all rights reservedmicroeconomics © oxford university press malaysia, 2008 12– 1

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All Rights Reserved Microeconomics © Oxford University Press Malaysia, 2008 12– 1

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Page 1: All Rights ReservedMicroeconomics © Oxford University Press Malaysia, 2008 12– 1

All Rights ReservedMicroeconomics© Oxford University Press Malaysia, 2008

12– 1

Page 2: All Rights ReservedMicroeconomics © Oxford University Press Malaysia, 2008 12– 1

All Rights ReservedMicroeconomics© Oxford University Press Malaysia, 2008

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Oligopoly

CHAPTER

12

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Definition

A market structure in which there are only a few firms selling either standardized or differentiated products and it restricts the entry into and exit from the market

DEFINITION OF AN OLIGOPOLY

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Characteristics

• Few numbers of firms: The number of firms is small but size of the firms is large.

• Homogeneous or differentiated products: These products can be standardized products such as steel, zinc or copper which is price based. Other industries such as electronics automobiles offer different products where emphasis is on non-price competition, such as advertisirs.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AN OLIGOPOLY

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• Mutual interdependence: Firms in an oligopoly market always considers the reaction of their rivals when choosing price, sales target, advertising budgets and other business policies.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AN OLIGOPOLY (CON’T)

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• Barriers to entry: Restricts new entrants into the market through various types of barriers of entry such as the control of certain resources, ownership of patents and copyrights, exclusive financial requirements and legal barriers.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AN OLIGOPOLY (CON’T)

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PRICE AND OUTPUT DECISIONS FOR AN OLIGOPOLIST

Non-Price Competition

• Firms compete with each other using advertising and product differentiation techniques.

• Firms try to capture the market from rivals through better advertising campaigns and produce high-quality products instead of reducing prices.

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• Besides advertising, research and development activity is important for oligopoly firms to invent new products and improve the quality of the existing products.

PRICE AND OUTPUT DECISIONS FOR AN OLIGOPOLIST (CON’T)

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PRICE AND OUTPUT DECISIONS FOR AN OLIGOPOLIST

Price Rigidity and Kinked Demand Curve

• Since there is mutual interdependence between oligopoly firms, the prices in the market are more stable. This is called price rigidity in oligopoly market.

• The price rigidity explains the behaviour of an oligopoly firm that has no incentive to increase or decrease the price. The theory of the kinked demand curve is based on two assumptions.

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1. First assumption: If an oligopolist reduces its price, its rivals will follow and cut their prices to prevent losing the customers.

2. Second assumption: If an oligopolist increases its price, its rivals would not increase their prices and keep their prices the same, thereby they gain customers from the firm that increases the price.

ASSUMPTIONS OF A KINKED DEMAND CURVE

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An oligopoly firm faces two demand curves that is an individual demand curve (dd) and an industry demand curve (DD).

Price (RM)

Quantity

dd

Q*

P*

DD

According to the second assumption, when a firm increase the price (P*), no other firms will follow. Above P*, the firm will follow dd curve.

If the firm decrease the price, other firms will follow. Below P*, the firm follow DD curve.

Because of this assumption, an oligopolist faces kinked demand curve.

KINKED DEMAND CURVE

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Price (RM)The kinked demand curve  below point E creates a gap in the MR, which is indicated by the dotted line ab.

This shows price rigidity in the oligopoly market.

QuantityMRQ*

P* E

DD

MC1

At this range of MR, any change in the MC does not reflect changes in

the profit maximizing price and output.

MC2

a

b

KINKED DEMAND CURVE

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Athletic footwear faces the following demand curve:  P1 = 600 − 0.5Q1 for price increase  P2 = 700 − 0.75Q2 for price decrease The firm’s marginal cost is RM150. What is the price and output at the kink? At what range of value will the marginal cost shift without changing price and output.

PROFIT MAXIMIZATION USING THE EQUATION METHOD

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Solution At the kink, P1 = P2

600 – 0.5Q = 700 – 0.75Q 0.25Q = 100

Q = 400  P = RM400To find the range of MC, the upper limit and lower limit of MR needs to be found out. MR1 = 600 − Q1 = 600 – 400 = 200MR2 = 700 − 1.5Q2 = 700 −600 = 100The range for MC to shift is between 100 and 200

PROFIT MAXIMIZATION USING THE EQUATION METHOD (CON’T)

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GAME THEORY (CON’T)

A game theory is a model of analyzing strategic behaviour of rivals.

Strategic behaviour refers to the actions taken by firms to consider the expected movement of rivals and the mutual recognition of interdependence between these firms.

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Strategies are the important actions for each player.

The score obtained by each player in this game is called payoff.

GAME THEORY (CON’T)

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The payoff refers to the profits and losses of players, which is determined by strategies and constraints faced by the players.

Constraints faced by the players come from the consumers who determine the demand curve for the product in this industry.

GAME THEORY (CON’T)

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PRISONERS’ DILEMMA

In order to understand how the game theory works, we can start with a simple non-economic example called the prisoner’s dilemma.

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• The strategy is to separate the partners in different rooms to make sure they cannot communicate with each other. Four combinations of strategies that might be possible in this game are given below.

PRISONERS’ DILEMMA (CON’T)

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1. Both Gavin and Tan confess

2. Neither Gavin nor Tan confesses

3. Gavin confesses and Tan does not

4. Tan confesses and Gavin does not

Based on the four possible outcomes, we can tabulate of these outcomes. This is called the payoff matrix.

PRISONERS’ DILEMMA (CON’T)

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PAYOFF MATRIX

Gavin :

15 years

Tan:

15 years

Gavin :

3 years

Tan:

5 years

Gavin :

25 years

Tan:

3 years

Gavin :

5 years

Tan:

25 years

GA

VIN

TAN

A payoff matrix is a table that shows a listing of payoffs that each player will get for each possible combination of strategies that the

two partners might choose.

Confess

Confess

If both of them confess for murder offence; they will get

15-year sentence.Do not confess

If Gavin confess for murder offence and Tan does not; 3-year sentence for Gavin and

25-year sentence for Tan.

Do not confess

If Tan confess for murder offence and Gavin does not; 3-year sentence for

Tan and 25-year sentence for Gavin.

If both of them does not confess for murder offence; they will get 5-year sentence

for bank robbery.

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PRICE LEADERSHIP

Price leadership means the pricing strategy in which the firms in an oligopolistic industry follow the price set by the leading firm.

Price leadership is one form of collusion under oligopoly.

There is no formal or tacit agreement.

There are two types of price leadership.

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1. Dominant price leadership

- The dominant price leadership firm may be the largest firm that dominates the overall industry.

- The dominant price leadership firm can act as a monopoly where it sets its price to maximize profits; other firms will set their prices at the same level.

2. Barometric price leadership

- One firm will be the first to announce price change. This firm does not dominate the industry.

- Its price will be followed by others.

TYPES OF PRICE LEADERSHIP

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CARTEL

A cartel is a group of firms whose objective is to limit the scope of competitiveness in the market.

Cartel arises because firms want to eliminate uncertainty and improve profits by stabilizing market shares and prices, reducing competitiveness and eliminating promotional cost.

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• The most famous cartel is Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

• Cartel agreement is an arrangement among the oligopoly firms to cooperate with one another to act together as a monopoly.

• An ideal cartel will be powerful to establish monopoly price and earns supernormal profits.

CARTEL (CON’T)

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• Profits are divided among firms based on their individual level of production.

• Each firm sells different quantities and obtains different profits depending on the level of AC at the point of production

CARTEL (CON’T)