alleged assassination plots involving foreign leaders · (14~~ congress > sez\thte report 1st...

(14~~ CONGRESS

> SEZ\ThTE

REPORT 1st Session so. 91465

ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS

AN INTERIM REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITI’EE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES SENATE

TOGETHER WITH

ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE VIEWS

NOVEMBER 20 (legislative day, NOVEMBER X3), 1975

U..k. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

61-986 0 WASHINGTON : 1975

SENATE SELECT CO&IMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO ISTELLIGESCE ACTIVITIES

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman

PHILIP A. HART, hllchlgan HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tmnessee WALTER F. ?+IONDALE, hfinnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES JlcC. Jl.\THIAS, JR., Xwyland ROBERT JIORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennnsylvania GARY HART, Colorado

WILLIAM G. MILLER, Star Director FREDERICK A. 0. SCIIWARZ, Jr., Chiej Counsel CURTIS R. SYOTHERS, Counsel to the Minority

AUDREY HATRY, Clerk of the Committee

CONTENTS

Prologue----________------___-_----~-------------------~------------ I. Introduction and Summary--- _ _ - _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _-_ _ _ __

A. Committee’s Mandate- _ _ ___- __ _____________ _ _____________ __ B. Committee Decision To Make Report Public- _ ________ __- _____ C. Scope of Committee’s Investigation _______ - _ __- _________ -__ ___ D. Summary of Findings and Conclusions- ______ _______ ____ _____.

1. The Questions Presented ____ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Plots _________ _ 3. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on The Issues of Author-

ity and Control--_ _____ - _______________________ _ _______ II. Covert Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation- _ _ _ _ _

A. Policy Development and Approval Mechanism--- - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ B. The Concept of “Plausible Denial” _____ _ _-_ _________________ _

III. Assassination Planning and Plots--- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ A. Congo__--_____-_____-___________________-----~---~-------

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Introduction____________________________~~-----~--~----~ Dulles Cable to Leopoldville: August 26, 1960 _______________ CIA Encouragement of Congolese Efforts to “Eliminate”

Lumumba-___-_____-_________-_______-_________-_____ The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba _____________ - ___________

Bissell/Tweedy Meetings on Feasibility of Assassinating (4

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Lumumba_l__-____-~______-___-__I__-__-___-_-___I Bissell/Scheider Meetings on Preparations for Assassinating

“An African Leader”------- _____ - _____ -__-___-___-_ Scheider Mission to the Congo on an Assassination

Operation-____--________________________~--------- Congo Station Officer Told to Expect Scheider: Dulles

Cables About “Elimination” of Lumumba ___________ -_ Assassination Instructions Issued to Station Officer and

Lethal Substances Delivered: September 26, 1960- _ _ ___ Hedgman’s Impression That President Eisenhower Ordered

Lumumba’s Assassination- _________ _________________ Steps in Furtherance of the Assassination Operation- _ _ _ _ _

(i) Hedgman’s Testimony About Confirmation from Headquarters of the Assassination Plan ______c__ -_

(ii) “Exploratory Steps”- - - _ __ _- - __ _ __ -_ _ __ _ _ _ ___ __ _ _ (iii) The Assassination Operation Moves Forward After

Scheider’s Return to Headquarters: October 5-7, 1960-_-___--____________________________------

(iv) Headquarters Continues to Place “Highest Priority” on the Assassination Operation- _ _ ___- ___________

Tweedy/B&e11 Testimony: Extent of Implementation; Extent of Authorization _________________ - ___________

(i) Tweedy’s Testimony About the Scope of the Assaasi- nation Operation ________ - ______ -- ____ -- ____ -_-_

(ii) Bissell’s Testimony About Moving the Assassination Operation From Planning to Implementation- _ _ _ _ _

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III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued A. Congo-Continued

5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Their Agents in the Page

Congo_----------------------------------------------- (a) Mulroney’s Assignment in the Congo ___________ __- _____

(i) Mulroney’s Testimony That He Went to the Congo After Refusing an Assassination Assignment From Bissell__------------------------------------~~

(ii) Bissell’s Testimony About the Assignment . , Mulroney---..-----.---------------------------

(iii) Mulroney Informed of Virus in Station Safe Upon Ar- riving in Congo: November 3, 1960------- _______

(iv) Mulroney’s Plan to “Neutralize” Lumumba- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ (b) QJ/WIN’s Mission in the Congo: November-December

1960___------------------------------------------ (~1 WI/ROGUE Asks &J/WIN to Join “Execution Squad”: \-,

December 1960__~_-___-_-_------------------------ 6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing

About Lumumba’s Death in Katanga Province- ___________ (a) Lumumba’s Imprisonment After Leaving U.N. Custody:

November 27-December 3, 1960-- _- ________ -___-___ (b) Lumumba’s Death _____________ _ _- _____ ---:--: _______

7. The Question of the Level at Which the Assassmatlon Plot Was Authorized_-------------------------------------,;

(a) High-Level Meetings at Which ‘I Getting Rid of Lumumba Was Discussed----- ____ -___-___-_-___-___- ____ - ____

(0 Dillon’s Testimony About Pentagon Meeting: Summer 1960___---------------------------------------

(ii) Robert Johnson’s Testimony That He Understood the President to Order Lumumba’s Assassination

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at an NSC Meeting ____ - _____ -_- ______-_____--- (iii) Special Group Agrees to Consider Anything That

Might Get Rid of Lumumba: August 25, 1960-,--,, (iv) Dulles Reminded by Gray of “Top-Level Feeling

That “Vigorous Action” was Necessary in the Congo: September7-8,1960____-----------------------

(v) Dulles Tells NSC That Lumumba Remains a Grave Danger Until “Disposed Of”: Se~~?~r”‘~_‘_9”~11

(b) Testimony of Eisenhower White House (c) Bissell’s Assumptions About Authorization by President

Eisenhower and Allen Dulles-- _ _ _ _ -___ __ __-_____---- (d) The Impression of Scheider and Hedgman That the

Assassination Operation Had Presidential Authorization- B. Cuba-----------------------------------------------------

1. The Assassination Plots-- _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _-_ _ __ (a) Plots: Early 1960---- ____ - _____ - _____ -___- ___________

(i) Plots to Destroy Castro’s Public Image- _____________ (ii) Accident Plot- - _ _ _ __- _____ - _____________________

(iii) Poison Cigars- - _ _ ___- _____________ -_ ___- ________ (b) Use of Underworld Figures-Phase I (Pre-Bay of Pigs) _ _ _ _

(i) The Initial Plan- _ _ _ _ __ --_ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _-- (ii) Contact with the Syndicate’- _ ___ ___-___-___- ____ _- (iii) Las Vegas Wiretap__--___~__----- ________-__--__-

(1) CIA Involvement in the Wiretap-.. &------- _____ (2) Consequences of the Wiretap--- ___________-___-

(iv) Poison is Prepared and Deljvered to Cuba- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - (c) Use of Underworld Figures: Phase II (Post-Bay of Pigs)--

(i) Change in Leadership- _ _ _A _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ -- - (ii) The Operation is Reactivated- _ /_ _________________

(d) Plansin Early 1963 _____ - ______ - ____ --__- ___--______- (e) AM/LASH _______ - __________ +- _____ -- ______--__-___-

(i) Originof theProject-----,--------- ___--_____---- (ii) The Poison Pen Device_- -: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ - __ _ _ _ _

(iii) Providing AM/LASH with’ Arms ____ - ________ -___ __

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III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued B. Cuba--Continued

2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Author- ized Within the Central Intelligence Agency? ______________

(a) TheQuestion Presented___-_---_-_--- _________________ (i) Dunes_-_---_------~------~------~------~-~-----

(ii) McCone__-_______________________________------ (b) Did Allen Dulles Know of or Authorize the Initial Plots

Against Castro?-----------~---~- ___________________ (i) Dulles’ Approval of J.C. King’s December 1959 Mem-

orandum_-___-______________----------------------- (ii) Dulles’ January 1960 Statement to the Special Group- (iii) Meetings in March 1960 __________________________ (iv) Recision of Accident Plot in July 1960 ____.________ (v) Briefing of Dulles on Use of Underworld Figures in

September1960__-----------~-------~---------- (1) Evidence Concerning What Dulles Was Told- _ _ _ _ (2) Evidence Concerning When the Briefing Occurred-

(vi) Edwards’ Communications to the Justice Department in 1961 and 1962 ________ ----_-_-_-_-_--- ________

(vii) General Cabell’s Remarks to the Snecial Groun in November 1960- _____ -_- ________ -~---_.---_~---

(c) Did John McCone Know of or Authorize Assassination Plots During His Tenure as DCI? _____ - ____ --_------_

(i) McCone’s Testimony _______ - _____ -__ __ _______ __ _ _ (ii) Testimony of Helms, Bissell and Other Subordinate

AgencyEmployees__________________-___.._----- (iii) Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About the

Assassination Plots--- __-_-_-_-_- _____ ___ __ ___ __ (iv) The Question of Whether General Carter, McCone’s

Deputy Director, Learned About the Underworld Plot and Informed McCone _________ --_-_----_-_

(v) The August 1963 Briefing of McCone-----_---- _____ 3. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au-

thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency?. -- _ - _ (a) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside the

Central Intelligence Agency in the Eisenhower Admin-

(i) Summary__----~-------------------~------------ (ii) Richard Bissell’s Testimony-- __ __ _________ _____ ___

(1) Lack of Personal Knowledge----_-------------- (2) Assumptions Concerning Dulles-- __ ___ __ __ _____

(iii) Testimony of White House Officials- __ _ - _ _ _ _ __ __ __ _ (1) Gordon Gray- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (2) Andrew Goodpaster-- _ _____________ __________ (3) Thomas Parrott-- __ _ __ __ __ _-_ __ _ _ _ __ _ __ __ _ __ _ (4) John Eisenhower- ____________________________

(iv) Documentary Evidence--- __ _-_-_ __ _ __ _ __ __ _ __ __ _ _ (1) Inspector General’s Report ____________________ (2) Contemporaneous Documents--- __ __ _-_ _ _ _ __ __ _

(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside the Central Intelligence Agency During the Kennedy Administration- - - - _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ __ _-_ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ __

(i) Pre-Bay of Pigs Assassination Plot- _ _ - __ _-_ _ _ __ __ _ _ (1) Bissell’s Testimony Concerning His Assumption

That Dulles Told the President- _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ (2) Bissell’s Testimony Regarding His Own Actions-- (3) Kennedy Administration Officials’ Testimony-, _ _ (4) The Question of Whether Assassination Efforts

Were Disclosed in Various Briefings of Adminis- tration Officials- _ _ _________________________

a. Briefing of the President-Elect ______________ _ b. Discussion with Bundy on “Executive Action

Capability”-- _ __ __ __ _ __ __ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _____ _ c. Taylor/Kennedy Bay of Pigs Inquiry ________

(5) Conversation Between President Kennedy and

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III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued B. Cuba-Continued

3. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au- thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency?-Con.

(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency During the Kennedy Administration-Continued

(i) Pre-Bay of pigs Assassination Plot-Continued (6) The Question of Whether the President or the

Attorney General Might Have Learned of the Assassination Effort from the Cuban Partici-

(7) pants_-_-__-_--__--_--~----------~---~----

The Question of Whether the Assassination Opera- tion Involving Underworld Figures Was Known About by Attorney General Kennedy or President Kennedv as Revealed bv Investina- tions of Giancana “and Rosselli- -_ - I_ - - _ _ - - I- _

a. 1960_-____--_______---------------------- b. 1961_--_------__--__~~------~-----~---~-- c. 1962_-_____-_______----------------------

(1) Did President Kennedy Learn Anything About Assassination Plots as a Result of the FBI Investieation of Giancana and Rosselli? ____ i-Z-- __________________

(2) The Formal Decision to Forego Prosecution- (a) Events Leading Up to a Formal Brief-

ing of the Attorney General ________ (b) Briefing of the Attorney General on

May 7, 1962__--__-________-_____ (aa) The Attornev General Was Told ~ I

That the Operation Had Involved an Assassination Attempt---- ________________

(bb) Evidence Concerning Whether The Attorney General Was Told That the Operation Had Been Terminated ____ -__ _ _____

(ii) Post-Bay of Pigs Underworld Plot-MONGOOSE Period-__----__-----____________________~----~

(1) Events Preceding the Establishment of MON- GOOSE_________-_-__-____________________

a. The Taylor/Kennedy Board of Inquiry- _ ___ __ b. National Security Action Memorandum 100 of

October Fj, 1961, and the CIA Intelligence Estimate-- _____ -- ____ -- _________________

c. President Kennedy’s November 9, 1961 Con- versation with Tad Szulc- _ _- _____________

d. President Kennedy’s Speech of November 16,

(2) 1961---_-_________--___________________

Operation MONGOOSE- _ _ - - _- ____ - __________ a. The Creation of Operation MONGOOSE-- -__

(1) The Special Group (Augmented) @GA)--- (8) General Lansdale Named Chief-of-Oper-

ations of MONGOOSE-- ______________ (3) CIA Organization for MONGOOSE_ - ____

b. Lansdale’s Theory and Objective for MON- GOOSE__-_-__________-~---------------

c. Bissell’s Testimony Concerning Presidential Instructions to Act More Vigorously- _ _ _ _ _

d. The January 19, 1962 Special Group Meeting- e. General Lansdale’s MONGOOSE Planning

Tasks _____ -- __________ -_--__---_._- ____ f. Lansdale’s Rejection of a Suggestion that a Prop-

aganda Campaign, Including Rewards for Assassination, Be Explored _.____ __________

g. The control System MONGOOSE Operations- h. The Pattern of MONGOOSE Action _________

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III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued B. Cuba- Continued

3. At F Vhat Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au- thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency?-Con.


(ii) Post-Bay of Pigs Underworld Plot-MONGOOSE \--, ~~ Period-kontinued-

(3) Evidence Bearing on Knowledge of and Author- ization for the Assassination Plot, Phase II- __ _

a. Helms’ Testimony Concerning Authority- _ _ _ _ (1) Helms’ Perception of Authority __________ (2) Helms’ Testimony Concerning the Absence

of a Direct Order and Why He Did Not Inform Administration Officials-------..

($1 Helms’ Perceution of Robert Kennedy’s ‘-’ ~~ Position on *Assassination ____ _ _ _ ___ _ :- - (4) Helms’ Testimony as to Why He Did Not

Obtain a Direct Order- _ - _ ___-- _______ (6) Helms’ Perception of the Relation of

Special Group Controls to Assassination Activity __________ -__-___- __________-

b. Harvey’s Testimony Concernin (1) Harvey’s Perception of Aut ‘6.

Authority--- _ ority--------

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(2) Harvey and the Special Group (Aug- mented)-----------------------------

c. Testimony of Kennedy Administration Of- ficials_-_-_------------------------------

(4) The August 10, 1962 Special Group (Augmented) Meeting_----------------------------------

a. The Contemporaneous Documents- _ _________ (1) Lansdale’s August 13, 1962 Memorandum-- (%) Harvey’s August 14,1962 Memorandum---- (3) The Minutes of the August lo,1962 Meeting- (4) The August 10 Meeting-- _ __ _ _- _ _ ___ __ __

b. The Testimony- _ __ _ _-_ _ __ ___ _ -_ ____ __-_- __ (I) Testimony About the August 10 Meeting- _ _

(a) McCone- _____ -_- ______ - _________ (b) Harvey ____________ - _______ - _____ (c) Goodwin---- ______________________ (d) McNamara ________ -_-__-- _______

(8) Testimony About Events After the August 10, 1962 Meeting ______ _ ________ ____

(a) McCone ______ - ______ - ___________ (5) Harvey_------------------------- (c) Elder- _ __ _ __ ______ _-_ ____ __ _ -1-L __ (d) Lansdale __________________ --___--

(3) Testimony of Reporters About Lansdale’s Comments on the August 10 Meeting---

(a) The Martin Report ________ -_ _ _ _ -_ (5) The O’Leary Re art-- _ _ - _ ________

(iii) The Question of Whether the A 8 /LASH Plot (1963- 196.5) Was Known About or Authorized by Admin- istration Officials Outside the CIA- _ - _ ___________

(1) Kennedy Administration’s Policy Toward Cuba in 1963_______-_____----------~------------

a. Organizational Changes _______________ - _____ b. Discussion of the Contingency of Castro’s

Death____-________-_------------------- c. The Standing Group’s Discussion of United

States Policy Toward Cuba-- _____________ d. The Special Group’s Authorization of a Sabo-

tage Program A ainst Cuba----- __________ e. The Diplomatic 8 ffort to Explore an Accom-

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III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued B. Cuba-Continued

3. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au- thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency?-Con.


(iii) The Question of Whether the AM/LASH Plot (1963- , 1965) -Was Known About or Authorized by Admin- istration Officials Outside the CIA-Continued

(2) Testimony on the Question of Authorization for the AM/LASH Poison Pen Device _______._-__

a. The October Meeting with AM/LASH and the Use of Robert Kennedy’s Name Without Obtaining His Approval- _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _

b. The Delivery of the Poison Pen on November 22, 1963-_-_-----_-_-___----------------

(3) The Question of Authorization in the Johnson Administration_-_----------- _______________

a. Summary of the Assassination Activity-- _ _ _ _ _ b. The Issue of Authorization _______________.__ c. The Covert Action Program Against Cuba in

1964-1965_-_----_-__~----~----.-------- d. The Special Group Investigation of Reported

Castro Assassination Plots by Cuban Exiles- e. Helms’ Report to Rusk---------- ___________ f. Helms’ Briefing of President Johnson on the

1967 Inspector General’s Report _____ __ _ ___ (4) Helms’ Testimony on Authorization in the

Johnson Administration - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C. Institutionalizing Assassination: The “Executive Action” Capa-

bility--_-------~--------~-------~---~---------------..--- 1. Introduction__-_____------------------------------------ 2. The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization, or

Knowledge of the Executive Action Project _______________ 3. The Question of Authorization or Knowledge of the Executive

Action Project by the DCI- __- _________________________ 4. The Question of Whether Project ZR/RIFLE Was Connected

to Any Actual Assassination Plots- _ ____ _____ __ _______ __ _ (a) Conversation Between Bissell and Bundy-- _ _____ .______ (b) Bissell’s Instruction to Harvey to Take Over Responsibility

for Underworld Contact: November 1961- __ __________ (c) Use of QJ/WIN in Africa ______________________________

D. Trujillo_---_---_-----_---_-_-_---_-_-_-_-_-____________-_- 1. Summary_-----_---_-_____________________ 2. Background___---------~-~----------~---------------~--- 3. Initial Contact With Dissidents and Request for Arms- _ _ __ _ _

(a) Dissident Contacts----~-----------------~----------~- (b) The Request for Sniper Rifles- _ _ __ -_-_- _- _-___ ________

4. Summer and Fall of 1960 _________________________________ (a) Diplomatic Development-Withdrawal of United States

Personnel__--------------------------------------- (b) Dearborn Reports Assassination May Be Only Way To

Overthrow Trujillo Regime--__-_ __- _- __ ___ _. _ __ __ __ _ (c) Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate- _ ______________ (d) CIA Plans of October 1960---------------------~-~---- (e) December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Actions- - _ _

5. January 12, 1961 Special Group Approval of “Limited Supplies of Small Arms and Other Material”--- _ __ __ __ ___________

(a) Memorandum Underlying the Special Group Action-_- _ _ _ 6. January 20, 1961-April 17, 1961 (the Kennedy Administration

throughthe Bayof Pigs)___--_---_-___-------- _________ (a) Specific Events Indirectly Linking United States to Dissi-

dents’ Assassination Plans- _ _ - _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ (i) Assassination Discussions and Requests for Ex-

plosives ________ -------_----- _________________

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III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued D. Trujille-Continued

6. January 20, 1961-April 17, 1961 (the Kennedy Administration through the Bay of Pigs-Continued

(a) Specific Events Indirectly Linking United States to Dissi- Psge dent’s Assassination Plans-Continued

(ii) The Passage of Pistols_- _ _ _ _ _-_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 199 (1) Pouching to the Dominican Republic-- _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ 199 (2) Reason for the CIA Instruction Not To Tell Dear-

born-------------------------------------- 199 (3) Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?------

(iii) Passing of the Carbines- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- _ z (1) Request by the Station and by Dearborn and Ap-

provalby CIA______--__------------------- 200 (2) Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?---- 200 (3) Failure to Disclose to State Department Officials

in Washington- _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _-_ _ _ _ _ _ _-_ _ __ _ _ 201 (iv) Requests for and Pouching of the Machine Guns- - - _ _ _

(1) Requests for Machine Guns- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2”::

(2) Pouching of Machine Guns Approved by Bissell- - 202 (b) Knowledge of Senior American Officials (Pre-Bay of Pi@) _ - 202

7. April 17! 1961-May 31, 1961 (Bay of Pigs Through Trupllo Assassmation)--__------------------------------------- 205

(a) Decision Not’ to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccessful United States Attempt to Stop Assassination Effort.. __ -

(b) Further Consideration of Passing, Machine Guns- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2; : (c) Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961_ - _ _ - 208

(d) Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine Guns-------- 208 (e) Dearborn in Washington for Consultation-Drafting of

Contingency Plans - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - 209 (f) Cable of May 29, 1961____ - ___________________-_______ 212

8. May 30,..1961 and Immediately Thereafter ____ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ -_ _ - - 213 (a) Trupllo Assassinated--- _____ --___- _____ - _____ - _______ 213 (b) Cables to Washington- - _ ___-__ ____ - _________________ - 213 (c) Immediate Post-Assassination Period- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ 214

E. Diem----------------------------------------------------- 217 1. Sumrnary__--------------------.------------------------- 217 2. The Abortive Coup of August 1963- _ ______-_____ _____----- 217 3. The November 1963 Coup-- - ___ -__ ____ - -__ --________--___ 220

F. Schneider_------------------------------------------------ 225 1. Summa~__--------------------------------------------- 225 2. The President’s Initial Instruction and Background __ _ _ ___ __

(a) September 15 White House Meeting---- _ _ __ -_-_ ________ f;; (b) Background: Tracks I and II ___________________L______

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(c) CIA Views of Difficulty of Project _________________-__- 232 3. CIA’s Implementation of Track II _________________________ 233

(a) Evolution of CIA Strategy- ___________________________ (i) The “Constitutional Coup” Approach- __- __________

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(ii) Military Solution- _ _____ __ __ _ _ __ ___-_ -_ __ __ __ __ __ 234 (b) The Chile Task Force- _ _ _ _ __ __ __ _-___-___-_ _ _ _ __ -.- ___ (c) Use of the U.S. Military Attache aml Interagency Relatlons- 2 (d) Agents Who Posed as Third Country Nationals-- ________ 238 (e Chief of Station ________________________ -_-_- _________ 239

4. C 2 A Efforts to Promote a Coup _________ -_-___-__-- _______ 239 (a) The Chilean Conspirators- _ _ __ __-_ __ ___ __-___ __ __ __ __- (b) Contacts Prior to October 15--------------------------

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(c) October 15 Decision ___________ - ________ - ______ - ______ (d) Coup Planning and Attempts After October15 _ _ _ _-___-_

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(e) The Shooting of General Schneider.. -__ __ _ __ _ __ ___ ___ __ _ 245 (f) Post October 22Events -_____ --- ______ -___-___- _______

5. CIA/White House Communication During TrackII---------- !$

(a) September ____ - _________________ - ______ -_--_-_- _____ (b) October--------------------------------------------- E3 (c) December_------------------------------------------ 253 (d) Did Track II End?--- _-_ ________ ___ _ - _ __ _-_ _ __ _____ __ 253

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IV. Findingsand Conclusions--__------------ _____ - _____ -_-- _______ A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves- _ _ _ _______ -__ _ ____ -

1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba- - - _ __ _ _ - _ _

2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed as a Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States----- _ _ - _ - - _

3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Deaths of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider---..

4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be of Crisis Proportions---------------- ____ -- ____. - ____.__

5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders ____________

6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in Assassination Efforts_--- ____ -- ____ --_-___- _____ --- _____

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves _____--__________- 1. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination--__---

(a) Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local Governments ________-_____-________

(b) The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them- __ --___ _- ____ __

2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures for Their Criminal Talents ____ ---___- _____ -_--___

C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to Authorization and Control- The Apparent Lack of Accountability in the Command and

Control System Was Such That the Assassination Plots Could Have Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization- _ _ _

Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were

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Authorized_------------------------------------------- (4 D iern__--------------------------------------------- (b) Schneider------------------------------------------- (c) Trujillo____-_--------------------------------------- (d) Lumumba-_-_--------------------------------------- (e) Castro---- _____ -- ____ -- _____________________________ CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Operations Per-

ceived Assassination to Have Been a Permissible Course of Action_-----------------------------------------------

The Failure in Communication Between Agency Officials in Charge of the Assassination Operations and their Superiors in the Agency and in the Administration was Due to: (a) The Failure of Subordinates to Disclose Their Plans and Opera- tions to Their Superiors; and (b) The Failure of Superiors in the Climate of Violence and Aggressive Covert Actions Sanc- tioned by the Administrations to Rule Out Assassination as a Tool of Foreign Policy; To Make Clear to Their Subordinates That Assassination Was Impermissible; Or To Inquire Fur- ther After Receiving Indications That It Was Being Con- sidered__---------------------------------------------

(a) Agency Officials Failed on Several Occasions to Reveal the Plots to Their Superiors, Or To Do So With Sufficient Detail and Clarity _____ _ - __ __ __ _- __ _ _ - _ __ __ _- __ __ _ _ _

(i) Castro _____ -- _________ - ____ -- ___________ - _______ (ii) Trujillo ____ -- _________________ - _________________

(iii) Schneider---- ______________ -- ________________ :-- (b) Administration Officials Failed to Rule Out Assassinatron

As a Tool of Foreign Policy, To Make Clear to Then Subordinates That Assassination Was Impermissible- or To Inquire Further After Receiving Indications That Assassination Was Being Considered ____ _ _- ___________

(i) Trujillo--- _______ -- ______ -- ____ - ______________ _- (ii) Schneider--_-_______----------------------------

(iii) Lumumba ____________________ - _____ --_-__- ______ (iv) Castro _______________________ - _______ -- ____ -__-_

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267 267 270 272

273 273 273 273 274

XI

IT’. Findings and Conclusions-Continued C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to Authorization and

Control-Continued 5. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assassination

Plots Occmred Were Revealed by the Record To Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Were Most Necessary___~-_____-_-~----..~~~~-~------~~~~---------

(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of Plausible Denial ______ -_-- _.__.___ -_-- _____ --------

(b) The Danger of Using “Circumlocution” and “Euphemism”. (c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions__-------------. (d) The Danger of “Floating Authorization”-__------------. (e) The Problems Connected With Creating New Covert

Capabilities ________ ------ __._ -.-_----__-_--- ______ V. Recommendations ___._________.___ -- _._______ ----__-.-------__

A. General Agreement That the United States Must Not Engage in Assassination _____________ -_- _______ -_-_---_-_---- __._._.

B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination_____-..----------------- C. The NeedforaStatute-------------.-----------------------

Epilogue___--____~._..~-~--.~~~..~----~-~-------------------------- Statement of Joinder . ..______.____________________ --- _.___ ---_--__ AppendixA---______._-----__-~------~--~-------~-~.---~---------- AppendixB-_______________-___-_-----~---~---~--------------------- Separate Views of Senator Philip A. Hart_--___-_-_------------------- Additional Views of Senat.or Robert Morgan- - - _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ - _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ - Additional Views of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr ________ -- ___________ Additional Views of Senator Barry Goldwater ___.__________.__________ Supplemental Views of Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr ________ ______ Abbreviations of Citations-- __ __ - _____ ____ - _________ _ ___ ________ ----

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PROLOGUE

The events discussed in this Interim Report must be viewed in the context of United St,ates policy and actions designed to counter the threat of spreading Communism. Following the end of World War II, many nations in Eastern Europe and elsewhere fell under Communist influence or control. The defeat of the Axis powers was accompanied by rapid disintegration of the Western colonial empires. The Second World War had no sooner ended than a new struggle began. The Communist threat., emanating from what came to be called the “Sino- Soviet bloc,” led to a policy of containment intended to prevent further encroachment into the “Free World.”

United States strategy for conducting the Cold War called for the establishment of interlocking treaty arrangements and military bases throughout the world. Concern over the expansion of an aggressive Communist monolith led the United States to fight two major wars in Asia. In addition, it was considered necessary to wage a relent- less cold war against Communist expansion wherever it appeared in the “back alleys of the world.” This called for a full range of covert activit.ies in response to the operations of Communist clandestine services.

The fear of Communist expansion was particularly acute in the United States when Fidel Castro emerged as Cuba’s leader in the late 1950’s. His takeover was seen as the first significant. penetration by the Communists into the Western Hemisphere. United States leaders, including most Members of Congress, called for vigorous action to stem the Communist infection in this hemisphere. These policies rested on widespread popular support and encouragement.

Throughout this period, the United States felt impelled to respond to threats which were? or seemed to be, skirmishes in a global Cold War against Communism. Castro’s Cuba raised the spectre of a Soviet outpost at America’s doorstep. Events in the Dominican Republic appeared to offer an additional opportunity for the Russians and their a.llies. The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the stra- tegic center of the african continent, and the prospect of Communist penetration there was viewed as a threat to american interests in emerging African nations. There was great concern that a Communist takeover in Indochina would have a “domino effect” throughout Asia. Even the election in 1970 of a Marxist president in Chile was seen by some as a threat similar to that of Castro’s takeover in Cuba.

The Committee regards the unfortunate events dealt with in this Interim Report as an aberration? explainable at least in part, but not justified, by the pressures of the time. The Committee believes that it is still in the national interest of the United States to help nations achieve self-determination and resist Communist domination. How- ever, it is clear that this interest camlot justify resorting to the kind of abuses covered in this report. Indeed, the Committee has resolved that steps must be taken to prevent those abuses from happening again.

(XIII)

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