軟體專案管理報告 improving project outcomes through operational reliability: a conceptual...
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軟體專案管理報告
IMPROVING PROJECT OUTCOMES THROUGH OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY:A CONCEPTUAL MODEL
951606 范雅筑 951644 李源裕951623 江小琪 951703 洪嘉昌951632 陳葦芸 951736 陳啟天951645 王俐尹 951751 李洹宇951626 王佩婷 951758 謝孟樸
Summarized from.: Sullivan, J. and Beach, R., 2010, International Journal of Project Management, 28, p. 765-775.
INTRODUCTION
951645 王俐尹
INTRODUCTION
Management information system (IS) projects have been studied for many years, and numerous recommendations have been made to improve performance.
ERP systems are highly integrated, complex, cross-functional systems, which support business processes across an entire organisation.
INTRODUCTION(CON.)
High reliability organisations (HRO) operate in environments where the potential for disaster is high, the pressure to meet expectations is persistent and the consequences for failure are publicly visible.
INTRODUCTION(CON.)
That projects can also be considered as ‘‘particular kinds of organisations” (ibid) reinforces our view that these ‘project-based organisations’ might benefit from an improved understanding of how high operational reliability is achieved.
INTRODUCTION(CON.)
The aims of this phase were to: (a) provide the theoretical foundations for
researching the factors that contribute to operational reliability in IS project environments.
INTRODUCTION(CON.)
(b) develop a framework to facilitate a comparative analysis of organisational activities and the synthesis of empirical data gathered in subsequent stages of the research.
(c) extend knowledge of those organisational characteristics that contribute to successful project outcomes/reliable operational performance.
HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANISATIONS
951644 李源裕
HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANISATIONS
Some organisations have been very successful in the implementation of complex systems
HRO is capable of developing and/or applying sophisticated technologies
HRO is the way that these organisations deal with failure and recovery
HOW HRO WORK
high reliability is possible and that organizations possess attributes that can enhance reliability
design reward systems to recognize the costs of failure
ATTRIBUTES
The HRO places a higher priority on reliability than any other objective
It places a high priority on effective performance and avoiding disasters through processes of collective learning
CHARACTERIZATION
high technical competence high performance and oversight a propensity to constantly search for
improvements a propensity to constantly search for
improvements
CHARACTERIZATION (CONT.)
operate under high pressure use incentives and share expectations to
enhance reliability maintain hazard-driven operational flexibility
to ensure safety promote a culture of reliability avoid cost effective trade-offs and trial and
error learning
HRO MATRIX
using a two dimensional matrix
technological risk
Reliability
HRO MATRIX
EXAMPLE
television weather reporter be plotted in quadrant 1
low reliability and low technological risk
metropolitan water supplier be classified into quadrant 3
high reliability and low technological risk
EXAMPLE(CONT.)
United States Military at the right side of quadrant 3 and in
quadrant 4
Chernobyl and Three Mile Island nuclear power plants during their respective crises
quadrant 2
FRAMEWORK
profit-seeking organisations might place a different emphasis on reliability compared to non-profit organisations
service organisations (high consumer contact) may avoid technological risk in preference for proven technologies compared to manufacturers
RISK
951626 王佩婷
PRIMARY RISKS FACED BY THE HRO
The primary risks faced by the HRO are those that : may result in significant property damage or loss
of life those associated with failure to meet the
expectations of stakeholders for safe and effective performance
So they refer to these as
operational and
stakeholder risks
OPERATIONAL RISK FACTORS
Grabowski and Roberts have suggested that HRO risk factors involve ‘‘high consequence.”
In extreme cases, they include uncertain or hazardous operating environments,
‘‘a situation that invokes a sense of dread”
OPERATIONAL RISK FACTORS (CONT.)
Risk factors exist in other forms such as introducing new technology where
failure to properly manage the technology might threaten the value of the company stock or drain resources from more profitable ventures
OPERATIONAL RISK FACTORS (CONT.)
human activities : false assumptions about reality or the effects of political activity
when small anomalies evolve into significant problems risk factors can arise as effects of a ‘‘disaster incubation period”
OPERATIONAL RISK FACTORS (CONT.)
Risk factors can be categorized into threegroups:
1. known risk 2. imagined risk 3. unknown risk
STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS An organisation’s stakeholders include its
managers,employees, regulatory and political entities and, increasingly,the general public and consumers
Stakeholder influence on project outcomes is well known and strategies to influence the behavioural characteristics of individuals to mitigate the effects in ‘‘sensitive projects” have been presented
STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS (CONT.)
The HRO requires a ‘‘high level of goal congruence and a shared sense of duty to the collective purpose”
Aboard US Navy aircraft carriers, each individual is expected to perform assigned tasks reliably as well as monitoring the larger picture
STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS (CONT.) In these organisations, the expectations of
individuals are so high that an organisational culture develops surrounding those expectations.
This is in stark contrast to the non-HRO where failure to meet expectations rarely invokes the same degree of anxiety from stakeholders.
The consequences of failure are related to stakeholder expectations in that failure to meet minor expectations will result in minimal consequences whilst major failures will result in more severe consequences.
CAPABILITY
951623 江小琪
CAPABILITY
• Capability can be defined in terms of resources and competences.
• The HRO places a higher priority on the adequacy of these resources.
• Competences include proprietary process knowledge, unique skills and experiences.
• The HRO must have significant reserves of these competences to adequately address the hazards of their environment.
RESOURCES
• Reliability to be equal or greater in importance to efficiency and maintaining adequate resources is a prerequisite of reliability.
• Grabowski and Roberts suggest:– Over time large scale systems can become
degraded.• Higher operational costs than conventional
organizations.
RESOURCES (CONT.)
Perrow drives toward efficiency (cost reduction or
increased profitability) increased the danger in complex systems.
Roberts in large scale HRO environments where resource
requirements can be significant.
RESOURCES (CONT.)
The HRO also has a heightened awareness of investments in safety.
Many organizations understand that ‘‘expenditure on safety is a good investment.”
But the HRO is characterized by an operational ethos in which reliability rivals efficiency.
The cost of an accident far outweighs the cost of preventive measures.
COMPETENCE FACTORS
Competences include the skills, procedures, knowledge and experience of an organization’s members.
These factors are difficult to quantify and tend to fluctuate over time.
In times of crisis, exceptional competence is often credited with averting disaster.
COMPETENCE FACTORS (CONT.)
To attain ‘high reliability’ high levels of competence are necessary but even organizations with plentiful resources will occasionally experience system failure.
In essence, it is the competence factors that prevent disaster, not resources alone.
COMPETENCE FACTORS (CONT.)
How these competences are nurtured and deployed within the organization will impact on the effectiveness of the system.
The matrix structure, frequently associated with project-based organizations, can be particularly useful in overcoming problems that are inter-functional in nature.
COMPETENCE FACTORS -SAPIENTIAL AUTHORITY They also provide competence and
confidence building opportunities for individuals that can lead to the creation of sapiential authority .
Sapiential authority• knowledge and expertise • maturity (life knowledge) rather than hierarchical
position (structural or positional authority To be particularly useful when events
become critical .
DISAGREEMENT
As previously mentioned, there is some disagreement as to whether all failures can be completely prevented in complex systems.
Perrow’s “Normal Accident Theory” accidents in complex technological systems must
be expected, that eventually enough circumstances will align themselves and failure will follow.
EXAMPLE
A Thousand Heroes In 1989 United Airlines Flight 232
from Denver to Chicago suffered an explosion in one of the aircraft’s engines causing a loss of hydraulic power. 111 passengers died but 185
survived.
CAPABILITY TO MITIGATE RISK
&THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
951736 陳啟天
5.CAPABILITY TO MITIGATE RISK
some organisations must carry excess capability to mitigate exceptional operational risks.
lower capability is required by those whose perceived risk and consequences of failure are lower.
the HRO must ‘‘avoid errors or failure because the potential cost is unacceptable to society”
6.THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
Organisations that reliably manage complex systems maintain a balance between those factors that represent a threat to the system and those that mitigate them.
HRO is able to consistently achieve this balance over long periods of time.
6.THE CONCEPTUAL MODELA conceptual appear to facilitate high operational reliability.
ABOUT THIS MODEL
Five interacting forces: expectations, risk factors, resources, competence factors, and consequences.
6.1 RESOURCE AND EXPECTATIONS
adequate resources are essential to support complex systems in the HRO.
cutting back resources and emphasising efficiency is detrimental to reliability.
A MODEL ABOUT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS AND RESOURCES
The bidirectional nature of this relationship is represented in the model as dotted lines.
whilst the variable relative strength (or weakness) of these components is represented as triangles.
A MODEL ABOUT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS AND RESOURCES
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
951758 謝孟樸
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
Five factors Resource 、 Expectation 、 Consequence 、 C
ompetence factor 、 RiskRelationship Resource and expectations Expectations and consequences Consequences and competence factors Competence factors and risks
EXPECTATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
Factors of Influence consequence Resources are reduced Ability insufficiency External political influences Environment opposition
EXPECTATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
EXPECTATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
Direct proportion - Weight of expectations increase, Weight of consequence
increase
Fear ( Fears of the consequences of not meeting expectations )
Inverse proportion - Weight of expectations decrease, Weight of consequence
increase
Security ( Security of flies )
CONSEQUENCES AND COMPETENCE FACTORS
Unbalance Consequences System’s failure Develop slowly lead to new procedures
CONSEQUENCES AND COMPETENCE FACTORS
HRO’s mechanism Learn from mistakes Avoid repetitions Have exceptional organisational learning
capability
COMPETENCE FACTORS AND RISKS
Factors of increases risk Exceed development ability Exceed Design limit Exhibited groupthink Exist political pressure Less competent
COLUMBIA DISASTER
951606 范雅筑
ORIGIN OF CLUMBIA DISASTER
On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated on re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere, killing all seven astronauts.
CAUSES FOR THE DISASTER
Technical causes for the disaster A piece of protective foam strikes the leading edge of
the wing on lift-off. Administrative and organizational contributors.
Unknown risk : NASA unaware that a foam strike could cause catastrophic damage to the shuttle.
Knowledge management : With staffing levels of the Shuttle program declining NASA had no plan in place for retaining the knowledge of key personnel.
ERRORS OF THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM (1)
Unrealistic expectations held by Congress. NASA had also failed to imagined risks and the
possibility of unknown risks that would have led to contingency plans.
Areas of capability were insufficient. the mishandling of the foam strike
ERRORS OF THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM(2)
The operational program was perceived to be a ‘‘mature and reliable system.” caused the focus of the program to be erroneously
transitioned from development to operational Years of inadequate funding
forced NASA to ‘‘ do more with less. ”
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW MODE Be more efficient
reduce costs Management with considerably less NASA oversight.
• Outsourcing an obvious thing to do because the risks
were believed to be known and under control.
Consolidate shuttle operations under a single-business entity. even the eventual privatization of the Space Shuttle
Program.
DIFFICULTIES IN INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
The organization culture of the 1960s was resistant to change and rigidly hierarchical.
Greater expectations to accommodate special interest projects without corresponding increases in resources.
There are many shortcomings of the organization and requiring remedial action.
Organizational learning at NASA.
NORTHEAST BLACKOUT
951632 陳葦芸
NORTHEAST BLACKOUT
On August 14, 2003
Midwest and Northeast United States as well as Ontario, Canada
Eastlake 5 came into contact with overgrown trees and shut down.
NORTHEAST BLACKOUT(2) Some areas were without power for as long
as four days, and parts of Ontario endured rolling blackouts for over a week
It cost the United States and Canada billions of dollars in lost commerce
NORTHEAST BLACKOUT(3)
NERC( The North American Electric Reliability Council) , a nongovernment agency, and its ten subordinate Regional Reliability Councils (RRCs) are responsible for the voluntary operating and planning standards that promote reliability within the power grid.
NERC does not have authority to enforce compliance for the standards that promote reliability within the power grid.
MAINTAINING A HIGH DEGREE OF RELIABILITY WITH A SYSTEM NEED
Requires skilled operators
complex computer and communications systems
careful planning and design
FIRSTENERGY’S PROBLEMS
FirstEnergy—a company that caused the blackout.
FirstEnergy’s substandard power generation and transmission capability had been in place for a long time before the blackout
The absence of any legally binding authority for enforcement contributed to non-compliance.
FIRSTENERGY’S PROBLEMS(2) inadequate training
an inability to acquire and understand information concerning the status of the power grid
weakening infrastructure
ineffective policies and procedures
CONCLUSION failure was inevitable, but it was preventable.
The most obvious problem was a lack of accountability.
Without consequences for non-compliance, the organizational learning relationship is ineffective.
CONCLUSION(2) the model explains why an increased risk of
power grid deterioration combined with stagnant, or possibly atrophying competence would lead to disaster.
CONCLUSION
951751 李洹宇
HOW TO IMPLEMENT AND OPERATEA SYSTEM SUCCESSFUL
HRO oganizational characteristics
Tranfer to non-HRO
FACILITATE THE STUDY 1
the literature relating to the HRO
the organisational characteristics
the environmental factors
Example: a failed examination
FACILITATE THE STUDY 2
immediate & practical using
monitoring & measuring
it might be a long time
MORE EFFECTIVE APPROACH
the magnitude of the failure ( the one-off nature of projects & the critical role information
systems)
identify any potential weaknesses early
researchers and project management professionals evaluate
LIMITATIONS
951703 洪嘉昌
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The above research has focussed on organisations in the United States.
in other countries and industries, the possibility that national culture may influence the utility of the model should not be ignored.
EXAMPLE
Milliken and Mellahi have an underpinning assumption: The HRO can be transferred to other, less critical environments.
For example, organisations operating in less critical environments to the HRO or under different cultural conditions may not have the ability or volition to learn from their experiences or change behaviours.
SHOULD KNOW BEFORE STUDY THE MODEL
The interrelationship between risk and capability is complex and multi-dimensional, it is not a simple two dimensional phenomenon like the conceptual model.
SHOULD KNOW BEFORE STUDY THE MODEL(CONT.)
Basic factors of the conceptual model: Resource, Expectation, Consequence,
Competence factors and Risk factors.
Others factor in the real world: Strategy, Country, Culture, Politics, Social, ….etc.
THE VALUE OF THE MODEL
The model does show the state, at a point in time, of the factors that enhance capability and allow risk to emerge.
The value of the model is therefore in its ability to provide a means of conceptualizing the dynamic relationships between the factors.
Example of relationships in the model: Consequences and competence factors Competence factors and risks factors
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!
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