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Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of PoliticsAuthor(s): Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. GencoSource: World Politics, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Jul., 1977), pp. 489-522Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010037

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CLOUDS,

CLOCKS,

AND

THE

STUDY

OF

POLITICS

By GABRIEL A. ALMOND and STEPHEN J.GENCO*

IN

its

eagerness o become

scientific,

olitical cience

has in recent

decades ended

o ose

contactwith tsontological ase.

t has tended

to treat olitical

vents

nd

phenomena

s natural vents

ending

hem-

selves o

the ameexplanatory

ogic

as is found n physics

nd the

other

hard sciences.

his tendencymay

be understood

n

part

as

a

phase

n

the scientificevolution,s a diffusion,ntwosteps, fontologicalnd

methodological

ssumptions

romthe strikingly

uccessful

ard

sci-

ences: first o psychology

nd economics,

nd then

fromthesebell-

wether

human

sciences o sociology,

nthropology,olitical

science,

and even

history.

n adopting he

agenda

of

hard science,

he social

sciences,

nd political

cience

n

particular,

ere

encouraged y the

neopositivist

chool

f

the

philosophy

f

science

which

egitimated

his

assumption

of ontological

and

meta-methodological

omogeneity.

Morerecently,omephilosophersfscience nd somepsychologistsnd

economists

ave had

second

houghts

bout

theapplicability

o

human

subject

matters

f

strategy

sed

in hard science.

t

may

be useful

o

bring hese

rguments

o the attention

f

political

cientists.

POPPER

S

METAPHORS

Karl

Popper,

who

along

with R. B.

Braithwaite,

arl

Hempel,

and

ErnestNagel has arguedthethesis

f

meta-methodologicalomoge-

neity,more

recently

as stressed he

heterogeneity

f

reality,

nd its

unamenabilityo

a

single

model

of scientific

xplanation.

e

uses the

metaphor

f

clouds and

clocks

to

represent

he

commonsense otions

of

determinacy

nd indeterminacy

n

physical

ystems.

e asks us to

imagine

continuum

tretching

rom

he

most

rregular,

isorderly,

and unpredictable

clouds"

n the eft

o the

most

egular,

rderly,

nd

predictable

clocks"

n

the

right.

s the

best

xample

f

a

deterministic

system ear theclock-extreme,oppercites hesolarsystem. oward

this nd

of the continuum

e

would find

uch

phenomena

s

pendu-

lums,

precision

locks,

nd

motor

ars.As

an

example

f

a

system

ear

the

other,

ndeterminate,

nd of the

continuum,

e

cites

a

cluster f

gnats

or small

flies

n which each

insectmoves

randomly xcept

hat

*

An

earlier

version

f

this

paper

was delivered

t the

Edinburgh

PSA

Congress,

August

976.







490 WORLD POLITICS

it turns

ack

oward he enter hen t strays

oofar

rom

he warm.

Near this xtreme e wouldfind as clouds, heweather,chools

f

fish, uman ocietiesnd,perhaps bit loser oward he enter,ndi-

vidualhuman eings nd animals.

The Newtonianevolutionn physicsopularizedhenotion-which

was to persist orapproximately50 years-that

hiscommonsense

arrangementas n error. he successfNewton'sheory

n

explaining

andpredictingmultitudefcelestialnd

earthbound

vents y

his

laws of motion

ed most hinkers-although

otNewton imself-to

embracehepositionhat

he

universe

nd

all

its

parts

were

y

nature

clocklikend nprincipleompletelyredictable.henomenahat

ad

the ppearancef ndeterminacyereviewed s beingmerely oorly

understood;n time, hey lsowere xpectedo be found egular

nd

predictable.hus, he eigning odel

f

cience

fter

ewton

ffirmed

that ll

naturewas governed y

deterministicaws

or,

to

put it

in

Popper'smetaphor,all clouds re clocks-even he most loudy

f

clouds."'

In

the 920'S, thedevelopment

f

quantum heoryhallengedhis

clocklike odel fnature ndsupportedheview hatndeterminacy

andchancewere undamentaloall natural rocesses. ith his iscov-

ery, opper'smetaphor as inverted;

ow

thedominant iew

held

that

to ome egree

ll

clocks

re

clouds;

r n other

ords,

hat

nly

clouds xist, hough louds

f

very

ifferent

egrees

f

cloudiness."'

Many cientistsnd philosophersreeted

his

hange

f

model

with

relief,incet seemed ofree hem

rom he

nightmare

f

determinism

that

enied he fficacy

f

human

hoices nd

goals.

ButPopper oeson toarguehis centraloint,hat indeterminism

is not

nough"

o

account or he pparentutonomy

f

human

deas

in

thephysical orld.

If

determinism

s

true,

hen hewhole

world

is

a

perfectlyunning

lawless

lock,ncluding

ll

clouds,

ll

organisms,

all animals,llmen. f,onthe ther and, ierce's rHeisenberg'sr

some ther orm f

ndeterminism

s

true,

hen heer hance

lays

major

ole

n

our

physical

orld. ut s chance

eallymore atisfactory

than

determinism

"3

Popper nswers

n

thenegative. lthoughhysicistsndphilosophers

have ried o buildmodels

fhuman hoice ased

pon heunpredict-

ability

f

quantumumps,4 e rejects

hese

s being

oo

circumscribed.

1

Karl R. Popper, Of

Clouds and Clocks:

An

Approach

o the

Problem f Ration-

ality

nd the Freedomof Man,"

in

Popper,

ObjectiveKnowledge:

An

Evolutionary

Approach

Oxford:

Clarendon ress

972), 2io; emphasis

n

original.

2

ibid., I3; emphasis

n original.

3

Ibid.,

26; emphasis

n

original.

4ArthurH. Compton,

he Freedomof

Man

(New

Haven:

Yale University ress

I935) .

This content downloaded from 164.41.221.145 on Fri, 15 Aug 2014 21:49:46 UTCAll bj JSTOR T d C di i






CLOUDS,

CLOCKS, AND POLITICS

491

He acknowledges

hat

the

quantum-jump

odel

may

be a

model

for . .

snap

decisions....

But

re

snap

decisions

eally

o

very

nter-

esting? re heyharacteristic

fhuman

ehavior-of ational

uman

behavior?" e concludes:I donot hink o.... Whatweneedfor

understanding

ational uman

ehavior-and

ndeed nimal

ehavior

-is

something

ntermediate

n

character,

etween

erfect

hance

nd

perfect

eterminism-somethingntermediateetween

erfect

louds

and

perfectlocks.... For

obviously hatwewant

s

to understand

how such

non-physical

hings

s

purposes,

eliberations,lans,

eci-

sions,heories,

ntentions,ndvalues, an

play

part

n

bringingbout

physical

hanges

n

the

physical

orld"5

Popper'smethod farrivingt a solutiono thisproblemeems,

like

the

problem

tself,

o be relevant

o

politics

nd

political

cience.

His

conjectures that he

roblem

s

essentially

neof

control;.e.,

he

controlf

behavior

ndother

spects

f

thephysical orld

y

human

ideas

or

mental

bstractions.

hus,he

states hat the olutionmust

explain

reedom;nd it

must

lso explainhow

freedom

s

not ust

chance ut,

ather,

he

result

f

a subtle

nterplay

etween

omething

almostandomrhaphazard,nd omethingike restrictiverselec-

tive ontrol-such

s an aimor

standard-though

ertainlyot

cast-

iron

ontrol."

ccordingly,e

restrictshe

cope

f cceptable

olutions

to

those

hat

conform

o the dea

of

combining

reedomnd

control,

andalso othe

deaof

plasticontrol,'s

I shall

all t n

contradistinc-

tion o

a

'cast-iron'ontrol."'

Popper eaches

n

evolutionary

olution

o this

problem-one hat

stresses

rial

nderror

limination,

r variation

nd

selectiveetention.7

Only uch theoryanaccommodatelasticontrol,ndthushuman

freedom.

nce this s

seen,

he

problem fthe

relationshipetween

ideas

nd

behaviorecomes

olvable: For

the ontrolf

ourselvesnd

of

our

actions

y

our

theoriesnd

purposess

plasticontrol.

We are

not

orcedosubmit

urselvesothe

ontrolf

our heories,or

we can

discuss hem

ritically,

nd we

can

reject hem

reelyf

we

think hat

they

all

hort f our

regulativetandards.

ot

onlydo our

theories

controls,butwe cancontrolurtheoriesandeven ur tandards):

there

s

a

kind

f

feedbackere."8

Popper oncludes:

We have

seenthat

t is

unsatisfactoryo

look

upon

he

world s

a

closed hysical

ystem-whetherstrictly

eter-

5Popper

(fn.

), 228,

229;

emphasis

n

original.

6

ibid.,

3I-32;

emphasisn

original.

7

See

Donald T.

Campbell,"Variation

nd

Selective

Retention

n

Socio-cultural

Evolution,"

eneral

ystems

earbook,

IV (i969).

8

Popper

fn.

),

240-4I;

emphasisnoriginal.







492

WORLD POLITICS

ministic

ystem

r

a systemnwhichwhatevers

not trictlyetermined

is simply ueto chance; n such view f the

world uman reative-

ness nd human reedoman onlybe

illusions.... I havetherefore

offereddifferentiew ftheworld-one nwhich he hysical orld

is an open ystem.his s compatible ith he

viewof theevolution

of

ife s a process f trial-and-error

limination;nd it allowsus to

understandationally,hough arfrom ully,

he emergencef bio-

logicalnoveltynd the growth f humanknowledge nd human

freedom."9

Thus Popper ells s that hemodels f

explanationppropriateo

thephysicalciences ill not nable s to come o gripswithhuman

and cultural henomena,nd thatwhilewe can increase ur under-

standing

f

hem, e cannot xplain hem ullyecause f heir reative

andemergentroperties.

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROPERTIES

OF

POLITICS

Popper's ssay resentss with hreeways

f

conceptualizing

ocial

reality-as clock, s a cloud,

ndas a

system

f

plastic

ontrols.

olit-

icalreality, hich t sthe ask fpoliticalcienceo

explain,

s

clearly

best apturedy he hirdonceptualization.t consistsf deas-human

decisions, oals,purposes-in

onstantnd intensenteraction

ith

other

deas,

uman

ehavior,

nd

the

physical

orld.At the enter f

this

omplexystem

re

choices nd decisions-decisions

o

command,

obey, ote,

makedemands.

he

political

niverse as

organization;

elites

makedecisions

o

command

r

notto

command,

hat o

com-

mand,

ow

o

mplement

ommands.itizens

nd

subjects

akedeci-

sions ocomply,owto complyrnot ocomply;o makedemands,

how to

makedemands,

r not to makedemands. hat is

the

heart

of

politics,he ubject

matter

ur

discipline

s committedo

exploring

andunderstanding.

The relations

mong

hese

ventsre

not

imply eactive,

s

are the

encounters

f

physicalbjects; hey

renot

readily

menable

o

cause-

and-effect

clocklike"

odels

r

metaphors.

asically,

his s because

the

ehavioral

epertories

f

elites

nd

citizens

renotfixed

epertories.

Theactorsnpoliticsavememories;heyearn romxperience.hey

have

goals, spirations,

alculative

trategies.emory,earning,oal

seeking,

nd

problemolving

ntervene

etween

cause"

nd

"effect,"

between

ndependent

nd

dependent

ariable.

Political ecisions

re

notmade nd

mplemented

n

a

vacuum; hey

are

subject

o

a

complex rray

f

constraints

nd

opportunities.

hese

9lbid.,

54-55.







CLOUDS, CLOCKS,

AND POLITICS

493

constraints-the

ecessities

f

politics-range

rom

he

relatively

ard

variety

epresentedyenvironmental

r

ecological

imits

o

the

quite

soft

arietyllustrated

y

passing

ashionsnd fads.Constraints

efine

the operationalilieu" fpoliticalctors'0nd xhibitaryingegrees

of

manipulability.

ome, ike

geographyr the evel

f

technology,

re

difficultoalter

ven

n

the ongrun;

n

the

hort

un,

hey

re

prac-

tically

onmanipulable.thers,ike ultural

alues

nd

public

pinion,

arerelatively

asy o

manipulaten

some

ircumstances,ore ntrac-

table

n

others.

ut

manipulation

s

very arely

mpossible

n

principle.

Even

relatively

ardenvironmentalonstraints-suchs the

relation

between

materialesource

eeds nd

population-can

ometimese

altereds a consequencef man'screative,daptiveapacities.he

agricultural

evolutionome

o,ooo

earsgo

multiplied

ymany

imes

thenumberf

people

apable fbeing

ustained

n a

given

pace,

nd

the

ndustrial

evolutionfthe ast

wo

enturies

ultiplied

t

bymany

times

gain.

These

ontologicalropertiesf

political

ffairs

re

plain

for ll

to

see;they renot

matters

n which

easonable

ersons

an

differ.ocial

scientistsho-for

whatever

hilosophicalrmethodologicaleasons-deny hem nd viewhuman ehaviors

simplyeactive

nd

conse-

quently

usceptibleo

the ame

xplanatory

ogic s

"clocklike"atural

phenomenare

rying

ofashion

science ased

n

empiricallyalsified

presuppositions.hat

becomes lear

when heir

xplanatory

chemes

are

thought

f n

terms

f

their

wn

behaviors

scientists.

nsofar

s

they

cknowledge he

importance

f

scientific

emory,

cientific

creativity,alculative

trategies,

oalseeking,

nd problem

olvingn

their wnwork,heymustnsome egreecknowledgeheseualities

in

the

human

nd socialmaterial

hey

nvestigatend seek o

explain.

The

implication

f

these

omplexities

fhuman

nd social

eality

s

that

he

explanatory

trategy

f

thehard

ciences

as

only

limited

application

o

the ocial

ciences.

odels, rocedures,nd

methodolo-

gies reated

o

explore

world n

which

locklike

nd

cloudlikehar-

acteristics

redominateill

capturenly part

f

the much

richer

world

of

social nd

political

nteraction.

hus,

a

simple earch or

regularitiesnd lawful elationshipsmong ariables-a trategyhat

has ed

to

tremendous

uccesses

n

the

physical

ciences-will ot

ex-

plain

ocial

utcomes,

ut

only

ome

f

the

onditions

ffectinghose

outcomes.

Because he

roperties

f

political

eality

ifferrom

hose f

physical

10

Harold

Sprout

nd

Margaret

prout,

he

Ecological

erspectiven

Human

Affairs

(Princeton: rinceton

niversity

ress

965).







494

WORLD

POLITICS

reality,heproperties

f

political egularities

lsodifferrom hose f

physical egularities.

he regularitiese discover

re soft.

hey

are

soft ecause

hey

re he utcomes

f

processes

hat

xhibit

lastic

ather

than ast-ironontrol.hey re mbeddednhistorynd involve e-

currentpassings-through"

f large

numbersf human

memories,

learning rocesses,

uman

oal-seekingmpulses,

nd choices

mong

alternatives.he regularities

e discoverppear

ohave short

alf-

life.

Theydecay uickly

ecause f

thememory,reativeearching,

and earninghat nderliehem.ndeed, ocial

ciencetselfmay

on-

tributeo thisdecay,

ince earningncreasingly

ncludes ot only

learning

rom

xperience,ut

from

cientificesearch

tself.

The softnessndhistoricaloundednessfpoliticalheoriesan be

illustratedy a few xamples.

olitical cientistsre

ustifiablyroud

of

their heory

f voting ehavior.

t is the

losest

hing

o

a

scientific

theoryhatwe

have. t

has

generated

set fwhat

ppear

o

be "cover-

ing aws"-demographic

nd attitudinal

orrelates

f

the

voting

eci-

sion, nductively

rrived t.

The deductive

ownsianmodel

of

the

consequences

or

partyystems

f

different

istributionsf voter tti-

tudes ooks ike nevenmore asic aw

of

politics.

ut

even

casual

review fthefindings

fvoting esearchnthe ast hirtyears hows

how

unstablehese

egularitiesre,

nd

how

far hort

f

hard cience

our

effortso stabilizehemmust nevitably

all.Modern esearchn

voting

ehavior

ade

tsgreatestrogress

n studiesf Americanlec-

tions

n

the

950's

and early

960's,

a

period

f

rapid

conomic

rowth

and low-intensityolitics.

tudentsf American oting ehaviorn

that

eriod

maintainedhey ould xplain

nd

predict

mericanoting

behaviorn thebasis f"partydentification"nd "candidatemage";

issues eemed oplay nly secondaryole."The

result f his fforto

produce hard ausal

xplanationasa psychological

heoryfvoting

behavior ased

n

party

dentificationnd candidate

mage.But

this

theory

as

soon o be

challenged y

studies

one

n

the

early970's

which

nclude

atafrom he

930's

and ate 96o's.These

arlier nd

later

eriods

how

American oters

s

making

heir

hoices

n

the

basis fcandidates'ssue

ositionso

a far

reater

xtenthan

was true

ofthe

950's

andearly

960's.

Recent riterspeak fthe decomposi-

tion"

f

the

partyystem,

f

the ndividuationf

voting ehavior,nd

of

the

ideologization"

f

American

olitics.'2

nd one

of the eading

11

Angus Campbell nd others,

he

Voter

Decides

(Evanston,

ll.: Row

Peterson

I954);

Campbell ndothers,

he American

Voter

New

York:

Wiley

960).

12

NormanNie,

SidneyVerba, nd

John

R.

Petrocik,

he

Changing

American

Voter

(Cambridge:Harvard

University

ress

976), 345ff;

Walter

Dean

Burnham,

ritical

Elections nd the

Mainspringsf

American

olitics New

York:

Norton 97o).







496 WORLD

POLITICS

variables

ad

ittle

ndependent

mpact

n

the

policy

ariables.

hen

controlled

or evel

f

economic

evelopment,

he ffectf

these

olit-

ical differences

as washed

way.

This

finding

ed

to

theremarkable

conclusionhat conomic nd other nvironmentalariablesxplain

public

olicy

much etterhan

olitical ariables.'6

There re

two

spects

f

this esearch

n

public

olicy

hat

renote-

worthy

or

ur

purposes.he

first

s

the

xtraordinaryonstriction

f

the

imendspace

erspectivesnthis

ffortotest

global

roposition

concerning

he

relationship

etween

conomics,olitics,

nd

public

policy. he

fact

hat hese

were

heAmerican

tatesnthe

1950's-a

period f

political

tability-rather

han n

the

1930's,did not

reg-

ister s limitinghekinds f inferenceshat ouldbe drawn. olit-

ical

cientists

tudying

hese roblems

rought

o

historical

erspective

to

bear

n

their esearch-nomemoriesf

war,

evolution,

nd

depres-

sion, nd

oftheir ell-known

elationships

o

politics

nd

public

olicy.

Second,

here

as

no

recognition

f the

fact hat

nvironmental

ari-

ables annot

irectlyroduce

ublic

olicy, hat

olitical

hoicemust

in

the

nature

f

the ase ntervene

etween

hem,

nd

that

istorically

thisnterventionas beenveryargendeed.

Socialmobilization

heory

as

sought

o

explain

nd

predictrends

toward

politicization,

emocratization,nd

de-ideologizationrom

trends

oward

rbanization,

ndustrialization,

ommunication,ndedu-

cation-only odiscover

hat

when

hese

elationships

re

examined

historically,

uman

ntractability

nd

inventiveness,

s

well as

sheer

chance,

omplicateshese

atterns

normously.'7

he

prophetf

the

endof

deology'8as

become

heprophet

f

the

postindustrial

ociety'

and, urrently,heprophetfsocial isjunctionsndculturalxhaus-

tion."0

ocial

cientists

re

finding

hat

hey

o

a

better

ob

of

xplaining

when

hey

ollowhe

ourse

fhistory,

sing

ophisticated

ethodolo-

gies

to

isolate

ecessary

equences

nd

constraints,

utalways

ware

of

the

roleof

chance

ndhuman

nventivenessn

producingheout-

comes

hey

reseeking

o

explain.

In

their

ascination

ith

owerful

egularitiesnd

uniformities

hat

have

he

propertiesf

causal

necessityr

high

probability,

ocial

cien-

16

See

Thomas

R.

Dye,

Understanding

ublic

Policy

Englewood

Cliffs,

.J.:

Prentice-

Hall

I972),

243-48,

or

a review

of this

iterature

nd a

fuller

ormulationf

these

findings

nd

inferences.

17For

a review

of

this

iterature,

ee

GabrielA.

Almond, cottC.

Flanagan,

nd

RobertJ.

Mundt,

ds.,

Crisis,

Choice

nd

Change Boston:

Little

Brown

973),

8ff.

18

Daniel

Bell, The

End

of

deology New

York:

Free

Press

96o).

'9

Daniel

Bell,The

Coming

f

Post-Industrial

ocietyNew

York:

Free

Press

973).

20

Daniel

Bell,

The

Cultural

Contradictionsf

Capitalism

New

York:

Basic

Books

I976).







CLOUDS,

CLOCKS,

AND

POLITICS

497

tists

ave verlookedhe

fact

hat

much fsocial nd

politicalhange

hastobe

explained eithery

trongegularities

or

by

weak

regulari-

ties,

ut

by accidental

onjunctions-byvents

hat

had a

low

proba-

bilityfoccurring.he concatenationfparticulareaderswithpar-

ticular

istoricalontextss a matter f chance-offortune-rather

than

ecessity.cholarsan

explain hyRussia

was

ripe

or evolution

in

9I7; and they an explain

ome spects

f

Lenin's ersonality

nd

operationalode; butthey

annot xplainwhy he

two conjoined o

produce

heBolshevik

evolution,nly hat heyonjoined ychance.

The

problems similar o that

f thebiologisteeking o explain he

emergencef a

new species. e can describen

ecological

iche

n

termsf onstraintsndopportunities;ut or heniche obe occupied,

the hance ccurrencef an

appropriate utationr

setof mutations

is

required.

Although

n

somerespects

he problems similar o thatof

the

biologist,tdiffers

n

fundamental

ays.

The

interplay

etween

he

constraintsf

the cological

iche

nd

the

andomness

f

he

rocess

f

mutation,o besure,s a matter

f

trial

nd error.

he search rocess

is a random ne,and largely enetic.n human ffairs,he search

process

n

addition

as

mportant

onscious,lanfulspects.t nvolves

not only

hechance

oncatenation

f a

revolutionaryolitical iche

with

Lenin, utwith scheming,ontriving,

illing,mprovising

Lenin,

onstantlyrobing,esting,nd earning

bout

he

constraints

and

opportunitiesithin he

niche

he

is

strivingooccupy. nce he

does

occupyt,

he transforms

heniche

nd

the

population

ccupying

it n

ways

hatwill

onstrainbut gain

not

determine)uturedaptive

efforts.f we areto understandolitical eality, e havetocome o

grips ot nlywith ts

determinatespects ut,most

articularly,ith

its

reative,daptive,

roblem-solvingspects.

or

t

s this

ast harac-

teristichich

s

the

ssentially

uman

roperty,

ndwhichs

the

nique

mechanism

nd

explanatoryhallenge

f

the

ocial ciences.

THE CLOCK

MODEL OF

POLITICAL SCIENCE

The now

dominant,

behavioral"

tradition

n

political

cience

endstorestn threepistemologicalndmethodologicalssumptionshich

it

has

taken

rom hehard ciences:

I)

that he

purpose

f

science

s

the

discovery

f

regularities

n,

and

ultimately

aws

of,

social

and

political

rocesses;2)

that

cientific

xplanation

eans

he

deductive

subsumption

f

individual

vents

nder

covering

aws";

and

(3)

that he

nly cientifically

elevant

elationships

etween

vents

n

the

world re thosewhich

correspond

o

a

physicalisticonceptionf







498 WORLD

POLITICS

causal onnection.hese ssumptions

rehighlynterrelated,nd each

carriesmportantubstantivemplications

or he tudy

f

politics.

(i) The emphasisn generalizations

n politicalcience

must

irst

be understoodn historicalontext.When David Easton rguedn

I953 that knowledgeecomes ritical

nd reliablewhen t increases

in generalitynd internallyonsistent

rganization,hen, n short,

it s cast n the orm fsystematic

eneralizedtatementspplicableo

large

umbers

f

particularases,"'"

e

was

peakinggainst

tradition

of deographic,escriptive,oncumulative,

nd nstitutionalase tudies

that ad dominated uch fthe

disciplinewith fewnotable xcep-

tions) or everal ecades. similar

oncernnimatedhebehavioral

polemicsf Truman ndothersn theearly

95O's.22

The long-term

result f

this raiseworthy

ttempto shift mphasis

rom

escription

to

explanation,owever,asbeen

he nshrining

f

thenotion fgen-

eralization

s the sine qua

non of

the

scientific

spirations

f

the

profession.his is perhapsmostreadily pparentn the recently

burgeoningscope nd methods"iterature.

or

example, carrow,

n

his ComparativeoliticalAnalysis,

nnounceshat Generalizations

are the hallmarkf all scientificndeavor,"23hileConway nd

Feigert,

n

Political nalysis:

n

Introduction,eclare

hat

the unc-

tionof science s

generallyerceived

s

being he

establishmentf

general

aws

or

theories

hich

xplain

he

behavior ithwhich

he

particulariscipline

s concerned."24ven

a

sophisticatedtudy,

uch

as

Przeworski's

nd Teune's

Logic of Comparative

ocial

nquiry,

states

omewhat

ogmatically

hat:

The

pivotal ssumption

f

this

analysiss

that

ocial cienceesearch,ncludingomparativenquiry,

should nd can leadto general tatementsbout ocialphenomena.

This

assumptionmplies

hat

human

nd

social

behavior an be

ex-

plained

n

terms

f

general

aws stablished

y

observation.ntroduced

here

s

an

expression

f

preference,

his

ssumption

ill notbe

logi-

cally ustified."25

The

substantive

mpact

f this

mphasis

n

generalizations

s to

focus

he ttention

f

research

n

regularities,niformities,

nd

stable

21

Easton,

The Political

ystem

New

York:

Knopf

953), 55.

22

David B. Truman,

"The

Impact

on

PoliticalScience of the Revolution n the

Behavioral ciences," eprinted

n Heinz

Eulau, ed.,

Behavioralismn

Political cience

(New York:

Atherton

969).

23

Howard A. Scarrow, omparative

oliticalAnalysis: n IntroductionNew York:

Harper & Row

i969),

33.

24

MargaretConway and

Frank B.

Feigert,Political

Analysis:An Introduction

(Boston:Allyn nd

Bacon

972),

17.

25Adam

Przeworski nd

HenryTeune, The Logic

of

Comparativeocial Inquiry

(New

York:

Wiley 970),

4.







CLOUDS,

CLOCKS, AND POLITICS

499

patternsf

association

npolitical

rocesses

t theexpense

f

unique

or

low-probabilityvents r

political utcomes.

s

Frohock

xpresses

it

n

The Nature f

Political

nquiry,Sciences

concerned

ith

stab-

lishing ausal elationsndgeneralaws.To dothis he ocial cientist

must

oncentrate

n

systematic

atterns

fhuman onduct.

nly

s

an

events

a

recurring

nstance

f

general

lass an t

be

treated

cientifi-

cally.""

We arenot

rguing

ere

or

he

view hat

egularities

o not

occur

in

political

rocessesrthat

alid

generalizationsannot

e made.

As

we

noted

bove, olitical

egularities-albeit

oft-clearly

xist nd

are

crucial o

politicalnquiry.

ather,ur

criticisms aimed

t

positions

that eeregularitiesndgeneralizationss theonly roper bjectsf

scientific

olitical

nquiry. his

seems o us

an

unnecessaryelimita-

tion f

the cope

f

the

discipline'subjectmatter.

f

political

eality

is

best iewed s a

conjunctionf

hoice nd

constraint,nd as

a

source

of

both

egularity

nd nnovation,hen

olitical

cience

hould ot

be

limitedoa

consideration

fonly art fthis

eality.

pure ocus

n

generalizations

s

"the

hallmarkf

ll scientific

ndeavor"

ould

eem

tocondemnt to ust uch limitation.

(2) The

concern ith

eneralizationsnd

regularities-and

he

on-

comitant

illingnesso imit

he

cope

f

political

cience

oonly hose

aspects f

political

ealityhat re

generalizable-is

losely

ssociated

with

particular

onception

f

explanation

n

political

nquiry.

his

positions

also

reflected

n

the

scope

ndmethods"

iterature.

lan

Isaak,

n

his

Scope

nd

Method

f

Political

cience,

eclares

hat

olit-

ical

scientistsust ccepthe scientificact f ife" hat everyoundexplanation

nd

prediction

ontains

t

east ne

generalization;ithout

generalizationshereould

be

no

explanations

r

predictions."27imi-

larly,

onway

nd

Feigert

rgue

hat

Explanationsn

scienceequire

...

laws

or

theories

hich

rewell

stablished....

xplanationccurs

when

he

acts o

be

explained

an

be

deduced

s

a

logical

onsequence

of

the

aws

or

theorynd

..

other nown

acts."28

Themodel

f

explanation

lluded o

here sthe

o-called

covering

law"ordeductive-nomologicalD-N) model evelopednthephiloso-

phy

f

cience yR. B.

Braithwaite,29

arl

Hempel,30

ndothers. he

26

Fred

M.

Frohock,

The

Nature

of

Political

nquiry

(Homewood,

Ill.:

Dorsey

I967),

14I.

27

Isaak, The

Scope

and Method

of

Political

Science

(Homewood, Ill.:

Dorsey

i969), 8o.

28

Conway

nd

Feigert

fn.

4), 27.

29

Braithwaite,

cientific

xplanation

Cambridge:

ambridge

niversityress

953).

30

Hempel,

Aspects

f

Scientific

xplanation

New

York:

Free

Press

965);

see also

ErnestNagel,TheStructurefScience New York:Harcourt, race ndWorld

96i).







500

WORLD POLITICS

basic deaunderlyinghis

model s that

omethings explained

hen

it has been

hown o be

a memberf a more eneral lass f

things.

"To explainomethings

toexhibitt

s a special ase fwhat s

known

ingeneral.""3his s achieved,ccordingo themodel,when hepar-

ticular ase s deduced

rom more

eneralaw (or setof aws)

that

"covers"

tand all other

elevantlyimilar

ases. hat s why enerali-

zations lay

uch fundamentalole

n deductive

xplanations.

The explanatory

ower

fthe

D-N

model erives

rom he

fact hat

deduction

rom overingaws ogically

ecessitates

hat

which

s de-

duced.

he deduction

explains"y elling s that,

n

the

asis

fwhat

we already now the

generalization),

he ase

n

question

as to be

expected:thadto occur heway t did.32hisnotionf"itwasto be

expected"

tands t the

enter fthedeductiveonception

f

explana-

tion, nd

accounts or

heclose ssociationetween

xplanation

nd

prediction

n themodel.33

oradherents

f

he

D-N

model,

n

explana-

tion

that

would not be

equally apableof supporting

prediction

wouldnot

ualifys a true

xplanation.34t s not

urprising,herefore,

that losed

deterministic

ystems-"clockodels"

n Popper's

ermi-

nology-aremost menableoD-N explanation.s Hempelputs t:

"The best xamplesf

explanationsonforming

o the

D-N

model re

based nphysicalheories

f

deterministic

haracter.... [T]he

laws

specified

y

uch theory

or

he

hanges

fstate

redeterministic

n

the ense

hat, iven

he

tate

f

hat

ystem

t

any

ne

ime,

hey

eter-

mine ts

tate

t

any

ther,

arlier

r

later,

ime."35

Itisclear

hat he

D-N

model

oses tsusefulness

o

the

degree

hat

there reexceptions

o the

aw or aws

warranting

he

xplanation

n

question.fwecannotegitimatelyaintainhat allA's areB's"and

must

ettle

or

law

assertingnly

hat

some

A's

are

B's,"

then

he

deductive

ink

s dissolved

nd our

xplanation

fthe ccurrencef B

continueso

be

problematic.

his

state

f

affairs,

owever,

s

ust

what

is

mplied

y

henotion

f

plastic

ontrol.

lasticity

eans

hat

we

can

31

AbrahamKaplan,

The

Conduct

f

Inquiry San

Francisco:

Chandler

964),

339.

32Ibid

33

aul Diesing, atterns

f

Discoveryn the Social Sciences Chicago: Aldine

Ather-

ton

97I),

164.

See Hempel

(fn. 30), 367,

wherethis

position

s maintained

while its

obverse-

that validprediction

ust lso

qualify

s an

explanation-is

ut

aside. Thismodifica-

tion of the

so-called

symmetry

hesis f

explanation

nd

prediction"

as

not

always

been appreciated y political

cientists.

ee, e.g.,

Oran

Young,

"The Perils f

Odysseus:

On Constructing

heories n International

elations,"

n

Raymond

anter ndRichard

Ullman, eds., Theory

and

Policy

in International

elations

Princeton:

Princeton

University

ress

972),

183.

35

Hempel (fn. 30),

351;

see

also

Nagel (fn.

30), 323.







CLOUDS, CLOCKS, AND POLITICS 501

expect,

n

principle,

hat

here

will

be exceptions

o

any generalizations

we might

orm bout

the phenomena hat re

of

interest

o

us.

Thus,

the moreour subjectmatter xhibits lastic ontrol, he ess t will be

amenable o simpleD-N explanations.

(3)

The notionof causality s

closely

ssociatedwith

the idea

of

covering-lawxplanation y both

political cientistsnd philosophers

of science.R. B. Braithwaite,or

xample, escribes ausality trictly

n

terms

f

covering aws: "[T]he statementhatsome particular vent

is

the

effectf

a

setof circumstancesnvolves he assertion

f a

general

law;

to

ask

for

hecause

of

an

event

s

always

o ask for

general

aw

which pplies otheparticular vent."36

This formulations

echoedby political cientists.

hus,

Robert

Dahl

argues hat If we wishto explain n

event, ,

in a

strictlyausal man-

ner,we consider as an effectnd

bring t under ome generalization

of the form: Every ventC is

accompanied aterby an eventE.'

. . .

The

C

is called the cause,E the

effect."37imilarly,saak maintains

that, If saying hat A causesB' is tantamount

o

B

alwaysfollowsA,'

then hey re bothreducible o If A, thenB.' In otherwords,we can

expresswhat is traditionally

nown

as

a

causal relationship ithout

using the term

cause."38

All of

these

characterizationsest

on

the

notionof

causality

s

an

explanatoryoncept.But how is this

explanatory

tatus

cquired? As

can be seen

from

ven

a

cursory xposure

o

the iterature

n

causation

and conditions,39

he

concepts cause"

and

"effect"re

broad and

am-

biguous.

One element

f their

meaning

seems

to stand

out

in

any

account,however: the principleof "same cause,same effect."40s

Hempel puts it,

"as

is

suggested y

the

principle

same

cause,

same

effect,'he assertion

hat

a given set

of]

circumstances

ointly

aused

a

given

event

mplies

that whenever nd

wherever

ircumstances

f

36

Braithwaitefn. 9), 2;

see also

Hempel fn.

30), 348-49.

37Dahl,

"Cause and Effect

n

the

Study

of

Politics,"

n

Daniel

Lerner, d.,

Cause

and

Eflect

New York: Free

Press

965),

87.

38

Isaak (fn. 7), 95.

39

ee, e.g., ErnestSosa, Causation nd ConditionalsOxford: OxfordUniversityPress

975);

MylesBrand, d.,The Nature

f

CausationUrbana:Universityf llinois

Press

i976).

40

There aremany

disputes

oncerning

he

philosophical

tatus f

causality

hat

go

well

beyondthis

consensual lement f its

meaning-for

example,

he

problemof

whether

he

causal

connection

epresents

constant

onjunction,

ogical

necessity,

r

"natural" ecessity;nd the

problem

f the

temporalrderingnd

contiguityf causes

and

effects.or a discussion

f these n

terms

elevant

o

political

cience

esearch,

ee

Georg

Henrik

von

Wright, xplanation

nd

Understanding

Ithaca,

N.Y.:

Cornell

University

ress

971).







502

WORLD POLITICS

thekind n questionccur,

n

event

f

thekind

o

be

explained

akes

place."'" r,

n Abraham

aplan's lightly

ore

autious ormulation:

"Causalconnection

s

usually nalyzed

n terms f

some

relation

f

implication:he rammarfthe if-then'onjunctions at east start-

ingpoint.

f

the ause ccurs,hen

ts

ffects

ccur."42t

is

this

lement

of

"same ause, ame ffect"

hat

onfersxplanatoryower

n

causal

relations

n

theworld.Without

t,

causality"ecomesimplynother

problematicnd essentiallynexplainedelationshipetween wo or

more hings,vents,r processes.

This

philosophical

haracterization

fthe

elationship

etweenause

andeffects closely elatedoPopper's otion

f

cast-ironontrol.he

cause roduceshe ffect,ndthe xistencefthe ause sthe xplana-

tion f he ffect. world fpure ause ndeffect,

s

narrowlyefined

by his dentification

f

causality

ith

overing-lawxplanation,

ould

be

a

worldwithout

xceptions,

world hat ould

not

be

other han

what t s. Such world,we feel,

s

completely

lien

o

theworld

f

politics,n which hepotentialor urprisend nnovations inherent

in

many,

f

notmost, ituations.

In spite fthe nflexibilityndaridityfthe xplanatoryonceptf

causality,owever, any olitical

cientists

ave

attempted

o

couch

their

nalysesfpolitical henomena

n terms fthe

notions

f

cause

andeffect.he results

often

n

odd

mixture

f

formalized

efinitions

andunrelatedmpirical

ubstance.s

an

example

f

uch

mixture,

e

mightake brief

ook

tonebranch

f

politicalnalysis

hat as

made

considerable

se

of ausal ormulations-theiterature

n

the

oncept

f

power. ere

he

elationship

f

ause

nd ffect

s

explicitly

nvoked

s a

metaphoror necessary,ependentonnectionetweenvents.orex-

ample,Herbert

imon

has

stated hat

for

he ssertion

C

has

power

over

,'

we

can

ubstitute

he ssertion

C's behavior

auses 's

behavior.'

If

we

can

define

he

ausal

elation,

e can

define

nfluence,ower

r

authority,

nd

vice

ersa.""

Similarly,

ndrew

McFarland

ssertshat

"definitions

f

power

r influenceased

on

such

conceptss force,

incentivesr

utilities,

ndminimum

inning

oalitions

re

..

reducible

to causalterms."44orerecently,ackNagelhas defined ower s

follows:A

power elation,

ctual r

potential,

s an

actual

rpotential

causal elation

etween

he

preferences

f

an

actor

egardingn out-

41

Hempel

(fn.

30),

348-49.

42

Kaplan,

Noncausal

xplanation,"

n Lerner

fn.

37),

146.

43

imon,

Models

f

Man

(New

York:

Wiley

957),

5.

44McFarland,

ower

and

Leadership

n

Pluralist

ystems

Stanford:

tanford

ni-

versity

ress

i969),

29.







CLOUDS,

CLOCKS,

AND POLITICS

503

come

nd

the

utcome

tself."45

nd

Robert

ahl,

n the

atestdition

of

his

Modern

olitical

Analysis,

eems o

maintain

although

with

some aveats)

is

ong-standing

iew

hat

ausations fundamental

o

understandingower nd influenceelations:whenwe single ut

influencerom

ll

other spects

f

human

nteraction

n

order

o

give

it

special ttention,

hat

nterestss

andwhatwe focus ttentionn

is

that

neormore f

thepersons

n this

nteractionet

what

heywant,

orat

east et loserowhat hey ant,

y ausing ther

eople

oact

n

some articularay.

We want o call

attentiono a causal

elationship

between hat

A

wants nd whatB

does."46

How is theword cause"

eing

sed

n

these

efinitions?

learly

t

isnotbeing sed s anexplanatoryoncept,nthe ense escribedy

philosophersfscience.

or an

explanation

o be

truly

ausal

n

that

sense,

s

we have

een, he

relationship

n

question

ouldhaveto be

(i) cast-iron,

2) generalizable,nd

(3)

amenable

o

covering-law

explanation.one

of these roperties

ould

eem

o

apply

o

power

relationships.here s no "necessity"

nherent

n

the

outcome f

an

attempto assert ower ver nother

erson,

s there s

in a

causal

connectionetweenwo physicalbjects. he target f thepower

attempt ay, or ny

numberf

reasons,

ct

differently

han he

power

wielder ouldhavehim ct.This s

because power

elationshipoes

not

nvolveast-iron

ontrol;nstead,t s

an

nteraction

f

wo

hoosing

and

mutuallyonstraining

ndividuals,ach

with

his own

resources,

goals, urposes,

nterests,nd

strategies.he intentionsndresources

of

thefirstertainly

onstrainhechoices nd actions

f thesecond,

but

hey o notdeterminehose

hoices nd actions

n

any

ort f

cast-

iron ense.

This

"looseness

f

fit"

etweenhebehaviornd ntentionsf

actors

involvedn an

attempto exercise

owermeans hat heir elationship

is

not

eadily

eneralizable;either

s t

particularlymenableostrict

covering-lawxplanation.

s Hart

nd

Honore

ave

ut

t:

"The

state-

ment

hat ne person id somethingecause

.

. another

hreatened

him,

arries

o

mplication

r

covertssertionhat f

the

ircumstances

were

epeated,

he

ame

ction

ould

ollow;

or oes

uch

statement

requireor tsdefense,sordinaryausal tatementso,a generaliza-

tion.

. "

Theseconsiderationsead us to

conclude hat

he

power

45Nagel,

The

Descriptive nalysis

f

Power

(New

Haven: Yale

Universityress

1975), 29.

46Dahl,

Modern

PoliticalAnalysis 3rd

ed.; Englewood

Cliffs,

.J.:

Prentice-Hall

1976),

30;

emphasis

n

original.

47H.

L. A. Hart and

A.

M.

Honore,

Causation n

the Law

(Oxford:

Clarendon

Press

959), 52.







504

WORLD

POLITICS

relationships notcausal,

t least

not n

the

explanatory

ense

f

the

term.48

This conclusion ould

eem,

n one

sense,

o be shared

y

Dahl

and

many fthe ther oliticalcientistshousecausal anguagentheir

definition

f

power.

f we examine

heir

mpiricalnalyses

f

power

relations

n

real-worldolitical

ituationsather

han heir

efinitions,

we

find arefulnd

precise

xaminations

f

the

omplex

nteractions

that

ontribute

o

outcomes,

ithouteliance

n

simplistic

otions

f

"same ause, ame

ffect."

n such

ubstantive

nalyses-as

pposed

o

definition

aking-plasticity

s

recognized

nd

indeterminatenesss

often

andledwith

ophistication

nd

insight.

Whatwe seem oobserven this articularrea fpoliticalesearch,

then,s a rhetoricalr

metaphorical-rather

han

xplanatory-usage

of

causal

anguage

n

formalizations

nd

definitions.

his

accounts

or

the

lack

of

a

subsequent

ommitmento actual

ausal

analysis

n

substantive

esearch.

he somewhat

ncongruous

ap

can

perhaps est

be

explaineds

an

attemptn the

part

f

politicalcientists

o

create

"halo

effect"round

heir

heoretical

ormulations.ur

longing or

full cientifictatus as edus tocreate kind f"cargo ult," ashion-

ing

cardboardmitationsf

the ools nd

products

fthe

hard ciences

in

the

hope

hat

ur

ncantationsould

make hem eal.

These hree

lementsf he

mplicitogic

hat

nforms

uch f

polit-

ical

science

esearchoday ppear

o mply

substantive

odel f

the

political

orld

which losely

esembleshe

eterministic

clock

model"

outlined

yPopper. hat s not o

say hat nypolitical

cientists

ctu-

ally ee

the olitical orld

his

way;nodoubtwe

would ll

agree

hat

itoftenppears obe quite orous,rregular,ndunpredictable.ather,

it is to

say

that

he

arsenal f

meta-methodological

rinciples

nd

procedures e

have

borrowedrom he

physical

ciences-or,

more

correctly,

rom

certain

hilosophical

erspectiven

thephysical

sciences-has

ome ous with n

array f

substantive

ssumptionshat

all

proclaim

he

principle

all

clouds re locks."

f we

search

nly or

generalizationsnd

regularities

n

political

rocesses,

f

we couch

ur

explanations

nly

n

terms f

the

overing-law

odel,

nd f

we view

politicalelationshipss ultimatelyausal nnature, e arecommit-

ting urselves-whether

e

recognize

t or

not-to a

disciplinary

e-

search

rogram

esigned

o

strip

way

the

cloudlikend

purposive

aspects

f

political

eality

n

order o

expose

ts "true"

locklike

structure.f

politicss

not

locklike

n

its

fundamental

tructure,

hen

48

For further

rguments

long similar

ines, ee

Terence

Ball, "Power,

Causation

and

Explanation,"

olity,

iii

(Winter

975),

I89-214.







CLOUDS, CLOCKS, AND POLITICS

505

thewhole

rograms

nappropriate.e

believe

his

o be the ase:

he

current

uandaryn

political

cience

an

to a large xtent e

explained

by he

act hat,

y

hemselves,clock-model"

ssumptions

re

nappro-

priate ordealingwith he ubstancefpoliticalhenomena.

THE ADOPTION OF

THE

CLOCK MODEL AND ITS

EFFECTS

ON POLITICAL

RESEARCH

AND PEDAGOGY

The

movementoward

ard

cience

n the

tudyfpoliticss

a

phase

in

the cientific

evolutionfthe ast

everal

ecades. hegreat

reak-

throughs

n

physicsnd

biology,nd

theextraordinary

ncreasesn

research

undings

science

ecame national

sset,

reated mood

of sanguinexpectations.t is notsurprisinghatpoliticalcientists

sought

o share n

this

xcitingnd

remunerativedventure.

Politicalcience

was

invited

o

imitatehe

hard

sciences

y

some

of

the

more nfluential

hilosophersf science

n the

grounds

hat

politicaleality

ent tself

othe ame

owerful

ethodshat adproven

so

effectiven

physics

ndbiology. hat

s one

of thebasic enets f

the

ogical

ositivistraditionn

the

philosophyf

science,49nd

has

been startingoint ormany ooks ndarticlesesignedo show he

social

ciences

ndhistoryow

to achieve

"truly"cientifictatus.50

In

addition,herewas

mmediate

vidence f the

uccess

f thehard-

science

trategy

ithin

he ocial ciences

hemselves.sychologynd

economicsad

been he

firstisciplinesn

the

ocial ciences

o

move

in

this

irection,

emonstratinghe

possibilitiesf

experimental

eth-

ods,

sophisticated

uantitative ethods,

omputer

imulation,nd

mathematical

odelling.he

combinationf

philosophical

egitima-

tion ndthedemonstratedrogressfpsychologyndeconomics as

impossible

o

resist.

As a

consequence

f

these

egitimations

nd

demonstration

ffects,

the ncentive

tructuref

political

cience

egan

o

ncourage

n

orienta-

tion

modelled

n

the

physical

ciences. he

pressures

or

onformity

can

be

measured

n

terms

f

prestige,ournal

ublications,

ellowships,

and

grants.

Major sources f

research

undingnd

graduate

ellow-

ships,

uch

s theNational cience

oundation,

ave

beendominated

by thehardsciences;he socialscience ivisionsave been unior

49

ee von

Wrightfn.40),

chap. .

50See,

e.g.,

Nagel

(fn. 30); Hempel

(fn.

30), chap.

9;

May

Brodbeck, "Explanation,

Prediction,nd

'Imperfect'

nowledge," n

Herbert

eigl and Grover

Maxwell, ds.,

Minnesota

tudies n the

Philosophy

f

Science: Vol.

3

(Minneapolis:

Universityf

Minnesota

ress 962); Richard .

Rudner,

hilosophy

f

Social

Science Englewood

Cliffs,

.J.:

Prentice-Hall

966);

Rudner,

Comment:

n the

Evolving

tandard

View

in

Philosophyf

Science,"

merican

olitical

cience

Retview,ol.

66

(September

972).







506

WORLD POLITICS

partnersn these gencies,

ndthepoliticalcienceection

asbeen he

most unior f all. Projects

hathavethe ppearance

f hard cience

havehad the nside rack

or ainingubstantialesearchupport.

Perhaps hemost mportantonsequencef this mitationf hard

science as been n emphasisn method s theprimary

riterion

or

judging he uality fresearchn politicalcience.

oday,

he

eading

researchraditionsend o

be definedy heirmethodologies

atherhan

their ubstantiveoci.One result f thisprinciple

f organization-

althoughertainlyot

necessaryonsequencef t-has

been hat he

valueof thiswork eems

o be measured rimarily

y its technical

virtuosity,nd only econdarilyy the mportance

f the problems

treatedr lluminated.

In the ast wodecades here as been tremendous

rive oward

quantificationn political cience. iker elebrated

histrend

n

a

recentommunicationothe

Americanolitical cience

eviewwhen

he

commented

hat ome wo-thirds

f

the rticles

n

recent

ssues f

that ournalwerebased

on

quantitativenalysis

mployingophisti-

cated

tatistics.5'uantification

as undoubtedly

ontributedo

major

advancesnpoliticalciencend other ocial ciences.ut t has also

led

to a

significant

umber f

pseudo-scientific

xercises

hat

xhibit

theform utnot thesubstance

f

research

n

the

physical ciences.

Such tudies ecomemore

revalent

hen he

use

of

quantification

s

treateds an end

n

tself

atherhan s

a

means

oward

nderstanding

concreteolitical roblems.

rrelevant

uantification

as

recently

een

the ubjectfsearchingritiques

n international

elations,52ompara-

tive

olitics,5"olicy

tudies,54

nd elsewhere.

Quantitativenalysisn political ciencehas moved ncreasingly

towardmore ophisticated

tatistical

ethods. ut he tructuref the

data in

social

science esearch

ften omes nto

conflict

ith the

assumptionsnderlyingonfirmatory

tatistical

heory.

he

problems

involved

n

applying

omplex

tatistical ethods

o

nonrandom,on-

linear,

r

nonadditive

ata

should

notbe

minimized.55

uch

of the

51WilliamH. Riker, uoted

in "Editorial

Comment,"

merican

olitical

Science

Review,Vol. 68 (June

974),

733-34.

52EdwardR. Tufte, Improvingata Analysisn Political cience,"WorldPolitics,

xxi

(July

969).

53

AndrewMack,

Numbers

re Not

Enough,"Comparative

olitics,

ii

(July975).

54 RalphE. Strauch,

A

Critical

ook at

Quantitative

ethodology,"olicyScience,

ii (Winter 976).

55

See,

e.g., Hayward

R. Alker,

The

Long

Road to Internationalelations

heory:

Problems f Statistical

onadditivity,"

orld

Politics,

viII

(July1966);

Hubert M.

Blalock,

"Correlated ndependent

Variables:

The Problemof

Multicollinearity,"

n

Edward

R.

Tufte, d.,

The

Quantitative

nalysis f

Social Problems

Reading,

Mass.:

Addison-Wesley970).







CLOUDS, CLOCKS,

AND POLITICS

507

inferential

ower

f these

methods

s lost

when

he

tructure

f the

datadoes

notconform

o therigid equirements

f

the heory.

hese

difficultiesaveproven

ormidable

nough olead some

tatisticians,

such s John ukey, t Princeton,o devise lternativeata-analytic

techniques

hat, lthoughotnearly

s powerfuls

themost dvanced

statisticalethods,re

more ompatible

ith

he

diosyncratic

harac-

teristicsf

social ndpoliticalata.56

erewe seem

o havefallennto

a trap omparable

o that fthe arly

hases fThird-World

evelop-

ment

when high echnologies"

erentroducednto

oor gricultural

countries

ithout egard ortheir

isruptiveonsequences.

e are

discoveringhat n intermediateevel

f statistical

echnology,hich

takes nto ccount hespecial haracteristicsf socialdata, s more

appropriate

o the socialsciences

han are the

very ophisticated

methods.

Running arallel o

this mphasisn statistics

n

political

cience

is an interestn mathematics

nd

the onstruction

f

simple,

ogically

rigorous

models. his

approach as

been

advocated

n

comparative

politicsy Holt and

Richardson,

ho

argue

hat political

cientists

musturn o mathematics"fthedisciplinestoprogresscientifically.

They re

carefulo distinguishhis

athfrom he tatisticalne: "In

making

n

appeal

formore

mathematics,

e are not

talking

bout

statistics..

. [S]tatisticsrovides

science

with

basis

for

rigorous

induction. ur

critique

uggests

hat

hecrying

eed

n

comparative

politicss

for

more igorous

eductionnd

this s wheremathematics,

not

statistics,s relevant."57

his statement

s echoedby

A. James

Gregor,ranYoung," nd

many

thers.

Thedifficultyithmathematicalodelssthathey suallymeasure

up poorly

o the

omplexities

fthe

phenomenaeing

modelled.

or

example,

ran

Young,

who

strongly

dvocatesheuse

of

modelling

methods

n

international

elations,

as

candidly

bservedhat The

inherent

azard fthis rocedure

s

that ts

products

ay isplay

ittle

relevanceo the eal

world

f

nternational

elations

or he

ndefinite

future."59olt

nd

Richardson,

n

the

ther

and, rgue

hat mathe-

matically

riented

olitical

cience

must

necessarily

ake

a

radically

56

Tukey,

xploratory

ata

Analysis Reading,

Mass.:

Addison-Wesley

977);

David

C. Hoaglin,

A FirstCourse

n Data AnalysisReading,Mass.:

Addison-Wesley,

orth-

coming).

57

Robert

. Holt and John

M. Richardson,r., Competing

aradigms

n Compara-

tive Politics,"

n Holt and John

E. Turner,

ds., The Methodologyf Comparative

ResearchNew

York:

Free Press

970),

70.

58

Gregor,

Political cience nd the

Uses

of Functional

nalysis,"

merican

olitical

Science Review,

Vol. 62 (June

i968), 425-39;

Young (fn. 34).

59

Ibid.)

96.







508

WORLD

POLITICS

circumscribed

iew fpolitical

eality,utting

tself ree rom

roblem

solving:

A

science hat sheavily

ommitted

o dealingwith

ocially

andmorally

elevant

roblemsindsittle sefor

his ind

fparadigm

or for hecommitmentomathematicshat trequires.orpolitical

science o

advance,t must

hed his

rofessionalommitmento

solv-

ing

ocial nd

moral roblems."6"

Oneaspect f

themathematical

pproach

o

politics

eserves

pecial

mention:

he se

of

rational-choiceodels o

xplain olitical

ehavior.

These

models

reparticularly

nterestingecause

hey

ake hemost

intractablelementsfpolitical

rocesses-thendividual

ndcollective

choices

f

politicalctors-and

ry

o

treat

hem

eterministically.

ome

analystsave rgued hatfpoliticalciencesever obea true cience,

the

notion

f

rationality

ust

e

ts

entral

oncept.

or

xample,

iker

andOrdeshook

rawan

explicitnalogy etween

ationality

n

the

onehand

nd

thenotion fmechanism

n the ther:

...

it s clear

hat he

ssumptionfrationality

ndthe

ssumption

f

mechanismlay

omparableoles

n

the xplanationf

the

ocial nd

physical

orld.

he mechanical

ssumptions

ssert

hat here

s

some-

thingbout

hingshatssuress

they ill

usually)move egularly,

and therationalityssumptionssertshat heres somethingbout

people hatmakes

hem ehave

usually)

n

a

regular

ay.

n

each

case, he unction

s togeneralizebout

he

egularity.61

The kindof

regularities

iker

nd Ordeshookre

concerned ith

here reof

special

ype-"postulated"s

opposedo

"observed"egu-

larities.

rantinghat

hoices

n

empirical

ituations

sually

ail to

exhibit

he

degree

f

regularityecessary

or

warrantingeductive

explanationsnd theories,iker nd Ordeshookhoose o builda

theory

f

politics

n

thefoundations

f

how

people

would ct

fthey

were

ational

tility

aximizers.

his,

f

course,

eads

o a

theory

hat

fails

omodel

olitical

eality

ell.

But

he

ubstantive

oss s

considered

acceptable

n

ight

f

the

methodological

ain:

The

method f

postu-

lated

egularity

s

positively

ore

fficient,

ecauset

permits

he

asy

generation

f

hypotheses

nd

offers

single

nd

parsimonious

xplana-

tion

fbehavior."62

60

Holt

and Richardsonfn.57),

70-71.

61

William

H.

Riker nd

Peter

C.

Ordeshook,

n

Introductiono Positive

olitical

Theory

Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:

Prentice-Hall

973),

ii.

A

sympathetic et sober

evaluation

f

the

utility

f rational

hoice

models

or

xplaining

nd

predictingoalition

behavior s

offered

y

AbramDe

Swann,

CoalitionTheories nd

Cabinet

Formations

(San Francisco: ossey-Bass973).

62Riker

and

Ordeshook

fn.

6i),

11-12.

By "explanation,"

e can

onlyassume

hat

Riker

nd Ordeshook

mean

"definition,"

ince

the

postulationf rationalityefines

(hypothetical)ype

f

behavior,

ut does not

explain

t in

any way.








The

popularity

f

rational-choiceodels

n

politicalcience

would

bepuzzlingo nyone howasnot amiliarith he urrentierarchy

of

methodologicalnd substantiverioritiesn thefield. utwith his

hierarchyn mind, ome articularlyerplexingxercisesecome n-

derstandable.or example,n the recentlyublished andbook f

Political cience, .Donald Moon contributespieceon "The Logic

of

Politicalnquiry."6"his article egins ery romisinglyy articu-

lating

heD-N

model f xplanations well s

an

mportantlternative

to

it, the nterpretiveodel,which xplains ehaviorn terms f

motives,ntentions,ules nd norms, tc.Noting erious efects

n

bothmodels,Moonturns o the ask f synthesizinghe wo n order

tocreate more omprehensiverameworkorpolitical xplanation.

But the "synthesis"urns

ut notto

be

a

synthesis

t

all;

insteadt

consists

f

a substitution

f

a rational ctor model

f man"for he

interpretiveodel

f

explanation.his eliminates

he looseness"nd

lackof

regularity

f

empirical

hoice

hat

s

capturedy

the

nterpre-

tivemodel nd substitutes

or t

"presuppositionsthat] pecify

he

decisional

remises

f

the

ctors

which, ogether

ith

escriptions

f

theirituations,rovidehe ationaleor he ctions hich ringbout

theoverall atternf socialbehavior . . that . . theoristsesire o

explain."64

Likethe

egularities

f

nteresto Riker

nd

Ordeshook,

hese

pre-

suppositions"repostulatedspecified) prioi. They eplace he

on-

tingentspects

f

empirical

hoice nd

action

with ausal nd

awlike

assumptions.hus,

hoices re reduced

o

an

algorithmpecifying

necessaryutcome rom necessarytility

alculation.he

net

result

ofthis ubstantiveeductionsa definitionfchoicentermsfcause-

and-effectelationships;

hich

s

to

say, definition

f

choice hat

denies he

xistence

fchoice

ertainly

his onclusion

ould

ppear

strange

f

we werenot

familiar ith he

currentriority

f

method

over ubstance

n

political

cience.

s it

is,

we can

see

that

Moon s

struggling

ith he ask f

fitting

isrecalcitrant

ubject

mattero the

strict

xigencies

f

a

methodological

otion

f

necessity

hat

ears ittle

resemblanceo the ealities

f

political

hoice.

Thestressn reductionistxplanation,uantification,ndformaliza-

tion as also ed to

an

overloading

f

graduate

urricula.

f

a

political

scientist

ust e a

statistician,sychologist,

nd

sociologist,

hen

ome

ofthe

raditional

urriculum

as o

be set

side

n

order o

make oom

63

Moon, "The Logic

of Political

nquiry:

A

Synthesis

f

Opposed Perspectives,"n

Greenstein

nd

Polsby fn.

A

I.

14Ibid.,

I94.







510

WORLD

POLITICS

for hese ewer isciplines

nd

techniques.

nyone

who

has

taught

in a major raduate epartment

f

political

ciencen the ast wenty

years

illrecall

his nexorable

rocess

fnarrowing

nd technicizing

of thecurriculum;heforeign-languageequirementsave beenre-

duced, he

field xamination

equirements

avedropped

rom ive o

four o three,erhaps

ven

o two.By the

mid-ig6o's,

t had become

possible

or

omeoneo

become

Ph.D. n

political

cience

ith ittle

ifanyknowledgef

political

heory,

olitical istory,

oreign

olitical

systems,

nternational

elations,

ndeven

much bout

Americanolitics

andgovernment.

s

Hayward lker

asrecently

emarked:

Training

graduatetudentsntensivelynmultivariateuantitativeethodsuch

as

factor

nalysismakes ess

time

vailable

ordeveloping

sophisti-

cated wareness

f whathas

classicallyeen

thoughtnd

said

about

political

ife....

Thusmodernraining

s

particularly

nappropriate

or

understanding

odernolitics

n whichmany uestions

bout

ystems

restructuring

re continually

aised."65

Accompanying

his

narrowing

nd technicization

f thegraduate

curriculumas been

demoralization

f

the

older ntellectual

radi-

tionsnthe ocial ciencesnd npoliticalcience.oliticalheorynd

philosophy,

ublic

aw and

public

dministration,

nd

descriptive

n-

stitutionalnalysis

ave ll become efensive,

eripheral,

nd econdary

subject

matters.

s a

result,

large art

f he olitical

cienceradition

is

no

onger

eing

ransmitted

ffectivelyoyounger

enerations.

What

we

suggest

ere

s

that science"

s not set

of

methods

x-

tracted

rommathematical

hysics,

s

the neopositivisthilosophers

might

ave

usbelieve;

t s

ultimately

commitmento explore

nd

attemptounderstandgivenegmentfempiricaleality.hemeans

employed

n

pursuing

his oal

hould e

secondary:

n "good" cience,

methodsre fit o the ubject

matteratherhan ubjectmatter eing

truncatedr distorted

n order

o fit t to

a

preordained

otion

f

"scientificethod."

his s the esson

hat ocial cientistshould

ave

learned

rom

hephysical

ciences.nstead,hey

ave gnored

tand,

in

the rocess,ave

undermined

hatAbraham

aplanhascalled he

"autonomyf nquiry.""f social ciences to redeemtself,Social

scientists

eed

to

construct

heir

wn notions f

good

science,'

heir

own

methodological

pproachppropriate

o their

articular

ubject

matter....

This

view

mplies

iving

p

thenotion hat heres

some

65

Alker,

"Polimetrics:

ts

Descriptive

oundations,"

n

Greenstein nd

Poisby

(fn.

3), VII,

57.

66

Kaplan fn. 1),

3.







CLOUDS, CLOCKS,

AND

POLITICS

511

close nalogy

n

the

social

ciences

o basicresearch

n

thephysical

sciences."67

SECOND THOUGHTS

IN

PSYCHOLOGY

AND ECONOMICS

Much

of theknowledge

urdiscipline

as

acquired

f "scientific

method" as

been ilteredhrough

he wo pace-setting"

isciplines

n

social cience-psychology

nd

economics.f

we

lookclosely

t

the

present

tate

fthese

isciplines

hich

have

pioneered

n

the

use

of

statistical

ethods,

mathematical

odels, nd

experimentation,

e

find vidence

fsomedoubt

nd

disillusionment.

Psychology,

uch ikepolitical

cience,

as over

he ast

ouple

f

decades ntertainednearlyonstantgreat ebate" oncerninghe

conceptual

nd methodological

rinciples

nderlying

hediscipline.

How

should

man, s the

ubject

matter

f

psychology,

e

conceptual-

ized

What

ind f

knowledge

hould

sychology

ope

o cquire,

nd

howcan this

nowledge

est

e pursued?

ately,

ome articipants

n

this ebate ave

ecomemore

ndmore

ritical

f

he

stablished

rtho-

doxy

nd havebegun

o

question reviously

acrosanct

ssumptions.

These riticsrenot henevitableissentinginoritynany iscipline,

but nclude

ome f

therecognized

eaders

n theprofession-leaders

who, nfact,

avebeen

nstrumental

n creating

hevery

onceptions

they

owquestion.

The

problem

f

the

image

f

man"

n

psychology

as

been aken

up many

imes.

A particularly

renchantnd

lucid

discussion

as

offered

y

sidor

hein

n

his

962

presidential

ddress

o

theSociety

for hePsychological

tudy

fSocial

ssues.

hein rguedhat

among

psychologists

.

. theprevailingmage f Manis thatfan impotent

reactor,

ith ts

responses

ompletely

etermined

y

two distinctnd

separate,

lbeit

nteracting,

ets

ffactors:

i)

the

forces

mpinging

n

it

and

2)

its

onstitution

including

n the attererm

.. momentary

psychological

tates)."68

e held hat

his

mage

s

obviously

alse,

hat

psychologists

an

cling

o t

only

by

violating

urcardinal

bligation

as scientists-to

aintain

aithn our

ubject

matter,

o

support

crupu-

lously hatwhichwe observe,nd to observeullywithout illful

bias."69

What

his

magedenies,

nd whatobservation

learly

ttests

o,

s

67

Marc J.

Roberts,

On

the

Nature nd

Condition f Social

Science," aedalus,Vol.

I03

(Summer

974),

6i,

62.

68

Chein,

"The Image

of

Man,"

Journal

f

Social

Issues,

xviii

(October

962), 3.

69

bid.

Similar rguments

re

made in

Rom

Harre

and

P.

F.

Secord,

The Explana-

tion

of

Social

Behavior

Totowa,

N.J.:

Rowman

nd Littlefield

972).







512 WORLD POLITICS

that

man

s "an active, esponsiblegent, ot imply helpless,ower-

less eagent."

hein

ontinues:

I am

saying

hatwe

should

ot

permit

ourselveso be seduced,s so many f us havebeen, ythose reten-

tious igh rder onceptualizationsfPsychologyhatwould enyMan

the uality hat s inalienablyis, he ualityffreedom-and,

n

the

denial,

make

Man,

s a

psychologicalgent,

naccessible."70

This argumentears strong esemblance

o

Popper's.

he deter-

minist

ssumption

f

cast-ironontrol"

ver hoice nd ction

s

rejected

for conceptionhat llowsfor he autonomyfhuman ction

n

creating,

s

well

as

in

respondingo,

he

world.

nterestinglynough,

Chein

laims o be a determinist-inhe

ense

f

viewing very

vent

ashaving ecessarynd sufficientonditions-butrgueshatmotives

andpurposeshare n thedetermination

fhuman

ctions,

hus

ring-

ing

them

nder irect

uman

ontrol.

ike

Popper,herefore,

hein s

concernedith he uestionfhow mental vents"

uch

spurposes,

deliberations,lans, tc.,

an

play part

n

bringing

bout

hange

n

the

hysical

orld.

In

his

presidentialddress eforeheAmerican sychological

sso-

ciation

n

i975,

Donald

Campbell

alled

n

psychologists

o show bit

ofepistemicumility,ndtorecognizehatallscientificnowledges

indirect,resumptive,bliquely

nd

ncompletely

orroboratedt

best."

He went n to argue hat eductionism

n

psychology ust e seen s

a

firsttep

n a

long-termesearchtrategy,

ot s an

end

n

tself:

Consideringhecomplexities

f

ourfield nd our models rom he

history

f

the uccessful

ciences,strategy

f

deliberatenitial ver-

simplification

as oberecommended

o

psychology.

ut his

uarantees

thatnthe arly tagesfdevelopmenthe-heoreticalrthodoxyill

be

misleadinglyeductionistic,

ill

portrayumanss more imple

machineshan heyctuallyre.

f

psychologiststsuch stage ere o

losetheperspective

hat

his iew

was a

product

f

theirong-term

strategy,ere nsteado exaggeratehedegree f perfectionf their

currentheories,

nd

were

o

propagate

hese

mmatureheoriess final

truth,

he

net

esult

ould e

destructive

f

popular

alues....

Here

again,scienceequiring

he

trategy

fdeliberate

nitial

versimplifica-

tion

may

ecruit

cholars

vereager

o

adopt demeaning,echanistic,

reductionisticiew fhuman ature.7'

Today,

t

east

ome

sychologists

ave

managed

o

move

eyond

he

mechanistic

mage

f

man,

nd are

pursuing

esearch

ased

upon

a

more

ealistic

nd useful

onception.mong

he

newer

pproaches

n

70Chein

(fn. 68), 2;

emphasis

n

original;

8.

71

Campbell,

On theConflict

etween

iological

nd Social Evolution

nd Between

Psychology

nd

Moral Tradition,"

merican

sychologist,

xx

(December

975),

II20,

II2I.







CLOUDS,

CLOCKS,

AND POLITICS

513

social sychology,

or xample,s "attribution

heory,"

hich xamines

the assumptions

nd working

ypotheseshat onstitute

he

"naive

psychology"

f ordinaryeople s they

nterpretheir

wn behaviors

and the ctionsfothers.ee Ross, neofthe eadersn this ield, as

summed p

the ignificance

f this pproach:

The currentscendancy

f attribution

heoryn socialpsychology

ul-

minates long truggle

o upgrade hat

iscipline'sonceptionf man.

No longer

he stimulus-response

S-R)

automaton f radical behavior-

ism,promoted

eyond herank of information

rocessor

nd cognitive

consistencyeeker, sychological

man

has

at

last beenawarded

a status

equal

to that of

the scientist

who investigates

im. For man,

in

the

perspectivef attributionheory,s an intuitive sychologist ho seeks

to

explain

behavior and

to

draw

inferences

bout actors and

their

environments.72

What

f

psychology's

econd roblem,

hekind

f

knowledge

t

can

expect

o

attain bout

man?That

ssue

as

recently

een

given

areful

considerationy

theeducational sychologist

ee Cronbach.

Reflecting

on his

experience

n

experimental

ocial

psychology

ver

the ast two

decades,

Cronbach sks the question,

Should

social

science spire

to

reducebehavioro laws?" He observes hat Social scientistsenerally,

and psychologists

n particular, ave

modelled heir

work on

physical

science, spiring

o amass

mpirical eneralizations,

o restructure

hem

intomore

general aws,

nd to

weld scattered

aws

nto

oherent

heory.

That

lofty

spirations

farfrom

ealization.""

The essential

ifficulty

ith

this

methodology,

ronbach

rgues,

s

that

ocial

science

aws,

unlike

physical

aws,

seem

to

be

highly

muta-

ble. As he puts t,"Generalizationsecay."Further,At one timea

conclusion

escribes

he

existing

ituation

well,

at

a

later time

t

ac-

counts

for

rather ittle

variance,

nd

ultimately

t

is

valid

only

as

history.

he

half-life f

an

empiricalproposition

may

be

great

or

small.

The

more

open

a

system,

he shorter he half-life f

relations

within t are

ikely

o be."

He

compares

he ask

of

building

heories

n

this

way

with

mechanical

ssembly roblem:

It is as

if

we

needed

gross

f

dry

cells

to

power

an

engine

nd could

make one

a

month.

The energywould leak out of thefirst ells beforewe had half the

battery

ompleted.

o

it s with he

potency

f our

generalizations.""

72

Ross, The Intuitive

sychologist

nd

His Shortcomings:

istortions

n the

Attribu-

tion Process,"

n L.

Berkowitz,

d.,

Advances n

Experimental

ocial

Psychology,

(New

York:

Academic ress

977), i74.

73Cronbach,

Beyondthe

Two Disciplines

of Scientific

sychology,"

merican

Psychologist,

xx

(February

975),

ii6, I25.

74

bid.,

22-23.







514

WORLD POLITICS

Atthe ndof this

rticle, hich ecountswo

decades

f

aspiration

toward

nomologicalsychology,ronbach

rites:

Social

cientistsre ightly

roud f he iscipline e draw

rom

henatu-

ralscienceide fourancestry.cientificisciplines whatweuniquely

addto

the ime-honoredays f tudying

an.

oo narrow

n

dentifica-

tion

with cience,owever,

asfixed ur yes pon

n nappropriateoal.

The

goalofourwork,

have rgued ere,

s not o

amass eneralizations

atop

whicha theoreticalower an some day be

erected.... The special

task f he ocial cientist

n

eachgeneration

s

to

pin

down

he

ontempo-

rary acts. eyond hat, e shareswith

he

humanisticcholar

nd

the

artist

n

the ffort

o

gain

nsight

nto

ontemporaryelationships,

nd

to

realign heculture's iewofmanwithpresentealities.75

Economics,

ike

psychology

nd social

psychology,

as also

been

having

ts roubles

n

recent

ears.

he

critical

hemes

ave

been

ur-

prisinglyonsistent;

hefield

s seen s isolated nd

inbred,

ith ts

formal

models

earing ery

ittle

esemblance

o

the

mpirical

orld

with

which conomists

resupposed

o

be

concerned.hese riticisms

havefor

quite

ome ime eenthe tock-in-tradef such

stablished

gadfliesf theprofessions

Gunnar

Myrdal

nd

John

enneth al-

braith. yrdal,or xample,asarguedhat conomistsavefailed o

produce elevantnowledgeecause

f

an

inappropriate

ommitment

to

themethods

f

the

impler

atural ciences:

In

recentdecades . . therehas been a

strenuous, ven strained, ffort

amongmy economic

olleagues

o

emulatewhat

they onceive

f as

the methods f the natural ciences

y

constructingtterlyimplified

models, ften iven

mathematicalressing....

It should e clear,however,hat his doptionf a form,which he

natural

cientists,

n

more imple, ointed

uestions,an usefor

nalysis

and

presentation,oes

not

eallymake

he ocial

ciences ore cientific,

if

that orm

s

not

dequate

o

social eality

nd

therefore,

ot

dequate

for

he nalysis

f

t.76

Similarly,

albraith

sed theoccasion f his

972 presidentialddress

to

the American

conomicAssociation o chide

the

profession

or ts

failureto

come to grips with

practical conomic

problems: "Neo-

classical rneo-Keynesianconomics, houghproviding nlimited p-

portunities

or

demanding

efinement,

as

a

decisive law.

t

offers

o

usefulhandle

for

grasping

he economic

roblems

hat

now

beset

he

modern

society.

. .

No

arrangement

for

the

perpetuation

of

thought

75Ibid.,

I26.

76Gunnar

Myrdal,

Against

he

Stream:Critical

ssays

on

Economics

New

York:

Vintage I972), I43.







CLOUDS, CLOCKS,

AND

POLITICS 515

is securefthat

houghtoesnotmake

ontact ith heproblemshat

it spresumed

o olve."77

These

oubts

ndconcernsave ately ecome bitmore

widespread.

MarcRoberts,youngerconomist,ssertshat a significantropor-

tion frecentheoreticalork n

economicsasbeen f ittle

cientific

value.

Many

apers xploreuestionsosednotby heworld tself,

ut

by omeone

lse'smodel."78heseviews eem o be shared y ome f

themost espectedeaders

f

the conomic

stablishment.

skar

Mor-

genstern,

n

an

importantaperpublished

n

1972, argues

hat

co-

nomics s in

a

crisis ecause t lacks theconcepts, ethods,nd

philosophy

t needs

o deal

adequately

ith ocial

nd

politicaleality.

Following discussionf currentquilibriumheory, orgenstern

observes:

The contrastith eality

s

striking;

he ime

ascome

or

conomic

theoryoturn roundo"face hemusic."

Theres, f

ourse,lways

he

ossibility

nd he

emptation

f

proving

all sortsf heoremshich ave

o

empirical

elevancehatsoever..

Yet he

ltimate

riterion

s whetherhat

he heoremssertss what

is foundnreality.ne annotelp ut eremindedfHansChristian

Andersen's

tory

f the

Emperor's

lothes.79

Wassily

eontief,

ho won

theNobel Memorial

rizefor he

n-

ventionf

nput-outputnalysis,

as

struckn

even

more essimistic

note. n hispresidentialddress o the

AEA, given wo years

efore

Galbraith's,eontief

rgued

hat

The

uneasiness

in economics]

s

caused

ot y

he rrelevance

f he

racticalroblems

owhich

resent-

day

economistsddress

heir

fforts,

utrather

y

the

palpable

nade-

quacy f the cientific eanswithwhich hey ry osolve

hem.....

Uncriticalnthusiasm

or

mathematicalormulationends

ften o

conceal

he

phemeral

ubstantive

ontent

f

the

rgument

ehind he

formidableront

f

algebraicigns."

e concludedhat

In

no

other

field

f

empiricalnquiry

as

so

massive

nd

sophisticated

statistical

machinery

een

usedwith uch

ndifferent

esults.""

The

problems

n

economics,

s in

psychology,

ould

seemto

be

primarilyubstantive.orgenstern,ounding uch ikePopper, oints

77John

K. Galbraith,

Power

and the

Useful

Economist,"

merican

Economic Re-

view,Vol.63 (March 973),

2.

78

Roberts fn. 67), 6o.

79

Morgenstern,ThirteenCritical Points in Contemporary conomic Theory,"

Journal

of

Economic

Literature,

x

(December

972),

ii64-65.

80

Leontief,

Theoretical

ssumptions

nd

Nonobserved

acts,"

American

Economic

Review,

Vol. 6i

(March 971), I, 2, 3; emphasis

n

original.







516 WORLD POLITICS

tothe ailuref conomicsodeal eriouslyith he onphysicalspects

of conomicrocesses:

...

the overwhelmingmphasis

n

the physical spects f the economic

process

.

. seemsone-sidedwhen we realize that t is plans, decisions,

preferences,tates f nformation,xpectations,tc., tc., hat etermine

themovementndsignificancefthephysicalomponentsf thewhole

economichenomenon.e arefar rom avingmore han road otions

of

howto describend measure heir hare n a concreteituation.o

we evenhave goodmethodologye could pply?81

It

used o

be,

nd

apparentlytill s in much f economicheory

f

notpractice,hat hese ecisionsnd expectationsouldbe discounted

because hey ended o cancel ne anotherut n the lassicalmarket

situation.oday,however, any conomiststtributelargepart f

thediscipline'smpiricalilemma oa failureoappreciate

ow

xten-

sively olitical ecisions

ow

overridehe

mechanismsf themarket.

Galbraith

bserves

hat

in

placeof themarketystem, e

must

ow

assume hat or pproximatelyalf f all economic utput heres a

power r planningystem."82he effectf this njectionf planning

into

he conomic rocess as been o upset hepredictiveapabilities

ofeconomic heory. obertHeilbroner,ncommentingn the nability

of economics

o

predict

hecourse f

a national

conomy,

emarks hat

"it

may be

that his

s

less

possible

han t

was,

because the

economy

itself

ow

s

so muchmore

creature

f decision

making,

nd so much

less

theoutcome

f

sheer

nterplay

f

mpersonal orces,

hat

rediction

becomes

nherently

ore

difficult."83

This

major problem

n

economics

would

seem

to

have

important

implicationsorpolitical cience. or what the economists re saying

is that

o

the extent heir

ubject

matter

s

becoming

more

political,

t

is

becoming

ess

susceptible

o

scientific

nd formalistic

ethodologies.

The

impact

f

decisions,

f

the

possibility

f

shifting

he

economy

n

new

directions,

ndermines he

regularity

f the

impersonal

orces

that

previously

llowed

for successful

redictive

nd

modelling

xer-

cises.

This conclusion

oes not

augur

well for

those

who

envision n

eventually

ormalized

olitical

science.

ndeed,

the

tendency

eems

tobe in theopposite irection;conomicsmaybe becomingmore ike

political

cience

A

second

and related

problem

conomists

ave had to

deal with

deserves

mention: he

problem

f

decaying eneralizations.

ike

psy-

81

Morgenstern

fn.

79),

1187-88.

82

Galbraith

fn.

77),

4.

83

Quoted n Wade

Greene,

Economistsn

Recession,"

ew York

Times

Magazine

May

12,

1974,

p.

64.







CLOUDS, CLOCKS, AND

POLITICS 517

chology,conomicsasbeen nsuccessful

n

ts

ttempt

obuild

asting

empirical

odels

f

ts

ubject

matter.sLeontief

uts

t:

In

contrastomost hysicalciences,

e tudy systemhats

not

nly

exceedinglyomplexut lso na statef onstantlux. haven mind

not he bvioushangen the ariables

. . that ur quationsre up-

posed oexplain,ut he asic

tructuralelationshipsescribedy he

form

nd he arametersf hesequations.n ordero

knowwhat

he

shapes

f

these tructural

elationships

ctually

re

t

anygiven ime,

we

have

o

keep

hem nder ontinuous

urveillance.84

These second houghtsn economics

nd psychologyllustrate

he

degree owhichhe wo ellwether

isciplinesrenowreassessingheir

earlierxplanatorytrategiesndmeta-methodologicalommitments.

Clearly,heir ttemptsodealwith he

omplexities

f

social ealityn

terms f a

modelof scientific ethod orrowedrom hephysical

sciences as run ntomoredifficulties

han

hey

ad

expected. he

ambivalence

f this fforto

bring

he human

nterprise

nder

he

categoriesnd logic

of

the hard sciences

as

been

captured y

the

economistnd

social

philosopher

lbert

irschman,

ho

points

ut

ina recentook-in

a

sectionntitled

A

Passion or hePossible"-that Most ocial cientistsonceivetas their xclusiveask odiscover

and stress

egularities,

table

elationships,

nduniform

equences

.

."

ratherhan

ecognizing

the

multiplicity

nd

creative

isorderf the

human

dventure."e

maintainshat

he social

cientistsould

be

surprisedndeven distraught

f their

earch or

generalaws

were

crowned ith

otal

uccess,"nd

concludes,

Quite ossibly

. .

all the

successiveheoriesnd modelsn the ocial

ciences,nd the mmense

effortshat o into hem,remotivatedythenoble,funconscious,

desire

o demonstratehe

rreducibility

f the ocial

world o

general

laws n

no

other

way

would

t

have

been

possible

o

affirm

o con-

clusivelyhe ocialworld s the

realm f

freedom

nd

creativity.

85

The

philosophy

f

ciencetself

s

experiencingprocess

f

re-evalua-

tion

nd

reorientation

imilar

o

that

aking lace

n

psychology

nd

economics.

he

article

yPopper

hichwe

have

sed

s

a

metaphorical

guide

or ur wn

hinking

s but

ne

example

f

more

eneral

rend

inthefieldxemplifiedyhiswork86nd that fPolanyi,87anson,88

84Leontief

(fn. 80), 3.

85

Albert . Hirschman, Biasfor

Hope (New

Haven: Yale

University

ress

971), 27.

8"Popper

(fn. ); Conjectures

nd

RefutationsNew York:Basic Books 963); The

Logic of

Scientificiscovery New

York:

Basic Books

959).

87

MichaelPolanyi, ersonal

nowledge Chicago: University

f

ChicagoPress

958).

88

Norwood R.

Hanson, Patterns

f Discovery Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversity

Press1958); Observation

nd

Explanation:

A

Guide to

Philosophy f

Science

New

York:

Harper nd

Row

97i).







518 WORLD POLITICS

Kuhn,89 uine,90akatos,91oulmin,92

nd

many

thers.

oday,

he

pre-eminentosition eld by ogical ositivismn thephilosophyf

science eems o be weakening.hilosophersf science o longer ee

their oleas one of egislatinghe rules" f science; hey re more

likely opursue escriptivendexplanatoryodes

f

research.cience

is viewed s an activityr a process, ot imply

s a

logical roduct.

Accordingly,

n

appreciations beginningo develop or hedegree

to which cience-humankind'softiestntellectualchievement-is

groundednd dependentponbasic ommon ense nd informals

wellas formalizedubstantivenowledge.93hilosophersre earning

more

bout ow

cience rows nd how t prospers.he newer itera-

turenthe hilosophyf ciences rich n nsightsnd mplicationsor

the nterprisef social cience.

IMPLICATIONS

If the

whole

f social

eality

as

distinctive

ropertiesendering

t

unamenableo simpledeductive-nomologicalorms f explanation,

this

s

especiallyhe asefor he tudy

f

politics hich,

f

ll

the ocial

sciences,

ocuses

most

irectly

n

collective

oal-seeking

nd

adaptive

processes. political cience olely oncerned iththe search or

regularities

hich onstrainhoice

would

miss

hedistinctive

spect

of

politicaleality,

hich s

the fforto

escape

rom

onstraints,

o

dis-

cover alue-optimizing

olutions

o

problems

n

the context

f

con-

straints.

The

anthropologistohn

W. Bennettecommendsn

approach

o

anthropologicalheory

nd

research hich s orientedround

he on-

cept f daptation:

Instead

f abstractions

rom

ehavior,

ike

culture

r

the reductive

formulas

f

sychology

r

genetics,adaptation]

ocuses

n

humanctors

who

ry

o

realize

bjectives,atisfyeeds,

ndfind

eace

while

oping

with

resent

onditions.

n their

oping,

umans

reatehe ocial uture

in the ense

f

generating

ew

roblems

r

perpetuating

ld

ones nd

may venmodify

he

biological

onstruction

f

the

population

n

the

process....By nalyzing

he actorshat

uide

he hoice

f

trategies,

89

Thomas S. Kuhn,The Structuref ScientificevolutionsChicago:Universityf

ChicagoPress

962).

90

W. V. 0. Quine, Ontological

elativityNew

York:

ColumbiaUniversity

ress

i969).

91

mre Lakatos, "Falsificationnd the

Methodology f Scientific esearchPro-

grammes,"n Lakatos nd

Alan

Musgrave, ds., Criticism

nd

the Growth f

Knowl-

edge (Cambridge: ambridge niversity

ress

97o).

92

Stephen Toulmin,

Human

Understanding, (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity

Press 972); Foresight

nd

UnderstandingNew

York:

Harper nd Row

i96i).

93

SeeCampbell fn. 1).








we gain

knowledgef thepossibilitynd direction

f

change nd the

relationf

human

ehavior

o

the

milieus.94

We would rgue hatwhat

Bennett

as to

say

bout

nthropology

applieswithevengreater orce o political cience: the mportant

phenomena or an

adaptationalnthropologyre dynamic uman

purposes,eeds nd

wants... " The emphasisught o shifttoward

strategicoping,hat s, theattempto realize ndividualnd social

objectiveshrough

hemobilizationf social nd material esources.

This categoryf

human ehavior as become ominantn thecon-

temporaryorld

with ts nterdependencend growingonstraintsn

free ction.""

DuncanMacRae rgues similarhesis egardinghedevelopment

ofthe ocial

ciencesn the ast everal ecades.

They

the

ocial

ciences]

aveevolved rom n earlier orm f social

analysis,ess pecializednd recondite,y mitatinghenatural ciences

. . . many social

scientists ave become convinced hat the most effec-

tive ath o useful

pplicationies hroughbjectiveesearchnd theory

construction,ree rom he omplicationsf deologicalndphilosophical

dispute. heyhave

thusdeveloped istinctechnicalerminologiesnd

methods f research,pecializedournals nd programsf graduate

instruction.

hrough

hese

devices

hey

have

separated

he

discourse

of

pecialists

rom

hat

f

the

general ublic,

nd the ommunications

f

the ndividual pecialists

rom

ne another. he course

f

the social

sciences uring

he

past

several

ecades

has thus

been

guidedby

the

model f natural

cience-howeveristinct

heymay

eem

from t to

natural

cientists

hemselves.96

MacRae's

olution

o

this

roblem

f

thewithdrawal

f

thesocial

sciencesromocial roblemolvingsto ntroducento heuniversity

a

"disciplinef

policy nalysis"

hichwill

combine

ocial

heoriesnd

analysis

ith

isciplined

thical

iscourse.

e believes

hat he

present

situation

f

cognitive

nd valuative

ragmentation

n

the

disciplines

f

social

cience an

only

be

overcome

y

an

institutional

olution-the

introductionf

research

nd

teaching epartments

f

policy nalysis

and

applied

ocial cience.97

We havesomewhatess

faith n

organizationalolutions,

nd

areconvincedhat he

discipline

f

political

cience-which astended o

abandon he ask

MacRaenow

wishes o

ssign

o a

special iscipline

94Bennett,

"Anticipation,

daptation,

nd the

Concept

f Culture

n

Anthropology,"

Science,

Vol.

192 (May 28,

I976),

847.

95Ibid.,

850, 851.

96

MacRae, The Social Function

of

Social

Science

(New

Haven: Yale

University

Press 1976),

3.

97Ibid.,

77ff.







520

WORLD

POLITICS

is

still

apable

f

reasserting

centralole

n

the

tudy

nd evaluation

ofpublic olicy. he powerful

ttraction

f

the

xample

f

thenatural

sciences asbegun ofade

s our

fforts

ave allen

hort four

spira-

tions. espite heprominencef the rend mong urmethodologists,

in our

eadingournals,

nd

n

some

f

our

eading

entersf

graduate

instruction,he verwhelming

ajorityfthe rofession

n

theUnited

States

nd

abroad ither

ctively

esists

he

model, xperiences

sense

of

obsolescenceecause f

tsprominence,

r s indifferent

o t.Most

of

he ublished ork

n

political

cience,ettlesor oals ess

mbitious

than

nomotheticxplanation.

his work ncludes

escriptive

r his-

toricalccountsrcase tudies akingimited se

of

heoretical

rame-

works nd generalizations,nd contributeso the imsofunderstand-

ing, nterpreting,nd exploringolitical ealitynd policy

lternatives

whichMacRae dentifiess crucial

o

policy nalysis.

One mightmake

hecase

that

he earch

or

greater

igor

n our

understandingfpolitics

ight ave

mademore

rogress

f

ts

laims

and

expectationsad

been

ess

xtreme,

ess

xaggerated,

essdifficult

to quarewith recalcitrant

eality. more

autious

pproach

o scien-

tificrogress,ecognizinghe eculiaritiesfhumanndsocial eality,

mighthave

resulted

n

a more

general cceptance

f

appropriate

quantification,

f the

heuristicalue f formal-mathematicalormula-

tion, xperimentalethods,

nd the ike.

It is of

nterest

hat

quarter

f a

centurygo,

n the

ftermath

f

WorldWar

I,

when hemovementoward

ciencen

the

ocialdis-

ciplines as ustbeginning,

his

elationship

etween

he search or

regularitiesnd man's fforts

o discoveralue-optimizingolutionso

hispredicamentsas more learlynderstood.ne hasonly o com-

pare n early scope

nd methods" ookwith he

more

ecent nes

cited bove. ome

wenty-fiveears go,many

f

the

pioneers

f the

behavioral

ovement

n

the

social ciences

ontributedo

a

volume

entitled

he

Policy

Sciences:

Recent

Developments

n

Scope

and

Method.

n the

eading

hapter,

aroldLasswell tated is

priorities:

"Ifour

policy

eeds

reto be

served,

hat

opics

fresearch

remost

worthy

f

pursuit?

. . What are the

most

promising

ethods f

gatheringacts nd interpretingheir ignificanceorpolicy?How

can

facts

nd

nterpretations

e

made

ffective

n

thedecision-making

process

tself

"

The same ssay elebrated

he

ntroduction

f scientific

methods

nto

the

social

ciences-statistics,

athematical

odelling,

and

related

pproaches.

utthis cientific

ardening

f

methodwas

set

n

the ontext

f

problemolving,

alue

larification,nd theen-

hancement

f thehuman ondition.asswell

ooked ponmethod s







CLOUDS,

CLOCKS,

AND POLITICS

521

making

ossible cts of

"creativemagination"hich

might

move

mankind

n

constructive

irections

way

rom

he yranniesnd catas-

trophesof

the I930's and

I940's.98

The connection etweenthe searchforregularitiesnd political

creativity-clearlyeenby that

eneration reshlyeturned rom

Wash-

ington nd the

military

heaters f World War

II-was

gradually ost

in

thedecades that

followed.

The

"methods"message

of

Lasswell's

sermonwas heard

and acted

upon

with the mixed

resultswe

have

reviewed,

ut the

"policy cience"

message

argely ellon

deaf

earsfor

reasonswe

have suggested

bove.

What

is

under

attackhere s

the

pecking rder,

nd

the

particular

setof prioritiesndresourcellocations, hichhave cometodominate

the

profession

n

the ast

decades. hese

priorities

nd

allocative

olicies,

and this

pecking

rder, re egitimated ot

by

successes

n

the

explana-

tion

of

political

reality,

ut

by the

example

and the

demonstration

effectf

thehard

sciences.

pecking rder

n

whichmathematization

and

sophisticated

tatisticalnalysis re

viewed

as the only sources f

"real"

or

"powerful" heory,

hile

theories roducedfrom

he

inter-

playof maginationnd induction retreated s "heuristic"r "weak"

theory,

annot be

justified y the

explanatory

erformance f

the

former. heories

are

inherently eak

in the human

sciences-both

those

hat ook

"strong" ecause heyook

like the theories f

physics,

economics, r

psychology,nd thosethat ook "weak"

because

they

derive

ypotheses

rom

heexaminationf

ndividual asesor historical

experience.

Another

spect

f

thepecking rder

which

s under

riticism

ere

s

thedistinctionetween ureand appliedpolitical cience. venin the

hard

ciences,

he

comparative

ntellectual

ayoffs

f

so-called

ure

and

applied

research re

not at all

clear-cut.mportant

iscoveries

ften

emerge

ut

of

applied

esearch.

n

the ocial

ciences,ncluding olitical

science,

his

difference

oses ts

meaning

ince

the

special

haracteristic

of

social

reality

s man's

adaptive

ehavior. he

part

of

the

discipline

which calls itself

ure

political

cience,

earching

or

powerful

nd

enduring egularities,asmissed heessential ointof itssubjectmat-

ter.

At

best

t

lluminates

he

context

f

political

ecisions;

ut t

eaves

unexplored

he

daptive

earching

rocess,

he

policy

ptions,

nd

their

consequences.

urely

he

study

f

public

policy-viewed

as

effortso

adaptto,cope with,

modify,

nd overcome

onstraints-is

s basic

and

pure

an

undertaking

s

is

the search for

constraining

egularities.

98

Daniel

Lerner

nd Harold D.

Lasswell,

ds.,

The

Policy

ciences:

Recent

evelop-

ments n

Scope

and

Method

Stanford: tanford

niversity

ress

950),

3, I2.







522 WORLD POLITICS

Indeed,we might rgue hat

he essence

f

political

cience-insofar

as it is to

be defined y

the

essence

f the

politics

t

studies-is

he

analysis

f choice n the ontext

f

constraints.hat would

place

the

search orregularities,he search or olutionsoproblems,ndthe

evaluation

f hese

olutionsn the ame evel.

hey

would ll be

parts

of a common fforto confront

an's

political

ate

with

igor,

ith

the

necessarybjectivity,

nd

with

n

nescapable

ense

f

dentification

with he ubject

matter hich he

political

cientisttudies.

Our

policies

fresearch

upport

nd

professionaltraining

eed o

be

freed

rom

mitatinghe hard sciences. olicy

tudies,nstitutional

studies,

nd philosophicallyophisticatedvaluativetudies

re

claim-

ants n researchupport ith smuch egitimacys is currentlyc-

corded

mathematical,tatistical,

nd

psychological

nd

sociological

reductionisttudies.

nowledge

f

political

ubstancen ts

nstitutional,

historical,ndphilosophicalspects

astobe

re-established

n an

equal

footing

ith

ophisticated

ethodologies

nd reductionist

nowledge

in

our

programs

f

graduate

raining.

whole

ibrary

f

meta-method-

ological

andbooksnd primers

mposinghemodel

f

hard cience

onpoliticalealityastobere-evaluatedn a new ight. hesevolumes

do not

represent

he true

ath"

o scientific

rogress;ather,heyre

a historical

eviation,

flirtationithmistaken

etaphors

hat

empo-

rarily

aptured

he

magination

f

social

scientists.

heir

historical

importances

thus

reat,

ut

heir

elevance

o

practicalesearchrob-

lems

n

the social ciencess limited. o

progress

cientifically,

he

social

disciplinesequire

heir wn

philosophy

f

science ased

on

explanatorytrategies,

ossibilities,

nd

obligationsppropriate

o

human nd ocial eality.

almond e genco 1977

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