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Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing Vijay V. Vazirani Georgia Tech Market Equilibrium and Pricing of Goods

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Market Equilibrium and Pricing of Goods. Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing. Vijay V. Vazirani Georgia Tech. Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations, 1776. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Algorithmic Game Theoryand Internet Computing

Vijay V. Vazirani

Georgia Tech

Market Equilibrium and

Pricing of Goods

Page 2: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Adam Smith

The Wealth of Nations, 1776.

“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard for their own interest.” Each participant in a competitive economy is “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.”

Page 3: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

What is Economics?

‘‘Economics is the study of the use of

scarce resources which have alternative uses.’’

Lionel Robbins

(1898 – 1984)

Page 4: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

How are scarce resources assigned to alternative uses?

Page 5: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing
Page 6: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

How are scarce resources assigned to alternative uses?

Prices!

Page 7: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing
Page 8: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

How are scarce resources assigned to alternative uses?

Prices

Parity between demand and supply

Page 9: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

How are scarce resources assigned to alternative uses?

Prices

Parity between demand and supplyequilibrium prices

Page 10: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Leon Walras, 1874

Pioneered general

equilibrium theory

Page 11: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

General Equilibrium TheoryOccupied center stage in Mathematical

Economics for over a century

Mathematical ratification!

Page 12: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Central tenet

Markets should operate at equilibrium

Page 13: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Central tenet

Markets should operate at equilibrium

i.e., prices s.t.

Parity between supply and demand

Page 14: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Do markets even admitequilibrium prices?

Page 15: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Do markets even admitequilibrium prices?

Easy if only one good!

Page 16: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Supply-demand curves

Page 17: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Do markets even admitequilibrium prices?

What if there are multiple goods and multiple buyers with diverse desires

and different buying power?

Page 18: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Irving Fisher, 1891

Defined a fundamental

market model

Special case of Walras’

model

Page 19: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing
Page 20: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing
Page 21: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

utility

Concave utility function

(Of buyer i for good j)

amount of j

Page 22: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

( )i ij ijj G

u f x

total utility

Page 23: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

For given prices,find optimal bundle of goods

1p 2p3p

Page 24: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Several buyers with different utility functions and moneys.

Page 25: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Several buyers with different utility functions and moneys.

Equilibrium prices

1p 2p3p

Page 26: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Several buyers with different utility functions and moneys.

Show equilibrium prices exist.

1p 2p3p

Page 27: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Arrow-Debreu Theorem, 1954

Celebrated theorem in Mathematical Economics

Established existence of market equilibrium under very general conditions using a deep theorem from topology - Kakutani fixed point theorem.

Page 28: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

First Welfare Theorem

Competitive equilibrium =>

Pareto optimal allocation of resources

Pareto optimal = impossible to make

an agent better off without making some

other agent worse off

Page 29: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Second Welfare Theorem

Every Pareto optimal allocation of resources

comes from a competitive equilibrium

(after redistribution of initial endowments).

Page 30: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Kenneth Arrow

Nobel Prize, 1972

Page 31: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Gerard Debreu

Nobel Prize, 1983

Page 32: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Agents: buyers/sellers

Arrow-Debreu Model

Page 33: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Initial endowment of goods Agents

Goods

Page 34: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Agents

Prices

Goods

= $25 = $15 = $10

Page 35: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Incomes

Goods

Agents

=$25 =$15 =$10

$50

$40

$60

$40

Prices

Page 36: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Goods

Agents1 2: ( , , )i nU x x x R

Maximize utility

$50

$40

$60

$40

=$25 =$15 =$10Prices

Page 37: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Find prices s.t. market clears

Goods

Agents

$50

$40

$60

$40

=$25 =$15 =$10Prices

1: ( , )i nU x x R

Maximize utility

Page 38: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Arrow-Debreu Model

n agents, k goods

Page 39: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Arrow-Debreu Model

n agents, k goods

Each agent has: initial endowment of goods,

& a utility function

Page 40: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Arrow-Debreu Model

n agents, k goods

Each agent has: initial endowment of goods,

& a utility function Find market clearing prices, i.e., prices s.t. if

Each agent sells all her goodsBuys optimal bundle using this moneyNo surplus or deficiency of any good

Page 41: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Utility function of agent i

Continuous, quasi-concave and

satisfying non-satiation.

Given prices and money m,

there is a unique utility maximizing bundle.

: kiu R R

Page 42: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Proof of Arrow-Debreu Theorem

Uses Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem.Deep theorem in topology

Page 43: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Proof

Uses Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem.Deep theorem in topology

Will illustrate main idea via Brouwer’s Fixed

Point Theorem (buggy proof!!)

Page 44: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem

Let be a non-empty, compact, convex set

Continuous function

Then

:f S S

nS R

: ( )x S f x x

Page 45: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem

. .x s t x f x

Page 46: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem

Page 47: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Observe: If p is market clearing

prices, then so is any scaling of p

Assume w.l.o.g. that sum of

prices of k goods is 1.

k-1 dimensional

unit simplex

:k

Page 48: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Idea of proof

Will define continuous function

If p is not market clearing, f(p) tries to

‘correct’ this.

Therefore fixed points of f must be

equilibrium prices.

: k kf

Page 49: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

When is p an equilibrium price?

s(j): total supply of good j.

B(i): unique optimal bundle which agent i wants to buy after selling her initial

endowment at prices p.

d(j): total demand of good j.

Page 50: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

When is p an equilibrium price?

s(j): total supply of good j.

B(i): unique optimal bundle which agent i wants to buy after selling her initial

endowment at prices p.

d(j): total demand of good j.

For each good j: s(j) = d(j).

Page 51: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

What if p is not an equilibrium price?

s(j) < d(j) => p(j)

s(j) > d(j) => p(j)

Also ensure kp

Page 52: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Let

s(j) < d(j) =>

s(j) > d(j) =>

N is s.t.

p '( j) =

p( j) −[s( j) −d( j)]N

'( ) 1j

p j

( ) [ ( ) ( )]'( )

p j d j s jp j

N

( ) 'f p p

Page 53: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

is a cts. fn.

=> is a cts. fn. of p

=> is a cts. fn. of p

=> f is a cts. fn. of p

: ( )i B i

: ( )j d j

: ii u

Page 54: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

is a cts. fn.

=> is a cts. fn. of p

=> is a cts. fn. of p

=> f is a cts. fn. of p

By Brouwer’s Theorem, equilibrium prices exist.

: ( )i B i

: ( )j d j

: ii u

Page 55: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

is a cts. fn.

=> is a cts. fn. of p

=> is a cts. fn. of p

=> f is a cts. fn. of p

By Brouwer’s Theorem, equilibrium prices exist. q.e.d.!

: ( )i B i

: ( )j d j

: ii u

Page 56: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Bug??

Page 57: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Boundaries of k

Page 58: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Boundaries of

B(i) is not defined at boundaries!!

k

Page 59: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Kakutani’s fixed point theorem

S: compact, convex set in

upper hemi-continuous

: 2Sf S

nR

. . ( )x s t x f x

Page 60: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Fisher reduces to Arrow-Debreu

Fisher: n buyers, k goods

AD: n +1 agents

first n have money, utility for goods last agent has all goods, utility for money only.

Page 61: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Pricing of Digital Goods

Music, movies, video games, …

cell phone apps., …, web search results,

… , even ideas!

Page 62: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Pricing of Digital Goods

Music, movies, video games, …

cell phone apps., …, web search results,

… , even ideas!

Once produced, supply is infinite!!

Page 63: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

What is Economics?

‘‘Economics is the study of the use of

scarce resources which have alternative uses.’’

Lionel Robbins

(1898 – 1984)

Page 64: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Jain & V., 2010:

Market model for digital goods,

with notion of equilibrium.

Proof of existence of equilibrium.

Page 65: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Idiosyncrasies of Digital Realm

Staggering number of goods available with

great ease, e.g., iTunes has 11 million songs!

Once produced, infinite supply.

Want 2 songs => want 2 different songs,

not 2 copies of same song.

Agents’ rating of songs varies widely.

Page 66: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Game-Theoretic Assumptions

Full rationality, infinite computing power:

not meaningful!

Page 67: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Game-Theoretic Assumptions

Full rationality, infinite computing power:

not meaningful!

e.g., song A for $1.23, song B for $1.56, …

Page 68: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Game-Theoretic Assumptions

Full rationality, infinite computing power:

not meaningful!

e.g., song A for $1.23, song B for $1.56, …

Cannot price songs individually!

Page 69: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Market Model

Uniform pricing of all goods in a category.Assume g categories of digital goods.

Each agent has a total order over all songs

in a category.

Page 70: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Arrow-Debreu-Based Market Model

Assume 1 conventional good: bread.

Each agent has a utility function over

g digital categories and bread.

Page 71: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Optimal bundle for i, given prices p

First, compute i’s optimal bundle, i.e.,

#songs from each digital category

and no. of units of bread.

Next, from each digital category,

i picks her most favorite songs.

Page 72: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Agents are also producers

Feasible production of each agent

is a convex, compact set in

Agent’s earning: no. of units of bread producedno. of copies of each song sold

Agent spends earnings on optimal bundle.

Rg+1

Page 73: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Equilibrium

(p, x, y) s.t.

Each agent, i, gets optimal bundle &

“best” songs in each category. Each agent, k, maximizes earnings,

given p, x, y(-k)

Market clears, i.e., all bread sold &

at least 1 copy of each song sold.

Page 74: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Theorem (Jain & V., 2010):

Equilibrium exists.

(Using Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem)

Page 75: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Arrow-Debreu Theorem, 1954

Celebrated theorem in Mathematical Economics

Established existence of market equilibrium under very general conditions using a theorem from topology - Kakutani fixed point theorem.

Highly non-constructive!

Page 76: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Leon Walras

Tatonnement process:

Price adjustment process to arrive at equilibrium

Deficient goods: raise pricesExcess goods: lower prices

Page 77: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Leon Walras

Tatonnement process:

Price adjustment process to arrive at equilibrium

Deficient goods: raise pricesExcess goods: lower prices

Does it converge to equilibrium?

Page 78: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

GETTING TO ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM: A PROBLEM AND ITS HISTORY

For the third International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics

Kenneth J. Arrow

Page 79: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

OUTLINE

I. BEFORE THE FORMULATION OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY

II. PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUMIII. WALRAS, PARETO, AND HICKSIV. SOCIALISM AND DECENTRALIZATIONV. SAMUELSON AND SUCCESSORSVI. THE END OF THE PROGRAM

Page 80: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Part VI: THE END OF THE PROGRAM

A. Scarf’s exampleB. Saari-Simon Theorem: For any dynamic system

depending on first-order information (z) only, there is a set of excess demand functions for which stability fails. (In fact, theorem is stronger).

C. Uzawa: Existence of general equilibrium is equivalent to fixed-point theorem

D. Assumptions on individual demand functions do not constrain aggregate demand function (Sonnenschein, Debreu, Mantel)

Page 81: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Several buyers with different utility functions and moneys.

Find equilibrium prices!!

1p 2p3p

Page 82: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

The new face of computing

Page 83: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

New markets defined by Internet companies, e.g., Microsoft Google eBay Yahoo! Amazon

Massive computing power available.

Need an inherently-algorithmic theory of markets and market equilibria.

Today’s reality

Page 84: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Standard sufficient conditions

on utility functions (in Arrow-Debreu Theorem):

Continuous, quasiconcave,

satisfying non-satiation.

Page 85: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Complexity-theoretic question

For “reasonable” utility fns.,

can market equilibrium be computed in P?

If not, what is its complexity?

Page 86: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Several buyers with different utility functions and moneys.

Find equilibrium prices.

1p 2p3p

Page 87: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing
Page 88: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

“Stock prices have reached what looks like

a permanently high plateau”

Page 89: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

“Stock prices have reached what looks like

a permanently high plateau”

Irving Fisher, October 1929

Page 90: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing
Page 91: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing
Page 92: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Linear Fisher Market

Assume:Buyer i’s total utility,

mi : money of buyer i.

One unit of each good j.

i ij ijj G

v u x

Page 93: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Eisenberg-Gale Program, 1959

max log

. .

:

: 1

: 0

i ii

i ij ijj

iji

ij

m v

s t

i v

j

ij

u xx

x

Page 94: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Eisenberg-Gale Program, 1959

max log

. .

:

: 1

: 0

i ii

i ij ijj

iji

ij

m v

s t

i v

j

ij

u xx

x

prices pj

Page 95: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Why remarkable?

Equilibrium simultaneously optimizes

for all agents.

How is this done via a single objective function?

Page 96: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Rational convex program

Always has a rational solution,

using polynomially many bits,

if all parameters are rational.

Eisenberg-Gale program is rational.

Page 97: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

KKT Conditions

Generalization of complementary slackness

conditions to convex programs.

Help prove optimal solution to EG program:Gives market equilibriumIs rational

Page 98: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Lagrange relaxation technique

Take constraints into objective with a penalty

Yields dual LP.

Page 99: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

min cT . x

s.t. A x =b

L(x, y) = (cT . x−yT (Ax−b))

g(y) =minx {cT . x−yT (Ax−b)}

∀y: g(y) ≤ opt

Page 100: Algorithmic Game Theory and Internet Computing

Best lower bound = maxy g(y)

g(y) =minx {(cT −yTA)x+ yTb}

If (cT −yTA) ≠0, g(y) =−∞

Therefore, maxyT .b

s.t. yT A=cT