LIBRARY IJ /iUSA I3 " T LEAVENWOIW KAI!

MAR - 1 1965

ACCESSION NOF----PO REGISTSPION C N/~og-F'^ t- HEADQUARTERS u ,, M,,'i o. "

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE CCMAND, VIETNAMOffice of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

APO San Francisco 96243

MACJ233Serial No. 019210 February 1965

SUBJECT: Orientation Material

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Attached for information are copies of MACV Staff paperswhich have been of value in the orientation of newly assigned personnel.

a. Inclosure one, Viet Gong Tactical Doctrine, is a generalsummary of Viet Cong tactics and methods of operation in the RVN.

b. Inclosure two is a pamphlet dealing with Viet Cong Infra-structure, while inclosure three is a prepared briefing on this subject.Charts reflecting type Viet Cong political - military organization ateach echelon, COSVN through village/hamlet level, are included.

2. Addressees are encouraged to forward to this headquarterscopies of any locally-prepared material which would be of value forslmilar purposes.

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CHAIRMAN, JCS, l.ASH 259 DCDIRECTOR, NSA, WASH 25, DCDIA, (9843), WASH 25, DCOFFICE OF ACSI, DA, (8533), W'ASI 25, DCDIRECTOR OF INTELLIGFNCE, ATTN: AFCIN, HQ USAF, WASH 25, DCDIRECTOR, OFFIC:E OF NAVUIL INTELLIGENCE, WA`SH 25, DCCHIEF, USAINTCA, Ft hiolbird, MDCMC (CODE A02), Arlington 14, VaHQ STRICCt, Mac Dill AFB, Tampa, Fla.CG, 1ST MARINE DIV, FPO, SF CaliforniaCG, 1ST MARINE AIR WING, iFF, FPO, SF, CaliforniaCCI'iANDANT, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, Ft McNair, WASH 25, DCINDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMEDI FORCES, Ft McNair, WASH 25, D'MILITARY ASSISTANCE INSTITUTE, Arlington Towers, Arlington, V.AiPED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE, Norfolk, VaLIBRARY, 1ARiRY T-I'aR COLLEGE, Carlisle Barracks, PaNAVAL WAR COLLEGE, Newport, RIAIR ,-AR COLLEGE, Maxvell AFB, AlaUS ARMY C&GS COLECGE, Ft Leavenworth, KanC3JU11T.IDAWNT, MARI}NE CORPS SCHOOL, Quantico, VaC3I:iANDER, AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxawell AFB, AlaCG, CMOIT Dr't N'^. T 7 Cr"t"'r Nt Ft Belvoir, VaCCiJ'AiMNDANT, USA ARMOR SCHOOL;, Ft Knox, EKyC(XJvYANDA-NT, USA iNF SCh OL, Ft Benning, GaUCA. INF SChIOi.OL, ATTN: DIRECTOR OF INSTRUCTION, Ft Benning, GaC(CI4-,.ANDl\ANT, USA ARTY SCHOOL, Ft Sill, OklaCG, III US'tRiY CORPS, Ft Hood, TexCG, XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS, Ft Bragg, NC 28307COM12AlNDA`NT, DEFEIISE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL, W.SH 25, DCCOLMMA1NDANT, USA INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL, Ft Holabird, MdC-.liAANDAINT, JOHN F. KENNEDY SPEC WARFARE CENTER, Ft Bragg, NCCG, USA FCS, SOUITHERN COiD, Ft Amnador, Canal ZoneCC;MAlNDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC, FPO, SF, CalifC~.i.Mi DER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ARMiY P.CIFTC,AO US ForcesCCv3ANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC AIR FORCE, ATTN: DIDDS, APO US FeCi. IND 2'. IN CHIEF, PACIFIC FLEET, FPO, SF, Uae iCIQIA iMNDiER, SEVENTH FLEEiT EPO, FPO F, CalifCG, FIZET MA.RINIE FORCE, PACIFIC, FPO, SF, ,CalifCTF 79, C/O CG, 3RD iMARDIV, 4iF (FOR CGe, III MEF), FPO, SF, CECG, USARYIS, APO US Forces 96331CG,' 25TH INF DIV, APO US Forces 96225SEATO IEADQUARTERS, APO US Forces 96346DEPCHIMF JUt, LA;G, BANGKOK THAI, APO US Forces 96346CHIEF JUS4lAG, BANGKOK THAI, APO US Forces 96346DEPCCOUSMACTHAI, BANGKOK THAI, APO US Forces 96346COMUS4ACTHAI, BANGKOK, THAI. ApO U1 Forces 9634(COINANDER, 13TH USAF, ATTNo 13 ICD, APO US Forces 96274 (3)CG, 3RD LMR DIV, FPO, US Forces 106CG, 1ST M:R BRIG, FliF, FPO, SF, Calif

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CO, ARI MAP SMVICE, J!PAIJ, APO US Forces 96267', - ,

CO, 9TH USAS. FIELD ST7pTION, AP) US Forces 96274GO, 501Ti INT3SFL CORPS (r;"JiUP, 2.Y0 US Forces 96267CO, DT r D, 50OTH INTC GP, LPO US Forces 96.2700, US ''.HRI4NE !.ULIO UNIT, *'0 US Forces 96337CQ:IPHIBGRU ONE C/O FPO, SF, Calif (INTRN AilEA)CO, USl\ J.UNGL2. ,ARFA1S-EE SC10HL, Ft Sherrman, Cn-1 .l ZoneCO, US&GC.OA, ATT'J: GL:;C.E-POA, Ft Ilu.:ic*cuca, Ariz.CO, US. iKP & INTEL SCHOOL, !PO 172, New York NYAtI,:EICAN ]Di"l SSY, APO US Forces 96243 (15)OSA, :l;fICA.N i. 3 .SSY, APO US Forces 96243US OPi'L'AIONS IISSIOi], .'APO US Forces 96243CHIEF ()F S3.;IFF, USCV, '/ iPO US Forces 96243USJT4VihA, TftA.IIJ"'!D, ')PO US Forces 6'" F ',.USA..., CA'MBODIA, APO 153, US ForcesUS;Aiih, LAOS, ? PO US Forces 96352USs-SSL, !'7PO US T;orces 96243AC OF S, J1, US AC'V, APO US Forces 96243AC OF S, J?, US',CV, APO US Forces 96243,C OF S, J3, US 4aCV, APO US Forces 96243AC OF S, J4, USL4ACV, APO US Forces 96243AC OF S, J5, US1.A-CV, APO US Forces 96243AC OF S, JA, USKI.CV, APO US Forces 96243CHIEF, COM(BINED STUDIES, APO US Forces 96243CLASSIFII.D I.AIL & RECORLS, US'iACV, APO US ForcesCO, USASFV, APO US Forces 96240CG, USASCV, .PO US Forces 96243DOD, 8TH RRU, APO US Forces 96243CO, 8TH RRU, PO US Forces 96243CO, SP'C TIL INTEL ASST TEAh, iPO US Forces 96243CCDiA.,NDLE, 2ND AIR DIV, ATTN: D/I, APO.US ForcesDOD, SPEC REP OFT', APO US Forces 96243CO, CENTRAL REGISTRY DET, APO US Forces 96.°43SENIOR ADVISOR, J2, RVNAF, APO US Forces 96243SENIOR ADVISOR, I CORPS, 220 US Forces 96337SENIOR ADVISOR, II CORPS, APO US Forces 96295SENIOR ADVISOR, III CORPS, APO US Forces 96227SENIOR ADVISOR, IV CORPS, APO US Forces 96215

SENIOR ADVISOR, EACh /_.RVN DIV, (1 EA DIV JD)V)SENIOR ADVISOR, EACH ARVN SECTOR (1 EA SECTOR ADV)

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USAF COUNTi2INSURGENCY SCHOOL M .:-,,ell A.FB, AlIDIRECTOR, JRATA, .PO US Forces 96?2432SENIOR .DVISOR, MARINE BRIGADE, .0PO US Forces 96243SENIOR A.DVISOR, AIRBORNE B3RIGA'.DE, IAPO US Forces 96243CHIEF, NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP, APO US Forces 96243STRAC INTEL C1IE, I-II AIR-30BRN CORPS (AJBGB-RA), Ft B:CCIfANDZR, 405TH FIGHTER WING, ATTN: D/I, tPO US ForceSENIOR ADVISOR, CMD, APO US Forces 96243

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VIET CONG TACTICAL DOCTRINE ..... ' i ...

VIET CONG 14URCES

REPUBLI C OF VIE TNAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents Page i

1. General Page 1

2. Principles of Viet Cong Tactics Page 1

3. General Characteristics of Viet Cong Attacks Page 1 - 2

4. Planning Page 2 - 4

5. Preparation of the Battlefield Page 4

6. Preparation of Troops and Equipment Page 4 - 5

7. Movement Page 5 - 7

8. Disposition of Forces Page 7

9. Attacks Page 8 -10

10. Attacks on Fortified Positions Page 10- 12

11. The Meeting Engagement Page 12 - 13

12. The Ambush Page 13 - 15

13. Sequence of Events Page 15 - 16

14. Viet Cong Tactics in the Rainy Season Page 16CLASSTTFED BT Y CVSJjO?_

15. Sumnmary SUB^ 1 O . . .A7,S. TF..ATOI Page 17

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' V.IEDT CONG TACTICAL DOCTRINE

1. Generalo

Viet Cong (VC) tactical doctrine emphasizes offensive actionand follows in general the Communist doctrine for guerrilla warfare asdeveloped by the Viet Mirh during the French-Viet Minh vtar, Thereforethis study deals primarily Aith Viet Cong offensive tactics,

2. Principles of Viet Cong Tactics

The t.er in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) is by no means a con-flict of the "conventional type"'. However, the Viet Cong have generallyfollowed the same principles of war contained in United States tacticaldoctrine. In the same sense that the United States has studied the im-pact of nuclear war on these principles, the Viet Cong have evaluatedthem in light of guerrilla warfareo The principles of Mass, Surprise,Simplicity and Offensive. -ere considered adaptable to their operationswithout further clarification or modification. To the remaining five:Mobility (Maneuver), Economy of force, Unity of Command, Objective, andSecurity, the VC have added special delineating factors which they con-sider essential to the success of their military operations. No matterwhat size action is contemplated, Viet Cong doctrine requires consider-ation of these principles. Viet Cong terminology is sometimes vague andseemingly misleading, but related actions and repetitious referencesshow that the above principles are the basic foundation of their doctrine.They continually emphasize that, when these principles are properly con-sidered and efficiently applied successful accomplishment of the missionwill result.

3. General Characteristics of Viet Cong Attacks

a, The Viet Cong attack is meticulously planned, rehearsed indetail if possible, and is characterized by surprise, speed, seizure ofthe initiative, movement, maneuver, and mobility (foot). They a+,tackonly vhen success appears certain and execute a short, ruthless actionfollowed by a well-plPnned and rapid withdrawalo The Viet Cong contin-ually seek to achieve local superiority at a critical time and placeand at the same time adhere to the principle of mass by concentratingand committing firepower and mnneuver forces on a highly selective basis.Subscribing to the axiom "not to battle on anyone s terms but their own",they adhere to the Dhilosoohy of Mao Tse Tungs 't.hen the enemy advances-withdraw; when he defends - harass; whenhe w.ithdraws - pursue"o

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b. In general, any Viet Cong attack ifeatures hea-vy irie'poit-er'delivered from advantageous terrain to provide supporting fire for as-sault elements. Doctrine, however, calls for planning to consider theassault phase without supporting firepowero Troops are prepared to en-gage in hand-to-hand combat and, while fire and assault elements per-form their missions, other forces prevent enemy breakout or withdrawal.Should such occur, doctrine calls for immediate pursuit and notifica-tion of adjacent Viet Cong units.

c. The Viet Cong stress unity of conmiand and effort, frominitial planning stages through completion of the .ttack. The proce-dclral steps and specific characteristics of each are particularly sig-.nificant to a studv of past Viet Coni 'tactics and a projection of thosetactics to be anticipated in the future,

4. Planning

a. Minute and careful compilation of information on the enemy,terrain, and status of the local populace is the most prominent charac-teristic of Viet Cong planning, The meticulous and thorough manner inwhich intelligence is sought underscores the high premium that VC lead-ers assign to this facet of their preparation.

b. Close, undetected observation of the enemy and the objec-tive is accomplished over a period of days or weeks by special recon-naissance units, or personnel specially selected for the task. Thoroughbriefings are delivered after which the unit moves to vantage pointsaround the objective area.. A detailed sketch of the area is preparedwith particular attention to tho size, location and rature of natural orman-made obstacles. Wlhen obstaclescappear to present a significant dif-ficulty, infiltration of intelligence collectors is conducted duringdarkness to get as close as possible (if necessary into the obstacleitself) to feel out, measure, sketch and record, Routes of guard posts,sentry schedules, and the weapons on the post are noted. Detailed datais developed on movement; into and out of the area to determine the in-terval between movements, the weapons available and their firepower.Intelligence personnel are particularly alert for special strengths orweaknesses indicated by the normal activities within the area of inter-est. Through such surveillance they compile data on strength, coriposi-tion, morale, attachment, combat ca.pability, disposition, command posts,liaison and cormunication. Efforts are r~ai.de to gather all possible bi-ographical da.tct on enemy commanders, in order to analyze their weak orstrong points; and predict the commander's probable reaction once theattack is launchedo Of particular significance to the Viet Cong is theroute, or routes, over wrhich the enemy might withdraw to alternate posi-tions, or over which reinforcements might be sent, Toward this end

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they determine the locations of enemy forces that could provide rein-forcement and estaite strength, ETDs, travel time and ETAs. Analy-sis of routes is conducted to select the best site for obstacles orCaiibushes.

c. The Viet Cong e.)ist in considerable measure off the coun-tryside and are well able to exploit terrain, but this does not deminishthe attitude ,ith which they conduct terrain awnalysis. The lirmitedscope of their present operations facilitates their performing thisfunction in painstaCking detail. In studying terrain, the Viet Cong seekto capitalize on advdntages offered and to use it in such a manner thatit becomes a disadvantage to the enemy. They ga-ther data on roads, vil-lages, rivers, streamis, lakes, ponds and canals. Dimensions and loca-tions of bridges, bushes, walls and fences are recorded and sketched ifthere is even a slight possibility of their affecting the operation.Particular attention is given to likely enemy defensive positions andobservation posts; their locations are noted on sketches so that plan-ning procedures take them into consideration. If none are apparent,reference is made to terrain which the enery could possibly use for suchpurpose,

d. Standard Viet Cong procedure calls for developing informa-tion about the civilian population contiguous to the planned operationarea. Depending on the situation they are apt to enforce temporaryevacuation of the area or somehow include the population, passively or

actively, in the scope of operations, They look for sympathetic civil-ians and/or organizations and assess sentiment toward the GVN as com-pared to that towards themselves,° where Viet Cong agents have infiltra-ted and are operative in the area, as is the case in rTny areas of theRV1J, gaining intelligence of this type is .o major problem to the VietCong.

e. lihen infonlration on the enery, terrain or population appearsto be insufficient, extreme measures are taken to obtain the necessarydata and final decisions are delayed pending its receipt, providing thattime permits. In nP.ny cases, the capabilities of separate specially-trained units or personnel are coordilnted closely with the organic in-telligence capability of the unit, Viet Cong leadership techniques callfor the commander to be w.ell forward and in a position from which he .canlend guidance and supervision to the intelligence effort. Additionally,the conumnder is required to personally reconnoiter the area inmediatelyprior to conmmencing the operation.

f. The intelligence produced from the above process is thebasis for the developmrent of adva.ntages and disadvantages for varyingcourses of action. It permits the VC to conduct a renarkably thoroughanalysis of the enemy and to realistically evaluate their strengths

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" '"-.--..:-'agaihst' lot .o'' he enemy, before arriving at a final concept for theoperation. From this stage, plans are formulated containing all fun-damental requirements in final reconnaissance; preparation of the bat-tlefield, men and equipment; movement to the line of departure orambush site; formulation of assault and fire support plans; clearingthe battle area; and disengagement and withdrawal if such becomes nec-essary. Separate plans and procedures are carefully prepared for boththe withdrawal and disengagemento

g. The following excerpt from a captured document emphasizesViet Cong philosophy regarding planning and preparing for battle:

"Attack preparation must be scrupulous in all phases inorder to prepare completely, and all conm.anders must have a good under-standing of the situation, If preparation requires too much time, thereis increased danger that our plans might be disclosed to the enemy; hema.y change plans and positions, or increase his strength or move away.Under such circumstances our preparation must be prompt, and at thesame time we must maintain surveillance so that any chansige which pre-sents outstanding advantage to us nmy be attacked immrediately. Indoing this, however, do not take unnecessary risks. This is anotherreason why our. troops must always be ready to attack. In cases ofattacks on a transient enemy or enemy recruits, preparations do notrequire the same care as tha-t of attacking bases. lfe should be readyto attack such targets"o

5. Preparation of the Battlefield

Preparation of the battlefield is an integral and importantphase of Viet Cong operational plarming and involves both tactical andlogistical considerations, This philosophy of creating the proper at-

mosphere for offensive action is practiced at all levels of conimmand inmanners peculiar to their own situation and missions. The level, ob-jective and scope of operation, troop movement, time available, andsubsequent plans are factors which affect the complexity of battlefieldpreparation; particularly at the lower levels. This preparation isconsidered by the VC to be a primary function for a. local unit. Itwill involve the gathering of pre-attack intelligence, a survey of es-tablished Viet Cong communications and fbcilities in the battle area.,and coordination with guerrilla forces in the area. Provisions arealso made for billeting, food supplies, re-supply of ammunition, andhandling of wounded. VC doctrine requires that such functions must beperformed for the main forces by local elements.

6. Preparation of Troops and Equipment

a, Overall Communist political-military doctrine calls for

political as well as military preparation of troops prior to bommitting

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them to combat, Political instruction will usually be conducted at thelatest time possible prior to the attack. The instruction consists ofpolitical and ideological propaganda oriented toward the impending tac-tical requirement and aims to condition emotionally the individual sol-dier to pursue the objective without the slightest reservation. Theobjective is to instill in the soldier a particular, but perhaps super-ficial, brand of courage. All arries desire their troops to be emotion-ally conditioned to combat situations, bit the Communist method of ob-taining it is somewhat different from the practices of western armedforces. The Viet Cong somehow link every tactical action of the indi-vidual soldier to overall political goals. This preparation of the sol-dier is composed, timed and presented in such a manner that it usuallyachieves significant success,

b. Additionally, and when time and security precautions permit,the complete concept of the operation is disseminated to the troops; ata minimum, major points are always covered. Unit cornmlanders and theirsubordinate commanders are always thoroughly briefed and in most caseswill have studied the operation minutely, using sand tables, drawingsand maps. The careful preparation for a sizeable operation nmy consumeseveral weeks prior to the initiation.

Co Viet Cong doctrine, as does that of the west, calls foradaptation of equipment to fit the environment under which the actionis to be foughtO Although their present equipment resources limit thescope of such adaptation, the Viet Cong do make shifts of weapons inorder to exploit the situation they will enter, or to conserve materiel.Those individuals whose task does not require initial use of a weapon,such as ladder bearers,. probably will be unarmed.

7. Movement

a, The thoroughness which characterizes the recornnissancepreviously mentioned carries over into Viet Cong movement. They prac-tice rigid movement discipline plus sound tactical assembly and disper-sion procedures. Their doctrine in this regard varies little, if any,from that of the United States or other western countries, lWhat doesdiffer, however, is the ranner and discipline with which such doctrineis practiced. Viet Cong leaders have fought for years and have learnedwell the benefit'. to be gained from efficient and careful movement,assembly and dispersion. The individual Viet Cong soldier adheres tothese same principles, Well-tric-ned, combat-indoctrinated troops ofany army tend to do likewise, but the Viet Cong are particularly skilledin these techniques,

b. For security reasons, movement warning orders are held toa minimumio Sometimes to the point of withholding notification forpreparation of the next (dt.ys rations. This is generally the rule

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' -rather ,tha the. theexception, unless the route to be travelled is with-out water and/or an accessible food supply. In the latter cases, wvordis passed to alert the troops to carry their owrn water and food supply.On extended nr.rches the cooking of food is usually limited to oncedaily, normally in the early morning hours.

c. On an operational ntission a Viet Cong battalion will moveover trails, roads, canals or any terrain which will conceal their move-rment to battle positions. No set nmrch formnttions are practiced althoughthey do have a basic arrangement that generally applies. Terrain is thedetermining factor in march formations, but in any case leading elementsare liaison agents or scouts who precede the main body by a considerabledistance. They are followed by a reconnaissance intelligence unit whichprovides forward and flank security. A rifle company with at least onemachinegun or automatic rifle is next followed by the a.vailable weaponsor combat support unit. The battalion headquarters and a protective ri-fle company are the next elements while the third rifle corimparny is thel.st march unit and provides the rear guard, usually a squad. Unitssmaller than battalions try to follow this same principle no matter howmeager their force or limited their weapons. Such a formation providesfor local security in all directions and places combat elements and sup-porting weapons well forward for immediate employment if necessary. Thecommand element is then well positioned to coordinate and rapidly controlany actions necessary; and it has a ready reserve imnediately available.However, any formation is dependent on the terrain, and the Viet Cong areexperts at blending movement with terrain whether during daylight or dark-ness,

d. River, canal t.nd road crossings are conducted in a conven-tional manner. Initial security and scouting patrols are sent forwardand laterally on the far side of the obstacle and laterally and to therear on the near side. W'hen the situation is developed and crossing ispermissible, action is swift and conducted with dispersion. Securityelements are recalled after the main body has control of the situationon the other side. .hen water crossings are hampered by lack of water-craft, field expedients are used, i.e., rafts for weapons and equipmentare made from sheets of plastic that are a part of the individual equip-ment of each mano

e. Mhen bivouacs are called for and the locale permits, theyare established on the banks of streams, or in forests; in any case, max-imum exploitation of terrain is sought. Sentries are usually posted inpairs at a Radius of several hundred meters, but the distance is reducedduring darknesso Other security measures used during movement, assemblyand dispersion consist of miscellaneous and basic signal systemrn.. Dur-ing daylight the movement of branches, bushes, or tree limbs, is used

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for identification and signalling, ioe,, a certain number of brushmovements requires a set response of so many movements, by the unit.At night, devices such as animal sounds or clicking of sticks areused.

8. Disposition of Forces

a. In the simplest terms, the Viet Cong believe that soundtroop dispositions and, a mental conviction that the battle can and mustbe won will produce victory and destruction of the enemy. Consideringtheir successes, this belief has some proven validity. More precisely,their successes have been due to judicious selections of objectives thatare within Viet Cong capabilities. They are well aware of their materi-el deficiencies, consequently, their disposition of forces constantlyseeks to offset these limitations.

b. The Viet Cong base all troop dispositions on the resultsof careful analysis of the enemy, terrain and available forces. Prac-tically all Viet Gong attacks feature assaults from encirclement or somevariation of it. Doctrine almost flatly refuses to tolerate attacksusing a purely frontal disposition, however, they may resort to thiswhen natural or man-made obstacles on flanks or to the enemy's rear canbe integrated into attack planso Any disposition other than some de-gree of encirclement will not permit them to exploit their mobility andadaptability. They believe that encirclement facilitates attainment ofthe objective in that it permits severance of enemy withdrawal routesand establishment of ambushes or obstacles on routes over which the en-emy might reinforce, tllether large or small forces are employed to pro-vide the encirclement is dependent upon the coverage desired, size ofthe enemy force, whether infiltrators have penetrated the enemy ranks,and whether traitors are within GVN ranks, When the latter two casesexist, employment of smaller forces is given due consideration becauseof the increased possibility of greater enemy panic when attacked fromwithin as well as without,

c. When the enemy establishes definite patterns of training,movement or tactics, the Viet Cong may use a light force for encircle-ment. In such cases, set patterns allow th'e Viet Cong to place a mainattacking force to take advantage of the probable enemy reaction.

do Doctrine calls for the observance of usual characteristicsof good troop disposition, those of concealment and camouflage, observa-tion, fields of fire and sufficient maneuver room. They seldom desireto take real estate as an objective - not at this stage of the conflict-rather they seek to close with and destroy the opposing force, provided

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-that the 'cir^c.:msrtences overwhelmingly favor their success. Toward this

end, they strive for disposition tha.t limit the enemy's maneuver room

and hinder his development of firepower. In many instances they alter

enemy maneuver room by man-traps armed with sharpened, disease-infectedbamboo sticks. Maximum use is ma:de of terrain for concealment and can-

ouflage. They realize that secrecy and surprise depend a great deal on

how effectively they are concealed, not only from the opposing force,

but also from stray peasants kwho are perhaps friendly to GVN. They seek

positions for automatic weapons yielding fields of crossing -:nd grazing

fire which do not interfere with maneuver room.

e. Comuil.".nd and observation posts are established for surveil-

lance and control, and they will usually establish no less than two.

From one of these positions the comlmrnder will exercise close supervi-

sion of the z.:pending actionl It allows him to influence quickly the

action if enemy reaction is unexpected, or to take his own counter-action to enerr reinforcemlent, It enables him to have <n immediate

grasp of the situation, which is vital to the proper disposition and

exploitation of a mobile force as is the Viet Cong.

9. Attacks

a. In l1964, Viet Cong military tactics can be divided into

three broad c.ategories:

(1) Aitt;,c ks against isolated C(Y outposts and training

centers, new life hamlets: and sometinmes the capitals of districts and

provinces.

(2) Meeting engagements with GVN forces.

(3) Ambushes of any a-:,nd every type of GVN force, including

ARVN units.

b Viet Cong attacks in .al -three categories continue to be

executed in a short, ruthless and overw;helling nmanner. Maximum fire is

usually delivered a-t the onset of the a.ttack - neither too early nor too

late, but at a predetermined tirime upon order of the commaander. Viet

Cong intelligence hais ordinarily allowed the planning to pinpoint the

enemy elements tha.t are to be prima-ry targets or objectives. Alternate

methods of attack are provided for in case movement and/or appearanceof the oDpos;nr force indicates thiey have knowledge of an impendingattack. Secondary missions for selected groups facilitate rapid changes

in attack plans if called for by such disclosure. Seldom do their at-

tacks last more than several hours. After the attack has been completed,

they immediately ulove from the area leaving only a small element to

"clean" the battle area of weapons, ammunition, brass and other useful

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supplies, as well as to evacuate their dead and wouin. inhthey, ;, i,

feel that time will not allow complete cleaning of the area, they

hide what they can, planning to return subsequently and salvage what

they leave. If no enemy reinforcements are anticipatedthe VC are

likely to remain in the area and engage in propaganda activities.

(1) All Viet Cong attacks endeavor to achieve surprise,

and hit the enemy .-t a time, place and in a marnner which is not antic-

ipated. It is not necessarily dependent on misleading the eneny. The

enemy may know from the attendant situation that he will be attacked,

but if the VC efforts are effective, he will not know how, when, where

or in what strength.

(2) Hand-in-hand with secrecy and surprise is the ele-

ment of speed, which is characteristic of all Viet Cong offensive ac-

tion. They attack swiftly, withdraw quickly, disengage rapidly and

counter-attack without hEsitation.

(3) The Viet Cong on occasions will attempt to "condi-

tion" enemy installations into a state of susceptibility and vulnera-

bility to attack. They try to generate conditions whereby the enemy

underestimates Viet Cong potential. Ruses are created and false in-

formation is planted to create suspicion, doubt, hesitation and con-

fusion in the mind of the enemy. To further psychologically condition

opposing forces they sometimes have the local populatioh evacuate the

area, unexplainably to the GVN.

(4) The Viet Cong always provide for several methods of

withdrawal subsequent to an operation, and for disengagements, if for

some reason the attack does not irrmediately gain the desired results.

In the case of the former, the main body's route of withdrawal is dif-

ferent from that of the covering force. Plans usually 6all for a size-

able covering force; however, the actual size is determined on-the-spot

by the commander. In any event the dead, wounded and heavily armed

elements are the first to be withdrawn. Efforts are made to conceal

their r.ovements by-brushing trails, crossing water, etc... ihen terrain

does not lend itself to unobserved movement they will sometimes conceal

themselves until darkness, and then withdraw,

(5) Disengagement is called for when the VC.are unable to

control the situation, or it appears that the enemy may acquire the up-

per hand. Again, in this case, a strong covering force is used under

the personal supervision and control of the commander. Their disengage-

ments are executed with a. r pidity and mobility which have made it ex-

tremely difficult for contact to be maintained, particularly if reaction

is slow.

9

c. Harassing tactics are continuously conducted by all typesi; ,<.- f A Viet .Cong for:eeo This action is sometimes coordinated with "condi-

tioning" an area for susceptibility to attack. Most often, however, itis conducted to disrupt, annoy and confuse the enemy so that morale andcombat readiness are lowered. The objective often appears to be one ofirritation rather than destruction of the enemy or the capture of equip-ment; although it can be combined with these at any time.

10. Attacks on Fortified Positions

a. The difficulties posed to conventional forces by fortifiedinstallations are compounded and become more complex for the ordinaryViet Cong force. The only units having the inherent capabilities andresources sufficient to undertake such sactions are main and local forceunits. Using such a force as ac base elenent, a special task-force typeunit is tailored to fit and meet the problems and complexities presentedby a given fortified positiono Since this is the case, common sense dic-tates that every precaution be taken by the Viet Cong in planning andorganizing for such an attack, not only to insure success, but to pre-vent decimation of their elite and special-type units. Decisions to con-duct such operations are b~ased on the ultimate in intelligence gathering,as has been previously discussedo

b. Depending on enemy strength, firepower and magnitude of thefortification, attacks of this nature are made with reinforced companiesor battalions. In either case, Viet Cong tactics are rather standardthough terminology differs from that of western armies. Fire support isalways ma.ndatory in these actions. Four main elements are organized outof the overall attacking force:

(1) A spearhead, or leading element.

(2) A secondary forceo

(3) A second-wave or exploitation force (main attackingforce).

(4) A reserve element

The leading element is assigned the mission of eliminating and clearingpositions and obstacles to facilitate entry or passage of the exploita-tion force toward the final and primnary objective. The secondary forceis actually a secondary attack, since it is coordinated with the assaultof the leading elements, but its objective is the breaching of a secondpassage to the main objective. Doctrine calls for the exploitation ormain-attack elements to use the first gap effected, either that accom-plished by the leading element or that acquired by the secondary force.

10

-mm

I

If the :fQn erJs:;.3ddlatyed at the time the latter is successful, then thea i'i i :" - ih'n at'a ck is shiftedo The reserve element provides security for the

operation and, in effect, isolates the battleground from reinforcementby the enemy.

Co The leading and secondary forces are organized into specialcells or teams in order to facilitate accoLmplishment of their assignedmissions. Though deviations may be encountered, the general breakdownof these units is as -riven below-

(1) One demolition team, 9 meno

(2) One base of fire team, 3 automaltic rifles.

(3) One assault team., platoon or comparable size.

(4) One second assault team, if needed,

The deiolition cell cadvances under the cover of supporting fires andendeavors to clear a path as soon as possible. The size of the teamwill vaTry with the nurm.ber of obstacles to be cleared, Personnel com-

prising this teaml are not randomr selections or volunteers from through-out the unit, but rather they are a group that has trained together rasa. unit.

(1) The base of fire team supports the demolition andassault tea.ms by heavy concentrated fire of !,utoma.tic weapons and mir-tars. A detailed fire plan is prepared and minutely reviewed by allco.mriand echelons involved.

(2) Tle assault teamr takes imiiiiediate advantage of ob-stacle clearances, and vigorously assaults to insure firm establish-ment and widening of the breacho It continues the assault to effectdeep penetrations. If difficulties are encountered which tend to slowthe oiimorenrtum of the attack, the second assault team is coiti.t-tedowVhen the breach is completely effected the mxain exploitation forceaggressivelyr and violently continues to attack the aiiain objective.

do The importance attached by the Viet Cong to prior plan-ning for operations of this rp.tu-re is illustrated by the followingexcerpt from a document captured by C-VN forces:

"Attacks on fortified nositions are complicated affairs,and their plans rust be carefully- prepa.red because the enemy is inprepared positions and has contingency plans . A step-by-step andrisis ioll-by-rmiission plan must be prepare-d Tjitlh definite assignmient ofmissions and precise delineation of responsibilities. Cadres must bepositive in their a ctiionrs and be quick to take advanta e of all opportunities. Reviewing, supervision, accuracy and careful planning wtjill

11 -Elrm--p.*U A .^s *'* ..

prevent, C:iTrel'es execution and insure success". Toward this end, the.i- :^-'-:: Viet-'.:Cor operaions order includes the enermy situation, mission, co-

ordination and liaison, w;eapons, political :-ctions and concept of op-erations.

11. The I eetinx Enga eijnt

a. "Judicious refusal to engage" has been presented 'as aprinciple of war to ,wlich the Viet Gong try to adhere. T:ough thisis true, their forces are trained to cope with the situation when itarises. It is defintd in Viet Cong doctrin,- as "an unexpected andsudden confrontation of twvo opposing forces neither of wilich is Swareof the other's strength, weapons, coimLositic,i, or mais'ion", Neitherforce has an offensive plan for the particulcar sitir tion, and thle VietCong realize they will usually be at a disadvantage in such a predic-amnent. Doctrine calls for avoiding this situation, ihowever, being'.a re that there will. be instances where this cannot be done, thley;rAve formnul-ated three objectLives to be accomplished ;lwhen t he meetingoccurs:0 c C'L' " S:

(1) "3Be t-ihe firct to deploy troops to critical terrainr".

(2 "13e the first to open fire".

(3) "Be the -first to assault",

They teach thlat the first unit to deploy to key terrain will gainimportant tactical advantages. By- so doing, they aim to force theenemyl into an unfavorable and perhaps untenable position. In seekingto be the first to fire, the Viet Cong hope to create sudden andextreme confusion in forcing the enemy to hastily deploy under fire,In theory the revul-tant atmosphere should imrediately allow Viet Congforces to assault and destroy the enemyn

b. Practical application of th:;. thIory calls for all troopmovements to be preceded by "look-out teams" or scouts. ReCr securityis likewise provided as is flank security, and the distances involvedare fullp dependent on the terraino When the enemy 's presence is de-tected, rapid and silent notification is passed to the commander whilethe scouts immediately take positions which offer them observation andfields of fire. Concurrently, the conimandsr performs a hasty estimateof the situation and deploys the main force. If these actions allowadvant-egeous terrain to be occupied, fire is coiijmenced as a prelude tothe assault. When good terrain cannot be quickly occupied, the scoutsopen fire to deploy and pin the enemy. The commander, in -the meantime,maneuvers his other troops to positions from rwhich sufficient fire

12

C_

:' ,: :...Us.upeu-iority ct^be developed to permit assault. When a favorable at-nlosphere cannot be. obtained due to eneiciy strength and/or terrain, thecormmander is taught to continue the fire fight with a few elements andhastily disengage. Once the main body has broken contact, the forwardelements perform a retrograde movement.

c. Captured documents sum up this theory wirth the following:

"Therefore, the side which adheres to the three principles,practices good scouting procedures, has well-trained personnel thoroughlyacquainted with their jobs and cool-leaded, active and determined leader-ship - this side will have the initiative . nd will occupy good terrainfeatures first, open fire first, and assault first. This side will bethe winner".

The Viet Cong excel in ea.ch of these areas, and though they prefer tofighlt : t a time and place of their own choosing, they can, and will,fight meeting engagements.

12. The Ambush

a. "The ambush is a conmmon form of combat ermploed by guer-rillas. It is a well-planned disposition of troops in concealed posi-tions either on one or both sides of a road, river or canal over whichthe enemy will pass. Wie wait until the enemr- reaches a predeterminedposition in the ambush site at rwhich time we destroy him b\ violentand sudden attack' . This is a description of an ambush as containedin a Viet Cong document captured by ARVN forces.

b. The topographical characteristics of South Vietnam lendthemselves well to guerrilla techniques, and in many areas they par--ticularly favor the specific tactic of the ambush. A not-too-severeclimate and adaptable terrain offer the basic requisites for estab-lishment of ambushes. This allows occupation of positions for hours,or days in some instances, without imposing undue hardships on theambushing forces. Terrain provides extremely. good concealment ofpositions and routes thereto. The countryside and a restricted roadnet act as aids to the Viet Cong ambush by conditioning GVN physicalsusceptibility and limiting routes of transportation. The Viet Congare much aware of these conditions and the result has been the conductof numerous ambushes throughout Vietnam.

c. As in other Viet Cong cormbat actions, preparation andplanning are in great detail, and intelligence remains the rost fun-damental requirement for the planning. Without it, the risks are toogreat and they do not comply with guerrilla doctrine which calls for

13

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."fighting :nlIy_-'on, their terms". The intelligence requirement remainsthree-pronged: to obtain all information on the enemy, terrain andcivilian population. This paves the way for establishm.ent of theappropriate-sized ambush party in the most advantageous terrain, atthe proper time, with maximum security and secrecy. Preparation ofthe battlefield is laborious and minute; planning includes movementto and occupation of, the ambush site, conduct of the operation,possible un':xpected reactions and withdrawal. Carefully delineatedmissions are assigned to individual soldiers and/or teams, and pre-arranged signals are devised. All these areas are checked and re-checked and, if possible, rehearsals are held. Last, but not least,comes the inevitable and omnipresent political indoctrination to"raise morale, preserve secrecy and arouse determination".

(1) Moverient to the site is over covered routes avoidingvillages End roads as much as possible. Training and pre-planning al-lows individuals to move directly to their positions upon entering themilbush site. On. occasions when terrain does not offer the maximum inconcealment, they' will choose not to occupy positions until the lastpossible moment. In the interim, they remain close by with only scoutsin position who, when the enemy is near, sound the alarm for rapidoccupation of the site. Once in position, the ambush party imposesmovement and noise discipline. Prior and subsequent to occupation,the Viet Cong have been known to prohibit the populace access to anypart of the anticipated battleground.

(2) Troop dispositions depend on Viet Cong strength,enemy strength and terrain. Regardless of disposition, the force isdivided into sections, each being designmted a portion of the enemyas a target. This does rrt mean 'to imply that the Viet Cong dividetheir forces ecually anid then position them. On the contrary, theyfirst exploit favorable positions affoided by terrain, and then allotsegments of the enemy as primary targets. A very broad guide willusually allocate two-thirds of the force: to attack the enemy. Up toone-third of the force using mines, barricades or other obstacles isemployed to prevent the enemy's forward and/or rearward movement., Anyreserve is deployed to fill areas of potential weakness. Un the i'lanksand to the rear they will usually place security teams. Their missionis to warn of, or amibush enemy reinforcements, The T dded ambush ofreinforcements is a typical Viet Cong tactic, Lut when it is not plan-ned, delay is sought in order to prevent the reinforcement and ambushedforces from being mutually supporting. Disengagement is called forwhen there is the slightest possibility of successful reinforcement.

14

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4

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;_': . .. . .d. TViet Cong :ambushes are generally designed to destroy theenemy and to capture equipment, In pursuing these objectives they areable to maintain offensive initiative, augment equipment and imbed inthe minds of GVI forces the belief of Viet Cong invincibility in thistactic. Other variations of the ambush are resorted to, but onlywhen specific requirements exist.

(1) During withdrawals or disengagements, the Viet Congare likely to hastily organize ambushes of various sizes. They canrange from several individual soldiers to a sizeable force, dependingon the situation. In any case, it is designed to delay, disrupt anddisorganize the pursuing enemy. No attempt is made to close with ordestroy the opposing troops because the Viet Cong in this instanceare usually at a disadvantage, and the mission then is only to enablemajor elements to break contact.

(2) Ambushes are also conducted in conjunction withattacks on isolated posts and/or installations. The size and scopeof the ambush varies, bit when used in this respect it is establishedon routes of enemy reinforcement. A variation of this occurs whenpart of the enemy garrison is allowed to flee. After the primaryattack is completed, Viet Cong forces make it appear that they havecompletely withdrawn front the area - only to ambush the garrison asit returns to reoccupy the post.

(3) Viet Cong ambushes have also been directed againstrail and water traffico Adroit use of cines and demolitions arecoordinated into these Cambushes, particul rly the former type. Thisambush of rail traffic has been significant in that it has establisheda Viet Cong capability to seriously disrupt, if not completely- sever,all such traffic. Ambush of watercraft is almost wholly limited tothe Delta area and is conducted in a manner Similar to that which isexhibited in ambushing on lando

e, As in all their offensive actions, the Viet Cong conductthe ambush violently. Heavy and intense firepower is delivered at theoutset to obtain the maximwum from surprise and shock action.

'13. Secuenrce of Events

A typical sequence of events for a VC force prior to andfollowing a planned engagement is briefly described as follows:

a. Concurrent with planning, troops are physically andmentally conditiored by conducting a rigorous training program inwhich considerable time is devoted to ideological indoctrination.The period of time involved usually is about one or two mionths.

15

., ̂ -..:-. : : : ; : .. i.~ii.e;W plans are comapleted, rehearsals are conducted untilconimanders -re satisfied tha.t all personnel are completely familiar'with the operation and the p :rt that they wrll play. This usuallycovers a one or two we:. k period. Along with this, conditioning iscontinued and troops are equiplped for the action.

14. Viet Cong Tactics in tile Rimn Season

a. The tactics applied by the Viet Cong during rainy orhigh water season follow the principles described abo-v-e, but withparticular enphasis on those tactical actions that will capitalizeon exp:ected vulnerabilities that the Viet Cong believe wrill resultfrom decreased enemny rmobility. 'Abushes of vehicles and boats, anddestruction of lines of cornurunication between the larger bar:e areasand principal eneyi.i head quarters a re considered by the Viet Gong tobe thle i:iost; lucrative oper-~iotionr . The a--'tack of lines of coui:uni-cation in the Viet Cong view has the twro fold benefit of :elayingenemy r,::)supply and movement wdhile also causing the enemy to disperseforces for route pe:rotection and the ,eby limiting his capab;.ility toattack Viet Cong base areas,

b. In this application, as in all Vie Cong operations,country-wide, or~ even military region wiide, Fshift in tactical emnha-sis does not occur uniformly.; throughout a sizeable geogr-aphlic areawith the onset of the rai-ny season. I-owevJer, the wet season worksto their adv':antage in their caLipaiin ag .inst local objectives vdithinthe Caf fected areas. The followTing actions are emphasized;

(1) Attacks 1.gainst supply- d; pots and training centerswhere rapid reinforcement w ;ll be ir.peded by high water.

(2) Harass.ment of secondary roads to draw eneLi securityforces away iron the main or heavily defended routes.

(3) Deztruction of bridges and storage depots that sup-port resu)-pply or reinforceme-nt of isolated enemy installations.

(4) Making use of periods of poor visibility andhigh winds theat conceal nmovement to take under att,:ck those srimllposts that are difficult to approach during periods of clear visibility.

c. No adv; ntart, accrues to the Viet Cong as a direct resultof the rainy season, but they are prepared to capitalize on any oppor-t,~-'-" -';s tha;t are rrc sented if the enemy perlits the weather to restrict,diminish or channelize his operations in such a way as to render hirlselfaulner~.ble.

16

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The Viet Cong military forces have applied and continue toappiy with some aimplification, the Viet Minrh-proven, Corimmunist guer-rilla tactical doctrine to achieve their military objectives. Theyhafve been encouraged by their s-ucces.3es in employ-ing these tacticsand, therefore, can be expected to continue to employ similar tacticsin the future. Their tactics do not show a drastic departure fromtime honored principles that have resulted in success in any militaryconflict. VC success is due to the meticulous attention pFrid toexecution of these principles.

17

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VC INFRASTRUCTURE

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VC INFRASTRUCTURE

Io INTRODUCTION ...

1o PURPOSES The purpose of this pamphlet is to describe in generalterms the covert and clandestine military-political framework which theCommunist Viet Cong have established throughout South Vietnam, and to suggestintelligence and operational methods which warrant .emphasis, particularly atsector and lower levels, in order to develop detailed information on local VCstructure as the basis for operations to neutralize or eliminate this structureo

2o CONTROL OF THE VC MOVEMENT: It should be noted at the outset that VCorganization in any given area of SVN is not the result of spontaneous, uncon-trolled or haphazard activation and growth such as has happened in some previousinsurgent situations; nor do the various components of the VC structure operateindependent of control and support from a higher authorityo instead% we areconfronted byy an organization the growth and activities of which have been sub-jected to careful planning and coordination at each level of command by meansof a political-military control apparatus which extends from HANOI through Cen-tral Office South Vietnam (COSVN) and the regional, provincial, district, village)and hamlet echelons throughout the countryo Portions of this apparatus have beenin existence since before World War IIo

3. A MONOLITHIC MOVMENT? Some differences as to VC organization, rate

of growth) and methods of operation exist throughout the various regions, primarilydue to differences in the local environment to which the VC must adjust, butb.sia4ly .we are confronted with one highly coordinated and tightly disciplinedrevolutionary movement the branches of which are both inter and inbrarelated andreach into every hamlet and village in RVPO Since every point of contact exten-ding frdm ths :VC. apparatus serves as a nerve end, sending impulses back to thenerve centers, eaposurB. of these connecting links leads to exposure of other por-tions of the VC system0 However, as is well knownl .elaborate security arrange-ments ex4st to protect She VG apparatus at each echelono In their own areas theVC subject all suspect individuals, including their own cadre, to repeated sur-veillance and investigationo This same thorough investigation is typical of theirintelligence oriented approach to potential targets for recruitment, proselyting,or the various forms of coercion and attacko

4.· IDENTIFICATION AND DEFEAT OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE: Because the VC organi-zation i regardless of its outward appearances is held together by an internalframework, we refer to this hidden but most important nerve system, as the infra-structure, .whii must .be exposed before the outward manifestations of the VCmovementt can be defeatedo It could also 'i eferred to as the substructure orunderstructureoi . .tke an iceberg, the .largest and most dangerous portion ishi den; from view, like a foundation, it is the vital organization upon which VCgrowth and prosperity depend, LUke the chain'of command, it is an invisiblehetwork which, in a highly efficient and disciplined organization, may be tem-poriarilly evered but is quickly replaoedo Two programs to be considered in this

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pamphlet are intelligence operations and population control operations,both of which are .interrelated and' vital to the ovsa'll program of identi-fying and removing the VC infrastructureo '0 ': :- .

II. GENERAL SITUATION BY AREAS OF CONTROL/ ..- , ,,~ .. .. , ~ ~ __ .· , " i. ·/ .

1o GENERAL' The impact of the VC movement varies from area to areaaccording to the state of GVN-control and the VC strategy and objectivesfor the area. The VC expenr their effort and resources according to theurgency of the situation and the risks they consider to be warranted;otherwise, they strive to make whatever progress is possible in all areasoIn describing the situation, it is useful to consider three types of areas:

ao VC Controlled (VC call these "liberated" areas)

be Contested (vdieputsedl)

co GVN controlled ('ftemporarily occupied by the eneny")

2o .VC CONTROL°LD_ Manypart. of the country have never known strongcentral government influence o Certain of these were considered secure areasby the Viet Minh, having been writtePi off by the French.; and have been fur-ther developed by the Viet Congo Ith these areas the VietC ong program,although on a smaller scale, most nearly resembles the type of consolidationprogram which large portions of China underwent prior to 1950 as the ChineseCommunist Route Armies occupied areas beyond ~entral government control, andat their leisure went about the reshaping of social and economic structuresaccording to their own doctrineo

ao In the VC controlled areas of SVN, VC units remain generallydispersed and concealed because of allied (friendly) air capabilities, butthe' presence of thse .units for'enforcement of VC programs is well known toall of the peopleo . VC domination of the populace in these areas however,is not. entirely dependent .upon the .use of forceo; The VC have exploited thetraditionar hostility of the people inr mary of these areas to central govern-ment control o They have also initiated VC.sponsored programs to improvesocial and economic conditions, bring about land reform, raise educationalstandards, and formed local defense programs to "protect"t the people fromGVN tax collectors, military conscription, corvee labor programs~ absenteelandlords, money lenders, and the likeo

bo GVN elements can enter such areas in force; however VC.preparations against such entry, such as the construction of "combat village&s"generally make these expeditions unprofitableo VO hamlets, potential airlanding areas' and routes: of access often contain f£.ir 'fiation '. and extfentsire antipersonnel devices whid' permit th' V 'V and,. the .villager.s toconduct either act^e or .passive 4s.istani to.GVN ent 0 'nt.u to the overalsituation,: GVil temprta: forsay 'i suh are.as ha'V liltle '^.innent effectand it is believed that the effort may beti'er spent. in other areas wheremore lasting progress against the VO may be possible,

a ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. .sa

2

Co fhile the VC maintain any cOncealed base% ast' iUot.SV .'' -utr........ . '. .-,those within the VC controlled iaeas pliy an important ,part' i theiroverall military programo .Manufatusre -storage and distraibtion of crude . -;(but effective) weapons arnd other war materiel can be hnp *it"l i ^i";readily in those areas where extensive and elaborate caches and workshopscan be prepared for current or future use in' and around any of the villagesor in .remote locations not likely to be reached by GVN forceso Almosttotal control of local manpower and agricultural assets deny these resour-ces, to the GVN and place them ate m disposal of the VCo Also, the generallack of GVN surveillance: or interferene makes the VC areas good: spring-boards for initiation of operations against province and district capitalsor othr-,remaining pockets of GVN control which can be maintained only atgreat cost within areas under VC controlo

.- do In VC controlled areas the infrastructure follows the samegenera. pattern as throughout the countryi though there is greater emphasison administrative organization than on tan agitation and conspiratorial activi-ties sirce the areas are already VC-dominated and undergoing consolidationoRecruitment by GVN of anti-VC agents in such areas is difficult due to thelack of ay, outward evidence of GVN support the great risks involved, andthe difficulty .of making contact for communications and reportingo. However,reliable 'agents once placed have relatively less difficulty than ni .otherareas in determining VC .structure and capabilities since there is lessapparent need for concealment of VC strength in these areas. Detailedintellig'ece on V. areas continues to be required by GVN as the.basis forair and surface operations against, selected targets whose destruction willhave impact upon overall VC capabiities, .lthough significant' lesseningof VC control in the areas attacked ray not, be an inmnediate GVN objectiveor: capabilityo ;

3o CONTESTED R t. Is within a sbteond category; of areas thatour knowledge 'of VC infrastruPcture is most urg etly requiredo' I this arethe contested areas within which GVT is making max °M effort to hold andincrease i.. .influence over the ,population o The VC in these areas maintaina capability, to strike cruel blows using .cdmbintion's of .local guerrillasand. large: mobile units attacking isolated outposts and .ulnerable 'halets,int dicting lines .of commxnication, disrupting economic patterns, levying'and' cOllecting taxes, 'subsistence, and material items from all elements ofthe population, as well as creating incidents which range in scope and in-tensity from propaganda to assassinationo In this highly complex'a d fluidenvironment, GVN' and VC political and military structure are in directconfrontationo

. a " GYN authorities are at a disadvantage in that they amus allo-cate much of 'their forces to the maintenance of such tenuouas control .

as now existes, attempting gradually to expand their sphere ."of .influeneodConcurrentsl, operations mmst 'be conductied along and beyond the peripheryof areas being pacified in order to. seek out. and destroy C ajor iuits or,as, amiamu to keep these 'units$ off balance. Faulty intelligence andoverextensiOn of GVN forea:. can lead to premature withdrawal from' "pacified"areas witfh the result that. the' c infrastructure continues to be effective,reprisals are oonducted against those who have cooperated with the GVN, and

3

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the local populace becomes even less responsive to ftu.;eGN effortsin their area, -.

'·' ' .'f '%.

bo VC forces have the advantage in that thi%' 'Can st.e against . ,fixed and .vulnerable targets at the time and place of their choosiiing, ~"'Howevers to maintain their apparatus .and obtain manpower, subsistenceS,materiel, shelter, medical care, intelligence channels of communicationanh concealmen for 'theif forces in the face of the GVN presencet limitedthough it may be, requires the utmost in secrecy. devoting great attentiont'o detail in planning, and obtaining both passive and active support from· rge segments of the local population. The ability to obtain this supportfrom the people- whether voluntary or involuntary is the VC0 greatesta&seto

4' GVN CONTRONLLED At the other end of the spectrum within the citiesand'surrounding areas now controlled by the GVN,, VC apparatus and activityare almost entirely covert, but no less dangerous. Here~ reliance is placedupon small, cellular units whose existence b capabilityt and ultimate .missionsare known only to a few key activistsk such as is typical in any communistuinddrground nhetwork o VC military capabilities within the larga, .. ensly.· dppilated urban areas are largely; tintested and there may be a teadenny forresponsible' GVN and US authorities to underestimate this potential threatoTerr'brijtic activities are maintained at a low and selective levels suffi-cient Wo impress target 'elements with the risks attached to betrayal of VCinterests and the futility of expeting governmental protection of individuallife and property Propaganda and recruitment activities are conducteddiscreetly~ but effectively, as are fund raising and other support programsconducted amidst the population, whose resistance is generally passive atbesto Making use of this apparatus. the VC gather intelligence for local andregional use and make !4etailed plans in anticipation of some local or exter-

;nal occurrence which could provide opportunities for full use of the capa-bilities so painstakingly developed,

5, POLITICAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS,

' 'a Certain functional organization appears common to VC structureat all echelons. A committee or commissariat exists at each level to overseethe translation of instructions.9 policy and -guidance received from higherauthority into specific campaigns, plans .and orders for execution at own andsubordinate levels0o hile VC long range plans are tightly held and can only"be speculated upon by the lesser cadresa a factor which merits considerationwhen evaluating apparent knowledgeability displayed by low level sources,short range VC plans are developed' in. great detail and 'enerally well inadvance by units concernedo For -example in anticipation of seasonal changesadjustment of activities is preplanned so as to compensate for changing'Operating conditions while maintaining a pre-detenmined overall level ofoperational intensityo

(1)responsibilities

Certain members of the commissariat also have functionalChief among these would be the chiefs of the political and

militaryy sectiolls il The pol:Lticail ,ci'.] . ;isr"ni' e. ... .' .Ly a separzate sectionxbut political elelments are found Jn the mil.Jt.-ry staff section and also inall military unitsa The commander of the senior ilitary- unit may also bemilitarr representative on th. "'cmmis'sariat9 and asl ead.ie . oqt;he,Mii-tary staff sectiono' : . '

' : : '~i: .. · :: . ... .(2)' ' ouriterintellgence is a functio" 't" . it'security .eleene. .L;

within the political sectiono The far-reaching responsibilities of thepolitical and security elements give them authority to look into allactivities within their geographical area. .They deal continuously withtheir counterparts at .other echelons.

(3) .ilitary operations are planned by the military affairscommittee, 'military section, -or staff bureau which may be separate entitiesor one and the sameo The combat ;tfaitelligende functi.n is frequently a partof the operational staff element

(4) Recruiting (or proselyting) is a major activity which isundertaketi in a thorough, persistent and imdagfnative manners as reSdiitshave indicatedo Close liaison exists between this element and the securityelement s o

(5) Propaganda elements under the political sections are.active at each levelo Their programs are directed at both friend and toe,w.th continuous reindoctrination of the "liberated" population receivinghigh priority attentiono

(6) MailUtary training is a., fnction of the military.affairseleiniehts however such training probabt... dat :t$s a disproportionate shareof the program to political subjects

(7) Other commnon' sections iWtlude- ogisticsd communications,and' special elements to meet local financial, ,agrieultural' ,and other re-quirementso Staff elements are alsoh established to give...p'uli.ity arnddeal with special inte-rescs or fronts , such as "Ti'ar Vict.i' s ^..arziersFishermen, etco , awich the VC wish to play'up or exploito

b, Organization charts refIecAting type political-mi l+..v. 'ilr)er-v.sory structures and troop objectives are included ab irclEosres to thispamphlet ffr background information olyo. It is kno.tn that GVN aigencies atdistrict' agid higher levels already possess consiarable' detailed knowledgeas t 'the .outliie of VG0. iifrastrceturei na their genera '-area.s .of inatere'tand iesiponai±i2tyo

6 UtMEN.GCY IEN D T "O THA INFASTRUCTURE B hat is now required isaystematic actiona thriouh local intelligence and population control programs,Ito expand present knowledge of the VC infrastruoture and to identify andappirhend thoAe ky W wio, regardless .t theib motivation5 make the VG,O6ai'azatio aid aie&ods effective .i their straggle to gfadually supplantand.eveuria.. lly overthPro the established-.governmnto While the VC mayfrequent'ly give the appearance of being defeated :c ally it mast be recog-nized that the VC organizatio' goes deep, that i is effective, and that it

5

is prepared 'to; tae advantage of ary.weakness " lack of GVN. organizationin Ar..area of<. ;Stb.,Vietnam by implementing its own VC mifta,. politi-ca&, &nd 'ecohcai prigrams 'to "meet the people .s need" , GVN viglane,even-in "pacified" areas, can not be relaxed

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VC INFPrASTRUCTUL.E

(A prepared briefing)

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·· L

VC INFRASTRUCTURE! '

For the next 45 minutes I am going to talk to you about':the.;V.C infra-

structure. The term infrastructure in this context is used to mean that

portion of the VC organization which is hidden from view, which lies be-

neath the surface, Which is not obvious, but which is the framework upon

which dependsl< all other VC or VC supported organizations and activities.

In practical terms, the VC infrastructure is the VC political-administra-

tive orgnization by ivhich the VC control or seek to control the populace

of SVN, the economic organization Vwhich supports both the ;tc-inistrativeand military organization, and the orgoanization for social dominatiqn.

To better understand tthis' organization, let us take a brief lookat

the VO aims and objectives in sVN; just what are they trying to accomplish?

It presently appears that the VC strategy is:

1. To force a cease-fire and seige power thru political maneuver.

2. After that, to form a "neutral" coalition government and force the

withdrawal of US forces,

3. This will be followed by negotiations with Hanoi to reunify the

two Vietnams.

This path is viewed by the VC as more political than military.

The second item I would like to touch on briefly is the Communist, not

just VC,) doctrine of power. It is based on 6 major tenets:

1. One unified political/military strategy at all levels.

2. Detailed political/military tactical methods to c.rry out the

strategy.

3. One unified political/military chain of command from the Central

Comnittee to the hamlet coniittee, '

I.-ncCi 3

m m--.. ...

4. Elite "cadre who thoroughly understand the sptategy and are versed

in intelligence/psychological/political/nilitary affairs and Can'traini -.. ..

others to carry out these methods; " - .... :"''.-.. ... i ii5. Secrecy and surprise

6. Emnphasis on intelligence, particularly political intelligence.

In SV' inP particulars the communists have the following specific

obje ct ivet^

1.; To establish base areas and ensure the security of their rear

installations

2. To organize peasant masses in order to deprive the GVN of their

support and provide manpower and supplies necessary to:

(1) Build and maintain a large cadre organization and armed

forceso

(2) Isolate the central government and the Americans politically

by obtaining the active or passive support of all segments, of the population.

(3) Divide and subvert government leaders and the armed forces.

In the. pursuit of their strategy and objectivess and by applying their

organizational theories the VC have developed a well -organized, extensive,

covert and clandestine government in SVN under the command of the Lao Dong

or Workersg Party, 'in Hanoi

Most of its leaders are known by aliases and the structure of the

government is largely hidden

Secrecy is the cardinal principle Organizational ,and physical com-

partmentation is extensive Officials and officers are told only what they

need to know. Bases are widely dispersed, hidden, and linked by radio or

covert communications routeso The routes are divided into separate links;: .· i ... .. .

2

· � ·

the liaison agents in each link know only their own linl" and.,not the whole

chain

The government attempts to make its rule popular, but uses an iron

hand4 if necessary.

This government is supported at each echelon, from the. Central Office

in Tay Ninh Province, down through the regional, provincial, district,

village atdg hamlet levels, by troops and militia, even in so-called GVN-

controlled areas.

Taxes are collected to help finance VC governmental activities and

ec.onmic/social development is implemented in VC controlled areao.

.The entire apparatus in SVN is governed by a central committee called'.; , '. .-'^ . ., ,

the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN) located in the Duong Minh Chau War

Zone (War Zone C) in Northern Tay Ninh Provinee next to the Cambodian border.

COSVN consists of over 1200 men and women laboring in myriad bureaus,

se ons brahes subsections, etco These staff elements are by no means

concentrated in compounds or fortified areas, but are scattered in lonely

that6hed houses in the hamlets and Jungle and in undergroundistallations

COSVN comes under the direct control of Hafiio0 Communications with Hanoi

is by radio, by couriers using the many land trails leading to NVN, and

probably by agents using the norma l couerci alair- rout,-e linking Phnom

Penh and Vientiane with Hanoi

COSVN's ,overall mission is to translate the policies of the Central

Ccmmittee. of ,:the Lao Dong Party into concrete directives, regulations, and

orders which will be implemented by lower echelons i. the VC organizationo

:COSVlt'a organized ino two major sections - political section -and

a military sedtiono. This duality isearried ot in -'al' lower echelon down* . . . - . .s . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..j.S

to the regional levelo In the province and below, the smaller number of

personnel in those headquarters normally causes the two funccttis to be· . . , ..-:.... ,"" - " " " ~ -,-

meshed into one component . ....

The COSVN Political Section in turn has 4 sections which are respon--..^:

sible for the so-called "Liberation Radio" station, the security of the war

zone, liaison with front organizations in SVN and the development of themes

and directives for propaganda, psywar, entertainment, and political educa-

tion which are directed outside the VC organizationo

The COSVN Military Section is broken down irto four major bureaus:

1 o The Political Bureau, which is responsible for political

training, special services security trainingi press relations, enemy troop

proselyting, and personnel assignments. This is a sort of G1 with major

emphasis on political training and indoctrinationo

2.o The Staff Bureau, which is respansible for VC operations,

military training doctrine and regulations, the organization of military

intelligence units and the collection of intelligence on enemy units

This is a combined G2 - G30

3o The Logistical Bureau, which handles such affairs as medical

care, finance, ordnance, economic policyg depots, factories, taxation, etco

4o The Troop Proselyting Bureauo The establishment of a separate

bureau at 'the highest level for the purpose of supervising and directing

troop proselyting points up the great importance the VC place on this type

of actiono

What do the VC mean by troop proselyting? It is the recruitment of

menbers of the RVN armed forces over to the VC cause, The program has many

advantages to the VC, many of which are obvious o They gain already trained

e

and armed ,meni they Qbtain. in mi. 'ases, a fifth coliuir ready to turn its

weapons on unsuspecting friendly trbops at the appropriate. t"l they.gain ..

invaluable intelligence and eventually, they gain in 'manpowero '"'. .

As an adjunct to COSVN, we find at the mnational l evel:.he National

Front for the Liberation of South Vietrmo The Front wtia established in

196P and is an important political action/propaganda F:grm f COSVN. iThe

Front is .supposedly made up of representatives of varidus ethic' and' re-

ligious groups4, socio-economic classes, and professional groups such as the

People's Revolutionary Party' VO regional. and provincial:'coinittees, the VC

a^rmedd forces, youth, farmers and women ~s organizations, Montagnards .nd

Cmobodians, Buddhists and Catholics, Cao jDaists and Hoa Haos, artists,

writers, students- teachers, etco

The NFLSVN is precisely what its name implies, a front organization

for COSVN which the Communists use in an attempt to unify all religious and

ethnic groups and all classes irto one political movement under Communist

controlo

The Front, which is a rival to the GVN and which has proclaimed a

policy of national independence, peace and neutrality" also is the vehicle

the Communists would use to form a coalition govern.ment i should the oppor-

tunity ariseo

The military force under the direct co'ntrol of COSVN presently con-

sist of 2 regiments of 3 rifle battalions each, and a guard or-security

battalion. There is a possibility that the regiments each have a heavy

iWeapons support battalion or an artillery battaliono It is the objective

Of the:';Central Office eventually to form a divisiono

% /:-, ' 1 '5

The next rung down the ladder are the military regions of which there

are five: :' ...

1o MR 5 which is responsible for the area from'Uthe DMZ in the

North down tp a line drawn along the southern boundaries of Khanh Hoa,

Darlac and Quang Due Provinces

2o MR 7 which covers the area down to the southern boundaries of

Tay Ninh! and Binh Duong and the western boundary of Bien Hoa-

3o The SCGD Special MR, which covers the Saigon metropolitan area

and Gia Dinh Province

.4o MR 8 which covers the area down to' the Mekong River and An

Giang;

; 5o MR 9 which covers the lower Delta region

Each MR command has a main base area developed during the IndoChina

war and -teactivated in 1958-1959o The VC generally remain in these base

areas which are located in remote, inaccessible areas made up of closely

integrated complexes of villages prepared for defenses a politicaly indoc-

trinated population in which even children have their specific intelligence

tasks, and an administrative machine parallel to that -of the legal authority

to which may be added at will any military unit assigned to operate in that

area.

As mentioned before, the duality of the political/mXlitary combination

obtains at this level alsoo The 1R is mainly a tactical headquarters, but

has responsibility for applying the directives received from COSVN to the

peculiarities of its particular area0

Y. 'ou will notice on this chart that the political headquarters has a

military section and the mlitary headquarters has a political section.

6

., . . I .I,- I .6 . I.- (?

In theory, the political and rmilitary headquarters are equalo In actuality,

the political headquarters establishes the policy and the military headquar-

ters carries it out. The military section found in the political-headquar-

ters is where this.:policy is establishedo The political section located in

the mllitary headquarters i.:,a watch dog which sees'to it that the policies

are carried out faithfully and which also observes and reports to the poli-

tical headquarters on the adherence of the individual members of the military

headquarters to the party lineong -e pr es. Theseare.

Below the MR 1avel We 'e find a varying nuiber of provincesO These are

VC piavinces and th'eir .boundaries do not, necessarily coincide with those

established by the GVN. The province is one of the main policy making and

poliy imp lementing echelonls A'n the 'chai of cmnand' The provincial cen-

trall'commnittee has 9 to .15 memberso Its staff is made up of about 300 people.: '.

As are' other headq"arte'rs, .-the provincial headquarters is usually located in

a remot' re-gion ,dispersed.in several hamlets or int thatched huts hidden in. ..

the jungle. forest or swamp c .The headquarters moves from time to timeo

The province.usually'has' radio and courier'"contact with the MR and

courier nets to the district c a itt.ees"which h ve'simi'ar nets to the

village- conom tteeso. The amilitary -affa.irs 'seetion of the provincial commit-

tee hab radio and/or courier : contact w ith the military force operating

directly under its controlo

The District Committee is :.probably" the key level 'n 'the. VC infrastruc-

ture, The District is responsible" for the consolidation' of VC gains and

for enlarging VC control into virgin 'territorieso It not only directs but

participates directly in the village :and hamlet rganizational activitieso

.The' district headquarters contains the same elements ,a^s those we have

* w * |~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

* :'' _

7'

already discussed9 but of course9 on a smaller scale, The district

organization9 including the military forces under its direct control,

numbers somewhere in the vicinity of 200 to 250 menI ..' . ....

In some districts, the district chief is also oi.i head of the mili-

tary affairs committee and commander of the district company or platoon.

The main contact between the district headquarters and the populace

is through what the VC call "tmission" or "'activity2" teams9 or what most

students of Communist revolutionary methods call agitprops from the

Russian words for agitator and propagandisto

These teams are normally allocated on the basis of one per village

areao They number anywherp from 3 to 25 men depending on the number of

hamlets and inhabitants in their areas of responsibilityo In VC controlled

·aras these teams make the rounds of the hamlets conducting meetings, ex-

plaining VC policies9 advertising VC military victoriesg extolling VC

ecpiomic and social developments in the area9 collecting information and

intelligence not only on RVN military units but on economic9 social and

political conditionso The information is then relayed by messengers to

the district headquarters where it is evaluated and used as the basis

-fr VC actiono

The district establishes the program of economic and social develop-

mento Schools may be built9 farming quotas established9 seed furnished,

entertainment teams sent outo

The district committee will arrest and judge recalcitrant persons,

enemies of the people, criminals9 gamblersg and the likeo

The district committee will install village and hamlet leaders and

supervise the proper organization of .the populace into VC front and. e

supported organizationso These oranizations usually are four in number:

1. Farmtrs '.gahization

2 XWomnien s Organization .

3, Youth Organization

4, Self-Defsna e 'Corps

Th:e distrt units aere esponsible for the tri the VC SDC, for

superviing the establiaent of proper defense plan in the hamlets, for

supervising the establishment of .proper: camouflage, aev..a uat.ion and intelli-c.:. ... ·,: , .

gencce reporting pr cedures on the .rt, of the .p opulace.,and for establishing

qubats for aniit . ' .erve~ baAed'o-:tbhe needs of hei' hamlet, villages, the

district urits ahnd..:ter headquarterso

At the villag le'velfwei the. same orignization as in htgher echelons,

4tWS the aded secticias' that are respao^hle sr th. -o-called mass rgani-

Utionsi Theses.ave b iientioned 'be.: res :The, Fa sere, Wcens outh and

S 'The VC atteno i::'getall of ,,people JAto:;.ne or, more of these orga-

i''ti[ons, in order. o.ige thhem ota do h.. e VtSe C,:e to o.bt.i their suRport

.. .' . ...in Qone rorn or anOtherw. 'ttawittin: g thott t m ay be,

At the lowest iOigda e I wei ' Wt · he hanml;. It u a is run

by; ViiVC-appointd 'cffcia l Ifbr .th fi*st *e: mQnthster it.s sganization

by^ith&VC. Jertuall4Y, 'irh i&bitafe ,.are jAuged by the., VC to be

suffiditfly indeotriinated -kid oiplatisa^j.t *y wil b.e allowqd ;to. 'elect

thbeir i chief, .subject to VO approval

the hamlet chief is responsible for the r.cruiting of :meninto .the .V

sef-itense f'ore t'6 .guard the hrmlet aga tl. rvrnwent incursions, and

t;o Wetablish a Slal perimeter defense and warning, syst.emo, The .p9pulace Of

the:,haamlet i3s ford. i*d o 'thie 4 VC .sponsored.organizations; ctasses are con-

du.ced in the avOwed aiaLs anB objectives of the VCo In the sphere ot econiic

9

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L1

development, the VC Rexact rice seedlings from the richer farmers and

distribute them to the poorer oneso Land owned by absentee landlords

is confiscated and redistributed to the landless or the poor farmers.

A collective is established to render financial support to destitute -

farmers. Agricultural experts advise the farmers in the improvement of

their crops. Local force military units are called upon to help build

dikes, to repair houses, to replace houses damaged by military action of

either side. Classes in reading and writing are established, In return,

the people are expected to pay taxes to the VC to support the military

forces and.to help in the social and economic development of the hamlet

&nd surrounding areas o

So far, I've been talking about organization for control of the people.

The system becomes even more complex when I bring in the subject of the

Communist Partyo

The cadres particularly the leaders or the elite who make up the

chain of command that I have just described, are usually members of the

Gommunist Partyo Thus they wear two hats, since they are engaged in purely

party activities as well as normal political, military, economic and social

actitivities It is the duty of all party members and their responsibility

to conduct or supervise party activity party training, and to establish

and translate military/political/economic/and social programs that are in

keeping with party desires and theories

The party apparatus forms a separate and parallel chain of command

from top to bottom. The leaders of the party normally are in positions of

responsibility in the political/administrative organizationo They thus

form what is called an interlocking directorate which assures that the

10

desires of the party r se are translated it;o political and military

actions which, in turn, are meshed, since members of the political 1ccnittees

are, in many cases, the military leaders als o' ;

In addition to and in conjunction with his other duties, each party '

member has five basic responsibilities .

1o Intelligence

20 Propaganda

30 Struggle (that is political persuasion or military action)

4o Training

5o Organization of other peopleo

Well-versed through training and experience in political, psychological

andmilitary affairs, these cadre drive and guide the Communist operationo

So -we finally get down to the n.no What kind of animal is this

Communist? Jean Larteguy 9,a French writer with many years of Journalistic

and military experience in Indochina and North Africa, describes ;the charac-

ter and 4ives of the ammunist cadre in his novel The Centurions:

r"The Party and the AArm#, thatYs their, whole lifeo Outside them theyhave no existence .. . .t .- - .

'"Mary of the officers and other ranks have been waging clandestine warfor years They've lived in bands .quartered~ in out-of-the-way littlevillages .. Sin the mountains:. in this militarily -intranemsent, rigorist andhighly organized communityo : , . ..

stEven the Voi'e (a. V. cadre), whols a graduate of Hanoi University andquite brilliant has ceased to have an original thought or to struzggleagainst his surroundingso. All those ~chaps, just, 'in order to burvive, needall the strength they have.o They must endure night marches, battles todeath, insufficient foodo In their leisure hours they. are tran*forBed intopropaganda machines. They are compelled to reiterate again and again thesanme slOgans that have to be hammered into the. thick skulls. of the nha-ques(VN peasants)o They organize all sorts of associations td embrace thecivi3lian population and see to it that thobse associati .nr do not ee6e adriftimmediately0 They have to instruct recruits, conseript eooliteO9 cOllectmoneyt: These men don't have a mirnte to themselves; their life is3nt their

I

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own, mThus tkey preter to accept.tst 'o:t.m s rather tha*poader ovwr it and, diBeuss ti-,e. '

,a4 ait i ., a ftew .ares et ea a tha*e rea.t atn witmhout««xl1 Wo ito t*Iy ± toa and A4 town a «i tlo aa^, 1laeri». ~. . :'-t r ' . . . t

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