n .
H S E r is k s a r e to o h ig h to n o r m a l ly b e to le r a te d . F u n d a m e n ta l im p r o v e m e n ts n e e d e d a n d r is k s o n ly c o n s id e r e d w h e n th e r e a r e n o a l te r n a t iv e s a n d p e o p le a r e w e l l in f o r m e d .
Incr
easin
g In
dividu
al Ri
sks a
nd S
ociet
al Co
ncer
ns
T o le r a b i l i t y T h r e s h o ld
Incr
easin
g In
dividu
al Ri
sks a
nd S
ociet
al Co
ncer
ns
T o le r a b i l i t y T h r e s h o ldT o le r a b i l i t y T h r e s h o ld
20
Risk Perception - Types of Fatalities, US, 2001
Number of deaths /year
47,288
20,308
15,019
14,078
3,309
3,281
396
61
44
Match the causes to the listed number of deaths/year(data from the National Safety Council).
Cause
Accidental Drowning (Non Transport)
Transport Accidents
Contact with venomous animals & Plants
Lightning
Legal Intervention
Falls
Assault
Accidental Poisoning
Exposure to smoke, fire and flames
Answers
Transport Accidents
Assault
Falls
Accidental Poisoning
Exposure to smoke, fire and flames
Accidental Drowning (Non Transport)
Legal Intervention
Contact with Venomous animals & plants
Lightning
21
Relative Risk
Tolerability Threshold
Incre
asin
g I
nd
ivid
ual
Ris
ks a
nd
Socie
tal
Con
cern
s
Tolerability ThresholdTolerability Threshold
Lightning
Venomous animals & plants
Legal Intervention
Drowning
Accidental Poisoning
Falls
Oil and Gas ExtractionTransport Accidents
Assault
22
Actual Vs Perceived Risks
45 Deaths in 1996
59 Deaths in 1995
76 Attacks Worldwide49 Attacks USA1 Death USA 2001
Which “hazard” results in more deaths per year?
23
Risk Misperception
.. Mountaineering Council for Scotland said
“These two men were very aware of safety issues and did not have a reputation for taking any sort of risks”
24
Problem Framing
An outbreak of disease is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs have been proposed:
If you choose. . . Then. . .
Program A 200 people will be saved
Program B 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved 2/3 probability that no people will be saved
Which program would you select?
25
Rephrasing the Problem
Program A 200 people will be saved
72% Program C 400 people will die 22%
Program B
1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved 2/3 probability that no people will be saved
28% Program D
1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved 2/3 probability that no people will be saved
78%
Depending on the problem phrasing, people made different decisions:
26
ALARP Definition
To reduce a risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable involves balancing reduction in risk against time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving it.
This level represents the point, at which time, trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained.
••
••
•
•
Risk Cost
Screening Criteria
ALARP ?
From quantitativerisk analysis
27
ALARP: Road Transport ExampleALARP: Road Transport Example
When does the cost of further reduction measures become disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained?: • No specification• Does not meet legal requirements• No regular vehicle maintenance• Provide recovery measures,
e.g. roll-bars, seat belts• Provide mitigation, e.g., speed limiter,
4WD• Provide driver training• Provide safe driving incentives• Journey management system• Road transport management system• Avoid journeys by planning• Build black-top roads• Use aircraft transport only• Automate production facilities -
eliminate routine driving• Stop production
Intolerable
SCREENING CRITERIA
ALARP region
ALARPprobablyin this area
28
ALARP and Risk Tolerability – 4 Levels of RiskALARP and Tolerability
Principle
Does the design, operation and maintenance of each systemreduce the HSE risk from each failure mode so that it is both tolerable and ALARP?
Failure Modes
Are there sufficient barriers and recovery preparedness measures (either hardware or operational) to reduce the HSE risk from each threat / consequence so that it is both tolerable and ALARP?
Threats / Consequences
Are the HSE risks from each hazard tolerable? Can the hazard be eliminated or the source of the hazard minimized? If not, is the resulting risk ALARP?
Hazards
Are the HSE risks arising from the cumulative exposure to all HSE hazards both tolerable and ALARP?
Cumulative
Risk
ALARP and Tolerability Principle
Does the design, operation and maintenance of each systemreduce the HSE risk from each failure mode so that it is both tolerable and ALARP?
Failure Modes
Are there sufficient barriers and recovery preparedness measures (either hardware or operational) to reduce the HSE risk from each threat / consequence so that it is both tolerable and ALARP?
Threats / Consequences
Are the HSE risks from each hazard tolerable? Can the hazard be eliminated or the source of the hazard minimized? If not, is the resulting risk ALARP?
Hazards
Are the HSE risks arising from the cumulative exposure to all HSE hazards both tolerable and ALARP?
Cumulative
Risk
Etc.
Etc.Threat 3: Fatigue Damage
Hazard 3: H-09.01 Weather
Hazard 1: H-08.04
Boat collision hazard to offshore structures
Hazard 2: H-01.06
Hydrocarbon Gas
Failure Mode 1: Surface
Corrosion
Failure Mode 2:Galvanic Corrosion
Failure Mode 3:Stress
Corrosion Cracking
Threat 2: Corrosion
Threat 1: Overpressure
Etc.
Consequence 1: Fire
Threat 3: Fatigue Damage
Hazard 3: H-09.01 Weather
Hazard 1: H-08.04
Boat collision hazard to offshore structures
Hazard 2: H-01.06
Hydrocarbon Gas
Failure Mode 1: Surface
Corrosion
Failure Mode 2:Galvanic Corrosion
Failure Mode 3:Stress
Corrosion Cracking
Threat 2: Corrosion
Threat 1: Overpressure
Etc.
Consequence 1: Fire
The HEMP Standard describes the Tolerability Threshold, Evaluation requirements and Demonstration requirements for each of these levels of risk.
29
ALARP and Risk Tolerability Decision-Making
For example:•Variances to SEPCo requirements
•Identification of a new hazard, or a change in risk of an existing hazard
•Operating without barriers/recovery measures or operating in a way that deteriorates a barrier
•Making a change that impacts an existing barrier
•Selecting a new concept
•Adding additional risk such that the cumulative risk threshold may be approached
ALARP and risk tolerability decisions are required when changes affect hazard management.
30
Decision Making Framework Outline
TechnologyBased
Values Based
Drivers
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Well establishedsolution
Well understood risks
Very novel
Significant trade-offs
Strong viewsand perceptions
Higher level of M
anagem
ent
DecisionLevel
31
Decision Making Framework
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based Analysis
e g CBA Q
RA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
SEPCo Decision Making Framework
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based Analysis
e g CBA Q
RA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based Analysis
e g CBA Q
RA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
SEPCo Decision Making Framework
Higher level of M
anagem
ent
DecisionLevel
32
Following the Decision-Making Process
Define decision
Evaluate at the Cumulative, hazard, threat, and failure mode levels
Demonstrate the decision as defined in the HEMP Standard
Type A? Type B? Type C? Use the right-hand side of the framework.
Use the left-hand side of the framework.
Determine decision type
Evaluate
Calibrate
Demonstrate
What do you need to decide?
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based
Analysis
e g C
BA QRA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
SEPCo Decision Making Framework
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based
Analysis
e g C
BA QRA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based
Analysis
e g C
BA QRA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
SEPCo Decision Making Framework
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based Analysis
e g CBA Q
RA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
SEPCo Decision Making Framework
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based Analysis
e g CBA Q
RA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based Analysis
e g CBA Q
RA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
SEPCo Decision Making Framework
T h re a t 3 : F a tig u e
D a m a g e
H a z a rd 3 : H -0 9 .0 1 W e a th e r
H a z a rd 1 : H -0 8 .0 4
B o a t c o llis io n h a za rd to o ffs h o re s tru c tu re s
H a z a rd 2 : H -0 1 .0 6
H yd ro c a rb o n G a s
Failure Mode 1: S urface
C orros ion
Failure Mode 2:G alvanic C orros ion
Failure Mode 3:S tress
C orros ion C racking
T h re a t 2 : C o rro s io n
T h re a t 1 : O v e rp re s s u re
E tc .
C o n s e q u e n c e 1 : F ire
T h re a t 3 : F a tig u e
D a m a g e
H a z a rd 3 : H -0 9 .0 1 W e a th e r
H a z a rd 1 : H -0 8 .0 4
B o a t c o llis io n h a za rd to o ffs h o re s tru c tu re s
H a z a rd 2 : H -0 1 .0 6
H yd ro c a rb o n G a s
Failure Mode 1: S urface
C orros ion
Failure Mode 2:G alvanic C orros ion
Failure Mode 3:S tress
C orros ion C racking
T h re a t 2 : C o rro s io n
T h re a t 1 : O v e rp re s s u re
E tc .
C o n s e q u e n c e 1 : F ire
33
Type A Decision Example
The decision context is Type A because this decision is well-understood.
The decision bases are Codes and Standards (ASME, SEPCo design schedules), Good Practice, and Engineering/Expert judgment of the designer. cumulative risk level – N/A
hazard level - consider whether a new hazard is being added or a change in risk is being proposed for an existing hazard. Consider the risk management hierarchy.
threat/consequence level - verify against the personnel at heights bowtie.
failure mode level – N/A
Since this decision is well understood (Type A), the means of calibration is Codes and Standards, so no additional consultation is required Since this decision is well understood (Type A) reference is made to the Hazards and Effects Register, and no additional demonstration is required other than the normal project documentation such as as-built drawings and calculations.
You have to design a new ladder to access a work platform.
How are ALARP principles applied?
How to design a ladder for accessing a work platform. Define
decision
Determine decision type
Evaluate
Calibrate
Demonstrate
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based
Analysis
e g C
BA QRA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
SEPCo Decision Making Framework
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based
Analysis
e g C
BA QRA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based
Analysis
e g C
BA QRA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
SEPCo Decision Making Framework
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based Analysis
e g CBA Q
RA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
SEPCo Decision Making Framework
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based Analysis
e g CBA Q
RA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications
Significance to DecisionMaking Process
Means of Calibration
Codes and Standards
Peer Review
Verification
Benchmarking
Internal StakeholderConsultation
External StakeholderConsultation
Decision Context Type
A
B
C
Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications
Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards
Codes & Standards
Societal Values
CompanyValues
Risk Based Analysis
e g CBA Q
RA
Goo
d Pra
ctice
Engineering/E
xpert Judgem
ent
SEPCo Decision Making Framework
T h re a t 3 : F a tig u e
D a m a g e
H a z a rd 3 : H -0 9 .0 1 W e a th e r
H a z a rd 1 : H -0 8 .0 4
B o a t c o llis io n h a za rd to o ffs h o re s tru c tu re s
H a z a rd 2 : H -0 1 .0 6
H yd ro c a rb o n G a s
Failure Mode 1: S urface
C orros ion
Failure Mode 2:G alvanic C orros ion
Failure Mode 3:S tress
C orros ion C racking
T h re a t 2 : C o rro s io n
T h re a t 1 : O v e rp re s s u re
E tc .
C o n s e q u e n c e 1 : F ire
T h re a t 3 : F a tig u e
D a m a g e
H a z a rd 3 : H -0 9 .0 1 W e a th e r
H a z a rd 1 : H -0 8 .0 4
B o a t c o llis io n h a za rd to o ffs h o re s tru c tu re s
H a z a rd 2 : H -0 1 .0 6
H yd ro c a rb o n G a s
Failure Mode 1: S urface
C orros ion
Failure Mode 2:G alvanic C orros ion
Failure Mode 3:S tress
C orros ion C racking
T h re a t 2 : C o rro s io n
T h re a t 1 : O v e rp re s s u re
E tc .
C o n s e q u e n c e 1 : F ire
34
ALARP Thinking
The picture shows an example of a ladder and cage. Has it been designed to reduce the risk to ALARP?
35
ALARP Thinking - Risk Reduction Ideas (RRIs)
Develop Risk Reduction Ideas for the preceding example.
Remember the Risk Management Hierarchy!
Evaluate hazard level - consider whether a new hazard is being added or a change in risk is being proposed for an existing hazard. Consider the risk management hierarchy.
Consider the Evaluate step.
• Eliminate • Substitute • Isolate / Separate• Engineering Controls – Prevention & Mitigation• Procedural Controls• Personnel Protective Equipment
36
Ranking Tool for selecting optionsXX
Cost multiplier
Cost of Implementation
Cost
1 Low <$50k
2 Medium $50k -$500k
3 High >$500k
Benefit multiplier
Benefit Examples
1 High Move one or more boxes on risk assessment matrix.Reduction of likelihood of a magnitude or more (failure goes from 1/10 to 1/100), consequences are reduced significantly (from potential fatality to minor injury), benefit due to lower penalties/cost of absence/injuries, significant positive reputation impact
2 Medium Reduction of likelihood less than magnitude (from 1/10 to 1/50), consequences are reduced, benefit due to lower penalties/cost of absence/injuries
3 Low Limited reduction in likelihood, limited reduction in consequence
Effort multiplier
Effort of Implementation
Activities examples
1 Low Quick fix, simple to do, applicable to a specific location (no SEPCo wide impact). Little planning required, one person or small team can execute RRI. No shutdown or downtime required.
2 Medium Simple fix but with Asset or Operation-wide implications. Complex, site specific activity. Some planning required. Involvement of local contractors. Small team to carry RRI out. May extend a shutdown.
3 High Complex activity with SEPCo wide implications. Major planning involved. May involve larger contracts. Specific SEPCo team required. Requires a dedicated shutdown to implement.
Range Proposed Action
1-4 Do
6-9 Study
12+ Pass
Sample Score assignments
Cost multiplier Benefit multiplier Effort multiplier Score=
38
Type B Decision Example
Define decision Is a pressure vessel fit for service based on changes in wall thickness from corrosion?
Determine decision type
The decision context is Type B since it is a deviation from codes and standards or good practice (API RP 579)
Evaluate cumulative risk level – N/Ahazard level – evaluate based on the vessel contents for considerations regarding environmental effects, flammability or health hazards. The risk management hierarchy should be used. threat/consequence level - An analysis should be conducted for overpressure and any other threats that might be impacted by reduced wall thickness (corrosion, vibration, etc.). failure mode level – conduct a detailed analysis for each failure mode.
Calibrate The means of calibration is peer review, so consultation is made with:•Technical Authorities•Regulatory Affairs•Workforce•Senior Leadership
Demonstrate Consult the HEMP Standard for demonstration requirements! Since this is a Type B decision, demonstration shall be made using the report format in Attachment B of the HEMP Standard. Reference the hazard management hierarchy and the Engineering Analyses from Fitness for Service reviews.
A pressure vessel has been noted to have a reduction in wall thickness from corrosion. Should it be kept in service? How would you make this decision?
39
HEMP Web Site
Available via the HSE in SEPCo Web Portal or directly athttp://sepco3.shell.com/sites/hse/hemp/
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