Amending the Party-List Law

Points for Consideration

Agustin Martin G. Rodriguez

Empowering Civic Participation in Governance

PL as Electoral and Political Reform Political because it establishes a politics

of programs that allows the marginalized direct representation in Congress

Electoral because it introduces a system of proportional representation that is supposed to encourage the electorate to vote for parties

Its Objectives

To establish a system of proportional representation that allows marginalized groups direct and genuine representation

To encourage the electorate to vote for parties based on programs and encourage the formation of parties based on platforms and programs

Dismal Implementation

In 1998, only 33.5% voted for the PL with only 14 seats filled

In 2001, only about 40% voted for the PL with only about 5 to 7 seats filled

Thus party-list groups have only token representation in Congress

The Heart of the Problem

The lack of a clear allocation formula No clarity whether the party-list system

is a sectoral or proportional system Or if a hybrid, what this hybrid aims at

No clarity regarding who should be accredited Led to fiasco of 160 accredited groups

Cap of 3 seats encourages party splits Lack of an effective education campaign The 2% threshold seems is far too high

for many marginalized groups to hurdle Almost ensures that the most marginalized

and unorganized groups will not win representation

This leaves most the party-list to be the domain of well-organized development NGO coalitions and ideological groups

Dismal Results for 2001

As it has evolved, the party-list system has become the domain of the organized civil society groups Groups with the least resources and

capacities to conduct a national campaign A situation exacerbated by the lack of unity

among the groups

One can view the domination of civil society groups as a positive development for genuine representation of the marginalized In fact, in the 11th Congress, they were able

to bring to legislative discourse the issues of their constituents

This backed by consultation and research

However, party-list groups seem unable to translate their good work into votes

In fact, the results of 2001 seems to indicate the collapse of many of the more representative and effective of these party-list groups

Results for the Incumbent PartiesP AR TY 1 9 9 8

E LE C TIO N R E SU LTS

% O F P L V O TE S

P LAC E 2 0 0 1 E LE C TIO N R E SU LTS

P LAC E % O F P L V O TE S

IN C R E ASE IN V O TE S

AP E C 5 0 3 ,4 8 7 5 .5 1 8 0 1 ,5 8 7 3 5 .3 7 2 9 8 ,1 0 0

V F P 3 0 4 ,9 0 2 3 .3 3 4 5 7 6 ,2 0 6 4 3 .8 6 2 7 1 ,3 0 4

P R O M D I 2 5 5 ,1 8 4 2 .7 9 5 4 2 2 ,2 4 1 5 2 .8 3 1 6 7 ,0 5 7

AK B AY AN 2 3 2 ,3 7 6 2 .5 4 9 3 7 3 ,5 9 5 7 2 .5 0 1 4 1 ,2 1 9

B U TIL 2 1 5 ,6 4 3 2 .3 6 1 0 3 2 9 ,9 2 0 8 2 .2 1 1 1 4 ,2 7 7

AB A 3 2 1 ,6 4 6 3 .5 1 2 2 4 1 ,7 7 9 1 4 1 .6 2 -7 9 ,8 4 7

C O C O F E D 1 8 6 ,3 8 8 2 .0 4 1 3 2 2 8 ,8 4 8 1 5 1 .5 3 4 2 ,4 6 0

C O O P -N ATC C O

1 8 9 ,8 0 2 2 .0 7 1 2 2 2 6 ,1 6 8 1 6 1 .5 1 -3 6 ,3 6 6

SAN LAK AS 1 9 4 ,6 1 7 2 .1 3 1 1 1 4 9 ,2 7 8 2 3 0 .9 9 -4 5 ,3 3 9

AB AN SE P IN AY

2 3 5 ,5 4 8 2 .5 7 8 1 3 2 ,3 3 1 2 5 0 .8 9 -1 0 3 ,2 1 7

AK O 2 3 9 ,0 4 8 2 .6 1 6 1 2 5 ,0 2 5 2 7 0 .8 4 -1 1 4 ,0 2 3

ALAG AD 3 1 2 ,5 0 0 3 .4 1 3 1 1 7 ,0 1 9 2 9 0 .7 8 -1 9 5 ,4 8 1

SC F O 2 3 8 ,3 0 3 2 .6 7 3 7 ,4 1 2 7 6 0 .2 5 -2 0 0 ,8 9 1

Notable Points

MAD and Bayan Muna had phenomenal outcome with 20% of the vote between them

APEC which came closest only got 5.37%

Only 5 of the 10 qualifiers are incumbents

Most of the incumbents that are composed of civil society groups were edged out of the qualifying 10

Only Lakas and NPC qualified of the established parties

The anti-drug and anti-corruption issues seemed to get votes for MAD and CIBAC

Despite the optimism of the incumbents they failed to win enough votes to qualify

Many fell bellow the top 20 spot This is because:

They failed to awaken the votes of their constituencies

They even failed to gain significant votes, many even losing votes in the tens or hundreds of thousands

Some parties seemed to have collapsed

Many of these problems seem to indicate the need for civil society groups to act with greater consolidation

It may also indicate the need for civil society groups to critically engage political parties

These issues may not be addressed by legislation alone, however there are some amendments that are essential

The Proposed Amendments

Installing an allocation formulaNumber of seats x total votes of groups

Total Votes of Qualifying Groups This ensures proportional representation

because– It takes into account the number of seats to de

distributed– And ensures a proportional distribution of seats

Raising the 3 seat cap to between 5 and 10

Retaining the 2% quota to ensure a substantial constituency However, one proposal is to use the 2%

quota from the previous election to allow smaller groups to prepare and plan more effectively

Others propose that the quota be abolished since the results of the elections will yield an natural threshold

Implementing an education campaign in consultation with civil society groups

Fixing the criteria for accreditation and fixing the accreditation process to ensure that only the representatives of the marginalized are accredited

The Issue of Sectoral Representation Some sectoral blocks will argue that the

spirit of the party-list representation is not fulfilled by the current system because the marginalized sectors will never be able to win representation

Thus they propose that some seats be reserved for the marginalized sectors

12 or 14 seats will be reserved for the basic sectors, the rest of the seats will be left open to proportional representation One seat for each sector will be reserved And the group that garners the highest

vote in their sector will occupy the sectoral seat

However a threshold will still be installed

But groups will have to indicate under which system they will run

Two schemes of voting are proposed: One vote per voter Two votes per voter:

One for the proportional system One for the sectoral seat

– (Although Rep. Marcos proposes 13 votes per voter)

Advantage of this proposal Sectors are assured representation

Disadvantage Will not encourage consolidation and will

not encourage engagement of political parties

However, the reality of Philippine politics does not allow the margins to have direct representation any other way

Points for Discussion

Should the party-list system be primarily a purely proportional or sectoral system or representation? Or a clear mix? Which system should be adapted?

Should the 2% threshold be retained as such?

How do we ensure representation for the marginalized and underrepresented? What are the criteria for accreditation?

Will the proposed ban on the top 5 political parties be fruitful?

How many seats should the cap be?