alan gardiner - the theory of proper names: a controversial essay

T H E T H E O R Y OF

PROPER NAMESA CONTROVERSIAL BY SIR ALAN G A R D I N E R ESSAY

Fellow of the British Academy

L O N D O N

O X F O R D

UNIVERSITYNEW Y O R K TORONTO

PRESS

Oxford University Press, Amen House, LondonGLASGOW BOMBAY NEW YORK CALCUTTA TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON IBADAN MADRAS KARACHI CAPE TOWN

E.C.4

FIRST PUBLISHED 1 9 4 O SECOND EDITION SECOND IMPRESSION 1954 1957

PRINTED

IN

GREAT

BRITAIN

PREFACEA p a r t from a few trifling v e r b a l changes and a couple of added footnotes the bulk of this book is the exact reprint of a paper-bound booklet published in a very small edition in 1940. Doubtless o w i n g to the circumstances of the times, but possibly also to the original publication's somewhat nglig apparel, this passed almost unnoticed, and I have knowledge of only two reviews, the second of w h i c h appeared a whole decade later than the first. H a v i n g always felt that a piece o f work that h a d cost me so m u c h trouble deserved a better fate, I decided to see whether the situation could not be remedied b y such external allurements as m y excellent friends at the O x f o r d University Press were able to offer. I a m sure I h a v e acted wisely in not attempting to alter m y m a i n text, since at the age of seventy-four m y ability to deal with an exceptionally difficult topic is certainly smaller than it was fourteen years ago. Nevertheless I h a v e been unable to dispense with some pages of fresh c o m m e n t , appended at the end of the book under the h e a d i n g Retrospect 1953. Here I h a v e found myself compelled to admit the force of an objection raised in the later o f the t w o reviews above mentioned, and to suggest some alterations in m y formal definition accordingly. H a d I thought fit to remodel m y earlier text, this w o u l d h a v e occasioned some changes also there, and particularly in m y concluding sentence (p. 67), but for the reason stated I have deemed it more prudent, as w e l l as more honest, to leave m y original formulations uncorrected.

vi

PREFACE

I n suppressing m y earlier P r e f a c e I h a v e b e e n p r o m p t e d b y the c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t at the present time it w o u l d h a v e b e e n m a i n l y i r r e l e v a n t . Its p r i n c i p a l t h e m e w a s the d i f f i c u l t y I h a d e x p e r i e n c e d in g i v i n g m y essay its final s h a p e , a n d the a c c o m p a n y i n g a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s t u r n e d m o r e u p o n the e n c o u r a g e m e n t e x t e n d e d to m e b y friends t h a n u p o n a n y fruitful suggestions they h a d to offer. A f t e r all, the c h i e f o b l i g a tion i n c u r r e d b y a controversial w r i t e r is t o w a r d s those w h o s e opinions h e a t t e m p t s to refute, n o t h i n g b e i n g m o r e s t i m u l a t i n g t h a n to e n c o u n t e r assertions w i t h w h i c h one c a n n o t a g r e e . I confess to h a v i n g w o n d e r e d m o r e t h a n o n c e w h e t h e r m y criticism o f B e r t r a n d Russell o u g h t not to h a v e b e e n r e w r i t t e n , seeing t h a t the e m i n e n t p h i l o s o p h e r has n o w restated his position in c o n s i d e r a b l y m o d i f i e d f o r m (Human Knowledge, 1948, P a r t I I , c h . iii, a n d P a r t I V , c h . viii). I f I h a v e refrained, it is b e c a u s e I a m no l o n g e r e q u a l to the task. Besides, Russell's m a i n contentions a p p e a r to h a v e rem a i n e d the s a m e ; for h i m the moon a n d this are still p r o p e r names, a n d Socrates n o m o r e t h a n a m e r e description. O n the positive side I feel t h a t m y m a i n i n d e b t e d ness is to M i l l a n d to D i o n y s i u s T h r a x .

1953

CONTENTSI . Mill's conception outlined I I . The Greek tradition I I I . Implications of that tradition. Name and Word I V . Embodied and disembodied proper names. Our discussion to turn upon the former V . Various incongruent uses found in Speech to be disregardedI

4 5 8I I

V I . Homonymous and common proper names. Surnames and gentile names are of the latter variety 15 V I I . Proper names involving more than one word. Use of the definite article "9V i l i .

Collective and plural proper names. Mos, 2 2

I X . Some singular names are not proper names. Criticism of Mill's account 25 X . The Greek view of proper names as names individually used is inadequate. Mill's superior criterion of meaninglessness discussed 29x i

The principles involved in naming. True names. The importance as evidence of the word sun

32

X I I . Mill's failure to pay sufficient attention to the name itself, i.e. to the name in its aspect of sound-sign 38 X I I I . Proper names of clear etymology or with meaningful associations 41 X I V . Definition of a proper name X V . The conditions which give rise to proper names: (a) Celestial bodies42

43

viii XVI. XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. XXI. (b)

CONTENTS Place-names names; designations &c. &c. like Cook,

45 47 50 51 52

(e) Personal

Father(d) Ships, houses, animals,

(e) English and Latin names of birds, plants, (f)

Month-names and days of the week. Feast days

(g) Mythological andfictional names. Existence a necessary condition of all proper names, but only existence in the mind

54 57 66 68 68 69 69 71 CRITICIZED 77

XXII. XXIII.

Criticism of the views of Bertrand Russell and Prof. Stebbing Conclusion. Points wherein my view differs from those of others

A P P E N D I X . Some other definitions criticized:

(i) Keynes(2) (3) (4) Bertelsen Funke Brndal

RETROSPECT I953 INDEX OF AUTHORS ' OTED OR

T H E T H E O R Y OF PROPER NAMES I

I L L ' S conception o f P r o p e r N a m e s as m e a n i n g less marks set u p o n things to distinguish t h e m f r o m one another seems, at first sight, as sensible as it is simple. A p p l i e d , for e x a m p l e , to the names o f the rock-infesting monsters S c y l l a a n d C h a r y b d i s a definition a l o n g these lines appears u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e . T h o s e n a m e s might, if c h a n c e h a d so willed it, h a v e been i n t e r c h a n g e d w i t h o u t i m p a i r i n g their demonstrative efficacy. T o us in m o d e r n times, at all events, S c y l l a a n d C h a r y b d i s m e a n , merely as names, absolutely n o t h i n g . N o d o u b t they w e r e f r a u g h t w i t h sinister m e a n i n g for a n Odysseus perilously steering his ship between t h e m . B u t M i l l explicitly excludes from his understanding o f the t e r m ' m e a n i n g ' a n y previous k n o w l e d g e of the o b j e c t denoted. I n s p e a k i n g o f proper n a m e s as meaningless m a r k s he makes ' m e a n i n g ' s y n o n y m o u s w i t h 'connotation', a n d b y a c o n n o t a t i v e n a m e he understands one w h i c h not o n l y denotes something, b u t also connotes or implies some attribute o f it : such a concrete general n a m e , for instance, as tree, w h i c h m a y b e used to denote this or that particular tree, b u t w h i c h in so d o i n g simultaneously implies o f it the attributes shared b y it with other trees. Since the n a m e s Scylla a n d Charybdis connote no such attributes, they are n o n connotative or meaningless a c c o r d i n g to M i l l ' s terminology. A n d since also these n a m e s are u n d e n i a b l y B

M

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T H E T H E O R Y OF P R O P E R " N A M E S been

distinguishing marks, for h i m they w o u l d h a v e typical 'proper names'. 1

T o the objection arising f r o m the fact that p r o p e r names are usually g i v e n for a reason, w h i c h reason m a y h a v e been the possession o f characters a c t u a l l y indicated in the names, e.g. Dartmouth, Rochefort, Mont Blanc, M i l l has again a n answer. C o n c e r n i n g D a r t m o u t h he writes : 2 town may have been named Dartmouth, because it is situated at the mouth of the Dart. But it is no part of the signification of the word Dartmouth, to be situated at the mouth of the Dart. If sand should choke up the mouth of the river, or an earthquake change its course, and remove it to a distance from the town, the name of the town would not necessarily be changed. T h a t fact, therefore, can form no part of the signification of the word ; for otherwise, when the fact confessedly ceased to be true, no one would any longer think of applying the name.' T h e a r g u m e n t is not c o n v i n c i n g as it stands. T h e n a m e Dartmouth seems at least to i m p l y the attribute ' l y i n g a t the m o u t h o f the D a r t ' , seems at least to be connotative. B u t if it is connotative, a n d if none the less w e continue to regard it as a proper n a m e , then M i l l ' s definition breaks d o w n . F r o m that definition c o m b i n e d w i t h the situation conjured u p b y h i m , w e m i g h t rather conclude that Dartmouth c o u l d b e c o m e a p r o p e r n a m e only after the sand or e a r t h q u a k e h a d accomplished its charactere f f a c i n g work. S u c h was, indeed, the v i e w a d v o c a t e d b y the Swedish g r a m m a r i a n Noreen, 3 w h o contended that* M i l l gives no formal definition, but the statement of his position in m y opening sentence is roughly accurate. For some qualifications see below, p. 34, n. I, and p. 35, n. 1. 2 J . S. M i l l , System of Logic, Bk. I, ch. 2, 5. I shorten the passage slightly, since it is mixed u p with discussion o f the n a m e John. 3 Einfhrung in die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der Sprache, Halle, 1923,

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T H E T H E O R Y OF P R O P E R " N A M E S

Spittal, the n a m e o f a w e l l - k n o w n p l a c e in C a r i n t h i a , w a s n o t h o r o u g h b r e d p r o p e r n a m e so l o n g as a hospital existed there, a n d a c q u i r e d t h a t r a n k o n l y w h e n the hospital disappeared. A s against this a r g u m e n t , linguistic feeling a n d the consensus o f p h i l o l o g i c a l opinion w o u l d alike assure us that Spittal w a s the n a m e o f t h a t t o w n , a n d a p r o p e r n a m e , from the v e r y start. It is easy to r e d u c e such a n a r g u m e n t ad absurdum. W i l l it be seriously m a i n tained that a M r . I r o n m o n g e r w o u l d lose his n a m e if he returned to the trade o f his forefathers, or a M r . C o w a r d if p r o v e d g u i l t y o f acts o f c o w a r d i c e ? I shall return later 1 to the p r o b l e m o f Dartmouth a n d other n a m e s like it, the d e b a t e c o n c e r n i n g w h i c h has b e e n recalled at this early stage m e r e l y to show that the theory o f P r o p e r N a m e s presents difficulties not obvious at a first g l a n c e . T h a t M i l l ' s e x p l a n a t i o n s h a v e not c o m p l e t e l y satisfied either philologists or logicians is evident f r o m the m a n y disquisitions devoted to the question since his d a y . N o n e the less I a m c o n v i n c e d that his v i e w is not far w i d e o f the m a r k , a n d needs only a little alteration a n d e l a b o r a tion in order to set it o n a solid f o u n d a t i o n . M i l l ' s c h a p t e r o n N a m e s has at least one merit n o t earned b y e v e r y subsequent b o o k o n L o g i c ; it shows that his m i n d distinguished w i t h all requisite clearness b e t w e e n n a m e a b l e things a n d the v e r b a l instruments used for reference to them. T h e defect o f his linguistic theory is that it is neither b r o a d l y e n o u g h conceived nor yet sufficiently detailed ; it is absurd to think that the h i g h l y c o m p l e x m e c h a n i s m o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n could be a d e q u a t e l y treated in the f e wp. 384. A s noted below, pp. 4 1 - 4 2 , N o r e e n barely saves his thesis b y the insertion of the epithet ' t h o r o u g h b r e d ' (1lollblut). T h e a r g u m e n t is repeated in e x a g g e r a t e d form b y V . B r n d a l , Ordklasserne, C o p e n h a g e n , 1928, p. 83. 1 See below, p. 4 1 .

4

T H E T H E O R Y OF P R O P E R

NAMES

pages he devotes to it. T h e purpose o f m y a d m i t t e d l y imperfect essay is threefold : first, to a d a p t M i l l ' s conception of proper n a m e s to the general theory o f Semantics I h a v e e n d e a v o u r e d to e x p o u n d e l s e w h e r e ; second, to test that c o n c e p t i o n b y the a d d u c i n g o f m a n y m o r e examples, a n d in p a r t i c u l a r to study the conditions w h i c h lead to the imposition o f p r o p e r n a m e s ; a n d last b u t not least, to a n i m a d v e r t o n a v i e w o f p r o p e r n a m e s m u c h in v o g u e a m o n g m o d e r n logicians, b u t w h i c h I regard as a w h o l l y pernicious aberration o f t h o u g h t .

II T h e term ' P r o p e r N a m e ' comes to us f r o m the Greeks, a m o n g w h o m , rendered in L a t i n b y nomen proprium, m e a n t a ' g e n u i n e ' n a m e , or a n a m e m o r e genuinely such t h a n other names. 1 A c c o r d i n g l y the w a s contrasted w i t h the or 'appellation', a term used to describe w h a t w e c a l l 'general names' or ' c o m m o n nouns' like man, horse, tree. T h e Stoic C h r y s i p p u s m a d e a sharper distinction, c o n f i n i n g to w h a t w e n o w c a l l proper names. T h e later g r a m marians, b y using the epithet either w i t h or w i t h out , i m p l y that the is a sort o f , b u t not a quite g e n u i n e one. N o better a c c o u n t exists than that b y D i o n y s i u s T h r a x , a p u p i l o f Aristarchus w h o lived in the second century B.C. His statement 2 m a y be rendered :1 S c h o e m a n n , Lehre von den Redetheilen, B e r l i n , 1862, p . 82, n. 2, p o i n t s o u t t h a t this t e r m h a s often b e e n w r o n g l y i n t e r p r e t e d to m e a n p e c u l i a r to the i n d i v i d u a l , cf. G e r m . Eigennamen, w h e r e a s the r e a l m e a n i n g is 'authentic', 'properly so called' ; so too J . W a c k e r n a g e l , Vorlesungen ber Syntax, Basel, 1 9 2 0 - 4 , v o l . ii, p . 61. 2

"

e V n

,

-,

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noun or name' (the one word is used, this covering both notions ; cf. the French nom = nom substantif, whereas the Germans, like ourselves, distinguish Nomen = 'noun' and Namen) 'is a declinable part of speech signifying a body or an activity, a body like "stone" and an activity like " e d u c a t i o n " , and may be used both commonly and individually; commonly () like " m a n " , " h o r s e " and individually ( "privately") like "Socrates".' Dionysius himself also uses the term , identifying it with such names or nouns as are used 'individually' (tSi'ojy) ; of the he says it is 'that which signifies individual being' ( ) such as "Homer", "Socrates"." Ill Since a n y fruitful discussion m u s t start f r o m points o f a g r e e m e n t , w e shall d o wisely to g o b a c k to the f o u n t a i n h e a d a n d to a d o p t its standpoints as o u r o w n . It w i l l b e seen that Dionysius is c o n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y w i t h the kinds a n d the uses o f words, a n d o n l y secondarily w i t h the n a t u r e o f the things denoted b y t h e m . A c c o r d i n g l y w e too o u g h t to regard the p r o b l e m o f p r o p e r n a m e s as essentially a linguistic p r o b l e m , a n d so l o n g as it is a question o f investigating their essential nature w e o u g h t strenuously to d e n y that there exists a n y other l e g i t i m a t e road o f a p p r o a c h . It will b e f u r t h e r observed that D i o n y sius chooses his examples f r o m the r e a l m o f daily e x p e r ience, in o n e case indeed referring to something o f a n abstract n a t u r e ( ' e d u c a t i o n ' ) , b u t otherwise c o n c e r n i n g himself o n l y w i t h w e l l - a u t h e n t i c a t e d m a t e r i a l entities. olov , Se olov naiSe', re 8 , olov , & Be olov . Dionysios Thrax,p. 634ft, 124

t h e edition by U h l i g , L e i p z i g , 1885.

ovv earl, T lb Lav , otov "- O , o p . cit., p. 636ft, p. 33 of the edition.

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I n contrasting the c o m m o n a n d the i n d i v i d u a l or exclusive e m p l o y m e n t s o f names, he a p p a r e n t l y failed to take into consideration that the n a m e Socrates c o u l d be, a n d certainly often h a d been, used o f other persons besides the famous philosopher. T h e other e x a m p l e ' H o m e r ' w h i c h he cites shows it w a s really the philosopher he h a d in m i n d . W e m a y , I think, fairly assume that in Dionysius' t h o u g h t at the m o m e n t the n a m e Socrates itself w a s as u n i q u e as the celebrity to w h o m he w a s referring. L e t us take, then, as o u r starting-point such p r o p e r n a m e s as are applied, in English usage at the present time, to only o n e h u m a n being, n a m e s like Jugurtha a n d Vercingetorix, or a g a i n the n a m e o f a m o u n t a i n like Popocatepetl, or that o f a city like Chicago. T a c i t l y assumed in the w o r d s o f Dionysius is the fact that the uses o f n a m e s or nouns to w h i c h he refers are constitutional a n d n o r m a l uses, not historically single or exceptional ones. T h i s is evident from his mention o f the ' c o m m o n ' use o f names, b y w h i c h he p l a i n l y m e a n s t h a t a n o u n like man w a s used sometimes o f this m a n a n d sometimes o f that, not that it w a s used o f t w o or m o r e persons o n a n y single g i v e n o c c a s i o n h e was certainly not thinki n g o f the d u a l or p l u r a l . Dionysius was, a c c o r d i n g l y , concerned w i t h the inherent nature o f certain names, not w i t h their m o m e n t a r y uses or extensions or misapplications. T r a n s l a t e d into terms o f recent linguistic theory, this m a y be expressed b y saying that the c a t e g o r y o f p r o p e r n a m e s is a c a t e g o r y o f L a n g u a g e , not a c a t e g o r y o f Speech. 1 Jugurtha, for e x a m p l e , is a n a m e w h i c h belonged constitutionally a n d p e r m a n e n t l y to a certain N u m i d i a n king, a n d it is to b e d e p l o r e d w h e n e v e r a1 Gardiner, Theory of Speech and Language, 2nd ed., O x f o r d , 1951, p p . 130-4.

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logician says a n y t h i n g o f this kind : ' H e r e the w o r d smith [seil. L a t i n faber) is used as a p r o p e r n a m e ' , j u s t as if the n a m e Smith were a fortuitous m o m e n t a r y a p p l i c a t i o n , a n d h a d not belonged to its o w n e r f r o m the v e r y d a y o f his birth. 1 M o d e r n philology has f o l l o w e d ancient e x a m p l e b y referring to a like Jugurtha, not as a w o r d m e a n i n g that p a r t i c u l a r individual, b u t as his ' n a m e ' . W e speak o f 'proper names', not o f 'proper nouns' or 'proper w o r d s ' . T h i s , therefore, is a fitting o p p o r t u n i t y to consider the difference between a ' w o r d ' a n d a ' n a m e ' . O f the t w o terms, ' n a m e ' is far the older. I t is indeed i n c o n c e i v a b l e that a n y h u m a n society, h o w e v e r primitive, should h a v e lacked a w o r d for ' n a m e ' . T h i s term belongs to the preg r a m m a t i c a l stage o f t h o u g h t , to a time w h e n p e o p l e h a d no interest in words for their o w n sake, b u t t h o u g h t o f t h e m solely as a means o f s p e a k i n g a b o u t the things o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . T h e y n e v e r inquired w h a t such a n d such a w o r d meant, but only b y w h a t n a m e such a n d such a t h i n g w a s called. M a t e r i a l l y a ' w o r d ' a n d a ' n a m e ' are identical. B u t there is this i m p o r t a n t difference that the direction o f thought is opposite in each case. 2 W h e n w e speak o f a ' w o r d ' our minds travel f r o m the sound-sign to w h a t e v e r it m a y m e a n ; w h e n w e speak o f a ' n a m e ' w e i m p l y that there exists s o m e t h i n g to w h i c h a certain sound-sign corresponds, s o m e t h i n g that w a s the Jons et origo o f the n a m e , something t h a t supplies its raison d'tre.1 e.g. Joseph, Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed., O x f o r d , 1916, p. 29 : 'Smith, for e x a m p l e , as meaning one w h o works in metal, is a general term, because I m e a n the same by calling D i c k or T h o m a s a smith ; if I use it as a proper name, numerous as are the persons w h o bear it, I do not m e a n the same in each use of it.' T h e italics are mine. 2 O n this point see the interesting remarks in Dornseiff, Der deutsche Wortschatz, Berlin, 1934, p. 16.

'

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T H E T H E O R Y OF P R O P E R " N A M E S IV

N o w in v i e w o f this difference o f attitude i n v o l v e d in ' w o r d ' a n d ' n a m e ' our retention o f the designation 'proper n a m e ' seems to dictate in a d v a n c e a decision w e need to m a k e w i t h o u t further delay. It has not been recognized as clearly as it should h a v e been that linguistic science is concerned w i t h t w o closely related, b u t none the less distinct, kinds o f proper n a m e , a n d w e h a v e to m a k e u p our minds w h i c h o f these kinds is that w h e r e o f w e intend to discuss the theory. W e h a v e seen that Dionysius regarded a proper n a m e as a w o r d definitely tied d o w n to a particular entity like Socrates a n d H o m e r , a n d w e ourselves, in e m p l o y i n g the same term 'proper n a m e ' , seem c o m m i t t e d to not a l l o w i n g the entity n a m e d to vanish out o f our sight altogether. O n the contrary, it seems i n c u m b e n t u p o n us to keep that entity more or less clearly before our minds t h r o u g h o u t the ensuing discussion. N o r is the decision w e h a v e to m a k e m e r e l y a m a t t e r o f choice, since it will a p p e a r in d u e course that these ' e m b o d i e d p r o p e r names', if I m a y so call them, are historically prior to, a n d the a c t u a l originators of, the 'disembodied' variety, the separate existence o f w h i c h has n o w to be vindicated. B y 'disembodied p r o p e r names' I m e a n those w o r d sounds that are studied for their e t y m o l o g y , f r e q u e n c y , a n d distribution in such books as M a w e r ' s Place-names of Buckinghamshire, W e e k l e y ' s Romance of Names, R a n k e ' s gyptische Personennamen a n d m a n y similar works. 1 T h e s e scholars might, h o w e v e r , not u n r e a s o n a b l y c l a i m that the1 T h e distinction here m a d e was pointed out in a short article contributed by me to the Mlanges de linguistique et de philologie offerts Jacques van Ginneken, Paris, 1937, p. 308.

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subject-matter o f their books consists o f e x a c t l y the s a m e p r o p e r n a m e s that are dealt w i t h b y Dionysius a n d M i l l . T h e y w o u l d point out that the w o r d amo c o n j u g a t e d i n a L a t i n g r a m m a r is just the same w o r d as was h e a r d on m a n y a R o m a n lover's lips, t h o u g h in the g r a m m a r interest is m o m e n t a r i l y w i t h d r a w n from the notion o f 'loving', whilst a n y p a r t i c u l a r instance o f amorous e m o tion is entirely out of the p i c t u r e . I t must be c o n c e d e d f r a n k l y that the categories o f ' e m b o d i e d ' a n d 'disemb o d i e d ' p r o p e r n a m e s show a g r e a t overlap. W h e n the student o f A m e r i c a n l a n g u a g e s concentrates his attention o n a p r e s u m a b l y unique n a m e like Popocatepetl, this remains still the n a m e o f the m o u n t a i n , t h o u g h the m o u n tain itself is not e n g a g i n g the t h o u g h t s o f the philologist. B u t the position is different w i t h those p r o p e r n a m e s w h i c h h a v e been attached to h u n d r e d s o f different entities both real a n d i m a g i n a r y . T h e r e h a v e been literally thousands o f persons called Mary or John or Henry, a n d even p l a c e - n a m e s display a certain a m o u n t o f repetition, as m a y be seen under such h e a d i n g s as Sutton, Victoria, York in the index to a n y g o o d atlas. T h e m u l t i t u d e o f persons a n d places for w h i c h p r o p e r names h a v e to b e f o u n d is so great that the s a m e n a m e s must i n e v i t a b l y o c c u r a g a i n a n d again. N o w w h e n the etymologist focuses attention o n the n a m e Mary, it is evident that this n a m e is c o m p l e t e l y disembodied ; Mary is, as it were, the essence extracted f r o m a vast assemblage o f e m b o d i e d Marys. H e n c e it seems necessary, in the interests o f clear t h i n k i n g , to distinguish between the t w o classes. T h e e m b o d i e d proper names, t h o u g h w e c a n a n d indeed must investigate their theory, as b e i n g the p r i m a r y a n d o r i g i n a t i n g species, are in their multiplicity o f no concern to the philologist as such. T h e w o r k s t h a t deal w i t h this latter

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class are E n c y c l o p a e d i a s , Histories, Dictionaries o f N a t i o n a l B i o g r a p h y , G e o g r a p h y books, a n d the like. O t h e r reasons m a y be a d d u c e d for treating ' e m b o d i e d ' a n d 'disembodied' p r o p e r n a m e s as separate classes. M o s t words r e g a r d e d merely as word-sounds, word-forms, or technical terms to b e defined, are d e a l t w i t h m a i n l y in educational a n d scientific treatises, b u t disembodied proper names are often to b e f o u n d in o r d i n a r y literature or in conversation. T h u s w e frequently c o m e across sentences l i k e : He was a Shropshire farmer, whose name is variously given as Harris or Hobson. His cousin's name was Rose. H e r e Harris, Hobson, a n d Rose are word-sounds predicated o f a particular class o f w o r d - s o u n d w h i c h is called name a n d o f w h i c h I h a v e a l r e a d y a t t e m p t e d to e x p l a i n the nature. In these contexts Harris, Hobson, a n d Rose, t h o u g h ultimately referred to particular persons t h r o u g h the mediation o f the genitives whose a n d cousin's, are immediately signs o n l y for certain word-sounds o f a specific quality, not signs for persons; y o u c a n n o t predicate a person o f a w o r d - s o u n d like a n a m e . I n conclusion m e n tion m a y be m a d e o f the official c a t a l o g u e o f Christian n a m e s w h i c h enumerates the only ones that F r e n c h law will allow to be selected for the children o f F r a n c e . A s f o u n d in this c a t a l o g u e the names are obviously disembodied, t h o u g h presenting themselves as candidates for re-embodiment. F o r all I k n o w some o f t h e m m a y not h a v e been a c t u a l l y e m b o d i e d for decades. 11 Brunot and B r u n e a u , Prcis de grammaire historique de la langue franaise, Paris, 1933, 381 : ' A c t u e l l e m e n t nous devons prendre les prnoms sur une liste officielle tablie en 1865 : cette liste contient Eusbiote et Rigobert, mais non Henriette, Juliette, Paulette, Pierrette.' Further, Prof. Brndal tells m e that some years ago the Danish G o v e r n m e n t , in order to remedy the existing monotony of surnames (most of them formed b y means of -sen f r o m the father's n a m e ) , published an official N a m e - b o o k , out of w h i c h

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T H E T H E O R Y OF P R O P E R " N A M E S V

H e n c e f o r t h , accordingly, w h e n e v e r I use the t e r m 'proper n a m e ' w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n , I shall m e a n the sort o f e m b o d i e d proper n a m e that both Dionysius a n d M i l l a p p e a r to h a v e h a d in m i n d , the sort that is e x c l u sively e m p l o y e d of, a n d tied d o w n to, a p a r t i c u l a r person or p l a c e or w h a t e v e r it m a y b e . O n l y if w e a d o p t this course c a n w e hope to save their f u n d a m e n t a l distinction b e t w e e n nouns that are ' c o m m o n l y ' used a n d nouns that are used 'individually'. 1 I t has been seen that one a n d the same w o r d - s o u n d w h a t has been described as a ' d i s e m b o d i e d proper n a m e ' i s often a p p l i e d to different individuals. F o r e x a m p l e , I h a v e a son called John, a n d so has m y n e i g h b o u r . W h a t is the linguistic relation o f the t w o J o h n s to one a n o t h e r ? Before a n s w e r i n g this question I a m compelled to strike o f f at a t a n g e n t b y the o c c u r r e n c e o f the p l u r a l Johns in m y o w n last sentence. T h i s o c c u r r e n c e m i g h t seem to b r i n g to light a third kind o f p r o p e r n a m e intermediate b e t w e e n the t w o others, n a m e l y a n o n l y partly d i s e m b o d i e d p r o p e r n a m e . I t is clear that the singular John i m p l i e d in this p l u r a l signifies neither ( i ) a sound, nor (2) a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l ; t h o u g h the p l u r a l is used in reference to m y n e i g h b o u r ' s J o h n a n d m y o w n , its singular means in itself only 'person h a v i n g the (disembodied p r o p e r ) n a m e John'. T h i s is seen even m o r e clearly in the Marys of England, w h e r e the i n d i v i d u a l females intended are not, nor c o u l d they all be, specified. Johns a n d Marys here, to w h i c h m a y be a d d e d such e x a m p l e s as my John, your John, a John, resemble suchn e w names could legally be chosen. S o m e of these names h a v e never b e e n used. 1 I n point of fact w e cannot save it at all, as w e shall see later.

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g e n e r a l n a m e s as horse a n d tree, b u t w h e r e a s these latter c o n n o t e attributes entirely distinct f r o m the sound o f the words, the assumed ' p a r t l y disembodied proper names' connote m e r e l y the possession o f a p r o p e r n a m e o f the w h o l l y disembodied t y p e . It m i g h t seem at first sight that p r o p e r n a m e s o f this third kind are derivatives at t w o removes from the e m b o d i e d p r o p e r n a m e s that are their originals, that in f a c t the d i s e m b o d i e d John w a s first distilled out o f a w h o l e collection o f Johns, a n d then p a r t l y re-embodied in w h a t to all a p p e a r a n c e is a general n a m e . S u c h a hypothesis holds pretty w e l l o f the Marys of England, but fails to d o so o f the two Johns, w h e r e Johns is evidently constructed, o n the spur o f the m o m e n t , f r o m the t w o i n d i v i d u a l persons concerned. T h e reason w h y w e must refuse to a d m i t the p a r t l y disembodied proper n a m e s as a n a u t o n o m o u s third v a r i e t y of proper n a m e is that they d o not fulfil the condition laid d o w n on p p . 6 - 7 a b o v e . T h e y are not facts o f L a n g u a g e , b u t facts o f S p e e c h , creatures o f the m o m e n t , f o r m e d to m e e t a p u r e l y t e m p o r a r y linguistic need, not p e r m a n e n t constituents o f our v o c a b u l a r y . T h e best w e c a n say o f t h e m is that they are proper n a m e s o f the one k i n d or the other used in a p a r t l y e m b o d i e d w a y like c o m m o n nouns. A s w e shall see later, it is b a r e l y disputable that some p r o p e r names possess that p o w e r o f c o m m o n a p p l i c a t i o n w h i c h w e associate w i t h c o m m o n nouns (general names), 1 b u t for the e x a m i n a t i o n o f these the m o m e n t is not yet ripe. T h i s seems a n o p p o r t u n e m o m e n t , h o w e v e r , for1 N o t e here once and for all that the terms ' c o m m o n noun' a n d 'general n a m e ' are synonymous. T h e former is the term preferred by g r a m m a r i a n s , the latter t h a t accepted by M i l l a n d other logicians. I shall use either the one or the other according as seems most appropriate to the context.

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m e n t i o n i n g certain e m p l o y m e n t s to w h i c h , for the s a m e reason as w i t h the Johns a n d Marys a l r e a d y discussed, the title o f c o m m o n n o u n must b e refused. (1) V e r y r e m a r k able is the ease a n d virtuosity w i t h w h i c h m o d e r n E u r o p e a n l a n g u a g e s c a n e m p l o y p r o p e r n a m e s to attribute to some other person or place, w h e t h e r a c t u a l or m e r e l y postulated, o n e or more salient qualities w h i c h it is desired not to specify. E x a m p l e s a r e : He is a veritable Paderewski. We can well dispense with any more Napoleons. A Shakespeare or Goethe needs no advertisement. Only a Raphael could have painted such a picture.1 The new Jerusalem. Brussels is a little Paris. Every country has its Babylon, only few an Athens or a Florence. T h e correct g r a m m a t i c a l description o f such e m p l o y m e n t s is : a n i n d i v i d u a l proper n a m e used as a c o m m o n n o u n . I h a v e elsewhere e n d e a v o u r e d to e x p l a i n h o w Speech, i.e. the ad hoc, historically u n i q u e , utilization o f L a n g u a g e , m a y b e n d to its i m m e d i a t e purpose a w o r d not constitutionally s h a p e d to the use for w h i c h it is e m p l o y e d . B y such ' i n c o n g r u e n t ' uses p e c u l i a r nuances are c o n v e y e d , a n d it is t h r o u g h such uses that semantic a n d g r a m m a t i c a l c h a n g e s are b r o u g h t a b o u t . S o m e o f the e m p l o y m e n t s here envisaged h a v e g r o w n so h a c k n e y e d that the reference to the original entity designated b y the proper n a m e b e c o m e s first obscured a n d then c o m p l e t e l y obliterated ; in the final stage w h a t w a s once a p r o p e r n a m e has b e c o m e a c o m m o n n o u n like a n y other. T h e intermediate stage m a y b e illustrated b y the Maecenases of New York; a spa ; a Lido; the final stage b y a guy (from the images o f Guy Fawkes carried a b o u t b y1 T h e writer intended to imply that a picture of such m a g n i f i c e n c e could h a v e been painted only by a m a n possessing the genius of R a p h a e l , a n d , since there w a s no other m a n with that degree of genius, that the picture could h a v e been painted only by R a p h a e l himself.

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children) a robin (diminutive o f Robert) ; an academy (from the A t h e n i a n g a r d e n w h e r e P l a t o t a u g h t ) . (2) A n o t h e r use o f p r o p e r n a m e s w h i c h must be r e g a r d e d as unconstitutional (if I m a y b e a l l o w e d so to express it) arises f r o m a m e n t a l d o u b l i n g or m u l t i p l i c a t i o n o f the original entity, e.g. The mirrors all around her showed a dozen separate Janes. Looking up from his place at the breakfast table, John Fortescue saw returning his gaze from above the fireplace a younger and much better-looking John Fortescue ; so too the L a t i n Joves, i.e. images o f J o v e . (3) Similar, b u t resulting f r o m the m e n t a l bisection o f the entity, is duae Galliae, i. e. Cisalpine a n d T r a n s a l p i n e G a u l . H e r e the p l u r a l is obtained b y h a l v i n g the entity a n d t h e n a p p l y i n g the n a m e o f the w h o l e to e a c h half. A curiously analogous process, b u t one l e a d i n g to the reverse result o f creating a singular form, will be illustrated later (pp. 2 4 - 2 5 ) b y such e x a m p l e s as , -. T h e s e latter words are, h o w ever, no mere occasional employments, n o mere p h e n o m e n a o f Speech, so t h a t consideration o f t h e m must b e deferred. (4) Y e t a n o t h e r secondary use o f p r o p e r n a m e s h a d better be dealt w i t h here, t h o u g h it gives rise to real c o m m o n nouns, in w h i c h the originating b e a r e r o f the n a m e is in some cases r e m e m b e r e d , in others forgotten or half-forgotten. H e r e the n a m e is applied to something o f a w h o l l y different species f r o m that o f the original possessor, this b e i n g the inventor or original user in the case o f persons, a n d the source o f the m o d e l in the case o f places. E x a m p l e s are : a Ford; a chesterfield; a mackintosh; a Panama (hat) ; an ulster. I t will simplify o u r task to h a v e eliminated all the a b o v e from our discussion. W h e r e a p r o p e r n a m e has1 I d o not quote dunce, since this apparently d i d not refer originally to Duns Scotus himself, b u t only to his followers ; the early f o r m is a Duns man.

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been a d m i t t e d l y perverted f r o m its proper function to serve some other semantic purpose, the latter lies outside our i m m e d i a t e problem. T h e categorization o f Marys, Johns, a Shakespeare, Joves, Galliae, is not affected b y the a b n o r m a l f u n c t i o n or b y the use o f a p l u r a l ending. O n the other h a n d , it becomes a m a t t e r o f opinion, or r a t h e r o f linguistic feeling, w h e t h e r the status o f proper n a m e should b e a l l o w e d to cases like a Ford, a Panama. T h e e m p l o y m e n t or n o n - e m p l o y m e n t o f a c a p i t a l letter indicates the line a c t u a l l y taken in this m a t t e r b y philologists a n d printers. It is inevitable that there should be hesitation a n d disagreement as to w h a t w o r d s are proper n a m e s a n d w h a t not. W e thus find ourselves m o v i n g towards a conception in h a r m o n y w i t h the G r e e k v i e w , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h a p r o p e r n a m e is m e r e l y a n a m e m o r e g e n u i n e l y so (KvpLov) t h a n others. F o r m y p a r t I should h a v e preferred to use a different m e t a p h o r a n d to say that p r o p e r names are n a m e s that are more p u r e l y so t h a n words o f a n y other kind, since in t h e m the process a n d purpose o f n a m i n g shine forth like u n a l l o y e d m e t a l , whilst in the m a j o r i t y o f words that process a n d purpose are obscured a n d c o n t a m i n a t e d b y the a d m i x t u r e o f m e a n i n g , or b y the imperfect success w i t h w h i c h the purpose o f n a m i n g is attended.

VI T o return to the point at w h i c h I digressed, the best w a y o f m a k i n g clear the relation o f the t w o proper n a m e s exemplified in m y o w n a n d m y n e i g h b o u r ' s J o h n is perhaps b y reference to the deliberate acts o f n a m i n g b y w h i c h they o b t a i n e d their n a m e s . T h o s e acts h a v e a m a r k e d resemblance to certain n a m e - g i v i n g s w h i c h d o

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not give rise to proper names. Similarly deliberate acts h a v e been required to give their names to such a n e w d r u g as insulin a n d to the m e c h a n i c a l c o n t r i v a n c e called a typewriter, a n d no one will dispute that these acts h a v e a d d e d new words to the English l a n g u a g e . It seems to follow that every christening adds a n e w w o r d , if not to the English l a n g u a g e , at all events to the circle or linguistic c o m m u n i t y in w h i c h the n a m e is destined to pass current. E a c h o f these words has a sense, an e x c h a n g e v a l u e , as different f r o m its fellows, I will not say as the senses o f insulin a n d typewriter, b u t at least as the senses o f insulin a n d genasprin, or as those o f typewriter a n d countingmachine. M y J o h n is tall, dark, a n d differs m a r k e d l y in character a n d ability, not to speak o f age, f r o m m y neighb o u r ' s small a n d fair-haired J o h n . T h e t w o names John h a v e , accordingly, a different sense, b u t the same sound. Is it not imperative then to say that the t w o names are h o m o n y m s ? A h o m o n y m is a w o r d that has the same sound as another, b u t a different sense. 1 It c a n h a r d l y be denied that the n a m e s o f the t w o J o h n s fulfil these conditions. Since the most f u n d a m e n t a l o f all the principles governing the mechanism o f L a n g u a g e m a y b e expressed in the m o t t o 'distinctive sounds for distinctive meanings', it1 ( U n d e r this definition, w h i c h is that of the Concise Oxford Dictionary ( 1 9 1 8 ) , ' h o m o n y m s ' include, not only words of different m e a n i n g spelt and pronounced alike (e.g. file, sound), b u t also words pronounced alike, but spelt differently (e.g. son and sun, hair a n d hare). It is doubtless useful to have so comprehensive a term, b u t w o u l d it not be profitable to reserve the term ' h o m o p h o n e ' for pairs of the latter kind? I n that case ' h o m o g r a p h ' might be e m p l o y e d for words spelt alike, but differing in both sound and meaning, like entrance, p r o n o u n c e d entrahns and entrons ; progress, pronounced progrs and progrs; produce, pronounced prodjus and prds. It is distressing h o w often B . B . C , announcers confound words like the last two examples.)

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must b e a d m i t t e d that a h o m o n y m o u s proper n a m e like John is h a r d l y as good a s p e c i m e n o f its class as Vercingetorixin t h e o r y at least, a n d to some extent also in p r a c tice, as those w h o h a v e suffered f r o m the exasperating m o d e r n h a b i t o f using C h r i s t i a n n a m e s in a n d o u t o f season well k n o w . H o w e v e r , for reasons w h i c h need not here b e stated, the h a r m d o n e to comprehension b y h o m o n y m s is less than sometimes supposed, a n d since bearers or givers o f such n a m e s as John m a y i n d i g n a n t l y resent the suggestion that they are not as good as a n y others, I will pass on to m y final c o m m e n t u p o n t h e m . I f w e regard John, the n a m e o f a g i v e n J o h n , as a w o r d different from, a n d merely h o m o n y m o u s with, the n a m e John b e l o n g i n g to some other J o h n , w e are clearly thereby d e b a r r e d f r o m using these n a m e s as evidence that some p r o p e r n a m e s c a n be c o m m o n l y used. T h i s brings us to the question : d o a n y proper n a m e s exist w h i c h simultaneously are c o m m o n n o u n s ? A little farther on I shall a d d u c e such w o r d s as a n d as fairly good testimony to that contention, or to describe m y thesis more a c c u r a t e l y , I shall a r g u e that these w o r d s c a n quite n o r m a l l y a n d in c o n g r u e n c e w i t h their constitutional nature be a p p l i e d to various individuals, w i t h o u t thereby losing their status o f p r o p e r n a m e s . A t this point, however, I must confine myself to p r o p e r names w h i c h started b y b e i n g designations o f single individuals, a n d in following o u t that p r o g r a m m e , the next items for consideration must b e surnames a n d L a t i n gentile names. It m a y , I think, safely be assumed that the p r i m a r y purpose o f these w a s the identification o f some individual, a purpose w h i c h in the right e n v i r o n m e n t , e.g. in a school w h e r e there are no t w o boys w i t h the s a m e surname, is entirely successful. T h e absence of the p l u r a l

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e n d i n g in the F r e n c h les Petitjean, les Hamel seems to hint at a n awareness that the n a m e is p r o p e r l y the distinctive b a d g e , not o f the f a m i l y as a w h o l e , b u t o f e a c h o f its c o m p o n e n t members. B u t there is a g o o d reason to deter us f r o m r e g a r d i n g a n a m e like Boileau, w h e n serving as a designation o f t w o m e m b e r s o f the Boileau family, or Claudius, w h e n f o u n d a p p l i e d to t w o different R o m a n s o f the gens Claudia, as a h o m o n y m in e a c h respective case. T h a t reason is that there h a v e been n o deliberate acts o f n a m i n g to justify such a n interpretation. T h e n a m e s are not p u r e l y arbitrary, b u t pass o n f r o m father to son a u t o m a t i c a l l y a n d compulsorily. O u g h t w e then to call Boileau a n d Claudius c o m m o n nouns, a n d to p u t t h e m on a level w i t h horse a n d tree ? C l e a r l y not, for the i n d i v i d u a l entities called horse are b o u n d together b y p a l p a b l e resemblances w h i c h m i g h t be s u m m e d u p in a n abstract t e r m horsiness or horsehood, w h i l e a b o u t different Boileaus a n d C l a u d i i there is no corresponding resemblance that c o u l d be s u m m e d u p as Boileauness or C l a u d i u s h o o d . E v e n c o m m u n i t y o f b l o o d is not implied, since one m i g h t b e c o m e a Boileau b y m a r r i a g e a n d a C l a u d i u s b y a d o p tion. O n e is therefore t h r o w n b a c k on the c o m m o n possession o f a p a r t i c u l a r n a m e or significative word-sound as the sole resemblance, so far as L a n g u a g e is concerned, b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l bearers o f surnames or m e m b e r s o f the R o m a n gentes, a n d , as w e shall see w i t h ever increasing clearness, it is d e p e n d e n c e u p o n the sound alone for their significative force w h i c h really m a r k s the distinction b e t w e e n proper n a m e s a n d c o m m o n nouns. O n the other h a n d , one c a n n o t reject the a r g u m e n t that surn a m e s a n d gentile n a m e s are used c o m m o n l y () o n the g r o u n d that their plurals, like Johns a n d Marys, are m e r e facts o f S p e e c h , not o f L a n g u a g e . S o m e at least o f

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these plurals, e.g. the Plantagenets, the Romanoffs, are m o r e familiar, m o r e stabilized as units o f the English l a n g u a g e , than the corresponding singulars. I f a special g r a m m a t i cal term must be f o u n d for surnames, L a t i n gentile names, a n d examples like Mrjhos, , p r o b a b l y the most a p p r o p r i a t e term w o u l d b e ' c o m m o n p r o p e r names'.

VII A m o n g the postulates w i t h w h i c h w e started w a s o n e to the effect that a n a m e is a kind o f w o r d , only looked u p o n in the reverse direction, i.e. starting w i t h the thing designated a n d thence proceeding to the linguistic instrument serving for its designation. T h i s postulate involves, o f course, the v i e w that a p r o p e r n a m e is likewise a w o r d o f a p a r t i c u l a r kind. C o n s e q u e n t l y if w e find, as w e n o w shall, that certain proper n a m e s are composed, not o f one, b u t o f several words, that will be a v a l i d g r o u n d for considering t h e m rather less legitimate specimens o f the category t h a n one-word proper names. T h i s d i s p a r a g i n g verdict c a n n o t , however, b e e x t e n d e d to examples w h i c h are really no less c o m p o u n d w o r d s than Dartmouth or Oxford, t h o u g h written separately w i t h o u t even so hesitating a link as a h y p h e n . W e m a y u n d o u b t e d l y r a n k Mont Blanc a n d Buenos Aires as a d m i r a b l e e x a m p l e s o f a p r o p e r n a m e , or at all events it is not their writing as t w o w o r d s w h i c h c o u l d prevent us f r o m g r a d i n g t h e m a m o n g the purest o f their kind. 1 M a n y more c o m p l e x examples o f the kind o c c u r , b u t with v a r y i n g degrees o f inseparability in1 O n the other h a n d , the fact that these n a m e s h a v e some significance does detract a little, but only a little, f r o m their purity. T h e purest of proper names are wholly arbitrary and totally without significance.

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the c o m p o n e n t elements. T h e s e elements m a y comprise one or more simple p r o p e r names, e.g. Piero dei Medici, Stow-on-the-Wold, or m a y dispense w i t h t h e m altogether, e.g. Les Pays Bas, the Black Prince. N o t all the c o m p o n e n t s are o f e q u a l significative v a l u e ; in the p l a c e - n a m e Sutton Scotney, for e x a m p l e , residents in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d m a y drop the purely a u x i l i a r y Scotney, b u t Sutton is indispensable. C o m p o u n d p r o p e r n a m e s often contain a n adjective or a c o m m o n n o u n , e.g. Lord Melbourne, le Duc d Aumale, Market Harborough, New Jersey, Long Island. S o m e names o f persons c a n n o t be r e g a r d e d as c o m p o u n d s at all, b u t m a y be t e r m e d 'composite p r o p e r names'. T h e s e are combinations o f Christian a n d s u r n a m e like Roger Bacon, or complete L a t i n names like Marcus Tullius Cicero. T h e m o d e o f f u n c t i o n i n g here arises, as often in samples o f S p e e c h that h a v e not the v a l u e o f proper names, e.g. a very poor widow, f r o m the presentation o f successive word-clues, w h i c h c u m u l a t i v e l y b r i n g to light the entity m e a n t b y the speaker. T h e reason for composite p r o p e r names obviously lies in the h o m o n y m i t y o f the components ; there w e r e other Rogers a n d Bacons besides Roger Bacon, a n d other Tullii besides the f a m o u s orator. A s in the c o m p o u n d Sutton Scotney, so too in the composite Edgar Allan Poe, one o f the elements is p u r e l y auxiliary ; Edgar and Poe h a v e doubtless served, each in its o w n milieu, to identify the bearer, b u t Allan c o u l d never h a v e d o n e so. I n certain composite proper names, as well as in c o m p o u n d ones (the t w o classes merge into one another, showing h o w v a g u e the b o u n d a r i e s of linguistic categorization m a y often be), some honorific elements b e l o n g to the proper n a m e , a n d some not ; for instance, Sir in Sir Walter Raleigh is a m o r e or less integral p a r t o f the n a m e , b u t Esq. in John Henderson, Esq. is not.

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T h e a b o v e desultory remarks o n c o m p o u n d or c o m p o site p r o p e r n a m e s seemed a p p r o p r i a t e in a w i d e survey o f the theme, b u t no a t t e m p t c a n here be m a d e to classify the countless varieties. It is, h o w e v e r , necessary to d w e l l on the f u n c t i o n o f the definite article. A b s e n c e o f the article is in m a n y languages a g o o d criterion as to w h e t h e r a w o r d is a proper n a m e or not, so m u c h so that the use o f the article in the sun, the moon (so too in F r e n c h , G e r m a n , Italian, H e b r e w , Arabic,, a n d E g y p t i a n ) is w e l l - n i g h p r o o f that these words are not p r o p e r names, a fact w h i c h will be s h o w n later to h a v e g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e for o u r theory. A l m o s t e v e r y w h e r e , h o w e v e r , there is great inconsistency a n d diversity o f c u s t o m in the use or a v o i d a n c e o f the definite article. In L a t i n , o f course, this does not exist. I n G r e e k o & m e a n s 'the aforesaid A l e x a n d e r ' a n d in G e r m a n die Anna has something like the force o f 'our A n n ' in English. O n the other h a n d , in some l a n g u a g e s the definite article is regularly f o u n d w i t h names o f rivers a n d mountains, e.g. la Seine, the Thames (note in Swedish Themsen), der Rhein, il Po, 6 (the Nile, contrast for E g y p t ) , the Alps, les Alpes, die Alpen, the Pamirs, the Himalayas. C o m b i n a t i o n s such as the Fraser River a n d variants like the Himalaya Mountains show, in c o m p a n y w i t h the g e n d e r o f the article, w h a t is left implicit in the a b o v e n a m e s , b u t it w o u l d b e w r o n g to assume earlier forms in w h i c h the words for river or m o u n t a i n s w e r e expressed. T h e same holds good for the n a m e s o f groups o f islands like the Hebrides, the Orkneys, the Seychelles, a class in w h i c h a g a i n are f o u n d e x a m p l e s w i t h the implicit w o r d expressed, e.g. the Leeward Islands, or w i t h it as a variant, e.g. the Orkney Islands. I n several E u r o p e a n l a n g u a g e s names o f countries affect the article, e.g. la Russie, die Schweiz, VInghilterra, les Indes, t h o u g h

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custom is vacillating, contrast die Schweiz w i t h Belgien, la France with en France. VIII M y last p a r a g r a p h has included a n u m b e r o f p l u r a l p r o p e r names, a n d this brings us face to face w i t h the question h o w far p r o p e r n a m e s m a y b e considered as individual names. It is incontestable that i n d i v i d u a l persons a n d places f o r m the p r i n c i p a l source o f supply, b u t negative instances are so frequent that application to individuals c a n clearly not be m a d e a conditio sine qua non in defining proper names. Dionysius, indeed, t h o u g h citing no examples of a non-individual kind, does not commit himself to the statement that all p r o p e r names a p p l y to individuals. A l l he says is that p r o p e r n a m e s are used 'individually' ( ) n o t e the a d v e r b o r that they signify 'individual b e i n g ' ( IS lav ), a n d this might m e a n o n l y that the w o r d s called p r o p e r names a p p l y globally a n d exclusively to a n y t h i n g to w h i c h they do a p p l y . M i l l likewise quotes no non-individual examples, b u t he goes further than Dionysius inasmuch as his statements show h i m to h a v e regarded proper names as a sub-class o f singular or individual names, a c a t e g o r y w h i c h he defines as f o l l o w s : ' A n i n d i v i d u a l or singular n a m e is a n a m e w h i c h is only c a p a b l e o f b e i n g truly affirmed, in the same sense, o f one thing.' 1 L o g i c i a n s since M i l l h a v e often instanced proper names o f w h i c h the objects are not individuals in a n y n a t u r a l sense o f the term, but a p p a r e n t l y w i t h o u t a t t a c h i n g a n y great importance to the fact. A l o n e the school o f m o d e r n logicians o f w h o m Bertrand Russell a n d Miss S t e b b i n g h a v e been1

M i l l , op. cit., Bk. I, ch. 2, 3.

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the c h i e f exponents definitely t a k e as their point o f d e p a r ture the notion that a p r o p e r n a m e , to b e really such, must b e the n a m e o f a n i n d i v i d u a l thing. 1 N o t h i n g , it is true, prevents a n y p l u r a l i t y b e i n g t h o u g h t o f as a unity, if w e wish to think o f it in t h a t w a y , a n d such appears to b e the w a y in w h i c h m a n y o f the f o l l o w i n g e x a m p l e s are t h o u g h t of. T h e clearest cases are collectives, i.e. nouns o f singular g r a m m a t i c a l n u m b e r referring g l o b a l l y to a collection o f similar individuals, e.g. the Mafia, the Camorra, the Duma, the Dodecanese, the Heptarchy, others to w h i c h some m i g h t refuse either the title o f p r o p e r n a m e or that o f collective are Parliament, Congress, the Atlas Insurance Company. A t least one F r e n c h philologist 2 has claimed France as a collective, b u t w h e t h e r o n a c c o u n t o f its thirty-three p r o v i n c e s (in the e i g h t e e n t h century) or its eighty-six d e p a r t m e n t s or its f o r t y - t w o million inhabitants I d o not k n o w . N o t all g r a m m a r i a n s w o u l d a c c e p t France as a collective, b u t the o p i n i o n thus v o i c e d at least hints at the troubles in w h i c h w e m a y inv o l v e ourselves if w e m a i n t a i n t h a t p r o p e r n a m e s c a n a p p l y o n l y to individuals. It is surely w o r t h y o f reflection that E u r o p e comprises a n u m b e r o f countries o f w h i c h G e r m a n y is one, that Prussia is a p r o v i n c e o f G e r m a n y , t h a t Berlin is in Prussia, a n d t h a t t h a t same c a p i t a l houses several million persons. L e a v i n g collectives, w e n o w c o m e to plurals o f w h i c h no singular is recorded, e.g. the L a t i n Quirites, Luceres, Ramnes ; m o u n t a i n - r a n g e s like the Andes ; g r o u p s o f islands like the Azores ; groups o f stars like the Pleiades. I pass over such a n a m e as Athenae, since this,1 T h a t t h i n g being unlike a n y t h i n g t h a t w e call an individual t h i n g , proper n a m e s being restricted b y these authors to 'particulars'. See b e l o w , p. 58. 2 M a r o u z e a u , Lexique de la terminologie linguistique, Paris, 1933, p . 128.

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t h o u g h in developed L a t i n o f p l u r a l f o r m , refers to a single city, whereas in the other n a m e s I h a v e q u o t e d the plurality of the entities n a m e d is b e y o n d dispute. T h e thesis that p r o p e r n a m e s referring to pluralities refer to them g l o b a l l y a n d for that reason m a y be considered individual names becomes u n t e n a b l e w h e n proper n a m e s are o f plural f o r m a n d h a v e nevertheless singulars o f their o w n . I n quite early times tribal n a m e s like Veneti, Helvetii a p p e a r to h a v e h a d no corresponding singulars, b u t that they were not, or not always, t h o u g h t o f g l o b a l l y is s h o w n b y the possibility o f sentences like Venetorum alii fugerunt, alii occisi sunt. W e m a y dismiss f r o m the discussion n a m e s like , , the singulars o f w h i c h designate the e p o n y m o u s hero. E x c e p t for the reason a b o v e m e n t i o n e d Veneti m i g h t seem pretty well on a p a r w i t h the Seychelles, the Pyrenees ; one c a n n o t speak o f Seychelle or a Pyrenee. Difficulties arise, however, over Mfoi a n d , w h i c h at first encounter us in the guise ofpluralia tantum, but later evolve the singulars a n d , no m o m e n t a r y creations, b u t p e r m a n e n t forms that h a v e well earned their status as words o f the G r e e k l a n g u a g e . H e r e w e find a p h e n o m e n o n rather similar, e x c e p t that it is no m o m e n t a r y creation, to duae Galliae, b u t w h e r e a s there a singulare tantum has developed a p l u r a l b y c u t t i n g the designated entity, like a w o r m , into t w o parts a n d m a k i n g these into t w o similarly n a m e d entities, here a plurale tantum has been resolved into its c o m p o n e n t individ u a l members, each o f w h o m is thus represented as a b e a r e r o f the p r o p e r n a m e in question. It must b e clearly understood that a n d are o n l y in a restricted sense n a m e s o f i n d i v i d u a l M e d e s a n d Persians, since these will h a v e possessed particular n a m e s o f their o w n . Nevertheless, since ol Mffioi m e a n s 'the M e d e s ' ,

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MfjSos will m e a n 'a M e d e ' , j u s t as it m i g h t c o n c e i v a b l y b e c o m e possible one d a y to speak o f a Seychelle or a Pyrenee. T h e p l u r a l o f MfjSos forbids us to regard the singular as signifying 'one belonging to the M e d e s ' , t h o u g h w e m u s t regard Romanus as m e a n i n g 'one b e l o n g i n g to R o m e ' , un Franais as 'one belonging to F r a n c e ' , a n d Englishman as 'a m a n b e l o n g i n g to E n g l a n d or the English'. T h e s e last, like the adjectives identical or c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e m (cf. also gens Claudia), are no m o r e t h a n derivatives o f p r o p e r names, since they d o not identify the m a n to w h o m they refer, b u t m e r e l y describe h i m as b e l o n g i n g to the c o u n t r y identified b y the proper n a m e . MfjSos, I m a i n t a i n , is m o r e o f a p r o p e r n a m e than Romanus a n d belongs, like surn a m e s a n d gentile names, to the class o f ' c o m m o n p r o p e r names', t h o u g h surnames, for the reason that they w e r e designations o f individuals at the start, are even m o r e indisputably e x a m p l e s o f the c a t e g o r y 'proper n a m e ' .

IX I t appears to b e equally true that not all singular n a m e s are proper names. T h i s w a s also M i l l ' s opinion, for it will be r e m e m b e r e d (see p p . 2 2 - 2 3 ) that held p r o p e r n a m e s to b e merely a sub-class o f singular names. His remarks on the other sub-class are, h o w e v e r , unsatisfactory, a n d it is necessary to subject t h e m to careful analysis. Since in his a c c o u n t of p r o p e r n a m e s he lays all the stress on their b e i n g non-connotative, it w a s n a t u r a l for h i m to emphasize the connotative n a t u r e o f such singular n a m e s as are not p r o p e r names. B u t one c a n h a r d l y refrain f r o m astonishment to find h i m q u o t i n g as authentic e x a m p l e s the f o l l o w i n g : the only son of John Stiles, the first emperor of Rome ; the author of the Iliad ; the murderer of Henri Quatre. H e

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does not note, nor w i l l I d w e l l on, the fact that all these examples contain p r o p e r as well as g e n e r a l names. T h e sole objection I shall m a k e is that M i l l here introduces a liew kind o f linguistic p h e n o m e n o n not strictly c o m p a r a b l e to the n a m e s that h a v e been the m a i n subject o f his c h a p t e r . T h i s has been chiefly d e v o t e d to discussing the constitutional nature o f isolated words, t h o u g h it must b e confessed he sometimes mixes u p w i t h t h e m ad hoc c o m binations like this table. I f it be retorted that in m y m a n y w o r d proper names I h a v e been guilty o f the same error o f m e t h o d , I shall reply that there is a w o r l d o f difference b e t w e e n designations o f a c k n o w l e d g e d p e r m a n e n c e , w h i c h are genuine word-equivalents, a n d collocations o f w o r d s capriciously p u t together on the spur o f the m o m e n t for a set c o m m u n i c a t i v e purpose. I n m y o w n terminology M i l l ' s examples are facts o f Speech, not o f L a n g u a g e , a n d it w a s stipulated at the beginning o f this essay (pp. 1 2 - 1 3 ) that our investigation should extend o n l y to the latter. I t is true that in some o f m y m a n y - w o r d n a m e s (e.g. Edgar Allan Poe) the coherence o f the parts is m u c h slighter t h a n in others (e.g. Mont Blanc), b t if required, I a m quite r e a d y to jettison the former. A t all events, M i l l ' s e x a m p l e s are o f entirely different quality, a n d must, a c c o r d i n g l y , be dismissed as irrelevant. I shall return to such 'descriptions' in another context. M i l l h a d previously suggested sun a n d God as e x a m p l e s o f connotative singular names, a n d the former is really w o r t h y o f the most serious consideration, t h o u g h it m a y be d o u b t e d w h e t h e r c o n n o t a t i v e is e x a c t l y the right w o r d to describe its m e a n i n g f u l q u a l i t y . T h a t sun is not a proper n a m e will b e a d m i t t e d b y all w h o h a v e a feeling for l a n g u a g e , w h i c h is n o t so b a d a criterion as some w o u l d h a v e us suppose. O n e has only to p u t the w o r d s sun a n d

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moon alongside Sam a n d Munro to feel their difference o f status, a n d indeed our task m a y b e defined as to discover a sound intellectual basis for w h a t w e a l r e a d y k n o w instinctively. A l s o the e m p l o y m e n t o f the definite article w i t h the w o r d for 'sun' in a n u m b e r o f different l a n guages, is, as I h a v e already p o i n t e d out (p. 2 1 ) , v a l u a b l e testimony to that conclusion. N o r does M i l l c l a i m sun as a p r o p e r n a m e ; his rejection o f it is o n the g r o u n d that it is not really a singular n a m e . H i s a r g u m e n t runs as follows :* 'These, however, (i.e. sun and God) are scarcely examples of what we are now attempting to illustrate, being, in strictness of language, general, not individual names : for, however they may be in fact predicable only of one object, there is nothing in the meaning of the words themselves which implies this ; and accordingly, when we are imagining and not affirming, we m a y speak of many suns; and the majority of mankind have believed, and still believe, that there are many gods.' It is a curious, a n d obviously unjustifiable d e m a n d , perhaps inspired b y the words only a n d first in t w o o f the c o m binations o f w o r d s w h i c h w e r e q u o t e d a b o v e as M i l l ' s authentic e x a m p l e s o f c o n n o t a t i v e singular names, t h a t the m e a n i n g o f these should h a v e to contain some suggestion o f their singularity. It is a d e m a n d discountenanced b y the p r o p e r names w h i c h he admits to b e singular names, since proper n a m e s a c c o r d i n g to his o w n v i e w h a v e no m e a n i n g , a n d their m e a n i n g , therefore, c a n contain no such suggestion. H i s a r g u m e n t that sun is not really p r e d i c a b l e only o f o n e o b j e c t , because at w i l l w e c a n i m a g i n e several suns, w o u l d e q u a l l y exclude p r o p e r names f r o m b e i n g singular n a m e s , since, as w e h a v e seen (pp. 1315), there is no difficulty at all in i m a g i n i n g t w o Shakespeares or t w o Goethes. A better a r g u m e n t w o u l d1

Mill, op. cit., Bk. I, c h . 2, 5.

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h a v e been that astronomers h a v e n o w p r o v e d that the stars are really suns, these like our sun p e r h a p s the centres o f solar systems o f their o w n . But this a r g u m e n t too is not a g o o d one, since in speaking o f the stars as suns, w e d o not use sun in its n a t u r a l a n d n o r m a l sense o f the large a n d brilliant celestial b o d y w h i c h , e x c e p t to the m i n d o f Science, rises in the east a n d sets in the west. M i l l himself has defined a n i n d i v i d u a l or singular n a m e as o n e ' w h i c h is o n l y c a p a b l e o f b e i n g truly affirmed, in the same sense, [the italics are mine] o f o n e thing'. 1 If, none the less, sun is refused the r a n k o f a singular n a m e on a c c o u n t o f the stellar suns that astronomers h a v e so inconveniently discovered, I shall fall b a c k on the L a t i n sol,2 the G r e e k , a n d the H e b r e w shemesh. T h e r e is not a scrap o f evidence to suggest that either o f the t w o latter w a s ever used in the plural, or t h o u g h t o f otherwise than as a singular n a m e . N o r w e r e a n y o f these n o r m a l l y taken as p r o p e r names, t h o u g h Sol a n d " b e c a m e so on the occasions w h e n they w e r e personified, i.e. e n d o w e d w i t h a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c attributes. S i n g u l a r n a m e s that are not proper n a m e s are far f r o m numerous. A s other e x a m p l e s I submit for consideration moon, paradise, hell, ecliptic, zenith, nadir, sky, zodiac, demiurge, Zero, chaos, pole-star ; b u t zodiac will possibly b e c l a i m e d as a collective, a n d chaos a n d pole-star are sometimes regarded as p r o p e r names. It is not quite clear, m o r e o v e r , w h y n a m e s o f diseases like cholera a n d tuberculosis should b e e x c l u d e d , or a g a i n n a m e s o f elements like strontium or o f materials like wood.* S o m e h a v e d e c l a r e d strontium, helium,See above, p. 22. Soles in the sense of 'days' is another e x a m p l e of the type of duae Galliae, b u t with a superadded temporal nuance. 3 M i l l (op. cit., Bk. i, c h . 2, 5) points out that abstracts are non-connotative, but declares that some at least are general ( 4), e.g. colour.1 2

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a n d so forth to be proper names, b u t here w h a t I should like to call the L a w o f Serial U n i f o r m i t y stands in the w a y on a c c o u n t o f such names o f elements as gold a n d silver. T h e d o u b t f u l categorization o f several o f the a b o v e e x a m p l e s y e t once a g a i n shows t h a t w e must not r e g a r d the c a t e g o r y o f proper n a m e s as a rigidly d e m a r c a t e d d o m a i n , b u t rather as a sort o f e m i n e n c e attained b y a large n u m b e r o f words, t h o u g h their foothold is often s o m e w h a t insecure a n d m a y b e m a d e more so b y a n incautious step in one direction or another. X S u m m i n g u p the results a l r e a d y o b t a i n e d w e see that the identification o f proper n a m e s () w i t h those t h a t are i n d i v i d u a l l y (Ihiws) used, a n d the contrast o f these w i t h those used c o m m o n l y (?) does not p r o v i d e a w a t e r tight definition, since there exist i n d i v i d u a l l y a p p l i e d n a m e s (e.g. ) w h i c h are not p r o p e r names, a n d c o m m o n l y a p p l i e d n a m e s (surnames a n d MfjSos, & c . ) w h i c h are. A t best Dionysius' a c c o u n t describes an a p p r o x i m a t e l y true state o f affairs. T h u s m u c h m a y be a l l o w e d in its f a v o u r , since most i n d i v i d u a l l y used single-word n a m e s are in fact proper n a m e s t h e y include a m a j o r i t y o f singular names a n d some collectives, see a b o v e w h i l e most c o m m o n nouns are not. 1 I t is n o w evident that theAbstracts like propinquity and homogeneity are presented to us by L a n g u a g e as singular names, b u t Speech might c o n c e i v a b l y use even these, like all singular nouns whatsoever, as general names, i.e. a writer might choose to write There exist many propinquities, a propinquity of place and a propinquity of kinship, for example. 1 In m y book on Speech and Language, p. 4 1 , I wrongly defined a proper n a m e as a w o r d referring to a single i n d i v i d u a l . In this mistake, h o w e v e r , I a m in g o o d c o m p a n y , both the Oxford English Dictionary a n d Prof. W y l d ' s Universal English Dictionary sharing in the error.

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secret o f the proper n a m e is not to b e discovered a l o n g the lines followed b y Dionysius, a n d w e consequently fall b a c k u p o n the criterion o f meaninglessness a d v o c a t e d b y M i l l . B u t this criterion a g a i n will not suffice in its present f o r m . It is easy to show that proper n a m e s h a v e m e a n i n g in various c o m m o n non-technical senses o f the term, a n d that their m e a n i n g m a y be a c q u i r e d in different ways. A t this point w e h a d better p a r t c o m p a n y w i t h M i l l ' s m u c h disputed term 'connotation', w h i c h has c o m e in for p e r h a p s even more t h a n its fair share o f criticism. I f ' m e a n i n g ' be t a k e n to signify simply ' e x c h a n g e v a l u e ' , then obviously all proper n a m e s h a v e m e a n i n g , since they are w o r d s a n d every w o r d is a sound-sign standing for something, this something b e i n g its e x c h a n g e v a l u e . It must be carefully observed that the m e a n i n g or e x c h a n g e - v a l u e o f a w o r d can never, in strict p a r l a n c e , be a material thing, b u t is simply the m e n t a l c o u n t e r p a r t o f that thing, if indeed the w o r d refers to a n y t h i n g material at all. T h e m e a n i n g m a y comprise a visual or other i m a g e a n d must consist o f k n o w l e d g e o f w h a t e v e r the w o r d means. B u t in the case o f a p r o p e r n a m e , say the n a m e o f a person or p l a c e , w e m a y k n o w next to n o t h i n g a b o u t that person or place. I n such circumstances are w e entitled to say that the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d is nil ? I d o not think so, a n d comparison w i t h other w o r d s that are not p r o p e r n a m e s shows w e are not entitled to take that v i e w . W h e n d e a l i n g w i t h foreign l a n g u a g e s w e are often at a loss for the m e a n i n g o f a w o r d , a n d the like sometimes happens even w h e n concerned w i t h English. F i n d i n g ourselves in this embarrassment, w e d o not assert that t h e w o r d has no m e a n i n g , but w e h a v e recourse to the dictionary. I f w e d o not k n o w the m e a n i n g , s o m e b o d y does, a n d w e n a t u r a l l y seek help from those best informed

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on the subject. T h e r e is no reason w h y proper n a m e s should be r e g a r d e d in a different light. For a p r o p e r n a m e to exist, it is necessary that there should be someone interested in, a n d h a v i n g at least some k n o w l e d g e of, that w h i c h it names, a n d this k n o w l e d g e , w h e t h e r g r e a t or small, must evidently be a c c e p t e d as the m e a n i n g . A n d since m a n y p r o p e r names n a m e things o f extreme c o m plexity like persons and places, it is little w o n d e r that Jespersen argues, 1 in conscious contradiction o f M i l l , t h a t such names, so far from being meaningless, are absolutely the most m e a n i n g f u l o f all. B u t M i l l has anticipated this a r g u m e n t , a n d meets it as follows : 2 'When we predicate of anything its proper name ; when w e say, pointing to a man, this is Brown or Smith, or pointing to a city, that it is York, we do not, merely by so doing, convey to the reader 3 any information about them except that those are their names. By enabling him to identify the individuals, we may connect them with information previously possessed by him ; by saying, This is York, w e m a y tell him that it contains the Minster. But this is in virtue of what he has previously heard concerning York ; not by anything implied in the name.' M i l l goes on to contrast the p r o p e r n a m e s a l r e a d y discussed w i t h the ' m a n y - w o r d e d c o n n o t a t i v e n a m e ' built of marble in the sentence The town is built of marble. O f the latter c o m b i n a t i o n o f words he says, in conclusion : ' T h e y are not mere marks, b u t more, t h a t is to say, significant m a r k s ; a n d the connotation is w h a t constitutes their significance.'' O . Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar, L o n d o n , 1924, p p . 6 4 - 7 1 . M i l l , op. cit., Bk. I, ch. 2, 5. 3 ' R e a d e r ' in Mill's text is, of course, a slip ; he meant 'listener'.2

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A t first sight the conclusions o f the last t w o p a r a g r a p h s a p p e a r both true, b u t contradictory. A r e these c o n c l u sions really i r r e c o n c i l a b l e ? C a n a p r o p e r n a m e be b o t h m e a n i n g f u l a n d meaningless? I believe it possible, a n d that the seeming contradiction lies in the v a r y i n g degree o f i m m e d i a c y (in b o t h the e t y m o l o g i c a l a n d the t e m p o r a l senses o f the term) possessed, o n the one h a n d b y proper names, a n d on the other h a n d b y w o r d s that are not. O r d i n a r y words, a m o n g w h i c h general n a m e s p l a y a prom i n e n t part, directly c o n v e y information ; p r o p e r n a m e s merely provide the key to information. T o hark b a c k to M i l l ' s o w n e x a m p l e , York certainly does not m e a n cathedral-town, b u t it provides any k n o w l e d g e a b l e listener w i t h a d a t u m w h i c h , after only the slightest interval for reflection, will b r i n g to his consciousness the fact that the t o w n he is b e h o l d i n g possesses a c a t h e d r a l ; the same n a m e will doubtless recall to his m e m o r y other information as well. U l t i m a t e l y York will p r o v e m u c h more inf o r m a t i v e t h a n cathedral-town, b u t in itself it does no more t h a n establish the identity o f the t o w n spoken a b o u t . I n order to describe the q u a l i t y in the possession o f w h i c h cathedral-town has the a d v a n t a g e over York, M i l l has wisely chosen the term ' c o n n o t a t i o n ' , h o w e v e r disputable his further doctrines in c o n n e x i o n w i t h that t e r m m a y be. Doubtless one m o t i v e for that choice w a s to g u a r d himself against the o b j e c t i o n that the i d e n t i f y i n g p o w e r o f a p r o p e r n a m e is, o f itself, ' m e a n i n g ' .

XI W e must n o w inquire into the principle u n d e r l y i n g the practice of n a m i n g , a n d following u p o u r answer to this question ask in w h a t sense a p r o p e r n a m e is more

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g e n u i n e l y a n a m e than other n a m e s . For this p u r p o s e it will be necessary to cast a r a p i d g l a n c e at the n a t u r e o f L a n g u a g e a n d at its m o d e o f f u n c t i o n i n g . L a n g u a g e owes its existence to the fact that e x c e p t in a v e r y g e n e r a l a n d indefinite w a y the minds o f h u m a n beings are closed to one another. S y m p a t h y there often is, a n d o c c a s i o n a l thought-transference o f a mysterious kind need n o t b e denied, b u t b r o a d l y speaking, if a m a n wishes to b r i n g something he has perceived or t h o u g h t o f to the notice o f a c o m p a n i o n he c a n effect this o n l y b y recourse to signific a n t signs accessible to the senses o f both a n d b e a r i n g for both the same m e a n i n g or reference to thought. S u c h a sign m a y in theory be a n y t h i n g perceptible to the senses a n d easily p r o d u c e d b y the m a k e r o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n , b u t w h a t w e call L a n g a g e provides far a n d a w a y the most effective code, its instruments b e i n g distinctive sound-signs, so intimately b o u n d u p e a c h w i t h its o w n distinctive t h o u g h t or m e a n i n g t h a t the purposeful utterance i m m e d i a t e l y evokes in the listener the c o r r e s p o n d i n g thought. T h e m e c h a n i s m o f L a n g u a g e , i.e. the process called S p e e c h , is c o m p a r a b l e to t h a t o f a p i a n o . I f the performer strikes the w h i t e key l y i n g b e t w e e n t w o isolated b l a c k keys, the note D is o b t a i n e d , w h i l e the note E results j u s t as i n e v i t a b l y f r o m striking the next w h i t e key to the right. I n L a n g u a g e the fixed c o m b i n a t i o n o f sound-sign a n d corresponding t h o u g h t is c a l l e d a ' w o r d ' , a n d the relation b e t w e e n these t w o constituents o f a w o r d is e v e n m o r e a r b i t r a r y than that b e t w e e n the key o f the p i a n o a n d its resultant note. T h e r e s e m b l a n c e b e t w e e n a d o g a n d a w o l f is so great that, if L a n g u a g e h a d b e e n m o r e deliberately created, one m i g h t h a v e e x p e c t e d a corresp o n d i n g resemblance b e t w e e n the t w o names. S u c h correspondences are not alien to L a n g u a g e altogether, as

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the declensions a n d c o n j u g a t i o n s clearly show. But on the whole, linguistic signs are a r b i t r a r y , so that diverse l a n g u a g e s show v e r y diverse w o r d s for the same object, e.g. F r e n c h maison, L a t i n domus, G r e e k , A r a b i c bayt for w h a t w e call a house. T h e house w e speak o f w i t h a n y one o f these w o r d s need not b e present to our senses, a n d indeed w h a t the w o r d calls u p to our minds i m m e d i a t e l y , w h e t h e r or not it is referred an instant later to a n actual house, is the impression left b y the houses w e h a v e seen in the past, or w h a t w e h a v e learnt a b o u t t h e m in some other w a y . S i n c e one house differs from a n o t h e r , a n d as most objects designated b y c o m m o n nouns show similar differences, the impression left b y the w o r d m a y (unless represented b y a visual image, as in m a n y minds) be v a g u e a n d s h a d o w y , a n d all that the w o r d c a n then d o is to p u t the listener on the right track a n d p r e v e n t h i m thinking o f a c o w or a d o g w h e n desired to b e thinking a b o u t a house. N o w w h e t h e r the t h o u g h t or impression corresponding to a w o r d , i.e. w h a t w e m a y call the w o r d ' s ' m e a n i n g ' , b e something v a g u e or s o m e t h i n g precise, the f u n d a m e n t a l principle involved is, as I h a v e a l r e a d y mentioned, 'distinctive sounds for distinctive m e a n i n g s ' , a n d such sounds are called 'words'. 1 I n cases w h e r e the m e a n i n g is v a g u e , it is obviously less usual to think b a c k from the m e a n i n g to the sound, a n d a c c o r d i n g l y the term ' n a m e ' finds its greatest utility w h e r e the t h i n g n a m e d is precise,1 It is of importance to note that the immediate effect of a word-sound c a n only be to identify, and that its distinguishing p o w e r is only secondary and consequential. M i l l seems to h a v e been a w a r e of this, b u t does not state it explicitly. S p e a k i n g o f proper names, he m o r e often stresses their identifying function, but occasionally, as in his comparison with the act of M o r g i a n a (see below, p. 39), h e alludes to their distinguishing function, so that the opening sentence of the present essay can stand.

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a n d w h e r e the utterance o f the w o r d - s o u n d points t o w a r d s earlier memories o f the s a m e thing, not towards some impression w h i c h , o w i n g to its vagueness, w o u l d b e e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e to a n y n u m b e r o f r o u g h l y similar things. O t h e r w i s e expressed, a true n a m e o u g h t to call u p the t h o u g h t o f something d e t e r m i n a t e a n d definite, so m u c h so that w e n o r m a l l y forget that all a w o r d c a n d o is to c o n j u r e u p a thought. F o r g e t t i n g this, w e n a t u r a l l y a n d conveniently say that a true n a m e is the n a m e o f a definite thing. 1 I n the last p a r a g r a p h the expression 'true n a m e ' has been e m p l o y e d , since a true n a m e is not necessarily a proper n a m e , as must n o w be explained. I t is a w e l l k n o w n psychological l a w that the m i n d selects f r o m e v e r y experience that w h i c h is useful to it, a n d allows all else to fade o u t completely, or at least to b e relegated into the b a c k g r o u n d o f the subconscious. A g o o d e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n o f this l a w has j u s t been q u o t e d : e x c e p t u p o n reflection, or in scientific analysis, w e are unconscious that all a w o r d c a n o f itself d o is to refer us to a n associated t h o u g h t ; w e , h a v i n g received that thought, a u t o m a t i c a l l y refer it to t h e thing that seems relevant in t h e context or situation. H e n c e the t h i n g is often supposed to be the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d , t h o u g h , o n an a c c u r a t e analysis, that it c a n n e v e r be. B u t the psychological l a w h a s another e q u a l l y i m p o r tant consequence. So intent are w e o n the things referred to b y the words w e hear, t h a t unless some p e c u l i a r circumstance like a m i s p r o n u n c i a t i o n or a p a r t i c u l a r1 M i l l (op. cit., Bk. I, ch. 2, 1) w a s quite clear on this point, b u t sensibly prefers to speak in general of names as being the n a m e s of things, not of ideas of things. For this reason it c a n n o t be quoted against the opening statement of this essay that op. cit., Bk. I, ch. 2, 5, he says of proper names : ' W e p u t a mark, not indeed u p o n the object itself, but, so to speak, u p o n the idea of the object.'

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elegance o f diction distracts our attention, w e b a r e l y perceive the sound o f the w o r d , t h o u g h this sound remains all the while the instrument b y w h i c h c o m m u n i c a tion is actually effected. I n j u s t the same spirit, w h e n w e travel to L o n d o n b y train, w e m a y w e l l be thinking o f L o n d o n a n d w h a t w e shall d o w h e n w e get there, b u t it seldom crosses our thoughts that a c o m p l e x steam-driven m e c h a n i s m is w h a t is b r i n g i n g a b o u t the fulfilment o f our purpose. A t this point the e v i d e n c e o f the w o r d sun proves o f inestimable v a l u e . N o o n e c a n deny the definiteness o f the sun, or the fact that the w o r d sun directs o u r attention to that celestial b o d y , or to the t h o u g h t o f it, b y m e a n s o f o u r previous memories o f that selfsame b o d y , i.e. b y means o f the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d sun. N o one c a n d e n y that sun is the 'true n a m e ' o f the sun in the sense a b o v e attributed to the term. B u t not only logicians, b u t also the c o m m o n consent o f m a n k i n d , as attested b y the use o f the definite article the sun, agrees that 'sun' is not a proper name. 1 Surely the reason is that w h e n the w o r d sun is heard, w e usually a n d p r e d o m i n a n t l y are unconscious of the sound o f that w o r d ; the w o r d to us is all m e a n i n g . It is difficult to define e x a c t l y the j u m b l e o f visual, tactile, a n d c o n c e p t u a l impressions w h i c h the w o r d sun resuscitates in our minds, b u t that notions o f brightness, w a r m t h , vitalizing p o w e r , superior size to all other celestial bodies e x c e p t the m o o n , association w i t h d a y a n d so forth are a m o n g t h e m no one will dispute. Further, it is o f great importance that these notions1 (It is on this point that philologists and at least one philosopher definitely part c o m p a n y . Russell, Human Knowledge, p. 87, explicitly states the moonthis of course on the same footing as the sunto be a proper name.)

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should be c o m m o n to all m a n k i n d , so m u c h so that they spring into consciousness in a n u n m i s t a k a b l e , t h o u g h u n differentiated, w a y as soon as the w o r d is p r o n o u n c e d . So p r o m i n e n t is all this m e a n i n g that beside it the sound o f the w o r d is as n o u g h t ; the m i n d passes right t h r o u g h the sound a n d is arrested only b y the m e a n i n g . M i l l misses the point in his discussion o f the w o r d sun as a g e n e r a l n a m e . It is i n d e e d potentially a g e n e r a l n a m e , because if any other entity except our o w n sun h a d the same qualities the s a m e w o r d sun w o u l d h a v e to b e used to denote it w i t h brevity a n d inclusiveness. B u t it is p r e d o m i n a n c e o f the m e a n i n g over the sound that makes it a g e n e r a l n a m e , not the factual or i m a g i n a r y existence o f other objects possessing the same qualities. L e t us n o w , however, consider w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n if there existed in the heavens a second celestial b o d y almost identical in nature w i t h o u r sun, but w h i c h w e w e r e interested to distinguish f r o m it. O b v i o u s l y to use the same w o r d sun of both w o u l d be o f no avail ; the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d w o u l d then serve m e r e l y to m a r k the resemb l a n c e o f the t w o suns, b u t w o u l d not help t o w a r d s distinguishing them. For that purpose a distinctive n a m e w o u l d h a v e to be found for the second sun, the n a m e sun b e i n g reserved for our o w n . It is easy to see w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n to the w o r d sun in that case. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f its distinctive sound w o u l d b e greatly e n h a n c e d , since it w o u l d b e precisely that sound, a n d n o t h i n g else, w h i c h b y identifying each w o u l d distinguish the one celestial b o d y f r o m the other. It is clear that in this case Sun w o u l d h a v e b e c o m e a proper n a m e . A p r o p e r n a m e is, then, a w o r d w h i c h identifies its object b y virtue of its sound alone, and w h e n w e c o m e

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to survey the various classes o f t h i n g to w h i c h p r o p e r n a m e s belong, w e shall find t w o constant features that were mentioned in o u r supposed transformation of the w o r d sun. In the first place, the things called b y proper n a m e s are mostly m e m b e r s o f a set in w h i c h the resemblances considerably o u t w e i g h the differences, so that special labels, as it were, are required to m a r k the distinction. A n d in the second place, the a c t u a l n a m e forces itself u p o n o u r attention more p r o m i n e n t l y t h a n d o other words. T h i n k o f the place in our lives o c c u pied b y christenings a n d introductions o f persons b y n a m e , inquiries after the names o f places, a n d so forth. C l e a r l

alan gardiner - the theory of proper names: a controversial essay

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