albanians and serbs locked in...

KOSOVO: ENTITY WITHOUT IDENTITY?

ALBANIANS AND SERBS LOCKED IN CONFRONTATION

© Ivan Miljojkovíc

M.C.J. van der Wilk MA Thesis European Studies

First reader: Dr. E. van Ree

Second reader: Drs. N. Tromp –Vrkić

KOSOVO: ENTITY WITHOUT IDENTITY?

ALBANIANS AND SERBS LOCKED IN CONFRONTATION

Author: M.C.J. van der Wilk

MA Thesis European Studies

East European studies

University of Amsterdam

First reader: Dr. E. van Ree

Second reader: Drs. N. Tromp –Vrkić

August 2007

Table of Contents

PREFACE.................................................................................................................................................. III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................................. III MAP OF KOSOVO .......................................................................................................................................V ACRONYMS...............................................................................................................................................VI INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................VIII

1 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF KOSOVO ...................................................................... 10 1.1 Colliding Myths from 1389 till present ................................................................................... 10 1.2 Tito’s Yugoslavia 1945-1980 ................................................................................................. 14 1.3 Milošević’ Greater Serbia 1987 - 1997 .................................................................................. 17 1.4 The Kosovo war 1998-1999 .................................................................................................. 21 1.5 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 1999 – present................................................. 23

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................. 29

2.1 What is a nation?................................................................................................................... 29 2.2 Modernism versus Primordialism .......................................................................................... 30 2.3 Imagined community versus Invented tradition ..................................................................... 31 2.4 Civic versus Ethnic nationalism............................................................................................. 33

3 THE IDENTITY QUESTION IN KOSOVO................................................................................................. 35

3.1 Supra-ethnic identity versus Ethnic identity........................................................................... 35 3.2 The current situation of the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs ....................................... 38 3.3 Kosovo Albanians versus Kosovo Serbs............................................................................... 42 3.4 A common symbol for Kosovo............................................................................................... 47 3.5 Cutting the umbilical cord ...................................................................................................... 54

3.5.1 Kosovo Serbs versus Serbian Serbs............................................................................. 55 3.5.2 Kosovo Albanians versus Albanian Albanians .............................................................. 56

4. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................. 65

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................................ 68 APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................................... 76

I. UN Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999) ......................................................................................... 76 II. Standards before Status (10 December 2003).......................................................................... 76 III. Composition Negotiation Teams............................................................................................... 76 IV. Comprehensive Proposal Marti Athisaari (10 February 2007) .................................................. 76

II

Preface Since March 2006, the disputed territory of Kosovo has completely occupied my mind. The people

living in Kosovo, regardless of whether they are past, present or future residents of the region, intrigue

me. Kosovo became close to me personally due to its absorbing and complex history and its recent

turbulent past.

I enjoyed travelling through Kosovo and experiencing its rich and beautiful natural and cultural

heritage. At the same time I became frustrated and saddened by the neglect and ignorance of this

heritage due to enormous industrial pollution and damage done by individuals. Past national conflicts

and the resulting inflicted damage, as well as the negative consequences of economic growth and

vandalism have all had a degrading influence on Kosovo. While attending the course “Cultural

heritage and living together” during the Mitrovica Summer Courses 2007 organised by SPARK, I

became aware that all people should take responsibility for our common world heritage and I hope that

in the near future all residents of Kosovo will do the same.

Much has been said and written on the political and historical situation of Kosovo, but sources

available on the identity issue are scarce. This is somewhat remarkable, as the acknowledgement of

one’s ethnicity and/or identity can be perceived as the root of the current problems in Kosovo. This

thesis is a discussion of the search for a new identity in Kosovo which desperately needs to become a

more peaceful and stable entity than it currently is.

This thesis should be regarded as an academic discussion paper. Academic values of

objectivity, transparency and accuracy have been strived for. Notwithstanding, I am aware of the fact

that by writing about the identity question in Kosovo, I have touched upon sensitive and disputable

issues concerning Kosovo’s history, politics and society. Due to these topics, I can understand that

some people might be offended by some aspects of this research. Nonetheless, please note that

academic principles have always been my guideline.

Acknowledgements There are many people and organisations that I would like to thank for their support and guidance

during the seemingly endless process of writing this thesis. Without their support, this thesis would not

have been possible.

First of all, I owe much respect, recognition and gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Erik van Ree,

who had the patience and enthusiasm to guide me through the academic process of (re) structuring,

specifying and analysing and who has taught me to be comprehensible, critical and punctual.

I would like to thank the Dutch organisation IKV Pax Christi and their Serbian and Kosovo

counterpart NGO’s Fractal and Integra, by giving me the opportunity to participate in Our Future

Network (OFN), which supports dialogue between youngsters of Serbia and Kosovo. Besides the

inspiration for this thesis, the Our Future Network gave me the opportunity to feel, see and to explore

the Kosovo experience. Thanks to OFN, I have enriched myself with priceless memories and many

new, precious ‘Balkan engaged’ friends from the Netherlands, Serbia and Kosovo. The staff on South

III

Eastern Europe of IKV Pax Christi have always been very helpful, interested and supportive of my

thesis. I would like to thank Ewa Oosterwegel, Dion van den Berg, Gregor Niessen and Johan te Velde

for their valuable contributions, perspectives and shared experiences in the region. Especially I would

like to thank Linda Schevers for her continuous support, academic insight and valuable involvement

during the whole thesis process.

I am greatly indebted to my class and professors of the course Cultural Heritage and living

together during the Mitrovica Summer Courses. They gave me the final inspiration and

acknowledgements for this thesis. Especially I would like to thank Neda Kurjacki, Ivan Miljojkovíc and

Ivan Krstic for their fascinating contributions. Furthermore I would like to thank Annelies van den Berg

of SPARK for her continuing interest and valuable assistance.

Additionally, I would like to express my gratitude to Huub Alberse, Secondee for the OSCE in

the region of Peć/Peja, for his valuable contributions, his close eye for objectivity and detail.

Moreover, I am gratefully indebted to Jon Warne for getting my English to flow more fluently.

Likewise I would like to thank Steve Meyer and Catríona Rush for their editorial work.

Doutzen Wierda your help during emergent situations, your swift and sharp reactions were of

enormous value. Additionally, Dima Peteva it was great to join you on the final road of our Master and

to share the thesis process together.

Additionally, I would like to thank my parents, Herman and Drieneke van der Wilk, for giving

me the opportunity to study and their support during my study time through which I became able to

broaden my general knowledge, my perspectives on variety of cultures, languages and countries.

I also would like to thank all my friends and family who gave me the mental support of

continuing my thesis by listening to my struggling stories and by showing their interest in my thesis

efforts and study.

Last, but certainly not least, I want to stress the continuous support of Rutger Smit, who

provided me with his enduring confidence in me, his inspiration and his endless care and support for

me. He gave me the priceless energy to continue to reach my goals, taught me to believe in myself

and to be confident on my work.

I invested more than one year in this thesis on the identity question in Kosovo. It has been a

challenge to put all my skills and knowledge into the academic learning process. Indeed it became my

life work so far. So please, read and enjoy, and become as well inspired and moved by the multi-faced

entity of Kosovo!

Marieke van der Wilk

The Hague, August 2007

IV

Map of Kosovo

1

1 ICG, 2007 (14th of May): 39

V

Acronyms

AAK Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo) (Prime Minister

Agim Ceku)

AI Amnesty International

Ashkali Albanian speaking ethnic minority

B92 Independent Serbian TV, radio channel and website

BIRN Balkan Investigative Reporting Network

DS Demokratska stranka (Democratic Party) (Boris Tadić)

DSE Deputy to the Special Envoy

DSS Demokratska stranka Srbije (Democratic Party of Serbia) (Prime Minister Vojislav

Koštunica’s party)

EU European Union

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

ESI European Stability Initiative, a think tank.

FARK ‘National Army of Kosova’

FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Gorani Muslim Slavs

IC International Community, the United Nations member states.

ICG International Crisis Group, a think tank.

ICR International Civilian Representative

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

ICTY International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia

ISG International Steering Group

IEV Inter – ethnic violence

IDP Internally displaced person

IOM International Organization for Migration

INGO International Non – Governmental Organisation

ISG International Steering Group

KiM Serbian News Agency for the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian community in

Kosovo and Methoija

KISP Kosovo Standards Implementations Plan

KFOR The Kosovo Force

KLA Kosova Liberation Army (also UCK)

KPC Kosovo Protection Corps

KPS Kosovo Police Service

KSIP Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan

LDK Lidjah Demokratike e Kosoves (Democratic League of Kosovo) (President Fatmir

Sedjiu)

VI

Metohija South – Western plain of Kosovo including the districts of Peć/Peja, Dakovica and

Prizren. Serbs refer to Metohija as the monastery estate and Serbian church-owned

land. In Albanian referred to as Rrafsh I Dukgjinit. NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO Non-governmental Organisation

NLA National Liberation Army of Macedonia

OIK Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo

OMIK OSCE Mission in Kosovo

ORA Partia Reformiste ORA (Reformist Party ORA) (Veton Surroi)

OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PDK Partia Demokratikee Kosoves (Democratic Party of Kosovo)

(Main political successor of the KLA and largest opposition party, led by Hashim

Thaqi)

PISG Provisional Institutions of Self Government

RAE Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians

RFL/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; private international communications service to

Eastern and South-eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle

East, and South-western Asia.

Roma Gypsies

SAJ Serbian anti – terrorist units

SAP The Stabilisation and Association Process

SE Special Envoy

Shqiptar Albanian

SNC Serbian National Council

SPO Srpski pokret obnove (Serbian Renewal Movement)

SPS Socialist Party of Serbia, formerly led by Slobodan Milošević.

SRS Srpska radikalna stranka (Serbian Radical Party) (Currently led by Tomislav Nikolić as

Vojislav Šešelj is awaiting his trial at the ICTY in The Hague.)

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General

UDB Yugoslav Security Services

UCK Ushtria Climitare e Kosoves (the KLA)

UNOSEK United Nations Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the future

status process for Kosovo

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo

VII

Introduction

Kosovo: entity without identity?

The significance of Kosovo, a crucial geographic entity in the heart of South Eastern Europe, has

increased to a remarkable extent.2 It has been said that Kosovo comprises two national histories; the

rise of the medieval Serbian state and the making of modern Albania, in addition to a rich legacy that

has been left behind by the Ottomans.3 Kosovo became the most explosive danger zone in Europe

due to aggravated claims of Albanians and Serbs over a history that dwells between myth and reality.

Kosovo was at the beginning of one of the main and earliest conflicts in former Yugoslavia, but has as

well the key to ending it.

The Kosovo conflict that emerged in 1981 and reached its climax in 1999 is described as the

most intractable, the most dangerous and the most intense of all the political conflicts in the Western

Balkans. Currently, however, a process of transition is taking place. Nonetheless, due to the shared

history of nationalism and devastating wars, lasting effects remain visible in the economic, geographic,

demographic, cultural and political structures of the Western Balkans. Significant differences exist

between the various countries in the region and within this region Kosovo should be considered a

unique case.4 Kosovo remains one of the most demanding challenges for the Western Balkans and

especially after 1999 also for the international community. Because ever since the NATO

bombardments in 1999, Kosovo has been governed and controlled under UNSC resolution 1244

which established the UN interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, better known as the abbreviation

UNMIK.5 Kosovo is referred to internationally as UNMIK Kosovo or Kosovo (UNMIK).

Eight years later, the status of Kosovo is still undefined. On the 21st of February 2006 the

negotiations on the status of Kosovo between Serbian and Kosovo leaders started.6 These

negotiations had to define the final status of Kosovo, a very difficult task since both parties are

seemingly irreconcilable. Serbia wants to keep Kosovo as its province and the Kosovo Albanians

strive for an independent Kosovo. Moreover, the Kosovo conflict remains a delicate equilibrium,7 as

the riots that took place in the city of Mitrovica in 2004 illustrated.8 Just one event can trigger a new

chain of violence in the region and therefore it is of extreme importance that a solution for Kosovo is to

2 The author refers to the notion of Kosovo as a geographic area, it does not indicate a position on the larger issue of the

political status of Kosovo today or in the future. The author refers to the international notion of ‘Kosovo’ instead of the Serbian

reference of Kosovo I Metohija or Kosmet, or the Albanian reference of Kosova or Kosovë without any judgment intended. The

form of ‘Kosovo’ is currently used the most in English language publications.

3 Malcolm, 1998: Introduction 4 The Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo will be referred to as respectively Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians.

Kosovo will be used for every concept, in order to avoid distinctions and to incorporate all residents of Kosovo. Originally, a

resident of Kosovo used to be named a Kosovar. At present the notion is more often used to refer to the Kosovo Albanians and

can therefore not be used as a neutral notion. 5 UNMIK, 2001 – 2006: UNMIK At a Glance

6 UNOSEK, 2006: February 21

7 Meurs, Weiss, 2004: 2

8 Hirs, 2004

VIII

be found in the near future because reverberations of this debated region are felt throughout the

Balkans.9

The Kosovo puzzle has the impression of an unsolvable one. The possible solution of one of

the communities fulfilling the minority position is a non- starter, as the Serbian community would not

like to be a minority within an independent Kosovo any more than the Albanian community would want

to be a minority within Serbia. Moreover the solution of a ‘neutral’ Kosovo nation seems impossible

because a shared Kosovo identity does not appear to exist. Crucially, identity in a national state is of

great importance since the feeling of solidarity and belonging within a community is an essential part

of creating the concept of citizenship. Elements such as a shared past or a sense of similarity bind

people to form a nation. The views of Gellner on nationalism and Smith’s theories on identity can be

used for a better understanding of this matter: Gellner believes that nations are a modern

phenomenon created by themselves in historically recent times. Smith believes that nations have

historical ethnic roots that draw on the pre-existing history of ethnic groups. It seems that the society of

Kosovo lacks these constituents of a nation and thus it will be very difficult to work on a unified Kosovo

nation.

Hence, the main hypothesis of this thesis will be:

The Kosovo problem is hard to solve because there is no such thing as a Kosovo identity.

The present day situation in Kosovo cannot fully be understood without knowing the intriguing

history and the complex political situation of the past decades. As the journalist James Pettifer

summarised; journalism and writing about Kosova is a journey – into a complex reality, a part of the

world where great historical forces, religions and peoples collide…”10 History shows the strong

colliding identities of the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, so would there be any room left for a Kosovo

identity in the near future?

In order to cover all concepts, the thesis will be structured as follows. The first chapter

describes the historical and political outline of Kosovo. The theoretical framework on the notions of

nationalism and ethnicity will be discussed in the second chapter. This framework will be used as the

basis for the analysis of the research on the identity question in Kosovo, which will be the focus of the

third chapter. To conclude, an answer will be given to the hypothesis in the conclusion.

9 Curri, 2005: 48

10 Pettifer, 2005: 4

IX

- Kosovo: Entity without Identity? -

1 Historical and political framework of Kosovo

1.1 Colliding Myths from 1389 till present The title of Julie Mertus’ book Kosovo; how myths and truths started a war illustrates perfectly the role

of mythology in the Kosovo conflict as the histories and myths of the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo

Albanians are central to understand the problems in Kosovo.11 During the 19th century the

development of myths and national symbols became important elements in the nationalisation of

European cultures. The territory of Kosovo can be seen as the puppet of two colliding national myths.

On the one hand Serbia, with the myth of Kosovo Polje as the ‘cradle’of Serbia as it was the centre of

the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian medieval civilisation. While on the other hand, Albanian

heroes and movements contributed to the development of an Albanian identity and their

‘autochthonous’ claim on Kosovo. Throughout history both nations have competed and conflicted

numerous times, eventually resulting in the Greater Serbian idea versus the Greater Albanian idea.

These developments can be compared to a pendulum of power that has swung back and forth

between these two ideas; between Serbia and Albania. From time to time the Serbian- or the Albanian

nation-states became reality and history and myths accordingly converged in favour of the respective

nation. Mertus argues that the tension between these communities have intensified due to the

competing and conflicting ‘truths’ of interpretations and histories.12 As a result of the violent ethnic

separation of the two communities in the nineties, both sides became even more assured of the justice

of their own claims.13

Ever since it’s early history, Kosovo has been the subject of discussions over territory and

demography. One of the historical allegations concerning the settlement of territory is the debate

concerning the question: Who was in Kosovo first? The issue is whether the Albanians are descended

from the Illyrians or from the Thracians, the former having occupied the western Balkans and the latter

its eastern half in pre-Roman and Roman times. Albanian scholars support Illyrian origins of the nation

and claim to be the primordial ancient nation of the Balkans as they have always felt a strong

attachment to Kosovo as their Albanian motherland. Moreover Albanians maintain that Kosova’s

ancient predecessors were the Dardanians, who they claim were an Illyrian tribe that later enjoyed a

special status in the Roman Empire. However some Serbian authors reject this argument and say that

they distinguish Thracian elements in the Dardanians. Furthermore they claim that the South Slav

community has dominated the Kosovo region since the 6th century continuously, and that the

Albanians arrived a century afterwards.14 Despite the counter arguments of the Serbs, the Albanians

will always claim to being the ancient residents of the Balkans and therefore of Kosovo.

The most famous Serbian struggle in the territory of Kosovo is certainly the battle of the 28th of

June 1389 on the Field of Blackbirds, Kosovo Polje, which has been made into the national chronicle

11 Mertus, 1999: 1 12 Ibid.: 1, 13 13 Kostovicova, 2005: 213 14 Vickers, 1998 : 1-4

10


of Serbia. The legend of Kosovo Polje describes the power struggle between the Serbian King Lazar

with the Turkish Sultan Murad, as part of the Ottoman invasion. Many facts about the battle are

doubtful, however the fighting was intense and both armies suffered heavy losses. Furthermore, both

Murad and Lazar were killed.15 The Serbian army lost the battle but it did not yet mean the end of the

Serbian kingdom, only in 1459 did the medieval Serbian state become extinct as it was to be

incorporated into the Ottoman Empire.16 Despite the defeat, the battle and the cult of King Lazar

became the symbol of the moral victory of good over evil: a symbol for Serbian martyrdom but also a

new beginning for the Serbian ‘heavenly’ nation.17

The battle is seen as the early precursor of the start of Serbian nationalism and Serbian

statehood as it has been presented in many traditional songs and folk poetry. A new epic tradition of

the militant but suffering nation came into existence. Investigative research on this tradition has been

done by Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864), a collector of Serbian epics and reformer of the Serbian language

who promoted Serbian nationalism to the rest of Europe.18 Kosovo Polje became the source of

inspiration for the Serbian historian Spiridon Gopĉević (1855-1928), it grasped the inspiration of the

German philosopher Goethe (1749-1832) and contributed to the idea of creating a ‘Greater Serbian

state’.19 This idea finds its origins in the draft Načertanije by Ilija Garasanin who encouraged Serbia in

1844 to take over the occupied Ottoman lands and to reinforce the strong medieval Serbian state of

King Stefan Dušan. Kosovo and Albania needed to be recaptured before proclaiming any form of

independence as the Ottoman Empire was weakening during that time.20 This nationalistic ideology

which incorporates Serbian territorial claims, better known as ‘the Greater Serbian idea’, became a

key factor in the development of Serbian nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth century.21

The earliest Albanian nationalist expression dates as well back from the 15th century. One of

the legendary Albanian national heroes is Gjergj Kastrioti, better known as Skënderbeg or

Skanderbeg. After having fought many wars under the supervision of the Ottoman army, he later

renounced the Ottoman Sultan in 1443. With his own Albanian army assembled, he struggled to

regain autonomy and to do away with the Islamic conversion brought by the Ottomans.22 Despite

strong resistance, Albania remained part of the Ottoman Empire until 1912. Nevertheless Skënderbeg

became the symbol of national unity and strength for the Albanian community and later became of

crucial importance in the development of an Albanian national identity during the 19th century. For

example, the black double-headed eagle on a red background that was depicted on the emblem of

Skënderbeg became the source of inspiration for the Albanian national flag when proclaiming

independence in 1912.23

15 Malcolm, 1998: 58 – 80 16 Ibid.: 92 17 Vickers, 1998: 14 - 15 18 Kola, 2003: 4 19 Detrez, 1999: 20, 28, 33 20 Kola, 2003: 11 21 Detrez 1999: 28, 33 22 Kola, 2003: 5 23 Vickers, 1999: 8,9,46

11


However, contrary to the swift development of Serbian nationalism from the early beginning of the 19th

century, the Albanian consciousness and the Albanian national movement was very slowly awakening

as it was curtailed by the Ottoman occupation and its own backward economic situation.24 The

Ottoman rule can be seen as a threat to the Albanian political, social and cultural identity as the

Ottomans refused to recognise the Albanians as distinctive from the Turks, although sharing the same

Islamic faith.25 With no alphabet and thus no development of the Albanian language, the Ottoman

Empire ensured that Albania was the last Balkan nation to achieve independence from its Ottoman

supremacy.26 The first effect of Albanian nation building was to be seen in the end of the 19th century,

when the Russian – Ottoman war ended in the beginning of 1878 and resulted in the Treaty of San

Stefano in March 1878. As a result new empires were created in the formation of a Greater Bulgaria

and Greater Serbia which took advantage of their power and as a result slowly invaded the Albanian

territories, including Kosovo. In order to curb the expansion of a Greater Bulgaria, the Treaty of San

Stefano was revised by the Treaty of Berlin in June 1878 which gave rise to the independence of

Serbia and Montenegro and autonomy for Bulgaria under Ottoman rule.27

Thus the territory of Kosovo became divided between the Ottomans and the Montenegrins.

However, giving Albanian inhabited land to a Slav kingdom caused sufficient resentment to start the

first Albanian resistance movement which was based on the nationalist ideology of Sami Frashëri.28

Accordingly, on the 10th of June 1878, the League of Prizren was set up to defend the Albanian

territories and to fight for an autonomous republic within the Ottoman Empire until the creation of an

independent Albanian republic.29 However League’s fight for territorial integrity was soon to be

crushed by the Ottoman army as the growing Albanian movement was a threat to the Ottoman rule.30

In 1908, another attempt for more autonomy was undertaken by supporting the revolution of the

radical Young Turks who wanted to create a Turkish national state. However, this attempt failed as

well, as the empowered Young Turks imagined a strong centralised state which eventually clashed

with the autonomy ideals of the Albanians.31

The ‘Albanian question’ was finally determined during the first Balkan War in which the Balkan

League, consisting of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia took the lead in liberating their

countries from the Ottoman oppressor. They wanted to keep Austria out and take position against the

rise of the Albanian identity and the eventual formation of an autonomous Albanian state.32 The

declaration of the war created excitement amongst the Serbian militaries as the prospect of

recapturing Kosovo after five centuries and taking revenge for the Battle of Kosovo became a reality.33

24 Vickers, 1999: 14 25 Ibid.: 27 26 Ibid.: 27, 30 –31 27 Malcolm, 1998: 200 28 Vickers, 1999: 30, 31 29 Detrez, 1999: 33 30 Vickers, 1998: 48 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid.: 75 33 Vickers, 1998: 76

12


After the Ottomans had been defeated, Serbia celebrated their victory over Kosovo Polje and brutally

invaded Kosovo and the surrounding Albanian territories.34 Atrocities were committed on a large scale

with the goal of transforming the ethnic character of the Albanian regions entirely and civilising the

region according to Serbian standards, also known as Serbianisation.35

As Kosovo was to be ruled by Serbia, the North of Albania was divided between Serbia and

Montenegro. Despite the oppression, the Albanians in South Albania declared their national

independence on the 28th of November 1912 which was due to be internationally acknowledged on the

29th of July 1913. During the First World War in 1914, the whole of Serbia (Kosovo and Methoija

included) was taken over by the Austrian – Hungarian empire and Bulgaria. The Kosovo Albanians

fought with the Austrian – Hungarian forces against the Serbs, however in 1918 they were defeated by

the Serbian četniks, the rebel of the Serbian nationalists, who invaded Kosovo. Serbia regained its

victory and Kosovo was to be reoccupied by Serbia.36 The Serbs living in Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo,

Croatia and the Montenegrin Kingdom, became one Slav state; the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and

Slovenes. The Greater Serbian dream became a reality whereas the Albanian quest for independence

was to be totally neglected. The pendulum of power over Kosovo swung towards the Greater Serbian

idea.

The time period between the end of the Russian – Ottoman war in 1878 and the Albanian

independence of 1912 is known in Albanian history as the Rilindje Kombëtare, the national rebirth or

national renaissance.37 During this time cultural, national and political movements among the Albanian

communities started to grow. Although the ideals of the League of Prizren were not realised, their

legacy of national awareness continued to live on amongst Albanian intellectuals. In the decades

afterwards, they had a powerful influence on the Albanian movements such as the kaçak movement

who fought for the establishment of a unified state of all Albanian inhabited lands, as more than half of

the Albanian population lived outside the borders of the Albanian region. However, these Albanian

freedom fighters had been defeated by King Zog in 1924.38

Until the beginning of the Second World War in 1941, the Kosovo Albanians were neglected

as an existing national minority as they were suppressed in their language in schools and cultural

activities. Furthermore, a strategy of Serbian colonisation was set in motion in order to change the

ethnic composition of Kosovo. By expropriating the Albanians of their lands and property, they were

officially encouraged to emigrate, or sometimes even deported, to Albania or Turkey.39 Yet this

strategy could not be implemented thoroughly as the scattered Albanian communities were to be

united in April 1941, after the Nazis had invaded Yugoslavia. A German - Italian accord was made in

Vienna to create an ethnic Albanian state in order to curb Serbia’s influence in the region. This Greater

Albanian idea consisted of Albania, Kosovo, and other Albanian inhabited regions in Greece,

Macedonia and Montenegro. Thanks to the Italian ‘liberators’ the Albanian dream became true even 34 Malcolm, 1998: 252 -253 35 Ibid.: 252- 254 36 Detrez, 1999: 35-37 37 Malcolm, 1998: 217 38 ICG, 2004 (February 25): 3,4 39 Malcolm, 1998: 269

13


though under Italian supervision.40 The Serbian policies were reversed; lands and property were given

back to the previous owners and Serbian colonists were imprisoned or expelled from Kosovo. The

pendulum of power over Kosovo swung back to the Albanian side.

1.2 Tito’s Yugoslavia 1945-1980

Due to Italy’s capitulation in 1943, a disordered situation was created. The Albanian resistance

movement took advantage of the situation and started to fight for an ethnically pure and independent

Albania within the structures of a second League of Prizren. These nationalists were the previous

collaborators with the Italians and in favour of the extreme right Albanian resistance, also known as

the Balli Kombëtar or National Front. For their own benefit, the Nazis supported an independent and

neutral Albania, and therefore the Balli Kombëtar and the Nazis fought together against the Serbian

nationalistic resistance movement, the četniks.41 In time, Yugoslav communist partisans formed the

Yugoslav National Liberation army and initiated a guerrilla campaign against the invasion of the

German Nazis and Italian fascists and freed Yugoslavia from the Axis in 1945. After the takeover, the

Yugoslav communist partisans retaliated with the collaborators of the enemies and members of non –

communist resistance movements such as the četniks and the Balli Kombëtar. Throughout the

Yugoslav time period, the Kosovo Albanians were regarded as collaborators of Fascist Italy and Nazi

Germany.42

The leader of the Liberation Front was Joseph Broz Tito who became the head of the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The FRY established six socialist republics of which Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia. Within the boundaries of Serbia,

the two autonomous socialist provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo – Metohija were recognised.43 The

Albanians in Kosovo were seen as a nationality and not as a nation, as the ‘nation’ of Albanians had

its own state in Albania. The same applied to the Hungarians of Vojvodina.44 Tito adopted the Soviet

economic policies of the rapid promotion of heavy industry and the collectivisation of agriculture.

However, relations between Stalin and Tito deteriorated due to the long term ‘Balkan Federation’

project, in which Albania and Bulgaria would be merged into communist Yugoslavia. Although the

project was first initiated by Moscow, Stalin started to see Tito as its rival and did not want Communist

Yugoslavia to expand.45 Tito preferred to unite with Albania rather than with Bulgaria. Hence Tito

discussed with Hoxha a Yugoslav – Albanian unification, in order to solve the Kosovo question.

However, this unification never came as on the 28th of June 1948 the Yugoslav Communist party was

expelled from Cominform, the international Communist board, due to counter revolutionary practices.

After the break with Moscow, Tito decided to follow his own Yugoslav way of self-government, which is

described as an obstinate combination of mild socialism, totalitarian politics, and a mixed construction 40 Kola, 2003: 22 - 23 41 Detrez, 1999: 45 - 47 42 Ibid.: 50 43 Crampton, 1997: 217 44 Ibid.: 276 45 Ree, 2005: 170

14


of nationalism and federalism.46 Hoxha decided to align with Stalin instead of Tito and as a

consequence the borders between Yugoslavia and Albania were sealed off. As Kosovo was seen as a

potential region of influence of Hoxha, it became the victim of the hostile Yugoslav Security Services

(UDB) which were hunting for traitors. Nevertheless, the early fifties was a period of relative stability

between the major ethnic groups of Yugoslavia, as they were bound together by facing the Soviet

threat.47

After the war, Serbia remained the largest and most powerful republic within the Yugoslav

framework as the Yugoslav state bank and other central governmental institutions were located in the

capital of Yugoslavia, Belgrade. Moreover, the existence of the Serbian Communist party gave the

Serbian nationalists large influence on the future of their fatherland.48 In the non – Serb republics, the

most important positions in the governmental administration, the banks, the army and the party, were

disproportionately performed by Serbs and other nationalities were therefore underrepresented.49 The

pendulum of power had swung back again in favour of Serbia as Kosovo was integrated under the

Yugoslav framework and thus the Albanians in Albania and Kosovo were dominated by Yugoslav

rulers. However, a shift in the dominant Serbian rule on Yugoslavia was made when the chief of the

Security Services, Aleksandar Ranković, was purged in 1966.50 He was seen by non - Serbs as the

personification of the Serbian domination and underhand development of Serbian nationalism. This

event had a great impact on the political developments in Yugoslavia as it was taken by the non –

Serbs and minorities as a victory. After the Ranković incident, the Albanians became aware of their

numerical superiority in Kosovo and organised large demonstrations in 1968 calling for a greater

recognition of Albanian rights in Kosovo. As the Kosovo Albanians still had very strong feelings

towards their homeland, demonstrators would carry pictures of Hoxha and call for an Albanian

republic.51

Brown notes that an aggressive form of Albanian nationalism rose in the end of the sixties and

the beginning of the seventies. At the same time, Serbian power diminished as Tito inaugurated more

extensive rights for all the republics by means of decentralisation measures and making concessions

to the minority nationalities for example to allow the Kosovo Albanians to fly the Albanian flag.52 The

zenith of Albanian national interest was the change of the Yugoslav constitution in 1974, which gave

the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina a higher status on the Yugoslav federal level.53

However Kosovo was not granted a republican status and residents could thus not apply for Kosovar

or Albanian citizenship because of the fear that Kosovo would request more than being only a

republic.54 Nevertheless, the status of Kosovo was gradually and carefully upgraded by Tito’s policies

46 van Hengel, 2006: 12 47 Malcom, 1998: 320 48 Lebor, 2002: 29 49 Crampton, 1997: 338 50 Detrez, 1999: 50 51 Crampton, 1997: 310 52 Brown, 2002: 163 53 Ibid.: 164 54 Detrez, 1999: 67

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in favour of the Kosovo Albanians. The pendulum of power over Kosovo slowly had swung back to the

Albanian side.

One can conclude that Yugoslav politics became very complicated by the issue of the ‘national

questions’ which Tito tried to solve through his multi - ethnic balanced model of ‘Brotherhood and

Unity’ in his federation of six republics. This equilibrium might have appeared to be stable but it proved

to be false with the sudden death of Tito in 1980. The Kosovo Albanians lost their protector,

uncertainty and fear took the lead as the Serbs wanted to take revenge for their disgraced nation.55 A

year later, Kosovo once again determined the future of the political framework of the Balkans as

Yugoslavia collapsed due to serious ethnic rioting that broke out when the Albanians called for a

Kosovo republic. This revolt was perceived by the Yugoslav authorities as nationalistic and

counterrevolutionary and they were worried that the Kosovo Albanians wanted to secede from

Yugoslavia and eventually join Albania.56 According to Tromp – Vrkić these concerns were not

reasonable as the depressing political and economical circumstances in Albania surpassed the

situation in Yugoslavia.57 Moreover, the Albanian sentiment had diminished due to the isolation of

Albanian communism, the underdeveloped status of Albanian-inhabited regions in Yugoslavia and a

lack of hope for a ‘Greater Albania’.58

So, not the Albanian question but rather the Serbian question was triggered, as the Serbs felt

threatened in their stable and privileged position in Yugoslavia it was easy to demonstrate against the

alleged discriminations of Serbs in a minority position.59 This feeling was instigated by a strong

nationalistic document that set the Serbian agenda for the next ten years, namely the SANU

Memorandum of 1986 which relinquished a restart of a dangerous form of Serbian nationalism during

the 1980s. In the publication of the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences,

twenty intellectuals urged for far reaching changes in the Yugoslav economic and political system as

they felt subjugated in their Yugoslav status.60 They blamed the 1974 Constitution for weakening

Serbia’s position in Yugoslavia and depriving it from its right to form their own Serbian state that was

fought for throughout history.61 Moreover, they made resentful and polarised statements claiming to be

suffering from physical, political, legal and cultural genocide by the “Albanian aggressors”62 and

warned that the ‘Great Albanian racists’ were striving after an ‘ethnically pure’ Kosovo.63 The

Memorandum can be seen as an important catalyst in the development of Serbian nationalism, even

though the stated facts appeared to be both false and wrongly defined.64 One person would exploit his

55 Brown, 2001: 164 56 Duijzings, Janijć et al., 1996: xvii 57 Tromp – Vrkić in ibid.: 49 -50 58 ICG, 2004 (February 25): 4 59 Crampton, 1997: 388 60 Mihailovic, Krestic, 1995: 95 - 120 61 Ibid.: 126 62 Ibid.: 127 63 Ibid.: 128 - 129 64 ICTY, 2004: November 17

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power to the utmost as he would use these nationalistic demands as a propaganda tool for his own

party program. His name was Slobodan Milošević.

1.3 Milošević’ Greater Serbia 1987 - 1997

Milošević, born in 1941, became the decisive protector of Serbs living in Kosovo through exploiting the

Kosovo issue for his own benefit. In 1987, Milošević was sent to Kosovo, as a member of the Serbian

Central Committee, with the task of soothing the rising ethnic tensions and solving the problems with

the local communist party in Kosovo, which consisted of mostly ethnic Albanians.65 He did not intend

to meet Serbian nationalists however on the streets a group of Kosovo Serbs demanded a dialogue

with the communist party as they felt disregarded by them. As a response to the Kosovo Serbs,

Milošević returned on the 24th of April to Kosovo and listened to their speeches which were blaming

the Albanians for striving for an ethnically pure Kosovo. Moreover they argued that a Serbian exodus

was taking place.66 In his speech, Milošević reacted to these outcries and convinced the crowd that

this situation could not be tolerated any longer. He stood up as their decisive protector and promised

to safeguard the rights of the Kosovo Serbs under the Yugoslav communist regime. During his

speeches other Serbian nationalists had gathered outside the building and got into a fight with the

Albanian police. When Milošević came out of the building he was told by the crowd that they were

beaten up by the Albanian police and that they hit women and children as well. Then Milošević replied

with the famous words:” You will not be beaten again.”67 As a consequence of this remark, the crowd

started to cheer for Milošević as he was the first communist leader who took a public stance for the

Serbs.68 By doing this, Milošević violated the core Titoist principles of unity and brotherhood of the

multi – ethnic federation of Yugoslavia. The career of the ‘Protector of Serbia’ was set in motion.

As the battle for a ‘Greater Serbia was restarted, Milošević deplored the Serbs living in Kosovo

to never give up the cradle of Serbia by saying: “This is your country, these are your houses, your

fields and gardens, your memories. You are not going to abandon your lands because life is hard,

because you are oppressed by injustice and humiliation. It has never been a characteristic of the

Serbian and Montenegrin people to retreat in the face of obstacles, to demobilize when they should

fight, to become demoralized when things are difficult. You should stay here, both for your ancestors

and your descendants…Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia would disintegrate

without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give up Kosovo! [sic].69

After the incidents in Kosovo, Milošević’s popularity rose rapidly thanks to the nationalistic

path for Serbia he chose to follow accompanied by an extensive media campaign.70 Furthermore, he

created a solid and powerful political position by voting his former friend and anchor President of

65 LeBor, 2002: 113 66 Percy, Macqueen, 1995c Part 1 67 ibid.

68 Vickers, 1998: 228

69 Speech held on 20 April 1987( Documentary ‘Death of Yugoslavia) , Percy, Macqueen, 1995c Part 1 70 Malcolm, 1998: 342

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Serbia, Ivan Stambolić out, followed by purging the most important leaders in Kosovo and Vojvodina71

which he replaced by loyal supporters such as the radical nationalist Vojislav Šešelj. During 1988 and

the beginning of 1989 demonstrations in Serbia were being held that rallied for ‘the truth’. The

demonstrators wanted unity for Serbia, support for Serbs in Kosovo and the abolition of the autonomy

of Kosovo.72 On the 23rd of March 1989, Milošević withdrew Tito’s decentralisation policies and

abolished the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina by amending the constitution of the Socialist

Republic of Serbia. Protests by Kosovo Albanians were violently suppressed by a military intervention

resulting in twenty-four causalities. Simultaneously, the Serbs were celebrating their victory.73 Serbia

was re-united again and Kosovo’s autonomy was abolished. Subsequently the myth of a ‘Greater

Serbia’, the aim to unite all the Serbs in one nation that needed to expand its territory, was restarted

by Milošević. The pendulum of power over Kosovo swung back again in favour of the Serbs.

The celebration of the reunification of Serbia reached a climax on St. Vitus Day; a day on

which the Serbs traditionally remember their defeat at the Battle of Kosovo Polje and honour the

Serbian heroes and victims that fought for the Serbian nation. On the 600th anniversary of the battle,

on the 28th of June 1989, Milošević stirred nationalism to its zenith as he closed his speech at Kosovo

Polje to a crowd of half a million people: “Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in

battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded

yet”74 The speech and statements that were made are seen as very controversial by various analysts.

According to Erik Nijsten, Milošević has always denied that the speech for Serbian reunification at

Gazimestan was intended to stir up violent conflicts involving Serbs in other parts of the Yugoslav

republic. However, as the Nijsten cynically notes: “civilian conflicts originated in Slovenia, Croatia and

Bosnia Herzegovina afterwards.”75

As a result of Milošević’s actions, the situation in Kosovo and Serbia changed radically

between 1988 and 1989. After the abolishment of the autonomous principles in the Yugoslav

constitution, the strategy of Serbianisation restarted. The aim was that Kosovo Serbs would begin to

reclaim their republic in all the societal structures. They demanded the most important positions back

in trade, political, industrial and educational areas; the positions which they filled when Serbs held a

majority position during the Yugoslav era. The total societal restructuring by the Serbs is compared by

Detrez as a coup d’etat in the federal departments of Kosovo as measures were taken unilaterally and

without agreement.76 Contact between the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians became problematic

due to the mass removal of Kosovo Albanians from the Kosovo state institutions and enterprises.

Albanian civil servants were being fired or arrested and their positions were replaced with Serbs that

supported Milošević.77 Demonstrations by Kosovo Albanians turned into violent clashes with the

71 Northern part of Serbia. Similar to Kosovo: Autonomous status from 1974 – 1989 within Serbia. 72 LeBor, 2002: 119 - 133 73 Detrez, 1999: 109 - 110 74 Milošević, 1989: Speech Kosovo Polje 75 Nijsten, 2006: 8 76 Detrez, 1999: 113 77 Vickers, 1988: 248 - 249

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Serbian military and the protestors were put in jail, charged with counterrevolutionary activities.78 Even

the media came under strict control of the state and was used to discriminate on an ethnic basis.79

Although it was not an official legal policy, the government turned a blind eye to violence committed by

the Serbian police. As a consequence, public life was made almost impossible for the Kosovo

Albanians as human and civil rights were disfigured.80 It seems that the Serbian government tended to

pursue a policy of ethnic segregation.

Another result of the segregation policies of Serbia, was the ‘school battle’ in Kosovo, as the

Serbian school system only utilised the Serbian school curricula which included the use of the Serbian

language, the teaching of Serbian history and the Orthodox religion. Serbs perceived the Albanian

education as a hotbed for Albanian nationalism and therefore severely restricted or denied the access

of Albanian youngsters.81 As a protest against the Serbian discriminatory policies, the Albanians

boycotted the Serbian school system who from their perspective taught an alien ideology. Instead of

being educated at school or university, the Albanian youngsters were taught in private houses,

garages, shops and cellars all around Kosovo from 1992 until 1999. According to Kostovicova, the

parallel education set up for the Kosovo Albanians, was a symbol of Albanian nationhood and a

defence against Serbia’s political control over Kosovo.82 According to Kostovica: “…the reality of

ethnic segregation between Serbs and Albanians in a Serb – ruled Kosovo during the period of

Milošević’s rule had a profound impact on the future coexistence in the territory, precisely by creating a

context in which an exclusive and divisive nationhood thrived.”83 Cleary, the pendulum of power over

Kosovo continued to be on the Serbian side as the Albanians became disempowered by the Serbian

policies of ethnic isolation and separation which were needed to fulfil the notion of the Serbian nation.

All aspects of life in Kosovo changed completely as walls of ethnic separation came into being

between the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. As a result, an ethnically divided society was

created in which both groups were no longer working and living together. From a demographic

perspective, towns and villages changed into ethnic homogeneous communities. Due to the Serbian

policy of ethnic segregation, it was almost inevitable that through an intellectual underground

resistance movement, a parallel republic came to exist. This ‘shadow’ state was led by the Democratic

League of Kosovo (LDK), and imitated governmental structures in which a president, a legislature and

civil society initiatives were included.84 Moreover, the Kosovo Albanians had proclaimed their own

constitution in September 1990, but this was condemned by the Security services as a criminal

injustice in the Republic of Yugoslavia.85 As civil institutions were made inadmissible by the Serbs, the

Kosovo Albanian community developed their own systems for health care, education and media.86

78 Malcolm, 1998: 344, 34 79 Vasilijević in Duijzings, Janijć et al., 1996: 88 80 Malcolm, 1998: 349, 350 81 Kostovicova, 2005: 214 82 Ibid: 1, 213 83 Ibid. 84 LDK in Albanian: Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK) 85 Detrez, 1999: 116 86 Brown, 2001: 172 - 173

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The pacifist resistance movement against the Serbian powers was led by the ‘Ghandi of the Kosovo’,

Ibrahim Rugova who travelled extensively all over the world to plead for the Kosovo case. Rugova and

the LDK pursued three aims which were pacifist resistance, international awareness of the problem

and the condemnation of the Serbian establishment over Kosovo.87 In 1991, the underground

assembly of the LDK held a referendum for all the Kosovo Albanians. The election campaign

proceeded through Albanian newspapers, radio and indoor meetings throughout Kosovo. The

referendum declared Kosovo to be a sovereign and independent republic on the 19th of October

1991.88 However the declaration of independence was not officially approved by Serbia and the UN as

both perceived Kosovo to be an internal Serbian problem.

According to Detrez two contradicting imaginary worlds originated. First the Serbian view of

the reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia. This truly is a fictional view since the Kosovo population in

majority consisted of Albanians (over ninety percent), whereas the only authority of the Serbs

consisted of their governmental and military powers. Furthermore, the imagined Albanian perspective

of an independent Kosovo republic shaped their reality as if there was an independent state without

any Serbian control. However this is a delusion as well. The fictional parallel republic lacked the state

instruments of a separate territory, the international recognition, their own currency, an army nor did

their inhabitants possess a passport of Kosovo.89 It is sound to conclude that, albeit via the lack of any

official state preconditions, the only true constituent of the imagined and fictional republic was the

shared Albanian identity of the ‘believed’ residents. This might explain the reason why the Serbian

authorities did not intervene to a certain extent into the Kosovo initiatives. They turned a blind eye to

these activities as it did not touched upon any legal nor official form of a governmental administration.

So officially there was nothing to be worried about or to fight against. This situation benefited both

parties, because in a sense it was delicate balance between the Kosovo Albanians desire for an own

state and the need of the Serbs to exercise their authority. Nevertheless, the Serbian authorities would

still hinder the Kosovo Albanians or intervene with violence if they felt threatened in their supremacy.

Visibly there are the two colliding myths of a Greater Serbia and a Greater Albania, although one

might defy that an independent Kosovo is not a Greater Albania. Nevertheless, the claim for an

independent Kosovo for all Albanians could possibly lead to the quest for a greater Albanian nation

whether that would be in the structure of a Greater Kosovo or Greater Albania.

Kosovo was kept in grip of fear after Kosovo’s wish for self – determination was disregarded at

the Dayton Peace agreement of 1995 in Bosnia. Support for Rugova’s peaceful resistance diminished

immediately. Feelings of disappointment and frustration dominated and the Kosovo Albanians

demanded more decisive action from their leaders. From 1995 onwards radicalism grew rapidly

among young Kosovo Albanians. Radical groups started to execute violent terrorist attacks in Kosovo

which triggered a spiral of violence.90 Victims were not only Serbs but Albanian collaborators too. The

situation became very tense as various terrorist attacks were answered with violence by the Serbian

87 Malcolm, 1998: 348 88 Detrez, 1999: 116 89 Ibid.: 130 90 Bieber, Daskalovski, 2003: xiii

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police. Numerous secretive underground organisations had been involved with the terrorist attacks but

an exact number stayed indefinable. However, at the end of 1997 one of the organisations, the Ushtria

Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK), the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) made itself known to the public. They

declared that Serbia pursued a policy of massacring the Albanians and would therefore start the fight

for the freedom of Kosovo as long as it would take.91 Many jobless youngsters, frustrated by the poor

socio - economic situation in their country, were drawn to fight for the independence of Kosovo. They

were willing to uphold the historical ideal of Albanian unification of all Albanian - inhabited lands that

would conquer any Slav dominance.92 Moreover, the Albanian Diaspora, living throughout the

Balkans, wanted to fight against the humiliation and reprisals of the Serbs as well and came into

action.93 The KLA fought for the achievement of their nationalistic goal of achieving a ‘Greater Albania’

and not out of religious conviction, although they were possibly sponsored by Islamic countries.94 Thus

the myths of a ‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Greater Albania’ were triggered again and were to violently collide

once again in history.

1.4 The Kosovo war 1998-1999

Despite the growing number of combatants, clear statistical information on the KLA is not available.

Sources state opposing facts on the structure and dimension of the Kosovo Liberation Army during

1998 and 1999. The KLA is described by one source as a guerrilla movement, others state it was an

organised army. Numbers of the militant group vary between 200095 – 10,000 core fighters.96

Presumably the KLA started off as an unplanned movement and a disorganised organisation without a

unified central command97 which over the years developed into a more structured organisation,

although it still was made up of various clans.98 Irrespective of the size, however, the KLA remained

militarily weak compared to the Serbian security forces that were built up to 18,000 soldiers.99

The rise of KLA terrorist attacks made the Kosovo Albanians fear for possible Serbian

reprisals. From February 1998, this fear became a reality as a flood of killings by the Yugoslav army

and Serbian police covered Kosovo.100 Entire villages were being destroyed as houses were burned

down, people were driven away, boys older then fifteen years were executed and women violently

abused. Whole families were murdered including the entire Jahari family, well known in Kosovo

because of its in heritage of the Kaçak movement and its leading role in the KLA. All communities that

91 Kusovac ,1998: 13 - 16 92 ICG, 2004 (February 25): 6 93 Pettifer, 2005: 153 94 Detrez, 1999: 68 95 Pettifer, 2005: 149 96 ICG, 1999 (November 2): 5 97 Pettifer , 2005: 149, 186 98 ICG, 2000: 25 99 Rezum, 2001: 45 100 HRW, 1999: January 29

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had relations with the KLA, or which were supposed to support them, were attacked by the Serbs.101

The Serbs knew that to destruct an entire family is the gravest thing one can do in Albanian culture as

it is a strong tradition that the family roots (fis) must carry on.102

The killing of 45 ethnic Albanians in Racak provoked Europe and the USA to find a diplomatic

solution for Kosovo which resulted in the Rambouillet negotiations.103 During the negotiations the

Serbian and Albanian delegations tried to find a settlement on the proposed Interim Agreement for

Peace and Self Government for Kosovo.104 The Albanians unilaterally signed the agreement but the

Serbian authorities rejected it as it would allow autonomy for Kosovo and thus threaten Serbia’s

sovereignty. Nevertheless, Milošević was urged by the UN “to limit and withdraw the Serbian army and

special police forces in Kosovo, and to bring to a halt the exorbitant, improper use of force and

violence in Kosovo”. After several official warnings of military attacks and no response from Milošević,

NATO intervened by bombing Serbian communication infrastructure and military targets on the 24th of

March.105 Yet the NATO campaign did not stop the ‘Serbian war machine’ from performing ethnic

cleansings. On the contrary, massacres by the Serbian forces against Albanian citizens became more

frequent as they hastened up the expulsion of the Albanians.106 The war was twofold, one war was

raged between the Yugoslav army and the Serbian troops against the KLA, whereas NATO started its

offensive against Yugoslav army and Serbian forces. The fully fledged war lasted 78 days and ended

on the 9th of June 1999 as the Military Technical Agreement between KFOR and the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia was signed. The withdrawal of the Serbian police and

paramilitaries and the Yugoslav forces started. A week later, NATO troops arrived in Kosovo.

The situation of the country was devastating; the infrastructure was totally ruined, and whole

villages were eradicated. The economy had been set back for years. Furthermore the psychological

effect was enormous; many people had died, many children had been made orphans and many more

lives were shattered. Before the war, violence and massacres in Kosovo triggered already a mass

exodus of 250,000 refugees out of Kosovo during the summer of 1998.107 After the war, 1.8 million

people were displaced. This included 860,000 ethnic Kosovo Albanians, which is more than 80

percent of the entire population of Kosovo, who fled to neighbouring states such as Macedonia,

Albania and Bosnia or sought refuge in various other countries of Europe.108 The death toll of the

brutal war is devastating. The nightmare consisted of 6,000 Serbian military deaths and 2,000 civilian

deaths that were claimed by the Serbian government. Moreover, 8,000 KLA soldiers and more than

101 The municipalities of Glogovac (Gllogofc) and Srbica (Skenderaj) in the Drenica region, and Southwestern municipalities of

Djakovica (Gjakove), Orahovac (Rrahovec), and Suva Reka (Suhareke) 102 Pettifer, 2005: 144 - 145 103 HRW, 1999: January 29 104 UNSC, 1999: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo 105 NATO, 1999: March 23 (040) 106 HRW, 1999: January 29 107 LeBor, 2002: 361 108 UNCHR, 1999: December 17

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10,000 Albanians were killed.109 Approximately 500 deaths were caused by the NATO bombings in

Yugoslavia.110

The legitimacy and legality of NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo has been disputed

thoroughly. NATO launched its military campaign to avoid a humanitarian tragedy in Kosovo, without

the agreement of the Security Council of the UN. NATO justified its humanitarian intervention by the

containment of regional stability as they suspected mass killings of the Albanian civilians through a

deliberate policy of mass deportations.111 Supporters of the NATO intervention argue that the air

strikes were successful in accelerating the downfall of Milošević and bringing the ethnic cleansings to

a halt.112 However, critics, for instance Bissett, condemned the NATO campaign as it caused a

humanitarian disaster in the Balkans which created not only more bloodshed and violence as the war

intensified, but also reprisals that were taken by the Kosovo Albanians afterwards.113

1.5 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 1999 – present

After the war 10,000 displaced persons from ethnic minority communities slowly returned to their

places of origin. However both ethnic groups had fear of returning to their homes in Kosovo. For the

Kosovo Albanians most of the homes and possessions had been burned by the Serbian police forces

and had to search for new places of residence and start a life elsewhere. For the Kosovo Serbs the

war was not over yet due to the insecure post war situation, not least because those who returned

faced hostility and attacks from the Kosovo Albanians. Homes and possessions were taken over by

Kosovo Albanians or damaged as well. Thus the Kosovo Serbs, afraid of the reprisals, started to move

out of Kosovo or would seek security in small urban communities or in protected enclaves. In this way

their freedom of movement has been severely restricted. Hatred between different ethnic groups

became very much a part of daily life in Kosovo and therefore much work needed to be done to

contain another violent eruption. Who would guarantee that the fragile peace settlement would hold?

After the war, Kosovo went through a gradual process of change from post-war Kosovo towards a

Kosovo in transition.

A stop to the disorder, anxiety and turmoil in Kosovo was offered by a political solution of the

Security Council of the United Nations. They adopted resolution 1244 on the 10th of June 1999. In this

resolution the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) suspended the air operations against the FRY

and demanded the end of violence and repression in Kosovo by the various military and police forces

from the FRY. The resolution mandated to establish an interim civilian administration led by the UN

peacekeeping operation under which the people in Kosovo could progressively enjoy substantial

autonomy within the FRY.114 The resolution states that Kosovo has substantial autonomy but its

degree and nature are not defined as Kosovo still is a legal part of Serbia. The international civil 109 Rezun, 2001: 68 110 Abrahams, Ward, 2001: Chapter 16 111 Solana, 1999: 114 – 117 112 Abrahams, Cartner, 1999: April 2 113 Bissett, 2001: 39 – 42 114 UNSC, 1999:Resolution 1244( Appendix 1)

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presence in Kosovo led by the United Nations is known as the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo

(UNMIK). The Kosovo Force, KFOR, assists the civilian presence and is responsible for establishing

and maintaining the security in Kosovo.115 The duties of the UN interim force handles the day-to-day

governing of Kosovo varying from promoting the self – government in Kosovo, facilitating the future

status process, maintaining civil law and order, promoting human rights to assure the safe and

unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.116 Thus, the main

goals are to establish security and to build institutions in Kosovo where an institutionalised society

either was part of a repressive regime or existed underground. The UN is given the leading role in the

Kosovo mission, but for a better coordination the structure of UNMIK has been divided into four pillars:

Pillar I: Police and Justice, headed by the United Nations117 Pillar II: Civil Administration, headed by the United Nations and the PISG Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU)118

In order to rebuild its society, Kosovo faced several difficult challenges in the peace and

stability process that is outlined by the UN, the OSCE and the European Union. As Kosovo has been

one of the poorest regions of the Balkans it faced a disastrous economic situation with a decline of old

industries and an underdeveloped rural agriculture. Socio - economic problems such as high

unemployment, low educational standards, geographic isolation and a lack of intern and foreign

investment created a negative scenario for Kosovo’s future.119 Moreover, organised crime developed

rapidly in Kosovo and became foremost in international trafficking in humans, drugs and weapons

resulting from the developing poverty, weak state institutions and corruption. Because of its weak

social structures, Kosovo is seen by many criminal networks as an easy transit country from the

Balkans into Western Europe.120 All these factors can have potentially destabilising effects which can

exacerbate the climate of tension. The unresolved status of Kosovo is seen as an obstacle to its

economic recovery. Moreover, a final status does not necessary imply a stable Kosovo.

The most pressing issue for Kosovo is security. After 1999, interethnic violence and crime

continued to rise against the Serbian minorities that are victims of Kosovo - Albanian intimidation or

harassment.121 As a consequence, the minorities need to be protected by the UN, who mainly live in

isolated enclaves throughout Kosovo.122 During UNMIK’s presence, the UN Security Council tried to

115 KFOR, 1999 116 UNSC, 1999: N9917289 117 Pillar I was first covered by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for humanitarian

assistance but ended in June 2000. In May 2001 Police and Justice was established for pillar I. 118 UNSC, 1999: N9917289 119 ICG, 2006 (February 17): 5,6 120 Blitz, Brad, 2006: 106 121 ICG, 2006 (February 17): 8 122 HRW, 2006

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agree upon a form of statehood appropriate for Kosovo, however no follow up plan for resolution 1244

had proven to be acceptable and thus the UNMIK presence was continuously extended. In order to

simplify the internal administration and to be able to measure the progression of Kosovo, the

‘Standards before Status’ approach was developed. In the Kosovo Standards Implementations Plan

(KSIP), UNMIK and the PISG agreed in 2003 that certain standards had to be achieved first, before

starting any political negotiations on the future status of Kosovo.123 The targets for Kosovo varied from

functioning democratic institutions, a well-established rule of law to the freedom of movement for all its

residents.124 Only by complying to the ‘Standards’ could UNMIK hope to find a compromising solution

between stable democratic institutions and the ongoing tense ethnic situation in Kosovo, before

addressing the status issue. However, the Kosovo Albanians perceived the standards procedure as an

obstruction for their ultimate goal to become independent as they hoped that UNMIK would grant them

full sovereignty and authority over the region. Moreover, the Kosovo Serbs criticised the Standards as

it could work for the Kosovo Albanians as a façade of a multi –ethnic society that could be unravelled

easily after an eventual independent Kosovo.125

Despite the positive intentions of the UN, the negative consequences of postponing the

consideration of a final settlement in an ethnically tense region became clear on the 18th of March

2004. Riots broke out between Serbian and Albanian youngsters in the ethnically divided city of

Mitrovica in Northern Kosovo due to inciting incidents that occurred on the 16th of March. The unrest

was the worst in Kosovo since the war in 1999. Ethnic Albanians frustrated by the local political

situation, the poor economic situation and the lack of attention from the international community for a

clear future perspective on Kosovo, turned against the Kosovo Serbs and UNMIK. According to a

policy paper of the IKV, indistinctiveness of the situation kept illusions alive and as a consequence the

international community gave Kosovo Albanians with independence aspirations and Serbian

extremists freedom to play on fertile ground to exploit their ethnic distinctiveness against one

another.126

The riots, described by the ICG as ‘the ethnic cleansing of entire minority villages and

neighbourhoods’, resulted in 19 causalities, 900 injured residents and more than 4,500 citizens

internally displaced. Besides physical harm, material damage was done to the 700 homes of non –

Albanian communities, 30 Serbian churches and two monasteries.127 The OSCE concluded that the

riots of March 2004 resulted in a negative blow to minority communities.128 The eruption of violence in

Mitrovica led to criticism of the presence of the international community in Kosovo. After five years of

peacekeeping, the UN was apparently not vigorous enough to grasp the dissatisfaction of the Kosovo

Albanians and the increasingly vulnerable position of Kosovo Serbs, Roma’s and other minority

communities. NATO was foremost blamed for the disastrous failure to protect minority communities.129 123 UNMIK, 2005: What are the standards? 124 UNMIK, 2003: Standards for Kosovo (Appendix 3) 125 Ibid.:10 126 Hal, Oosterwegel, 2005 127 ICG, 2004 (April 22): Executive Summary 128 OMiK, 2004: May 4: 6 129 ICG, 2004 (April 22): 3 - 6

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As a response to the Mitrovica riots, action was taken prioritising the Kosovo standards plan.

Standards of main concern became the protection of minorities including freedom of movement, the

improvement of security, the establishment of the rule of law, decentralisation issues and the return of

displaced persons within or outside Kosovo.130 Moreover, international authorities and analysts urged

the international community to reconsider and reorient its strategy for dealing with Kosovo and to

speed up their progress on a future status solution. The ICG warned: “Time is running out in Kosovo.

The status quo will not hold.”131 Kai Eide, UN Ambassador for Kosovo, advised the UN Security

council to start the political talks on the status issue without loosing the commitment of implementing

the Standards. Eide stated: “the reality that the international presence is likely to decline in the coming

years and the fact that the economy is continuing to deteriorate – thereby adding to the level of

frustration and dissatisfaction – raising the final-status question sooner rather than later seems to be

the better option and is probably inevitable.”132 The UN Security council decided on the 24th of October

2005 to launch a political process that was designed to determine Kosovo’s future status according to

the UN resolution 1244.133 The UN appointed Martti Athisaari as the Special Envoy (SE)134 to lead the

newborn UN institution: the United Nations Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary – General for

the future status process for Kosovo (UNOSEK). UNOSEK is seen as a new chance for Kosovo to

change into a lasting stable and developed community. One hopes that through the negotiations

UNOSEK would able to bridge the wide gap between the desires and aspirations of Kosovo Serbs and

Kosovo Albanians concerning the future status of Kosovo. A zero-sum game of two opposites; either

immediate independence for Kosovo or a Kosovo (again) governed by Serbia.

Before starting the negotiations the members of the Contact Group, an informal grouping of

influential countries that carry out diplomatic issues in the Balkans which consists of the United States,

Russia, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany, set the nonnegotiable issues.135 No negotiation

was possible on the partition of Kosovo, the return of the situation before March 1999 and any form of

union of Kosovo with another country. The latter issue prevents Kosovo to unite with Albania in order

to execute the historic idea of creating a ‘greater Albania’. Furthermore they set ten guiding principles

that the negotiators had to follow of which the most important one was that the final settlement should

be in line with the wish of the people of Kosovo.136 The negotiations that were held between February

and November 2006 consisted of two negotiation teams of Kosovo and Serbia in which prime

representatives were included, UNMIK and the Contact Group.137 The primary goal of the negotiations

is to find solutions for the main obstacles or practical day-to-day problems that prevent the Kosovo

Albanians and Kosovo Serbs from living peacefully together. Before addressing the prompting status

130 UNMIK/PISG, 2004: Standards Implementation Plan 131 ICG, 2005 (January 24): 1 132 Eide, 2004 133 UNSC, 2005: S/PRST/2005/51 134 Denisov, 2005: S/2005/709 135 Niessen, Oosterwegel 2006: The EU is informally considered to be the Contact Group “plus” but as is the case with the

Contact Group they do not have an official role in the negotiations. 136 UNOSEK, 2005: Guiding principles 137 Appendix 3: Composition Negotiation teams

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issue itself, the negotiations started off with the ‘technical aspects’ of the status package with the idea

of finding the common ground between Pristina and Belgrade. Consequently, the negotiation rounds

concerned discussions on decentralisation, the protection of community rights, cultural and religious

heritage, regional security and stability, Kosovo’s multi-ethnicity, and economic issues concerning

state property and debt.138

The complexity of finding a solution to the final status of Kosovo not only came forward with

the ‘technical aspects’ of the status issue but also when the issue is addressed directly to leaders from

Serbia and Kosovo. Serbian President Boris Tadić and Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica made the

case for Serbia that essential autonomy was the only solution to the Kosovo status problem. Koštunica

said: “(Serbia) cannot accept the creation of a separate state on 15% of its territory”.139 Whereas

Kosovo President Sejdiu stated the opposite: "Independence is the alpha and omega, the beginning

and end of our position.”140 As both sides were persistent in making their own case and were not

willing to share the different views with each other, Athisaari concluded that the negotiations were

deadlocked after fifteen rounds of direct talks between the negotiation teams due to the limited

results.141 Athisaari assigned the ultimate verdict on the Kosovo Status to the Security Council by

handing in his final proposal on the 21 of January 2007.st 142 On the 2nd of February Athisaari proposed

the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement to Belgrade and Pristina.143 In this

proposal, the Kosovo Serbs will receive a lot of self-government in a sustainable Kosovo that will draw

upon a new core constitution which will represent its multi – ethnic society, which means that all the

rights of the various ethnic communities are to be complied with. The intention of the proposal is to

create a stable basis for a ‘safe and economically sustainable Kosovo’ from which all the communities

should benefit.144 Athisaari distinctively avoided mentioning the notion of independence for Kosovo or

Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. However the proposal was perceived in generally as an incentive

for an independent Kosovo under international supervision.145

After a final chance was given to come to compromising solutions by discussing the Athisaari

proposal in Vienna, the parties failed to come to an agreement. On the 10th of March 2007, Athisaari

concluded that the yearlong negotiations ended in standstill due to the lack of compromise and

common ground to achieve an agreement.146 Thus, on the 26th of March the final Comprehensive

proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement, as well as the Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-

General on Kosovo’s Future Status were officially handed over to the Security Council.147 Athisaari

advised the UNSC to grant Kosovo supervised independence as it is the only option for Kosovo to

138 UNOSEK, 2007: The Status Process 139 BBC, 2006: July 24 140 Sejdiu, 2006 141 RFE/RL, 2006: February 27 142 B92, 2006: October 10 143 UNOSEK, 2007: February 2: Comprehensive Proposal 144 Appendix 4: Comprehensive proposal 145 B92, 2007: February 2 146 RFE/RL, 2007: March 10 147 UNOSEK, 2007: The Status Process

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become economically viable and stable as the PISG and Serbia cannot agree on minor practical

issues. Further delay to the status decision would lead to further stagnation, violating the democratic

developments and endangering ethnic reconciliation.148 However, Athisaari’s model of granting

Kosovo semi-independence or limited sovereignty within the state borders of Belgrade is very unusual.

Athisaari wants to make a compromise between the Kosovo Albanians who are given the prospect of

independence and the Kosovo Serbs who are promised extensive rights in security and privileged

relations with Serbia. Implementation of these measures needs to go through extensive

decentralisation measures which are highly controversial as the distinction between building up a

central government and the protected Serbian majority municipalities, who keep their strong and

financial relations with Belgrade, becomes blurred. The resolution of Kosovo’s future status is

perceived as a unique political and legal process, compared to other similar conflicts.149 It seems that

Athisaari as the mouth - piece of the international community wants to accomplish the impossible by

bridging the wide gap between the desires and aspirations of the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo

Albanians. Will the impossible be possible in Kosovo?

148 UNMIK, 2007: April 25 149 ICG, 2007(May 14): I, 7

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2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 What is a nation?

Ethnic conflict is frequently about territory. Over centuries the territory of Kosovo has been fought over

by two ethnic groups; Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians. The Kosovo Serbs attempt to

continue the situation in which the territory of Kosovo is a part of Serbia, whereas the Kosovo

Albanians strive for an independent state of Kosovo. Yet, when do we talk about the state or country

Kosovo? What makes a country a country? What makes a state a state? In the following chapter it is

necessary to take a closer look at the theoretical concepts of state, nation, nation – state, civi

albanians and serbs locked in...

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