albania within the slav orbit: advent to power of the communist party

8/12/2019 Albania within the Slav Orbit: Advent to Power of the Communist Party

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Albania within the Slav Orbit: Advent to Power of the Communist PartyAuthor(s): Stavro SkendiSource: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Jun., 1948), pp. 257-274Published by: The Academy of Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2144839.

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ALBANIA WITHIN THE SLAV ORBIT: ADVENT TOPOWER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

IHE internationalrole of Albania,since the end of WorldWar II, has been a turbulent one. She has been foundguilty of aid to the Greek guerrillas in their fight against

the Greek government. It has been charged that the minesplaced in the Corfu Channel were put there " with the knowl-edge" of her government. She has accused the Americanmission to Tirana of having organized sabotage and plots. Ineach instance she has been defended and supported by theSoviet Union and Yugoslavia.

It is not a new thing to see the Slavs interested in non-SlavicAlbania. They have been so in the past. The difference isthat today they have taken up Albania's defense, whereas be-fore they tried to invade or partition her. What is new istheir change in policy. The aim has remained the same: thecontrol of Albania.

In the Balkan War of 1912, when the Ottoman Empire col-lapsed, the desire of the Serbs for expansion grew and theypushed as far as the shores of Albania. They would have re-mained there, had it not been for the opposition of Italy andparticularly of Austria-Hungary. The latter Power fearedthat, if Serbia occupied the coast of Albania and fell under theinfluence of Tsarist Russia, she might threaten Austria's positionin the Adriatic and thwart her Drang nach Osten.

After World War I Yugoslavia favored the partition ofAlbania. When that became impossible, because of PresidentWilson's strong opposition, Yugoslavs tried to get control bybacking Ahmet Zogu (later King Zog) in his return to power.For more than a year Zog followed a Serbophile policy, but in1926 he signed a treaty of " friendship and security" withItaly, and Yugoslavia's hopes were frustrated.

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258 POLITICALSCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL.LXIIIDuring World War II, however, there were no Balkan orextra-Balkanstates to opposeYugoslavexpansion;and the con-trol of Albania by a Slav satellitefitted well into Soviet Russia's

plans. In the Balkan peninsula the Soviet Union had addedto her sphere of influence another territory which might be-come for her an outpost in the Mediterraneanand a base forexpansion.It is precisely because of Albania's key position that theSlavs have taken such a great interest in her. This smallcountry, approximately 11,500 squaremiles in area and with apopulation of a little more than 1,100,000, is situated at thenorthwest edge of the Balkan peninsula,opposite the heel ofItaly; and a channel only 47 miles wide separates the twoshores. The Power which has control of this strait has controlof the Adriatic Sea; but this control is impossiblewithout thepossessionof the Albanian coast. The most strategicpoint onit is Valona, a largebay protected all aroundby mountainsandhills and at the entrance by a rocky island, Saseno.

A little south of Valona is the coast of Himara, and stillfarther down the port of Santi Quarantawith the hills whichjoin Cape Stylos, on the Greek frontier. This littoral oppositeCorfu serves to make out of the channel between that islandand the shorea large and strong base.In order to get hold of this strategic position in Albania,Tito, as leader of the Yugoslavs,used methods different fromthose of World War I. He did not invade the country bymilitary force, nor did he support a single strong man there.He created a party and helped establish a communist regimewhich would be closely connected with his own and willingto execute his orders. The processwas long but successful.

IIThe regime of King Zog had been a personaldictatorship.In the top positions n the governmentwere placedofficialswho

had served in the corrupt Ottoman Empire,and who conceivedof politics in terms of intrigues and personalinterests. Theywere servile to the master and tyrants to the people.In opposition to them a new generationarose. Many werenot satisfiedwith the educationreceived at home and continued



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No. 21 ALBANIA WITHIN SLAV ORBIT 259their studies in European universities. When they returned toAlbania they tried to bring abiout changes, but their effortswere frustrated because every new and liberal tendency wasfeared by the regime. But their democratic ideas could notbe suppressed. Liberalism spread over the country and at timesemerged with force against the dictatorial regime, as in therevolution of Fieri, in south central Albania, and later in theuprising of Argyrokastro (1938), in southern Albania.

In such an environment one would naturally think that manyof the younger generation might become Communists. Infact, however, they did not. They realized that their countryneeded a more efficient government, better educational facilities,improved methods in agriculture and greater social justice-inshort, a lifting up of the Albanian people. They also felt thedesire for independence, which had been jeopardized by the wayKing Zog's regime had opened the country to Italian penetra-tion. As a consequence, they had grown more nationalistic.They had too much to do in their own country to think oftransforming the world.

Nevertheless, there were a few communist groups in Albania,when the country was occupied by Mussolini's armies. Threewere especially important. One was the group of Korcha, inthe south. Its members were workers, who had formed asociety called Puna (the Work) and its program was wide-spread propaganda. To this group belonged the present Pre-mier of Albania, Enver Hoxha, while he was still an unim-portant teacher at the Lycee of Korcha and played a secondaryrole in the local communist movement. The second groupwas that of Zjarri (the Fire), and its seat was Tirana.Its members thought that in a half-colony or an occupiedcountry like Albania the Communists should support national-ism, which was a force against imperialism and fascism. Thelast group was that of Scutari, in the north. Its program wasto train the leaders for the movement and to win new recruitsfrom the Gymnasium of Scutari or among the government em-ployees. All these groups were small, however, and frequentlyworked at cross purposes. Their contacts with communistelements outside the country were extremely tenuous.



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260 POLITICALSCIENCE QUARTERLY [VoL. LXMSomemonths after the attack upon Russiaby Hitlerite Ger-many two emissariesof Tito, Miladin Popovich and DushanMugochi, arrived at Tirana. For the insignificant communistgroups they wore the aureoleof a party recognizedby Moscow.In a short time the two Yugoslavs succeeded in uniting thegroups and forming the AlbanianCommunistparty (November8, 1941), only the groupof Zjarrirefrainingat the outset fromjoining it. They also chose the membersof the Central Com-mitteeof the party, of whom the presentPremier,EnverHoxha,was one. It was natural that the new party should be de-

pendent on the Yugoslav Communistparty. In fact, it was abranchof it; and the newly elected members of the AlbanianCentral Committee informed the Yugoslav party that theywould carry through the task which had been assigned tothem.1 The two emissariesof Tito stayed in Albania duringthe whole period of the war, and they were the real " bosses"of the Albanian Communistparty. MiladinPopovichwas thepolitical organizer,and Dushan Mugochi, better known underthe pseudonymSala,was the military organizer.The Communistsresortedto a political stratagemwhich hadproved successful in neighboring countries. On September16, 1942 they organized a conference at Peza, a village nearTirana,to which were invited Communistsrepresentingvariouspaper organizationsand non-Communistswho were favorablydisposedtoward them. A resolutionwas prepared,which pro-claimed the National LiberationFront. The people were toldthat the union between the Communistsand the Nationalists" had been cemented", and that they would fight the invadertogether. In reality only a few nationalist groups had beenrepresentedat the conference,and they had not adheredto theresolution which effectively gave the direction of the wholerevolutionarymovement to the Communistparty. With theemergenceof the National LiberationFront, the Communistshad anotheradvantage,for the undesirable erm " Communist"disappeared,and they could preparetheir own civil revolutionunder the guiseof nationalrevolution. The new front was thecounterpartof the Greek EAM, with the great differencethat

1 From the archivesof the Albanian Communist party, seized by the governmentearly in 1943 and madepublic during the trial of Communists n Tirana, May 1943.



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No. 21 ALBANIA WITHIN SLAV ORBIT 261in Albania the Communist party was not only the chief butthe sole party in the movement, the rest of the participantsbeing personsof leftist tendencies,or of no political tendenciesat all, who joined in order to fight the Italian armies.The Communists n Albanianow enjoyed a unique position:they controlled the only political party in the country. KingZog's dictatorshiphad not allowed the formation of politicalparties, nor had it encouragedpolitical leaders. Membersofparliamentwere appointed,not elected. King Zog had to givehis approvalfor each candidate,and no other tickets than thoseof the governmentwere permitted. The king was also carefulto exclude from these tickets young Albanianswho, becauseoftheir liberal and democratictendencies,might cause trouble inthe parliament. This accounts for much of the ascendancyof the Communistsin Albania.There were, however, nationalistgroupswhich offered activeor passiveresistanceat the outset of the Italian occupation,andwhich later formed an organization called " The NationalFront ". At its headwas MidhatFrasheri,a veteran of the Al-banian nationalist movements and a well-known writer, whohad representedhis country at severalinternationalconferences.As the main goal of the organizationwas to free the countryand createa democraticregime, it was joined by many differentgroups with center or left of center tendencies. Although itsleadersenjoyed considerableprestige as patriots, they did notpossess the requiredrevolutionary qualities.

The National Front had a large following, and the Com-munists, as long as they did not feel themselvesstrong, had toreckon with it. Efforts were made to bring about an agree-ment, but the obstaclesweregreat. The National Front saw inthe Communistparty an organizationwhich by its very naturewas international and depended on a foreign Power. Theycould not trust it, as its activity was likely to change accordingto ordersreceived from outside. Besides, they were suspiciousthat it had become a tool in the hands of covetous Slav neigh-bors. The Communists,on the other hand, pretendedthat theycould not rely on the National Front for close collaboration,because their own policy was for strong action against the in-vader without regard to damages to the country, and they



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26:2 POLITICALSCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL.LXIIIconsidered the National Front inactive and inclined to makecompromises with the enemy in order to save the country fromdestruction. In reality, however, the Communists did not de-sire a sincere understanding. Their aim was to seize controlof the country; and the nationalist organization was a rivalwhich had to be destroyed. Consequently, while the discus-sions for an agreement were going on, they made use of everypossible kind of propaganda among the people to underminethe position of the National Front.

When the Americans landed in Sicily, however, a great at-tempt was made at collaboration between the National Frontand the National Liberation Front (the camouflage of theCommunist party). The reason was public pressure and thepossibility of an Allied landing in Albania. On August 2,1943 representatives of both organizations met at Mukaj, avillage near Tirana. The discussions were long and hot. Thepoint at issue was the question of Kossovo. Kossovo is thatpart of present Yugoslavia, adjacent to Albania, which wasoccupied by old Serbia during the first Balkan War. It isa very fertile region and is inhabited mostly by Moslem Alba-nians. At the time of the Mukaj Conference it formed part ofAlbania, since Italy had annexed it after the collapse of theYugoslav state in the spring of 1941. The National Frontstood for reintegration of Kossovo into Albania and proposedto fight for it. The Communist representatives objected stren-uously. At last a compromise was reached: the question ofKossovo would be decided at the end of the war by a plebisciteof its people. When this obstacle was removed, the two partiesagreed on unity of action and on the formation of a commoncommittee, which would correspond to a revolutionary gov-ernment, called "The Committee of National Salvation ".The agreement, however, remained merely a document. TheCommunist representatives had apparently gone beyond theinstructions of their leaders. In the secret directions givenby the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Partyto its provincial committees early in September 1943, it wasstated: " You know that the agreement with the NationalFront . . . has been to the detriment of the National Li'ber-ation movemernt and to our Party, and as such it has been dis-



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No. 2] ALBANIA WITHIN SLAV ORBIT 263approved by the Central Committee." Then followed thereasons:

This agreementhas placed us in a difficult position; at themoment when the National Front shouldhave been put againstthe wall . . . at the moment when the National Front shouldhave been presented to the Albanian people as an organizationwhich desires divisions and systematically sabotagesour efforts,we handed to it the Charterof agreement n the form it desired,in order to make a better show before the people.2

It would also have been folly for Tito's emissaries to agreethat Kossovo, regarded by the Yugoslavs as part of old Serbia,might go to Albania with or without a plebiscite. Furthermore,Italy was on the verge of capitulation, and the German collapsedid not seem far off. The Communist organization was dis-ciplined, aggressive and unscrupulous, and Tito's forces weregrowing stronger from day to day, while the victorious Russianarmies were approaching. As time passed, the hopes of anAllied landing in Albania vanished. When the Germans enteredAlbania after the Italian armistice, the Communists declaredwar on their rival. Caught between two fires, the heterogene-ous and undisciplined National Front passed through a seriouscrisis: great confusion reigned in its ranks. On the one hand,the Germans had declared that their occupation was onlymilitary, as distinguished from the Italian domination, andthat they recognized the independence and neutrality of Al-bania. They even permitted Mehdi Frasheri, the President ofthe Council of Regency, to protest to the German governmentagainst the occupation of Albania by the German armies. Onthe other hand, whole districts had been devastated during thefive years of resistance, and thousands of people were in themountains without food and shelter. Their bands had beendisorganized and were too weak to oppose German militaryoperations and resist at the same time the attacks of the Com-munists. Besides, Allied help had been very limited, and therewas no hope of an early landing.

2 "The Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party to all the Pro-vincial Committees", 10 P. M., September 9, 1943, signed by Shpati. This cir-cular fell into the hands of the bands of the National Front in September 1943.It was published in the newspaperAlbania, August 15, 1947, Rome, Italy, pp. 2-3.



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264 POLITICALSCIENCE QUARTERLY [VoL. LXMAll these considerations made the National Front cease the

struggle against the Germans. Some members and groupseven joined the Germans in their fight against the Communists;but the truly democratic groups, after having recovered fromthe first confusion, resumed their resistance to both the invadersand the Communists.

Everywhere the object of the Communist party had been toremove all obstacles to its political power. In Albania the jobof the Communists was easy. The National Front had beeneliminated as an opposition partly because of its disintegrationand partly because of the propaganda favorable to the NationalLiberation Front broadcast over the radios of the Allies.Furthermore as early as September 1943, the Communists hadgiven instructions to the provincial committees:

.. . .with relentless work to discredit the National Frontbefore the people, to detach the peoplefrom it and to unite themwith us. . . to present it as striving for division and as aninstigator of fratricidal fighting, to make the people see that thepolicy of the National Front will lead us to armed conflict, tomake it (so look) that the whole people will revolt because ofit, and in this way the historical responsibility or the disunityof the Albanianpeopleand for the armedconflict will fall . . .on the National Front.3

Later, the ruin of every village burned by the Germans wasattributed to the National Front. The same fate was reservedfor the unimportant Legality Organization, composed ofxnountaineers of the district of Kruja, in central Albania, andof some former officials of King Zog's regime. On the otherhand, Albania had no government in exile, like Greece orYugoslavia, nor were there any Allied forces in the country.Thus, for the National Liberation Front the path was clearin politically disorganized Albania, and, what is more, it had thesupport of Tito's forces and of the Greek EAM. When theGerman armies withdrew from Albania, its revolutionary gov-ernment, which had withstood all the military operations of the

3 In the circular of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party,mentioned in footnote 2.



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No. 2] ALBANIA WITHIN SLAV ORBIT 265Germans, installed itself at Tirana, on November 29, 1944 asthe government of Albania under Enver Hoxha as Prime Min-ister. It was the triumph of the Albanian Communist partyand the victory of the Slavs.

IIIOnce in power, Hoxha's Communist government used every

means to consolidate itself. Many of its most bitter opponents,kaders of the National Front or the Legality Organization, hadfled to Italy. Those it could arrest in Albania it brought be-fore the People's Court to be judged as " war criminals " or" enemies of the people ". The object of the trials was not somuch to punish the collaborators as to eliminate those personswho had influence over the people and might oppose the com-munist regime. The government also persecuted the Catholicclergy, whose hold on the mountaineers of the north is strong.In the days of King Zog's regime the Catholic clergy was theonly well-organized force in Albania. Of course, the gov-ernment did not neglect the drive against the remaining guer-rillas, who were resisting in the mountains. But in a countrylike Albania, when frontiers are closed and the regime is sup-ported by the neighbors, every resistance is doomed to failure.

The National Liberation Front had done its job; but condi-tions now required that it should be known as " The DemocraticFront ". Premier Enver Hoxha and other responsible menmade speeches, promising that the basis of the new front wouldbe broadened. Soon it became clear, however, that all this wasa bluff. Members of the front, who truly favored an enlarge-ment, like Dr. Gjergj Kokoshi, Minister of Public Instructionin the first Hoxha cabinet, were ousted and later condemnedfor plotting against the regime. The Communist party wascareful to keep the newly baptized front as closely in the handsof the Communist party as possible. It was interested only inhaving its appearance democratic. Its purpose was twofold:at home, to make the people believe that the government wasready to collaborate with the democratic elements of thecountry and so strengthen its position; abroad, to persuade theworld that the government established in Albania was " Demo-cratic" and should be recognized.



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266 POLITICALSCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. LXIIIHoxha's government, however,hadnot receivedthe stamp ofconstitutionality. Therefore,elections were held on Decem;ber2, 1945. With no organizedoppositionand with the prevailingterror,it was natural for the DemocraticFront (the peacetimecamouflagedCommunist party) to score a triumph. It wasthe only ticket in the elections. Soon the Constituent As-sembly convened at Tirana and abolishedthe monarchy, pro-claiming Albania a Popular Democratic Republic. The As-sembly was changed to the People'sAssembly, the parliament,which chose the membersof the Presidium of the state. This

was similar to what had previously happened in Yugoslavia,which in turn had followed a Soviet pattern.This post-war governmentof Albania has been impatient incarrying out the radical changes which would bring about acommunist society. It first confiscated the lands of thelandowners and redistributed them among the farmers. Ac-cording to the Agrarian Act of 1945, every farmer with afamily of 5 members s allowed the use of 5 hectares (approx-imately 12.35 acres). That is all the land allotted to him. Incase he has a larger family, he receives Y2 a hectare for eachadditionalmember. But the farmergets only the producefromthe land. Ownership is vested in the state. At times thefarmercannoteven retainwhat he produces. If productionex-ceeds the amount fixed by the government, it has to be sold ata low price to the state agriculturalcooperative.It is obvious that this is not an agrarianreform. A reform,in general, means a change without breaking with tradition.An agrarianreform, in particular,is an expropriationor con-fiscation of the superfluous and, beyond a limit fixed by law,with recognition of the private ownershipof the land. Whathas taken place in Albania is not a "reform" but a " revolt"in land: abolitionof private agriculturalproperty.The main concernof the Albanianregime hasbeenthe youth.The Communistsfirst exploited their enthusiasmand spirit ofsacrificeagainst the Fascist and Nazi armiesand, then, in thecourse of the strife, they organized them. Today thousandsof young men are kept in the disproportionatelyargeAlbanianarmy. Others have been regimented in the Youth Organ-izations. Everywherethe hold of the Communistparty is kept



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No. 21 ALBANIA WITHIN SLAV ORBIT 267fast by a spying system characteristicof all totalitarianregimes.Great importancehas also been given to the education of theyouth in the new ideology. This job was entrusteduntil somemonths ago to a veteran Communist, ProfessorSefjulla Male-shova. He had left Albania in 1924 and had gone to Moscow,wherehe became versedin Communistpropagandaand workedwith the Comintern. He was regarded n Albania as the theo-retician of the Communist ideology. Immediatelyafter theliberation he became Minister of Popular Culture and Propa-ganda, and later he took up the Ministryof Public Instruction.He prepared he new programsof the schoolsin which the newideology was, of course, the guiding principle.The towns, as well as the more numerousvillages, have beenfitted into the communist system. Albania had relatively fewindustries to be transformed-some cigarette factories, six orseven power plants, three alcohol industries, a small numberof tanneries,and a few olive oil mills. Thesewere all national-ized, not by any sort of expropriation, but by simple gov-ernment confiscation. The mines and the important oil wellsof Kuchovo were easily nationalized. They belonged toItalian companies,and they passedover, by the Allied treatywith Italy, to the Albanian state. Thus everything that canbe classifiedas a " meansof production" has becomethe prop-erty of the Albanian government.In a communistic regime the merchants, being intermedi-aries, are consideredparasites,and it is believedthey should beeliminated as a class. Consequently, they became the nextvictims. Unlike the landowners, they were not deprived oftheir property by outright confiscation. Instead, the govern-ment levied taxes so excessivethat, even if they sold everythingthey possessed, hey could not pay. If any merchantsmiracu-lously were able to pay their taxes, the government imposed asecond tax. When they were unable to meet their obligations,the governmentconfiscated their property. But as this seldomcovered the requiredtaxes, the merchantswere imprisonedandtheir familieswere evicted fromtheir homes. There remainedonly a few small shopkeepers,who dependedon the merchants,and who naturally were doomed to elimination. The statethen took over the role of the merchants: a class disappeared.



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268 POLITICALSCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. LXISuch radical changes provoked some resistance. The gov-ernment has used every means of suppression. It has executed

its most dangerous opponents and has imprisoned many others.But the resistance is still there.In the outside world, Hoxha's government has establishedclose relations only with Russia and her satellites. With Yugo-slavia particularly the ties have been so strong that the govern-ment has not hesitated to betray the Albanians of Kossovo.When the Germans retreated, Tito's forces tried to occupyKossovo but they met with strong resistance. The brave

Kossovars had decided that their country should remain partof Albania, however communistic the latter might turn out tobe. At that diflicult juncture for the Yugoslavs, Alban'ianbrigades of the National Liberation Front entered Kossovo inorder to appease the inhabitants and later to open the way toTito's army. Thousands of opponents were executed, andKossovo today forms part of Yugoslavia.In the meantime nothing weakened the relations of new All-bania with Yugoslavia. In all the Albanian schools, the studyof Serbo-Croatian has become obligatory, and many young, Al-banians have been granted fellowships to study in the Universityat Belgrade or Zagreb. An economic treaty has been signedbetween the two countries, and the Yugoslav dinar and theAlbanian currency have been made interchangeable, while acustoms union is in force. Late in June 1946, Premier Hoxhavisited Marshal Tito. The outcome was the conclusion of apact of friendship and mutual assistance, confirming the resolu-tion of Albania and Yugoslavia to defend jointly their freedom;and independence. Allusion was recently made to this pact inconnection with the drive of the Greek army against GeneralMarko's guerrillas: a threat on the part of Yugoslavia thatraids across the Albanian border and attacks on Albanian troopswould invoke its military clauses.

With Bulgaria, another Russian Balkan satellite, relationshave also grown closer. On December 16, 1947, duringPremier Hoxha's visit to Sofia, a treaty of friendship, collabora-tion and mutual aid and a cultural convention were signedby him and Prime Minister Dimitrov, and the question of aBalkan or East European Federation seems to have been dis-



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?4. 21 ALBANIA WITHIN SLAV ORBIT 269cussed. The unexpected rebuke by Pravda appearedon Jan-uary 28, 1948.

There has been much talk, before and after the war, abouta Balkan Federation. For small Albania, whose lands arecoveted by neighbors, that would be an ideal solution. Butthere cannot be any Federation without truly democraticregimes in the federated states. Although governments withinthe Russian orbit still repeat slogans of independence and sov-ereignty, they have lost them both. Therefore, the Federationadvocated by Premier Dimitrov could only be a union of total-itarian governments.Most of the control of Albania has passed over to Russia.The port of Valona and the Linguetta (the promontory whichprotects the bay of Valona) have been fortified. There areRussian advisers for the ministries and Russian organizers inthe Albanian army. The Albanian government refused to takepart in the Marshall Plan, in spite of the great need for out-side help. But Prime Minister Hoxha and members of thecabinet went to Moscow, when summoned there, in order toadhere to the Molotov Plan.

For the Soviet Union Albania is an ideal place from whichto exert pressure on Greece. Every movement on the borderscan be justified on the ground that Greek claims, threaten theintegrity of Albanian territory. Of this there has been ampleproof. The United Nations Special Committee concluded inits report that " aid in the form of logistical support is beingfurnished from Albania to the guerrillas operating on Greekterritory." Not having signed treaties of collaboration ormutual assistance with Albania, the Soviet government thusavoids formal responsibility for any complications which mayarise between Albania and Greece during the current struggle.

After the elections of 1945, both Britain and the UnitedStates were inclined to recognize Hoxha's regime. Americahad set as its only condition that the government shouldrecognize the Albano-American treaties concluded before the4 By democratic regime is meant that kind of regime which accepts legal opposi-tion to the ruling class through freedom of press, liberty of association,and freeelections for the representatives n parliament.5 The New York Times, January 18, 1948, 22:1.



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270 POLITICALSCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. LXIIIwar. These were pacts of an international character, whichdid not jeopardizeany Albanian interests. Hoxha's govern-ment, however, refused any recognition. It is interesting tonote that the same treaties had previously been recognized byTito's government. The growing tension between the SovietUnion, on one hand, and Britain and America, on the other,has madelittle Albania intensify her hostile attitude towardtheWestern Powers.The first country to be attacked by the present Albaniangovernment was Great Britain. It was charged that her mil-itary mission in Tirana had establishedcontacts with membersof the Democratic Front and other Albanians and had organ-ized a plot for the overthrow of the re'gime. Later the Corfuincident came before the United Nations Security Council,which decided, 7 to 2, that the mines " had been placed withthe knowledge of the Albanian Government." Now that caseis being heard in the International Court of Justice at theHague. The Albanian government has maintained thatBritain's applicationwas illegal, as therewas no specialarbitralagreementbetweenthe two countries,and that the InternationalCourt of Justice was incompetent,since Albaniahas not signedits statute.The attack against the United Statesstartedlater with prop-aganda in press and speech. Prime Minister Hoxha, on hisreturn from the Paris Conference of 1946, addressed he Al-banianyouth, accusing the United Statesof being the principalobstacle to Albania'srights. Meanwhile,the movementsof theunofficial American mission at Tirana had been restricted.Next came the staged " plot " in connection with the drainageproject of Lake Maliq, in southern Albania. The Albaniangovernmenthad announcedthat the works of the lakewould befinished on November 29, 1946. When it becameevident thata great blunder had been committed, for the drainagecouldnot be completed at the announced date (the works are con-tinuing even to this day) the government of Tirana accusedthe American Mission and some American members ofU.N.R.R.A. of having organized sabotage by subsidizing Al-banianengineers. It is significantthat the trials in connectionwith the two mentionedplots began after Britain and America



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No 2] ALBANIA WITHIN SLAV ORBIT 27Ihad decided to withdraw their missions,when it had becomeobvious that the Albanian regime did not representthe peopleand repressedevery human liberty.Dissatisfactionis now manifest in the Albanian army. Of-ficersand soldiersrealizethat their struggle againstthe invadershas brought only a change in masters: Albania has passedfrom Axis to Slavic domination. Some army men have goneinto the mountains, while others have crossed the Greekfrontier. A majority of them had been membersof the Com-munist party. Any of these deserters who have, beenapprehendedin Albania have been brought before the courtand condemned to death as conspiratorsagainst the govern-ment. One of the condemned was Colonel Kadri Hoxha, ahero of the National Liberation Front and its representativewith the Allies in Italy during the war. But of still greaterimportance were the trials in September 1947, when ninedeputies, former membersof the Communist party, and anumberof intellectuals were accusedof plotting the overthrowof Hoxha's government. Some of the defendants, like KosteBoshnjaku,general director of the National Bank, had beenveterans of communism. During the war some purges hadtaken place in the ranks of the Communists. They wereprimarilydirected against members of the group of Zjarriandthe so-calledgroup of Te Binjte (The Young).These staged plots in Albania are not unique. They havebeen seen in all Balkan states within the Russiansphere. Theaim is to eliminateevery sort of opposition,however democraticit may be, and to justify before the people the government'spolicy of hostility toward the United States and Britain. Thedifference has been only in the particular conditions in eachcountry. In Albania, where there are now no American orBritish representatives, he government is free to choose anyaccusation it pleases and give it the crudest form. As thereare no political parties in Albania-like the Agrarianin Bul-garia or the historical ones in Rumania-which could becometargetsof the government,the plottersareoften accusedof hav-ing ties with the headquartersof the National Front, whichare in Italy. This organization has been the chief opponentof the present regime.



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272 POLITICALSCIENCE QUARTERLY [VoL LXMIV

Communism in Albania has not sprung from the conditionsof the country. It is an imposition from outside. As such itis resented by the inhabitants, whom experience has taught:" Offer your hospitality to the foreigner, but be careful notto trust him."You cannot expect a mountaineerof north Albania to givehis support to a regime which tries to destroy the clan systemand the patriarchalfamily so dear to him. Nor is it possiblefor the peasant of south Albania to back a system which hasdeprivedhim of the fieldshe owned and loved and has loweredhim from the positionof a master of the land to that of a slaveof the state. It cannot be expected that the townsman ofAlbania, whether in the north or in the south, who has beenrobbed of his business-small, but his own-will support aregime which has paralyzedthe economic life of the nation.Hoxha's government has not been able to replace what ithas destroyed. First, it has not the means. Albaniahas neverbeen a self-sufficientcountry; it is even less so after the devas-tation of the war. Today the doors of emigration are closedon both sides. The Slav protectorscannot aidher, becausetheyhave their own economic troubles. Powerful Russiahas prom-ised Albania only a little help, and that as a reaction to theMarshallPlan. Secondly,the governmentlacks capablepersons.The honest and more competent Albanians are in the prisons,in foreign lands, or outside the confidence of the Communistparty. Tkirdly, the changes of the regime run against thevery nature of the inhabitants. The Albaniansaregreat loversof liberty and their song is: " Liberty Thy bannertorn butflying." They cannot stand repressive systems. Their pastis full of examplesof revolts againstoppression.It is naturalto ask, then, in what lies the strength of Hoxha'sgovernment. One answer is the terror. The Minister of theInterior,Koci Xoxe, perhaps he mostpowerful man in Albania,a former tinsmith coming from one of the AlbanianvillagesofMacedoniaand a member of the former Korcha Communistgroup Puna, is an unscrupulousperson. He has created a widesystem of spying and by his stagedplots and ruthlesspersecution



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No. 21 ALBANIA WITHIN SLAV ORBIT 273has terrorizedthe people. Furthermore,the government hasthe backing of Yugoslaviaand the Soviet Union. If a revoltshould break out in Albania,Tito's armieswould marchin andsuppresst, andSovietRussiawould defend the actionbefore theother great Powers.In one matter, however, the Albanian government has thecomplete and unreserved upportof the people:the fight againstGreece's demands on northern Epirus. This region is thatpart of southern Albania which includes the prefecturesof Korcha (Koritza) and Argyrokastro. It has an areaabout one fourth of that of all Albania and a populationof 292,000, of whom 167,000 are Moslems and 125,000Orthodox Christians (Albanian census of 1930). Of thelatter only 35,000 are Greeks,accordingto the statistics of theLeagueof Nations, that is, a minorityof 12Y2percent. Greece'sclaimsare thereforeunfounded and can be labeledexpansionist.On the other hand, for mountainous Albania this region isfertile and has been " the cradleof nationalism"and the centerof progressiveforces. It was there that the fight against theAxis Powers by both the Nationalists and the Communistsbeganand grew. Without it therecannot be an Albania. Forit, the Albaniansare ready to endure an even more tyrannicalgovernment than that of Hoxha and to make supremesacri-fices.

The Tirana governmenthas well appreciated he importanceof the northern Epirus question and has exploited it to thefull. From the very outset it was ready to fight in order toprevent Greek encroachments on Albanian soil. It appearedthen before the people as a government determined to defendthe national interest. In this way, the maintenance of 70,000men under armsfinds a justification. Greece'sclaimshave alsobeen used to justify the hostility of the present regime towardBritain and America; for Great Britain has supported theGreeks, and the United States Senate two years ago passed aresolution that northern Epirus should be given to Greece.The same claims serve today as a justification for the supportgiven to the Greek guerrillas,since an extreme leftist govern-ment in Greece would give up all demands for southern Al-bania. Northern Epirus is the key to the inner strength of



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274 POLITICALSCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL.LXIIIHoxha's government. It is used as a panaceafor all the illsthe government has inflicted upon the people. Deprive it ofthat, and you have strippedit of all popularsupport.If Greece abandonsher demandson southern Albania, it iscertainthat she will find acrossthe GrammosMountainsa veryfriendly people. Greeks and Albanians have many things incommon. They fought together in the days of the Greekwar of independenceagainst the Turks. There are Albaniansettlementsin Greece-in Attica, the Aegean Islands,Pelopon-nesus-dating from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,whose people still speak Albanian in their homes and feel alove for the land of their forefathers.. They arevaluablelinks.Both countries are Mediterranean,and each is more secure ifthe two people are friendly and allied. Though today the Al-banian people are in the grip of a totalitarian regime servileto the Soviet Union and unable to move, tommorow they maybe free and able to stretch a friendly hand to Greece. Whynot preparethe ground? On the contrary,if Greececontinuesto claim southern Albania, she will make it easier for the Al-banian government to use the country as a military base forGeneralMarko'sbands and she will force the Albanian peopleto go on enduring the preposterousunion with Yugoslavia.Despite the strong anti-Americanpropaganda,Hoxha's gov-ernment has not succeededin alienating the people from theUnited States. They are grateful to the Americangovernmentfor the defense of Albanian rights at the Peace Conference of1919, when their country ran the risk of being partitioned.They remember thatAmerica never recognizedMussolini'soc-cupation of Albania, and that America, and not Soviet Russia,was the first country which, as early as 1942, praised the fightof the Albanian people and reaffirmedtheir right to enjoyfreedom and independence.

STAVRO SKENDINEW YOEKCITY

albania within the slav orbit: advent to power of the communist party

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