american democracy and computer-mediated communication: a case study in minnesota

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AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND

COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION:

A CASE STUDY IN MINNESOTA

Submitted by Geoffrey Scott Aikens

for the Doctorate of Philosophy in Social and Political Sciences

Cambridge University. April, 1997

E-Mail: [email protected]:http://www.gscottaikens.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART 1

1.0 Background

1.1 Constant on ancient and modern liberty

1.2 Burke on the American Revolution1.3 The founding fathers

1.4 The nineteenth century

2.0 Lippmann in context

3.0 Dewey in context3.1 Dewey on Lippmann

3.2 Deweyan basis for democratic ideas

4.0 The intervening years

5.0 Democracy and new communications technology

5.1 Russell Neuman updates Lippmann

5.2 Benjamin Barber returns to Dewey

5.3 Abramson, Arterton and Oren survey the field5.4 Robert Dahl -- from democratic realism to Deweyan idealism

6.0 The communications revolution

7.0 A Deweyan revivall7.1 The experimental method and democracy

7.2 Two systems of public opinion formation

7.3 Confronting economic realities of mass media

7.3.1 The local community
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7.3.2 Filling the media gap

7.3.3 Interactivity and a new public

7.3.4 Elections and representative officers7.4 From mass media control of agenda to the rise of the information elite

7.4.1 The role of a democratically generated intellectual elite

7.4.2 A system of public opinion formation open to all

PART II

1.0 Introduction

2.0 History of the Internet

3.0 The Minnesota Electronic Democracy Project

3.1 A history of the Minnesota Electronic Democracy Project

3.2 Statistics

3.2.1 Participation and the survey3.2.2 Usage statistics

3.3 Description of the archive as artefact

4.0 Theoretical Background

4.1 Characteristic properties of CMC4.2 A Deweyan interpretation by a modern practitioner

4.3 Contested terrain

4.3.1 In theory: Carnegie Mellon vs. Lea and Spears4.3.1.1 The Carnegie Mellon group

4.3.1.2 Lea and Spears SIDE model

4.3.2 In practice in politics4.3.2.1 Tensions4.3.2.2 Citizenship as a unifying self-category

5.0 Management of the boundaries

6.0 The mechanics of participation within the boundaries6.1 Submission

6.2 Response

6.3 Exchange

6.4 Thread

7.0 Threads

7.1 The first period7.1.1 The Governors race thread

7.1.1.1 Macroscopic analysis

7.1.1.2 Microscopic analysis7.1.2 Surfacing knowledge

7.2 The second period
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7.3 The third period

7.3.1 Deliberation, gender and democratisation

7.3.2 Context7.3.3 Context and agency

7.3.3.1 The art of politics in a new arena

7.3.3.2 Backlash7.3.4 Threads, deliberation and democratic norms7.4 The candidates and democratic norms

8.0 The media - new knowledge communicated to a mass audience

PART III

1.0 Summing up

2.0 Beyond 1994

3.0 Beyond Minnesota

4.0 Beyond the United States

APPENDIX 1: MN E-Democracy E-Debate 1994

APPENDIX 2: MN-POLITICS - Description and Guidelines

PART I

1.0 Background

1.1 Constant on ancient and modern liberty

In 1819 the Frenchman Benjamin Constant gave a speech at The Athenee Royal in Paris. The

speech, "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns" provides a broadframe to begin a reflection on American democracy and computer-mediated communication, or

what has generally become known as electronic democracy. The speech concerns how

conceptions of liberty changed from the time of the Athenian polis to 1819, after a period ofrevolutionary upheaval in the United States and France. In the ancient world, men defined liberty

in terms of their positive participation in the affairs of government. In the modern world, men

define liberty in terms of the freedom they have to secure their desires in their private lives.Constant writes, "in the kind of liberty of which we are capable, the more the exercise of politicalrights leaves us time for our private interests, the more precious will liberty be to us" (Constant

1988: 325).

Modern liberty as freedom from interference secured more fully through the exercise of political

rights entails certain risks. Government in the modern nation-state is increasingly complex. As a

result it is increasingly difficult for the citizen to maintain the knowledge of the affairs of the
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state needed properly to exercise political rights. Furthermore, because of the emphasis on

private affairs in the vast nation-state it is inevitable that individuals become absorbed in their

own concerns, further eroding their knowledge of the affairs of the state. The risk of modernliberty in the complex nation-state is, therefore, that private individuals will cease to exercise

their political rights and share in political power. In so doing individuals will undermine liberty.

After all, both ancient and modern liberties are functions of and extended through the exercise ofpolitical rights and the sharing in political power - what in some cases is called popularsovereignty.

The solution to this problem is the construction of institutions that balance modern liberty -

freedom from interference - and something akin to ancient liberty - active participation. Constant

writes,

Institutions must achieve the moral education of the citizens. By respecting their individual

rights, securing their independence, refraining from troubling their work, they must nevertheless

consecrate their influence over public affairs, call them to contribute by their votes to the

exercise of power, grant them a right of control and supervision by expressing their opinions:and, by forming them through practice for these elevated functions, give them both the desire

and the right to discharge these (Constant 1988: 328).

Constant was among the first to focus on institutions that would serve a wide variety of needs to

better secure liberty. The problem identified by Constant has not yet successfully been resolved.In fact, until the present there have been continuous calls for a variety of institutions that create a

balance between ancient and modern liberty, or what Isaiah Berlin similarly referred to as

positive and negative liberty (Berlin 1992).

Indeed, many structures have emerged to support, among other goods, the conceptions of liberty

outlined by Constant. In the United States, the focus of the current study, the constellation ofstructures and conceptions supported by networks of other structures such as popular elections,trial by jury, the executive function, congressional procedure, a judiciary founded upon the

interpretation of a constitution, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of

assembly, are aspects of what has come to be considered the democratic process. Instead offocusing on the theoretical goods supposedly furthered by what we now call the democratic

process, such as liberty or equality, or focusing on the constellation of institutions that make up

the democratic process, I will focus on the development of institutions in one limited domain ofthe process. Specifically, in terms of Constant, I will focus on institutions that ought to "grant

[the citizenry] a right of control and supervision by expressing their opinions". In modern terms

my interest is in the function within the democratic process of systems of public opinion

formation. While freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of assembly grant protectionagainst the interference in systems of public opinion formation, it is my contention that systems

of public opinion formation do not exist which enable the positive participation of the people in

the exercise of political power. As Constant explained, the emphasis on modern liberty -

protection from interference - over ancient liberty - positive participation - is detrimental to anyliberty and therefore the project of democratic self-government.


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What is called for, I argue in Part I, is the positive democratisation of systems of public opinion

formation. The basis for this argument and some guidance on how to achieve the democratisation

of systems of public opinion formation rest on the work of the American philosopher JohnDewey as he responded to the work of Walter Lippmann. This examination of Dewey is a

contribution to ongoing intellectual debate, apart from the empirical study in Part II. Primarily it

is meant to contribute insight into an American intellectual tradition that offers some guidanceinto how computer-mediated communication could and I argue ought to enhance the democraticprocess. Secondarily, it is meant provide information about the democratic theory of John

Dewey, implicitly arguing that recent events have made a Deweyan interpretation of the

democratic process increasingly plausible. First, I will examine Lippmann and Deweys thoughtin relation to the 1920s - the era in which they both wrote. Then I will examine recent efforts to

revive both a Lippmannesque and a Deweyan perspective. Finally I will offer a fresh account of

Deweys thought in relation to the present era as characterised by the emergence of computer-

mediated communications technology. Before turning to Lippmann and Dewey, however, I willfocus on relevant themes in the early years of American history.

It will be helpful to note, before continuing, that discussions of new technology and democracyoften are associated with ideas related to direct democracy, in which it is hoped the

representative system will be replaced by the direct rule of the people. That is not here the case.Rather, the following discourse attempts at all points to consider the feasibility of structuresusing new technology that will act within existing political traditions to deepen democracy and

provide new data about the nature of citizenship.

1.2 Burke on the American Revolution

The weight of public opinion, one could argue, was among the forces that pushed the Americancolonists to declare themselves independent of British rule. As a consequence, they sought to

institutionalise the idea of popular sovereignty as formulated, first, in Thomas JeffersonsDeclaration of Independence of 1776 and, second, in the Federal Constitution of 1783. The term"public opinion" was documented for the first time in the Oxford Dictionary in 1781. This

followed the war in the colonies as well as the English philosopher Edmund Burkes famous

defence of the American revolutionaries. Burke, in On the Affairs of America, offered hisexplanation of the motives of the American revolutionaries as they sought to escape British rule,

"I must beg leave to observe that it is not only the invidious branch of taxation that will be

resisted, but that no other given part of the legislative right can be exercised without regard to the

general opinion of these who are to be governed. That general opinion is the vehicle and organ oflegislative omnicompetence." The general or public opinion is, thus, both the cause and effect of

legislative omnicompetence, or the power to govern. It is, therefore, constitutive of popular

sovereignty. That the opinions of the average citizen take on public significance is of real

consequence in a state in which the idea of popular sovereignty is operative. Burke writes, "Infree countries, there is often found more real public wisdom and sagacity in shops and

manufactories than in the cabinets of princes in countries where no one dares to have an opinion

until he comes into them" (Burke 1949: 106).

1.3 The founding fathers


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The American founding fathers had varying positions on both the role of public opinion and the

need for strong and stable government in a complex nation-state. Thomas Jefferson, the

individual behind the so-called "Jeffersonian vision" that has inspired contemporary politiciansto extol the reputed democratic potential of the so-called communications revolution, expressed a

near mystical belief in the power of public opinion. The deliberation of the local community was

key in his vision of a congress of self-governing agricultural communities coming together overa vast territory to form a vibrant nation-state. Public opinion and democratic deliberation were atthe foundation of popular sovereignty. Jefferson, for example, wrote the often quoted passage, "I

know of no safe depository of the ultimate power of the society but the people themselves, and if

we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, theremedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion" (Jefferson 1984: 493). Yet

even as Jefferson expounded on the power of the people, he noted the need to "inform their

discretion". In this way he demonstrated his awareness of the problem the people en masse posed

to the stability of a single nation-state. While maintaining his vision of a congress of self-governing communities he also believed action was necessary to ameliorate the potential for

difficulties. He therefore supported an extensive programme of public works designed to bring

the nation together. These included the promotion of public education and the construction ofroads and canals. He wrote, "New channels of communication will be opened between the states,

the lines of separation will disappear; their interests will be identified, and their union cemented

by new and indestructible ties" (529). As Alexander Hamilton surely thought, there was more

than a little naivet in Jeffersons adherence to his vision of local autonomy. This is especiallythe case considering his simultaneous call for a focus on the construction of a single nation-state

through the creation of national networks. Even as it remains a powerful political token, the

Jeffersonian vision of local autonomy could not prevail in an expanding commercial empire(Trachtenberg 1965).

Many of the measures implemented on the suggestion of James Madison were clearly designedto promote public deliberation to form a broad public opinion. Simultaneously, measures were

implemented to ensure the establishment of a strong and stable government to oversee the

development of a complex nation-state. More of a realist than Jefferson, Madison argued for an

"extended republic" as opposed to a democracy. An extended republic would make popularsovereignty viable in a single nation-state as opposed to democracy which allows popular

sovereignty only in very small communities. Furthermore, Madison followed David Hume in

arguing that a representative system stretched out over a broad territory would create a stablegoverning structure. The size of the nation-state would mitigate the influence of factions in any

single part (Adair 1956-7, Hume 1985). Madison also argued for a system of "filtration" in

which popular elections at the local level would allow the general public to discharge its

democratic function in electing the first layer of representatives. A system of increasingly finegradation, such as elections covering a more extensive territory and, further, the establishment of

electoral colleges, would ensure that important national legislators were men of high calibre.

These men would, Madison thought, place the public interest before their private gain (Fishkin1996, Harrison 1993, Sunstein 1993). Finally, for our purposes, Madison eventually wrote the

First Amendment of the Bill of Rights, "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of

speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble..." (Madison et al. 1988).Madison called for the establishment of popular elections, the representative system, and the

prohibition on the interference with certain freedoms deemed essential to the formation of public


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opinion. The critical point to note, however, is that he neglected the construction of institutional

structures to ensure the opportunity for the participation of the general citizenry in the system of

public opinion formation. Perhaps, swept up in the tide of strong opinion among the population,Madison too maintained a faith in the democratic nature of the process by which citizens would

come to the opinions upon which they would base their votes for their representatives.

1.4 The nineteenth century

Over the course of the nineteenth century, as transportation and communication systems boundthe nation together more tightly, local deliberation would lose its importance in the formation of

public opinion. Because of the uses of electricity, national media would gain in importance. In

the early years of the nineteenth century, however, local deliberation was nonetheless commonand important. After his travels in the United States to observe American democracy in 1831 and

1832, another Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, argued that the opportunity for deliberation in

the local community about the well-being of the local community provided the most effective

anchor for the stability and well-being of the new nation-state. He wrote, "Those who dread the

licence of the mob and those who fear absolute power ought alike to desire the gradualdevelopment of provincial liberties" (de Tocqueville 1990: 95). The town meeting or the New

England town hall is the institutional structure that epitomised the importance of democraticdeliberation in the early years of the country. As a quasi-formal deliberative body at the local

level the town meeting was the distinctive American variation on the French salon or the English

coffee house. Each of these was a venue for a critical debating public to form and express a

variety of views on the decisions of governing bodies. As de Tocqueville wrote, "Town meetingsare to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the peoples reach, they

teach men how to use and how to enjoy it" (61). Unfortunately there was no constitutional

protection for the deliberative forums against the effects of changing technologies and changinginstitutional structures such as the press (Habermas 1989).

One pattern of change that had a determinative influence on systems of public opinion formationwas the increasing concentration of control over electrical currents and telegraphy. The ability to

send messages over wires to any place can fruitfully be viewed with Jeffersons desire to create a

communality across a broad expanse to cement the union. In 1853 Donald Mann, Democraticeditor ofAmerican Telegraph Magazine, made the connection when he wrote, "Nearly all our

vast and widespread population are bound together, not merely by political institutions but by a

telegraph and lightning-like affinity of intelligence and sympathy, that renders us emphatically

one people everywhere" (Czitrom 1982: 12). Those with the democratic vision of the benefitsof a unitary common will must have viewed the new technology with hope. It was also an

immense boon to the growing news industry. The growth from 235 newspapers in 1800 to

160,000 newspapers in 1899 was largely a function of the distribution system put in place

through the establishment of Associated Press wire reports sent by the telegraph monopoly,Western Union. As was confirmed in an 1874 United States Senate investigation into the

business practices of the Western Union/Associated Press alliance, the new technology had an

immense effect on the delicate, unprotected system of public opinion formation epitomised bythe town meeting. The Senate investigation wrote, "the power of the telegraph, continuously and

rapidly increasing, can scarcely be estimated. It is the means of influencing public opinion

through the press, of acting on the markets of the country and of seriously affecting the interests


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of the people" (26). A comparison of the words of de Tocqueville and Western Union President

William Orton best illustrates the nature of the change from the beginning to the latter part of the

century. In 1832 de Tocqueville observed that "the power of the periodical press is second onlyto that of the people" (188). Almost 40 years later the relative power of press and people could

be said to have switched with the increasing power of telegraphy. In 1870, William Orton told a

special house committee investigating the monopolistic practices of Western Union, "The merefact of monopoly proves nothing. The only question to be considered is whether those whocontrol its affairs administer them properly and in the interest, first, of the owners of the property

and, second, of the public" (Czitrom 1982: 27).

2.0 Lippmann in context

Walter Lippmann, working on propaganda for the United States during World War I, became

concerned with the power of the new media to manipulate public opinion and wield influence

over affairs of the state. In his highly influential book of 1922,Public Opinion, Lippmann sets

out to clarify the traditionally vague role of systems of public opinion formation in the political

process. In so doing Lippmann attempts to reconceive the nature of the political process in whichsystems of public opinion formation are set. For Lippmann the larger problem for democratic

theory is how to overcome the naive faith in a doctrine of popular sovereignty held by traditionaldemocrats. The reason this is a problem is that the public, in Lippmann's time, continues to

adhere to democratic ideas in a world in which democratic ideas are unrealisable. As Lippmann

writes, "The democratic ideal, as Jefferson molded it...became the political gospel, and supplied

the stereotypes through which Americans of all parties have looked at politics" (Lippmann 1960:270). Yet the Jeffersonian vision was always inadequate to the needs of a vast, technologically

advanced, commercial nation-state. The traditional democrat took it as a matter of faith that the

citizen would properly be informed. It is as if it were an affront to democratic ideas to work outhow the citizen might become informed. Famously, Lippmann investigated the flaws in the

proposition that men are naturally well enough informed to possess sound political judgement on

matters concerning the nation-state. In order successfully to discharge his democratic function a

citizen would, realistically, have to have an exceptional grasp of local, national and internationalaffairs. He would, in other words, have to be an "omnicompetent" citizen. In reality people

construct for themselves a conception of the world based on "fictions", "symbols", "fragments"

and "stereotypes", or, as Lippmann titled the introductory chapter of his book, "Pictures in OurHeads". He concludes, "Not being omnipresent and omniscient we cannot see much of what we

have to think and talk about" (161). His conclusion that citizens are ill-informed about affairs of

the state leads Lippmann to reconceptualise the basis of the political process.

Lippmann comes upon the issue of consent as he investigates the gap between democratic ideas

and political reality. He writes, "How, in the language of democratic theory, do great numbers of

people feeling each so privately about so abstract a picture develop any common will?" (193). Inbroaching the topic of the "common will" Lippmann suggests that an "Oversoul" is necessary.

This Oversoul is the crystallisation of the nation-wide wishes of an informed and active citizen-

body acting in concert to create legislation and govern itself. In other words it is thecrystallisation of a fiction. Lippmann uses this concept of the Oversoul to caricature the belief

held by traditional democrats in a common will. By comparison he points out that living human

beings must construct the consent of the governed. He writes, "the Oversoul as presiding genius


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in corporate behavior is a superfluous mystery if we fix our attention upon the machine (229)".

Instead of relying on a mythical Oversoul the realistic analyst would concentrate on the

structures through which opinions are shaped. As these are composed of "fictions", "symbols","fragments" and "stereotypes" it is of significant value to understand the manner in which

fictions, symbols, fragments and stereotypes envelop citizens, informing the pictures in their

heads. In concentrating on the actual machinery by which a non-existent common will isconstructed, Lippmann reveals his hypothesis that democratic ideas are an impossibility. Aminority will always dominate. He writes, "Nowhere is the idyllic theory of democracy

realized...There is an inner circle, surrounded by concentric circles which fade out gradually into

the disinterested or uninterested rank and file" (228). Free of democratic ideas Lippmann canfocus on better understanding the perfection of process. This will result in concrete knowledge

that will have a determinative influence on civilisation. Lippmann writes, "no matter how power

originates, the crucial interest is in how power is exercised. What determines the quality of

civilization is the use made of power" (312).

Based on his theory suggesting the inevitability of minority domination, Lippmann proposes that

the political process requires the replacement of a devotion to democratic ideas with a devotionto a high standard of living. Men do not desire self-government for its own sake but, rather, for

its results. Results can be defined in terms of human dignity as traditional democrats are apt todo. However, with such dignity given to the average citizen and the "opinions that happen to befloating around mens minds", control would be impossible and turmoil ensue. On the other

hand, by defining results as "a standard of living in which mans capacities are properly

exercised", the entire problem of political organisation changes. With the emphasis on producing"a certain minimum of health, housing, material necessities, education, freedom, pleasure", etc.

the "criteria can be made exact and objective, which is inevitably the concern of comparatively

few people" (314).

The driving force behind such a change is the deep allegiance by key sectors to the American

ideal of success. A simple doctrine of mechanical progress which fosters a desire "for the

biggest, the fastest, the highest, or if you are a maker of wrist-watches or microscopes, thesmallest; the love, in short, of the superlative and the peerless..." most notably symbolises this

ideal. Lippmann believes uncritically in the virtues of the ideal of success and mechanical

progress (109). Indeed he argues that a privately owned system of public opinion formation beconstructed to perpetuate the ideal. Particularly relevant is an improving standard of living - the

American dream. This system would be critical to ensuring the ongoing vitality of a particular

interpretation of reality. Political power thus resides in the construction of the machinery.Lippmann writes, "...the pattern has been a success so nearly perfect in the sequence of ideals,

practice, and results, that any challenge to it is called un-American" (110).

Three interrelated elements central to the system of public opinion formation proposed byLippmann are, then, the subsuming of political communication under the economics of mass

media, the creation of a culture of "objectivity" in the journalistic profession, and the

construction of a system of "organised intelligence" in elite administrative circles. First, it isperhaps the central point that the political media function as a subsidiary sphere of the mass

media, generally. The point of the mass media organisation is to run a profitable business. This

creates a tension within the organisation between the general motive of profit maximisation and


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the special role of the news media in informing the public on matters concerning democratic

governance. As Lippmann puts it, "We expect the newspaper to serve us with truth however

unprofitable the truth may be" (321). The fact that the media organisation sells advertising spacein the media product to the private sphere forces the editor of the media product to be cognisant

of the interests and opinions of current and potential advertisers as well as customers. They must

pay attention to advertisers because advertisers are often customers and, furthermore, they fundthe media product. They must pay attention to customers to maintain circulation and/or audienceshare to attract advertisers. By subjecting the construction of political media to these pressures,

Lippmann portrays a kind of system of accountability. The weight of opinion among the

community of respectable citizens and businessmen who buy the media product constrains thedecision-making abilities of the news editor, acting as intermediary between the public and

government. What is more important the community of respectable businessmen who fund the

media product also constrain editorial judgement.

Second, Lippmann formulated the importance of objectivity in the news process. To

Lippmanns mind a happening becomes news when it can be "fixed, objectified, measured,

named". A dispute, for example, becomes news when there is an arrest, or a complaint filed in acourt. A "dangerous issue", such as a strike to take Lippmanns example, becomes news only

when there is a concrete record of an action in some institution or when there is an event thatdisturbs the day-to-day activity of the citizen. Thus, in the case of the strike, the news is "theindisputable fact and the easy interest...the strike itself and the readers inconvenience". One of

several reasons offered for standards of objectivity is the desire of the editor to have a

professional operation and rules of the game. The staff will thus have guide-lines to help themavoid offending, confusing or alienating the loyal reader and/or advertiser with unconventional,

insufficient or clumsily described material. Again, another system of accountability is put into

place.

Finally, for Lippmann, the key to the construction of sound public opinion is the creation of

"organised intelligence" through a centrally located intelligence agency staffed by professional

scientists, social scientists and administrators. The better the ability of such institutions as thepolice and the courts and the legislative branch to organise information is, the more likely the

objective news service will work with greater precision in reporting the news, and the more

likely public opinion will adequately be informed for the political process to function smoothly.The press, then, is merely "a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and

then another out of darkness, into vision" (364). Perhaps the pivotal nexus of power is vested in

the highly rational policy elite that has invested the time and energy in understanding thecomplex functioning of the modern nation-state - the individuals in the various institutions who

organise information. Lippmann writes, "Only by insisting that problems shall not come up to

him until they have passed through a procedure, can the busy citizen of a modern state hope to

deal with these in a form that is intelligible" (402).

3.0 Dewey in context

3.1 Dewey on Lippmann


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In 1927 Dewey published The Public and Its Problems, which can be read as a rebuttal of

Lippmanns thesis. In the book itself, Dewey notes his debt to Lippmann, although their

conclusions diverge sharply.

Dewey expressed a great deal of admiration for Lippmann'sPublic Opinion, writing that it is no

longer possible to look at democracy in the same way after absorbing the power of Lippmannswork. In expressing this admiration, Dewey admits his acceptance of much of the Lippmann

analysis. For example, Dewey agrees that the machine age, symbolised by steam, cable,

telephone, radio, the railway, cheap printing and mass production, is also deeply marked by whatPresident Woodrow Wilson termed the "new era of human relations". Men and women are

closely linked by distant events through the rapid communication of information and

transportation of material goods. A primary consequence of the machine age and the new era of

human relations is the significance of events beyond their grasp on individuals living in localcommunities scattered across a vast nation-state. This extreme reliance of local people on the

business of the nation is responsible for the fragmentation of and deterioration in the significance

of the local community in the daily life of the individual. As Dewey puts it, "the machine age in

developing the Great Society has invaded and partially disintegrated the small communities offormer times..." (Dewey 1927: 127). Dewey agrees with Lippmann: a congress of autonomous

local communities was the basis upon which democratic ideas such as popular sovereignty weresupposed to function, according to traditional democrats. Because the machine age and the newera of human relations have made such an environment an anachronism, time and events render

the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty impracticable and unworkable in the vast, complex

nation-state that has developed.

The major point of divergence between Lippmann and Dewey is precisely over the significance

of democratic ideas. Lippmann rejects any devotion to democratic ideas after suggesting thatminority domination is inevitable. He then formulates theories about how the political process

can work despite the inability of citizens to govern themselves. Dewey argues that, in doing this,

Lippmann indicts democracy altogether. Democracy is central to Deweys philosophy, and

especially his conception of associated living. Deweys task is, therefore, to assert democraticideas against Lippmanns powerful rejection. In this way Dewey interprets Lippmanns anti-

democratic political theory and his own democratic political theory as two bodies of ideas vying

for supremacy in an era during which the impact of technology on human interaction hasdisconnected the further development of the political process from previously entrenched

traditions. Speaking of the 1920s, an era of upheaval and transformation, Dewey admits

uncertainty about which body of ideas will have a determinative influence on the development ofpolitical processes. On the positive side he asserts that the literature of democracy, the body of

ideals he seeks to uphold, "retain their glamour and sentimental prestige" and "still engage

thought and command loyalty". On the negative side, given the patterns of development in

telegraphy and radio, he concludes, "...those which have actual instrumentalities at their disposalhave the advantage".

Dewey agrees with Lippmanns pragmatic assertion that traditional democrats mistakenlyfocused on the origins of power in the communal will rather than on the processes through which

public consent is forged. A pragmatist himself, Dewey follows Lippmann. In calculating how the

political process ought to be adjusted to function successfully in a changing world, both men


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concentrate on systems of public opinion formation, specifically the operation of the press and

the organisations responsible for the deployment of expert information. Lippmanns theory

hinges on his argument that neither the press nor any other institution compensates for "thefailure of self-governing people to transcend their casual experience and their prejudices by

inventing, creating and organizing a machinery of knowledge" (365). The press, in other words,

is incapable of upholding the democratic ideas of popular sovereignty. It must, therefore, beorganised so that the political process functions despite this fact. It is precisely this point onwhich Dewey focuses his contrary analysis. At the concrete level he targets systems of public

opinion formation as essential to the organisation of power. He writes, "The smoothest road to

control over political conduct is by control of opinion" (182). Dewey goes on to contend that theLippmann system of public opinion formation is a betrayal of the democratic process. It is,

therefore, necessary for the community to perfect a "machinery of knowledge" to give substance

to democratic ideas. He writes, "When the machine age has thus perfected its machinery it will

be a means of life and not its despotic master. Democracy will come into its own, for democracyis a name for a life of free and enriching communication" (184).

During the 1920s both Dewey and Lippmann agreed that the set of developments summarised asboth the machine age and the era of new human relations clearly favoured the body of ideas

promoted by Lippmann against the body of ideas supported by Dewey. In 1927, in fact, allDewey could do was explain the problems. The powerful new instrumentalities deployed bypolitical and economic elites uprooted the individual in his or her community without his or her

knowledge, causing the "eclipse of the public". The result was that political and economic elites

found themselves able to control easily the political machinery. Dewey writes, "In a word, thenew forces of combined action due to the modern economic regime control present politics,

much as dynastic interests controlled those of two centuries ago" (108). The new age of human

relations, thus, "has no political agencies worthy of it" because private political and economic

interests prevail entirely, shaping the debate through control of the systems of public opinionformation. This does not, however, render the problem of the eclipse of the public insoluble. The

necessary task, according to Dewey, is for the public to recognise itself and become organised

through the creation of a machinery of "socialised intelligence". Specifically, Dewey is

concerned that the public recognises itself to give itself "weight in the selection of officialrepresentatives and in the definition of their responsibilities and rights" (77).

3.2 Deweyan basis for democratic ideas

Throughout his analysis Dewey is intent on performing intellectual work that is practical. He setshimself the task of defining the problem of the public, by searching for the conditions according

to which a public could emerge, and giving a self-admittedly vague account of how the public

that emerges ought to be organised to define and express its interests. For Dewey the problem of

organisation is impossible without solving the problem of emergence, and is thus secondary tothe problem of emergence. The entirety of this labour is, as Dewey writes, "in the first instance

an intellectual problem". In the era in which Dewey writes the situation is too bleak for Dewey to

be able to offer honest guidance on practical matters. Dewey emphasises conditions and thepotential significance of new technology. However, he fails to offer any guide for action or a

notion of what the new technologies might be. This has frustrated his interpreters until the

present. He is consistently accused of being vague and elliptical (Carey 1989, Damico 1978,


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Festenstein 1994, Rorty 1980, Ryan 1995, Westbrook 1991). I argue, on the other hand, that

Dewey had a deep understanding of the limits of what he could offer given the time in which he

was writing. Neither the conditions nor the technologies to realise his ideas were near the realmof possibility. It is, thus, a tribute to Deweys work that it is so helpful as a sort of message in a

bottle to future generations. It has become possible to make the argument I am making here that

the conditions and technology he believed to be inevitable have, in fact, come to exist. In the restof this section I will focus on the Deweyan foundation for democratic ideas, and the importanceof an emerging public as an agent of change. In the sections of Part I that follow I will sketch out

the context of the current era as opposed to the time in which Dewey was writing. With the so-

called communications revolution I will argue that we are witnessing the emergence of aDeweyan public and would, therefore, be well served to consider Deweyan notions on how to

organise the public.

To understand, however vaguely, the Deweyan basis for democratic ideas it is helpful to focus

on his account of how a "state" comes into existence. Very briefly, a public emerges when the

consequences of conjoint behaviour come to affect a large enough body of people. This results in

the emergence of representative officers who manage the business of the public. The public andthe resulting government are, together, a state. As he writes, "A public articulated and operating

through representative officers is the state; there is no state without a government, but also thereis none without the public" (67). The representative officers are self-interested individuals. Theresulting political machinery is, therefore, only as representative of the initial public as is

contingently convenient for the representative officers with control over the political machinery.

Thus, if representative officers can get away with despotic or oligarchic rule, they will. However,as the locus of power that brings the state into existence is the public, changing circumstances

can always bring another public or another aspect of the public into existence. This can force

changes in the status of representative officers and in the political machinery of the state.

Primarily, Dewey points to technological changes that have a large impact on conjointbehaviour, or the manner in which people interact. Such changes can result in the emergence of a

new public able to affect the selection of representative officers and cause the re-organisation of

the political machinery of the state. For example, he writes, "The transition from family and

dynastic government supported by the loyalties of tradition to popular government was theoutcome primarily of technological discoveries and inventions working a change in the customs

by which men had been bound together" (Dewey 1927: 144).

Underlying the Deweyan view of the state is a proposition that there exists a historical current by

which a public, as increasingly it is aware of itself, demands a greater voice in the selection ofrepresentative officers and in the design of the political machinery of the state. Thus, on Deweys

account, the historical current necessarily leads to the increasing perfection of democratic ideas.

In subsequent literature both Deweys account of the formation of the state and Deweys

democratic metaphysics in general have been the subject of much controversy. For example, ithas been asked, is it not an untenable generalisation to contend that the legitimacy of all "states",

including non-democratic "states", emanate from the public? Furthermore, is not the contention

that there exists a world historical current leading to the greater assertion of the voice of the

public in the selection of its representative officers and the design of political machinery, in otherwords, towards ever-greater democratisation, also highly disputable. Fortunately, for the

purposes of the current dissertation, Deweys account of the formation of the state and Deweyan


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democratic metaphysics, although informative, are not vital. At this point, in other words, the

prospects for the continuing endurance of democratic norms do not have to hinge on the

hypothesis that the "current of history" favours the formation of democratic political machinery.Rather, it hinges on whether people living in a self-proclaimed democratic political unit are

prepared to accept the exchange of a democratic political unit, however feeble, for a non-

democratic political unit, however clever the disguise. I will address this issue at a later point.

According to Dewey the continuing importance of democratic ideas in the early twentieth

century can be measured by the fact that every American political theory, every Americanpolitician, and every American journalist, including Lippmann, must seem to be making an

appeal to the people. Democratic ideas such as popular sovereignty are still meaningful to the

citizenry, even though the public has been eclipsed by self-interested individuals who control the

machinery through which the public is supposed to express its voice. Where Lippmann rejectsany need for democratic ideas in his effort to perfect the political process, Dewey emphasises the

importance of the historical interaction between democratic ideas and the development of

concrete democratic political machinery. In explaining how the implementation of democratic

ideas became so far removed from democratic political machinery in the United States in theearly twentieth century, Dewey demonstrates how a proclaimed devotion to the democratic ideal

of popular sovereignty is separate from the happenstance of the manner in which democraticideas are incorporated in the political machinery of any particular age. New technologies such asthe printing press transformed the manner in which individuals interacted and preceded the rise

of western democracies including the United States. Eventually, a new public, composed mainly

of the increasingly influential business classes, emerged to demand a voice in their affairs. Thispublic challenged the authority of the aristocratic elites in possession of control over the political

machinery. Among other things, it established the doctrine of popular sovereignty at the level of

the nation-state. According to Dewey the new public, the agent of change, reacted to the

organisational structures of entrenched elites such as the monarchy, the aristocracy and thechurch, by rejecting the virtues of association altogether. The intellectual elites affiliated with

this public instead put forward the notion that isolated man is man in his natural state and, in the

name of liberty, must be protected to pursue his private interests. Intellectual constructs, such as

both theories of natural rights and the doctrine of laissez-faire economics, marked this reactionagainst association and in favour of the individual. As we shall see in a later section, the

prevalence of such philosophies has an important social-psychological basis in the eminence of

the printing press. For now, the point is that the conflict between individual and society that hascontinually marked the development of actual democratic systems of government is largely a by-

product of the specific interests of a long deceased public. In order for the growing business elite

to advance its interests it made sense to over-emphasise the existence of a dualism between the

ability of the individual to go about his business and the restrictive posturing of the establishedhierarchical structures. On Deweys analysis the dualism reflected the contingent interests of a

specific group and is an inaccurate assessment of the nature of interconnectedness between the

individual and the variety of associations of which the individual is a part. Nonetheless, thedualism continues to be embedded in institutional structures, most notably in systems of public

opinion formation. Thus, the structures that exist continue to meet the self-interested needs of a

once emergent public that has, over time, become an economic and political elite with ever-greater control over the political machinery.


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Dewey portrays the individual as the result of the continuing effect of conjoint behaviour on a

biological organism. The individual so conceived and the varieties of associations of which the

individual is a part interconnect subtly and powerfully in innumerable ways. This reality rendersthe hypothesised dualism between individual and society meaningless. A body of ideas built

upon the hypothesised dualism is a mistaken foundation for a political process. This is especially

true for a democratic political process in which the nature of the inter-connectedness between theindividual and associations is of the utmost importance. The inaccurate contingencies embeddedin the previous development of democratic political machinery must, therefore, be overcome to

imagine the on-going development of democracy so that democratic ideas are more closely

realised. Dewey, on this basis, turns a critical eye on the notion that the solution to democracy isever more democracy if "more democracy" means nothing but the extension of the already

existing democratic political machinery. Rather, the notion that the solution to democracy is

more democracy must coincide with a re-examination of democratic ideas as well as an

investigation of the conditions for a public to emerge. The result of this re-examination may bean adjustment in the conduct of representative officers and the design of new political

machinery. As Dewey writes, "The old saying that the cure for the ills of democracy is more

democracy...may also indicate the need of returning to the idea itself, of clarifying and deepeningour apprehension of it, and of employing our sense of its meaning to criticise and re-make its

political manifestations" (144).

4.0 The intervening years

I will now present a thumb-nail sketch of significant trends from the 1930s to the 1960s and the1960s to the 1980s. These periods fall between the time in which Dewey set out his case against

Lippmann and the present, during which time it will be helpful to re-examine Deweys thought.

Between the 1930s and 1960s the case presented by Lippmann was very influential withresearchers in the social and political sciences, as well as professionals in other relevant fields

such as media and public policy. Detailed empirical analysis within tightly delineated

disciplinary practices, however, replaced the emphasis on a broad philosophical account of the

relations between systems of public opinion formation and democratic theory.

In one sphere of academia, a group of democratic realist political scientists further developed acontemporary interpretation of the so-called democratic practice. For the most part this work did

not address the systems of public opinion formation that were then controlled primarily by

institutional structures of mass media. The Austrian born political economist Joseph Schumpeter,

for example, continued to demonstrate the inevitability of political power being accumulated bysmall elites (Schumpeter 1976). Another democratic realist, Robert Dahl, led the effort to

construct a viable political system in which a raw competition for power among interest groups -

what Madison called factions - in possession of the most resources replaced the Madisonian

effort to ensure the election of the virtuous legislator. These groups could then leverage the mostsupport in their bid to control the elements of the decision-making process key to their interests.

Such a system has become known as interest group politics or pluralist democracy (Dahl 1956).

Dahl, who has subsequently referred to it as polyarchy II, says the system manages to "graft theexpertness of guardians to the popular sovereignty of the demos". To a degree such a system,

thus, finds some level of accommodation between the realities of elite domination in the

technologically advanced nation-state and an interpretation of popular sovereignty (Dahl 1989).


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At the same time, the aggressively empirical discipline of communications research was

developed. The study of the effects of the mass media on the American consumer was, perhaps, a

consequence of the establishment of firmly embedded institutional structures of mass media. Thealliance of advertising and commercial concerns in the formation of content and aggressive

control over the production and distribution of media conduits into the home characterised these

structures (Czitrom 1982). As the launching of the scholarly journalPublic Opinion Quarterly in1937 indicates, the work of Walter Lippmann was influential. One of the leaders in the earlyyears of the field, the Viennese social scientist Paul Lazarsfeld, head of the Princeton Office of

Radio Research and later director of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia

University, was explicit about the importance of the powerful new institutions in the formationof public opinion. He wrote, "Broadcasting in America is done to sell merchandise, and most of

the other possible effects of radio become submerged in a strange kind of social mechanism

which brings the commercial effect to its strongest expression" (Lazarsfeld 1940: 332). In the

new discipline the historical and institutional contexts out of which the institutions of massmedia emerged were ignored in favour of studies investigating precise social-psychological

effects. As a result of this narrow emphasis, an understanding of how individuals perceive media

as well as valuable new tools by which both political and media elites might manage publicopinion - tools such as polling methods, survey research, focus group research, marketing

strategies, etc. - were developed (Marsh 1982). Perhaps more than others in the field, Lazarsfeld

was aware of the disassociation between the social-psychological investigation into the group

dynamics of public opinion in a mass society, on the one hand, and the importance of the conceptof public opinion in traditional political theoretical literature, on the other. In a 1955 study

written with Elihu Katz, the authors urged the research community to consider increasingly the

human element in their formalistic equations. They wrote, "The traditional image of the masspersuasion process must make room for people as intervening factors between the stimuli of the

media and the resultant opinion, decisions and actions" (Lazarsfeld and Katz 1955: 32). The call

to consider more seriously the "human factor" may have been a consequence of a belief in the

desirability of a "classical-empirical synthesis". However, Lazarsfeld did nothing more than statethe desirability of such a synthesis. Perhaps this was due to the pervasive influence of media

industry leaders in the development of the field (Habermas 1989). Until the 1960s there was very

little critical analysis of contemporary systems of public opinion formation, especially in thecontext of democratic traditions.

In the 1960s an increasingly vocal culture of criticism emerged in academic circles. This culturewould become influential and active up to the present by creating and further developing areas

such as critical theory, literary criticism, cultural studies, media studies, feminist studies, post-

structuralism and post-modernism. This new spirit of critical inquiry drew heavily on the

previously marginalised critics of mass society such as the members of the Frankfurt School andC. Wright Mills, as well as mid-century European intellectual currents such as structuralism and

existentialism. In the United States this spirit fuelled the social upheaval and student unrest that

characterised the 1960s. It is wildly beyond the scope of this dissertation to make sense of thevarious currents during the period. One point of importance, however, is that the democratic

theory of John Dewey was pivotal in the development of the democratic theory of German

philosopher Jurgen Habermas, the primary protg of Adorno and Horkheimer, and othermembers of the Frankfurt School (Habermas 1971). In turn Habermas has had an influence on

American academics in a wide variety of disciplines, including each of the fields identified


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above. This is one interesting way in which Deweyan democratic theory has influenced

American intellectual life without the connection being explicitly realised.

Since the early 1970s there has been an increasing amount of commentary about Dewey and

Deweyan concerns. For example, the growing body of literature on participatory democracy

reflects a desire for a spirit of critical inquiry in societal institutions that sounds very Deweyan.One factor driving this movement is a worry that widespread cynicism among the mass public

towards politics could lead to breakdown in the democratic process. Although most of this

literature does not examine directly the relationship between systems of public opinionformation, the institutional structures of mass media and democratic theory, the influence of

Dewey as well as Habermas on, for example, Etzioni, Boyte, Pateman, Miller, Cohen, Guttman,

Fishkin, Sunstein, Sandel, et al. is clear. More directly a number of thinkers have consistently

been aiding a Deweyan revival. Richard Rorty in the 1970s and 1980s, Robert Westbrook (1992)and Alan Ryan (1995) have offered the most important general approaches to Deweyan ideas.

The accounts of Westbrook and Ryan, especially, have perpetuated an ongoing inquiry into what

Deweyan institutional structures might look like. For instance, Ryan writes of a Deweyan creed:

Only when people can communicate on free and equal terms can they achieve the deep self-

understanding that we have hankered after since the Enlightenment. If freedom and equality areabsent what can be said and thus what can be thought will be limited. How this translates into a

concern for democracy in the usual institutional sense complete with voters and ballot boxes and

average venal politicians may be hard to say. (Ryan 1995: 357)

Additionally, a number of thinkers concerned with the media have focused on the Dewey and

Lippmann exchanges. John Carey has argued that the discipline of cultural studies ought to make

a claim to fill the role of the Deweyan public (Carey 1989). Christopher Lasch invoked theDewey-Lippmann debates when he expressed a concern about the lack of public discourse in a

society increasingly driven by technological change (Lasch 1995). Others such as Jay Rosen andJames Fallows have used Dewey/Lippmann as an intellectual foundation for a movement toreform the profession of journalism from within. This movement is variously called civic - or

public - journalism (Fallows 1996, Rosen 1992).

5.0 Democracy and new communications technology

The best way to build the context for a re-examination of Deweys suggestions on a democratic

system of public opinion formation is to investigate the development of the literature that began

in the 1980s combining democratic theory and studies of new communications technologies. As

a reasonably close investigation of recent thinking on technology and democracy willdemonstrate, the tensions that emerge increasingly reflect issues brought to light by the

Lippmann-Dewey interaction. This will provide insight into the political and technological status

of electronic democracy as it has developed from a fringe topic in the mid-1980s to an issue with

important global repercussions in the mid-1990s. In addition, the investigation will serve as abrief literature review for the current dissertation.

5.1 Russell Neuman updates Lippmann


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In 1986, Russell Neuman wrote The Paradox of Mass Politics, thus up-dating Lippmann as well

as mid-century democratic realists such as Schumpeter and Dahl. Working in communications

research, Neuman suggests that a general re-examination of the function of mass media in thepolitical process is needed. Given the culture of criticism prevalent in many disciplines

including, increasingly, communications research, Neuman can be interpreted as responding to a

general climate supportive of ideas threatening a long line of American scholarship and practice.

According to Neuman there exists an enduring expectation that the citizen of a democratic

society be adequately informed. The reality demonstrated by powerful social scientificinvestigation is that the citizenry is not, on the whole, so informed. In The Paradox of Mass

Politics Neuman writes, "The paradox of mass politics is the gap between the expectations of an

informed citizenry put forward by democratic theory and the discomforting reality revealed by

systematic survey interviewing" (Neuman 1986: 3). According to Neuman the paradox is,however, not problematic in practice because the system works remarkably well although the

mass public is for the most part uninterested and unsophisticated. Thus, the paradox of mass

politics does not present a problem that must be remedied but is, rather, a characteristic of a

political system that works remarkably well. There is an implicit assumption beneath the paradoxof mass politics that if one can demonstrate that an informed citizenry does not exist, there is no

need to consider democratic ideas more fundamental than the expectation for an informedcitizenry. In adhering to the carefully constructed framework of pluralist democracy Neuman isthus able to carry forward a discussion of the modern American political process without a

positive reckoning with democratic ideas such as popular sovereignty. Given the heritage of the

Lippmann analysis combined with hard data about the mass public, Neuman seems to havedecided that he does not have to confront directly the claims of the Jeffersonian tradition.

Nonetheless, that tradition continues to resonate within the political culture from the time of the

founders through Lippmanns 1920s to Neuman in 1986. Neuman admits, "It is the persistent

character of the American political culture to assume that when a crisis arises, the citizenry willmobilise and respond." Even so, Neuman concludes, "This is a political culture of naivet" (188).

Such a characteristic is clearly not an aspect of the political culture he feels he must take

seriously in his analysis of political reality.

Neuman simply reaffirms Lippmanns effort to reconceptualise how the political process might

work well despite the existence of an ill-informed citizenry. It is not, therefore, necessary forNeuman to explain the rejection of democratic ideas. As a result Neuman does not express an

interest in the reasons why Lippmann re-conceptualised the function of a system of public

opinion formation in the American political process. Rather, the fact is that the institutionalstructures of the mass media have come to dominate the American landscape. As Neuman writes,

"Common to both the boosters and the critics of the mass media...is a shared sense of the media

as the central political educator." Furthermore, because the mass media function in a manner

strikingly similarto the Lippmann analysis, Neumans task is simply to further the notion thatthese immense structures are not likely to change. Neuman writes, "Theoretically, the media

could do more to inform and educate the public. But in fact they cannot do much more" (134).

Specifically, Neuman demonstrates the importance of the function of the mass media, while

defusing criticism by using the paradox of mass politics to argue that there is no other way for apolitical system to be structured in a complex nation-state.


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Of the centrality of the mass media Neuman quotes Lippmann, "In the industrialised nations of

the twentieth century the democratic polity cannot function as such without the institutional

structure of independent mass media" (133). Neuman admits the accuracy of the observation thatthere is a wide variety of opinion within the citizen-body. However, as the "social psychological

insight about human sensitivity to the social environment" would have it, individuals tend to

develop a sense of the predominant shape and direction of public opinion. Without statingwhether individuals are genetically constructed to adopt the predominant shape and direction ofpublic opinion as their own, or whether this results from a process of socialisation, Neuman

concludes, "Thus, the content of the mass media is relatively homogeneous, as is the pattern of

political concerns of the mass electorate" (152). Clearly, then, the mass media plays the pivotalrole of aiding in the construction of a homogeneous body of public opinion in a vast nation-state.

The political elites who best articulate the particular symbols that epitomise the flow of public

opinion at any given time can then effectively guide the country.

At the same time, Neuman writes, "The media are seen as potentially powerful forces and the

audiences seen as relatively defenceless. The power of the media, however, has been

exaggerated" (156). There is here an apparent contradiction with his conclusion that the role ofthe mass media is central to the American political process. This latter position is, however,

understandable when one realises that Neuman is using the paradox of mass politics as a tool toargue for the necessity of the institutional system of mass media to ensure that the system, andthe larger political process of which it is part, continues unchanged. In a democratic society on

the scale of the nation-state, the institutionalised structures of the mass media, in part, constitute

a bridge necessary to take account of the paradox of mass politics and yet enable the politicalsystem to work reasonably well. It is not a matter of the mass media being powerful as much as it

is a matter of the mass audience being inadequately informed and in need of guidance. As

Neuman concludes, "the critical factor appears to be the cognitive style of the electorate" (27).

Because of the cognitive style of the electorate the mass media are necessary in a complexnation-state.

5.2 Benjamin Barber returns to Dewey

Set against the neo-Lippmannesque manoeuvring of Neuman, Benjamin Barber was, in his 1984Strong Democracy, among the first theorists to link participation and new communications

technology. In so doing he explicitly acknowledges his debt to Dewey and Habermas. Barber

presents his conception of strong democracy as a replacement for the liberal democratic tradition,

which he calls thin democracy. In opposition to Neuman, among others, he accuses politicalscientists of contributing to a widespread political malaise who put forward a passive citizenry as

necessary for the health of the political process. The result of this malaise could be either the

emergence of an anarchistic or authoritarian political system. Barber sets forth an ambitious

agenda of reforms that would institutionalise strong democratic practices, allowing people to"govern themselves in at least some public matters at least some of the time" (Barber 1984). One

proposal is for a nation-wide civic video-text system through which citizens could use new

communications technology to engage in local, regional and national political meetings. In thisway Barber draws together a conception of the New England town meeting and the power of a

new generation of electronic technology such as cable, satellites and a relatively primitive notion

of two-way television. The over-arching idea is that new institutions can come into existence to


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make the Jeffersonian vision a reality. On Barbers analysis it is essential to construct these

participatory institutions that will either greatly enhance or, perhaps, replace the representative

system altogether.

Barber acknowledges the concern of the authors of the Federal Constitution that direct

democracy in a nation-state, eschewing the representative system, relies on a naive faith in aunitary common will - what Lippmann called the Oversoul. In response to this concern Barber

differentiates unitary democracy from strong democratic practices. On the other hand, unitary

democracy lends itself to demagogic manipulation and an authoritarian solution, in seeking toreveal a mystical communal will. Strong democracy, on the other hand, relies on extensive

"political talk" among the citizenry and an institutionalised ethic of reasonableness. Furthermore,

Barber suggests the need for an institutionalised ethic of regret so the citizenry will be prudent in

their deliberations on what has and what has not worked in the past, and cautious in theadvancement from thin to strong democracy. Although it is outside the scope of the current

dissertation, it is questionable whether Barber creates enough distance between his strong

democracy and unitary democracy to quell the legitimate concerns of those protective of

institutions that ensure accountability. It can be argued that he does not offer a convincingaccount of how his strong democracy would act as a buttress against parochialism or the ability

of a demagogue to exploit the public. Even so, in his emphasis on the revitalisation of democraticideas and his suggestion about the possibility of institutionalised "political talk", Barber bothclears the way for and presages the construction of democratised systems of public opinion

formation.

In 1984, however, Barber's ambitious theoretical labour is a long way from being realisable.

Questions abound. What agency will muster the power to construct his many ambitious

institutional structures, including the civic video-text system? How will ethics of reasonablenessand regret realistically operate in the new institutional structures? More to the point, how will his

society accommodate the paradox of mass politics, the notion that many citizens are not

informed or interested in being informed, although they very well may become interested in

participating? Barber writes, "At the moment when masses start deliberating, acting, sharing,and contributing, they ceases to be masses and become citizens" (Barber 1984: 155). The

juxtaposition of the mass society and citizenship is central, as we shall see in later sections. But

how will this transformation of the "masses" into "citizens" take place, specifically consideringthe already existing institutional structures of mass media and the role these play in the

construction of public opinion? Barber does not answer these questions and, therefore, neither

directly confronts nor overcomes the paradox of mass politics or the reality of the politicaleconomy of the mass media, as presented by Lippmann and updated by Neuman.

5.3 Abramson, Arterton and Oren survey the field

In The Electronic Commonwealth and Teledemocracy: Can Technology Save Democracy?,

Abramson, Arterton and Oren research a large number of projects using new communications

technology for democratic purposes. Considering that most of these experiments used either two-way video technology or the primitive (relatively speaking) computer-mediated communications

technology that existed before the recent generation, it is no wonder the vast majority of these

projects were seen as fringe experiments. The overall study, however, is a useful illumination of


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the electronic landscape with many of the observations holding up through time. Most

fundamentally, the authors conclude there is a distinctive conception of democratic theory

underlying the institutional structures of each experiment. They observe two broad trends in thevarious institutional structures. These trends successfully pull into the digital age the contrasting

body of ideas set out by Lippmann and Dewey.

The authors refer to the more prevalent of the two trends as "the quickening of democracy". This

is democracy by plebiscite, through hyper-sophisticated political polling, instantaneous

assessment of public opinion and electronic voting. Projects such as Hawaii Televote, HonoluluElectronic Town Meeting, and the QUBE system in Arlington, Ohio sponsored by Time-Warner

all reflect an effort to achieve a common will, or perhaps a sophisticated public opinion

construction. This trend towards direct democracy in which individuals vote either their assent or

dissent on issues using a TV remote control-style key-pad is extremely problematic. Accordingto the authors the process is subject to an immense amount of elite manipulation and presents the

opportunity for the emergence of a demagogue.

The quickening of democracy is the result of the continuing influence of the mass media cultureon democratic decision-making. Even while the environment continues to change as a result of

new communications technologies, the authors fear the mass media culture will continue todominate systems of public opinion formation and preclude the possibility for a democratic

revival. They cite four distressing developments. First, they fear the rules against cross-

ownership may be relaxed so that individual firms will be able to own multiple media franchises

in a single community. This will limit the diversity of opinion and opportunity for access tomedia essential to democratic decision-making. Second, they express concern over concentration

in ownership, citing the cable industry in which Telecommunication Inc. and Time-Warner are

the biggest operators, as a case in point. Third, the advertising driven mass media work againstnecessary democratic norms in biasing the delivery of "soft" entertainment and information to

the isolated consumer. This problem worsened during the 1980s when pressure in the media

business increased as a result of competition from new media organisations. At the time the

owners of the three traditional broadcasting corporations in the US concluded they must view thenews division, once a public-service money loser, as a marketable commodity like every other

division. Finally, the need for good visuals in TV news and the ability of elected officials to

manipulate this need by staging media events and gaining additional exposure, have caused themedia and government officials, "once supposed adversaries", to become increasingly "secret

sharers". Referring to advertising experiments in new media, but generalisable across the range

of issues, the authors offer the following gloomy conclusion, "Any potential the new mediamight otherwise have had to support a more civic culture is fast retreating" (Abramson et al.

1988: 290).

The other trend presented by the authors emphasises "the slowing down of democracy" throughthe encouragement of an ongoing process of assembly and democratic conversation. They

viewed Berks Community TV, Alaska LTN, North Carolina OPEN/net, as well as any number of

small-scale computer conferencing systems, as representing a conception of democratic practicein which various individuals and groups engage in political dialogue. This dialogue helps those

involved pin-point "emerging demands" and "aggrieved parties" to adjust public policy

accordingly (Arterton 1987: 66). The authors support the introduction of this extensive political


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dialogue within the traditional pluralist framework. Unlike Barber they are unwilling to consider

either the gradual phasing out or the abandonment of the representative system. They are

cognisant of the problems of what they call a purely communitarian democratic theory in whichcitizens engage in "self-government" at the local level. They are suspicious of this

communitarian democratic practice, of whom they incorrectly refer to John Dewey as a patron

saint. They believe it can lead to a community dangerously closed to the standards of largerpolitical units, thus contravening the positive effects of the Madisonian extended republic. Intheir conception of "pluralism with a communitarian face" they endorse both the need for a

national system of media as well as extensive political dialogue at the local and regional level.

One instructive example of the pragmatic notion that power determines the ability to impose the

definitive interpretation of events is the case of Berks Community TV. The authors regard this

project as the greatest success among the experiments they investigated. In my opinion, it mostclosely presages a democratic system of public opinion formation. Berks Community TV in

Reading, Pennsylvania undertook a project initially funded in part by the National Science

Foundation (NSF) to engage senior citizens in community affairs. Organisers did this by creating

interactive, participatory programming in which the seniors could engage community leaders indialogue. The programming was so successful it developed into a slate of community

government programmes aimed at a general audience. In one of the programmes, Inside CityHall, City Council members engaged in dialogue with the audience about a variety of topics.Karen Miller, who had only recently moved to Reading and was the first woman on City

Council, benefited so much from the exposure that she ran a successful campaign to become

Mayor of Reading in 1979.

Given Lippmannesque and Deweyan potentialities it is instructive to observe the difference in

the authors and Neumans interpretation of the project. The authors suggest as plausible thatBCTV and Inside City Hall had a "revolutionary" impact on Reading politics; that open

deliberation of issues in the context of the participation of elected officials led to a democratic

revival in local politics (Abramson et al. 1988). Neuman, on the other hand, explained the

success of the Reading experiment as a function of BCTV becoming a convenient tool for KarenMillers rise to power. The success of BCTV, in other words, was contingent on how useful it

turned out to be for the political elite (Neuman 1991).

5.4 Robert Dahl -- from democratic realism to Deweyan idealism

While the struggle to interpret the significance of passing events is crucial, perhaps most will

hinge on the struggle to impose the accepted interpretation of the larger geopolitical context. On

the one hand, in his 1991 book, The Future of the Mass Audience, which summarises the results

of a 5 year study of the impact of new technologies on mass media conducted in co-operationwith the senior corporate planners at ABC, CBS, NBC, Time-Warner, the New York Times and

the Washington Post, Neuman offers an analysis of political change related solely to the regular

phenomenon of political party realignment. He suggests that current political turmoil is a result

of perhaps the largest such realignment since the beginning of American party politics. He offersno context for change greater than can be explained by the party system, which is one of the bed-

rock institutions of a modern pluralism that emphasises "interest-group politics". It is

conceivable that those wielding power could force the imposition of such a narrow interpretation


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of historical change. The result would most probably be the quickening of democracy, which

would protect the interests of entrenched elites and preclude the possibility of a democratic

revival (Neuman 1991).

On the other hand, the interpretation of Robert Dahl, the eminent theorist of twentieth century

interest group politics, is much more incisive and disturbing. Dahl argues that "the proliferationof transnational activities and decisions reduces the capacity of the citizen of a country to

exercise control over matters vitally important to them by means of their national government"

(Dahl 1989: 319). It is, indeed, increasingly clear that economic and political organisations are,with the aid of global computer networks, conducting business without regard to the boundaries

of the nation-state. Furthermore, Dahl suggests that the ability to argue for any given boundary in

which the judgement of a particular demos ought to hold - either a city or a nation or the entire

world - is beyond democratic theory. There is in other words no theoretic reason for the demos ofa nation-state to be the primary political unit. Such things are, rather, a matter of historical

contingency. The result of these two factors is a prediction that the change in the scale of

political decision-making will trigger changes in the political process. These changes will be as

important as the change in decision-making at the level of the city-state to the level of the nation-state. Dahls primary concern is to ensure that democracy survives the changes. He is not,

however, certain democracy will survive.

There is here an immediate and crucial conflict between Neuman and Dahl. On the one hand

Neuman, the modern heir to Lippmann, asserts that an ill-informed electorate and the power of

the institutionalised system of mass media will continue to anchor a pluralist democratic systemin which competing elites achieve power through competition in a marketplace of ideas. This

will be a new pluralist democratic system, with more information, slightly more diversity of

opinion and slightly more participation (Neuman 1991). On the other hand, Dahl, one of thechief architects of pluralist democratic theory during the middle decades of the century, asserts

that there is a major difference between then and now. Dahl contends that he participated in the

necessary work of adapting a democratic system of governance to the needs of a vast, complex

nation-state by "grafting the expertness of guardians to the popular sovereignty of the demos".Now individuals are engaged in the work of "grafting the symbols of democracy to the de facto

guardianship of policy elites" (Dahl 1989: 337).

This conflict between Neuman and Dahl hinges on the perception of whether or not some belief

and devotion to democratic ideas is necessary for the survival of the democratic process. As we

have seen, Neuman carefully separates any reference to democratic ideas from a pluralistpolitical process that, supposedly, works either despite or because the mass electorate is woefully

ill-informed. Dahl, on the other hand, argues that even the highest office-holders in pluralist

democracy throughout the mid-twentieth century were forced to compete for the support of the

popular vote, although gross inequalities in opportunity to participate existed. This meant thatpower was to an extent derived from a conception of the "demos". Popular sovereignty was,

therefore, approximated crudely at the level of the complex nation-state. Dahl argues that the

institutional structures of what he calls polyarchy II - including universal suffrage, regularelections, a free press, the right to form parties - were and continue to be necessary to ensure a

process of decision-making in a large political unit that is accountable, to as large a degree as

possible, to the concerns of citizens. However, because of the increasing complexity that will


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result from the changes he identifies, Dahl does not believe the traditional institutions of

polyarchy II root any longer the process of decision-making in any conception of the demos. He

argues, therefore, that modern societies need to make a concerted effort to form new institutionalstructures that allow for the realisation to some extent, however imperfect, of democratic ideas.

There must, in other words, be a movement beyond polyarchy II to an as yet unrealised

polyarchy III. The new structures need to offer the citizen the opportunity to practise suchdemocratic rights as free speech, free press, free assembly and the right to form political parties.Furthermore, the new structures, rooted in a belief and devotion to the democratic ideas of

popular sovereignty, need to allow for a healthy democratic process at local, regional, national

and international levels.

Dahl confronts directly what he calls "theories of minority domination" that argue that a small

elite will always possess a radically unequal amount of power and that the mass of the populationwill always be subject to the control of the small elite. He concludes that there is no way

definitively to prove

american democracy and computer-mediated communication: a case study in minnesota

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