AL-BIRŪNĪ AND HIS KITĀB AL - JAMĀHIR FĪ-MA'RIFAT AL-JAWĀHIR: Ethical Reflectionsand Moral PhilosophyAuthor(s): SYED H.H. NADVIReviewed work(s):Source: Islamic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4 (DECEMBER 1974), pp. 253-268Published by: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, IslamabadStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20846926 .Accessed: 27/12/2011 17:43

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AL-BIRUNl AND HIS KITAB AL - JAMAHIR FI-MA'RIFAT AL-JAWAHIR: Ethical Reflections and Moral Philosophy

SYED H.H. NADVI

The School of Baghdad survived the political down-fall of the

Caliphate. The creative activity of Baghdad, although slowed down, did not cease completely until the middle of the XVth century. Asia, particu

larly India and China were influenced by Baghdad School. Abu Raihan al-BIrunl (b. 3 Dhul-Hijja, 362 A.H./4 September 973 A.D.; d. 2

Rajab, 440 A.H. 13 December 1048 A.D.), i served as a living link

between the traditions of the School of Baghdad and those of India. He

enjoyed the patronage of the Court of Mahmud of Ghaznah (997-1030

A.D.).

Kitdb al-Jamahlr reveals three-dimensional personality of al-Biruni,

namely (l)al-BIrunl as a teacher of ethics or moral philosophy, (2) as a scholar of mineralogy and an expert of precious stones known in Arabic

or in other languages, and (3) as an evaluator of precious stones and the

inter relationship between precious stones and coins*.

Ethics of al-Biruni:

Each discipline of thought has its own code of ethics. A lawyer, a physician or a teacher is supposed to be honest in his profession. Thus

honesty is a part of ethics. No religion is without ethical commandments:

"Thou shalt not Kill" or "Do unto others as you would have them do unto

you". Daily life is also governed by ethical notions which vary, of course,

according to the belief system of the community such as "The end justifies the means", "Might makes right", "Every man for himself", "My country,

right or wrong", "Good neighbour policy", "Fair play", or "Taking arms

against aggressor is always right course of action," and so on. Reaching a

decision, as to what choice among alternative courses of conduct one ought to make, is precisely speaking the subject matter of ethics or moral-phi

losophy Ethics are concerned with the understanding of what is meant by such terms as "good", "right", "justifiable", "duty", "responsibility" and

so on in forming judgment about how people ought to behave when con

fronted with a choice of alternative.

254 SYED H.H. NADVI

Value judgment is, therefore, implicit in ethics. It is difficult for all intelligent persons to agree on ethical terms, such as what is right and what is wrong, especially when their own interest and beliefs are dif ferent. The great moral teachers of mankind have devoted their lives to

reach a conclusion about a way of good life, about a concept of good and

bad and right and wrong. Thinking persons or moral philosophers like Confucious, Laotze, Buddha, Zoroaster, Socrates, Epicurus, Epictetus,

Spinoza, Kant and Dewey spent their lives in searching answers to ethical

problems.3 In Western as well as in Eastern civilizations conflicting ethical

ideals are quite evident. Worldliness of classical and Renaissance cultures was opposed to unworldliness of mediaeval and mystic renunciation of all

earthly desires. The Catholic ethics of Aquinas and the Protestant ethics

of Kant, the evolutionary ethics of social reform and the revolutionary ethics of violent seizure of power are two different ideals diametrically

opposed to each other. Socrates' theory that "Virtue is knowledge" was

contradicted by the Romantic slogan "Ignorance is bliss", for ignorance

keeps men happier. Similar is the conflict between established traditions and changing social conditions. The accepted or socially sanctioned

standards of good and bad are not one and the same. Ethical reflections are

yet in process of revealing the philosophy of common morality, acceptable to all religions and civilizations. Since ethical principles are involved in

making a choice between alternative possibilities in terms of better and

worse, it is the aim of moral philosophy to clarify ethical choice. A "good

person" or a "good character" is the product of good belief, good breeding, good habits, good education and good religious training. There are many different opinions about what is good in regard to character, breeding, habits, education and religion. Discussing the stable set of habit for the

formation of character Aristotle, in the first chapter of his Ethics, notes that a young person, ruled by uncontrolled impulses, was not yet ready for the study of ethics. The term "young" does not imply youthfulness in years but in maturity of habits of self-control and of reflections over one's experiences.

Now coming back to the first part of the Kitab al-Jawahir, namely the fifteen Tarwffrds with preceding and succeeding chapters 4, we can see his treatment of good, bad, happiness, moral excellence etc. The moral

Philosophy and ethical reflections of al-BIrunl revolve around his theories of virtue (aUMuruwwa) and perfection These concepts are evolved in various ways in his different Tarwtba or parts of preamble.

The whole philosophy is religious in character rather than abstract ration

AL-BIRUNI 255

alization like that of philosophers. He deals with the spiritual life of man, his virtues and evils affecting the conduct of man and society. His moral

philosophy derives its inspiration from the Qur'an and Sunna, so frequently

quoted in support of his statements and arguments.

Before opening his discourse on ethics, he initiates it with praise of God who created the universe, skies, sun and moon for the benefit of

man and sent down rain to raise his subsistence. He concludes it with the

praise of the Prophet.5

In the first Tarwfya al-Biruni discusses the five senses of man, so vital

for his existence and initial (perceptions

of Truth. They were, no doubt,

blessings of God.6 The second Tarwlhta deals with the senses of man

and of animals and describes the superiority of the former over the latter.

Animals were created for the service of man, so that man could be grateful to his Creator. The following verse has been cited in favour of the argu ment:

j pfijT) pi) J UjOU l*J ^4* UUJI Ui-Ail ?A*& W? ̂ U2U Ul tjy. ̂ jl

Mentioning the benefits of the senses of seeing and hearing 0*^1* he says that man was endowed with these senses so that he could recognize

signs of God and listen to His commandments. The importance of such

vital senses can be realized only after their loss. He concludes that these

senses served as major sources of knowledge. His entire effort is aimed to

prove the existence of God and His flawless creations for the benefit of man,

so that he could lay the foundation of his ethics on revelation rather than on

rationalism and to invite men to follow the divinely revealed ethics and

not an ethics related to human ambitions. He cites the following verses:

cH' **' uiri J>- J J J^TVI J WlJ (WS" (s

Ojpj** Ifi* f?*J 03jH U*J^J Oj^JI *J & jjfcj (r

In these verses indebtedness of man to his Creator, perfection of

creation and his accountability to the Lord have been highlighted. It

is, however, unfortunate that man, despite all such heavenly blessings, was ungrateful to his Lord.7 The third Tarwfya defines the nature of

associations {al-Jins, or temperamental affinity of good and bad charao

256 SYED H.H. NADVI

ters with each other). A blind person, for example, feels comfortable only with a blind friend. Evil goes with evil and virtue with virtue.8 Philosophy of renunciation and escapism has been rejected by al-BIrunl in the fourth

Tarwtba for man is a social being and he can't live without a society, with

out a leader and without a political life. God has created minerals like

gold and silver to facilitate man's needful social and political life.* The

tendency of accumulation and hoarding of wealth by the few has been con

demned in the fifth Tarwlha. Al-BirunI emphatically criticises such evil persons who deprive others from the use of gold and silver, which were

not to be eaten by man but to be used for the welfare of man and of State.

In this respect metals were regarded as total good. Man's ethics took a turn to selfishness which spoiled his virtues and manliness. The hoarders

and accumulators of gold, silver, metals and stones are condemned by al-BIrunl and have been warned of severe punishments in the light of the following verse because they violate the divine ethics: *?.

The main concepts of al-BTrunfs moral philosophy, are contained in his theories of al-Muruwwa (virtue) and aUFutuwwa (perfection) both being inter-related. They are discussed in the sixth Tarwlha, the former

dealing with the ideal of manhood, valour, chivalry, generosity and sense

of honour; while the latter treating the totality of noble character, chivalrous qualities of a man, his magnanimity, selflessness, generosity and noble heartedness. It was the designation of Islamic brotherhood of the Middle Ages and yet is used as names of several youth organization in Arab countries. Al-Muruwwa is a virtue centred on the individual while aUFutuwwa is all embracing and beneficial to others. IJatim of Tayyl and Ka'b Mama al-Iyadl have been quoted by al-Birfinl as examples in

this regard. The Arab ideal of generosity and hospitality is personified in Hatim, the source of many anecdotes. The latter gave hislife to save

the life of his thirsty friend by his generosity. An ideal and virtuous youth, according to al-BIrunl, is one who perceives the lawful and the forbidden

(haldl and haram) as ordained by divine authority, and who is saturated with virtues like gentleness (al^ilm), amnesty (al-'qfw), sedateness or grave manners (al-razana), toleration (al-ihtimal) and modesty (tawadu*) and who

is devoted to the welfare of others. An ideal youth is supposed to repel tyranny, protect truth and safeguard the rights of the neighbour, like

Hatim, so well known for his magnanimity and noble heartedness (karam and samafra). Al-BirunI quotes the following verses in support of his theory of al-Futuwwa:

AL-BIRUNI 257

The ideal youth is not one who sets back and forth to drink radiant and bright morning and evening wine. The ideal youth, on the contrary, is one who goes back and forth for the suppression of the enemy or evil and for the welfare of the friend (truth). At the same time 'All b. al-Jahm's verse is quoted in support of the theory of al-Muruwwa (personal virtues):

There is no shame if an ideal free man or knight loses his prosperity and happiness but the real disgrace is if he loses courtesy, generosity and

etiquette. Al-BIrunI is fully mindful to caution his ideal youth not to spoil his virtue by imposing his obligation and quotes the holy verse iS^Vij ,>JU f&Kxp i^ikj for in this case not only virtues are lost but also

they are rejected by God. Here again one can see how al-BIrunl's ethics is inseparable from his religious beliefs. If the Aristotle's young man ruled

by uncontrolled impulses was not ready for the study of ethics, al-BIrunl's

young man, devoid of al-Muruwwa and of al-Futuwwa, was not mature

enough for the study of ethics. Al-BIrunl's moral philosophy is diamet

rically opposed to the utilitarian ethics.* * The sign of an intelligent man, as described by al-Biruni, in the seventh Tarwihta lies in his perception of the blessings of Lord and not in getting involved in worldly luxuries and pleasures. The intelligent man is always grateful to his Lord. It is only an unintelligent person who is always lost in worldly pleasures with utter

disregard to ethics. Precious stones were in fact created for the use of the

grateful and virtuous people and not for the wicked and avaricious, always running back and forth for false self-praise and worldly prestige and power

Uoj *Vi tfM ju^jt j jyai ?>ij).i2 The eighth Tarwfya deals with the variation of human nature, so avaricious for precious things. The philo sophy of love which blinds a man has also been discussed here. It has been concluded that excessive physical and worldly pleasures lead to exhaustion and thus negate virtues.13 The concept of al-Muruwwa has been further elaborated in the ninth Tarwtfia. Crave for self-praise according to al Blrunl is negation of virtues. The philosophy of cleanliness has also been attributed to the concept of al-Muruwwa. Personal cleanliness, according to al-BIrunl, means cleanliness of heart and of intention; he says that:

The second caliph once defined al-Muruwwa as cleanliness of clothes

258 SYED H.H. NADVI

(vttiN J SMtn W). The Quranic injunction "Clean your clothes" has been interpreted by the exegetist as cleanliness of the heart and inten

tions. Al-BIrunI supports this interpretation.The tenth Tarwlhd further

enumerates the virtues of a perfect man as being large-hearted, covering the

weakness of others and of helping the needy. Religion itself teaches justice and equality. Al-BIrunl emphatically asserts that it is not precious stones

which decorate man's character, it is manly qualities which adorn his

conduct and it is a clean heart which pleases Lord. Hie cleanliness of body and dress, as in the case of pilgrims, is metaphorical implying cleanli ness of soul as well as of the body. ??l*Ji Js*# o^1 JuT^ abVi & oi Thus the perfection of cleanliness is analogous to the perfection of al-Mu

ruwwa.i* The noted emphasis of al-Biruni on the cleanliness of soul and

heart is a clear evidence that they are the main fountains of virtues, all goods

leading to happiness and to all good deeds like justic and other moral ex

cellences, unattainable by abstract reflections on empirical ethics. Soul

has been the centre of attention in all religious ethics although neglected in rational ethics, where logical dialectics serve as the basis of analysis of

human nature, his concept of good and bad etc.

The religious ethics of al-BIrunl is boldly projected in the eleventh Tarwlhd, when he asserts that pleasurer of God ought to be the objective of all human ethics, for it governs human conduct in terms of a choice of

alternatives between good and bad, vice and virtue. He condemns those

who fear kings, who destroy human virtues for self-projections and self

glorification and negate the concept of al-Muruwwa. The king would

not hesitate in letting loose his tyranny in order to save his throne. Thus

a king cannot be a model of virtues. Here we can see a revolutionary al

Blrunl, rising against the king, to destory the concept of al-Mu

ruwwa and of al-FutuwwaJ* The same idea is developed in the twelfth

Tarwlhd, where al-BIrunl, presents his theory of a welfare-state. The wealth

and treasures of kings according to al-BIrfinf's moral philosophy were to

be used for the welfare of the state and of its people and not for self concerned individuals. Virtue of wealth lies in being spent for the people. *7

Dealing with the utility of wealth al-BIrunl describes in the thirteenth Tar wlhd, how the rich and the poor used to save their wealth beneath the sur

face the earth and how they were lost without being utilized either by the inheritors of the wealth or by the people of the state. Thus the utility of

wealth comes to zero. This selfish conduct again negates the philosophy of FutuwwaJ* The fourteenth Tarwlhd deals with the problems of movable wealth. Kings would carry their wealth from place to place either

AL-BIRUNI 259

for their own use or for the benefits of the public but as the problem of transport of gold and silver had become difficult, they used to carry precious stones instead, in order to avoid the risk of theft or loss of gold or of silver.

Here al-Birunf philosophizes his ethics in a most sophisticated manner. He

implies that it is quality rather than quantity that matters in ethics. Vir

tues, however small, count much. A man who piles a heap of sins in his

life and lacks one single virtue is most unfortunate. It is enough for a

man to have few virtues to his credit for they are like precious stones.

After death, virtuous deeds, although few in number, can be a source of

salvation.*9 In the last Tarwtfia, al-BIrunl again generalizes his moral

philosophy saying that the use of gold and silver utensils were forbidden for the simple reason that they were available only to few individuals, the

kings or the rich, and not to the public and masses. Thus king's love with

gold and precious stones, so transitory and unreal in nature, was hazardous

and against the principles of aUFutuwwa. Virtue alone is real. It does possess

infinity and eternity. It is the misfortune of man who does not perceive this

Truth. Only few were endowed with divine wisdom to perceive truth.20

Here the ethical system of al-BIrunl in his Kitab al-Jamahir comes to a

conclusion. This preface, (before his first article on the precious stones) reveals al-BIrunl's religious being whose ethical reflections govern his

basic treatment of gold, silver and precious stones. Finally he points out

his primary sources and his indebtedness to his Lord who had enabled him to write a book on such an important subject.21

Al-Biruni and Reason: As Compared with the Main Ethical Trends in the West

Whether al-BIrunl applied empirical methods to his analysis of

ethics in Kitab al-Jamdhir or not and whether he treated reason as the

ultimate authority in religion and whether he was influenced in his treat

ment of ethics by Greek Rationalism and Naturalism, and if so in what

ways, and whether, like Spinoza, he treated human nature as geometrical

problem or whether like Kant the emphasised intrinsic value of the indi

vidual or whether like Bentham he reduced ethics to calculus or propagated a utilitarian ethics like J.S. Mill or criticised Bentham hedonism like

Bradley are queries of most interesting nature.

Being extremely precise, one can say that al-BIrunl in his Kitab

al-Jamdhir seems to be a true believer in revelations, the only source of

human knowledge in regard to ethics, and moral philosophy and the only basis of all human happiness. Moral good and excellence lie in manly

260 SYED H.H. NADVI

virtues as defined in al-Muruwwa and al-Futuwwa. Man must be grateful to his Lord, must obey his commandments. This is the only condition of

human happiness. Moral virtues must be all embracing and not indivi

dualized and selfish in nature. Man should serve others and should eman

cipate himself from the love of gold and silver, so transitory and short lived in nature. They were created by the Lord for the welfare of the state and

its people and not for the specific use or glorification of the kings and the

rich, who were prone to hoard them and to deprive others from their use.

Al-BIrunl during the whole course of his statements uses neither Greek

rationalism nor any geometry or calculus. On the contrary he quotes

"frequently like a devoted believer in revelation from the revealed book, the Holy Qur'an, as we have seen in the preceding discussion. The western

ethical philosophy is confronted with two opposing schools. One believ

ing in empiricism and the other in revelation, rejecting the empirical and

scientific verification in ethics for it was a normative discipline whose prob lem of "what ought to be" is insoluble by the factual or scientific methods.

Intuition of eternal moral laws, or in other words revelation of a higher or

supernatural world beyond the jurisdiction of scientific method of inquiry, is the starting point of this school. Being ethical absolutist in nature, the school maintains that if "good" virtues and human happiness were regarded as relative to human needs, ambitions and desires, then the concept of all

moral claims and obligations were meaningless. Al-BirunI belongs to this

very school and he opposes treatment of ethical valuation as hypotheses that

arise out of cultural conflicts and have to be tested experimentally on the

basis of the their instrumental value in resolving such conflicts in our human

relations. He maintains that political, legal, educational and other social

problems cannot be isolated from ethics. If Plato and Aristotle teach

that a good man is one who lives in accordance with the rational laws

of the stable society, al-Biruni teaches to live in accordance with divine

decrees. If Marx preaches to live in accordance with the economic interests

of his class and if Nietzsche's (as iconoclast) ethics, transcending all kinds of good and evil by breaking with philistine notions and the slave morality of Christianity and preaching an ideal society of emancipated superman, declares that God is dead and man is to take over, al-Birflni's ethics teaches

to surrender before God and to follow divinely guided ethics, a real source

of all "good", happiness, justice and equality.

Al-BIrunl in his Kitab al-Jamahir is free from rational dialectics

of Socrates and of Plato who discuss on the intellectual levels "why is justice better than injustice"? Happiness and well being, according to Aristotle,

AL-BIRUNI 261

are supreme to all human activities and good is equal to happiness. But

he concludes that there is little agreement about what constitutes

happiness.* Al-BfrunI has solved this crisis by preaching happiness, achieved merely through obeying revelations. Al-BIruni is opposed to pleasure in abstract sense. He is opposed to all those who want to

accumulate wealth, power, social fame and public prestige in addition to

sensuous excitements (food, drink and sex) in order to suppress the State

and its people. He is opposed to perversive happiness. He, like Plato and

Aristotle, does not establish an absolute cause of all goodness, and has

no empirical approach to ethics. In Aristotle's eyes the good man is one

whose activity and ethics are guided by reason while al-BIruni's is not in

favour of the use of scientific reasoning in ethics like these naturalists or

mathematicians or pure theoreticians who seek to demonstrate their con

clusions with logical certainty. Al-BIrunl cannot agree with Aristotle

and Dewey who regarded good as relative to man's interest. Al-BIrunl

does not subordinate ethics to human nature but subordinates human

nature to religious ethical theory. Spinoza treats human nature as he

treats geometrical problems to prove scientific objectivity and rational

method of proof into ethics and concludes that since emotions follow or

dinary laws of nature which are always the same, human nature must be

governed by some fixed laws. He thinks that application of geometry

to ethics may lead him to deduct fixed universal traits in all human beings. The only salvation according to him lay in the use of reason. But al

Birunl preferred revelation to geometry.

Emanual Kant seems to be much closer to al-BIruni than any other

western philosopher for the simple reason that he believed in the higher

moral world not limited by space and time. He attacked social utility and

pleasures as inadequate ethical standards or guides to the individual sense

of duty. The "good" for Kant is absolutely independent of the empirical

facts or laws. He says that nothing in the laws of natural sciences tells us

that we ought to treat human beings as moral ends in themselves. Kant,

however, thinks that good will is the sterling quality of all ethical characters

and good faith the moral basis of legal contracts. The greatest contribu

tion of Kant's ethics is its emphasis on intrinsic values of individuals as ends

in themselves. Such discussions seem to be not relevant for al-BIrunfs

ethics in his Kitab al-Jamahir. Bentham hedonistic ethics, being based

on a calculus of pleasure and pains teaches what to seek and what to avoid

in our private and public life. He says that good is whatever promotes

Sec ten chapters ( NicomachcanEthics for Aristotle's moral and intellectual analysis.

262 SYED H.H. NADVI

the happiness. Thus he reduces ethics to calculus. J.S. Mill like Bentham is a utilitarian. The utilitarians reject the two worlds of Kant, the physical and the spiritual, the temporal and eternal to which body and soul belonged

separately. The utilitarians wanted to bring ethics closer to natural and

social sciences. Their basic belief is that moral conceptions and standards

must be continually subjected to revision. Consequently, they reject the aristocratic ethics of Plato and Aristotle. The a priori ethics of Spinoza, the supernatural revelations Of mediaeval moralists, the intuition of Pro testant ethics, the two worldly systems of Kant; according to them, belonged to the past and to the passing culture and thus needed revision in the scienti fic and technological era. The basic belief of utilitarians is that goods are not absolute, self-sufficient and final termini of moral action. They

depend always on psychological, social and historical circumstances, in

which reflections over what is desirable, plays a decisive role, namely an

individual citizen could accept bribe and both Mill and Dewey would allow him to do so for the utilitarian formula of the "greatest good for the greatest number" will not object to it. But al-Birunl's ethics will not permit any one to accept bribe no matter what the circumstances are or were, for his

ethics was not relative to human interest but to divine injunctions. F.H.

Bradley's arguments, although dialectical, expose formal contradictions and

incomplete character of empiricism in ethics. He criticises Bentham's

hedonism and Mill's utilitarianism and defends self-realization as a more

concrete goal of a moral activity than evanescent pleasures or happiness in the abstract. Mill is censured for his vague and unattainable ideal in

his principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Yet

Bradley has no kinship with al-BIrunT.

While comparing al-BIruni's ethics with dialectical rationalism, we have to conclude that al-Birfin! depends more on revelation rather than on rationalism or empiricism and in his Kitdb al-Jamahir his main sources

of inspiration are the Holy Book, the traditions of the prophets and acts of those around the prophet.

AUBlrunl and Professor Eduard Sachau:

In the light of the foregoing discussions one can easily decide whether al-BIrunl was a good Muslim, a true and devoted believer or a bad

Muslim as Professor Sachau of Germany has maintained. In the preface

(English edition) of Kitdb al-Athar al-Bdqiya'an 'al-Qurun'anal-Khaliyd (by al-BIrunl) edited by Professor Sachau, the editor has claimed that al

AL-BIRUNI 263

Blriinfwas (1) a bad Muslim (2) a despiser of the Arabs and of Arabic Sciences and finally (3) he was not a Sunnf-Muslim. How can al-BIrunl

be a bad Muslim when he follows the Qur'an and Sunna in a devoted

fashion? His whole writing in Kitab al-Jamahir contradicts it and rejects this theory of Sachau. No statement on ethics are made without having been supported from the Qur'an. The greatest good on earth was devotion

to and service of human being as explained in al-Futuwwa (the perfection). Al-BIrunl preaches gentleness amnesty, sedateness, toleration, modesty,

magnanimity and large heartedness as prescribed and defined by the Qur'an and the Sunna and not as dictated by human reason often motivated by individual and selfish interests and desires. His writings in Tarwlbds prove that he was an orthodox and God fearing Muslim. Sachau's views have

been refuted by another German scholar Professor Krenkow, who worked

all his life on al-BIrunl, and had edited his Kitab al-Jamahir and supported

TaqI al-DIn Hilall on this issue.* * Al-BIrunl was a devoted Sunnl-Muslim

for in the eleventh Tarwifra he reveals that in 'AH he saw the fourth caliph, which shows that he did not believe in the Theory of divine determination of 'Alf.Moreover al-Biruni praises the well guided four caliphs (oj-^yuuwi) and praises 'Umar b. 'Abd al-*Aziz as well as the caliphs of the Marwanids.

He praises only few of the Abbasid caliphs. These beliefs clearly represent well known SunnI school of thought.*3 Al-BIrunl was neither an enemy of the Arabs nor a despiser of Arabic sciences as Professor Sachau has

maintained. On the contrary, he was a friend of Arabs and preferred them

to others for they had al-Muruwwa and some of them even sacrificed their

belongings and their lives for the service of others. In the ninth Tarwlfra he

speaks highly of Arabian folks and refers to them as an ideal. The eleventh

Tarwlfra and fourteenth Tarwlha reveal how he admired the Arabs* * and

how high in esteem was Arabic science in his eyes. He regarded al-Kindl

as the greatest philosopher of the Arabs.*5

From these documentary evidences it is qiute manifest that Profes

sor Sachau lost objectivity in his evaluation of al-BIrunl.

Al-BIrunl and the Department of Sindology:

There is a great deal of controversy as discussed in this Congress on the question of the birthplace of al-Biruni. Some of the early Arabic writers claim that al-BIrunl hailed from Sind (now a province of Pakistan), and BIrun was a town in Sind. The two primary Arab sources among others

to be cited are Ibn AbF U$aibi'a and Sbahrzurl. They in their books Tabqdt al-Atibba (vol. 2) and Akhbar al-Hukama respectively claim taht al-BIrunl's

264 SYED H.H. NADVI

origin goes to Sind. The latter also describes the Fauna and Flora of the city and its splendid view and says that there is no wonder that such a genius as al-BIrunl hailed from such a beautiful city, namely, Birun in

Sind.2*

The theory of al-BfrunFs origin has, however, been questioned by other scholars who maintain that al-BIrunl belonged to Khwarizm. Some

of them quote Kitdb al-Masdlik by Ibn IJauqal, an Atlas,which shows a

city Nirun in Sind and not Birun. They maintian that Nirun was mistaken as Birun by shere misunderstanding. They also quote ?am'anFs Kitdb

at-Ansdb and Yaqut's Mu'jam al-Udabd? in support of their statements.27

The difference of opinion on Birun and Nirun is not the subject of our present discussion. The main point revolves around a question "what further advancements were made in this field of research by the

Department of Sindology, devoted to discover every intellectual avenue

related to Sind?" If no research is conducted in this regard it is

amazing. Everyone would agree with this proposition that no matter

whether al-BIrunl belonged to Sind or to Khwarizm, a research ought to

have been advanced on this issue by the Institute of Sindology. Is it not

amazing that Kitdb al-Jamahir is translated in Russia 28 but not in Pakis

tan where the Department of Mineralogy needed its help more than in Russia. It should have been translated by experts in any language of Pakis

tan, in Sindhi, Panjabi or in Urdu, the national language. It might have introduced us to the precious stones and their history as al-BIrunl had described it in his first article about Jawahir where he disscussed the

form, circumstances, history and goodness of the precious stones like:

oyui 'jbuA Jv*Ji '?>tr-J 'ouyi (and their names as

to linguists and jewellers along with their prices. And we might have been benefited by the ocean of knowledge of al-BIrunl and from his art of diving etc., and by the valuable informations about va31 and its forms

and other relevant informations about it, and by the scientific and chemical

informations about.

u*u*Ji and ̂ksJi etc.30 Moreover, we might have been able to understand the contemporary prices of precious stones and the relationship between coins and precious stones. We might have known more about 'o*^

'virJI 'tfjr**1 etc. along with the mineralogical kno

wledge of al-Yaman.3i

If more discoveries were made in regard to al-BfrunI*s birth place

AL-BIRUNI 265

and some more light were shed on the dark film, it might have widened the intellectual avenues of research. It does not mean that a forced judgment, in order to prove that al-BIrunl belonged to Sind is made. On the contrary, it simply means a sincere and honest effort on the part of scholars to

push the territory of this research further ahead.

Knowledge and civilizations have neither frontiers nor boundaries

nor nationalities nor have they directions of east or of west, of south or

of north. Dr. Nitobe once remarked so truly that "the East is in the West

and the West is in the East ? there are no points in the compass of the

soul.3 2 Whether al-Biruni belonged to Sind or to Khwarism, his know

ledge is and shall ever remain the common heritage of humanity, either in

the East or in the West.

Conclusion:

It can safely be concluded that sources of al-BIrunl's ethics were

revelational without being influenced by rationalism or naturalism and he was a true devout Muslim and not a bad Muslim as Professor Sachau

had thought.

Al-BIrunfs refusal to apply empiricism to ethics and moral philos

ophy does not minimize his position as a great scientist and empiricist in other sciences. Human history is indebted to him for his contribution to mathematics, astronomy, geology, pharmacology, history, geography, linguistics, religion, ethics and philosophy.

NOTES

1. This date given by Sachau in the preamble of his Chronology of oriental races has been questioned by Taki ed-Din _al-Hilali in his Die Einleitung mal-BUuni Stein buck, (Leipzig 1941), p. vii. He on the authority of Professor Krenkow says that Sachau's date is not in agreement with al-BirOni's statement who says himself in the introduction Kitdb as-Saridana, that he was already eighty years old at that time, which contradicts Sachau's dating. See pp. vii and ix.

2. The book is divided into three parts (1) The preface (Hyderabad ed.) pp. 32-228 1-32, (2) First article dealing with precious stones, pp. 1-11, appended at the end of the pp. 32-322 (also pp. xx 1-11 appended at the end of the book) (3) Second article dealing with coins and precious stones and their inter-relationship pp. 228-271.

3. Abstract ethical principles cannot however, make a "good person" for ethics are discussed here merely as verbal and intellectual exercise. Professional codes of ethics, and other practical precepts of conduct belong to the study of applied ethics and homiletics. Socrates promoted ethics as rational discipline when he requested

266 SYED H.H. NADVI

people to define justice, courage, friendship and to clarify their ideas. For detailed abstract discussions see, Plato's Republic; Aristotle's to The Nicomachean Ethics; Benedict de Spinoza's On the Improvement of the Understanding and of Human

Bondage, or The Strength of the Emotions; Immanuel Kant's The Metaphysics of Morals, or Jeremy Bentham's An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Le

gislation; John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism; F.H. Bradley's Pleasure for Pleasure's Sake; John Dewey's Does Human Nature Change.

4. Al-BirQnl, Kitdb aUJamahtr fhMa'rifat al-Jawdhir edited by Professor Krenko

(Hyderabad, 1355 A.H.), pp. 3-32'.

5. Ibid., p. 3.

6. Ibid., p. 4.

7. Ibid, pp., 4-6.

8. Ibid., 6.

9. Ibid., pp. 6-8.

10. Ibid., pp. SAO.

11. Ibid., pp. 12-14.

12. Ibid., pp. 12-14.

13. Ibid., pp. 14-17.

14. Ibid., pp. 17-22.

15. Ibid., pp. 22-24.

16. Ibid., pp. 24-26.

17. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

18. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

19. Ibid., pp. 28-30.

20. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

21. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

22. Takied Din al-Hil&li, D/e Einleitung zu aUBlrunls Steinbuch mit erlauterungen ubersetzt (samml. Orientalistischer Arbeiten, 7, 24 cm, Leipzig 1941 (pp. V-XXI), see pp. VII-XII.

23. lbid.,pp.XII-XIV.

24. PP.XIV-XV.

25. PP. XV.

26. Al-BlrQnl, Al-Athdr al-Bdqtya, edited by Dr. C. Eduard Sachau, Professor of Oriental Studies, (University of Berlin, Maktabat al-Muthanna, Baghdad 1923), (date on the preface of the first edition is July 20,1878, Berlin), p. liii.

AL-BIRUNI 267

Sachau quotes al-Shaharzuri from a manuscript (Ms. Or. Octav. 217 Bl. 170 a) the content is given as below;

O^l ij* OlT J AuJl* Cl3jst J {JjjsJl # -u^tr< <jUu)jjI

oVji*JljU> ij o^iJI ^ jjj JLc ^>l ? ol^bL* *Jj SjJtT UT

j *jyU*J o^ljj *J (jii. U j (170 b) ̂ Cx4

Jlj^Vl cJ^Ji^l ys^w *JI oU^J Ul J JikJ Ui 4iu>>mo j ^UJ! aJj4

LUIIj U&JI (3^1 iujlx* Jli (5^1 & jj Xg*. <> ̂ J^^vj

-r*' fja <j*JI j ̂1 oU)U JUJlyJI <y*Jl itaJI c~*J j. ij^JI ̂ -pw

^ .UiL,VI c5b iilj^JI ^1 */JI ̂ JJ iJ*A jUJLJI

l$j|^l jtjuL |?ji*Jl Js-A*" LC* j>*VI ^uU

2uUJI J-u V iuJl & jU^JI j jjj-Jl J VI jSiJI

27. Al-BirQnl Commemoration volume />. 362, (Calcutta 1951.), See the article on "al-BirQni" by Moulftna Abd as-Salam Nadvi, p. 255.

28. The writer of these lines during his recent visit to England and France (July - Sep tember, 1973) came across the Russian translation of Kitab al-Jamahir at the Camb

ridge University, whose details are given as below:

"Collection of Information for the Indentification of Precious Stones** (Mineralogy). Translated by A.M. Belenitskii, Edited by Professor, GX5. Lemm Lein, Kh. K. Baranov and A.A. Dolima. with articles and remarks by A.A. Belenitskii and G.G. Lemm Lein. Published by the Academy of Sciences USSR (Moscow) 1963).

It has a supplementary passage from the book Al-Haztni * Versy MudrostV

(Scale of Intellect) containing abstracts of the treatise of al-BirQni on the Relation.

268 AL-BIRUNI

ship between metals and precious stones (In Russian text the writer has been helped by Dr. M. Azimullah).

29. Al-BirQni, Kitdb al-Jam&hir, ed. Krenkow, Op. cit. * W <> see pp. 32-138.

30. Ibid. ^jP* J *W ^UJI pp. 138-228. 31. Ibid., pp. 221-228.

32. Socichi Saite, In East and West, Conflict or Co-operation? (Student Christian Move ment Press, London 1936) p. 112.

* *