Altruism in the Financial Sector

Name: Hiwot Alemayehu

Candidate Number: T06558

Supervisor: Prof. Alex Preda

Word count: 11,671

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Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 4

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 5

2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................................ 8

2.1 Evolutionary biology ..................................................................................................................... 9

2.2 Social psychology ........................................................................................................................ 10

2.3 Cultural differences ..................................................................................................................... 13

2.4 Gender differences ..................................................................................................................... 14

2.5 Corporate Altruism ..................................................................................................................... 15

2.6 Motivations ................................................................................................................................. 17

2.7 Summary & Research problem ................................................................................................... 21

3. Hypotheses........................................................................................................................................ 22

4. Research methodology, method & data ........................................................................................... 24

4.1 Sample ......................................................................................................................................... 25

4.2 Experimental procedure ............................................................................................................. 26

4.3 Experimental limitations ............................................................................................................. 30

5. Results & Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 31

5.1 Altruism (Dictator game task) ..................................................................................................... 31

5.2 Demographical analysis .............................................................................................................. 32

5.2.1 Gender differences .............................................................................................................. 32

5.2.2 Age differences .................................................................................................................... 33

5.2.3 Income differences .............................................................................................................. 33

5.2.4 Years worked within the financial sector ............................................................................. 35

5.3 Perceived altruism (Scenario) ..................................................................................................... 36

5.4 Perceived vs. Actual altruism ...................................................................................................... 36

5.5 Motivations & Influences ............................................................................................................ 37

5.5.1 Scenario ................................................................................................................................ 37

5.5.2 Dictator game task ............................................................................................................... 38

6. Limitations & Future Research .......................................................................................................... 40

7. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 44

8. References ........................................................................................................................................ 46

9. Appendices ........................................................................................................................................ 52

Appendix A – Information Sheet ....................................................................................................... 52

Appendix B – Consent form .............................................................................................................. 54

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Appendix C – Scenario Sheet ............................................................................................................ 56

Appendix D – Dictator Game Task .................................................................................................... 57

Appendix E – Full Interviewer Script ................................................................................................. 58

Appendix F – Debrief ......................................................................................................................... 64

Appendix G – Ethical Approval form ................................................................................................. 65

Appendix H – Data: Altruism (Dictator game task) ........................................................................... 67

Appendix I – Date: Gender Differences ............................................................................................ 68

Appendix J – Data: Age differences .................................................................................................. 69

Appendix K – Data: Income Differences ........................................................................................... 71

Appendix L – Data: Years worked within the financial sector .......................................................... 77

Appendix M – Data: Perceived Altruism (Scenario) .......................................................................... 79

Appendix N – Data: Actual vs. Perceived Altruism ........................................................................... 80

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Abstract

Does professional employment within the financial sector impact altruism? Despite economic theory

modelling humans as rational, selfish, and always striving for utility maximisation, research often

supports the existence of altruism. Whilst initiating comparative investigations of altruism by

sectoral employment, this article focuses more specifically upon professionals working within

financial service companies. Accordingly, this study explores whether a difference exists in the

altruism levels exhibited between finance and non-finance professionals. 80 participants were

recruited (40 finance professionals, 40 non-finance professionals) to take part in this experiment. By

combining an interview with a hypothetical scenario, a dictator game task, and demographic

questions, this experiment examined both participants’ perceived and actual altruism levels. Dictator

game findings revealed finance professionals donated significantly less to their anonymous partners

than non-finance professionals, with the number of years spent working within the financial sector

being the largest influential factor on their behaviour. The participant’s income and gender were

also found to be influential, while their age was not. Commonly amongst both experimental groups,

participants’ perceived altruism levels were lower than their actual altruism levels. This article

concludes by confirming that finance professionals are significantly less altruistic than non-finance

professionals, acknowledging the study’s contributions to altruism literature, and urging researchers

to further explore the different lines of investigation suggested.

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1. Introduction

Why do humans engage in altruistic acts? With everyday behaviour filled with clear contradictions,

this appears to be one of the most complex unanswered questions about human nature. Human’s

value honesty, yet still cheat (Ariely, 2012). We have the ability to behave selfishly, yet still engage in

altruistic activities...but does societal context vary which dominates human nature at what time?

(Kluver, et al., 2014, p.150). More importantly, what is altruism? Altruism is often described as a

form of unconditional kindness, where one behaves intentionally to benefit others, without the

expectation of reward, and possibly at cost to one’s self (Neusner and Avery-Peck, 2005; Fehr and

Gätcher, 2000). Whilst Wilson (1975) defines altruism as “self-destructive behaviour preformed for

the benefit of others” (Michalski, 2003, p.342), Batson (1994) disagrees and provides further

granularity to altruism by distinguishing between helping and self-sacrificial behaviour. An act

cannot be defined as altruistic simply because the actor has suffered a cost, instead the behaviour

should have been intended to improve the welfare of the recipient (Batson, 1994). In order for the

act to be considered altruistic, the altruist should not expect to be the recipient of benefits or

recognition, nor should they expect an act of altruism in return. Although social and biological

perspectives may vary in their explanations or rooting of altruism, they both agree upon its existence

within humans.

Contrastingly, economic theory on human behaviour of resource transfer, takes an opposing stance,

constructing a behavioural model built upon preserving self-interest. This suggests that individuals,

referred to as Homo economicus, are rational, individually-orientated, and simply interested in

maximising their own well-being (Nyborg, 1999). Gintis (2000) further describes the outcome

orientated nature of Homo economicus’ as only being concerned about social interactions when it

affects their final consumption and wealth. This economics model often forms the bases for

neoclassical theory of a firm, suggesting individuals act rationally within a group of other rational

individuals, all independently acting upon available information to maximise their own utility (Kluver,

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2014, p.151). With finance professionals often thought to have individualist mentalities, and the

finance industry often being viewed as the pinnacle of self-interest, this research has chosen to focus

on the altruistic nature of those within the financial sector. Despite this homo economicus model

being commonly used in the world of business and finance, it has been subject to much criticism for

its rigid, uncompromising stance, and its lack of acknowledgment for all behaviours that do not

conform to the theory e.g. altruism. Anderson (2000, p.173) proposes that this is one of the only

theories that still functions across disciplines as a working assumption, even though it is

continuously discredited on empirical grounds. Research analysing both primary and secondary data

have advocated altruistic acts, and behaviours that deviate from the homo economicus individual.

Through conducting a dictator game experiment, Camerer (2003) found participants on average

gave away 20% of their endowment to their anonymous recipient. DeScioli and Krishna (2012) also

strengthened the argument against economic theory, finding dictators donated 36% of their

endowment, whilst the recipient only expected to receive 30%. Without exploring ones motivations,

charitable giving is also considered as a form of altruism. Upon analysing charity donation records

(i.e. secondary data), typical months in 2012 saw 55% of the UK population (approx 28.4million

adults) donate an average of £10 (NCVO & CAF, 2012). Nonetheless, economic theory disregards

these acts as abnormal deviants from human nature. When one’s motivations are explored however,

researchers often challenge the intentions behind their altruistic behaviour before being considered

truly altruistic. Andreoni (1989) introduced the concept of ‘impure altruism’, proposing that even

through the act of giving, people obtain some utility. An example of this utility, termed ‘warm-glow’,

suggests that an individual’s motivation for giving is due to this act evoking a sense of joy and

positive emotions within them.

The dictator game is a commonly used experimental technique when quantitatively measuring

altruism (Hoffman, et al., 1994; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; 1998; Jakiela, 2013). This one staged

experiment is essentially a money distribution task, where the participant (who plays the role of the

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dictator) decides on the money split with their, often anonymous, partner. There are many different

variations to this experiment e.g. naming a charity as the recipient of the donation as opposed to an

anonymous partner (Eckel and Grossman, 1996); however the level of altruism exhibited is generally

determined by the amount donated by the dictator. Of course the dictator can also choose to keep

all the money for themselves, thereby supporting economic theory. The dictator game will form the

basis of this study’s experimental technique.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews previous literature, and

analyses its applicability to the current study. Section 3 proceeds to specify the hypotheses for this

current study, followed by a thorough explanation of the methodology, method, and data collection

techniques in section 4. Section 5 discusses the results of this experiment, with section 6 analysing

the study’s limitations, and looking ahead for potential future research. The paper concludes in

section 7.

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2. Literature Review

Is economic theory of human behaviour correct in stating that individuals are selfish rational beings?

Are humans only interested in maximising their own well-being? Clearly this view contradicts the

mere existence of altruism, let alone pure altruism. The opposing views held towards altruistic

behaviour have arrived at an apparent impasse, and appear unable to overcome it due to altruism

being an aporia. Altruism is often referred to as an aporia since questioning one’s true motivation is

indeterminate (Benson, 2011).

There are many well documented, and possibly some undocumented, cases of egotistical or deviant

behaviour of finance professionals. Former presidential candidate John McCain even attributed the

2008 Global Financial Crisis to “greed, corruption, and excess, as Wall Street treated the American

economy like a casino” (Salsman, 2009). With several countries around the world still feeling the

strain from this crisis, it is of public opinion that the financial demise was as a result of corporate

greed and the working professionals within this sector. Due to causes of the financial crisis being

partly attributed to capitalism and inherent greed (Salsman, 2009), it is essential to investigate

altruism, and to what degree it is expressed by professionals within the financial sector, in

comparison with those who are not. Moreover, the gravity of exploring altruism within finance is

further apparent when evaluating where modern finance roots its theories of value from. According

to De Bondt (2008), there are 2 benchmark assumptions, ‘beautiful people’, and ‘beautiful markets’.

The concept of ‘beautiful people’ depicts individualistic actors who use all available information to

make rational decisions, in striving for utility maximisation. ‘Beautiful markets’ assume competitive,

yet perfect markets. This leaves no room for rational arbitrage, as value equals price i.e. Efficient

Market Hypothesis (EMH). With the roots of finance based around homo economicus beings, this

study into altruism within finance could provide further evidence for the need to update and extend

the homo economicus view on human nature.

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Although a limited amount of research studying altruism in helping professions (e.g. medical

treatment or clergy professions) have been conducted (Blaikie, 1974; Saks, 1995; Burks, et al., 2012),

altruism is yet to be studied between professions, in non-helping sectors. This current study has

revealed a gap within altruism research thus far, as comparative analysis through professional

sectors as a whole is not widely reported on. This report will focus on the finance industry as a broad

sector, and aim to uncover whether the levels of altruism demonstrated by finance professionals

differ to those outside of the financial services sector. Due to the insufficient amount of literature

researching altruism in the financial sector, this literature review is conducted in an indirect manner.

It proposes to explore opposing perspectives of altruism, and gain insight on differences in altruistic

behaviour displayed, including their possible motivational drivers.

2.1 Evolutionary biology

Evolutionary biologists explain altruism in relation to genetic survival and reproductive fitness,

particularly relative to animals/creatures, which unlike humans are presumably incapable of

conscious thought, (Okasha, 2013). The evolutionary perspective suggests altruism has a genetic

basis with a role of increasing reproductive success (Wilson, 1978). For example, organisms are

identified as behaving altruistically when increasing the offspring production quantity of another

organism, even if it means reducing their own (Okasha, 2013). This concept seemed to contradict

Darwin’s basic evolutionary concept of natural selection, and led to altruism levels being

differentiated. Darwin introduced the concept of group selection, proposing that although altruism

may be disadvantageous at an individual level, it could potentially be beneficial at group level.

Darwin explained this notion of self-sacrificial human behaviour to have evolved through a process

of between-group selection, in turn being a form of natural selection. For example, a tribe with

many altruistic members, helping one another and sacrificing themselves for the common good,

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would prosper against tribes mainly compiled of selfish individuals, who would eventually go extinct

(Okasha, 2013).

Hamilton (1964) later developed group selection into the ‘inclusive fitness theory’ (kin selection),

identifying 3 components within the evolution of altruism as being: the cost to the altruist, the

benefit of the recipient, and the genetic relatedness of the two. Hamilton stated that the ability for

the altruism gene to spread through natural selection was contingent on the benefits (in terms of

reproductive fitness) outweighing the cost of the altruistic act (Okasha, 2013). This suggests the

altruist discriminates towards relatives who share the same gene pool in order to increase the

number who carry this gene into the next generation. This is further supported by Wilson (2005),

who studied worker insects with zero reproduction (sterile), concluding that true altruism is

positively correlated to relatedness (Foster, Wenseleers and Ratnieks, 2006).

When addressing altruistic behaviour through an evolutionary perspective Trivers (1971, p.35)

asserts that the models take the altruism out of altruism. It is argued that altruism through the

evolutionary perspective cannot be described as pure altruism, as they appear to be of ‘genic self-

interest’. Nevertheless, evolutionary biologists stress that biological altruism is not to be likened to

the everyday, vernacular sense of the concept (motivating intentions), but instead, in relation to the

fitness consequences of the behaviour (Okasha, 2013).

2.2 Social psychology

Social scientists claim that when interacting with other people, individuals have unconscious, pre-

programmed rules of social exchange behaviour (Hoffman, et al., 1996), and decisions are often

believed to be highly influenced by their conscious and moral sentiments (Frank, 1987, p.603).

Contextual, social-cognitive, relational and affective roots of altruism are also often emphasised as

being embedded within the values and norms of the society (Mattis, et al., 2009, p.3). Additionally,

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the social perspective argues that society nurtures an individual’s predisposition to assist others

through processes of positive reinforcement, internalisation, and role modelling (Michalski, 2003,

p.343).

The relational models theory suggests humans cognitively create different types of relationships,

which serve for different functions. Distinctions made include: authority relationships based on

unbalanced power, trade relationships founded on reciprocity, and communal relationships based

on meeting each other’s needs (DeSioli and Krishna, 2012). In line with this theory, DeScioli and

Krishna (2012) systematically tested the relational distinctions. Associations with communal

relationships was found to markedly influenced altruistic behaviour, finding 55% of participants

donated their endowment in the ‘high-need’ condition, in comparison to only 28% in the ‘low-need’

condition. This can be argued to have an association to the evolutionary concept of kinship, as

altruistic behaviour was found to be more prevalent in high need communal relationships. These

findings however were believed to be predominantly dominated by context effects (i.e. the

participant’s degree of hunger) rather than the communal relation. Upon testing asymmetrical

authoritative relationships, results showed authority ranking to be influential in altruistic decisions

with 62% of dictators donating in high authority ranking conditions, compared to only 26% in the low

ranking conditions (DeSioli and Krishna, 2012). Fiske (1992) also specified that the expectations of

how one distributes their resources differ depending upon their relationship; with Brañas-Garza, et

al. (2010) finding people in dictator games give more money to friends than strangers.

In contrast, the social preferences model suggests no differentiation is made between types of

personal relationships, power relationships or trade. This model is often been used to understand

the constructs of altruistic behaviour, by which an individual values the others payoffs, i.e.

incorporating self-interest with altruism (DeSioli and Krishna, 2012). Individual social preferences are

believed to offer insight into many economic situations such as political support for redistributive

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social programmes, charitable giving, team production etc. (Jakiela, 2013, p.208). This model extends

to suggest that altruism may vary dependent both on the individual’s payoff and the potential

payoffs that the recipient is exposed to, dependent on the altruist’s decision (DeSioli and Krishna,

2012). When considering the social preference model, if an individual is valuing payoffs before

acting, can their behaviour be categorised as an act of pure altruism? This model is also believed to

be limited due to its failure to include the impact of situational factors and contextual/framing

effects on altruistic behaviour. The first experiment, on communal relations, conducted by DeScioli

and Krishna (2012) contradict this models prediction. High generosity was witnessed in the

anonymous condition, even though the participants knew that the cues were hypothetical, and

would therefore not be receiving a payoff.

Secondary data clearly supports the flexibility of an individual’s altruistic nature when faced with

different situations. In the analysis of 2012 charity donation figures in the USA, although giving

totalled $316.23 billion, this was 8.2% below the total giving of 2007 (Charity Navigator, 2013). This

shows the reduction of general altruism on a mass scale, doubtlessly due to the constraints of the

widespread financial crisis. This situational change also saw individuals alter the direction of their

altruistic behaviour towards charitable sectors they felt were currently more in need (e.g. food

banks and human services, as opposed to arts, and environment charities) (Charity Navigator, 2013).

Taking a cognitive approach, DeScioli and Krishna (2012) continue to explain that due to framing

effects; altruistic decisions are not only driven by explicit payoffs, but also by implicit payoffs (e.g.

cues given in the task description). This explanation is supported by Brañas-Garza (2007), who found

participants donate a larger proportion of their endowment when the recipient is said to be ‘relying’

on the dictator. Eckel and Grossman (1996) echo this by stating that altruistic behaviour is context

dependent, with dictator game experimental findings supporting this. When controlling recipient

identity, results found subjects on average donated 10.6% to their anonymous partner, compared to

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a donation of 31% when the recipient was described to be a charity (American Red Cross). Clear

contextual effects may go some way to explain variations found in public giving between different

charitable causes/sectors. Hoffman, et al., (1994) controlled how the dictator obtained their

endowment, and found that participants gave less money to their partners, when their endowment

had to be earned. Social distance was additionally identified as influential in one’s altruistic

behaviour. Bohnet and Frey (1999) created 3 main comparative degrees of identification

(anonymous, 1-way identification, and 2-way identification), finding participants’ altruistic behaviour

diminished as social distance increased.

Although these social models have their differences, social psychologists commonly argue that all

economic transactions are social due to the fact that they take place in various types of relationships

(DeScioli and Krishna, 2012).

2.3 Cultural differences

In accordance to Fiske’s (1992) relational models theory, an individual’s social-cognitive mechanism

is thought to distinguish the different functions from relationships, and adjust their altruistic

behaviour accordingly. This model claims to hold true for human social interaction across cultures

based on four basic relational models: communal sharing, authority ranking, equity matching and

market pricing (Fiske, 1992). When kinship (as a form of moderating altruistic behaviour) was

experimentally tested across European and South African Zulu cultures by Madsen, et al. (2010),

they found that within both cultures, altruism was strongest the closer the recipient’s relationship to

the individual. In 2006, the Charities Aid Foundation also reported for international comparisons in

charitable giving. Results found that although USA had the highest giving levels at 1.67% of their GDP

in comparison to the UK’s 0.73% of GDP, they found the fundamental nature of altruistic giving

between the countries to differ. UK donations to international causes represented 13% of their total

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giving, in comparison to only 3% donated to international affairs in the USA (CAF, 2006). Draguns

(2013, p.2) suggests that there must be a threshold for altruism that varies culturally, especially

between individualistic and collectivist societies, as what may seem completely selfless and heroic in

one, may appear as a mundane, involuntary action in another.

2.4 Gender differences

Studies continuously attempt to investigate the causes behind different altruistic decisions, with

some attributing variances to gender effects. The belief that human nature differs according to

gender is not a modern perception. Charles Darwin (1874) also concluded that men and women

differ in mental disposition, with woman showing greater tenderness, and men taking pleasure in

competition, which effectively leads to ambition and selfishness (Eckel and Grossman, 1998). A

double-anonymous dictator game experiment conducted by Eckel and Grossman (1998) revealed

statistically significant gender differences, with women, on average, donating twice as much as men

to their anonymous partners. These differences were mainly attributed to men being more

individually-oriented and selfish, in comparison to women’s socially-orientated, selfless nature (Eckel

and Grossman, 1998). Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) found gender differences when varying the

price of giving, showing woman appear more generous when the price of giving is high, but less

generous than men at lower prices of giving.

Due to methodological variations in experimental design, results from analysing gender differences

in altruism have been largely inconsistent. Bolton and Katok (1995) conducted dictator game

experiments and concluded there to be no gender differences. A number of empirical studies over

the years have found no gender differences in empathic or altruistic responding (Boice and

Goldman, 1981; Oswald, 1996; Rodgers and Klotz, 1994). After reviewing over 30 studies, Maccoby

and Jacklin (1974) also determined that women were not more empathic than men. It is possible

however, that unclear experimental instructions may have contributed to variations in gender

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differences analysis, with participants possibly interpreting the same initial question differently. For

example, some experiments required participants to recall how often they have helped others in the

past. This ambiguous design exposes answers to a degree of subjectivity. This is due to initial gender

differences when determining what to categorise as helping behaviour, even before being able to

analyse differences in the quantitative amount stated (Oswald, 2000, pp.545-546).

Nonetheless, Western society generally deems women to be more altruistic and empathic than men

(Oswald, 2000, p.545), and the existence of gender differences is further supported through the

analysis of charitable donations in non-experimental environments. When controlling for variables

such as background, income levels and age, regardless of marital status, women are significantly

more likely to donate than men, support more charities, as well as give larger amounts (Piper and

Schnepf, 2007).

As a form of supplementary analysis, this study will also interpret the experimental findings to

explore if any gender difference, in donation amounts, were observed.

2.5 Corporate Altruism

In 2012, charitable donations by corporations in the USA totalled $18.97billion, accounting for 6% of

total giving (Charity Navigator, 2012). Well known philanthropists, such as Bill Gates, argue the

necessity of corporate philanthropy, to aid those that markets are unable to (Henderson and Malani,

2008). In 2012 alone, the Gates Foundation’s total charitable distribution amounted $3.897 billion

(Gates foundation, 2012). However the true motivations behind general acts of corporate ‘altruism’

are often debated. Corporate philanthropy, in for-profit organisations, is considered as any

corporate social action, which allows the organisation’s altruistic output to take many different

forms (e.g. helping provide medication to the uninsured, producing green goods, and voluntarily

reducing environmental emissions) (Henderson and Malani, 2008).

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On an individual employee level, researchers have investigated ways in which the company can

affect an employee’s altruistic behaviour. Studies have found that employees altruistic levels

increase when employer-employee ethical values are more congruent (Goodman and Svyantek,

1999), contract expectations are better fulfilled (Coyle-Shapiro, 2002), and when firms create a

positive work environment by implementing good ethical values (Valentine, et al., 2011, p.513). It is

suggested that these factors, as well as career satisfaction, play a role in employee motivation to

behave more altruistically, due to the development of a stronger psychological contract (Valentine,

et al., 2011, p.513). The altruistic, or homo economicus, nature of individuals as a whole can

additionally have large effects on a variety of corporate and economic issues e.g. the optimal design

of institutions and contracts, the analysis of incomplete contracts, allocation of property rights etc.

(Henrich, et al., 2001, p.73).

In relation to firm level monetary funding donations, government legislation allows income tax

deductions, for the value of the charitable donation. These tax breaks also allows companies to

avoid capital gains taxation on donated properties/assets that have appreciated in value (Cordes,

2011). Intentions behind these financial donations are thereby often doubted. Apart from tax

breaks, other potential sources of motivation include, essential profit maximisation opportunities,

symbolic capital through public relations, and the agency-cost problem leading managers to try and

maximise their own utility (i.e. bonuses) by taking major risk with money that isn’t theirs (Henderson

and Malani, 2008). The financial advantages, as well as the perceived benefits to brand reputation,

has led many to maintain that, due to the rewards received, and lack of net loss/cost of welfare to

the company, these acts of philanthropy – however beneficial to the recipient – are not truly

altruistic. On the other hand, some researchers believe that social and economic goals maybe

integrally connected, thereby allowing the philanthropy to be a source of competitive advantage, as

well as public good (Henderson and Malani, 2008).

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Although this report will not be delving into corporations’ acts of philanthropy as an output of

altruistic behaviour, it shall aim to measure altruistic behaviour within the corporate world on a

more individual level. By capturing the levels of altruism displayed by professionals within the sector

(as opposed to corporate entities), this study attempts to provide some indication about the nature

of those who are behind the corporate decisions. Comparing their results to non-finance

professionals should be able to give the findings an extra dimension, when trying to attribute

behavioural traits of those within the financial sector, or contribute to explaining factors behind

questionable decision they may make.

2.6 Motivations

What drives people to behave altruistically? More specifically, do individuals help for selfless or

selfish reasons? Many different factors such as identification, reciprocity and social distance have

been suggested as potential motivators for helping behaviour (Trivers, 1971). Research also confirms

the influence of gratitude, as well as acknowledging its sensitivity to the cost and benefits linked to

altruistic behaviour (McCullough, et al., 2008).

Analysis of both experimental primary data, and charitable-giving secondary data, clearly supports

altruisms flexible nature when faced with situational differences, however fails to pinpoint ones

motivations for such behaviour. Batson (2011) stresses the importance of motivation when defining

altruism as “a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare”, however

does not specify the significance of behaviour. Nevertheless, one’s motivation and behaviour should

go hand in hand. After all, altruistic intentions cannot be recognised as such until put into action,

whilst actions cannot be considered altruistic if they were unmotivated and unintended (Draguns,

2013, p.2). The key to differentiating an act of pure altruism, from one of self-interest, is through

determining the behaviour’s goal-directed drive. However, due to questions of one’s true motivation

being often deemed as indeterminate, Benson (2011) proceeds to describe altruism as an aporia.

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“Is the giver in giving, or the partner in cooperating not acting in a way that, while

seeming to sacrifice, maximises that individuals fitness, status, prestige, or

security? Is what appears on the surface to benefit others or the common good

indeed selfish?” (Benson, 2011, p.195).

Batson, et al’s (1981) empathy-altruism hypothesis suggests that individuals are more likely to

engage in pure altruistic behaviour out of concern, by taking the perspective of the individual in

need. It is suggested that this empathetic concern in turn creates an altruistic motivation. Sanderson

(2010) supports the empathy-altruism hypothesis with evidence from a study where participants

were provided with 2 research tasks, which they had to allocate to themselves and another student

(1 task was more desirable than the other). Participants were split into 2 groups, a control group,

and a group that had to complete a perspective-taking exercise before allocating tasks. Findings

revealed 75% of the control group assigned themselves the more desirable task, compared to only

42% of the perspective-taking condition. Results support the notion of altruism motivated by

empathy.

Impure altruism pertains to explanations of motivation that are associated with psychological

egoism. Psychological egoism is a concept, in support of the homo economicus model of human

nature, suggesting that even in an act that appears altruistic, no matter how noble or beneficial it

may appear to others, humans are always motivated by their ultimate goal of self-interest (Batson,

1991). The aporia of altruism and concept of psychological egoism are well described by Graeber’s

(2001) fictional dialogue:

“Q: If people only act to maximise their gains in some way or another, then how

do you explain people who give things away for nothing?

A: They are trying to maximise their social standing, or honour, or prestige that

accrues to them by doing so.

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Q: Then what about people who give anonymous gifts?

A: Well, they’re trying to maximise their sense of self-worth, or the good feeling

they get from doing it.” (Benson, 2011, p.196).

Generally, such self-benefits are grouped into 3 main classes; reduction of aversive arousal, fear of

punishment for not helping, and desire for reward (Sanderson, 2010, p.488). Despite the fact that

the individual is still engaging in an act of helping, it cannot be defined as pure altruism as these 3

classes suggest the individual is motivated by personal, internal benefits. Similarly the negative-state

hypothesis suggests that individuals engage in altruistic behaviour in an attempt to improve their

own state. Cialdini, et al. (1973) proceeds to argue that altruism increases when an individual is in a

state of temporary negativity, as the altruistic behaviour is self-gratifying and helps to improve their

low mood state (e.g. guilt or depression) (Baumann, et al., 1981, p.1039). This is due to altruism

being affected by cognition, emotions and mood (Cialdini, et al., 1982). The negative-state

hypothesis has however been hotly contested. Batson (1989) challenged this hypothesis when his

experiment found that between high and low empathy participants, high-empathy participants were

more likely to behave altruistically. Since high-empathy subjects were not in a negative state, results

indicated that other factors were involved in their motivation, instead of reducing ones negative

state.

Questions about an individual’s intentions have also lead to the idea of reciprocal altruism, with

Trivers (1971) suggesting gratitude to be a motivating factor in facilitating reciprocal altruism.

Altruism and reciprocity are often concepts used in the same likening, however should not be

confused. Whilst an act can only be deemed purely altruistic if it is selfless and not done with the

expectation of any form of repayment, reciprocal actions do expect something in return. The notion

of reciprocity is based around unofficial social norms where individuals respond to friendly actions in

a nicer more cooperative manner. Similarly when responding to hostile actions, individuals are

20

frequently more nasty and sometimes brutal (Fehr and Gätcher, 2000). This current study is only

concerned with investigating altruism.

It is evident that the distinction between pure and impure altruism is not whether the individuals

own welfare was increased by their behaviour or not, but rather whether their intention behind

their behaviour was to maximise the welfare of the recipient, or their own. Finding a way to identify

these driving intentions is the current predicament. Batson, et al. (1981, p.291) alternatively

proposed that motivations for helping need not be completely or even majoritively altruistic in order

for it to have an altruistic component, since ones motivations may often be a combination of

altruism and egoism. Krebs and Van Hesteren (1994, p.104) also echo this proposal by stating a

behaviour can still be defined as altruistic even if it is not purely altruistic, and recommending

altruism to be viewed on a continuum with some acts being more altruistic than others.

Though definitions of altruism may show slight variations over the years, they all insist that an act of

helping, in an attempt to pursue self-gain, cannot qualify as altruistic (Krebs and Van Hesteren, 1994,

p.104). Defensively Batson, et al. (1981) propose that an increase in own welfare, e.g. through

feelings of satisfaction or relief, may actually be an unintended by-product of the altruistic

behaviour, as oppose to its goal, thereby still making the behaviour altruistically motivated. The

question of motivation behind one’s altruistic behaviour appears to be a cyclical scientific debate.

Acknowledging altruism and egoism to be motivational concepts, Batson, et al. (1981) attributed the

difficulty and current inability, in providing evidence to conclude the debate, to being unable to

observe motivation directly. Only the output of behaviour is observable, with motivational

explanations being subjective.

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2.7 Summary & Research problem

Taking all of the definitions and views into consideration, the definition of altruism that is chosen for

the purpose of this study is one influenced by Batson (1994) and Post (2002), and used by Mattis, et

al. (2009, p.2). In order for the behaviour to be defined as altruistic it must be:

“1. Voluntary

2. Undertaken without any prior interest in receiving internal or external rewards

3. Intended to enhance the welfare of others”

After carefully evaluating various types of literature within this field, it reaffirmed the clear lack of

altruism research analysed by sectoral employment. This study views this gap in literature as

problematic, emphasising the importance of exploring the altruistic nature of individuals working

within different employment sectors. If differences between sectors are found, research can

subsequently be developed to investigate causality, potentially identifying whether the individual’s

level of altruism is as a result of their long-term employment within that sector, or the reason they

are working within that sector to begin with. This study’s primary line of enquiry is to initiate

investigations of altruism by sectoral employment, through specifically analysing the financial sector.

Does professional employment within the financial sector impact altruism? Such findings will allow

for a deeper understanding of both the financial sector and human nature, offering an extra

dimension to current models and theories.

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3. Hypotheses

Taking the study’s main focus and research question into consideration, the following hypotheses

have been derived.

H0: No comparative difference will be found in the altruism levels displayed between finance

professionals and non-finance professions.

Holding the expectation that non-finance professionals will show higher signs of altruistic behaviour,

this study aims to disprove the null hypothesis.

H1: Finance and non-finance professionals will display differing levels of altruism.

As there is no previous literature within this field, expected findings are deduced through various

other sources, as opposed to being founded upon previous results. Therefore, this non-directional

hypothesis states a difference will be found between the 2 experimental groups, but does not

specify how they will differ.

H2: Finance professionals will display lower levels of altruism than non-finance professionals.

Although both groups of participants are expected to show signs of altruistic behaviour, this study

expects finance professionals to exhibit lower levels of altruism, displayed by donating less money to

their anonymous recipient. As discussed in previous sections, this expectation is built upon

perceptions of finance professionals having individualist mentalities, and the financial sector being

depicted as greedy, self-interested and corrupt. Much of the characteristics attributed to the

financial industry and their employees are in line with the homo economicus model. This report is

23

interested in exploring this further. Unfortunately, uncontrollable external economic factors, such as

the 2008 global financial crisis, may still be influential on participant behaviour. As this is not a

longitudinal study, and an experiment of this kind was not conducted before the crisis, this report

will be unable to decipher to what degree (if any) this will affect donation amounts allocated by

participants.

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4. Research methodology, method & data

Theoretical economic assumptions have largely been developed from analysing self-interested

trades under enforceable contracts; however these self-interest models have proven to be

inadequate (DeScioli and Krishna, 2012). Deceptive laboratory experiments construct an optimal way

of providing evidence about altruism, potentially revealing more coherent and definitive evidence

than other methods such as natural observation, or theoretical deduction (Batson, 2011). As a result,

this research will adopt a quantitative approach when collecting primary data through implementing

a single-blind, anonymous dictator game experiment. This particular economics games theory is

appropriately matched to my research question and hypotheses, as well as being in line with

previous research conducted within the field of altruism (Hoffman, et al., 1994; Eckel and Grossman,

1996; 1998; DeSioli and Krishna, 2012; Jakiela, 2013).

As previously discussed, the dictator game is made of only one stage; therefore the amount donated

by the dictator remains final. This differs from the ultimatum game experiments, often used when

examining fairness and reciprocity, which consists of two players and two stages. One player initially

proposes the amount of money split, and the second player chooses to accept/reject the offer.

Rejecting the offer will result in both players receiving nothing. Participants in the ultimatum game

must consider fairness of distribution, as well as strategic considerations to avoid counterpart

rejection (Hoffman, et al., 1994). In comparison, due to the dictator game only consisting of one

stage, the dictator bares no consequences for their actions. It is this lack of consequence that will

make their behaviour either support the concept of altruism, or maintain the homo-economicus

stance on human behaviour.

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4.1 Sample

The population of this study consists of those who do and do not work within the financial sector,

forming 2 experimental groups identified as ‘Finance Professionals’ and ‘Non-Finance Professionals’.

The criteria used to classify participants as ‘Finance Professionals’ was identifying if they were

currently working within a financial services company, with a company office located in the financial

district of London/the ‘Square Mile’. This study chose not to recruit participants who work within the

finance department of non-finance related companies (e.g. market research, retail, healthcare etc.).

This was in an attempt to maintain consistency, due to the belief that overall, office culture and

personalities may differ between financial and non-financial service companies. No additional

criterion was placed on these participants in terms of specifying which sub-sector they work in (e.g.

trader, analyst, corporate banker etc). As this is the first experiment to comparatively analyse

altruism by professional sector—specifically the financial sector—the population selected for

sampling was intentionally left broad. This study sought a general investigation of finance

professionals working within the financial district as a whole, allowing scope for further research to

expand on these findings (e.g. only using finance professionals and comparing them by sub-sector).

A criterion specifying participants neither to work, nor have a higher educational background within

the area of finance was used to categorise participants into the ‘Non-Finance Professionals’ group. In

an attempt to strengthen the population validity of this experiment, and to allow for further

demographical analysis, no age or income restrictions were imposed onto the selection criteria. To

achieve equal gender representativeness, this study recruited 20 males and 20 females for each

experimental group.

Using a combination of convenience and random sampling, 80 participants were sampled in total,

with both experimental groups consisting of 40 participants each. A sample of 80 was chosen to

allow for stronger significance testing. In line with the search criteria, convenience sampling was

used when selecting which offices and companies to conduct the experiments in, as they were the

26

companies the researcher was able to gain access to. However, to minimise sampling bias, and to

ensure for the generalisability of the results, random sampling was used when recruiting the

participants within these companies. Participants in the ‘Finance Professionals’ group, were

recruited from 4 financial services companies, and took part in their respective offices; Deutsche

Bank, Bloomberg LP, Deloitte, Lloyds Banking Group. Participants from the ‘Non-Finance

Professionals’ group were specifically chosen according to their selection criteria, with the study

taking place in a mixture of open and closed spaces.

4.2 Experimental procedure

As mentioned previously, a single-blind, anonymous dictator game was conducted, where the

dependent variable is the altruism levels exhibited by participants (i.e. donation amount), and the

independent variable is the participant’s profession. The experiment was standardised for all

participants, and was conducted in an identical manner in 8 sessions, with a total of 80 participants.

Each experiment was conducted on a one-to-one basis with only the researcher and 1 participant in

the room at one time.

There is a critical link between the properties of a situation, and the behaviour of the individual

within that setting. This significantly applies to traditional dictator games, as the experiment invokes

a set of expectations upon the participant, unknowingly creating a demand for a positive donation

(List, 2007). To avoid any unintentional set expectations from being a confounding variable upon this

study’s results, certain experimental adjustments were made from the traditional dictator game. The

single-blind nature of this study meant that participants were initially unaware of the true nature of

the study, as they were informed they were partaking in a study examining ‘the effect of culture and

personality in the alternative ways stress is handled in the work place’. All participants read the

information sheet (appendix A) and signed the consent form (appendix B) before proceeding to take

27

part in the study. The experiment was split into 3 parts; a short interview containing a mixture of

open and closed-ended questions, a practical independent scenario and task, and finally a few

demographic questions for analytical purposes. The experimental room was arranged so there were

envelopes laid out in numerical order on a table by the entrance. Envelopes were numbered 1-40 for

the ‘Finance Professionals’ group and 41-80 for the ‘Non-Finance Professionals’ group. Each

envelope contained a scenario sheet (appendix C), and a smaller brown envelope inside (identically

numbered to its corresponding white envelope) containing the dictator game task (appendix D) and

10 £1 coins. An empty box was placed on the other side of the room for participants to place their

envelope in upon completion. This experiment chose to use real money (GBP) in order to increase its

external validity, and observe less artificial behaviour.

Upon entry into the experimental room, each participant was instructed to randomly pick up 1 of

the large white envelopes on the table before taking a seat. The 1st part of the study asked 11

questions in relation to culture, personality, and stress, but responses collected were not analysed

(appendix E). For the purpose of this study, part 1 consisted of bluffer questions, created in line with

the apparent topic, to make sure participants were unaware this experiment was investigating

altruism. It was imperative that the participants had no knowledge of the true nature of the study as

it could have led to either a conscious or sub-conscious modification of their behaviour through the

influence of demand characteristics, or social-desirability effect.

After completing part 1 of the study, participants were then given brief insight and explanations

about the 2nd part of the study (appendix E) before the experimenter left the room. The participant

was first instructed to read and complete the scenario sheet inside the random envelope they had

selected at the beginning of the study. The scenario created was a hypothetical situation where the

participant had to decide if they were willing to donate a percentage of their hypothetical sign-on

bonus. The percentage that they may/may not have allocated in this scenario was analysed as their

perceived altruism level. Next participant’s opened the small brown envelope and read the dictator

28

game task inside. The dictator game task was presented and worded in such a way so participants

would not be aware that their altruistic natures were being studied. Nonetheless it was the

monetary amount donated from this task that represents the level of altruism demonstrated by the

participant. As altruism requires context for individuals to feel the cause is worthy of a donation

(Eckel & Grossman, 1996), the paper inside the brown envelope informed participants that the

unknown participant in group b, who was also doing the same task, was not allocated any cash for

task participation. Inside each envelope were 10 £1 coins, and the paper continued to read if

participants were willing to anonymously donate any of this £10 cash, to donate it into the brown

envelope and place it in the box at the back of the room. Taking inspiration from Jakiela (2013), the

wording of this experiment intentionally created enough ambiguity for participants to assume that

the £10 in the envelope was their money to keep, however this was not explicitly stated. In order to

test true altruism, it was important for participants to believe the £10 would be theirs to keep,

because this means any donation they make will be negatively affecting their ‘net income’ for the

task. Although the sole aim of altruism isn’t for the act to be costly to the giver, using real money

(that participants think will be theirs to keep) avoids participants yielding higher altruism levels, due

to not feeling a real connection with the money, or a sense of gain/loss. This also increases the

experiment’s ecological validity as it allows the settings within the study to be more relatable to the

real outside world. The anonymity of each dictator’s ‘paired-partner’ (the participant conducting the

same task in the alternate group) is essential, not only to remove potential preferential helping

behaviour by the dictator, but also as the ‘paired-partner’ in this experiment is fictional and does not

exist. The complete anonymity of this study (including the anonymous donation recipient) ensures

that participant cannot be receiving, or expecting to receive, any type of direct reward, in return for

their donation. Their potential ‘benefit’ through ‘indirect reward’ however, cannot be controlled by

anyone bar the individual. On the other hand questions remain as to whether these indirect rewards

can substantially be described as a benefit. The experimenter was not present in the room for the

29

part 2 of the study to avoid the possibility of observer effects and experimenter effects altering the

participant’s behaviour and thereby biasing the results collected.

The experimenter returned to the room for part 3 of the study to gather the participant’s

demographic information (appendix E). For supplementary analysis, this study additionally reports

for demographic distinctions/similarities found in relation to the participants behaviour, but will not

be analysing reasons why they may exist. The study concluded by asking the participant what they

thought this study was a better measure of (full interviewer script found in appendix E). This was

asked as a precautionary measure; since knowledge of the study’s true nature may alter the

participant’s behaviour, making them more or less generous than they normally would be.

Consequently, the results of any participant that associated the study with greed, altruism, or

anything of the like, would be withdrawn from the analysis. For the purpose of this report, the

participant’s motivation behind their behaviour is simply secondary information. Nevertheless for

additional insight, participants are asked to anonymously share their motivations/influences behind

their behaviour after the experiment had been completed.

This study took approximately 15 minutes with each participant, and all participants were debriefed

(appendix F) either by email or given a printed sheet to read. This study used human participants to

collect primary data, as well as initially incorporating minor elements of experimental deception,

therefore conducting a full debrief was essential. This debrief detailed the true nature of the study,

explaining why this study is important and why the deception was necessary, and provided the

experimenter’s contact details for the purposes such as reading this report, seeking counselling, or

withdrawing their data. Despite the ethical concern of deception, taking part in the experiment did

not result in any psychological distress, harm or embarrassment for the participants, which was

further controlled for by the anonymity and confidentiality of the data collected. In addition, all

experimentation took place after being granted ethical approval from the E&M Research Ethics

Panel (appendix G).

30

Subject-subject interaction was also controlled for by making sure those who have, and those who

are yet to, part-take in the study are not housed in this same room. This further precaution

minimised the risk of participant’s exchanging ideas/details about the experiment, to avoid demand

characteristics or social desirability effects influencing their behaviour (i.e. donation).

Both descriptive and inferential statistics will be used to analyse data collected from this study. The

main statistical analysis used for both altruism and perceived altruism, is an independent-groups

one-tailed t-test. This parametric test compares differences of mean donation amounts between

experimental groups, revealing whether the difference found is significant or not. Additionally,

measures of central tendency is be reported for, as well as conducting 1-way between groups

ANOVA tests when conducting demographic analysis for age, income, and number of years within

finance. All statistical testing will be conducted on SPSS using a 95% significance level (p<0.05).

4.3 Experimental limitations

It must be noted that this study is being conducted for an MSc dissertation project and is

consequently subject to heavy time and budgetary restrictions. 80 participants were sampled for the

dictator game experiment, and although this is adequate for statistical significance testing, the

experiment would have ideally been conducted on a much larger scale. This would have allowed for

a better representation of the population, generalisability of the results, and sharper statistical

significance testing. Unfortunately, larger samples require a greater amount of time and resources.

Additionally, experiments with finance professionals only took place in 4 offices. Had there been

more time and resources available (as well as a larger sample size used), it would have permitted

experiments to be conducted in a wider variety and amount of financial services companies.

Researchers aiming to replicate or develop this study further should use a sample size in excess of

100 participants, using a rough guideline of 10% of the finance participants for the amount of

companies they should be sourced from (e.g. 50 finance professionals, 5 finance companies). This

will ensure the significance of their results is not as limited.

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5. Results & Discussion

In an attempt to disprove the null hypothesis (H0), this study initiated analysis by drawing a

comparison between finance and non-finance professionals, by using their mean donations from the

dictator game task. Using the same results, this study then took a deeper analytical approach by

investigating any demographical differences/trends that may exist, in order to identify any

attributing factors/explanations to the overall results. Finally, statistical testing was concluded by

firstly comparing results from the scenario between experimental groups, and then comparing them

to dictator game results, to see if there is a difference between participants’ perceived, and actual

altruism levels. None of the participants guessed the true nature of the experiment, so results from

all 80 participants were used for analysis.

5.1 Altruism (Dictator game task)

Results rejected H0 by revealing a significant difference (p=0.0001) in the altruistic levels displayed

by finance professionals (M=1.73, SD=1.601), and non-finance professionals (M=3.05, SD=1.260;

t(78)=-4.113 (appendix H). The proportion of variance in donation amounts that is explainable by the

experimental groups was 17.8%, which in accordance to Cohen (1988, pp.284-287) is considered to

be a large effect.

Out of the possible £400, finance professionals donated £69 to their anonymous recipient (17.25%),

with the most frequent decision being to keep the £10 for themselves (27.5%). This is in stark

contrast from the non-finance professionals who donated almost double that amount (£122). With

only 2 participants donating £0, the modal donation by non-finance professionals was £3 (37.5%).

Findings clearly support the existence of altruism, as 83.75% of the 80 participants made voluntary

donations, yet simultaneously expose finance professionals as being less altruistic than non-finance

professionals. This is apparent by both the amount of participants who made a donation (mean

32

difference=22.5%), and by the monetary value of the mean donations made (mean

difference=£1.33). In spite of these differences, both groups commonly did not make donations

above £5. This threshold of 50% suggests that although those who donated behaved altruistically,

their altruistic nature did not extend to the extent of increasing their recipient’s welfare above their

own. Whichever way these results are analysed, they are in clear support of both H1 & H2.

5.2 Demographical analysis

Demographic information was collected about each participant, and used to further analyse altruism

levels by conducting an independent-groups 1-tailed t-test for gender, and 1-way between-groups

ANOVA tests for age, income bracket, and years within finance.

5.2.1 Gender differences

On average, both experimental groups showed females to be more altruistic than males, however

statistical significance was only obtained within finance professionals (p=0.003) (appendix I). 21% of

the variance in mean donations within finance professionals is attributed to gender differences,

compared to only a moderate 7.9% within non-finance professionals. Mean donations also revealed

male finance professionals (M=1, SD=1.257) to be the least altruistic, with female non-finance

professionals being the most (M=3.4, SD=1.314) (Fig 1). Results from this study support that of

previous research (Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001), in suggesting that

females are more altruistic than males. Interestingly, male non-finance professionals (M=2.7,

SD=1.129), showed higher levels of altruism in comparison to female finance professionals (M=2.45,

SD=1.605). This somewhat contrasts with the general finding of females being more altruistic than

men, whilst simultaneously supporting the notion of finance professionals having a lower propensity

of exhibiting altruistic behaviour.

33

5.2.2 Age differences

No progressive patterns were found in mean donations in both experimental groups, with results

suggesting age may not be a confounding variable upon participants’ altruistic behaviour (appendix

J). In addition, differences in mean donations were found between the age groups, with their effect

sizes calculated using eta squared (finance professionals=0.14; non-finance professionals=0.21).

Despite these large effect sizes, differences between groups were not significant for both finance

professionals (p=0.373), and non-finance professionals (p=0.147).

Even though the selection criteria didn’t specify age, the amount of participants within each of the 6

age brackets ended up being relatively even, which resultantly strengthens the representativeness of

the sample.

5.2.3 Income differences

A negative correlation was found between income and altruistic behaviour, as both groups showed

as income increased, altruistic behaviour decreased (appendix K) (Fig 2). Although causation cannot

be determined, effect sizes for finance professionals was 35%, and 25% for non-finance

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

Finance Professionals Non-Finance Professionals

Do

nat

ion

s (£

)

Male Female

Fig 1

34

professionals, suggesting the degree to which income brackets is accountable for variances in mean

donations is fairly large. This is seen to be more so than age or gender have been. Mean donations

were significantly different within both finance professionals (p=0.003), and non-finance

professionals (p=0.034), with post-hoc comparisons—using Tukey HSD test—finding the greatest

statistically significant difference to be within finance professionals between the brackets ‘<£20,000’

and ‘>£50,000’ (p=0.002).

As previously mentioned, no selection criteria was imposed upon income. As a result a wide

variation was found when comparing income earned by participants in the 2 groups, with double the

amount of participants earning <£20,000 in the non-finance group (n=12), and more than double the

amount of finance professionals earning >£50,000 (n=7). This could be attributable to salaries

generally being larger within the financial sector, or the lack of sector specification for non-finance

professionals within this study. Nonetheless the small number of non-finance participants within the

upper income brackets may have impacted the lack of significance found between brackets in post-

hoc comparison. To draw on further comparisons, the ANOVA test was run again after condensing

the 5 income brackets into 3 (conjoining the lower 2 and the upper 2 brackets) (appendix K). Post-

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

<£20,000 £20,000-£30,000 £30,001-£40,000 £40,001-£50,000 >£50,000

Do

nat

ion

s (£

)

Finance Professionals Non-Finance Professionals Fig 2

35

hoc Tukey HSD test found a strong significant difference between the upper and lower income

brackets (p=0.013).

5.2.4 Years worked within the financial sector

This supplementary analysis was only conducted upon finance professionals as they are the main

focus of this investigation.

The length of time the participant had spent working within the financial sector had the largest

effect on mean donation variation than all other demographic splits (eta squared=.04779).

Unfortunately, this effect was negative. As seen in Fig 3 the longer the participant had been working

in finance, the less money they donated in the dictator game task.

Findings showed an overall significant difference between groups (p=0.0003), and more specifically a

significant difference in donations when comparing those working within finance for <1yr, with the

remaining 4 brackets >3yrs (appendix L). Donations of participants working within finance 1-3yrs

were the only bracket that did not significantly differ from other brackets. An equally large

significant difference was found when comparing those working <1yr to those working 8-11yrs and

>11yrs (p=0.001; mean difference=£3). Interestingly, the mean donation of those working in finance

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

<1 1-3 3-5 5-8 8-11 >11

Do

nat

ion

s (£

)

Number of years worked in finance Fig 3

36

for less than 1yr (M=3.71, SD=1.89, n=7) was greater than the overall mean donation of non-finance

professionals (M=3.05, n=40), however the considerably smaller sample size must be noted.

5.3 Perceived altruism (Scenario)

On average, finance professionals allocated a slightly higher percentage (M=15.5, SD=16.283) than

non-finance professionals (M=13.88, SD14.119; t(78)=0.477) (appendix M). However, this difference

lacked statistical significance (p=0.635), and the effect size (eta square=0.0029) further showed the

small magnitude of difference between the groups average percentage distribution. A commonality

shared between both groups was a mode percentage allocation of 0% from their sign-on bonus

(n=23).

This scenario attempted to capture perceived altruism by creating a hypothetical situation; however

the construct validity of the scenario may arguably be limited. Does the scenario truly capture

perceived altruism? Although the ‘dream role’ within this scenario was left intentionally vague in

order to aid with participant identification, it was consequently subjected to the currently negative

perceptions of corporations and societal inadequacies. This could have partly biased responses, and

contributed to the amount of 0% donations. Perhaps specifying a specific sector of this role (apart

from finance), may have yielded different results.

5.4 Perceived vs. Actual altruism

Findings revealed non-finance professionals to be significantly more altruistic than what they initially

perceived (p<0.0001), with a mean difference of 16.625 between the scenario and the dictator game

task. Although finance professionals also donated more during the dictator game task (M=17.25,

SD=16.011) rather than the scenario (M=15.5, SD=16.283), this difference was not found to be

significant (p=0.629) (appendix N).

37

The 2 experimental groups were then combined (n=80), and analysis comparing perceived and

actual altruism was conducted at an overall level. Comparisons showed that participants perceived

themselves to be 35.8% less altruistic than their actual altruistic behaviour showed them to be.

Findings showed there to be a significant difference (p=0.0002) between perceived altruism

(M=14.69, SD=15.165), and actual altruism (M=23.88, SD=15.791).

5.5 Motivations & Influences

After completing part 3 of the study, all participants were asked if they could share any motivational

influences behind their decisions in part 2 of the study, without revealing what answers they gave. In

line with the empathy-altruism hypothesis, many participants across both experimental groups cited

empathy as a behavioural influence. They stated that before making their decisions, they attempted

to identify with the individual, and think about how they would feel if they were in that situation.

Commonly, participants expressed that they were not able to identify with the hypothetical scenario

as much as they could with the task, raising queries as to how percentage allocation decisions were

made. A few participants within both groups also referred to the concept of ‘karma’ as part of their

motivation behind their actions, which is somewhat similar to the concept of reciprocal altruism.

Although the recipient was anonymous, participants were still influenced by the belief that their

good actions will one day positively impact their life (i.e. indirect reward). Overall, differences in

participant responses were found both between the experimental groups, and between the scenario

and the dictator task.

5.5.1 Scenario

Although this study initially anticipated that external economic factors, such as the Global Financial

Crisis, could possibly affect participant’s donation amount, it did not anticipate that decisions made

38

in the initial scenario would be effected by the general negative perceptions of corporate firms

today. Participant’s stated that the greed and selfish nature associated with their perception of

corporations affected their behaviour negatively; citing that they felt it was the firm’s responsibility

to have enough funds to provide for the new recruits. Although this view was held by participants in

both experimental groups, this response was more prevalent within non-finance professionals, and

clearly displayed to be influential in their decisions. Nonetheless, non-finance professionals more

commonly cited that they were able to identify with the scenario, as some of them were asked to

voluntarily take a slight annual pay cut in order to avoid the redundancy of work colleagues. This was

never mentioned as an influential factor amongst finance professionals, presumably since financial

service companies did not implement such schemes.

5.5.2 Dictator game task

Again, differences in explanations were found between the 2 groups. As expected, a number of

finance professionals stated that their decisions were influenced by the competitive environment of

the financial world, as well as growing accustomed to its culture and common conduct within the

office. Interestingly, a few specifically stated that if they had done their task before working in

finance, they would have conducted part 2 of the study differently, and this response was common

in those working within finance from as little as 1 year, to as much as 37 years. Some finance

professionals even continued by saying that after conducting their task, they were surprised to see

how unknowingly selfish they had become over the years. As this is not a longitudinal study that

measures long-term changes in altruistic behaviour, it is impossible to evaluate these apparent

changes expressed by participants within a specific individual. Nonetheless, results from

demographic analysis clearly depict a significantly negative association between altruism levels, and

the length of time participants have been working within finance. Moreover the extent of this

difference can also be seen when analysing the mode responses between the finance and non-

39

finance professionals groups, showing that the most common donation was £0 and £3 respectively.

One finance professional suggested had they conducted their task outside of their working

environment (e.g. their home), the result from their task may have differed. Insightfully, this

participant proposed this may hold true for other participants also, as they are aware of many

professionals that have different personas when in and out of work. Non-finance professionals on

the other hand, mostly suggested influences relating to empathy. Responses commonly showed

feelings of identification, stating their task felt realer than their scenario, with their actions aiming to

reflect their desire to aid the unjust situation. A handful of participants between both groups also

stated that their answer to the task was partly influenced by their earlier answer to the scenario (i.e.

allocating 20% in the scenario influenced them to give £2 in the dictator game).

40

6. Limitations & Future Research

Despite controls being put in place, one of the basic unavoidable criticisms, common to most

experimental studies, is their automatic subjection to lower degrees of external validity due to their

artificial setting. In relation to dictator game experiments specifically, Bardsley (2007) argues that

the ex-ante external validity should be relatively high, as it requires minimal cognitive demand, and

reproduces familiar sets of opportunities faced by individuals on a daily basis. Additionally, this study

attempted to increase external validity by using real currency (GBP) in the dictator game, as well as

conducting the experiments in environments the participants were familiar with (e.g. their work

offices), as opposed to off-location laboratories. Conversely, motivations/influences feedback from

finance professionals suggested that donations may have differed if the experiment was conducted

outside their place of work. Future research could attempt to explore this further by sampling

finance professionals and comparing donations of experiments conducted in, and away from the

office.

Some well-recognised literatures investigating altruism generalise their results whilst only sampling

undergraduate students (e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Batson et al., 1981), arguably limiting their

population validity. Although this study did not implement a specific selection criteria based on age,

income etc., acknowledging the limitations imposed onto the previously mentioned studies, it

attempted to increase population validity by recruiting a sample from a large demographical range.

This was successfully implemented as participants’ backgrounds encompassed a large range of

income, age, education, professional seniority, and ethnic background, allowing findings to be better

generalised to the wider population. Though the participants within the sample had diverse

backgrounds, the restrictions imposed upon this study (refer to section 4.3), resulted in a relatively

small sample size. Using an appropriate confidence interval of 95%, this study was still able to

achieve statistical significance, when testing differences between experimental groups; however

future research replicating this study should strive to use a larger sample.

41

As identified earlier, this study purposefully took a broad approach in recruiting participants, but

after conducting the demographic analysis it is clear that this study offers many different directions

for future research to explore. When studying finance professionals, the most prominent factor

found to affect their donation amount was the number of years they had spent working within the

financial sector. Future research should aim to explore this further by only sampling finance

professionals, and using the number of years worked within finance as an independent variable, to

distinguish the experimental groups. This could pinpoint the critical turning period of altruistic

behaviour (if one is found at all). Similarly, feedback also revealed that finance participants felt they

had become more selfish over the years, suggesting they would have previously conducted the task

differently. This alternatively provides inspiration to conduct a longitudinal study. For example, a

longitudinal study could test candidates on their 1st day within the financial sector, and then conduct

a similar dictator game task on these individuals approximately 3years later. 3years is the suggested

time frame since the largest mean difference was found between the <1 and the 1-3 year brackets

(mean difference=1.339). Alternatively, the study can chose to test participants on multiple

occasions within a time frame longer than 3years.

When isolating demographic factors, participants’ annual income appeared to correlate with their

altruistic nature. Future research could choose to use the income brackets of finance professionals

as the independent variable and scrutinise this further. Additionally, finance professionals generally

earn higher salaries (in relation to other sectors), and tend to deal with large sums of money on a

day-to-day basis. Thus, the £10 used in the dictator game may have appeared insignificant. It would

be interesting for future research to recognise this, and test it further, as many different approaches

can be taken. Such approaches include replicating this study, but using larger sums of money e.g.

£10,000 instead of £10, and comparing mean percentage donations. Alternatively, applying the

different amounts used in the dictator game as the independent variable, and comparing the mean

percentage donations of the different experimental groups. Taking a different approach when

narrowing down the participant sample, future studies may choose to focus on comparing specific

42

professional sectors to one another. Some may assume the social sector to be the most altruistic,

whilst others may assume those in the media and broadcasting sector will show less altruistic

behaviour. A large comparative study, sampling participants from a variety of different sectors, may

help develop an altruism continuum scale for sectoral employment.

When scrutinising experimental methodology, this study appeared to limit participants’ endowment

decision to £1 increments, in the dictator game task. Through analysing percentage allocations from

the scenario, participants were found to exercise their unrestricted opportunity to use 5%

increments (e.g. allocating 25%). Similarly future research can implement this into the dictator game

task by supplying 50p coins, rather than £1 coins, thereby allowing participants a greater range of

donation choice. When examining the scenario, both experimental groups displayed lower levels of

perceived altruism, than the actual altruistic behaviour they later exhibited. Apart from the

previously mentioned influential possibilities, questions are raised as to whether participants lacked

empathetic concern due to their recipient being described as ‘Candidate Z’. Would participants have

empathised more with the scenario if ‘Candidate Z’ was given a randomly identifiable name? If so,

would this have resulted in a higher percentage allocation? Future research could test this by

replacing ‘Candidate Z’ with a well recognisable name, and comparing the results of perceived

altruism. Extending this concept of perceived altruism, future research could also look to compare

perceived and actual altruism levels on a deeper level. As this comparison was not the main focus of

this study, only a basic comparison was drawn upon.

Finally, this article proposes that only using dictator game experiments to test altruism is a limitation

in itself. The majority of altruism literature implements the dictator game as its method of collecting

results, but this study raises concerns about the dictator game’s content validity. Although monetary

donations are identified as a form of altruistic behaviour – with the dictator game demonstrating

this form very well – it does not define, nor encompass all aspects of altruism. As a result, this form

of testing should not be used to such a disproportional amount. Future research could gain better

43

insight by investigating other acts of altruism (incorporating relevant observations or testing), and

possibly combining/comparing this with dictator game results. While researchers such as Oliner

(2002) and Smolenska and Reykowski (1992) investigated altruism without implementing the

dictator game experiment, their results are limited by the extremity of the setting, since results were

based on individuals that rescued others during the holocaust. Distinctions however, should be

made between altruism and other helpful or self-sacrificial behaviour, as not all grand acts of

heroism may be purely altruistic (Mattis, et al,. 2009).

44

7. Conclusion

Against the homo economicus concept, this study aimed to capture levels of ‘pure altruism’ by using

the experiment’s complete anonymity to limit any identification, affection or gratitude from the

recipient, due to the potential ‘benefits’ this may give the dictator. Moreover, it experimentally

compared levels of pure altruism (as well as perceived altruism) between finance and non-finance

professionals. As expected, findings revealed finance professionals to be less altruistic than non-

finance professionals, with factors such as income, gender, and years worked within finance

impacting donation decisions.

This study opposes the homo economicus concept, derived from economic theory, and instead

proposes that human nature is better illustrated by Émile Durkheim’s more developed homo duplex

model. This model is able to encompass both the selfish and altruistic nature of humans, by

suggesting individuals move back and forth between 2 levels/phases. The individual state, and the

collective state. Originally developed in 1915, this model may initially appear outdated; however

Ehrenreich (2006) and Kluver et al. (2014) explain how homo duplex applies to modern society and

the corporate world. While the individual lower state refers to ordinary experiences, with one

pursuing their own goals, it recognises humans have social emotions that connect them with others,

whilst acknowledging these cultivated relations will essentially be beneficial to the individual in the

long-run. The collectivist state manifests through relationships, binding the individual to the social

entity as a whole. These 2 states are interlinked by uppers and downers, which symbolises contexts,

activities, or behaviours that initiate the change in state (Kluver, et al., 2014). Kluver et al. (2014,

pp.152-153) then continue to explain how corporate organisations facilitate level changes through

team building retreats, parties, and encouraging cohesion both in and out of work, which in turn

enhances altruism and compassion. This model takes a social approach to altruism, suggesting that

behaviour is influenced by its social environment.

45

This current study contributes to the field of altruism by beginning comparative investigations of

altruistic behaviour through professional sectors, creating a path for other researchers to further

analyse, examine and compare sectoral employment, along with their demographic variations. This is

beneficial to the world of altruism literature in a variety of different directions. For example

identifying which sectors have the highest/lowest amount of altruistic employees, or discovering a

cause and effect relationship between altruistic nature and an individual’s long-term line of work etc.

Specifically to the financial industry, this research can provide valuable insight into the nature of

finance professionals, as well as aid in attributing contributing factors and explanations for deviant

behaviours they may display (e.g. taking unnecessary risks in order to gain larger bonuses, at the

possible expense of their client’s fund). Furthermore, this study concludes to disagree with De

Bondt’s (2008), financial theory of ‘beautiful people’. The altruistic behaviour displayed across both

experimental groups suggests that individuals do not always strive for utility maximisation, or act in a

perfectly rational manner.

46

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52

9. Appendices

Appendix A – Information Sheet

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS

REC Reference Number: KCL/13/14- 1058

Title of study

The effect of culture and personality in the alternative ways stress is handled in the work place.

Invitation

I would like to invite you to take part in this study, which will form the basis of my postgraduate MSc

research project. Your participation is completely voluntary, so please be advised that refusal to take

part will not disadvantage you in any form (be it social or professional). To gain further information

on this study, please take the time to read below, and feel free to ask me any questions if you are in

need of further clarity.

What is the purpose of the study?

This study aims to uncover whether personality and culture have an effect on the way stress is

handled in the work place. Findings of this research can add greatly to this field of research, as it can

lead to better understanding of how stress is handled, and therefore lead to better solutions. This

research will also be comparing averaged results from a variety of different working sectors to

examine whether employees’ ways of handling stress differ between sectors.

Why have I been invited to take part?

This research aims to sample from a large population, as variety of working sectors, personality

types and cultural backgrounds are necessary. As to not cause any sampling biases, participants are

randomly selected from each of the different sectors being studied.

Do I have to take part?

No. Participation is completely voluntary, and you should only take part if it is your desire to do so.

Participation is completely anonymous; none of your personal details (e.g. name or phone number)

are required. You also have the right to withdraw your data during or after participating, if you no

longer wish to be part of the study until 15/08/2014.

What will happen to me if I take part?

If you still wish to take part after reading this information sheet, you will be asked to sign a consent

form and we will proceed with the study. The study is split into 3 sections. The 1st section is a short

interview asking a mixture of closed and open ended questions. For the 2nd section, after reading a

short explanation, the interviewer will step out of the room as this section involves a stress inducing

practical task that must be conducted individually. The interviewer will then rejoin the participant

53

for the 3rd section for another short interview simply asking some demographic questions. Overall,

this study should take approximately 15mins.

What are the possible risks of taking part?

Depending on the length of time each participant takes to complete the 2nd section of the study,

there might be slight delay in the length in time the study takes.

Will my taking part be kept confidential?

Upon analysis all data is completely anonymous, so the participant can NOT be linked to their data at

any given time. All information provided will be kept completely private and confidential.

How is the project being funded?

This research project is being Self-funded

What will happen to the results of the study?

All data will be averaged to see a general trend and then compared accordingly. These results will

then used in my final report. Should you wish to read a copy of the final report, it can be sent out to

you upon request.

Who should I contact for further information?

If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact me using the

following contact details:

Name: Hiwot Alemayehu

Email: Hiwot.alemayehu@kcl.ac.uk

What if I have further questions, or if something goes wrong?

If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the conduct of the

study you can contact King's College London using the details below for further advice and

information:

Alex Preda

Dept. of Management

King's College London

Franklin-Wilkins Building

150 Stamford Road

London SE1 9NH

Tel. 0207-848-4553

Email: alexandru.preda@kcl.ac.uk

Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part in this research.

54

Appendix B – Consent form

CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES

Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.

Title of Study: Altruism in the Financial Sector

King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: KCL/13/14- 1058

Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research

must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions

arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the

researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent

Form to keep and refer to at any time.

I confirm that I understand that by ticking/initialling each box I am consenting to this

element of the study. I understand that it will be assumed that unticked/initialled

boxes mean that I DO NOT consent to that part of the study. I understand that by not

giving consent for any one element I may be deemed ineligible for the study.

1. *I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated [INSERT DATE AND VERSION NUMBER] for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information and asked questions which have been answered satisfactorily.

2. *I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up to 15th August 2014.

3. *I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me. I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection Act 1998.

Please tick

or initial

Please tick

or initial

55

4. *I understand that my information may be subject to review by responsible individuals from the College for monitoring and audit purposes.

5. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to identify me in any publications

6. I agree that the research team may use my data for future research and understand that any such use of identifiable data would be reviewed and approved by a research ethics committee. (In such cases, as with this project, data would/would not be identifiable in any report).

7. I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and I wish to receive a copy of it.

8. I agree NOT to discuss the details of the interview, and the individual task.

__________________ __________________ _________________

Name of Participant Date Signature

__________________ __________________ _________________

Name of Researcher Date Signature

56

Appendix C – Scenario Sheet

Allocated group: A

Scenario 17:

You, and candidate Z have just been newly employed into your dream roles by company X.

Unfortunately , over the phone, the employer informs you that due to large unexpected budget cuts

in candidate Z’s department, the company will be unable to pay candidate Z’s sign-on bonus, whilst

you will still be receiving the advertised amount. Candidate Z is yet to be informed.

The employer suggests that if you were willing, they would be open to the suggestion of donating a

percentage of your sign-on bonus to candidate Z, as it is currently unknown for what period of time

candidate Z‘s department will be in this stage of difficulty. However the employer then stipulates

that if you were to agree to this, the donation would be made anonymous, and should candidate Z

decide to stay on this role, you can never tell them that their sign-on bonus was a donation from

you. It will simply appear to be a sign-on bonus paid by company X.

The employer then assures you that this is by no means obligatory, and guarantee’s that your

decision will not affect your position at the company, as this was an informal conversation, off the

record.

Question:

Would you be willing to donate a percentage of your sign-on bonus?

If yes, please state the percentage...................................................................

Yes No

57

Appendix D – Dictator Game Task

Similarly, the participant conducting scenario 17, in group B, has not been given cash for their

participation.

If you are willing to anonymously donate some of the cash in your large white envelope for this

random participant, please place it into the small brown envelope. Please note that this is not

compulsory.

Whether you have given away all of your participation cash, part of it, or none of it, please place this

brown envelope inside the box at the back of the room.

You must also make sure to keep your decision anonymous from the interviewer in the 3rd part of

the study, and be sure to keep your remaining participation cash in the original white envelope, so

the interviewer is unaware of your decision.

58

Appendix E – Full Interviewer Script

Introduction & Disso Details

Ask for the number on the envelope they have chosen and note it down

Hello my name is Hiwot Alemayehu and I am currently undergoing an MSc at KCL. Thank you

for agreeing to participate in this study.

My dissertation aims to capture the effect of culture and personality in the alternative

ways stress is handled in the work place.

I will be conducting this study in an identical manner within different working sectors, on 8

different occasions, with 80 different participants.

Study details

This study will be conducted in 3 parts:

o Part 1: Brief interview, conducted by interviewer (me)

o Part 2: Practical section, conducted individually. Enclosed within this envelope is

cash for task participation, and a scenario you must read in order to progress to the

3rd part of the study

o Part 3: Demographic questions for analytical purposes, conducted by interviewer

(me).

59

PART 1 - Interview

1. Which professional sector do you work in?

..............................................................................................................................

2. How many years have you been working within this sector?

3. Are you British born?

If No, how many years have you resided here? .....................................

4. Which culture would you say you were influenced by most?

How so?

..................................................................................................................................................................

..................................................................................................................................................................

..................................................................................................................................................................

5. What is the highest level of your parents’ educational background?

Mother: ....................................................................................................

Father: ......................................................................................................

<1 1-3 3-5 5-8 8-11 <11

Yes No

British Native

60

6. Out of a selection of low/medium/high, what levels of stress would you associate working

within your sector to?

Please explain your choice:

..................................................................................................................................................................

..................................................................................................................................................................

..................................................................................................................................................................

..................................................................................................................................................................

7. Which industry of work would you associate the LOWEST levels of stress with? And why?

Selection:..................................................................................................................................................

Explanation:..............................................................................................................................................

..................................................................................................................................................................

..................................................................................................................................................................

8. Which industry of work would you associate the HIGHEST levels of stress with? And why?

Selection:..................................................................................................................................................

Explanation:..............................................................................................................................................

..................................................................................................................................................................

..................................................................................................................................................................

9. When feeling stressed at work, do you conceal your stress and let it build up inside you, or

release it straight away? (e.g. crying, speaking to someone about it, making more plans/to-

do lists, shouting at someone releasing it in a form of anger etc).

..................................................................................................................................................................

Low

Medium

High

61

10. When feeling stressed whilst still in the office, what is a common thing you do to de-

stress?

..................................................................................................................................................................

11. Different types of exercise are commonly suggested as forms of reducing stress. Do you do

any kinds of exercise? If so which ones? And how often weekly?

Exercises:..................................................................................................................................................

Weekly?....................................................................................................................................................

PART 2 – Scenario & Task

This is the individual practical section. As mentioned at the beginning, you will find a

scenario in the envelope that you must read in order to finalise the 2nd part of the study.

Please do not open the smaller brown envelope inside until you have completed the

scenario in the white envelope 1st.

In total there are 40 different challenging tasks, and each envelope randomly contains 1 of

those tasks inside. Although the 40 tasks differ in nature, they all induce the same level of

stress.

It should be noted that as there are only 40 tasks, and 80 participants, each task will be

performed twice by two different people. Therefore each paired task, (and hence each

participant) is allocated to be in either group A or group B (this allocation is found at the top

of the scenario sheet)

In order to ensure complete anonymity, the random scenario allocation was conducted by

an independent adjudicator, and was not made note of. Therefore I, nor anyone else, is

aware of which task is contained within which envelope.

I will now leave the room to allow you to conduct the task individually.

When you have completed the task pop your head out the door so we can continue with the

3rd and final part of the task.

62

PART 3 – Demographic Questionnaire

Age

Gender

Ethnicity

White

If other, please specify ..............................................................

Black or Black British

If other, please specify ..............................................................

Asian or Asian British

If other, please specify ..............................................................

Arab

20-25 26-31 32-37 38-43 44-49 50+

Male

British

Other

Female

Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese Other

African Caribbean

Irish Other

63

Mixed/Multiple Ethnic Backgrounds

If other, please specify ..............................................................

Other

Please specify...................................................................................................................................

Highest Educational level

Area of study? ...................................................................................................

Income bracket (£)

**FINAL QUESTIONS**

12. On a scale of 1-10, how well do you think this study measured stress, culture and

personality?

.................................

13. What did this study measure best?

..................................................................................................................................................................

GCSE A-Level Bachelors Masters PHD

£20,000-£30,000 £30,001-£40,000 £40,001-£50,000 >£50,000 <£20,000

White & Black

Caribbean

White & Black

African

White &

Asian

Other mixed

background

64

Appendix F – Debrief

Altruism in the financial sector

Thank you for your participation in today’s study. Please read the following in order to gain a clearer

perspective on the purpose of this study.

This study aims to examine ‘true altruism’, and more specifically, explore whether a difference exists

between the altruistic behaviour of those who do, and do not, work within the financial sector.

Although there is currently a vast amount of research on altruism, it has never been investigated in

direct relation to an individual’s profession. The financial sector was specifically investigated due to

the perception of finance professionals having individualist mentalities. This comparative

investigation of altruistic behaviour is an important addition to current research, as results may

either support or contradict the benchmark economic theory of human behaviour. This is significant

for finance as much of its roots also implements this theory (e.g. Efficient Market Hypothesis),

modelling individuals as rational decision makers who preserve self-interest. This clearly contradicts

the mere existence of altruism.

For the purposes of this study, the 80 participants were split into 2 groups of 40. 1 group consisted

of professionals working within the financial sector, and the 2nd group, of individuals without an

educational or professional background within finance. Due to the imperative need to collect

unbiased results, the true nature of the study was not revealed. It was essential to this study that

the data collected reflected levels of ‘true altruism’, as opposed to collecting data of modified

behaviour with participants striving for social desirability.

All participants were also given the same scenario and practical task to read and complete for the

individual part of the study. This study will analyse altruistic behaviour using results from the

amount you may/may not have donated to the anonymous participant, in the individual practical

task. Please be assured that the purpose of this study is not to embarrass you, or cause you any

psychological harm, but simply to increase the validity of the collected data.

I want to reassure you that all of the information and data collected today is completely anonymous

and confidential, and there will be no way of identifying your individual responses. This study is NOT

interested in individual responses, as data from each group must be averaged in order to conduct

the comparison. However if you feel uncomfortable about the use of your anonymous data, you

have the right to withdraw your results until 15/08/2014.

As to not confound results, please refrain from discussing any details of this study, or your

experience as a participant, with anybody until after 15/08/2014.

Once again, your participation today is greatly appreciated, and will be of great aid within this

investigation of altruism. If you have further questions about the study, wish to know more about

the current research on altruism, or seek counselling due to psychological distress after

participation; please do not hesitate to contact me at hiwot.alemayehu@kcl.ac.uk

Many thanks,

Hiwot Alemayehu

65

Appendix G – Ethical Approval form

Research Ethics Office

King's College London

Rm 5.2 FWB (Waterloo Bridge Wing)

Stamford Street

London

SE1 9NH

4 August 2014

TO: Hiwot Alemayehu

SUBJECT: Approval of ethics application

Dear Hiwot,

KCL/13/14-1058 - Altruism in the Financial Sector

I am pleased to inform you that full approval for your project has been granted by the E&M Research Ethics Panel. Any specific conditions of approval are laid out at the end of this letter which should be followed in addition to the standard terms and conditions of approval, to be overseen by your Supervisor:

o Ethical approval is granted for a period of one year from 4 August 2014. You will not receive a reminder that your approval is about to lapse so it is your responsibility to apply for an extension prior to the project lapsing if you need one (see below for instructions).

o You should report any untoward events or unforeseen ethical problems arising from the project to the panel Chairman within a week of the occurrence. Information about the panel may be accessed at: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/committees/sshl/reps/index.aspx

o If you wish to change your project or request an extension of approval, please complete the Modification Proforma. A signed hard copy of this should be submitted to the Research Ethics Office, along with an electronic version to crec-lowrisk@kcl.ac.uk . Please be sure to quote your low risk reference number on all correspondence. Details of how to fill a modification request can be found at: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx

o All research should be conducted in accordance with the King’s College London Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research available at: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/iop/research/office/help/Assets/good20practice20Sept200920FINAL.pdf

66

If you require signed confirmation of your approval please email crec-lowrisk@kcl.ac.uk indicating why it is required and the address you would like it to be sent to.

Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to time to ascertain the status of your research.

We wish you every success with this work.

With best wishes

Annah Whyton – Research Support Assistant

On behalf of

E&M REP Reviewer

67

Appendix H – Data: Altruism (Dictator game task)

68

Appendix I – Date: Gender Differences

69

Appendix J – Data: Age differences

70

71

Appendix K – Data: Income Differences

72

Dependent Variable: Donation

Tukey HSD

Lower

Bound

Upper

Bound

2 1.300 .701 .360 -.72 3.32

3 2.056 .716 .050 .00 4.11

4 2.250* .733 .032 .14 4.36

5 3.071* .755 .002 .90 5.24

1 -1.300 .701 .360 -3.32 .72

3 .756 .624 .745 -1.04 2.55

4 .950 .644 .585 -.90 2.80

5 1.771 .669 .083 -.15 3.70

1 -2.056 .716 .050 -4.11 .00

2 -.756 .624 .745 -2.55 1.04

4 .194 .660 .998 -1.70 2.09

5 1.016 .684 .579 -.95 2.98

1 -2.250* .733 .032 -4.36 -.14

2 -.950 .644 .585 -2.80 .90

3 -.194 .660 .998 -2.09 1.70

5 .821 .703 .769 -1.20 2.84

1 -3.071* .755 .002 -5.24 -.90

2 -1.771 .669 .083 -3.70 .15

3 -1.016 .684 .579 -2.98 .95

4 -.821 .703 .769 -2.84 1.20

2

3

4

5

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

(I) Income

Mean

Difference (I-

J) Std. Error Sig.

95% Confidence

Interval

1

Multiple Comparisons

73

74

Dependent Variable: Donation

Tukey HSD

Lower

Bound

Upper

Bound

2 .450 .493 .890 -.97 1.87

3 1.050 .493 .230 -.37 2.47

4 1.350 .612 .202 -.41 3.11

5 2.083 .743 .059 -.05 4.22

1 -.450 .493 .890 -1.87 .97

3 .600 .514 .770 -.88 2.08

4 .900 .630 .614 -.91 2.71

5 1.633 .757 .220 -.54 3.81

1 -1.050 .493 .230 -2.47 .37

2 -.600 .514 .770 -2.08 .88

4 .300 .630 .989 -1.51 2.11

5 1.033 .757 .654 -1.14 3.21

1 -1.350 .612 .202 -3.11 .41

2 -.900 .630 .614 -2.71 .91

3 -.300 .630 .989 -2.11 1.51

5 .733 .840 .905 -1.68 3.15

1 -2.083 .743 .059 -4.22 .05

2 -1.633 .757 .220 -3.81 .54

3 -1.033 .757 .654 -3.21 1.14

4 -.733 .840 .905 -3.15 1.68

4

5

2

3

(I) Income

Mean

Difference (I-

J) Std. Error Sig.

95% Confidence

Interval

1

Multiple Comparisons

75

76

77

Appendix L – Data: Years worked within the financial sector

78

Dependent Variable: Donation

Tukey HSD

Lower

Bound

Upper

Bound

2 1.339 .641 .317 -.60 3.27

3 2.314* .725 .033 .12 4.50

4 2.548* .689 .009 .47 4.63

5 3.000* .662 .001 1.00 5.00

6 3.000* .662 .001 1.00 5.00

1 -1.339 .641 .317 -3.27 .60

3 .975 .706 .738 -1.16 3.11

4 1.208 .669 .476 -.81 3.23

5 1.661 .641 .128 -.27 3.60

6 1.661 .641 .128 -.27 3.60

1 -2.314* .725 .033 -4.50 -.12

2 -.975 .706 .738 -3.11 1.16

4 .233 .750 1.000 -2.03 2.50

5 .686 .725 .932 -1.50 2.88

6 .686 .725 .932 -1.50 2.88

1 -2.548* .689 .009 -4.63 -.47

2 -1.208 .669 .476 -3.23 .81

3 -.233 .750 1.000 -2.50 2.03

5 .452 .689 .985 -1.63 2.53

6 .452 .689 .985 -1.63 2.53

1 -3.000* .662 .001 -5.00 -1.00

2 -1.661 .641 .128 -3.60 .27

3 -.686 .725 .932 -2.88 1.50

4 -.452 .689 .985 -2.53 1.63

6 0.000 .662 1.000 -2.00 2.00

1 -3.000* .662 .001 -5.00 -1.00

2 -1.661 .641 .128 -3.60 .27

3 -.686 .725 .932 -2.88 1.50

4 -.452 .689 .985 -2.53 1.63

5 0.000 .662 1.000 -2.00 2.00

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Multiple Comparisons

(I) Years in Finance

Mean

Difference

(I-J) Std. Error Sig.

95% Confidence

Interval

79

Appendix M – Data: Perceived Altruism (Scenario)

80

Appendix N – Data: Actual vs. Perceived Altruism