A Background Study Guide for the

Disarmament and International

Security Council

Aitchison College Model United Nations

September 6 - September 9, 2018

Letter from the President 4

Letters from the Secretary-Generals 5

Introduction 7

Topic Area A: Creating a Nuclear Free World, Reviewing the Nuclear States and NPT 7

Nuclear States 9

USA 9

Russia 11

China 11

France 12

United Kingdom 13

India 13

Pakistan 14

North Korea 15

Israel 15

NPT 16

Non-Proliferation 17

Disarmament 18

Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy 18

Opposition to NPT 18

Other treaties regarding the Nuclear Problem 21

The Correlation between Peaceful Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons 22

Opposition of Nuclear Weapons 23

Global Zero and a Nuclear Free World 23

Topic Area B: Weaponiztion of Natural Resources 24

Types of Natural Resources 24

List of Natural Resources 24

Where are Natural Resources found? 24

Weaponization 24

ISIL and Water in Syria 25

Indus Water Treaty 26

Relevant Bodies 29

Questions a resolution must Answer 29

Disclaimer: Model United Nations are a simulation and no part of the study guide or

conference should be seen as anything more than that. Contents of the guide may not

be viewed as evidence of a historical fact. The State of Pakistan does not recognize

Israel as a nation.

No student/staff of Aitchison College condones anything that is written in the guide,

information is compiled from a number of sources, all which can be found at the end

of this guide in the bibliography.

Fayez Loan President

Aqdas Imran Secretary-General

Arman Nazir Secretary-General

Aitchison College Model United Nations

A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

Dear Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that I invite you to join us in Lahore, Pakistan, for the Aitchison

College Model United Nations Conference from Thursday the 6th of September to

Sunday, the 9th of September 2018! I am truly honored to serve as your President for

the Ninth Session of ACMUN.

In 2009, the first ACMUN was held, becoming the first international conference of its

kind in Lahore. We invite you to join us in fast-paced crisis in the Specialized Agencies,

regionally focused debate in the Economic and Social Council and Regional Bodies, or

the traditional UN experience in the General Assembly.

At ACMUN, our educational mission extends beyond the committee room. Through

opportunities like Global Village, we hope to foster cultural exchange and cultivate a

conference-wide community. Furthermore, we encourage all delegates to explore the

historically significant city of Lahore.

ACMUN constantly strives to embody the diplomatic spirit that inspired the creation of

Model United Nations several decades ago. Our commitments to substantive

excellence, diplomacy, and service to our delegates are all in the name of fostering

greater global cooperation. Despite that we simulate real-world decision-making

bodies, and strive to model the ideals of multilateralism and diplomacy. In 2017,

ACMUN succeeded in its goal of reaching out to a more diverse set of schools. This

year, at the 9th Session, we plan to build upon these successes by improving the

accessibility of our delegate training materials, and streamlining our administrative

processes to ensure the best possible delegate experience.

Whether you are an ACMUN veteran or have no prior Model UN experience, we

sincerely hope that you will join us for this unique opportunity and register for

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018. Please do not hesitate to reach out to

us with any questions or concerns. We look forward to welcoming you in September!

Fayez Loan,

President

Fayez Loan President

Aqdas Imran Secretary-General

Arman Nazir Secretary-General

Aitchison College Model United Nations

LETTERS FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERALS

Dear Delegates,

It gives me great pleasure to serve as the Secretary General for this edition of Aitchison College Model United Nations. I have been involved in the circuit for the good part of

the last 4 years and have managed to make a name for myself. I have taken part in multiple local Model UN's and have managed to bag awards in almost all conferences

including prestigious conferences such as LUMUN. I have managed to win

internationally as well at UC Berkeley Model United Nations so rest assured you all are in capable hands. I believe that Model UN's help to sharpen the leader inside of you

and helps to groom your personality as well. It’s a fun way of learning about the world.

In this era of globalization, being globally aware is more important than ever. It develops leadership skills. MUN is an exercise in research, public speaking, and

teamwork. These are skills that you will need throughout your career, and MUN gives

you a chance to practice them while you’re a student. Model UN is a powerful educational tool that offers highly valuable benefits to students. I look forward to

meeting you all this September.

Aqdas Imran,

Secretary-General

Fayez Loan President

Aqdas Imran Secretary-General

Arman Nazir Secretary-General

Aitchison College Model United Nations

LETTERS FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERALS

Dear Delegates,

I am Arman Nazir Chaudhry, the Secretary-General of this year’s edition and the chair of the Historical General Assembly at this year’s edition of the Aitchison

College Model United Nations. I have been involved in the circuit for the good part

of the last 4 years and have represented the Aitchison College Model United Nations Society, both nationally and internationally. I have also had the honor of chairing

World Bank before at ACMUN and serving as a Committee Director of SOCHUM.

This year at ACMUN the executive council looks to give this conference a more realistic approach than normal idealistic conferences, I believe my learning, as a

member of the Pakistani Delegation at Seeds of Peace will consolidate this effort.

Having said all this I anticipate that everyone attending this conference will guarantee that the debate does not move in hovers and before the end of the

conference, gives equipped and exhaustive answers for each and every committee. I sincerely hope that you will join us for this unique opportunity and give us a chance

to host you at Aitchison this year. Be Confident, Be Diplomatic, and Be Strategic,

that’s all I can give you. Best of Luck!

Arman Nazir,

Secretary-General

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 7

The Disarmament and International Security

Committee (DISEC) is one of the six subsidiary

committees of the General Assembly established

by the UN Charter in 1945. It deals with issues of

international security, disarmament, global

challenges and threats to peace; along with any

other issues under Article I, Clause 1 of the

Charter . Also known as 1 the First Committee,

DISEC meets annually for a 4-week session in

October. All 193 members of the General

Assembly are allowed to attend. Although the

First Committee has the power to discuss any

issue of international security, it can firstly only

pass nonbinding resolutions, and can only discuss

issues which are not currently being discussed by

the Security Council. Resolutions passed by

DISEC, therefore, are not legally binding and only

take on the form of recommendations. Despite

this however, the First Committee, along with the

General Assembly, has two distinct powers.

Firstly, it can pass resolutions onto the Security

Council to be discussed so they may become

binding international law. Secondly, pursuant to

the Uniting for Peace Resolution passed in 1950 ,

the 2 General Assembly may take action if the

Security Council fails to pass a resolution due to a

veto. In the case of an immediate threat to

international security, if a majority of General

Assembly members request for an Emergency

Special Session on the aforementioned topic, the

Secretary-General must grant it. The nature of the

First Committee has changed considerably over

time. the First Committee originally dealt with

political and security matters when established in

1946. In 1993, however, the UN General

Assembly restructured its six main committees

and passed this role to the Fourth Committee. the

First Committee has not only been the key point

of discussion for disarmament issues since then

but also since the establishment of the United

Nations itself. The very first resolution to be

passed in the UN concerning “The Establishment

of a Commission to Deal with the Problems

Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy” came

from the First Committee . The committee has

also undergone a series of reforms to 3 rationalize

its agenda , as well as focusing more on achieving

consensus to pass resolutions. 4 Despite this

however, many resolutions, especially regarding

new or controversial issues, split the First

Committee between several different voting

blocs. All members of the First Committee have

one vote each, regardless of population size or

political power.

Topic Area A

Creating a nuclear free

world, reviewing the

Nuclear States, Global

Zero and the NPT

Albert Einstein said: “The splitting of the atom

has changed everything, save our mode of

thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled

catastrophe.” Suddenly the destructive capacity

accessible to humans went clear off the human

scale of things.

A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that

derives its destructive force from nuclear

reactions, either fission (fission bomb) or from a

combination of fission and fusion reactions

(thermonuclear bomb). Both bomb types release

large quantities of energy from relatively small

amounts of matter. The first test of a fission

("atomic") bomb released an amount of energy

approximately equal to 20,000 tons of

TNT (84 TJ). The first thermonuclear

Disarmament and International Security Council 8

("hydrogen") bomb test released energy

approximately equal to 10 million tons of TNT

(42 PJ). A thermonuclear weapon weighing little

more than 2,400 pounds (1,100 kg) can release

energy equal to more than 1.2 million tons of

TNT (5.0 PJ). A nuclear device no larger than

traditional bombs can devastate an entire city by

blast, fire, and radiation.

Nuclear weapons, or any other Weapon of mass

destruction, have shown their lasting impact on

historical events. During WWII, the United States

of America dropped two nuclear bombs on the

cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The result is

known: The show of power of the USA forced

Japan to forfeit, which was one of the major

events initiating the decay of the German 3rd

Reich. As a response to the military superiority of

the USA, other countries like the Soviet Union

began to develop their own weapons of mass

destruction (WMD). The latter achieved to

construct these weapons in 1949, which pushed

the USA to develop even more powerful weapons

like the HBomb (thermonuclear) in 1951. These

bombs are said to be 100 times more powerful

than the original nuclear ones used in Japan. The

beginning of an arms race started. Among the

Soviet Union and the USA, three other countries

gained nuclear capabilities: The Peoples Republic

of China, France and the UK. The arms race

imposed an imminent threat to international

security. The world feared M.A.D. the “Mutually

Assured Destruction”. The deployment of just

one nuclear warhead would start a chain reaction

that ends in the annihilation of the whole planet.

This is exactly, where the United Nations plays a

role as a mediator, peacekeeper and life insurance

of our planet. With recent developments in global

politics, the threat of M.A.D. is as imminent as it

has last been in 1951. Back in the day, many

countries started to develop nuclear arsenals with

the mere purpose to discourage other countries

from attacks on one’s own sovereignty. This

policy of nuclear deterrence, apart from its

protective aspect, led to an increase in weapons

worldwide, which in turn imposed an even greater

threat to human existence. The Charter of the

United Nations was adopted in 1945 as a response

to the first ever use of NW in Japan. It distinctly

opposes an arms race while not mentioning

nuclear weapons distinctly. This, more general

goal of the United Nations, disarmament, formed

the basis of Article 11 and Article 26 of the

Charter. Article 11: The General Assembly may

consider the general principles of co-operation in

the maintenance of international peace and

security, including the principles governing

disarmament and the regulation of armaments. In

other words, Article 11 is the pillar of the creation

of the First Committee of the General Assembly:

DISEC, the Disarmament and International

Security Committee. One of the topics that the

Committee also engaged with, was the threat a

nuclear arms race imposes to international

security and how to prevent it. As a response, two

incredibly important treaties were passed with the

purpose to ensure nuclear control: The Statute of

the International Atomic Energy Agency (short

IAEA) and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

(short NPT). Even though the NPT only allowed

for the P5 to keep nuclear arsenals (while

committing to disarming them with time), other

countries ignored the treaty, becoming nuclear

weapon states as well. In 1974, India started their

tests followed by Pakistan and the DPRK. Israel

is said to have nuclear warheads as well, though

there is no official proof.

It is this sheer power of nuclear weapons which

led to the hope of Global 0 and a nuclear free

world, and the eradication of all nuclear weapons

of mass destruction to prevent the disaster they

may cause.

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 9

Why do countries want nuclear weapons in the

first place? Well, some want nukes for self-

defense; they're a relatively cheap way of deterring

an attack. Some want them as cover for their own

aggressive plans; brandishing a few nukes can

discourage resistance. Some want them as a badge

of prestige. Probably most nuclear-wannabes are

motivated by some mix of all the above.

Another way of asking the same question: Why do

most countries not want the bomb? Some

possibilities: They face no serious threats. They

have other means of security, either through self-

protection or alliances. They harbor no aggressive

ambitions. They have moral qualms about

pursuing the bomb. They don't have the financial

or technical prowess to build or maintain a

bomb—or, if they do, their society is too open to

build one covertly.

The United States was the first country to

manufacture nuclear weapons and is the only

country to have used them in combat, with the

separate bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki i

n World War II. Before and during the Cold War,

it conducted over a thousand nuclear tests and

tested many long-range nuclear weapons

delivery systems.[Note 1]

Between 1940 and 1996, the U.S. government

spent at least $9.08 trillion in present-day

terms on nuclear weapons, including platforms

development (aircraft, rockets and facilities),

command and control, maintenance, waste

management and administrative costs. It is

estimated that, since 1945, the United States

produced more than 70,000 nuclear warheads,

which is more than all other nuclear weapon states

combined. The Soviet Union/Russia has

produced approximately 55,000 nuclear warheads

since 1949, France built 1,110 warheads since

1960, the United Kingdom built 835 warheads

since 1952, China built about 600 warheads since

1964, and other nuclear powers built fewer than

500 warheads all together since they developed

their first nuclear weapons. Until November

1962, the vast majority of U.S. nuclear tests were

above ground. After the acceptance of the Partial

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, all testing was relegated

underground, in order to prevent the dispersion

of nuclear fallout.

Early on in the development of its nuclear

weapons, the United States relied in part on

information-sharing with both the United

Kingdom and Canada, as codified in the Quebec

Agreement of 1943. These three parties agreed

not to share nuclear weapons information with

other countries without the consent of the others,

an early attempt at nonproliferation. After the

development of the first nuclear weapons

during World War II, though, there was much

debate within the political circles and public

sphere of the United States about whether or not

the country should attempt to maintain

a monopoly on nuclear technology, or whether it

should undertake a program of information

sharing with other nations (especially its former

ally and likely competitor, the Soviet Union), or

submit control of its weapons to some sort of

international organization (such as the United

Nations) who would use them to attempt to

maintain world peace. Though fear of a nuclear

arms race spurred many politicians and scientists

to advocate some degree of international control

or sharing of nuclear weapons and information,

many politicians and members of the military

believed that it was better in the short term to

maintain high standards of nuclear secrecy.

Since this path was chosen, the United States was,

in its early days, essentially an advocate for the

prevention of nuclear proliferation, though

primarily for the reason of self-preservation. A

few years after the USSR detonated its first

weapon in 1949, though, the U.S. under

President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to

encourage a program of sharing nuclear

Disarmament and International Security Council 10

information related to civilian nuclear

power and nuclear physics in general. The Atoms

for Peace program, begun in 1953, was also in

part political: the U.S. was better poised to

commit various scarce resources, such

as enriched uranium, towards this peaceful effort,

and to request a similar contribution from the

Soviet Union, who had far fewer resources along

these lines; thus the program had a strategic

justification as well, as was later revealed by

internal memos.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program of

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency was

established after the breakup of the Soviet Union

in 1991 to aid former Soviet bloc countries in the

inventory and destruction of their sites for

developing nuclear, chemical, and biological

weapons, and their methods of delivering them

(ICBM silos, long-range bombers, etc.).

After India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons

in 1998, President Bill Clinton imposed economic

sanctions on the countries.

The U.S. government has officially taken a silent

policy towards the nuclear weapons ambitions of

the state of Israel, while being exceedingly vocal

against proliferation of such weapons in the

countries of Iran and North Korea. Until 2005

when the program was cancelled, it was violating

its own non-proliferation treaties in the pursuit of

so-called nuclear bunker busters. The 2003

invasion of Iraq by the U.S. was done, in part, on

indications that Weapons of Mass

Destruction were being stockpiled (lately,

stockpiles of previously undeclared nerve agent

and mustard gas shells have been located in

Iraq), and the Bush administration said that its

policies on proliferation were responsible for

the Libyan government's agreement to abandon

its nuclear ambitions.[

In 2009 and 2010, the administration of

President Barack Obama declared policies that

would invalidate the Bush-era policy for use of

nuclear weapons and its motions to develop new

ones. First, in a prominent 2009 speech, U.S.

President Barack Obama outlined a goal of "a

world without nuclear weapons". To that goal,

U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian Prime

Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a new

START treaty on April 8, 2010, to reduce the

number of active nuclear weapons from 2,200 to

1,550. That same week Obama also revised U.S.

policy on the use of nuclear weapons in a Nuclear

Posture Review required of all presidents,

declaring for the first time that the U.S. would not

use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear, NPT-

compliant states. The policy also renounces

development of any new nuclear weapons.

The Obama Administration, in its release of the

2012 defense budget, included planned to

modernize, as well as maintain, the nation's

nuclear weapons arsenal.

The United States is one of the five nuclear

weapons states with a declared nuclear arsenal

under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT), of which it was an

original drafter and signatory on 1 July 1968

(ratified 5 March 1970).

Trump wants America to “greatly strengthen and

expand its nuclear capability until such time as the

world comes to its senses regarding nukes”. How

does that parse? Trump’s acolytes outside the tent

say it means he cares about nuclear proliferation.

But who says it does? And how is the world meant

to react?

It will hardly do so by disarming. The essence of

deterrence is to reply to strength with strength.

Since Trump’s tweet was in response to Putin’s

similar tub-thumping earlier in the week, “the

world coming to its senses” is the last thing that

will happen. Trump has already said he regards

Japan, North Korea and other states going

nuclear as “inevitable”. The best that can be said

is that this is just another display of machismo.

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 11

As for its stance on Israel, The Trump

administration has taken the position that Israel

should not be required to discuss giving

up nuclear weapons, which according to foreign

sources it possesses, without recognition by all

states in Middle East of the country’s right to

exist.

As of 2017, the Russian Federation possesses

7,300 total nuclear warheads, of which 4,500 are

strategically operational. The exact number of

nuclear warheads is a state secret and is therefore

a matter of guesswork. The Federation of

American Scientists estimates that Russia

possesses 4,300 nuclear warheads, while the U.S.

has 4,000; Russia has 1,950 active strategic nuclear

warheads, compared with the U.S. having

1,650. On the other hand, Russia is estimated to

have roughly 1,500 tactical nuclear weapons, all of

which are declared to be in central storage.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in

1991, a number of Soviet-era nuclear warheads

remained on the territories of Belarus, Ukraine,

and Kazakhstan. Under the terms of the Lisbon

Protocol to the NPT, and following the 1995

Trilateral Agreement between Russia, Belarus,

and the USA, these were transferred to Russia,

leaving Russia as the sole inheritor of the Soviet

nuclear arsenal. It is estimated that the Soviet

Union had approximately 45,000 nuclear weapons

stockpiled at the time of its collapse.

In 2002, the United States and Russia agreed to

reduce their stockpiles to not more than 2,700

warheads each in the SORT treaty.

There were allegations that Russia contributed

to North Korean nuclear program, selling it the

equipment for the safe storage and transportation

of nuclear materials. Nevertheless, Russia

condemned Korean nuclear tests since then.

Russia signed the Chemical Weapons

Convention on January 13, 1993, and ratified it on

November 5, 1997. Russia declared an arsenal of

39,967 tons of chemical weapons in 1997.

On 27 September 2017, OPCW announced that

Russia had destroyed its entire chemical weapons

stockpile.

After the Korean War, the Soviet

Union transferred nuclear technology and

weapons to the People's Republic of China as an

adversary of the United States and NATO.

According to a Russian military doctrine stated in

2010, nuclear weapons could be used by Russia

"in response to the use of nuclear and other types

of weapons of mass destruction against it or its

allies, and also in case of aggression against Russia

with the use of conventional weapons when the

very existence of the state is threatened".

Russia is one of the five "Nuclear Weapons

States" (NWS) under the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which

Russia ratified (as the Soviet Union) in 1968.

The People's Republic of China has developed

and possesses weapons of mass destruction,

including chemical and nuclear weapons. The first

of China's nuclear weapons tests took place in

1964, and its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in

1967. Tests continued until 1996, when China

signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT). China has acceded to the Biological and

Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 and

ratified the Chemical Weapons

Convention (CWC) in 1997.

Historically, China has been implicated in the

development of the Pakistani nuclear program

before China ratified the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty in 1992. In the early 1980s,

China is believed to have given Pakistan a

"package" including uranium enrichment

technology, high-enriched uranium, and the

design for a compact nuclear weapon.

Disarmament and International Security Council 12

Early in 2011, China published a defense white

paper, which repeated its nuclear policies of

maintaining a minimum deterrent with a no-first-

use pledge. Yet China has yet to define what it

means by a "minimum deterrent posture". This,

together with the fact that "it is deploying four

new nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, invites

concern as to the scale and intention of China’s

nuclear upgrade".

China is one of the five nuclear weapons

states (NWS) recognized by the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty, which China ratified in 1992.

China is the only NWS to give an

unqualified security assurance to non-nuclear-

weapon states:

"China undertakes not to use or threaten to use

nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon

States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time

or under any circumstances."

Chinese public policy has always been one of the

"no first use rule" while maintaining a deterrent

retaliatory force targeted for counter

value targets.

In 2005, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released

a white paper stating that the government "would

not be the first to use [nuclear] weapons at any

time and in any circumstance". In addition, the

paper went on to state that this "no first use"

policy would remain unchanged in the future and

that China would not use or threaten to use

nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon

states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

China normally stores nuclear warheads separately

from their launching systems, unless there is a

heightened threat level.

France was the fourth country to test an

independently developed nuclear weapon in 1960,

under the government of Charles de Gaulle.

The French military is currently thought to retain

a weapons stockpile of around 300

operational nuclear warheads, making it the third-

largest in the world, speaking in terms of

warheads, not megatons. The weapons are part of

the national Force de frappe, developed in the late

1950s and 1960s to give France the ability to

distance itself from NATO while having a means

of nuclear deterrence under sovereign control.

France did not sign the Partial Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty, which gave it the option to conduct

further nuclear tests until it signed and ratified

the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in

1996 and 1998 respectively. France denies

currently having chemical weapons, ratified

the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in

1995, and acceded to the Biological Weapons

Convention (BWC) in 1984. France had also

ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1926.

French law requires at least one out of four

nuclear submarines to be on patrol in the Atlantic

Ocean at any given time, like the UK's policy.

In 2006, French President Jacques Chirac noted

that France would be willing to use nuclear

weapons against a state attacking France by

terrorism. He noted that the French nuclear

forces had been configured for this option.

On 21 March 2008, President Nicolas

Sarkozy announced that France will reduce its

aircraft deliverable nuclear weapon stockpile

(which currently consists of 60 TN 81 warheads)

by a third (20 warheads) and bring the total

French nuclear arsenal to fewer than 300

warheads.

In October 1952, the United Kingdom (U.K.)

became the third country to independently

develop and test nuclear weapons. It is one of

the five nuclear-weapon states under

the Weapons and a permanent member of

the United Nations Security Council.

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 13

The UK had a stockpile of 215 thermonuclear

warheads, of which 120 were operational, as of

2016, but the country has refused to declare the

exact size of its arsenal. Since 1998, the Trident

nuclear programme has been the only operational

nuclear weapons system in British service.

The UK government signed the Partial Test Ban

Treaty on 5 August 1963 along with the United

States and the Soviet Union which effectively

restricted it to underground nuclear tests by

outlawing testing in the atmosphere, underwater,

or in outer space. The UK signed

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on 24

September 1996 and ratified it on 6 April

1998, having passed the necessary legislation on

18 March 1998 as the Nuclear Explosions

(Prohibition and Inspections) Act 1998.

Current UK posture as outlined in the Strategic

Defence Review of 1998[167] is as it has been for

many years; Trident SLBMs still provide the long-

range strategic element. In April 2017 Defence

Secretary Michael Fallon confirmed that the UK

would use nuclear weapons in a "pre-emptive

initial strike" in "the most extreme

circumstances".

The Republic of India has developed and

possesses weapons of mass destruction in the

form of nuclear weapons. Though India has not

made any official statements about the size of its

nuclear arsenal, recent estimates suggest that India

has 140 nuclear weapons.

India is a member of three multilateral export

control regimes — the Missile Technology

Control Regime, Wassenaar

Arrangement and Australia Group. It has signed

and ratified the Biological Weapons

Convention and the Chemical Weapons

Convention. India is also a subscribing state to

the Hague Code of Conduct. India has signed

neither the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty nor the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,

considering both to be flawed and discriminatory.[

India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy

and is in the process of developing a nuclear

doctrine based on "credible minimum

deterrence." In August 1999, the Indian

government released a draft of the doctrine which

asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for

deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of

"retaliation only". The document also maintains

that India "will not be the first to initiate a

nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive

retaliation should deterrence fail" and that

decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons

would be made by the Prime Minister or his

'designated successor(s)'. According to the

NRDC, despite the escalation of tensions

between India and Pakistan in 2001–2002, India

remained committed to its nuclear no-first-use

policy.

India is not a signatory to either the NPT or

the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty (CTBT), but did accede to the Partial

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in October 1963. India

is a member of the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA), and four of its 17 nuclear

reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards. India

announced its lack of intention to accede to the

NPT as late as 1997 by voting against the

paragraph of a General

Assembly Resolution which urged all non-

signatories of the treaty to accede to it at the

earliest possible date. India voted against the UN

General Assembly resolution endorsing

the CTBT, which was adopted on 10 September

1996. India objected to the lack of provision for

universal nuclear disarmament "within a time-

bound framework." India also demanded that the

treaty ban laboratory simulations. In addition,

India opposed the provision in Article XIV of the

CTBT that requires India's ratification for the

treaty to enter into force, which India argued was

a violation of its sovereign right to choose

Disarmament and International Security Council 14

whether it would sign the treaty. In early February

1997, Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral reiterated

India's opposition to the treaty, saying that "India

favors any step aimed at destroying nuclear

weapons, but considers that the treaty in its

current form is not comprehensive and bans only

certain types of tests.

Pakistan began development of nuclear weapons

in January 1972 under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto, who delegated the program to the

Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy

Commission (PAEC) Munir Ahmad Khan with a

commitment to having the bomb ready by the end

of 1976.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons development was in

response to the loss of East Pakistan in 1971's

Bangladesh Liberation War. Bhutto called a

meeting of senior scientists and engineers on 20

January 1972, in Multan, which came to known as

"Multan meeting". Bhutto was the main architect

of this programme, and it was here that Bhutto

orchestrated nuclear weapons programme and

rallied Pakistan's academic scientists to build the

atomic bomb in three years for national survival.

Pakistan acceded to the Geneva Protocol on 15

April 1960. As for its Biological warfare capability,

Pakistan is not widely suspected of either

producing biological weapons or having an

offensive biological programme. However, the

country is reported to have well developed bio-

technological facilities and laboratories, devoted

entirely to the medical research and

applied healthcare science. In 1972, Pakistan

signed and ratified the Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1974. Since

then Pakistan has been a vocal and staunch

supporter for the success of the BTWC.

Pakistan is not a party to the Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) and is not bound by any of its

provisions. In 1999, Prime Ministers Nawaz

Sharif of Pakistan and Atal Bihari Vajpayee of

India signed the Lahore Declaration, agreeing to

a bilateral moratorium on further nuclear testing.

This initiative was taken a year after both

countries had publicly tested nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has blocked negotiation of a Fissile

Material Cutoff Treaty as it continues to produce

fissile material for weapons.[107][108]

In a recent statement at the Conference on

Disarmament, Pakistan laid out its nuclear

disarmament policy and what it sees as the proper

goals and requirements for meaningful

negotiations.

Pakistan has repeatedly stressed at international

fora like the Conference on Disarmament that it

will give up its nuclear weapons only when other

nuclear armed states do so, and when

disarmament is universal and verifiable. It rejects

any unilateral disarmament on its part.

Pakistan refuses to adopt a "no-first-use"

doctrine, indicating that it would strike India with

nuclear weapons even if India did not use such

weapons first. However, they mainly go by the

Theory of Deterrence which, as its name suggests,

is to have nuclear weapons for deterring other

nations from using their own against Pakistan.

North Korea has a military nuclear weapons

program and also has a significant quantity

of chemical and biological weapons. As of 2003

North Korea is no longer a party to the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(NPT). The country has come under

sanctions after conducting a number of nuclear

tests, beginning in 2006.

The Korean Central News Agency claims that the

"U.S. has long posed nuclear threats to the

DPRK" and "the U.S. was seized by a foolish

ambition to bring down the DPRK", so it

"needed a countermeasure".

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 15

Various diplomatic means have been used by the

international community to attempt to limit

North Korea's nuclear program to peaceful power

generation and to encourage North Korea to

participate in international treaties.

In May 1992, the International Atomic Energy

Agency's (IAEA) first inspection in North Korea

uncovered discrepancies suggesting that the

country had reprocessed more plutonium than

declared. IAEA requested access to additional

information and access to two nuclear waste sites

at Yongbyon. North Korea rejected the IAEA

request and announced on March 12, 1993, an

intention to withdraw from the NPT.

In 1994, North Korea pledged, under the Agreed

Framework with the United States, to freeze its

plutonium programs and dismantle all its nuclear

weapons programs in return for the normalization

of diplomatic relations and several kinds of

assistance, including resources for alternative

energy supplies.

North Korea later "clarified" that it did not

possess weapons yet, but that it had "a right" to

possess them, despite the Agreed Framework. In

late 2002 and early 2003, North Korea began to

take steps to eject International Atomic Energy

Agency inspectors while re-routing spent fuel

rods to be used for plutonium reprocessing for

weapons purposes. As late as the end of 2003,

North Korea claimed that it would freeze its

nuclear program in exchange for additional

American concessions, but a final agreement was

not reached. North Korea withdrew from

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003.

Since then, they have conducted several tests of

their nuclear weapons throughout the years.

Israel:

Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear

weapons, with an estimated arsenal of up to 400

warheads; which would make it the world's third

biggest arsenal. However, Israel has never

officially denied nor admitted to having nuclear

weapons, instead repeating over the years that it

would not be the first country to "introduce"

nuclear weapons to the Middle East. Israel has

also refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) despite

international pressure to do so, saying that would

be contrary to its national security interests.

Additionally, Israel has made extensive efforts to

deny other regional actors the ability to acquire

their own nuclear weapons. The counter-

proliferation, preventive strike Begin

Doctrine added another dimension to Israel's

existing nuclear policy. Israel remains the only

country in the Middle East believed to possess

them.

Israel's deliberately ambiguous policy to confirm

or deny its own possession of nuclear weapons,

or to give any indication regarding their potential

use, make it necessary to gather details from other

sources, including diplomatic and intelligence

sources and 'unauthorized' statements by its

political and military leaders. Alternatively, with

the Begin Doctrine, Israel is very clear and

decisive regarding the country's policy on

potential developments of nuclear capability by

any other regional adversaries, which it will not

allow. Alone or with other nations, Israel has used

diplomatic and military efforts as well as covert

action to prevent other Middle Eastern countries

from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Although Israel has officially acknowledged the

existence of Dimona since Ben-Gurion's speech

to the Knesset in December 1960, Israel has never

officially acknowledged its construction or

possession of nuclear weapons.

Israel's nuclear doctrine is shaped by its lack of

strategic depth: a subsonic fighter jet could cross

the 72 kilometers (39 nmi) from the Jordan

River to the Mediterranean Sea in just 4 minutes.

It additionally relies on a reservist-based military

which magnifies civilian and military losses in its

Disarmament and International Security Council 16

small population. Israel tries to compensate for

these weaknesses by emphasizing intelligence,

maneuverability and firepower.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, commonly known as the Non-

Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an

international treaty whose objective is to prevent

the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons

technology, to promote cooperation in the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the

goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and

general and complete disarmament.

Opened for signature in 1968, the treaty entered

into force in 1970. As required by the text, after

twenty-five years, NPT Parties met in May 1995

and agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely. More

countries have adhered to the NPT than any other

arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a

testament to the treaty's significance. As of

August 2016, 191 states have adhered to the

treaty, though North Korea, which acceded in

1985 but never came into compliance, announced

its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, following

detonation of nuclear devices in violation of core

obligations. Four UN member states have never

accepted the NPT, three of which are thought to

possess nuclear weapons: India, Israel,

and Pakistan. In addition, South Sudan, founded

in 2011, has not joined.

The treaty defines nuclear-weapon states as those

that have built and tested a nuclear explosive

device before 1 January 1967; these are the United

States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France,

and China. Four other states are known or

believed to possess nuclear

weapons: India, Pakistan, and North Korea have

openly tested and declared that they possess

nuclear weapons, while Israel is deliberately

ambiguous regarding its nuclear weapons status.

The NPT is often seen to be based on a central

bargain:

The NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never

to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-

weapon states in exchange agree to share the

benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to

pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate

elimination of their nuclear arsenals

The treaty is reviewed every five years in meetings

called Review Conferences of the Parties to the

Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Critics argue that the NPT cannot stop the

proliferation of nuclear weapons or the

motivation to acquire them. They express

disappointment with the limited progress on

nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized

nuclear weapons states still have 22,000 warheads

in their combined stockpile and have shown a

reluctance to disarm further.[dubious – discuss] Several

high-ranking officials within the United Nations

have said that they can do little to stop states

using nuclear reactors to produce nuclear

weapons. Several additional measures have been

adopted to strengthen the NPT and the broader

nuclear nonproliferation regime and make it

difficult for states to acquire the capability to

produce nuclear weapons, including the export

controls of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the

enhanced verification measures of

the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol.

The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven

articles. Although the concept of "pillars" is not

expressed anywhere in the NPT, the treaty is

nevertheless sometimes interpreted as a three-

pillar system, with an implicit balance among

them:

1. non-proliferation,

2. disarmament, and

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 17

3. the right to peacefully use nuclear

technology.

These pillars are interrelated and mutually

reinforcing. An effective nonproliferation regime

whose members comply with their obligations

provides an essential foundation for progress on

disarmament and makes possible greater

cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

With the right to access the benefits of peaceful

nuclear technology comes the responsibility of

nonproliferation. Progress on disarmament

reinforces efforts to strengthen the

nonproliferation regime and to enforce

compliance with obligations, thereby also

facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation. The

"pillars" concept has been questioned by some

who believe that the NPT is, as its name suggests,

principally about nonproliferation, and who

worry that "three pillars" language misleadingly

implies that the three elements have equivalent

importance.

Under Article I of the NPT, nuclear-weapon

states pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons or

other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient or

in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-

nuclear-weapon state in the manufacture or

acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Under Article II

of the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states pledge

not to acquire or exercise control over nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and

not to seek or receive assistance in the

manufacture of such devices. Under Article III of

the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon states pledge to

accept IAEA safeguards to verify that their

nuclear activities serve only peaceful purposes.

The signatory states agree not to transfer "nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and

"not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce" a

non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) to acquire

nuclear weapons (Article I). NNWS parties to the

NPT agree not to "receive", "manufacture", or

"acquire" nuclear weapons or to "seek or receive

any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear

weapons" (Article II). NNWS parties also agree to

accept safeguards by the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not

diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to

nuclear weapons or other nuclear

explosive devices (Article III).

Under Article VI of the NPT, all Parties

undertake to pursue good-faith negotiations on

effective measures relating to cessation of the

nuclear arms race, to nuclear disarmament, and to

general and complete disarmament.

Article VI of the NPT represents the only binding

commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of

disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states. The

NPT's preamble contains language affirming the

desire of treaty signatories to ease international

tension and strengthen international trust so as to

create someday the conditions for a halt to the

production of nuclear weapons, and treaty on

general and complete disarmament that liquidates,

in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery

vehicles from national arsenals.

Some governments, especially non-nuclear-

weapon states belonging to the Non-Aligned

Movement, have interpreted Article VI's language

as being anything but vague. In their view, Article

VI constitutes a formal and specific obligation on

the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states to

disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, and argue

that these states have failed to meet their

obligation.

Critics of the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon

states (the United States, Russia, China, France,

and the United Kingdom) sometimes argue that

Disarmament and International Security Council 18

what they view as the failure of the NPT-

recognized nuclear weapon states to disarm

themselves of nuclear weapons, especially in the

post–Cold War era, has angered some non-

nuclear-weapon NPT signatories of the NPT.

Such failure, these critics add, provides

justification for the non-nuclear-weapon

signatories to quit the NPT and develop their own

nuclear arsenals.

NPT Article IV acknowledges the right of all

Parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes and to benefit from international

cooperation in this area, in conformity with their

nonproliferation obligations. Article IV also

encourages such cooperation.

The third pillar allows for and agrees upon the

transfer of nuclear technology and materials to

NPT signatory countries for the development of

civilian nuclear energy programs in those

countries, as long as they can demonstrate that

their nuclear programs are not being used for the

development of nuclear weapons.

Since very few of the states with nuclear

energy programs are willing to abandon the use of

nuclear energy, the third pillar of the NPT under

Article IV provides other states with the

possibility to do the same, but under conditions

intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear

weapons.

The treaty recognizes the inalienable right of

sovereign states to use nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes, but restricts this right for NPT parties

to be exercised "in conformity with Articles I and

II" (the basic nonproliferation obligations that

constitute the "first pillar" of the treaty).

Over the years the NPT has come to be seen by

many Third World states as "a conspiracy of the

nuclear 'haves' to keep the nuclear 'have-nots' in

their place".] This argument has roots in Article

VI of the treaty which "obligates the nuclear

weapons states to liquidate their nuclear

stockpiles and pursue complete disarmament.

The non-nuclear states see no signs of this

happening". Some argue that the NWS have not

fully complied with their disarmament obligations

under Article VI of the NPT] Some countries

such as India have criticized the NPT, because it

"discriminated against states not possessing

nuclear weapons on January 1, 1967," while Iran

and numerous Arab states have criticized Israel

for not signing the NPT.[126][127] There has been

disappointment with the limited progress on

nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized

nuclear weapons states still have 22,000 warheads

among them and have shown a reluctance to

disarm further.

Although the NPT is a step in the right direction,

it is far from perfect and has a large number

of loopholes and flaws which seriously undermine

and decrease its popularity and usefulness.

The NPT—in effect for 35 years and signed by

189 countries (every country in the world but

three)—is teetering in crisis, possibly on the edge

of obsolescence. One country, North Korea, has

abrogated the treaty, the first signatory ever to do

so, and has since reprocessed enough plutonium

to build at least a half-dozen bombs. Another,

Iran, is poised to go down the same road via

enriched uranium.

More broadly, vast loopholes in the treaty, which

have long been noticed, are finally being

exploited. It is increasingly doubtful whether the

NPT, in its current form, can remain a useful tool

for constraining nuclear ambitions.

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 19

It's clear that the world is a better place because

of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the 1960s,

presidents, prime ministers, and arms-control

analysts predicted that 25 to 30 countries would

possess nuclear weapons by the end of the

century. Since 1970, when the NPT was signed,

the circle of nuclear powers has swollen only

slightly, from five countries (the U.S., Russia,

Britain, France, and China) to eight or nine

(adding India, Pakistan, Israel—the only non-

signatories—and probably North Korea). The

NPT wasn't the only reason for this restraint, but

it was one of the reasons, and it reinforced the

others.

The treaty forbids the five original nuclear

countries from supplying any other country with

the materials, technology, or other resources

needed to make atomic or hydrogen bombs. It

forbids all the other countries from acquiring or

manufacturing such materials or technology. As a

reward for this restraint, the NPT not only

permits but encourages these countries to develop

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The

technology for this will be provided, according to

Article V, "on a non-discriminatory basis" at a

price "as low as possible."

Here's where the first loophole appears. The

technology for producing nuclear energy is the

same as the technology for producing nuclear

weapons. To convert from peaceful to non-

peaceful use takes only enriching the uranium or

reprocessing the fuel rods into plutonium. The

NPT's negotiators knew this. But they counted on

two impediments. First, the treaty requires the

recipients of nuclear technology to allow

international inspectors to monitor nuclear

facilities in order to ensure nothing is diverted.

Second, at the time of the signing, these evasions

were far from easy. Enriching uranium requires

thousands of centrifuges—assembled just so—to

separate the tiny quantities of bomb-grade U-235

from the mass of non-bomb-grade U-238.

Processing plutonium requires a separate,

complex, and large facility.

Two things have happened in recent times: First,

owing to the spread of science and the ingenuity

of black-marketeers, seemingly unsophisticated

countries have learned how to enrich uranium;

second, owing to the limitations of intelligence-

monitoring, especially in closed societies, some of

these same countries have learned how to elude

inspectors, even to the point of covertly building

large nuclear facilities.

So, the Iranian mullahs can argue that under the

treaty they have every right to develop nuclear

energy, even to enrich uranium, as long as they do

so for allegedly peaceful purposes. In other

words, the NPT allows a country to step right up

to the line that separates nuclear energy from

nuclear weaponry—then to declare it's abrogating

the treaty, step across that line, and suddenly

emerge as a nation armed with the all-powerful

bomb. (Article X of the treaty allows a country to

abrogate; all the leader has to do is give 90 days’

notice and declare he's doing it for national-

security interests.)

The Iranians haven't been entirely legal in their

actions. Article III states that countries must open

their nuclear-energy facilities to inspections and

other safeguards. Yet the Iranians built their

enrichment facility covertly and opened it only

after a dissident group revealed its existence to

Western intelligence agencies.

The problem here, though, is that there's nothing

much the rest of the treaty's signatories can do

about this violation (though inspectors are now

monitoring the facility). The NPT in general has

no enforcement clause.

The big powers enjoy a loophole, too: Article VI,

which obligates the countries that already have

nuclear weapons to reduce their own nuclear

arsenals—a token of good faith to those who

promise to forgo nukes altogether.

Disarmament and International Security Council 20

Many critics of American foreign policy note that

the rest of the world can hardly be expected to

observe the NPT when the United States hasn't

lived up to its side of the bargain. Yet Article VI

is so loosely constructed, it's amazing that anyone

ever took it seriously. It states that the five nuclear

countries will "undertake to pursue negotiations

in good faith on effective means relating to

cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early

date." Read that again closely: not a cessation to

the arms race, but "means relating to cessation";

and not even to hold negotiations, but to

"undertake to pursue negotiations."

It's worth noting that the nuclear powers,

including the United States, have negotiated fairly

substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals

over the decades. It is also doubtful that deeper

American and Russian nuclear cuts would have

kept North Korea or Iran from pursuing nuclear

ambitions.

Any plan to strengthen the NPT must not only

shrink the loopholes but also deal with these more

basic questions—which boil down to the issue of

incentives. Back in the 1970s, the bribe for signing

the NPT was cheap access to nuclear energy. But

this has backfired, because nuclear energy turned

out not to be so cheap, and because peaceful

nuclear programs have proven such a useful

backdoor to developing nuclear weapons. So, the

big powers need to devise another payoff

involving economic aid or security

guarantees. This should be Topic A at the NPT

review.

Some wannabes will not be bought off, of course;

they simply want nukes. In those cases, the treaty

must be amended to provide an enforcement

clause—and, harder still, an enforcement agency.

Some have proposed eliminating Article X, which

allows a country to abrogate the treaty. The

problem is, all treaties have an exit clause; it's an

acknowledgement that the countries haven't

signed away their sovereignty.

Yet this dilemma forms the core of the problem.

It may well be that, in order to stop or seriously

curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

countries must sacrifice a little bit of sovereignty.

This has already taken place, to a small extent,

with the NPT's "Additional Protocol," a measure

that allows the International Atomic Energy

Agency to conduct short-notice inspections

of any site where it believes nuclear activity might

be going on. (Before the Additional Protocol, the

IAEA could inspect only sites that the host

country had "declared" to be nuclear facilities.)

This measure went into effect in 1997, and since

then 65 countries have signed it.

The signatories should discuss extending this

principle. It's time to discuss, for instance,

forming a multinational expeditionary force

equipped and empowered to invade or bomb the

nuclear facilities of a country that has either clearly

violated the NPT or abrogated it without a reason

of legitimate self-defense.

CTBT:

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty (CTBT) is a multilateral treaty that bans

all nuclear explosions, for both civilian and

military purposes, in all environments. It was

adopted by the United Nations General

Assembly on 10 September 1996, but has not

entered into force, as eight specific states have not

ratified the treaty.

1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry

out any nuclear weapon test explosion or

any other nuclear explosion, and to

prohibit and prevent any such nuclear

explosion at any place under its

jurisdiction or control.

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 21

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore,

to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in

any way participating in the carrying out

of any nuclear weapon test explosion or

any other nuclear explosion.

The Treaty was adopted by the United Nations

General Assembly on 10 September 1996. It

opened for signature in New York on 24

September 1996, when it was signed by 71 States,

including five of the eight then nuclear-capable

states. As of October 2016, 166 states

have ratified the CTBT and another 17 states

have signed but not ratified it.

The treaty will enter into force 180 days after the

44 states listed in Annex 2 of the treaty have

ratified it. These "Annex 2 states" are states that

participated in the CTBT’s negotiations between

1994 and 1996 and possessed nuclear power

reactors or research reactors at that time. As of

2016, eight Annex 2 states have not ratified the

treaty: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the United

States have signed but not ratified the

Treaty; India, North Korea and Pakistan have

not signed it.

Geophysical and other technologies are used to

monitor for compliance with the Treaty: forensic

seismology, hydro acoustics, infrasound,

and radionuclide monitoring. The technologies

are used to monitor the underground, the waters

and the atmosphere for any sign of a nuclear

explosion. Statistical theories and methods are

integral to CTBT monitoring providing

confidence in verification analysis. Once the

Treaty enters into force, on-site inspection will be

provided for where concerns about compliance

arise.

The Preparatory Commission for

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Organization (CTBTO), an international

organization headquartered in Vienna, Austria,

was created to build the verification regime,

including establishment and provisional operation

of the network of monitoring stations, the

creation of an international data center, and

development of the On Site Inspection capability.

Three countries have tested nuclear weapons

since the CTBT opened for signature in 1996.

India and Pakistan both carried out two sets of

tests in 1998. North Korea carried out six

announced tests, one each in 2006, 2009, 2013,

two in 2016 and one in 2017. All six North

Korean tests were picked up by the International

Monitoring System set up by the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

Preparatory Commission. A North Korean test is

believed to have taken place in January 2016,

evidenced by an "artificial earthquake" measured

as a magnitude 5.1 by the U.S. Geological Survey.

The first successful North Korean hydrogen

bomb test supposedly took place September

2017.

International Convention on the Suppression of

Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

The Convention covers a broad range of acts and

possible targets, including nuclear power plants

and nuclear reactors. It criminalizes the planning,

threatening, or carrying out acts of nuclear

terrorism.

Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere,

in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban

Treaty) (PTBT)

The PTBT requires parties to abstain from

carrying out nuclear explosions in any

environment where such explosions cause

radioactive debris outside the limits of the State

that conducts an explosion.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons bans the use, possession, development,

Disarmament and International Security Council 22

testing, deployment and transfer of nuclear

weapons under international law.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of

Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass

Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and

in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty)

The treaty prevents placement of NBC weapons

on the seabed and ocean floor to eliminate the

possibility of an underwater arms race and

promote the peaceful exploration of water bodies.

The link between nuclear weapons and civil

nuclear power is often denied by the nuclear

energy industry. The spread of nuclear weapons

and/or nuclear weapons technology is called

nuclear proliferation. The civil nuclear industry is

more often than not the source of proliferation.

Nuclear proliferation risks will be among us as

long as the civil and military nuclear industry

continue to exist.

Although nuclear power generates a significant

portion of the electricity consumed in the United

States and several other major industrial nations

without producing any air pollution or

greenhouse gases, its future is a matter of debate.

Even though increased use of nuclear power

could help meet the energy needs of developing

economies, alleviate some pressing environmental

problems, and provide insurance against

disruption of fossil fuel supplies, prospects for the

expansion of nuclear power are clouded by

problems inherent in some of its current

technologies and practices as well as by public

perception of its risks. One example is what to do

with the nuclear waste remaining after electricity

generation. The discharged fuel that remains is

highly radioactive and contains plutonium, which

can be used to generate electricity or to produce

nuclear weapons. In unsettled geopolitical

circumstances, incentives for nuclear weapons

proliferation could rise and spread, and the

nuclear power fuel cycle could become a tempting

source of plutonium for weapons. At the

moment, the perceived risks of nuclear power are

outweighing the prospective benefits.

Most of the world’s 400-plus nuclear power

reactors use lightly enriched uranium fuel. After it

is partially fissioned to produce energy, the used

fuel discharged from the reactor contains

plutonium and other long-lived and highly

radioactive isotopes. Early in the nuclear era,

recovering the substantial energy value remaining

in the discharged fuel seemed essential to fulfilling

the promise of nuclear energy as an essentially

unlimited energy source. A leading proposal was

to separate the plutonium and reprocess it into

new fuel for reactors that in turn would create,

through “breeding,” even more plutonium fuel.

This would extend the world’s resources of

fissionable fuel almost indefinitely. The remaining

high-level radioactive waste-stripped of

plutonium and uranium-would be permanently

isolated in geologic repositories. It was widely

assumed that this “closed cycle” architecture

would be implemented everywhere.

The technology for producing nuclear energy is

the same as the technology for producing nuclear

weapons. To convert from peaceful to non-

peaceful use takes only enriching the uranium or

reprocessing the fuel rods into plutonium.

In the past, enriching uranium required thousands

of centrifuges—assembled just so—to separate

the tiny quantities of bomb-grade U-235 from the

mass of non-bomb-grade U-238. Processing

plutonium required a separate, complex, and large

facility.

Two things have happened in recent times: First,

owing to the spread of science and the ingenuity

of black-marketeers, seemingly unsophisticated

countries have learned how to enrich uranium;

second, owing to the limitations of intelligence-

monitoring, especially in closed societies, some of

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 23

these same countries have learned how to elude

inspectors, even to the point of covertly building

large nuclear facilities.

Hence, another potent discussion for the

committee shall be about how to proceed so as to

maximize the possible advantages available by

exploiting nuclear energy without having to bear

the risk of a nuclear weapon process.

The anti-nuclear movement is a social

movement that opposes various nuclear

technologies. Some direct action

groups, environmental movements,

and professional organizations have identified

themselves with the movement at the local,

national, or international level. Major anti-nuclear

groups include Campaign for Nuclear

Disarmament, Friends of the

Earth, Greenpeace, International Physicians for

the Prevention of Nuclear War, and the Nuclear

Information and Resource Service. The initial

objective of the movement was nuclear

disarmament, though since the late 1960s

opposition has included the use of nuclear power.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament symbol,

designed in 1958. It later became a

universal symbolized in many different versions

worldwide.

With international relations between countries

becoming ever more complex as time progresses,

countries are getting even more incentives to

further their nuclear programs to get to the top of

this world’s military leaderboard. Thus, when

DISEC meets this September at ACMUN,

delegates will have their hands full with a topic so

precarious and intricate, it must be handled with

utmost intelligence and diplomacy to come up

with a solution for the betterment of mankind as

a whole.

Topic Area B

Weaponization of Natural

Resources

Natural Resources

A resource is an economic or productive factor

required to accomplish and activity. Natural

means provided by nature. Hence, natural

resources are substances given to us by the Earth

that are of immense value. In other words natural

resources are materials that are a part of nature

and can be exploited for economic gain.

Natural Resources are generally classified into two

major types:

1. Renewable: Renewable resources are the

ones that can be replenished meaning they

can be used over and over again. Such

resources are considered to have an

infinite supply that is not likely to run out

in the future.

2. Non Renewable: Non Renewable

resources are those that cannot be

replenished. These are the resources that

cannot be used over and over again. They

have a finite supply.

Water: Water is a necessity for life. It is used for

cooking, washing, drinking, agriculture, in various

industries to make medicines, dyes etc. Although

Disarmament and International Security Council 24

the Earth’s surface is 71% Water not all of this

water can be used for drinking. A small

percentage of this is potable water, i.e. that which

can be used for drinking and cooking.

Air: Air is also a necessity for life. It is not only

needed by humans but by animals and plants.

Polluted air can cause respiratory issues and a

plethora of other diseases.

Coal: Coal is a fossil fuel that can be burned to

produce energy. A major problem with using coal

is the pollution it causes.

Oil: Another resource used to produce energy, oil

is also an important fuel for vehicles and used in

industries.

Natural Gas, Phosphorous, various other metallic

minerals like gypsum, bauxite, phosphate all are

very important in today’s world.

They are found on or below the surface of the

Earth. Resources like water are found both above

and below the Earth’s surface, the former being

“Ground Water”.

Since these resources are of immense value there

is an issue over their allocation and at times

countries exploit other nations which are facing a

shortage of resources.

Weaponization basically means using something

as a weapon and in this case Natural Resources

are being used as weapons by nations.

1) Tactical Weaponization

Tactical weaponization involves the use of natural

resources as a weapon on the battle field in direct

or immediate support of military operations. In

other words, if a natural resource is being used as

the weapon itself to cause harm or in inflict

damage upon a region for a military purpose, then

it is being weaponized tactically. The most

common examples of tactical weaponization

include damming and flooding areas occupied by

enemy forces, using resources to expose an enemy

to easier attack, or cutting off energy to military

production facilities.

2) Strategic Weaponization

Strategic weaponization refers to the use of

natural resources to directly contribute to the

political or economic position of a given actor.

Instances of strategic weaponization must

provide some form of material or tangible asset to

the deployer, such as using natural resources to

expand control over land areas, as a funding asset,

or as a tool of psychological terrorism or

extortion.

3) Threat Multiplier

Threat multiplier is the most indirect method of

weaponizing resources, and involves the use of

natural resources to compound existing tensions

around the trade, regulation, distribution or

scarcity of resources. The “threats” that result in

conflict can exacerbate matters including climate

change, existing geopolitical tensions originally

unrelated to resources, or natural disasters such as

systemic drought. Temperature changes and

unpredictable precipitation fluctuations make

regions subject to droughts, in particular, and

increase the possibility for water conflict. The

threat multiplier category includes the use of

resource scarcity or conflict to leverage interests

on behalf of certain states or non-state actors.

For centuries, resources have been used as

weapons and instruments of war, as sources of

economic and political strength and as

justifications for conflict. Most ancient resource

weaponization revolves around the deployment

or manipulation of water resources, freshwater

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 25

resources in particular, since water is necessary for

irrigation, health, sanitation and agriculture.

World War II is one of the first examples of many

geopolitical actors being involved in an

overlapping series of resource weaponization. As

petroleum and oil became indispensable to the

war effort, particularly because of its need in

manufacturing bombs, transportation fuel,

machinery and guns, Allied powers began to

strategically bomb refineries, production

facilitates and storage resources of natural and

synthetic fuel in Germany and Axis Europe.

While the United States was able to produce huge

amounts of oil to fuel its armies because the

majority of its resources were consolidated in

U.S. States California and Texas, Germany had

few oil fields within its borders by the 1940s, with

the rest being relatively inaccessibly located in

occupied territories. Ploiesti, Romania was

Germany’s sole oil field and the location of many

refineries, and was attacked by Allied powers

during Operation Tidal Wave in 1943. Allied

forces also bombed dams on the Mo ̈hne, Sorpe

and Eder Rivers in Germany, and German forces

retaliated by destroying British and American

occupations and forces by damming and flooding

certain areas. WWII also saw the beginning of the

weaponization of hydroelectricity systems, which

were routinely bombed during the conflict,

especially in the Soviet Union.

The United Nations General Assembly

established the United Nations Commission on

Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources

on 12 December 1958 under resolution 1314

(XIII). In 1961, this Commission adopted a draft

resolution outlining principles concerning

permanent sovereignty over natural resources.

Following consideration of this draft resolution

by the Economic and Social Council and the

Second Committee of the General Assembly, the

General Assembly adopted resolution 1803

(XVII).

Fig. 1 (Source: Al Jazeera)

The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant has been

involved in one of the worst humanitarian

disasters in the 21st century, the Syrian Civil War.

Although, many parties are involved in this

conflict such as the Free Syrian Army, the forces

of Bashar al Assad, the Al Nusra Front (a division

of Al Qaeda), ISIS is one of the main parties.

Considered the strongest terrorist organization in

the world currently ISIS has expanded its control.

Fig. 1 above shows the control of ISIL alongside

other organizations within Syria.

The Euphrates River which supplies water to Iraq

and its neighbors is expected to decline by 50

percent in the next 8 years. There is a water

deficiency in these areas and ISIL has been quick

Disarmament and International Security Council 26

to take control of the drought affected areas for

recruitment purposes and for establishing

themselves. At certain points ISIL has also been

able to control water supplies. For example the

Mosul Dam which provides electricity to a large

area and contributes to 45 percent of the Iraqi

electricity supply and also supplies water to

Kurdish regions was taken over by ISIL in 2014.

Such an important dam in the hands of such a

terrorist organization is a cause for concern. Had

ISIL destroyed the dam they could’ve destroyed

Mosul and Baghdad completely.

Other means of strategic weaponization —

including extortion and so-called “hydro-terror”

— have also been used. For example, in June

2014, ISIS cut off the water and electricity supply

to Mosul and Tikrit after their seizure and

compelled residents to buy water at an

unaffordable rate. In Talkhaneim, ISIS shut off

the power used to draw water from local wells and

asked for 4 million dinars to turn the electricity

back on. This funding would directly aid ISIS

agenda by increasing the organization’s nautical

base, and also serves to increase the organization’s

legitimacy as governing body because it controls

resources crucial for the survival of the

population.

Pakistan and India- Indus River System

When British India was divided into two parts

Pakistan and India, many problems were caused

by the partition. One of them was the issue of the

Indus River System. The Indus River System

which is amongst the largest River Systems in the

world drained a huge area. Consisting of six main

rivers the Indus Plain was also split into 2 parts,

one being in India and the other in Pakistan. The

Head works of the 3 Eastern Tributaries remained

in India meaning India could control the

headworks.

Since India and Pakistan don’t have cordial

relations, having fought 4 wars, India can use this

geographical advantage.

Although the Indus Water Treaty was signed

between these 2 countries with help from the

World Bank, this still remains and issue between

the two countries as India has constructed dams

such as the Baglihar Dam which store water,

thereby stopping water from entering Pakistan.

The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960 after

nine years of negotiations between India and

Pakistan with the help of the World Bank, which

is also a signatory.

India and Pakistan disagree about the

construction of the Kishenganga (330 megawatts)

and Ratle (850 megawatts) hydroelectric power

plants being built by India (the World Bank is not

financing either project). The two countries

disagree over whether the technical design

features of the two hydroelectric plants

contravene the Treaty. The plants are on

respectively a tributary of the Jhelum and the

Chenab Rivers. The Treaty designates these two

rivers as well as the Indus as the “Western Rivers”

to which Pakistan has unrestricted use. Among

other uses, under the Treaty, India is permitted to

construct hydroelectric power facilities on these

rivers subject to constraints specified in

Annexures to the Treaty. Talks related to the

Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric power

plants are ongoing.

Pakistan asked the World Bank to facilitate the

setting up of a Court of Arbitration to look into

its concerns about the designs of the two

hydroelectric power projects. India asked for the

appointment of a Neutral Expert for the same

purpose. These requests came after the

Permanent Indus Commission had been engaged

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 27

in discussions on the matter for a while. During

several months prior to December 12, 2016, the

World Bank sought to fulfil its procedural

obligations with respect to both the Court of

Arbitration and the Neutral Expert. The Treaty

does not empower the World Bank to choose

whether one procedure should take precedence

over the other; rather it vests the determination of

jurisdictional competence on each of the two

mechanisms. At the same time, the World Bank

actively encouraged both countries to agree

amicably on a mechanism to address the issues.

.

Iran and Afghanistan: The Sistan Basin

The transboundary Sistan basin wetlands (also

known as the Hamoons) is located in an arid part

of Baluchistan near the Afghan and Iranian

border. This closed inland delta is nourished by

the Helmand River, which originates in the

mountains northwest of Kabul and flows for

some 1,300 kilometres through Afghanistan

before reaching Iran at the Sistan wetlands. It is

comprised of three geographical sub-units: the

upper terraces of the inland delta of the Helmand

river, which is mostly drained and used for

irrigated agriculture; the wetlands (Hamoons)

covering the lower delta depression; and a hyper

saline lake (Gowd-e-Zareh) in the lowest part of

the basin, which collects the overspill from the

wetlands and, in case of extreme floods, from the

Helmand River. There is no outflow from this

terminal lake; water is lost from Gowd-e-Zareh

only by evaporation. The political boundary

between the Islamic Republic of Iran and

Afghanistan splits the Hamoon system,

complicating management possibilities in the area.

Ninety percent of the watershed is located in

Afghanistan and practically all of the wetlands’

water sources originate there.

Tensions between Iran and Afghanistan over the

transboundary Sistan basin have existed since the

late 1800s. In 2001 tensions began escalating over

the increasing water scarcity in the basin and the

perceived underlying drivers. In 2002, UNEP

started providing both governments with

environmental diplomacy support, which resulted

in increased dialogue, information sharing, and

technical cooperation.

Since the late nineteenth century, Iran and

Afghanistan have striven to agree on a mutually

acceptable allocation of the waters of the

Helmand River. Their relationship has, at times,

been strained, particularly during periods of

drought-induced water shortages or

announcements of major water infrastructure

development projects. In 1973 an agreement was

reached between Iran and Afghanistan to allow 22

m3/sec to flow into Iran from the Sistan branch

of the Helmand River, located just south of

Zaranj. In addition, Iran was to purchase an

additional 4 m3/sec from Afghanistan, bringing

the total allocation to 26 m3/sec.170 While the

agreement was not formally ratified by

Afghanistan due to government instability,

Helmand River commissioners have been

assigned by both countries who since 2004 have

met on a regular basis to review water allocations

in accordance with the 1973 treaty. On this basis,

in 1981 Iran constructed three Chanimeh

reservoirs (I, II, III) with a capacity of 0.63 billion

m3 for drinking water purposes. Iran’s water

storage capacity was further increased to

approximately 1.5 billion m3 with the

construction of Chanimeh IV in 2008.

In 2001 tensions between the two countries

escalated when Iran wrote to UN Secretary-

General Kofi Annan, charging that the Taliban

had blocked the Helmand River, causing some

140,000 hectares of land in the neighbouring

regions of Iran to dry up. However, a UN

investigation found drought to be the main cause,

as the Helmand River was flowing at only 2 per

cent of its annual average. The wetlands have

remained almost completely dry for most of the

period between

Disarmament and International Security Council 28

2001 and early 2014. People lost their livelihoods

as agriculture and fisheries failed, resulting in

large-scale population displacements, including

the migration of Afghan refugees into Iran.

In 2002 the region was designated as a

humanitarian disaster zone and became a

recipient of relief aid. The environmental collapse

resulted in emigration, unemployment, and

smuggling, destabilizing this sensitive border

region and further straining relations between

Afghanistan and Iran. Following a medium- sized

flood in March and April 2005, a substantial part

of the wetlands refilled with water. However, this

proved short-lived as the wetlands dried out

again, and the drought has continued until today.

Actions taken by the United Nations in the

Past

At its first session, from 18 to 22 May 1959, the

Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over

Natural Resources instructed the United Nations

Secretariat to prepare a preliminary study on the

status of the right of permanent sovereignty of

peoples and nations over their natural resources

and to request governments, specialized agencies

and the regional economic commissions of the

United Nations to supply information on the

subject for incorporation in the Secretariat study

(Report of the Commission to the Economic and

Social Council on the work of its first and second

sessions, E/3334). At its second session, from 16

February to 17 March 1960, the Commission

considered the preliminary study prepared by the

Secretariat (A/AC.97/5 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1),

which included information it had received from

governments, specialized agencies and the

regional economic commissions of the United

Nations. On 4 March 1960, the Commission

requested the Secretariat to submit a revised study

for its consideration at the following session

(A/AC.97/7).

The revised Secretariat study (A/AC.97/5/Rev.1

and Corr. 1 and Add. 1) was considered by the

Commission, at its third and final session, in May

1961 (Report of the Commission to the

Economic and Social Council on the work of its

third session, E/3511). On 10 May 1961, in the

course of the debate in the Commission, Chile

submitted a detailed draft resolution

(A/AC.97/L.3) which proposed to adopt a

declaration of four principles concerning the

permanent sovereignty of peoples and nations

over their natural resources. On 18 May 1961,

following informal consultations with other

members of the Commission, Chile submitted a

revised draft resolution (A/AC.97/L.3/Rev.2).

On 22 May 1961, following minor amendments

to the text, a modified version of the Chilean draft

resolution was adopted by the Commission; the

Commission in turn adopted resolution I

(E/3511, annex) by which it requested the

Economic and Social Council to recommend that

the General Assembly should adopt a draft

resolution on permanent sovereignty, the text of

which was reproduced therein. This draft

resolution contained an eight-point declaration on

permanent sovereignty over natural resources.

The report of the Commission, together with the

revised secretariat study and the observations

made by the members of the Commission, were

transmitted to the Economic and Social Council

for its consideration.

In 1952, the General Assembly requested the

Commission on Human Rights to prepare

recommendations concerning international

respect for the right of peoples to self-

determination. The Commission on Human

Rights recommended the establishment of a

commission to conduct a full survey of the right

of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty

over their natural wealth and resources, having

noted that this right formed a “basic constituent

of the right to self-determination”. In accordance

with this recommendation, the General Assembly

established the United Nations Commission on

Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources

on 12 December 1958 under resolution 1314

(XIII). In 1961, this Commission adopted a draft

Aitchison College Model United Nations 2018 29

resolution outlining principles concerning

permanent sovereignty over natural resources.

Following consideration of this draft resolution

by the Economic and Social Council and the

Second Committee of the General Assembly, the

General Assembly adopted resolution 1803

(XVII).

DESA: United Nations Department of Economic

and Social Affairs

DPA: United Nations Department of Political

Affairs

PBSO: United Nations Peacekeeping Support

Office

HABITAT: United Nations Human Settlement

Program

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

UNEP: United Nations Environment

Programme

1. What legislation is required to prevent

Weaponization of Natural Resources?

2. How to deal with the Weaponization of

Natural Resources by non-state actors?

3. What are the changes that are required in

existing legislations to make them

suitable?

4. How should mediation take place in a

dispute?

5. What bodies should be involved in

mediation?

6. What are possible solutions to such

issues?

7. What qualifies as Weaponization?

8. In what cases is Weaponization legal?

9. What possible division of resources can

take place?

10. Who was sovereignty over these

resources?

11. What can be done to prevent future

conflicts?

Other than these questions delegates are required

to come up with proper and effective frameworks

that are equitable and suitable for the international

community.