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AIRPOWER II: Integrating Air, Cyber, and Space into Multi-Domain Operations

SYLLABUS

AY 18

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

PHASE I INTERMEDIATE LEVEL COURSE

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

21st Century Leaders for 21st Century Challenges

DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.

http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/ACSC/

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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

MAXWELL AFB, AL

FOREWORD

This Airpower II course syllabus for Air Command and Staff College provides an overview of

the course narrative, objectives, and questions, as well as a detailed description of each lesson to

assist students in their reading and preparation for lecture and seminar. Included is information

about course methods of evaluation, schedule, and the fulfilment of joint professional military

education core goals.

SIGNED

Heather P. Venable, PhD

Course Director, Airpower II

APPROVED

James W. Forsyth, Jr., PhD

Dean

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AIRPOWER II

COURSE OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION

Airpower II (AP2) examines the history of the US Air Force since the Vietnam War, after which

the service shifted its focus and culture from strategic bombardment to other modes of airpower.

Such seismic shifts continue today, as the Air Force attempts to integrate fully the cyber and

space domains. In examining this period, this course probes critically at varied understandings of

airpower. Finally, students consider how airpower’s range of kinetic and non-kinetic options can

enable future joint and multi-domain operations.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend relevant lessons from recent case studies of US airpower history.

2. Analyze current airpower capabilities and limitations.

3. Analyze the future application of airpower in joint, multi-domain operations.

COURSE QUESTIONS

1. What is airpower (doctrinally defined as “the ability to project military power or influence

through the control and exploitation of air, space, and cyberspace to achieve strategic,

operational, or tactical objectives”), and how is it effective in meeting national security

objectives?

2. How should the US military plan to use airpower in multi-domain operations in light of

current capabilities and limitations?

3. What is the interplay between the strategic and operational levels of war, and how do

doctrine, theory, leadership, and technology shape them?

COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE There fifteen course days consisting of 13 hours of lecture and 28 hours of seminar. AP2 is split

into three major blocks. Part I, days 1-6, “Learning from Disaster and Planning for Success,”

analyzes historical case studies. Part II, days 7-12, focuses on how the USAF operates in

multiple domains. Part III, days 13-14, proposes ideas about “Thinking about the Future Multi-

Domain Fight.” Overall, AP2 holistically injects cyber and space into “airpower” to gain a more

thorough understanding of capabilities and limitations. Additionally, the curriculum steps

outside of pure USAF airpower studies in an attempt to understand how others may view

airpower.

JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME-1)

AP2 addresses Intermediate-Level College Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint

Professional Military Education (JPME), established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01E, signed 29

May 2015. The course supports the following Joint Learning Areas and Objectives, listed below

with points of explanation:

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Learning Area Objective 1 – National Military Capabilities Strategy

a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces to conduct the full

range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.

Addressed in lessons AP-602, AP-603, AP-606, AP-607, AP-608, AP-609,

AP-612, AP-613, AP-614, AP-615, AP-618, AP-619, AP-620, AP-621, AP-

622, AP-623, AP-624, AP-625, AP-626, AP-627, AP-628.

b. Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for

joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.


AP-613, AP-622, AP-623, AP-624, AP-625, AP-626, AP-627, AP-628.

Learning Area Objective 2 – Joint Doctrine and Concepts

a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.

Addressed in lesson AP-611.

b. Comprehend the interrelationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.

Addressed in lessons AP-603, AP-611

c. Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex or

ambiguous environment using critical thinking, operational art, and current joint

doctrine.



620, AP-621, AP-622, AP-623, AP-624, AP-627, AP-628

Learning Area Objective 3 – Joint & Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War

a. Comprehend the security environment within which Joint Forces are created,

employed and sustained in support of JFCs and component commanders.



627, AP-628

b. Comprehend Joint Force command relationships.


AP-623, AP-624, AP-625, AP-626, AP-627, AP-628

c. Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical

levels of war.


AP-613, AP-622, AP-623, AP-624, AP-625, AP-626, AP-627, AP-628

d. Comprehend how theory and principles of joint operations pertain to the operational

level of war across the range of military operations to include traditional and irregular

warfare that impact the strategic environment.



622, AP-623, AP-624, AP-625, AP-626, AP-627, AP-628

e. Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power and the

importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole of government response,

multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security

interests

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AP-616, AP-617, AP-618, AP-619, AP-620, AP-621, AP-627, AP-628

f. Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the

operational level of war.


AP-610, AP-611, AP-612, AP-613, AP-624, AP-625, AP-626

g. Comprehend the relationships between national security objectives, military

objectives, conflict termination, and post conflict transition to enabling civil

authorities.


AP-612, AP-613, AP-618, AP-619, AP-627, AP-628

Learning Area Objective 4 – Joint Planning and Execution Process

a. Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and means available through

the framework provided by the national level systems.

Addressed in lessons AP-606, AP-607, AP-615, AP-620, AP-621

c. Comprehend the integration of joint functions (command and control, intelligence,

fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment) to operational planning

problems across the range of military operations.



626, AP-627, AP-628

e. Comprehend the integration of IO and cyberspace operations with other lines of

operations at the operational level of war.


AP-619, AP-622, AP-623, AP-624, AP-627, AP-628

f. Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, region,

culture/diversity, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force

operations across the range of military operations.



626, AP-627, AP-628

g. Comprehend the role and perspective of the Combatant Commander and staff in

developing various theater policies, strategies and plans.

Addressed in lessons AP-604, AP-605, AP-606, AP-607

h. Comprehend the requirements across the joint force, Services, inter-organizational

partners and the host nation in the planning and execution of joint operations across

the range of military operations.


AP-625, AP-626, AP-627, AP-628

Learning Area Objective 5 – Joint Command and Control

a. Comprehend the organizational options, structures and requirements available to

joint force commanders.


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b. Comprehend the factors of intent through trust, empowerment and understanding

(Mission Command), mission objectives, forces, and capabilities that support the

selection of a specific C2 option.


AP-627, AP-628

c. Comprehend the effects of networks and cyberspace on the ability to conduct Joint

Operational Command and Control.


AP-619, AP-621, AP-622, AP-623, AP-624, AP-627, AP-628

Learning Area Objective 6 – Joint Operational Leadership and the Profession of Arms

a. Comprehend the role of the Profession of Arms in the contemporary environment.


AP-619, AP-621, AP-623, AP-626, AP-627, AP-628

b. Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize

change, lead transitions, and anticipate/adapt to surprise and uncertainty.



627, AP-628

c. Comprehend the ethical dimension of operational leadership and the challenges it

may present when considering the values of the Profession of Arms.

Addressed in lessons AP-611, AP-613, AP-619, AP-621, AP-623, AP-625

d. Analyze the application of Mission Command (intent through trust, empowerment,

and understanding) in a Joint, Inter-agency, Inter-governmental and Multi-national

(JIIM) environment.


e. Communicate with clarity and precision.

AP-604, AP-605, AP-606, AP-607, AP-624

f. Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and

operations.



624, AP-625, AP-626, AP-627, AP-628

SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS (SAE)

SAE 1: Transregional, Multi-function, Multi-domain Joint Warfighting:

AP-605, AP-607, AP-609, AP-611, AP-612, AP-613, AP-618, AP-619, AP-622, AP-

623, AP-624, AP-625, AP-626, AP-627, AP-628

SAE 3: Military Operations in a Contested Cyberspace Environment:

AP-618, AP-619, AP-623, AP-625, AP-626, AP-627, AP-628

SAE 5: Nontraditional Threats to Security and Stability:

AP-614, AP-615, AP-616, AP-617, AP-618, AP-619, AP-620, AP-621, AP-622, AP-

623, AP-624, AP-625, AP-626, AP-627, AP-628

SAE 6: Operations Assessment:

AP-602, AP-603, AP-606, AP-607, AP-612, AP-613

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COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1. READINGS. Students are expected to complete all assigned readings prior to lecture and

seminar. Students should review the lesson objectives and overviews provided in the syllabus

before reading the assigned texts, and read them in the suggested order.

2. LECTURES. Students will attend faculty lectures that complement the readings and seminar

discussion, thereby enhancing knowledge of the course concepts. Lectures provide additional

historical background and different perspectives to stimulate and enhance learning in

seminar.

3. SEMINAR PARTICIPATION. Student participation in seminar discussions is vital to the

individual learning and success. Each seminar member is expected to contribute to the

discussion.

4. ASSIGNMENTS. Two graded written assignments and one briefing fulfill the requirements

of the Airpower II course: a take-home mid-term examination, a 5-7 minute briefing, and an

in-class comprehensive final exam. All written work must include an acknowledgement of

colleagues who made an intellectual contribution to the work as the first citation.

METHODS OF EVALUATION. The 4-5 page take-home examination (due day 8, 5 Feb) is

worth 30 percent of the final course grade, the in-class individual briefing (day 12, 22 Feb) is

worth 20 percent of the final course grade, and the in-class 4-5 page comprehensive final

examination (Day 15, 5 Mar) is worth 50 percent of the final course grade.

COURSE ADMINISTRATION

There are two types of readings in this course: 1) books issued by ACSC; and 2) selected

electronic files. Students can access the syllabus, course calendar, and selected readings as well

as other supplemental materials online. In addition, lecture slides will be posted when available

after the lecture. Students will also be able to download a zip file containing all files for their

convenience.

ACSC provides students with copies of the following course books, which must be returned at

the conclusion of the course:

• Michael J. Coumatos, William B. Scott, and William J. Birnes, Space Wars: The First Six

Hours of World War III (New York, NY: Forge, 2007).

• Brian D. Laslie, The Air Force Way of War: U.S. Tactics and Training after Vietnam

(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2015).

• Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War (New York, NY: Simon &

Schuster, 2016).

• Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational

Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

• Benjamin S. Lambeth, Unseen War: Allied Air Power and the Takedown of Saddam

Hussein (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).

• Philip P. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997).

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• John A. Olsen, ed., A History of Air Warfare (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010).

• John A. Olsen, ed., Airpower Applied: U.S., NATO, and Israeli Combat Experience

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017).

• John A. Olsen, ed., European Air Power: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington,

DC: Potomac Books, 2014).

• Robert C. Owen, Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience (Washington,

DC: Potomac Books, 2013)

• Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign against Iraq

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1995).

• Clinton Romesha, Red Platoon: A True Story of American Valor (New York, NY: Dutton,

2016)

• Stephen D. Wrage, Immaculate Warfare: Participants Reflect on the Air Campaigns over

Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).

Please refer any questions to Dr. Heather P. Venable (Course Director).

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AIRPOWER II

COURSE SCHEDULE

DAY 0

DATE: 15 December 2016 (Friday)

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Explain the course objectives, course questions, and course narrative.

2. Review the course syllabus, methods of evaluation, and expectations for seminar.

3. Built initial rapport between students and instructor.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-600 (L): Course Overview (Venable)

“Airpower” refers to the air, space, and cyber assets that are available to military leaders for use

in conflicts. This course examines how Airpower can effectively contribute to a nation’s

security, as well as how it has been successfully employed in past conflicts and how it might

influence future wars. This lecture introduces students to the key concepts and framework of the

course. CONTACT HOURS: 0.5-hour lecture

AP-601 (S): Course Introduction

In this seminar, instructors introduce themselves to their seminars, discuss classroom policies

and expectations, and set the stage for seminar discussions scheduled for day 1. CONTACT HOURS: 1-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

None.

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Part I: Historical Case Studies: Learning from Disaster and Planning for Success

DAY 1: THE LEGACY OF VIETNAM

DATE: 8 January 2018 (Monday)

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Understand how the USAF adapted and evolved to overcome flaws exposed by combat in

Vietnam to employ airpower more effectively and efficiently at the tactical, operational, and

strategic levels of war.

2. Evaluate Laslie’s and Winton’s competing narratives regarding how training, doctrine,

organization, leadership, and technology interacted to improve combat effectiveness and mature

airpower as a member of the joint force.

3. Analyze the legacy of the Vietnam War on a generation of officers and its resulting effect on

Air Force leadership and institutional culture.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-602 (L): Learning from Disaster?: Military Reforms after Vietnam and the Arab-

Israeli Wars (Campbell)

The generation that came of age in Vietnam incorporated the lessons of the Arab-Israeli

Wars and revitalized the service, developing capabilities, equipment and tactics that, while

designed for a European battlefield, would pay huge dividends in Desert Storm and beyond. The

lecturer’s personal experience and his intellectual journey will form the center of this lecture that

addresses how individuals and institutions learn from their experiences. CONTACT HOURS: 1-hour lecture

AP-603 (S): Learning from Disaster?: Military Reforms after Vietnam and the Arab-

Israeli Wars

After fifteen years in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, some military thinkers find

themselves in a similar position to military reformers of the 1970s and the 1980s. Perhaps there

is less of a sense of an urgent need to reform, but there is similar questioning among many that

occurred during and after the Vietnam War: why didn’t we win? In the late 1970s and 1980s, the

US military had tired of fighting an insurgency. It shifted its focus, instead, to preparing for the

fight it felt more comfortable with: the possibility of non-nuclear, conventional conflict in

Europe against the Soviet Union. Rather than trying to learn lessons from Vietnam, it chose to

learn lessons from the more conventional Arab-Israeli wars. Thus, the Army and the Air Force

developed AirLand doctrine for defeating the Soviets by considering each other’s capabilities

and limitations. However, historians differ on exactly the kind of changes made after the

Vietnam War, as evident in the disparity of arguments made by Brian Laslie and Harold Winton.

How do they view this period differently? CONTACT HOURS: 2-hour seminar

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REQUIRED READINGS

1. Brian Laslie, The Air Force Way of War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), ix-

112.

2. Harold Winton, “An Ambivalent Partnership: US Army and Air Force Perspectives on Air

Ground Operations, 1973-90” in Philip Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven (Montgomery: AU

Press, 1997), 399-433.

3. “Learning the Not So Obvious Lessons,” Air Force Magazine (March 2017), 68-72.

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DAY 2: OPERATION DESERT STORM

DATE: 11 January 2018 (Thursday)

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Examine the messiness and the missteps as well as the successes that characterized ODS’s

organizational planning process. What “lessons learned” drove the various proposed plans? Had

everyone learned the same lessons?

2. Evaluate the application of strategic paralysis theory to planning and operations. How did

planners translate strategy into an operational plan and the airpower limitations and capabilities

that planners considered for air, cyber, and space.

3. Apply Laslie and Winton’s arguments from Day 1 using ODS as a test case. Did doctrine and

theory clash? Does one author more accurately describe the Air Force of the 1970s and 1980s

than the other?

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-604 (L): Operation Desert Storm: Planning a Strategic Paralysis Campaign (Warden)

The success of an air campaign depends on the quality of its planning, the receptiveness

of those who must approve it, the ability and understanding of those who direct it (up to the

highest executive levels), and the expertise of those who execute and support it at the tactical and

operational levels. Each of these factors was an issue in the first Gulf War. Understanding the

interplay can be of significant value to those who might be involved in future enterprises. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-605 (S): Operation Desert Storm: Planning a Strategic Paralysis Campaign

From Riyadh, General Horner quickly read Tactical Air Command (TAC)’s airpower

plan and grumpily responded, “How can a person in an ivory tower far from the front…write

such a message? Wonders never cease.”1 How did the US plan for Operation Desert Storm? How

did the Air Force wrestle with the challenge of removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait? Many

officers are familiar with the larger plot, but this reading focuses on some of the subplots as

various Air Force factions wrestled with how airpower should be used efficiently and effectively

in ODS. CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign against Iraq

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1995), xi-134.

2. Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War (New York, NY: Simon &

Schuster, 2016), 21-24.

SUGGESTED READINGS

1. John Andreas Olsen, “Operation Desert Storm: 1991,” A History of Air Warfare (Potomac

Books, 2010), 177-200.

1 Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign against Iraq (Maxwell AFB, AL: AU

Press, 1995), 42.

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DAY 3: OPERATION ALLIED FORCE


LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Analyze the capabilities and limitations of airpower during the campaign. How effectively

and efficiently did airpower achieve tactical, operational, and strategic effects?

2. Explore theories of air coercion to determine how well they apply to this campaign and how

they might be successfully used in the future.

3. Understand the civil-military tension of the campaign within the framework of the larger

relationship between politics and war.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-606 (L): Operation Allied Force: Planning a NATO Campaign (Peck)

US Air Force Lieutenant General (Ret.) Allen G. Peck played an instrumental role in the

planning and execution of Operation Allied Force. The end of the Cold War helped unleash long-

dormant ethnic and religious tensions in many parts of the world. In the Balkans, rivalries led to

a series of military operations, interventions, and humanitarian crises that gained the attention of

transnational organizations. This lecture will briefly review airpower operations in the Balkans

during this period. It will then delve more deeply into the background leading to NATO’s

decision to use airpower to compel the Serbian leadership to cease atrocities against ethnic

Albanians in the province of Kosovo. The discussion will address key planning and execution

challenges for the Allied Force air operation and the degree to which these challenges were

overcome. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-607 (S): Operation Allied Force: Planning a NATO Campaign

Unleashed military power (aka Operation Desert Storm) was not in play for Yugoslavia

because it was first and foremost a NATO operation characterized by fragile coalition

relationships. Would the kind of gradualist campaign that harkened back to Vietnam’s Operation

Rolling Thunder be successful in coercing Slobodan Milosevic? What vision for targeting

Yugoslavia would win out—a traditional strategic air campaign or a focus on fielded forces? To

what extent does this 78-day campaign provide insights into the tensions between politicians and

military officers that have continued relevance today? CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 1-86 and 97-99.

2. Stephen Wrage and Scott Cooper, Immaculate Warfare: Participants Reflect on the Air

Campaigns over Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 1-19 and

101-108.

3. Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War (New York, NY: Simon &

Schuster, 2016), 107-118.

4. “Military Space Dominates Air Strikes,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 29 March 1999,

30-34.

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DAY 4: OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM


LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend airpower's role in facilitating the original strategic objectives that underpinned

Operation Enduring Freedom.

2. Analyze the capabilities and limitations of the “Afghan model” of warfare that fused ISR and

precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to facilitate effective co-operation between air assets, SOF

teams, and indigenous allies as the primary means of toppling the Taliban regime.

3. Consider how Operation Anaconda represents the challenges inherent in maximizing the

synergistic effects of land, air, and space assets in the context of joint operations.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-608 (L): Operation Enduring Freedom: Planning for Air-Ground Synergy and the

“Afghan Model” (Neuenschwander)

Colonel (Ret) Matthew Neuenschwander will provide insights into the synergy between

air and ground in OEF as well as some of the challenges. Whereas Allied Force suggested to

some airpower enthusiasts that airpower could “go it alone,” OEF required the use of troops on

the ground. The US used a small number of Special Forces in coordination with Afghan troops in

conjunction with airpower to pursue its strategic, operational, and tactical goals. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-609 (S): Operation Enduring Freedom: Planning for Air-Ground Synergy and the

“Afghan Model”

Operation Enduring Freedom represented both a continuation of, as well as a departure

from, established patterns of airpower application. Airlift facilitated the logistical sustainment of

the operation given the challenging location and conditions of the theater. Additionally,

technological advances showcased the growing importance of precision weapons, persistent ISR,

and unmanned systems in the conduct of the campaign. These helped give rise to what has

become known as the Afghan Model, about which scholars differ regarding the necessary

conditions for its effectiveness. Still, the relationship between the Army and the Air Force

appeared strained, as epitomized by the failure to coordinate planning of air assets for Operation

Anaconda. CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Benjamin Lambeth, Air Power against Terror (RAND, 2005), xiii-xxx, 274-279, 293-336.

2. Richard B. Andres and Jeffrey B. Hukill, “Anaconda: A Flawed Joint Planning Process,” JFQ

(2007), 135-40.

3. Richard B. Andres et al., “Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Contact,”

International Security 30 (Winter 2005/2006), 121-160.

4. Stephen D. Biddle, “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in

Afghanistan and Iraq,” International Security 30 (Winter 2005/2006), 161-176.

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DAY 5: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM


LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Analyze the effectiveness of the air campaign in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

2. Analyze OIF planning in the context of Deptula’s vision for successful warfare.

3. Compare and contrast the air-ground relationships in ODS, OEF, and OIF.

4. Comprehend Effects Based Operations (EBO) as a framework for campaign planning and

evaluate its utility for an air campaign.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-610 (L): Operation Iraqi Freedom: Planning an EBO Campaign (Hathaway)

US Air Force Colonel (Ret.) David “Zam” Hathaway played an important role in

planning Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Based on his experiences, he will discuss the strategic

context, planning, and execution during the war’s early stages. Colonel Hathaway will

demonstrate how air, space, and cyber power were the unseen enablers and that phases two and

three of OIF were the most successfully-integrated joint campaign in history. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-611 (S): Operation Iraqi Freedom: Planning an EBO Campaign

The debate over Effects Based Operations, or EBO, is an extension of the century-long

argument over how to best use air forces—in support of ground warfare or for independent

effects. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, as Commander of Joint Forces Command in 2008,

struck EBO from the joint vernacular. Nonetheless, EBO remains in Air Force doctrine.

Proponents point to Phase III of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as the embodiment of what a

well-crafted EBO campaign can do. Opponents claim that EBO is too prescriptive,

micromanaging, and ill-suited for the unpredictability of modern warfare. This lesson invites

discussion by first examining the OIF campaign strategy of 2003, and then by looking at both

sides of the EBO debate. CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. David A. Deptula, “Effects Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare,” (Aerospace

Education Foundation, 2001), 1-26.

2. Paul K. Davis, Effects-Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community,

(RAND, 2001), 24-28.

3. Benjamin Lambeth, Unseen War (RAND, 2013), 1-8, 15-36, 46-58, 220-223.

4. Williamson Murray, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: 2003,” A History of Air Warfare (Potomac

Books, 2010), 279-296.

5. James N. Mattis, “USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects Based Operations,”

Parameters (2008), 18-25.

6. John T. Correll, “The Assault on EBO,” Air Force Magazine (Jan 2013), 51-54.

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DAY 6: AIRPOWER FOR STRATEGIC EFFECT MEETS THE INSURGENT


LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Evaluate Colin Gray’s theory of airpower and compare it to other airpower theorists.

2. Evaluate various arguments regarding the effective use of airpower against insurgents.

3. Apply tactical and operational solutions seen in the Battle of Fallujah to the future of urban

combat.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-612 (L): Lessons Learned?: Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) (Hoffman)

In Airpower for Strategic Effect, Colin Gray cautions airpower thinkers to ensure they do

not evaluate airpower developments without considering the entirety of airpower history. In light

of the first day of AP2, this lecture will consider possible lessons to be learned from it as well as

point to some cautions regarding learning lessons removed from context. Finally, it will examine

the strategic effectiveness of airpower’s use in OIR. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-613 (S): Airpower for Strategic Effect Meets the Insurgent

In the previous lesson, we looked at how the US planned and executed the operation it

wanted to fight, using the concept of EBO. In this lesson we will assess the war the US ended up

getting that would require the enormous use of resources continuing to today in light of a

common critique of EBO being that it fails to have much predictive power given that the enemy

has a “vote.”

This lesson begins by wrestling with Colin Gray’s airpower theory and the critical

importance of using airpower for strategic effect. It then surveys recent writing on the use of

airpower in unconventional warfare. Finally, it examines the Battles of Fallujah and Kamdesh

from a more tactical perspective to better understand the challenges of CAS. The US began OIF

by waging a conventional campaign. It ended up getting an unconventional one for which it was

not prepared, as seen in the struggle for Fallujah, which is emblematic of a more common future

fight. After a previous defeat in April of 2003, a joint force swiftly and precisely retook the city

of Fallujah, Iraq in November of 2004. Many consider this operation to be a model for successful

urban warfare. About the battle, Jonathan F. Keiler writes, “Was Fallujah a battle we lost in April

2004, with ruinous results? Or was it a battle we won in November?” His answer is that the

“answer is yes. If that sounds awkward, it is because Fallujah was an awkward battle.”2 Keiler’s

interest, then, centers on the difference in success between the April and November battles.

Indeed, the use of airpower in the second Battle of Fallujah—particularly the AC- 130’s

matchless tactical nighttime firepower—provided critical support to the ground component. But,

in light of the long wars the US continues to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps the better

response to Keiler’s answer is: So what? Does it matter that the US won the Battle of Fallujah? CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

2 Jonathan F. Keiler, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?” The Naval Institute Proceedings, (January 2005), found in

Military.com, www.military.com/NewContent/1,13190,NI_0105_Falluhah-p.1,00.html.

17

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Colin Gray, “Airpower Theory,” Airpower for Strategic Effect (AU Press, 2012), 267-308

2. John Farquhar, “Airpower and Irregular War: A Battle of Ideas,” A&SPJ (Spring 2017), 51-

60.

3. Rebecca Grant, “The Fallujah Model,” Air Force Magazine (February 2005), 48-53.

4. Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2016), 169-189.

5. Clinton Romesha, Red Platoon: A True Story of American Valor (New York, NY: Dutton,

2016), 261-71 and 283-93.

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Part II: Operating in the Air Force’s Multiple Domains

DAY 7: CHANGING PARADIGMS OF AIR SUPERIORITY

DATE: 1 February 2018 (Thursday)

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the Air Force’s five core missions.

2. Evaluate the existing paradigm for air superiority in the U.S. Air Force.

3. Understand contemporary challenges to air superiority and develop principles to guide air

superiority for the next 30 years.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-614 (L): Changing Paradigms of Air Superiority (Lukasik)

The term paradigm was conceptualized by Thomas Kuhn in his brilliant and important

work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Examining great moments in scientific discovery,

such as Copernicus’s determination of our helio-centric universe, Kuhn theorized that paradigms,

“models from which spring particular coherent traditions,” were not perfect explanations or

frameworks but, rather, the best available at the time.3 Yet, once accepted, these paradigms were

hard to overcome. As Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler discovered while trying to change

scientific understanding to the sun as the center of the universe, paradigm shifts must contest the

inertia of the existing body of thought. This discussion will thus prepare students to evaluate the

extent to which the Air Force might need to reconsider its own paradigm of air superiority given

today’s rapidly changing environment. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-615 (S): Changing Paradigms of Air Superiority

Here they come, zooming to meet our thunder; at ‘em boys, give ‘er the gun.” Our Air

Force song invokes images of a nostalgic battle for the skies, a true quest for air superiority.

What did the song, written in 1938, represent to its writer or to the Air Force wives that chose it

for the Air Force song? Were the boys giving the gun fighter pilots, or waist and tail gunners on

bombers? Airmen have accepted the mandate for air superiority since Giulio Douhet wrote of it

in 1921, yet our history reveals that we have struggled at times to successfully determine how to

go about achieving it. This seminar will examine the air superiority paradigm. What is today’s

paradigm for achieving control of the skies in future conflict? What do the articles and other

evidence suggest about how we should think about air superiority? CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. John Mintz, “Asymmetric Air Warfare: A Paradigm Shift for US Air Superiority” (master’s

thesis, Naval War College, 2013), all.

2. Raymond Franck and Bernard Udis, “The Sixth-Generation Quandary,” Proceedings of the

Thirteenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium (April 2016), 67-85.

3. Lt Gen (Ret) David Deptula, “Evolving Technologies and Warfare in the 21st Century:

Introducing the “Combat Cloud”, Mitchell Institute Policy Paper (September 2016), 1-8.

3 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 10.

19

4. Lt Col Geoffrey Weiss, “The Efficiency Paradox: How Hyperefficiency Became the Enemy

of Victory in War” A&SPJ (Jan-Feb 2012), 1-18.

5. Capt Michael W. Byrnes, “Nightfall: Machine Autonomy in Air-to-Air Combat,” ASP&J

(May-June 2014), 48-75.

6. United States Air Force, Enterprise Capability Collaboration Team, “Air Superiority Flight

Plan, 2030,” May 2016, all.

7. United States Air Force, “Air Force Future Operating Concept,” September 2015, 7-38.

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DAY 8: SPACE WARS

DATE: 5 February 2018 (Monday)

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Consider the extent to which US and global militaries rely on space today. Is space a major

force multiplier? If so, should it be protected by an active military defense? Can an attack on

friendly space assets be deterred? Should America prepare for offensive space operations, and

who are the likely targets?

2. Assess whether the Air Force been a good steward for space? Accordingly, determine if space

is an independent warfighting domain. If so, should an independent space service have

authority in the space domain? What should an independent service have authority over? Is

there an appropriate analogy to construct a framework for a future space architecture (e.g. air

or sea power)?

3. Analyze and discuss future scenarios in which space support, enhancement, enablement, and

independent operations are increasingly critical to success. Consider the best methods for

predicting future contexts and accurate scenarios.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-616 (L): Current and Future Space Warfare (Doran)

No nation relies more on space for its security and economic well-being than the United

States. Accordingly, the USAF is tasked with ensuring access to space to all nations in time of

peace and denying it to enemies in time of conflict or war. This includes: space enhancement,

those capabilities that increase traditional capabilities or functions; space support, for the

military specifically those space capabilities that can replace or substitute for traditional earth-

based methods; space enablement, those activities that are made possible by or would not be

attempted without space capabilities; and space operations, to include independent offensive and

defensive capabilities. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-701 (E): Midterm Examination due at beginning of seminar.

AP-617 (S): Envisioning Space Wars

Although military planners understood the growing importance of space, the remarkable

changes in the way war would be waged by America after Vietnam emerged spectacularly in

1990 with Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Noted physicist and science fiction writer

Arthur C. Clarke famously declared that the US-Iraqi conflict was the world’s “first space war.”

Perhaps, but if the 1990 Gulf War represents the infancy stage of space power the second US-

Iraqi War (2003) demonstrated that space power had at least achieved puberty. Today, reliance

on space is not just a military concern. Loss of space access and support would have global

effects on commerce, banking, and transportation—in short, every facet of modern life would be

adversely affected. But this is PME, and, ultimately, the extent to which the world’s militaries

rely on space for both routine and exceptional operations should animate a continuing discussion

of the proper role of the US Air Force as a warfighting service in the domain of space. CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

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REQUIRED READINGS

1. Michael J. Coumatos, Space Wars: The First Six Hours of World War III (Tor Books, 2008),

1-99.

2. Capt Adam Jodice and Lt Col Mark Guerber, “Space Combat Capability . . . Do We Have It?”

A&SPJ (Nov-Dec 2014), 82-98.

3. Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations¸ ix-xviii, II-1 to II-10 “Executive Summary” and

“Space Mission Areas.”

22

DAY 9: CYBER AND ELECTROMAGNETIC WAR


LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Consider if cyber crises are increasingly likely in the 21st Century.

2. Understand the historical development of cyber and EM.

3. Apply various cyber scenarios to analyze the strategic, operational, and tactical implications

of using cyber.

4. Analyze the similarities, differences, and inter-relationships between cyber and EM kinetic

operations within the U.S. military, government, and commercial sector. What are their

capabilities and limitations?

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-618 (L): The Information High Ground: Cyber War (Jabbour)

This lecture examines blue cyber to highlight the disconnect between policy and

technology that resulted in a domain ripe with architectural vulnerabilities that endanger national

security. We examine cyber risk as a function of vulnerability, threat and impact, and explore all

the ways that blue cyber has institutionalized a culture of admiring the threat and blaming the

user, leading to a pattern of failures stretching from requirements to defense, and from

regulations to training.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-619 (S): Kissing Cousins: Cyber and Electromagnetic War

Are cyber crises increasingly likely in the future? Several readings will argue they are

not. Martin Libicki even points out that when cyber is used against military targets at the

operational level, its effects need not be viewed that dissimilarly from electromagnetic effects.

Yet Fred Kaplan’s Dark Territory highlights the organizational capacity the US has built to do

just that. Who is correct and why? And, if cyber crises are increasingly likely, what do they look

like at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war?

AP-801 (L): Classified Cyber Lecture (Jabbour)(Friday, 9 February 2018, 0730-0830)

This lecture explores “red cyber” to hone in on everything that our adversaries have done

right from doctrine and education to weapons and critical infrastructure. It also examines lessons

observed and ignored to outline a way forward towards mission assurance through information

assurance. Please note that there is an electronic reading to accompany this lecture: Dr. Kamal

Jabbour and Major Jenny Poisson, “Cyber Risk Assessment in Distributed Information

Systems,” Cyber Defense Review (Spring 2016), 91-112. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

REQUIRED READINGS

Cyber:

1. Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016), 203-285.

2. Jason Healey, “Five Futures of Cyber Conflict and Cooperation,” Georgetown Journal of

International Affairs (2011), 110-117.

3. Martin Libicki, “The Cyber War that Wasn’t,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of

Excellence (July 2015), all.

23

4. Gregory Rattray and Jason Healey, “Categorizing and Understanding Offensive Cyber

Capabilities and their Use,” Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyber Attacks (2010),

77-97.

5. Jon R. Lindsay, “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity,” International Security, vol. 39, no.

3 (Winter 2014/15), 7-37.

Electromagnetic War:

6. Sydney J. Freedberg, “Rogers, Richardson, Neller Brainstorm Future Cyber Structure,” all.

7. Bryan Clark and Mark Gunzinger, Battling the Air Waves (Washington, D.C.: Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2015), 1-18.

24

DAY 10: MOBILITY VIA AIRLIFT

DATE: 12 February 2018 (Monday)

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Analyze how rhetoric and reality play a role in the development of airlift strategy,

technology, doctrine, leadership, and operations.

2. Assess and understand the components of a successful air mobility force and how they

contribute to successful airlift operations, military operations, and national security strategy.

3. Analyze what capabilities are required for strategic airlift and how they may or may not be

different from those expected of tactical airlift.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-620 (L): Air Mobility-Global Reach, the Last Tactical Mile, and Military Operations

(Terino)

When most people think of strategic airpower, they envision huge fleets of bombers

winging their way to distant targets to wreak destruction on vast cities, usually with nuclear

weapons. However, arguably the most strategic employment of airpower in the last century has

been through air mobility. The Berlin Airlift, the first major operation of the newly independent

USAF, might even be the most successful single strategic air operation in history. Not only was

it the first direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold

War, it was the foundational event in altering American perceptions of Germany after World

War II and the single most important event in establishing the basis for the NATO alliance. A

quarter century later, Operation Nickel Grass, the strategic airlift to support Israel in the 1973

War after the Soviets began and airlift to support Egypt, altered the outcome of the conflict and

set the framework for recent American engagement in the Middle East. Both operations highlight

the importance of air mobility to American strategy and provide significant points for analysis of

the rhetoric and reality of how airlift functions in modern military operations. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-621 (S): Logistics across the ROMO-From HADR to A2AD

Rapid Global Mobility and Agile Combat Support are recognized as two of the six core

competencies of the United States Air Force and these mission sets are realized largely through

the employment of air mobility assets. Although early airpower theorists and practitioners

vaguely described how airlift could change logistics and improve combat flexibility, very few

military aviators in the era prior to WWII understood how to move cargo and goods quickly and

efficiently. Commercial aviation, which grew and expanded through government subsidies for

air mail operations, pioneered many of the best practices that would come to be associated with

modern airlift operations. Moreover, the pursuit of profit that drove passenger service also

contributed to the development of techniques, technology, and procedures associated with

moving personnel and goods rapidly and efficiently, a hallmark of strategic airlift operations. For

the USAF, this capability has emerged as a major component undergirding numerous aspects of

national power. Since the 1940s, the Air Force has invested heavily in developing the aircraft,

personnel, equipment, and expertise that makes it almost unique among the world’s militaries in

the ability to project power through airlift. And while the strategic component of airlift is well

understood and resourced, the tactical component of this mission is often a bone of contention

between services and even within the USAF itself. Yet, despite the assertion that military airlift

is a separate and distinct form of airpower that often does not follow the same logic that has

25

guided bombardment and fighter/pursuit for almost a century, a closer study of how strategic

airlift and tactical airlift contribute to logistical capability and combat power should reveal

similar theoretical, doctrinal, and operational issues as in other forms of airpower. CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Robert C. Owen, Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience (Washington,

DC: Potomac Books, 2013), 217-308.

2. Vince Beiser, “Organizing Armageddon: What We Learned from the Haiti Earthquake,”

wired.com (April 2010), all.

3. Gen Charles Brown et al., “Untethered Operations: Rapid Mobility and Forward Basing are Key

to Airpower’s Success in the Antiaccess/Area-Denial Environment, A&SPJ (May-June 2015),

17-28.

26

DAY 11: C2


LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the evolution and continued relevance of the key tenet associated with the

command and control of airpower: Centralized Control, Decentralized Execution.

2. Understand the roles of the Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander (C/JFACC),

and the C2 apparatus used to prosecute air operations.

3. Consider how airpower C2, the role of the JFACC, and the airpower C2 apparatus will have

to adapt to effectively operate in future threat environments, including resilient, adaptive

integration of operations in multiple domains.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-622 (L): Past, Present, and Future C2: Commanding and Controlling USAF’s Multiple

Domains (Reilly)

Is the term multi-domain operations just another “buzz” word? If not, what does the term

and the thinking behind it offer that is profound, distinct, and important to the modern military

professional? This lecture argues that multi-domain operations is not just another buzz word to

be tossed aside, and that it does represent a shift in thinking about warfare and military

operations. The lecture describes the roots of this shift, how and why it has evolved from service

and joint warfare constructs, and why it is important for professionals thinking about and

operating in the contemporary security environment. Finally, it offers students a way to think

about multi-domain operations that moves them from a catalog of things about warfare towards a

way to think about multi-domain operations. This way of thinking about multi-domain

operations will then be used as a framework in seminar to analyze and discuss multi-domain

operations in and through the air, space, cyber, land, and maritime domains. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-623 (S): The Evolution of Airpower Command and Control

Well before the creation of the U.S. Air Force in 1947, Airmen argued for the need to

centralize the command of airpower under a senior Airman, rather than, as Sir Arthur Tedder

famously criticized, “parceling out in penny-packets.” The 1943 version of the U.S. Army’s FM

100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, stated:

The inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset. This flexibility makes it possible

to employ the whole weight of the available air power against selected areas in turn; such

concentrated use of the air striking force is a battle winning factor of the first importance.

Control of available air power must be centralized and command must be exercised

through the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a

decisive blow are to be fully exploited.

This module will examine the important business of airpower command & control, including

doctrinal tenets, command of airpower, and the associated mechanisms for airpower command

and control. It will conclude with a look to the future adaptations that will be required to keep

airpower C2 as a competitive advantage for the U.S. and its coalition partners. CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

27

REQUIRED READINGS

1. USAF Doctrine Volume 1 (Basic Doctrine), “Centralized Control and Decentralized

Execution” (LeMay Center, 2015), 1-3. Available at

https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=V1-D81-CC-DE.pdf

2. Air Force Doctrine, Volume I, Annex 3-30, “Introduction to Command and Control” and “Key

Considerations of Command and Control.” Links available at

https://doctrine.af.mil/DTM/dtmcommandcontrol.htm

3. Joint Publication 3-30, “Command and Control of Joint Air Operations,” Chapter II (Joint

Staff 2014), II-1 – II-7. Link available at

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm

4. Paul J. Maykish, “C2 Rising: A Historical View of Our Critical Advantage,” A&SPJ (Spring

2014), 26-55. Available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/article.asp?id=211)

5. Clint Hinote, “Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution: A Catchphrase in Crisis?”

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2013), 1-22, 55-70.

6. Benjamin Lambeth, Unseen War (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013), 207-220.

7. Major Christopher G. Marquis, “Advancements in Joint Air Operations: The JFACC and AOC

from the Gulf War to Operation Iraqi Freedom,” (working paper, Air Command and Staff

College, Maxwell AFB, 2017), all.

8. Jeffrey Reilly, “Multi-domain Operations,” A&SPJ (Spring 2014), 61-73. Available at

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/article.asp?id=321)

9. US Army, “Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century,” TRADOC White

Paper (24 Feb 2017), all. Available via link on

http://tradoc.army.mil/MultiDomainBattle/index.asp

10. United States Air Force, “Air Force Future Operating Concept,” September 2015, review 14-

22.

11. Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations¸III-1 to III-2 “C2 of Space Forces”.

https://doctrine.af.mil/dnv1vol1.htm

https://doctrine.af.mil/DTM/dtmcommandcontrol.htm

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/article.asp?id=211

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/article.asp?id=321

http://tradoc.army.mil/MultiDomainBattle/index.asp

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DAY 12: OPERATION ODYSSEY DAWN AND UNIFIED PROTECTOR


LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the application of airpower in Operations Unified Protector and Odyssey Dawn.

2. Analyze the challenges of building a coalition that almost entirely used airpower to achieve

its goals.

3. Examine the challenges of military interventions that solely rely on airpower in the context of

the contention that airpower is cheaper, faster, and more humane.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-624 (S): Going It Together: Allied Efforts in Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified

Protector

The 2011 operations in Libya featured a broad coalition effort that relied entirely on

airpower. In some ways, it was the epitome of the promise of airpower – faster (7 months),

cheaper (about $1.2 billion), and more humane (no NATO casualties). Through airpower, the

United States and NATO stopped Muammar Qaddafi’s regime from massacring civilians in

Benghazi and allowed opposition forces to organize and develop as a fighting force. The US

military conducted joint and coalition operations on very short notice with limited resources over

a nation where little intelligence was available. This lesson explores the challenges of coalition

warfare as well as the inherent difficulties of effectively employing airpower at a moment’s

notice anywhere in the world. Furthermore, students should find themselves asking whether a

successful air intervention in a civil war really produced results that help us reach our strategic

aims. CONTACT HOURS: 3.0-hour seminar

AP-702 (E): In-Class Presentation, individual 5-7 Minute Student Briefings

REQUIRED READINGS

1. John Tirpak, “Lessons from Libya,” Air Force Magazine (December 2011), 34-38.

2. Ed Borghard and Constantino Pischedda, “Allies and Airpower in Libya,” Parameters

(2012), 63-74.

Individual student briefings assigned by instructor and based on:

3. Maj Jason Greenleaf, “The Air War in Libya,” A&SPJ (March-April 2013), 28-54.

4. Individual national participants from Karl Mueller, ed., Precision and Purpose: Airpower in

the Libyan Civil War (RAND, 2015).

29

Part 3: Thinking about the Future Multi-Domain Fight

DAY 13: AIRPOWER INTERDEPENDENCE

DATE: 26 Feb 2018 (Monday)

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the role of airpower in an Anti-Access/Area Denial environment.

2. Analyze the application of airpower in the sea domain.

3. Examine the challenges of multi-domain air operations.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-625 (L): The Rise of Chinese Seapower (Yoshihari)

The presentation, entitled will address: 1) the motives behind China's turn to the seas; 2)

Chinese views of Asia's maritime geography; 3) China's active defense strategy at sea; and 4)

China's growing counter-intervention capabilities in the aerospace and maritime domains. The

presentation will conclude with some implications and recommendations for U.S. and allied

strategy in the western Pacific. It will provide the larger strategic context for the employment of

airpower in a highly contested operational environment. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-626 (S): Airpower Interdependence with the Land and Sea Domains

The strategic challenges we face today often put the US in positions where the air, land,

and sea domains must work together. Airpower has long been leveraged in Land and Sea

domains and will continue to be an essential element of success in future multi-domain fights.

This lesson will challenge students to view the application of airpower through the lens of the

Land and Sea domains. Students will need to consider non-traditional airpower questions such as

how would an American F-22 and a Republic of Singapore destroyer work together in a conflict

in the Taiwan Strait? CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Joshua Himes, “Iran’s Maritime Evolution,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,

July 2011, all.

2. Cliff Roger et al., “Possible PLAAF Operational Concepts, Capabilities, and Tactics in a

Taiwan Strait Conflict” in Shaking the Heavens (RAND, 2011), 187-224.

3. U.S. Navy, Surface Force Strategy: A Return to Sea Control, pages TBD.

4. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihari, “Asymmetric Warfare, American Style,” U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings, vol. 138, no. 4 (April 2012), all.

5. Scott Truver, “Navy’s Distributed Lethality Will Reshape Fleet,” Breaking Defense (blog), 9

October 2015, http://breakingdefense.com/2015/10/navys-distributed-lethality-will-reshape-

fleet/.

6. James Holmes, “Distributed Lethality: The Navy’s Fix for Anti-Access?,” War on the Rocks

(blog), 19 January 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/01/distributed-lethality-the-navys-

fix-for-anti-access/.

30

DAY 14: FUTURE OF WAR

DATE: 1 March 2018 (Thursday)

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend what some of our allies and near-peers believe about airpower today.

2. Analyze how the role of airpower might evolve in future conflicts from the perspective of

other services.

3. Examine how the USAF envisions its future and the future of airpower.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-627 (L): The Future of War Panel (Clark)

Lecturers from various services that are helping to conceptualize multi-domain operations

will debate the future of war, thus providing various perspectives to students. Students will then

have an opportunity to engage with the lecturers. CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

AP-628 (S): The Future of War

With rapid advances in technology, increasing development and acquisitions timelines,

rising costs, and continually evolving battlefields, how should the US prepare to employ

airpower in the future multi-domain battle? What do our allies and near-peers think about the

future of war and airpower? What is the way forward for the Air Force? Students will consider

these questions and many others as they read and discuss articles on Russian military thought,

European and Israeli approaches to asymmetric warfare. Finally, we will consider selected

portions of USAF thinking. CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

Near-peers: 1. Timothy Thomas, “Thinking Like a Russian Officer,” Foreign Military Studies Office, Ft

Leavenworth, 1-38.

Irregular warfare: 2. Raphael Rudnik and Ephraim Segoli, “The Israeli Air Force and Asymmetric Conflicts, 1982-

2014” in Airpower Applied: U.S., NATO, and Israeli Combat Experience (Annapolis: Naval

Institute Press, 2017), 285-341.

The future of European Air Power?: 3. Marin van Creveld, “Approaching the End?” European Air Power: Challenges and

Opportunities (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 201-214.

4. R.A. Mason, “The Response to Uncertainty,” European Air Power: Challenges and

Opportunities (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 214-230.

Selected portions from Air Force future thinking: 5. United States Air Force, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Strategic Master Plan,” May 2015,

September 2015, all.

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DAY 15: FINAL EXAM

DATE: 8 March 2018 (Thursday)

LESSON OVERVIEW

AP-703 In-Class Comprehensive Final Exam

airpower ii - air university ay18... · this airpower ii course syllabus for air command and staff...

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