al-kindi - the founder of philosophical exegesis of the qur'an, janssens,

Al-Kindï: The Founder of Philosophical Exegesis of the Qur'an

Jules Janssens

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN

Al-Kindï, the father of Islamic philosophy, lived in the third/ninth century. Born

probably about 160/800 in Basra, or even more likely in Kufa, he finished his

education in Baghdad. He enjoyed the protection of the cAbbäsid caliphs of the epoch,

i.e. al-Ma°mün and al-Muctasim, and even became the personal tutor of the latter's

son. During al-Mutawakkil's caliphate, he fell into disgrace, but was later

rehabilitated, at least up to a certain degree. He died somewhere about 256/870.

Many of his works have been lost and, moreover, most of the works that have reached

us are only available in single manuscript form.1 Given these facts, it is difficult to

make final judgements about his thought.

Regarding his understanding of the Qur'an, we are in possession of three relevant

texts, i.e. a passage in the treatise JFT kammiyyat kutub Aristütälis (On the Quantity of

the Books of Aristotle'), which explains Q. 36:78-82; another passage in the treatise

Fï'l-Cilla aliati lahä yabrudu aclä al-jaww wa-yaskhunu ma qaruba min al-ard (On

the Reason why the Higher Air is Cold and that which is Near the Earth is Warm');

and the treatise Wl-ibäna can sujüd al-jirm al-aqsä (On the Prosternation of the

Outermost Body'), which consists entirely of a philosophical explanation of Q. 55:6.2

There might have been more, as is suggested by one of the titles of al-Kindi's works

mentioned by Ibn al-Nadïm in his Fihrist.3 Among the 'dialectical works'

(jadaliyyät), one finds indeed a reference to a work entitled Risala fi'l-tawhïd bi-

tafslrät (Treatise on Divine Unicity and Unity, Accompanied by Exegeses'). The

latter speci^cation (although the addition bi-tafslrät is not present in all editions)

might allude to the presence of exegetical fragments of Qur'anic ayas,4 but this is far

from certain since the term taf sir seems not have been used in a strict technical sense

before the beginnings of the fourth/tenth century.5 Hence, as long as the latter text, or,

at least, some more precise information about its contents, is not available, it is of no

use for evaluating al-Kindi's interpretation of the Qur'an. Of greater significance

would be the systematic use of Qur'anic terms, but as will be shown later the presence

of this kind of term is rather limited in al-Kindi's writings.

Hence, we have to concentrate on the three texts referred to earlier. R. Walzer, in his famous New Studies on al-Kindï, has already analysed two of them in detail, and the

2 Journal of Qur'anic Studies

treatise On the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle' has been once more the object of

special attention in P. Adamson's recent contribution on 'Al-Kindï and the

Muctazila'.6 In both cases, the focus was on Muctazili elements in al-Kindi's exposé.

However, in what follows I will concentrate on the proper 'exegetical procedure' used

by al-Kindi. I will try to show that, despite the presence of technical devices that were

also used in other kinds of exegesis, including that of the Muctazilis, al-Kindi offers an

outspoken philosophical exegesis of Qur'anic ayas for the first time in history, at least

as far as I can see. With N. Calder, I think that classical Qur'anic exegesis has to be

described against ideological purposes in addition to instrumental considerations.

However, when he specifies the former as follows: 'prophetic history, theology,

eschatology, law, tasawwuf,7 he, together with the vast majority of scholars who have

dealt with the different tendencies of Qur'anic exegesis in classical time, unjustly

overlooks 'philosophy'. Let me stress that al-Kindi belongs to a rather early period

in the development of Qur'anic exegesis. Thus, when he offered a philosophical

interpretation of Qur'anic ayas, as I believe he did, this 'ideological' approach

deserves in itself to be recognised as a particular one, all the more so given that it has

been carried on by Ibn Sina.8

But is al-Kindi's way of commenting upon the Qur'an really and profoundly

philosophical? Is it not in a large measure dependent upon a Muctazili approach? To

settle this issue is far from easy. It is obvious that Greek philosophical ideas have

influenced some Muctazili doctrines. Moreover, Muctazili kaläm is a wide, very

differentiated movement.9 It was in full development at al-Kindi's time: both Abü'l-

Hudhayl and al-Nazzâm were then active and elaborated two - in several respects

quite opposite - systems.10 But had al-Kindi any knowledge of them? In view of the

fact that they both travelled to Baghdad,11 it is possible that he had access to some of

their writings. However, their writings are known only through the reports of later

theologians, so that we are often unsure as to their precise wording. Hence, the

conclusion of a specific, direct influence can only be taken when it is beyond

reasonable doubt that a given idea belonged specifically to one of them.12 Of course,

on a general level there is no doubt that al-Kindi, insofar as he was living in a

Muctazili milieu, shared elements of their discourse. But it is also clear that he avoided

their ideological bent, and therefore that elements of possible influence have to be

judged with great care.

The passage in al-Kindi's treatise 'On the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle' which explains Q. 36:78-82 occurs in the midst of a detailed enumeration of all of Aristotle's works, intended to specify a correct method for learning philosophy. This method consists in following the right order of reading. Having insisted in a Platonic-Pythagorean way that one has first to familiarise oneself with mathematics, al-Kindi deals with the entire Aristotelian corpus. He then insists that the notion of 'substance',

Al-Kindi: The Founder of Philosophical Exegesis 3

as well as of its two predicates of quality and quantity, form the very basis of all

philosophical knowledge. After this issue, he remarks:13

If then, as we have said, a person does not obtain knowledge of

quantity and quality, he will lack knowledge of the primary and

secondary substances, so that one cannot expect him to have any

knowledge of the human sciences that are acquired through men's

research and exertion, i.e. their sagacity. What is arrived at in [the

human sciences]14 is a degree [of knowledge] that comes after (can) the

degree of divine science, which [occurs] in no time without research

and exertion, i.e. without human sagacity. [The latter science] is like

the knowledge of the Messengers (rusul) whom15 God has so

particularised that their knowledge [implies] no research, no exertion,

no investigation, no sagacity in mathematics or logic, being in no time.

Rather, due to God's will, it [implies] a purification and illumination

(inära) of their souls by the True One (li'l-haqq), [i.e.] through His

support, His assistance, His inspiration and His messages. Definitely,

this knowledge is an exclusive property of the Messengers to the

exclusion of the rest of mankind, and one of their prerogatives is [the

performance of a] miracle (cajïba), i.e. the [realisation of] marvels

(äyät) that set them apart from the rest of humankind. Hence, for

human beings other than the Messengers, there is no way to attain this

higher knowledge, which [encompasses]16 a knowledge of [both] the

secondary, true17 substances and the primary, sensible substances, and

related accidents {ma yacridu fiha), and [all this] without research or

sagacity in logic and mathematics as we have said, and without18 any

period of time. It is by nothing of this kind, but by the will of Him who

sends them, that the Messengers fully, instantly, understand the very

aim of [any] research (al-talab wa-lä ghayrihi). Intellects know for

certain that such knowledge comes from God, hence that it exists,

whereas [ordinary] human beings are incapable of [obtaining] some

thing similar because it is above nature, more precisely above their

natural disposition.19 Thus [ordinary human beings] submit themselves

in obedience and docility to it, i.e. their innate characters (fitar) firmly

believe the truth of what the Messengers bring forward.

Before quoting any Qur'anic text, al-Kindi distinguishes between two kinds of

knowledge, i.e. ordinary human knowledge and prophetic knowledge. Contrary to the

former, which requires great effort and is time-consuming, the latter happens all at

once while having its ultimate source in divine will. This characterisation makes it

clear that for al-Kindi prophetic knowledge is superior to any other kind of human

knowledge. But is this enough to affirm, as Walzer does, that philosophy is the


handmaiden of theology? I doubt this, especially because such an affirmation seems

rather inappropriate with respect to an Islamic context. Walzer himself observes that

the easy acquisition of knowledge is a common theme in Neo-Platonist philosophy,

but he detects a radical rupture with ancient Greek thought as soon as 'divine will' is

introduced as a central idea. Although he is completely right in stressing that such an

idea is lacking in such major Greek thinkers as, for example, Aristotle, he seems to

have overlooked the fact that this very notion is already present, although not often, in

the Plotiniana Arabica, more specifically in the Sayings of the Greek Sage.21 Even if

it is obvious that monotheistic considerations have influenced the actual wording of

these writings, no one will doubt that they are fundamentally philosophical. However,

the presence in them of important modifications engendered by religious motives is in

no way at the service of any particular religious system. Hence, al-Kindi, who

undoubtedly was familiar with these writings,22 may have been inspired by their

explicit use of the expression 'divine will', even if it was rare. Is it not striking that he

defines prophetic knowledge as encompassing both secondary and primary

substances, i.e. using outspoken philosophical terms? But I have to admit that this

does not constitute a decisive proof that he derived his notion of 'divine will' from the

Plotinia Arabica. One might even seriously doubt this. Indeed, there is at least one

element that must be explained with reference to an Islamic context, i.e. the reference

to the capacity to perform miracles. The designation of these latter by the term äyät,

especially, seems to be extremely relevant, since, as is generally known, the äyät of the

Qur'an constitute the miracle that guarantees the authenticity of Muhammad's

prophecy. This could be a strong indication that al-Kindi is first of all a defender of

religion, more specifically Islam, and only secondly a philosopher. However, the present

passage is far too limited in scope to say this with any confidence. Hence, let us now

concentrate on the way al-Kindi actually explains the Qur'anic ayas 78-82 of Sura 36.

Al-Kindi invites his reader to consider the profoundity - despite its simple wording -

of the answer offered by the Qur'an to the infidel's doubting the possibility of bodily

resurrection:

If a person reflects on the answers which the Messengers have given to questions about the hidden, true things, he would find out this: should the philosopher aim at answering them by employing his sagacity,24

[sagacity] which provides him through a lengthy intensity of research and training with knowledge of them, then that person should not find25 that the philosopher could produce a similar answer as brief and clear, simple and comprehensive as the Prophet gave to the question of the polytheists relating to his knowledge, [i.e.] whether26

it is encompassing [literally knowing] everything that is without beginning or end, a fortiorí (bal) [all things that are] endless [in the sense of] eternal a parte post (sarmadan abadan)?1 They said to


him - and this was an attack [since] they thought that he would not [be

able to] produce the answers they aimed at by posing their question, 6 O Muhammad, who will give life to the bones when they are rottenT

(Q. 36:78). Then the One, the True, revealed to him Say: He will give

life to them who brought them into existence at first, and He is

Cognisant of all creation (Q. 36:79) till His saying, 'Be', and it is

(Q. 36:82).

Before starting his exegesis proper, al-Kindi underlines that revelation is superior to

philosophy insofar as it offers a truly encompassing answer to such difficult questions

as, for example, bodily resurrection, and does so in terms easy to understand. Note

however that he does not say that this kind of truth is totally unavailable to the

philosopher. On the contrary, he clearly suggests that the latter may attain it, although

not without great efforts. Note moreover that the Prophet's knowledge is directly

linked with divine inspiration.

Having already quoted extensively from Q. 36:78-9, al-Kindi first concentrates on

their explanation:28

Which proof (dalli) is clearer and more concise than [the following] for

the illuminated, pure minds? When bones have been, but are no longer,

then it is possible that they, when they perished after having been, and

become rotten, once again become [existent] (takün). Indeed, the

putting together of what is scattered is easier than the making of

something existent (sancat ay sa), i.e. its creatio ex nihilo (ibdä°). For

the Creator of the bones,29 both [acts] are one [and the same] thing,

[and] nothing more intense or difficult.30 In fact, it is possible that the

power that has created ex nihilo, originates [again] what it has [let]

perish. Moreover, their [i.e. the bones] being after their non-being is

available (mawjüd) to the senses, not to say to the intellect. Hence, the

one who asked the present question, [i.e.] the denier of God's power,

[must] admit that he is after having not been, and that his bones were

not when he was non-existent.31 Therefore his bones necessarily exist

after having not been, and such is also their restoration, i.e. their

revivification: indeed, they are existent as living after having been not

living, and thus it is also possible that they become living after they

were no [longer] alive.

The present 'proof is articulated according to an α fortiori structure, and as

Walzer has observed, may as such have its ultimate source in Aristotle's Topics.32

But what is more striking is the presence in the commentary of a vocabulary that

is foreign to ordinary Qur'anic exegesis. Significant in this respect is the use of the


term ibdä3 Ccreatio ex nihilo'), which constitutes a key term in the Neoplatonica

Arabica, and the concept of which was also found in John Philoponus.33 Even if it

is present in a few Muctazili writings, its origin was certainly philosophical.34 The

same applies clearly also to the notion of aysa, a term which seems to belong to

the first period of translation and translates as the Greek einai or to on?5 Of

course, the acceptance of the possibility of a bodily resurrection was not a

common philosophical doctrine, but al-Kindi might have found in Philoponus

philosophical support for this idea that had been clearly expressed in the Qur'an.

As such, he undoubtedly is in rupture with ancient pagan philosophy, but not yet

therefore with philosophy tout court. But has one not to recognise with Adamson

that there is an outspoken Muctazili problematic when there is a reference to being

macdüml In the present fragment, at least as I understand it, this is obviously not

the case. For me, the personal pronoun huwa refers to the very being of the

unbeliever himself, and not to the bones.36 But the issue of macdüm will be dealt

with later again, since a later passage, and hence not this passage, forms the very

basis of Adamson's claim. One last observation regarding al-Kindi's commentary

on aya 79 has to be made: it completely omits any discussion of the final words,

i.e. He is cognisant of all creation. From a philosophical point of view, the divine

knowledge of particulars was a very difficult issue, for example Ibn Sina will try

to solve this complex issue by attributing to God knowledge of the particulars 'in

a universal way'.37 Is al-Kindi's silence in this respect maybe a sign of a

philosophical perplexity? But let us avoid overhasty conclusions, and concentrate

on his exegesis of the remaining ayas:38

Then He shows that the generation (kawn) of a thing out of its contrary is something existing (mawjüd): He who has made for you

the fire [to burn] from the green tree, so that with it you kindle

Ifire] (Q· 36:80). He has made (jacala) fire from not-fire, heat from not-heat; consequently, when a thing generates from its contrary, this [happens] in a necessary way (idtiräran). For if what originates (al-hadlth) does not originate from its very39 contrary, more precisely (wa-) if there is no intermediary between the two contraries - by 'contrary' I mean 'being' (huwa) and 'non-being' (lä huwa) - it (al-shay0) in that case would [have to] originate from itself. [But] then its essence would be fixed eternally a parte post

(abadan), [i.e. according] to an eternity that has a beginning.40 For if fire41 is not [coming] from not-fire, it then [must come] from fire. Hence, if [a] fire comes from [another] fire, and [this latter] fire from [still another] fire, then there will be endlessly (sarmadan), [in the sense of] eternally a parte post (abadan), fire from fire, i.e. [one] fire from [another] fire. Then fire would eternally a parte post exist,


there being no situation (hai) where it would be nothing (lays)',

hence a fire would never be after having not been. But (wa-) fires do

exist after having not been, and are destroyed after having been. So

the only remaining [possibility] is that fire is generated from not-fire,

and that every generation is from what is other than it. Therefore

everything that is generated is generated from what is 'non-being' (lä

huwa).

Both Adamson and Walzer stress that al-Kindi uses here a principle familiar to Greek

philosophy from the days of Plato and Aristotle, i.e. the idea that generation is from

contraries.42 They immediately add that al-Kindi applies the principle in a totally un-

Aristotelian way, since he simply ignores Aristotle's key notion of potentiality. They

are certainly right that al-Kindi makes no explicit mention of it. Nevertheless, one may

wonder whether he is not somehow alluding to it when he evokes the necessity of the

existence of an 'intermediary' state between the two contraries in the temporal

origination (ihdäth)43 of a thing. But even if one accepts their thesis of an utterly

un-Aristotelian approach, does this mean that al-Kindi was influenced by the

contemporary Muctazili debate about non-being? This is certainly not evident. In fact,

I want to make the following observations:

1. As far as I can see the discussion of generation in terms of 'coming from a

contrary' is typical of philosophy and has no place whatsoever in kaläm;

2. The explicit qualification of the process of generation as idtirär, 'necessary' would

rather surprise within a Muctazili context, since in it, it would almost inevitably

impose a compulsion on God;

3. The pronoun huwa (as well as its opposite lä huwa) appears to be used as

synonymous with the Greek on (respectively me on), as used in Ustäth's translation

of Aristotle's Metaphysics',44

4. The argument that things that come to be, in other words that possess no absolute eternity, cannot generate themselves out of themselves, since then they would necessarily produce an infinite series seems to be based on two Aristotelian principles, i.e. 'nature does nothing in vain' and 'everything that generates has to corrupt'.

These points, if I am not mistaken, show clearly that philosophy continues to offer

the basic framework of al-Kindi's exegesis. This becomes even more obvious when

one takes into account that al-Kindi's basic argumentation in favour of the existence

of something other than itself for every generation seems to have been largely inspired

by Philoponus, fragment 120, as Adamson has rather convincingly shown.45

The example of fire entailed in the fragment may have provided al-Kindi with


the opportunity to bring Philoponus' remarks directly in contact with the present

Qur'anic aya.

The very rudimentary explanation of Q. 36:81 that follows neither contradicts nor

confirms the presence of an outspoken philosophical approach:46

Then He [i.e. God] says, in order to clarify the generation of a thing

from its contrary, Is not He who created the heavens and the earth able

to create the like of them? Then He says, in view of what follows from

that, Yea! And He is the Creator (of all), the Knower.

The direct link between the problem at issue and the Qur'anic text is far from being

clear. One may even wonder whether this is not a kind of rhetorical strategy in order to

avoid a lengthy, and perhaps far-fetched explanation? For sure, things might have

been evident for al-Kindi, and hence he may honestly be convinced that no further

comment is needed.

Fortunately, al-Kindi deals in much greater detail with the next aya, Q. 36:82:

Then He [i.e. God] says in view of what is in the heart of the unbelievers, i.e. their denial of the creation (khalq) of the heavens -[this being so] because they assume that the period of time needed for the [heaven's] creation has to be [conceived] in analogy with human actions: since in human production (camaï) a greater production needs a longer time, hence for them the greatest of the sensible things [needs] the longest time of production - that He needs no period [of time] for His creatio ex nihilo (ibdä°).4S This is clear, for He makes (jacala) being (huwa) from non-being (lä huwa).

Indeed, He whose power reaches so far as (balaghat) to produce bodies (ajräm) from non-bodies, He brings out something existent from nothing (fa-akhraja aysan min lays), and thus He is in no need to produce in time since He is able to produce in absence of matter (min lä tina). For, whereas49 human action is impossible without [the use of] matter, the action of Him who does not need matter in the action He is undertaking (fi ficl ma yafalu) is in no need of time. [Hence God expresses Himself distinctly as follows:] His command, when He intends anything, is only to say to it, 'Be ', so

it is (Q. 36:82). That is, He only wills, and together with His will is that which He wills - great be His praise, and exalted His names above the opinions of the unbelievers! At the same time, 'what is nothing' is addressed.50 This is, in the language of the Arabs who are speaking in this way, something clear, usual, although they only speak by habit in such a way, for the Arabs use for the description of

47


a thing something that does not naturally belong to it, [as illustrated

by] the saying of Irnru0 al-Qays ibn Hujr al-Kindi:

And I said to the night, when it stretched its lazy loins

followed by its fat buttocks, and heaved off its heavy breast,

'Well now, you tedious night, won't you clear yourself off, and let

dawn shine? Yet dawn, when it comes, is no way better than you'.

One does not talk to the night nor does one address it, it has neither

loins nor back nor breast, nor [is it] rising; the meaning of the poetic

verses is simply that [the poet] is longing for the daybreak.

The strong emphasis on the fact that God creates out of nothing seems to be inspired

by the philosophical ideas of Philoponus, and hence foreign to a Muctazili approach.

Also, this time Adamson has indicated a most striking parallel text in Philoponus, i.e.

fragment 119, where the latter insists that God creates the matter of bodies out of

nothing, and certainly not out of a substrate.51 But Adamson pays no attention to the

fact that al-Kindi again, perhaps even more strongly this time, stresses that the divine

creation is in no need of time.52 This same idea is once more present in Philoponus,

fragment 115, where one reads '... and that God on the other hand gives existence to

the things directly generated by Him without a time lapse and without <a process of>

generation'.53 This idea of an act of generation that is not extended in time is absent in

Muctazili thought. The latter rather stresses that such an act is not extended in space.

For example Abü'1-Hudhayl, according to al-Ashcari,54 stresses that creation,

understood as the divine will, i.e. His word 'Be', is not in place, and in other words

is devoid of any spatial location. Note moreover that the absence of any duration of

time in God's creative action is explained on the basis of His ability to produce things

without any material substrate at His disposal. This is a typical philosophical issue,

and again shows great similarity with a saying of Philoponus in the very same

fragment already quoted: 'and yet God not only produces the forms of the things

directly generated by Him, but is believed to originate and create even matter itself.55

However, when al-Kindi offers his ultimate explanation of the Qur'anic aya, his

emphasis is entirely on the divine will, since he states that the divine command 'Be'

signifies 'He [i.e. God] only wills, and together with His will is that which He wills'. It

cannot be denied that this affirmation has much in common with Abü'1-Hudhayl's

identification of God's creation with His will as expressed in the command 'Be'.

According to the latter's explicit words, 'God's creation ... is His willing it [i.e. the

created being], more precisely, His saying to it: "Be".'56 But despite this similarity,

one may not overlook an important difference in the larger perspective in which this

view is embedded in the respective fragments: whereas Abü'1-Hudhayl concentrates

on the relation between the created thing and the act of creation, stressing both a

fundamental difference between them and a simultaneity, al-Kindi emphasises that the


act of creation is instantaneous. Certainly, this does not exclude a possible influence,

but it imposes at least some qualification when accepting the latter. Moreover, even

regarding the very idea of a divine will, Philoponus might have been a direct source

for al-Kindi. The same fragment 115 already referred to above, ends as follows: 'for

mere willing suffices for Him [i.e. God] to give substance to things.' According to

Philoponus, everything that is directly originated by God is not subject to a process of

generation, but is immediately realised by God's will.57 Such is at least the opinion of

the later Philoponus, who, as a Christian, has introduced monotheistic corrections to

ancient pagan philosophy. But this does not mean at all that Philoponus completely

abandoned philosophy. On the contrary, he continued to defend his innovative views

in a clearly philosophical way. Unfortunately, in the case of the issue of the divine

will, we lack any further elaboration. Therefore, it is difficult to decide whether al-

Kindi's formulation really depends directly upon Philoponus, all the more since the

latter mentions things that are directly originated by God - an idea which does not

necessarily contradict what al-Kindi says, but is neither explicitly mentioned by the

latter. The fact that al-Kindi starts the present paragraph with a reference to the

creation of the 'heavens' may constitute an indication, although not a very strong one,

of his restricting his considerations to these things that God had directly originated,

exactly as Philoponus did. However, in view of the available evidence, this issue is

hard to settle. Let me simply observe that the overall context of al-Kindi's wording

makes, in the present case, a Philoponian influence slightly more probable than one of

a Muctazili thinker such as, for example, Abü'1-Hudhayl. Nevertheless, I admit once

more that the latter is possible, but, as stated, in a qualified way. Does it not become

even likely in view of al-Kindi's mention of macdüm ('what is nothing') as an 'entity'

addressed too? But is al-Kindi understanding it in the very same way as the Muctazilis

did, i.e. as including a kind of ontologica! status? This seems to be doubtful. Indeed,

al-Kindi insists that real creation is out of nothing, as best illustrated by the following

quotation from the treatise Fî'l-facïl al-haqq al-awwal al-tämm ('On the True, First,

Perfect Agent'): 'The first true action is the existentialisation of existents from nothing

(tayJls aysät can laysa).'5S Hence, I wonder whether macdüm is not synonymous for

him with 'absolute non-being', a meaning that is quite different from the usual

Muctazili one. Certainly, its use here has probably been inspired by - or, at least, also

by - his discussions with his Muctazili contemporaries. Nevertheless, if my

understanding of his use of macdüm is correct, al-Kindi modifies in a substantial

way the very terms of the Muctazili problematic, that is there is a radical change in

emphasis from a relative non-being to an absolute non-being. He then no longer

partakes in the Muctazili point of view, but at most has in common with it some

superficial similarities regarding a willed creation by God. Even if his actual

engagement with the latter problem has been influenced by Muctazili thought, he, in

his solution, is clearly not following its ideological bent. In this sense, it looks as if

Philoponus also formed a major source, as Adamson has shown, and, in my view,


might even come to be regarded as the major source. However, regarding the use of

ancient poetry in order to explain a part of the Qur'anic aya, Walzer justly remarks

that it was a common usage in ancient Muctazili Qur'anic exegesis.60 But he seems to

have overlooked that in the early third/ninth century it was practiced by several

scholars, who did not necessarily belong to the Muctazili kaläm. The very first to have

introduced pre-Islamic poetry inside the framework of Qur'anic exegesis seems to

have been the grammarian al-Farrä3 (d. 207/822) in his work Macänl al-Qur3än.61

One also encounters it in the works of the Zaydi imam al-Qäsim ibn Ibrahim (d. 240/

860).62 If the latter may have shown Muctazili influences, this is certainly not the case

with respect to the former. I therefore doubt that one can consider the use of pre-

Islamic poetry to be an exclusive hallmark of Muctazili exegesis. Moreover, al-Kindi

does not concentrate on a specific word of the Qur'anic aya, but on an implied

rhetorical style of address. If I understand him correctly, he simply wants to say that

according to the Qur'an, if understood in its most profound sense, God's will, and it

alone, brings a totally non-existent being into being. Based on the explanation he

offers of Irnru0 al-Qays' poem, he moreover seems to suggest that God is 'longing' for

the existence of the concerned being, but he omits to discuss the precise implications

of that explanation.

Despite all these problems of interpretation, it is clear that in the above passage the

basic approach is rather philosophical than 'kalämic'. But it is also clear that al-Kindi

adheres to a current of monotheistic revision of ancient pagan philosophy, a current

that has started with the Christian thinker Philoponus, at least in his later period. For

al-Kindi religious revelation is not superfluous, considered from a philosophical point

of view. On the contrary, in some respect(s) it is even superior to philosophy, as he

stressed in the very beginning, and he once more repeats when closing this

'digression':63

Which man is able by means of human philosophising to compose in a

saying, commensurate with the letters of these ayas, what God has

composed for the Prophet by expounding (min Idäh) that the bones

revivify after having been decayed, and that His power can create the

like of the Heavens and of the Earth, and, moreover, that a thing is

from its contrary? Compared to it, rational, evolving languages are

weak; extremely [intelligent] men [lit. 'the utmost limits of men'] are

unable to do it, whereas (wa-) it is concealed from trivial intellects.

For al-Kindi the metaphorical language of the Qur'an, which he clearly distinguishes

from the rational (mantiql), expresses truths that the philosopher, in contrast to to simple

men, can understand, but which are difficult to articulate in ordinary language(s).

Moreover, the use of metaphors does not stop the Qur'an from taking into account the

essentials of philosophy, such as, for example, the idea that everything comes from its

contrary.


Q. 36:82 is again quoted by al-Kindi in one of his meteorological treatises, entitled

'On the Reason why the Higher Air is Cold and that which is Near the Earth is

Warm'. Having insisted that man, in his acquisition of knowledge, has to respect an

order, and hence is not able to know whatever he wants whenever he wants, he 64

continues:

And this [i.e. the knowledge of everything at will] is something of

which [ordinary] men are deprived, due to causes that limit their

nature, except the one who God has particularised with prophecy.

Indeed, He gives him that inspiration [i.e. of prophecy] (ilhäm), He

enlightens him in himself without [the intermediary] of primary

principles (awä°il), because His command is as God has said, His

command, when He intends anything, is only to say to it, 'Be', so it is

(Q. 36:82). Thus, the prophets are unlike65 ordinary men due to the fact

that (bi-) God requests them to be so [lit. 'that']. This is one of the

necessities66 through which God let a decisive evidence (furqänan)

occur between the prophets and the rest of humankind, in view of

obliging the [latter] to submit their souls, for the command of [the

prophets] is the divine command. The rest of human beings are unable

to reach it; more, they are guided to obey it, otherwise they become

great in their perplexity, and [thus] they overcome by it [all] ignorance

and failures.

Introducing a clear-cut distinction between ordinary men and prophets, al-Kindi evokes the divine command as being the very source of it. His reference to the Qur'anic aya 36:82 seems to be intended to show that God's acting is in no way mediated. There is no question of an act of creation, but what is at stake is an act of inspiration (ilhäm). Whether inspiration, or compulsion, or nature was at the basis of knowledge was a highly debated question in early Muctazili circles.67 So, it is possible that al-Kindi underwent an influence from these discussions. But, contrary to his £a/äm-coUeagues, he does not accept one, but two (co-existing) modes of knowledge, i.e. one by inspiration and another by acquisition. He makes a sharp distinction between prophets, who know by inspiration, on the one hand; and all other human beings, who know through a gradual process of acquiring science, on the other. Moreover, he insists that the former are superior, but that men will only obey them when they dismiss their ignorance, in other words, when they start to study philosophy. As to the quotation of the Qur'anic aya, it is interesting to observe that it illustrates the immediacy of prophetic knowledge, although neither the aya itself, nor its context point in such a direction. Note, moreover, that al-Kindi explains this 'immediacy of knowledge' in logical-philosophical terms as the absence of premises. Hence, it looks as if al-Kindi uses the Qur'anic aya in order to justify philosophically a mode of knowledge which is rather uncommon but nevertheless exists: i.e. a mode


that is characterised by a direct grasp of the essential truth of things. Aristotle's notion

of 'acumen' (anchinoia) could lie in the background of this conception of a direct

grasp that somehow seems to prefigure Ibn Sina's notion of hads.6%

From the exegetical point of view, when one compares the two fragments where Q.

36:82 is quoted, it is striking that the only common idea is that of an action happening

'at once'. One gets the impression that al-Kindi uses the Qur'an in order to

substantiate his theory, rather than to pay attention to the text in itself. This impression

is seriously strengthened when one looks to his 'Treatise on the Prostration of

the Outermost Body, i.e. its Obedience to God', which in its totality is intended to

explain one single aya of the Qur'an: Q. 55:6, and the star69 and the tree do adore

[Him] (wa'l-najmu wa'l-shajaru yasjudäni). The epistle is dedicated to Ahmad ibn

al-Muctasim, the caliph's son, who could have requested al-Kindi to offer an

explanation of the aya concerned according to rational syllogisms (bi-maqäyls caqliyya). Whether there was effectively such a request, or whether this was just a

rhetorical stratagem of al-Kindi, the fact remains that the given interpretation that will

follow is explicitly based not on tradition, but on reason. With Walzer,70 I admit that

reason occupies a central place in the Muctazili way of understanding revelation.

However, the use of the very term of maqäyls, a term that was not uncommon in the

Neoplatonica Arabica,11 strongly points into the direction of a philosophical

approach.

Before starting his proper commentary, al-Kindi offers two preliminary remarks:

1. First, he stresses that two kinds of people fail to understand the real meaning of the

prophetic statement: those who are completely deprived of reason, and hence are

ignorant; those who trust in the first instance the Prophet, but reject the exegesis

proposed by those having religion and profound intelligence (dhü'l-dln wa'l-

albäb). To which category of persons al-Kindi refers in the latter case is not wholly

clear. Elsewhere, also in writings of other contemporary authors or even later

scholars, I have looked in vain for a group described in this way. As far as I can

see, the term albäb is not really a technical term, in either Muctazili kaläm or in

philosophy);72

2. Secondly, he insists that there are problems of understanding related to the very

structure of language itself, indicating that many words have an ambiguous

meaning, especially in Arabic (exemplified by the word cädil, designating both the

just and the unjust man).

He then proceeds to the exegesis proper starting with two lexical explanations. This

was a common tool in Muctazili exegesis, but seems to have been used by a wide

range of Qur'anic interpreters.73 The first explanation concerns the term sujüd. Al-

Kindi attributes two meanings to it: prostration (in prayer), and obedience (täca). Then


he concentrates on the latter, once more distinguishing two senses: one implying

change from lack to perfection, and another based on free choice (ikhtiyär). Hereafter,

he starts an explicitly philosophical exposé. Having affirmed that the highest celestial

body is obedient in the second sense, he specifies it as the cause of generable and

corruptible things. He insists that cause is superior to effect, and that the motion of the

celestial sphere is the cause of the passage of generable and corruptible things from

potency to act. He further concentrates on the higher spheres in general, attributing to

them rationality, as well as the two noble senses of seeing and hearing.74 The two

lower psychic faculties of desire and anger are however denied of them. But the

universe is not limited to this higher perfect world. Thanks to God's power, the

sublunary world also originates, despite its limited perfection, for God provides with

existence whatever is not impossible. Al-Kindi even concludes that when this latter

action is fulfilled, it is the 'true prostration to He who is Generous in the emanation of

each act that is not impossible'.75 The epithet 'Generous' is not one of the Qur'anic

divine names and the source of al-Kindi's affirmation looks in the given context rather

philosophical by inspiration. As noted by Jolivet,76 the theme of divine generosity is

Platonic in origin. It is present in Plato's Timaeus, 29 E, and has reached the Arabs

thanks to Hunayn's (or his disciple's) translation of Galen's paraphrase of the

Timaeus. Whether al-Kindi has derived it from there cannot be affirmed with

certainty, but, as far as I can see, neither is it to be ruled out. Whatever be the case, his

explanation of divine generosity has obviously more to do with philosophy than with

religion.

Al-Kindi concludes that the universe resembles a unique animal, and that man

constitutes a microcosm. This latter idea was a common leitmotif in medieval Islamic

philosophy and was especially well attested in the fourth/tenth century.77 Without

explicitly mentioning it, it is clear that al-Kindi sees his fundamental distinction in the

universe between a higher and a lower world confirmed by the two words, i.e. najm

and shajar, by which the Qur'an designates that which performs the act of sujüd. He

hereby understands the former of the two as synonymous with 'star', an interpretation

which became uncommon in later taf sir, but was not really exceptional at al-Kindi's

time, as attested by, for example, al-Tabari, who mentions no less than four names in

favour of it, while quoting also four names for what will become the usual

interpretation.78 But al-Kindi is not really interested in this 'lexical' question. Rather,

his attention is completely concentrated on how the universe is constituted out of two

worlds, i.e. a super-lunar and an infra-lunar.

From the previous analysis, it is evident that al-Kindi is above all a philosopher, even if he might have been inspired by certain Muctazili ideas.79 For him philosophy is part of a timeless and eternal 'wisdom' (hikma).so Let me note moreover that I have searched almost in vain for the use of a typical Qur'anic vocabulary. Certainly, he uses a few of the divine names (but not all are Qur'anic), and even a few other notions,


such as for example, qudra, but they are always embedded in a context that I would

qualify as philosophical, although in a monotheistic version in the line elaborated by

Philoponus. Of course, al-Kindi does not admit the latter's typically Christian ideas,

but modifies them into an Islamic perspective. For him, the Qur'an is the highest of

revelations, probably because it expresses in the most elegant way the profoundest

truths, which are available to mankind only after a long exercise of philosophical

inquiry. However, the way he explains some of its ayas is far away from the common

understanding of most of the religious minds. Even from a linguistic point of view, it

looks arbitrary. Is this the reason why al-Färäbi decides not to deal with it? One will

have to wait until Ibn Sina before a philosopher will try to interpret Qur'anic texts

anew according to philosophical standards.81 However he already had at his disposal a

lot of tools that were not available to al-Kindi: the latter was in many senses a pioneer,

and deserves, despite his evident weaknesses, our deepest respect.82

NOTES

1 The majority of these treatises have been edited in M. Abu Rida, Rasä°il al-Kindi al-falsafiyya (2 vols, Cairo: Matbacat al-Jannat al-Ta3lif wa'1-Tarjama wa'1-Nashr, 1369/1950-1372/1953). A new edition, together with a French translation, of all of al-Kindi's treatises is planned in the project Oeuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindl. Two volumes have already been published: L'optique et la catoptrique, ed. and tr. R. Rashed, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science 29:1 (Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1997); Métaphysique et cosmologie, ed. and tr. R. Rashed and J. Jolivet, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science 29:2 (Leiden, Boston, Köln: EJ. Brill, 1998).

2 See Abu Rida, Rasä'il al-Kindl, vol. 1, pp. 363-84; vol. 2, pp. 86-100; and vol. 1, pp. 238-61. The former of the three treatises has also been edited, together with an introduction and an Italian translation, in M. Guidi and R. Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi, I. Uno scritto introduttivo allo studio di Aristotele' in Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Serie Sesta, Memorie a classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche 6 (Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1937), pp. 375-410 (I thank Cr. d'Ancona-Costa for her kindness in providing me with a xeroxed copy of this paper). A Spanish translation is offered by R. Ramon Guerrero and E. Tornero Po veda, Obras filosóficas de al-Kindí (Madrid: Editorial Colloquio, 1986), pp. 25-38. The last of the three treatises is also available, together with a French translation, in Rashed and Jolivet (ed. and tr.), Métaphysique, pp. 173-204. One can also find a Spanish translation in Ramon Guerrero and Tornero Po veda, Obras filosóficas, pp. 117-27.

3 Ibn al-Nadim, Kitäb al-Fihrist, ed. Sh. Khalifa and Walïd M. al-cAwza (2 vols, Cairo: al-cArabiyya li'1-Nashr wa'l-Tawzïc, 1991), vol. 1, p. 524.

4 See R. Walzer, 'New Studies on Al-Kindï' in R. Walzer, Greek into Arabie, Oriental Studies 1 (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1962), pp. 175-205, p. 183.

5 J. Wansbrough, Qur'anic Studies: Sources and Methods of Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 154-6.

6 P. Adamson, 'al-Kindi and the Muctazila', Arabie Sciences and Philosophy 13 (2003), pp. 45-77. For details of Walzer, 'New Studies on Al-Kindï', see note 4.

7 Ν. Calder, 'Tafsir from Tabarï to Ibn Kathïr: Problems in the History of a Genre' in G.R. Hawting and Abdul-Kadeer A. Shareef (eds), Approaches to the Qur'an (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 101-40, pp. 105-6.


8 See my 'Avicenna and the Qur'an: A Survey of his Qur'anic Commentaries' in Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'études orientales 25-6 (2004), pp. 177-92. It may be noted that al-Fârâbï, Ibn Sina's famous predecessor in falsa]a, has, as far as I can see, never elaborated any Qur'anic commentary, and seems even to avoid typical Qur'anic expressions.

9 A brief English survey of Muctazili kaläm is present in M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (London: Longman and New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 42-65.

10 cAbdurrahman Badawi, Histoire de la philosophie en Islam, Études de philosophie médiévale LX (2 vols, Paris: Vrin, 1972), vol. 1, pp. 54—145, presents both systems in a detailed way.

11 The fact that they passed at least some time (but it is difficult to decide whether this was for a short, or a longer period) in Baghdad is reported by al-Khatíb al-Baghdädi in his work Ta°rlkh Baghdad, vol. 3, p. 366 and vol. 6, p. 97, according to Badawi, Histoire, vol. 1, p. 54, n. 3 and p. 101, n. 3 (Badawi does not specify the edition, but probably refers to the Cairo 1349/1931 edition - unfortunately, I have had no access to this).

12 The relationship between al-Kindi and the Muctazila is a highly debated question in modern scholarship, see Adamson, 'al-Kindi and the Muctazila', p. 46, and my 'Al-Kindi's Concept of God', Ultimate Reality and Meaning 17 (1994), pp. 1-17, pp. 4-5.

13 Abu Rida, Rasa3il, vol. 1, p. 372, line 13 to p. 373, line 11; Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', pp. 395-6, eh. 6, Unes 1-14.

14 I suggest adding bihä after al-maqsüd, although none of the two existing editions offer such a reading, since it seems to fit the context and facilitates an understanding of al-Kindi's affirmation.

15 1 read khassühum instead of khassuhä (Abu Rida, Rasa0il) or khassühu (Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi').

16 This verb, together with the word 'both' that follows, translates the Arabic expression min ... wa-ilä, literally: 'from ... up to'.

17 With Guidi and Walzer, I read haqiyya instead of khafiyya (Abu Rida).

18 I follow the author's correction by Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', which consists in the addition of the negation lä; Ramon Guerrero and Tornero Poveda, Obras filosóficas, p. 29, adopt this reading: 'sin tiempo'.

19 I read wa-jiblatihä (or wa-jiballatiha) instead of wa-jablihä (?) (Abu Rida, Rasä°il) or wa-hllihä (Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi'). Ramon Guerrero and Tornero Poveda, Obras filosóficas, p. 30, in proposing the translation 'indole natural', confirm this reading. The term jibia, also vocalised sometimes as jiballa, means an 'inner disposition'; see E.W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (8 vols, London: Williams and Norgate 1865, reprinted Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1997), vol. 2, p. 376. The context invites us to see it as a precision of the term tabc ('nature'), which immediately precedes it and to which it is linked by the conjunction wa- which sometimes expresses the idea of a precisising factor.

20 Walzer, 'New Studies', p. 180.

21 See Sayings of the Greek Sage in Plotino, La discesa dell'anima nei corpi (Enn. IV 8 [6]). Plotiniana Arabica (Pseudo-Teologia di Aristotele, capitoli 1 e 7; 'Detti del sapiente greco'), Cr. d'Ancona-Costa (ed.), Subsidia Mediaevalia Patavina 4 (Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2003), p. 245, line 3. The coming into this world of the souls is said to be due to themselves as well as to the will of the Creator (irädat al-bàrì). See also P. Adamson, Ά Note on Freedom in the Circle of al-Kindî' in James E. Montgomery (ed.), 'Abbasid Studies', Orientaba Lovaniensa Analecta 135 (Leuven, Paris, Dudley MA: Peeters and Departement Oosterse Studies, 2004), pp. 199-207, especially pp. 202-7.


22 See G. Endress, 'The Circle of al-Kindi: Early Arabic Translation from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philosophy' in G. Endress and R. Kruk (eds), The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism, CNWS Publications 50 (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1997), pp. 43-76, p. 53.

23 Abu Rida, RasäHl al-Kindl, vol. 1, p. 373, line 12 to p. 374, line 1; Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi' p. 396, eh. 6, lines 14-21. The translation of the Qur'anic ayas at the end of the passage, as well as in the rest of the paper, are taken from The Holy Quran: Arabic Text and English Translation (Rome: Islamic European Cultural Centre, 1984).

24 I read Mihi alladhl instead of hllatihi aliati (Abu Rida, Rasä°il al-Kindl, and Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi').

25 With Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', and in accordance with Ramon Guerrero and Tornero Po veda, Obras filosóficas, p. 30 ('encontrará'), I read yajiduhu instead of najiduhu (Abu Rida, Rasa*il al-Kindi).

26 I read idhä instead of idh. Anyhow, the text as standing in the unique manuscript looks corrupt: Abu Rida, Rasa0il al-Kindl, proposes to add Allähi after Hlmuhu, whereas Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', propose to correct idh into min. Contrary to common interpretation, I understand the sentence that follows as related to the range of the Prophet's knowledge, not to God as its source.

27 My translation of sarmadan abadan as 'endless (in the sense of) eternal a parte post is somewhat tentative, but is based on the fact that the Arabic term sarmad normally expresses an absolute eternity, without beginning and without end, whereas that of abad, on the contrary, refers to an eternity a parte post, see S. Sheikh, Dictionary of Muslim Philosophy (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1976), p. 62, respectively p. 1. Later (see below) it will become more evident that the very problem of the polytheists concerns things that have been originated, but would not have an end. Note moreover that the present expression does not characterize, in my view, God, but refers to a qualification of possible objects of the Prophet's knowledge (see the preceding note).

28 Abu Rida, Rasaci al-Kindl, vol. 1, p. 374, lines 2-10; Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', p. 396, eh. 6, lines 22-9.

29 I read bäri°hä instead of barí3him (Abu Rida, Rasa3il al-Kindl, and Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi').

30 With Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', I read ascab instead of adacf (Abu Rida, Rasä°il al-Kindl).

31 The personal pronomen huwa of the Arabie expression huwa macdüm refers, as I understand the text, to the unbeliever himself. Adamson, On Knowledge of Particulars', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2000), pp. 273-94, p. 60, and Ramon Guerrero and Tornero Poveda, Obras filosóficas, p. 31, interpret it as referring to the bones. However, one would then expect the female pronomen hiya. Moreover, the meaning of such an affirmation is far from being clear. The translation of Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', p. 416: 'e che (analogiamente) il suo osso [che aveve in mano] non esisteva' partakes in the same grammatical problem and is from a doctrinal point of view even more problematic. Let me add that if I am right, a probably better reading would be: wa-huwa macdüm.


33 See G. Endress, Proclus Arabus: Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio Theologica in arabischer Übersetzung, Beiruter Texte und Studien 10 (Beirut, Wiesbaden: F. Steiner Verlag, 1973), p. 231.

34 See D. Gimaret and G. Monnot (tr.), Shahrastänl: Livre des religions et des sectes, Vol 1, Collection UNESCO d'oeuvres représentatives, Série arabe (Leuven: Peeters and Unesco,


1986), vol. 1, p. 202, η. 13. Abü'l-Hudhayl (according to Abü'l-Hasan cAli ibn Ismäcil al-Ashcari, Maqälät al-islämiyyln wa-ikhtiläf al-musallln, ed. Muhammad Muhyi'1-Dïn cAbd al-Hamid (2 vols in 1, Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1389/1969), vol. 2, p. 51) would have affirmed that 'God's ibtidä3 of a thing after it was not is His creation (khalq) of it'. Note that the term ibtidä3 is of the same root as ibdä3, but that the latter, contrary to the former, seems to have been more common in the writings of the philosophers, and also those of al-Kindi. However, in the present case the unique manuscript contains the reading ibtidä3, but I think that Abu Rida, Rasä3il al-Kindl, p. 374, n. 4, rightly observes that a correction into ibdä3 almost imposes itself in view of al-Kindi's other writings.

35 See Endress, Proclus Arabus, pp. 78-109. The term ay sa (and the realted terms lay sa and tay3ls) in a substantivated form is, at first sight, no longer present in al-Färäbi, but it clearly reappears in Ibn Sina.

36 See above, note 30.

37 For a basic presentation of Ibn Sina's theory on this issue, see M.E. Marmura, 'Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of Particulars' in Journal of the Amerìcan Oriental Society 72 (1962), pp. 299-331; now reprinted in Michael E. Marmura, Probing in Islamic Philosophy: Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Slnä, al-Ghazäll and Other Major Muslim Thinkers (Binghamton, New York: Global Academic Publishing, 2005), pp. 71-95. See also P. Adamson, 'On Knowledge of Particulars'. Note that the major problem for the philosopher in this matter consists in combining the absolute unity and immutability of the divine essence with the knowledge of multiple and variable things, this knowledge implying normally a mutiplicity in the very essence of he who knows.

38 Abu Rida, Rasä3il al-Kindl, vol. 1, p. 374, Une 10 to p. 375, line 5; Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', pp. 396-7, eh. 6, lines 29-38.

39 I read cayn with Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', instead of ghayr (Abu Rida, Rasa3 il al-Kindi); Ramon Guerrero and Tornero Po veda, Obras filosóficas, p. 31 translate 'precisamente' and thus confirm the former reading.

40 Contrary to common interpretation, I do not think that the negation lä has to be added before awwaliyya lahä ('has beginning'). On the contrary, I believe that al-Kindi refers specifically to an eternity a parte post. There is not only the use of the term abad, but from the doctrinal point of view the focus is on what is temporally, not absolutely, originated; in other words, something generated after God has already generated something else as existing. Note that I read abadiyyatan, hence consider abadiyya to be a substantive and not an adjective that qualifies dhätuhu as obviously thought by the editors.

41 I read al-när with Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', instead of al-yabs, 'dryness' (Abu Rida, Rasä3il al-Kindî). Adamson, 'On Knowledge of Particulars', p. 60, and Ramon Guerrero and Tornero Poveda, Obras filosóficas, p. 31, clearly accept the latter variant.

42 Adamson, 'On Knowledge of Particulars', p. 60-1; Walzer, 'New Studies', p. 185.

43 For the specific meaning of ihdâth as 'temporal origination', see my 'Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sina', Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 8 (1997), pp. 455-77, p. 469, now reprinted in J. Janssens, Ibn Sina and his Influence on the Arabic and Latin World, Variorum Collected Studies Series CS 843 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

44 See Endress, Proclus Arabus, p. 100.

45 Adamson, 'On Knowledge of Particulars', pp. 62-3. Philoponus' fragment is derived from Simplicius, Commentary in Physica, 5-8, ed. H. Diels, CAG X (Berlin: G. Reimeri, 1895), p. 1151, fines 8-21; an English translation is present in Philoponus, Against Aristotle, on the Eternity of the World, tr. Chr. Wildberg, The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 133.


46 Abu Rida, Rasa3il al-Kindl, vol. 1, p. 375, lines 6-8; Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', p. 397, eh. 6, lines 38-9.

47 Abu Rida, Rasä3il al-Kindl, vol. 1, p. 375, line 9 to p. 376, line 6; Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', p. 397, eh. 6, lines 40-54. The English translation I offer here is in several respects quite different from the one present in my 'Al-Kindi's Concept of God', p. 8 (note that the translation there is introduced mistakenly, probably due to a printing error, by 'commenting on aya 81 ' instead of 'aya 82'). Due to the publication of new studies on Arabic philosophy, and especially on al-Kindi, I felt the need of elaborating an - as I hope - improved translation of the passage, even if my basic understanding of al-Kindi has not really changed. The rendition of the poetry quoted is from A.J. Arberry, The Seven Odes (London and New York: George Allen & Unwin, 1957), p. 64.

48 For ibdâ3 as expressing the notion of 'creano ex nihilo', see my 'Creation and Emanation in Avicenna', Documenti e Studi sulla Traduzione Filosofica Medievale 8 (1997), pp. 455-77, pp. 470-6.

49 With Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', I read in ... fa-inna instead of in ... käna (Abu Rida, Rasä3il al-Kindi), despite the fact that this latter reading has been accepted by both Adamson, 'On Knowledge of Particulars', p. 61, and Ramon Guerrero and Tornero Po veda, Obras filosóficas, p. 32.

50 For this translation, see Adamson, 'On Knowledge of Particulars', p. 64, n. 55; J. Jolivet, L'intellect selon al-Kindl, Publications de la fondation 'De Goeje' 22 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), p. 107, n. 5.

51 See Adamson, On Knowledge of Particulars', p. 63. Philoponus' fragment is taken once more from Simplicius, Commentary in Physica, 5-8, p. 1150, lines 16-25; English translation in Philoponus, Against Aristotle, p. 132.

52 However, Adamson, in his recently published book, explicitly mentions this issue; see P. Adamson, Al-Kindl, Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 64. Since the book appeared after I had completely finished this paper, I could unfortunately not take it into account in a systematic way.

53 This sentence is present near the end of fragment 115 - see Simplicius, Commentary in Physica, 5-8, p. 1141, lines 27-9; English translation in Philoponus, Against Aristotle, p. 129 (Compare fragment 116, English translation in Philoponus, Against Aristotle, p. 130: 'For the things created by God immediately are neither generated out of something pre-existent nor by way of <a process of> generation or a stretch of time').

54 al-Ashcari, Maqälät al-Islämiyyln, vol. 2, p. 51.

55 See Philoponus, Against Aristotle, fragment 115, quoted in Simplicius, Commentary in Physica, 5-8, p. 1141, lines 16-8; English translation in Philoponus, Against Aristotle, p. 129.

56 See once more al-Ashcari, Maqälät al-islämiyyln, vol. 2, p. 51.

57 K. Verrycken, Alexandrie 529: Philoponus en het einde van de antieke filosofie (Best: Damon, 1998), p. 135.

58 Abu Rida, Rasä3il al-Kindl, vol. 1, p. 182; Rashed and Jolivet (tr.), Métaphysique, p. 169.

59 I want to stress that I do not think ihaXfalsafa and kaläm have no common borders or have not influenced each other. However, there existed a clear difference in methodology, a fact not only recognised by such thinkers as al-Färäbi and Ibn Rushd, but also by Ibn Sina and al-GhazalL I therefore do not exclude that a 'philosopher' deals with ideas and questions that come from a kaläm context, or vice versa, but it has to be proved that the concerned problem did indeed arise in that particular context. Now, in my view, and herein I clearly have a different opinion from Adamson, al-Kindi was only in a limited way influenced by Muctazili ideas or interrogations (although we clearly agree that al-Kindi, when he is dealing with 'theological'


problems, always does so in a philosophical way). In this respect, it may be worthwhile to quote Cr. d'Ancona-Costa, 'al-Kindi e la sua eredità' in Cr. d'Ancona-Costa (ed), Storia della filosofia nell'Islam medievale, Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi (Torino: Einaudi, 2005), pp. 285-6, vol. 1, pp. 282-351, p. 289: 'Altri studi hanno però mostrato che le somiglianze diendenzo dall'uso di fonti communi e che l'interpretazione del tawhld come dottrina filosofica della semplicità assoluta del primo principio è ben più radicale e ben diversamente fondata in al-Kindi rispetto ai primi pensatori del kaläm muctazila. La sua impostazione generale, anche quando discute gli stessi argumenti dei teologi muctaziliti (ad esempio la questione degli atributi di Dio), è sostanzialmente diversa dalla loro.' Moreover, his presentation of a monotheistic theological philosophy seems to be much more directly dependent upon Philoponus. Of course, one may wonder whether the latter has developed a philosophical theology that differed in method and goals from that of the fathers of the church? This broader issue exceeds clearly the limits of the present paper (I thank D. Gutas for having drawn my attention to this). One, moreover, may wonder whether a start for a 'theological philosophy' has not been made in late Hellenism, especially with Jamblichus and his comments on the Chaldaic Oracles, see Athanassiadi, La lutte pour l'orthodoxie dans le platonisme tardif. De Numénius à Damascus, Collection l'âme d'or (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2006), pp. 57 ff. (I thank Cr. d'Ancona-Costa for this reference).

60 Walzer, 'New Studies', pp. 182-3; his opinion is explicitly approved by Adamson, On Knowledge of Particulars', p. 65.

61 Wansbrough, Qur'anic Studies, p. 218.

62 B. Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qur'an in the Theology of al-Qäsim ibn Ibrahim, Kitäb al-Mustarshid, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science 26. (Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1996), p. 32; p. 32, n. 11.

63 Abu Rida, Rasa3il al-Kindl, vol. 1, p. 376, lines 7-11; Guidi and Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi', p. 397, eh. 6, lines 55-9.

64 Abu Rida, Rasä3il al-Kindl, vol. 2, p. 93.

65 I read fi ghayrihim with the manuscript (Abu Rida, Rasä°il al-Kindl, η. 4) instead of fi ghanlhim (Abu Rida, Rasa3il al-Kindt).

66 I prefer to read al-hawä3ij (given as a possible reading by Abu Rida, Rasä3il al-Kindl, η. 5) instead of al-khawä3ij (Abu Rida, Rasä3il al-Kindl).

67 See Shahrastäni, Livre des religions et des sectes, vol. 1, p. 256, n. 5.

68 See D. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science 4 (Leiden, New York, K0benhavn, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1988), pp. 159-76. Adamson (in a private communication) rightly pointed out that al-Kindi's familiarity with the Aristotelian notion of anchinoia is not evident insofar as he had no direct access to the Posterior Analytics. Hence, my suggestion that al-Kindi prefigures here somehow Ibn Sina's notion of hods is in need of further investigation.

69 In this case, I have chosen the translation 'star' instead of the more common 'herbs', since al-Kindi clearly understood the term in this way.


71 See, e.g., Die sogenannte Theologie des Aristoteles, ed. Fr. Dieterici (Leizig, 1882; reprint Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1965), p. 100, line 14; Endress, Proclus Arabus, p. 11 (Ar), proposition 5, line 43.

72 But al-Kindi makes it clear anyhow that an intelligent approach is needed when one deals with religion. According to Rashed and Jolivet (ed. and tr.), Métaphysique, p. 201 ad n. 2, the whole paragraph illustrates how philosophy has to elucidate the Qur'anic message.


73 Wansbrough, Qur'anic Studies, p. 201 enumerates it as one of the three basic characteristics of Qur'anic masorah.

74 Olympiodorus, in his Commentary on Plato's Phaedo (see L.G. Westerinck, The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo: Vol. I: Olympiodorus, Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks 92 (Amsterdam, Oxford, New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976), p. 84, § 9, fines 1-2 (English translation); p. 85, § 9, lines 1-2 (Greek)) ascribes a similar view to Proclus who would have taken it from Aristotle himself. Walzer, 'New Studies', pp. 202-3 has already mentioned this.

75 Abu Rida, Rasa3il al-Kindl, vol. 1, p. 259, lines 14-5; Rashed and Jolivet (ed. and tr.), Métaphysique, p. 197, lines 12-3.

76 Rashed and Jolivet (ed. and tr.), Métaphysique, p. 204, ad n. 46.

77 Joel L. Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival During the Buyid Age (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1968), p. 163, n. 149.

78 Abu Jacfar Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Jämic al-bayän can ta3wll äy al-Qur3än (30 parts in 10 vols, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1978), vol. 9, part 27, p. 84.

79 See Alfred I. Ivry, Al-Kindl's Metaphysics: A Translation of Yacqüb ihn Ishäq al-Kindl's Treatise 'On First Philosophy' (Fl al-Falsafah al-Ulä) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974), pp. 33^1; see also my 'Al-Kindi's Concept of God', pp. 14-5.

80 I derive this expression from Endress, 'The Circle of al-Kindi', p. 65.

81 See my 'Avicenna and the Qur'än', pp. 177-92.

82 My sincerest thanks to P. Adamson who not only kindly improved the style of the paper, but who also made stimulating remarks and objections. I wish also to thank Cr. d'Ancona-Costa and D. Gutas for their observations. The contents of the paper, including possible errors, remain of course my own responsibility.

DOI: 10.3366/E146535910800003X

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