al-fĀrĀbĪ's views on the relationship between philosophy and

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SOME REMARKS ON AL-FĀRĀBĪ'S VIEWS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND

RELIGIONAuthor(s): YASIN CEYLANReviewed work(s):Source: Islamic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 77-81Published by: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, IslamabadStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20840157 .

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SOMEREMARKSONAL-FARABFS IEWSONTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENPHILOSOPHYANDRELIGION

YASIN CEYLAN

Al-Farabi's positionon therelationship etweenphilosophy nd religioncan be extracted from his theories of knowledge and prophecy. In both

theories he relies on Greek sources. However, his eclectic approach to the

formulation of doctrines and sensitivity to Islamic factors provide some

distinct characteristics to his views.

In his theory fknowledge l-Farabidivides intellect irst ntotwo

categories: human and superhuman. The human intellect,while not inuse,

is called potential intellect, and when in use, is called acquired intellect. In

order to get the latter status, there is a need for a contact between the

potential intellect and the superhuman intellectwhich he also calls theActive

Intellect. ince no potentialpower goes intooperationby itselfxceptbyan external intervention, thus, forany proposition made on intellectual level,and above the material implications of representative faculty, there is a

necessary cooperationof the human and

superhumanintellects.1 This

superhuman intellect or the Active Intellect is identical with the tenth Intel

ligence of Plotinian Emanationist Theory. In this theory, ten Intelligencesdescend from the First, in a hierarchy one coming after the other, each

being caused by the one prior to itself. This sequence terminates at the

tenth, which after having lostmuch of its divine quality is not competent

enough to give rise to an eleventh intelligence. It is yet above thematerial

world and supervises the affairs of the sub-lunar world.2

The Active Intellect is the source of intelligibles. Since general con

cepts are not associated in anyway with the particulars, an external sourcefor these notions which occur in themind is necessary. This source is also

the centre for the unity of intellection experienced by all human beings.

Now this very source, namely theActive Intellect, whose contact is



78 IslamicStudies 33 (1994)1

required for any conceptual or theoretical knowledge is, at the same time,

thesource fprophetic nowledge. y ascribing hetwotypes fknowledgeto the same source, al-Farabi reduces the prophetic knowledge to the sphereof human knowledge and provides an explanation for it.As most prophetsare not intellectually trained, the theoretical knowledge granted to them is

not of the kind a philosopher attains after discursive thinking, whereby he

accomplishes synthesis between universal concepts. The locus for the

emergence of true knowledge in prophets is the faculty of representation.

However, this faculty stores only images ofmaterial objects, and subjectsthem to synthetical and analytical processes. Thus, itdoes not accommodate

intelligibles which have nothing to do with thematerial existence, and arethe only tools for constructing meaningful statements. Then, how to relatea prophet'smind,whichwhile lacking trained ntellectualdisposition,possesses a powerful imagination with those indispensable intelligibles?

The answer al-Farabi offers to this question is that the intelligiblestake on various imaginary shapes in the faculty of representation so that

they become understandable to the prophet as well as to themasses who

are instructed in a picture-language reflecting the image-formulations of

intelligiblesnthemindof the

prophet.3But what is thetruth-valuef these tatementsnsymbolicanguage?

Are they obe taken t their acevalue,or interpretedo that he mpliedmeaning is in linewith the statements comprising intelligibles? Moreover,are theprophets who receive thosemessages and express them inpicture-language acquintant with their abstract (statements made of intelligibles) coun

terparts, or not? If they are, why do they not also articulate them through

intelligibles so that the enlightened people can also take their due share of

themessage and fully appreciate it? If, on the other hand, the prophet is

destitute of themeaning of themessage in conceptual form, then how canhe be considered to be in full grasp of reality?

To avoid such difficulties the Spinozian stance on the issue isworth

consideration. Spinoza is of the opinion that the prophets and scriptures, as

the record of their speeches, do not expound philosophical truth, they ex

pound rather guidelines for the actions and manners of human beings. Thus,a prophet's mission is not to teach his people the nature of thingswhich ishandled by the theoretical reason.4 This reminds one of Luther's remark

about the nature of the knowledge the Bible contains. "The Bible is darkenough for souls that long and seek to know more."5

It remains thatwhat prophets preach are the necessary precepts for

good conduct and right deeds, so thatman can lead a better life and a

meaningful existence in thisworld. And for such an aim there is no need



YASIN CEYLAN/Al-Farabi's Views on Philosophy and Religion 79

for the synthetic formulations of the theoretical reason, both in sciences and

inphilosophy. ince theprinciples elieved in,for nyrightction isnot amatter to be fully examined and evaluated by the theoretical reason, their

truth is taken for granted in absolute sense. These principles are in a sense,

postulates of practical reason in Kant's moral philosophy. According to

Kant, there is a need for three postulates to be believed by anyone who

wants to lead a consistent moral life.They are human freedom, immortalityof the soul, and God's existence.6 Nevertheless, none of these can be ration

allyproved.For they renotmatters tobe perceivedby thesensibilityndtransferred to the understanding so that they can become the subject of a

judgment given in accordance with the fixed categories. Nor are they likemathematical concepts reconstructable in thephysical world. They are rather

matters for belief. Thus, man faces the precarious situation of believing in

somethings absolutely rue,while notknowing xactlywhetherhe is justified in this belief. As the truth-value of these three postulates can never

be demonstrated by the theoretical reason, they can only be associated with

the practical reason which should not seek epistemic certainty for its rules,maxims or postulates.

If theprophets

areonly emphasizing

what are related to thepracticalreason, leaving the domain of the theoretical reason to the natural develop

ments of man's intellectual abilities, then two things gain importance. First,theoreticalruth snottobe includedn theprophetic ission.Second,their

teachings involve all men at any level of intellectual training,whether theyare illiterate peasants or learned scholars. Because both are predisposed to

actmorally and the ostensible advantage of the scholar is not in the realm

of practical reason but in that of the theoretical.

Al-Farabi's contention that the allegorical language of the scriptureaddresses the uneducated masses who take these scriptural statements attheir face value, should not then express the truthsof the theoretical reason,as they are only aimed at guiding man's moral conducts.7 Therefore, the

implied meanings these statements stand for, which can only be com

prehended bywise men, should not differ considerably from the allegorical,since their interpretation cannot render them into theoretical propositions.

They will still remain maxims or postulates of the practical reason, the full

comprehension of which is impossible for the theoretical reason. Then what

is theuse of interpreting suchmetaphorical expressions, if ven their implied

meanings are not explicable through rational demonstration? As an illustration,Muslim philosophers' denial of bodily resurrection can be given. The

philosophers, while rejecting bodily revival as contrary to reason accepted

spiritual resurrection as rationally demonstrable. Whereas, the immortalityof the soul is equally undemonstrable by the theoretical reason. This reason

ing is true of God's existence too. By rejecting the anthropomorphic descrip



80 Islamic Studies 33 (1994) 1

tions used forGod in scriptures divine existence is not rendered rationally

justified.

But there sa case for thephilosopherwith regardto suchmaximsor postulateswhich involvemorality nlyand cannotbe fully nownbutbelieved in. If thedefenders f suchbeliefs claim that the truth f thesebeliefscan be rationallyemonstrated t is thedutyof thephilosopher o

say that it cannot. For, here there is amistake being committed against the

methodologywhich treats he truth f thepropositions f thetheoreticalreason and thoseof thepracticaldifferently.he mixingof these two

categories causes insurmountable difficulties.

It seems that al-Farabfs theory that there is a need for an allegorical

language addressed to the laity, so that the truth in the scriptures isbroughtnearer to their understanding, does not hold ifwhat is expressed by this

language is a philosophical truth.Because in that case even metaphors will

not help make abstract notions easier for the common people. On the other

hand, what will be the benefit of instructingmasses about thingswhich are

not suitable for their comprehension and will have no effect on their conduct,due to the

qualitiesofwhich

theyre

apttobe

happyor

unhappy.Thus, theSpinozianaccountthat hephilosophical ruthsdifferent

fromthat f religion nd that theformer houldnotbe searchedfor in

scriptures puts us in a more advantageous position for the solution of the

problem.8 f themain purpose inthescripturalnowledge sto inducementowards moral acts, then such beliefs should not be brought under philosophical scrutiny as towhether they are verifiable or not. They should rather be

treated like the Kantian postulates of practical reason. However, has a

philosopher no say in suchmatters? Or, are all beliefs for themoral conduct

ofman the same invalue, however theymay differ from each other? If theyare not, then the question ofwhich belief isgood forwhich moral act arises.

For, not all beliefs are conducive to right deeds. This aspect of the issue

naturally concerns a philosopher, as itdoes any intellectual who desires the

well-being ofmankind.

One of the importanthings obe consideredwhile evaluatingthe

relationshipetweenbeliefand act is that ny suchbelief shouldnotbeassessed independent of act which is itsfruit. Because there is no other

criterionnwhicha belief (involving oral conduct)can be judgedas toitsvalue forman. To do this, it iswiser to proceed from acts towards beliefs

butnotviceversa. Ifthis uleisnotobserved, njustice ill be done tomanybeliefs and the systems they are part of, while many unworthy beliefs will

be regarded as worthwhile only because they look more consistent and

somewhat rationally integrated.



YASIN CEYLAN/Al-Farabi's Views on Philosophy and Religion 81

^bu Nasr al-Farabi, Al-Farabi on thePerfect City, trans, and comments by Richard Waltzer

(Oxford, 985), .203.

2Ibid. pp. 105-107.

3Ibid. pp. 221-225.

4Benedict de Spinoza, A Theolo&co-Poluical Treatise (New York, 1951), p. 190.

5W.T. Jones, A History ofWestern Philosophy (New York, 1969), v. Ill, p. 57.

6Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (New York, 1956), pp. 137-138.7Al-Farabi, The Perfect City, p. 279.

Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise, pp. 190-199.

mm

al-fĀrĀbĪ's views on the relationship between philosophy and

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