air to air combat effectiveness

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AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OFSINGLE-ROLE AND MULTI-ROLE FIGHTER FORCES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

MICHAEL W. FORD, MAJ, USAFB.S., United States Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1994

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AM) SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: Major Michael W. FordTitle~of hesis: Air-to-Air Combat Effectiveness ofSingle-Role and Multi-Role Fighter Forces

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chairman

, Member, Consulting FacultyCOL Walter B. ~dg&, Ph.D.

Accepted this 3rd day of June 1994 by:

, Director, Graduate DegreePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those ofthe student author and do not necessarily represent the viewsof the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or anyother government agency. (References to this study shouldinclude the foregoing statement.)


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ABSTRACTAIR-TO-AIR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF SINGLE-ROLE AND MULTI-ROLEFIGHTER FORCES by MAJ Michael W. Ford, USAF, 135 pages.In their continuing efforts to determine how best to meet allglobal military challenges, U.S. Air Force leaders haveelected to discontinue fielding fighter forces dedicatedexclusively to air-to-air combat. Driven almost entirely bybudget considerations, these decisions will result in multi-role forces only partially concerned with air-to-air combat.what impact this restructuring will have on overall U.S. air-to-air combat capability has not been determined, however,and so provides the rationale for this research.This thesis examines the air-to-air combat performance ofvarious single-role and multi-role fighter forces during pastmilitary conflicts. Eleven criteria, ten objective and onesubjective, are used to measure and compare these two groups.The objective and subjective analyses together form the basisfor determining the relative air-to-air combat effectivenessof these forces.The comparative analyses used in this research show thatsingle-role fighter forces have consistently outperformedmulti-role forces as measured by the criteria used.Therefore, this thesis concludes that single-role air-to-airfighter forces are more effective than multi-role fighterforces in the conduct of air-to-air combat operations.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSFirst and foremost, I extend my heart-felt thanks andappreciation to my wife, Debby. As a sounding board, critic,and editor, her help was invaluable. Without her patience,understanding, and willingness to go the extra mile for ourfamily, I would not have been able to complete this thesis.I also consider myself very fortunate to have had atruly committed and helpful thesis committee. LieutenantColonel Pivarsky, Colonel Burke, and Colonel Edgar all gavewillingly of their time and expertise throughout thisresearch effort. They kept me focused on the task at hand

and together created an environment within which it was botheasy and enjoyable to work.Finally, I wish to thank the staff of the CombinedArms Research Library. On more occasions than I can count,they went out of their way to help me in the never-endingsearch for research material. They deserve acknowledgment assome of the unsung heroes of this entire graduate degreeprogram.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

THESISAPPROVAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ivLISTOFTABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viiiLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ixCHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Research Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ackground 5Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Delimitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Current U.S. Military Concerns . . . . . 15Criteria for Measuring Air-To-AirCombat Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . 16History of unit ~ir-To-Air erformance . . 17

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Significance of the Study . . . . . . . . . . 21

2 CRITERIA FOR MEASURING AIR-TO-AIR COMBATEFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Subjective Criterion: Mission ObjectiveAccomplishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25


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Objective Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Kill-To-Loss Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . 29Kills Per Engagement . . . . . . . . . . 31Percentage of Engagements Survived . . . . 32First Shot Opportunity . . . . . . . . . 34Percentage of Engagement Time Offensive/Defensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Shots Per Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . 37Percentage of Shots Valid At Launch . . . . 37Kills Per Firing Attempt . . . . . . . . . 39Air-To-Air Related Accidents . . . . . . . 40Incidence of Fratricide . . . . . . . . . 42

3 HISTORICAL INFORMATION ON AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT . . 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ntroductionObjective Background Information . . . . . .

American Volunteer Group In China In. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .orldWarIIWorld War I1 . ulti-Role Fighter Units .USAF 4th Fighter Interceptor WingIn Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..orea ~ulti-kole ighter Units . . . . .U.S. Navy F-8 Crusader Squadrons InVietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Vietnam . ulti-Role Fighter Units .Israeli Mirage Squadron In The 1967

. . . . . . . . . . . . .rab-Israeli WarSix Day War . ulti-Role Fighter UnitsBritish Sea Harrier Squadrons In TheFalkland ~slands ar . . . . . . . . . . .


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. . . . . .ubjective Background Information 69General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69Favoring Multi-Role Fighter Units . . . . 7 0Favoring Single-Role ~ir-TO-AirFighter Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

4 . ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7Kill-To-Loss Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8Kills Per Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . 81. . . . . .ercentage of Engagements Survived 84First Shot Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . 86Percentage of Engagement Time Offensive/Defensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Shots Per Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . 94Percentage of Shots Valid At Launch. . . . .ills Per Firing AttemptAir-To-Air Related Accidents . . .

. . . . . .ncidence of FratricideMission Objective Accomplishment .Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONSConclusion . . . . . . . . . . . .Recommendations . . . . . . . . . .

ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IBLIOGRAPHY

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . . . .

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LIST OF TABLESTABLE . . . . . . . .Korea: Air-To-Air Combat Results2 Overall Air-To-Air Combat Record In Vietnam . .3 Air-TO-Air Kills In Vietnam By Aircraft Type . .

Kill-To-Loss Ratios . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Kills Per Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .ercentage Of Engagements SurvivedFirst Shot Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .ngagement Time Offensive Or DefensiveShots Per Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .ercentage Of Shots Valid At LaunchKills Per Firing Attempt . . . . . . . . . . . .Summary Of Measures Of Effectiveness . . . . .

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAAAFBAFSAATACMSATFAVGBVR

CAPCASCINCW DFEAFFIWGCIAFPACAFPkSAMSEADSPOTAC

Anti-Aircraft ArtilleryAir Force BaseAir Force Safety AgencyArmy Tactical Missile SystemAdvanced Tactical FighterAmerican Volunteer GroupBeyond Visual RangeCombat Air PatrolClose Air SupportCommander-In-ChiefDepartment Of DefenseFar East Air ForcesFighter Interceptor WingGround Controlled InterceptIsraeli Air ForcePacific Air ForcesProbability Of KillSurface-To-Air MissileSuppression Of Enemy Air DefensesSystems Program OfficeTactical Air Command


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TACTSTFSUNEFUS FUSAFEUSMCUSNVID

Tactical Aircrew Combat Training SystemTactical Fighter SquadronUnited Nations Emergency ForceUnited States Air ForceUnited States Air Forces In EuropeUnited States Marine CorpsUnited States NavyVisual Identification


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CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION

UtroductionNever have a people been as generally uncertain about

the future of the world in relation to war than the presentgeneration.1 And no where is this uncertainty seemingly moreevident than in the United States Department of Defense(DOD). Senior military and DOD civilian officials find itincreasingly difficult to keep abreast of the myriad of far-reaching changes in the international political-militaryenvironment. Efforts to articulate a new national militarystrategy have forced all the military services to criticallyexamine the roles they can and will play in the emergingdefense paradigm. Further, massive budget cuts have leftservice planners looking for ways to carry out a host of newand diverse missions with a continually decreasing slice ofthe national budget.

More specifically, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) nowfinds itself in the position of still having to conduct thefull spectrum of tactical air missions, but with a shrinkingand aging force. As a result, fighter forces that at onetime specialized in operations in only one major missioncategory are now viewed as anachronisms. Major General Larry


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Henry, of the office of the Air Force Deputy Chief of Stafffor Plans and Operations, recently stated the official AirForce position that "to some extent, all our fighters will bemulti-role fighter^."^ Many senior leaders argue that wesimply cannot do all that is asked of us unless we multi-mission task all fighters remaining in the smaller baseforce.

Of particular importance to this thesis is the impactthis policy will have on the USAF air-to-air fighter force.The Air Force has empioyed dedicated; single-role F-15C air-to-air fighter squadrons since 1975, and until quite recentlyhad planned to continue to do so with the follow-on F-22Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATE). However, initiatives arenow being made to add the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses(SEAD) mission to the F-15 Force, and the full spectrum ofair-to-ground missions to the F-22 force.3 These effortsrepresent a fundamental departure from the current USAFconcept of structuring and tasking air-to-air fighter forces.-

hanges as relatively significant as those plannedfor these forces cannot be made without examining theattendant impact on the overall aerospace control effort.

Air Force doctrine stresses the primacy of aerospace controland warns that "a reduction in control threatens everymission, campaign, and type of force.04 Major General Richard


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Hawley, testifying recently before Congress, described thesituation in this manner:

Control of the air or air superiority is anabsolute necessity. Since the German attack onPoland in 1939, no country has won a war in the faceof enemy air superiority, and no defense hassustained itself against an enemy who has had airsuperiority. Conversely, no state has lost a warwhile it maintained air superiority, and attainmentof control of the air consistently has been a preludeto military ~ict0r-y.~And because air-to-air fighter operations play a major rolein the overall campaign for dominance of the air, changes tothe air-to-air force may have a far-reaching impact on allmilitary operations.

At issue then is the consequence of adding new anddifferent mission tasking to those units responsible forachieving and maintaining air superiority. All USAF effortsto add SEAD or air-to-ground missions to the air-to-airfighter force have been driven by the scarcity of defensefunding. what has been lacking is any meaningful discourseon the impact of multi-role tasking on combat capability.Rather, the underlying assumption in virtually all currentwriting on this subject is that additional tasking will notadversely impact our ability to conduct air-to-air missions.

When USAF Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak wasrecently asked about the impact of adding air-to-groundmissions to the F-22 force, he said: "I don't think it's abig issue that will require a lot of extra training or flyinghours in squadrons. 6 It is well that General McPeak


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believes additional flying time will not be necessary in thefuture because, in fact, these hours will not be forthcoming.Recently released USAF numbers show that flying time foractive duty tactical fighter aircrews will decline slightlyin 1994.' For the future, Air Force officials hope at bestto be able to maintain flying hours at levels approximatingthose of the past; certainly no increases are envisioned.

The basic problem with such assumptions is that theypresuppose a knowledge of how much air-to-air capability theU.S. will need in the future. They further assume thatmulti-role units will be as capable as current single-roleair-to-air units in delivering the necessary combatcapability. However, no one has determined how much combatcapability will be enough to effectively deal with futurethreats. Only time and an evaluation of future operationscan provide this knowledge. Nor is it sufficient to simplyassume multi-role units will be as proficient in air-to-airoperations as those that specialize in them. Common sense,in fact, would suggest just the opposite. Therefore, thisthesis will examine in detail the relative air-to-air combateffectiveness of single-role versus multi-role fighterforces

pesearch OuestionAre single-role air-to-air fighter forces more

effective than multi-role fighter forces in the conduct ofair-to-air combat operations?

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BackaroundThe existence of a permanent, dedicated single-role

air-to-air fighter force in the USAF is a relatively recentoccurrence. Throughout most of the USAF's history, multi-role fighter forces have been the norm and have tended toresemble the swing role air-to-air and air-to-ground fighterunits typical of those employed during World War II.* Infact, with the exception of the F-15C and the dedicatedcontinental air defense interceptors, every fighter everflown by the USAF has been used to drop bombs and attackground targets.9 Therefore, it has been generally true thatfighter units tasked with air-to-air missions have also beenconcurrently tasked with air-to-ground missions.

However, unit specialization in air-to-air combat forlimited periods of time has occurred on numerous occasions.In Vietnam, Korea, and World War 11, certain units within thefighter community have been tasked with engaging solely inair-to-air combat.1 in each case. commanders had determinedthe air threat to be significant enough to warrant a moreconcerted friendly air-to-air effort. As a result, unit air- ,to-ground tasking was suspended so that these units couldfocus all their efforts on air-to-air operations. When andif the air-to-air threat was neutralized, these units thenreverted to their former multi-role status.


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Despite these times of short-term emphasis on theair-to-air aspect of the air campaign, a sustained long-termemphasis was not made before Vietnam:

To informed observers it was ironic that theimportance of air-to-air, eyeball-to-eyeball combatin aerial maneuvering as a primary function ofgaining and maintaining air superiority was so soondiscounted after both world War I1 and the Koreanconflict....In Tactical Air Command (TAC) the ideathat enemy aircraft would be destroyed on the groundworked against any development of an air-to-airfighter while the idea of flexibility of air powermitigated against the idea of single-purposefighters 1

The Air Force view of air-to-air operations changedsignificantly, however, on the basis of Air Force experiencesin Vietnam.

In May 1965, General John P. McConnell, USAF Chief ofStaff, approved and sent to all commands a paper entitled"Air Force Doctrine on Air Superiority," which stated thefollowing:

Enemy airpower is destroyed in two ways: in theair and on the surface. Both methods are essentialparts of counterair operations and should be carriedout concurrently. Regardless of the tactical airtask or mode of attack, survival of the fighteraircraft we commit is at some time likely to hinge onair-to-air capability. Consequently, if either air-to-air or air-to-surface attacks are to succeed withattrition acceptable to us, we must provide aircraft,armament, and training which will succeed in air-to-air combat against the best enemy aircraft.12Thus, for the first time senior Air Force leaders

acknowledged the critical importance of air-to-air combat inthe overall campaign 'for air superiority. No longer was it agiven that U.S. air power would seek out enemy air forces and


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supporting infrastructures and utterly destroy or neutralizethem on the ground. Political and technical constraintscould create situations that necessitated sustained andcontinuous air-to-air combat as the only means of reducingenemy air power.13 Therefore, although the exact nature offuture operations could not be predicted, the official USAFposition held it prudent to maintain a highly competent air-to-air fighter force.

The most significant manifestation of this change wasthe type of fighter the USAF developed for the air-to-airrole. General Gabriel Disoway, commander of TAC in 1965,stated that "the philosophy that you are going to build oneairplane to do everything" might have been all right in WorldWar I1 but was no longer applicable.14 This shift towardaircraft specialization became policy shortly thereafter. InMay and June 1968, General McConnell testified on the needfor specialization before the Preparedness InvestigatingSubcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

We believe that the basic requirement is for abalanced force consisting of a family of weaponssystems, each designed to do one mission extremelywell, and one or more other missions crediblywell ..the force should include [an] aircraft [that]is going to be an air superiority fighter. Itspurpose will be to gain air superiority over theenemy and absolute air supremacy over thebattlefield. We do not want to degrade it foranything else.15

Not surprisingly, such an endorsement by senior AirForce leaders gave rise to a variety of single-purpose,specialized fighter aircraft. In this category are the RF-4


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for reconnaissance, the F-4G for SEAD, the A-10 for Close AirSupport (CAS), and the F-15A/C for air-to-air combat. Andconsistent with top-level guidance, the F-15 was designed tobe not just a dedicated air superiority fighter, but, as theoriginal F-15 Systems Program Office (SPO) director put it in1969, "the best air-to-air fighter that is humanlypossible. I6

Simply producing a superior fighter does not,however, guarantee success in combat. Steve Ritchie, the AirForce's first ace in Vietnam, commented that:

The pilot most likely to succeed is the one mosthighly trained. Stated another way, a superior pilotin an inferior aircraft will defeat an inferior pilotin a superior aircraft.17The truth of this statement was borne out by the relativelypoor showing of U.S. fighter forces in air-to-air engagementsthroughout the conflict in Vietnam. During the' time betweenthe end of the Korean war and many years into the conflict inVietnam, air-to-air training was virtually non-existent inU.S. fighter squadrons. Although not the sole cause, thisalmost total lack of adequate training goes far towardexplaining how Vietnamese pilots in generally inferioraircraft obtained such relatively good results in air-to-aircombat with U.S. forces.18

In 1972, the Air Force held a Tactical FighterSymposium to bring together experts in the fighter communityto identify current shortfalls and reco-end correctiveaction. One of the major findings at the symposium was that


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a critical lack of effective training was taking place infighter units. This finding led to the group'srecommendation, widely endorsed by Air Force leadership, formuch more realistic and challenging air-to-air trainingprograms.19 AS a result, overall air-to-air combat trainingat the squadron level, in formal advanced flying schoolprograms, and in major joint and combined exercises became,and remains today, the most rigorous and realistic in theworld.

The combined result of these efforts was the creationof the USAF's single-role, F-15C air-to-air fighter force,portions of which were the first contingent deployed to SaudiArabia during Desert Shield. It was this force that shotdown 36 of the 41 Iraqi aircraft destroyed during DesertStorm (2 of the other 5 Iraqi losses were to a Saudi F-15C),while sustaining no combat losses of its own.20 And it is

this force that will undertake the SEAD mission in the nearfuture. Although the extent to which F-15C units will flyair-to-air versus SEAD is yet to be determined, its single-role status will no longer be maintained.

Notwithstanding its performance in the Gulf War, theF-15C is one of the oldest elements of the fighter force mixin the USAF and has long been planned for replacement by theF-22 ATF.21 Although inherent air-to-ground capability hadalways been planned for the F-22. it, too, had been intended,


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since its conception in 1981, as a single-role air-to-airfighter.22 However, this is also no longer the case.Lieutenant General John Jaquish, one of the key figures inthe F-22 acquisition and development process, recently statedthat the F-22 with an air-to-ground capability will be a keycomponent of our future force structure and will be used inboth air-to-air and ground attack roles.23

Clearly, the Air Force is now coming around fullcircle in terms of air-to-air fighter force structuring. Nolonger will the Air Force provide assets and crews dedicatedsolely to the air-to-air role. Instead, we now see a returnto the concept of a completely multi-role fighter force, manyunits of which will conduct air-to-air to varying degrees.What impact this restructuring will have on air-to-air combatcapability is unknown. However, by comparing past combatperformance of single-role and multi-role units, future USAFair-to-air effectiveness may be more reasonably predicted.

. . .inlt onssingle- ole Aircraft: As already discussed, only a

very few fighter units have ever existed that from theirinception were or are dedicated solely to air-to-air combat.Instead, most conflicts have produced a fighter unit forcedby need to transition from a traditional multi-role status toa focused emphasis on air-to-air combat. Therefore, in orderto facilitate the basic analysis of this thesis, both of


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these types of fighter units fall into the "single-role",category.

Air Superiority: Central to the issues addressed inthis thesis is the concept of air superiority. As defined inJoint Publication 1-02, "air superiority" is

that degree of dominance in the air battle of oneforce over another which permits the conduct ofoperations by the former and its related land, sea,and air forces at a given time and place withoutprohibitive interference by the opposing force.24Air superiority is a minimum requirement and generallydescribes a situation existing in a specific area and for alimited duration.

Air Supremacy: This term, used frequently inrelation to Operation Desert Storm. refers to a degree of airsuperiority in which the enemy is incapable of "effective,"as opposed to "prohibitive," nterferen~e.~~t should benoted, however, that air supremacy involves extreme effortsand has often proven unobtainable. This has been the caseagainst formidable opponents, such as the Japanese Air Forceof World War 11; against less formidable enemies operatingfrom sanctuaries, such as the Chinese Air Force during thesecond phase of the Korean War; and against minor powerswhose equipment is supplied by a noncombatant third power,such as in Vietnam.26

Counterair: Counterair is the term the USAF uses todescribe all missions whose objective is gaining control ofthe "air" portion of the aerospace envir~nment.~' hese


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missions may be either offensive or defensive in nature, andmay occur deep in enemy territory or well into our own.Examples of counterair missions include a U.S. Navy Tomahawkcruise missile launch against an enemy command and controlnetwork; Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) attacksagainst fixed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites; F-4G SEADoperations against SAM and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA)sites; F-16 strafing of enemy aircraft parked on an airfield;and F-15 air-to-air dogfights against enemy fighters. Thecounterair determination is based on the intent of themission, not the weapons system used to accomplish it.

Air-to-Air Operations: The air-to-air operationsdiscussed in this thesis collectively constitute, therefore,one of several methods used to obtain and maintain airsuperiority or air supremacy. Air-to-air operations includeoffensive sweep missions into enemy territory to seek out anddestroy enemy aircraft; defensive Combat Air Patrol (CAP)missions in friendly airspace protecting a geographic pointor area against enemy airborne attack; escort and protectionof friendly aircraft conducting ground attack, SEAD, andother offensive missions in enemy territory; and protectionfrom enemy fighter attack of high-value friendly aircraftoperating in both friendly and enemy airspace.

. .lmltationsThis thesis has been limited by the inability to

travel to certain locations to conduct research. After12


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requesting information from The Air Force Historical ResearchAgency at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama, I wasinformed that due to very heavy workloads my requests couldnot be met. I was, however, offered the opportunity toconduct research in person. Unfortunately, this was notpossible. Similarly, I requested information from the AirForce Safety Agency (AFSA) at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico.Although AFSA personnel agreed to process my request, theywere unable to locate any pertinent information in the brieftime allotted for a search of their archives.

DelimitationsA fundamental delimitation is the exclusion of all

but combat fighter operations. The emphasis of this thesisis on the performance of fighter squadrons in actual combat,as opposed to peacetime training or exercises. It is only inthe crucible of combat that the bottom-line effectiveness ofany military unit can be analyzed. And since this effort isultimately concerned with the impact of force structurechanges on the effectiveness of future combat operations,only past air-to-air combat will be evaluated.

I have limited my research to aerial combatoperations of World War I1 and later conflicts. Althoughsome fighter units before this time were dedicated primarilyto air-to-air combat, their operations bear littleresemblance to those of today. Training for combat was soinadequate, reliability of aircraft was so poor, and record

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keeping was so sporadic that determining why combatoperations developed as they did is impossible to do.Therefore, the relevance of these operations to presentconcerns is difficult to assess.

I have not been able to study every fighter unit thathas ever engaged in air-to-air combat. Instead, I havefocused my efforts in two areas. The first is a generalstudy of the vast majority of fighter squadrons that togetherform the multi-role baseline for this thesis. The second isa detailed study of those fighter units that were either

established as single-role air-to-air squadrons or those thatbecame single-role units through training and emphasis onair-to-air combat.

To illustrate this delimitation, in examining theU.S. air campaigns in Vietnam, I have not detailed theoperations of the USAF1s 3th Tactical Fighter Squadron(TFS), but I have included detailed information on the U.S.Navy's F-8 Crusader squadrons. The reason is that the 13TFSwas a typical multi-role fighter unit whose record forms partof the multi-role unit baseline data. Conversely, theCrusader squadrons are prime examples of units thateffectively became single-role due to their emphasis on air-to-air combat.

Literature Rev&The overall amount and quality of source material

bearing on this research topic is more than adequate. Air-14


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to-air combat is a fascinating subject for many, and much hasbeen written on it. Similarly, the desire to increase, or atleast measure, combat effectiveness has also given rise toserious research in this area. Nevertheless, I have foundnothing to indicate that a comparison of single-role andmulti-role unit air-to-air effectiveness has been undertaken.Generally, this subject has either been ignored completely orone type of force has simply been assumed to be the mosteffective.

The research material I have sought and used fallsinto three major categories. The first is that pertaining tothe current U.S. military situation in general and USAF forcerestructuring in particular. The second category includesmaterial listing, describing, and evaluating possiblemeasures of air-to-air combat effectiveness. Lastly, I haveconducted extensive historical research on unit performancein air-to-air operations.

Current U.S. Military ConcernsThe most beneficial sources on current military

concerns, as well as those for the future, have beenprofessional journals, magazines, newspapers, and

Maaaz&ongressional records. Air Force , The AimowerJour

. .Review, The Air Force Tim-aL &D-lxtarv , The N a wm, ane's Defence Weeklv, and The Joint Force Ouarterlv

have all proven to be excellent sources. Each of thesepublications benefits from the extensive military knowledge


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of both staff and guest writers. Their critical and fact-filled essays on today's key military issues have provenquite relevant and helpful.

Congressional testimonies by W D officials. UnifiedCommanders-in-Chief (CINCs), and USAF leaders have providedkey insight into current thinking on future U.S. militaryoperations. Those called before Congress have sought toclarify service roles and missions within the new nationalmilitary strategy. Further, they have attempted to provideconvincing evidence of the need to begin, or continue, avariety of weapons system acquisition programs. The totalityof this testimony has helped present a more focused vision ofhow air-to-air combat will fit into the larger scheme ofjoint and combined theater warfare.

Criteria for Measuring Air-to-Air Combat EffectivenessInformation on measurement criteria has come from a

mix of books, periodicals, and published and unpublishedresearch efforts. Books and older periodicals have providedinsight on how those involved in a particular conflict judgedtheir own performance. Rather than clearly stating a measureof combat effectiveness, these sources point indirectly tocriteria for success the experts of the day felt wereimportant. Taken in total, certain supportable measures canbe discerned.

A variety of research efforts in recent years hasbeen designed to determine predictive measures of aerial

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combat performance. These efforts seek to identifymeasurable aspects of performance in a ground-based simulatorenvironment that can be used to accurately predict actualairborne combat effectiveness. The Air Force's ArmstrongLaboratory and Human Resources Laboratory, and the Navy'sAerospace Medical Research Laboratory have all conducted suchresearch. While many of the proposed measures have provenunsuitable for various reasons, some are applicable to my ownresearch design for this thesis.

History of Unit Air-to-Air performanceAgain, a variety of sources has yielded relevant

information. Each of these, however, has presented only arelatively small insight into a unit's past operations. Forexample,-one ource may only place a fighter squadron in aparticular location at a particular time. Another source isneeded to explain this unit's mission, equipment, training,and tactics. Yet another source may then detail actualcombat operations and the outcomes of campaigns andengagements. Only by collating the information from all suchsources has it been possible to clearly understand most pastunit operations.

Certain books, such as Frank Futrell's Aces & Aerial.

Yictories: The United States Air Force in southeast Asia1965 1971 are excellent sources of moderately detailed unitcombat statistics. Similarly, many articles found inprofessional periodicals of the day present general


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statistics on the outcomes of combat operations. For themost part, these sources are concerned with broad aggregatenumbers, such as total number of aircraft killed or lost, asopposed to unit-specific statistics.

To obtain information on specific units, I haveturned to published and unpublished unit histories, combatcrew narratives, and published individual diaries. Sourcesof this type provide insight into day-to-day unit operationsand give enough detail to help determine if a particularorganization is appropriate for inclusion in this thesis. Aspreviously noted, however, these detailed histories are notreadily accessible.

Finally, I have used numerous books, periodicals, andunpublished theses and monographs as sources of conceptualinformation on the single versus multi-role fighter issue.Richard Hallion's discussions in both book and periodical onthe subject of USAF tactical airpower development have provenparticularly helpful in understanding some of the majorfactors bearing on my subject. Similarly, General WilliamMomyer's Airwower in Three Wars (WW 11. Korea. Vietnam),presents an excellent framework for understanding the recenthistory of U.S. tactical fighter employment. Various theseshave also been useful for evaluating the concept of airsuperiority and the place of fighter units in the overallcounterair campaign.


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MethodolowThe information in this thesis is presented in a

sequential manner intended to support a comparative analysisof single-role and multi-role units in the conduct of air-to-air operations.

Chapter Two lists, defines, and amplifies criteriathat have been used in various studies to measure air-to-aircombat effectiveness. These criteria come from many sourcesand vary significantly in their relationships to air-to-aircombat. Therefore, each is explained in enough detail toshow why it is addressed and what it is actually measuring.Eleven criteria are addressed in this chapter; ten aresupported by empirical information, and one is supported bysubjective analyses.

Chapter Three provides historical data and is dividedinto two major sections. The first section containsempirical data on the performance of both single-role andmulti-role fighter units. Multi-role units are addressedgenerally, and the statistics and background informationpresented apply to this group as a whole. Single-role unitsare discussed in much greater detail. In addition topresenting empirical data on each single-role fighter unit,this subsection also contains narrative information on unitoperations and why these operations distinguish each unit assingle-role in nature.


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The second section of Chapter Three is a treatment ofthe single-role versus multi-role air-to-air fighter issuefrom a subjective perspective. This section usesauthoritative statements and observations to trace thedevelopment of airpower thinking and doctrine on thespecialization issue. To the extent possible, informationin both sections relates directly to one or more of themeasurement criteria established in Chapter Two.

Chapter Four is an analysis of the historicalinformation presented in Chapter Three relative to themeasures of effectiveness developed in Chapter Two. First,the available empirical data is analyzed relative to each ofthe objective measures. The data on each criterion isindividually evaluated to determine whether single-role ormulti-role fighter units emerge as being the most effectivein air-to-air combat.

Following this empirical analysis is a subjectiveanalysis of each of the units based on the authoritativedoctrinal information presented in Chapter Three. Theresults of the empirical and subjective analyses are thencompared with one another, and a final determination is madeon whether single-role or multi-role fighter units are themost effective in conducting air-to-air combat operations.

Chapter Five is the final chapter and presents theoverall conclusion stemming from the analysis in Chapter


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Four. This conclusion answers the thesis question. Finally,this chapter makes recommendations for further research.

Sianificance of the StudvAlvin Bernstein, editor-in-chief of the newly

published Joint Force Ouarterlv magazine, commented in hisinaugural issue that "just as there is no substitute incombat for trial by fire, so the best ideas can only emergeafter they too have undergone the appropriate trial bydebate."28 Whether the decision to return to a completelymulti-role fighter force is one of these "best ideas" isuncertain. What is certain is that this idea has not beenthoroughly subjected to a trial by debate. This issue, likemany others facing our military forces today, is simply tooimportant not to debate.

By establishing whether single-role air-to-airfighter units are more effective than multi-role fighterunits in the conduct of air-to-air combat, a sound groundwork for force structuring can be laid down. If multi-roleforces are equally effective, then current USAF initiativesshoula have no adverse impact on future combat capability.If, however, multi-role units are not as effective as single-role forces, then Air Force leaders can use this knowledge tomore intelligently plan for the required future air-to-airforce structure.

This issue has potential ramifications for manyothers besides those in the Air Force. General Gordon

21


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Sullivan, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, recently wrote that jointoperations are not only more efficient than single-serviceoperations, but also will be the future norm at every levelof command.29 This jointness can only serve to increase thereliance that all military services already have on the AirForce for providing the levels of air superiority necessaryfor carrying out other combat operations. Nor is thisreliance unique to the U.S. sister services. General McPeaktestified before Congress that the high-tech F-22 fighterforce was essential because, while our allies bring low-techaircraft to any alliance, they rely on us to provide thestate-of-the-art, high-tech forces necessary to ensure airsuperiority. 0

Perhaps the most significant contribution this workmay make is to the fighter acquisition process. The USAFgoal is to retire each fielded fighter type at the 22-year

point.31 Since the time from fighter concept development todelivery is now approximately 20 years, a service decision ona particular fighter represents a staggering 40-yearcommitment. A determination on single versus multi-role air-to-air fighter capabilities can only help to ensure the U.S.acquires the fighter force we truly need.

The bottom line is air-to-air fighter forces play asignificant role in the campaign for air superiority, which,in turn, is essential for overall victory. General Bruce


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H O ~ ~ O W ~ Yarned us not to lose sightof the importance of airsuperiority when he wrote:

A generation of American fighting men has almostforgotten what it is like IlQl to have air superiority - whatit is like to lose mobility except by night; to be cut offfrom supplies and reinforcements; to be constantly under thewatchful eye of enemy reconnaissance aircraft: to be alwaysvulnerable to strafing and bombing attacks; to see one'sfighters and bombers burn on their hardstands; to beoutnumbered, outgunned, and outmaneuvered in the air.32

It is my hope that this thesis will provide helpfulinsight for those who are now or may one day be tasked withdetermining the tactical fighter force needs of our country.


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CHAPTER 2CRITERIA FOR MEASURING AIR-TO-AIR

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

;mtroductionCriteria for measuring the success of combat

operations spring from two primary sources. The first is thebody of research efforts that looks to history and seeks toevaluate the relative effectiveness of past militaryorganizations, plans, and operations. The second is thatgroup which attempts to predict future battlefield outcomesbased on controlled simulations or observations of currentOperations.

For the most part, both types of research involvecriteria that can actually be used for either historicalanalysis or for efforts predicting future combat outcomes.Therefore, I have used both as sources for my research.Regardless of the source, however, all of these criteria areobjective in nature and concern measures of positionaladvantage, weapons employment, or the potential formane~vering.~hey are used to compartmentalize and quantifycombat actions in order to support direct comparison. Butcombat operations, and more specifically air-to-air combatoperations, are neither easily quantifiable nor measurable.


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For this reason, a purely empirical analysis of pastcombat operations will not create a complete and whollyaccurate picture. While numbers and statistics are importantand can reflect accurately on combat effectiveness, acomplete analysis will depend also on background rationaleand subjective input from those involved. Therefore, acriterion must also exist that supports a subjectiveanalysis.

This chapter addresses both subjective and objectivemeasures by which air-to-air combat effectiveness can beevaluated. Each focuses on either a different portion of thetactical air battle or stops at a different point in timealong the air-to-air engagement spectrum. Further, somereflect more strongly than others on causal factors, such asaircraft capabilities, weapons, or aircrew proficiency.Regardless, all have relevance to the study of air-to-aircombat effectiveness.

Subjective Criterion: MlSSlOn Obiect. . ive Accom~lishmen~webst.er's Dlctlonarv. . defines "effectiveness" as "the

quality of being effective," which in turn is defined as"producing a definite or desired result; effi~ient."~ omeaningful discussion of air-to-air combat effectiveness cantake place, therefore, without first determining what resultor results this combat is designed to bring about. Forair-to-air operations, like all combat operations, theseresults are expressed in terms of mission objectives.

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As discussed in Chapter One, all air-to-air missionscontribute in some manner to the battle for aerospacecontrol. But every mission is unique and, therefore, hasunique objectives, as do flights and even individual fighteraircrews within a particular flight. These objectives aredetermined by each mission commander or flight lead based onhis combined assessment of higher headquarters' tasking, hisavailable forces, the expected threat, and the overallsituation. Once determined and briefed, mission objectivesdictate all subsequent actions by all members of the mission.

It follows, then, that in the most basic sense amission that accomplishes its stated objectives is effective,while the mission that fails to meet its objectives is noteffective. For the individual flight lead, this assessmentis a simple matter of comparing performance to objectivesimmediately after the mission. However, these individual

mission objectives and aircrew responsibilities are virtuallynever recorded. Therefore, the detached researcherattempting to make an evaluation of effectiveness long afterthe fact and without a knowledge of mission objectives, mustacknowledge his effort as being fundamentally suspect. Tounderstand why this is so, consider the following detailedexample.

A flight of two fighters, leader and wingman, istasked as part of a bomber escort mission. When the missionis over, three bombers have been destroyed and the fighterlead is dead, killed by an unobserved enemy fighter; the

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wingman survived and achieved-two nemy kills. Knowingnothing else, one would most likely conclude the mission afailure overall because enemy fighters not only shot downthree friendly bombers, but also the fighter lead. One mightalso suggest that the fighter wingman acquitted himself wellby surviving and killing two enemy fighters.

But view these results in light of this flight'smission objectives and the actual events. The flight leadhad stated that the flight must destroy or drive off at least50% of the enemy fighters posing a threat to the formation ofsixteen bombers the flight was to protect. The lead furtherstated that his wingman's primary objective was to remainvisual with and protect him while he engaged the enemyfighters. When eight enemy fighters attacked, the leaderengaged with and was able to turn away four of them beforebeing shot down himself. But the wingman lost sight of leadearly in the engagement and eventually turned away to pursueand shoot down two of the departing fighters. The remainingfour enemy fighters were then able to close with and shootdown three bombers.

Viewing these results in light of the missionobjectives leads one to a much different conclusion about theflight's effectiveness. Although he did not kill any enemyfighters, the lead did in fact meet his primary objective ofdriving off 50% of the enemy force. Conversely, the wingman


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failed completely because he neither protected his leader northe bombers, but instead lost sight and moved off to engageenemy fighters that were no longer a threat to the mission.Clearly, the assessment of mission effectiveness differsgreatly depending on the extent of background informationavailable on mission objectives.

Although few, there are those who can, in fact, makea valid and meaningful assessment of air-to-air combateffectiveness based on mission objective accomplishment.Commanders, participants, and other trained observers whounderstand the intricacies of aerial combat and who haveobserved unit performance over long periods of time can drawhighly accurate conclusions from their observations. Whendoing so, they are not basing their statements on any oneobjective criterion. Rather, they are making subjectiveassessments based on their total knowledge of and intimacy

with the unit or subject of interest.As the previous example points out, any purely

objective evaluation of combat effectiveness cannot beconsidered complete in itself. Therefore, although whollysubjective in nature, evaluations of air-to-air combateffectiveness based on mission objective accomplishment cancontribute greatly to this process and are arguably the mostmeaningful and reliable of all.


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Kill-To-Loss RatioThis criterion is by far the best known and most

widely used. From the time of the earliest dogfights inworld War I, air battles and fighter units have beenevaluated in terms of how many enemy aircrafc have been shotdown versus how many friendly aircraft have been lost in theprocess. TO a large extent, this has become the definitivestandard of comparison because it is the mosr. easilymeasured.

combat "loss" if any of the same descriptive conditionsapply. Implied within this definition is the requirementthat the conditions described must have occurred during anengagement between opposing airborne forces. Therefore,

With only few minor differences, the terms "kill" and"loss" mean the same today as they have throughout thehistory of aerial warfare. The definition of "kill" sed asthe basis of awarding aerial victory credits in Vietnam isprobably the most succinct:

An enemy aircraft was considered destroyed if itcrashed, exploded, disintegrated, lost a majorcomponent vital for flight, caught fire, entered intoan attitude or position from which recovery wasimpossible, or its pilot bailed out. The claim hadto be substantiated by written testimony from one ormore aerial or ground observers, gun camera film, areport that wreckage of the enemy aircraft had beenrecovered, or some other positive intelligence thatconfirmed its total destr~ction.~

Conversely, a friendly aircraft has been considered a

although a friendly fighter shot down by a SAM, for example,29


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is certainly a loss, it is not an air-to-air combat loss anddoes not apply to this discussion.

This criterion is also the most complete because it

evaluates the effectiveness of the totality of the air-to-airfighter system (i.e., the aircrew, the aircraft, the weapon,and the tactic). Poor performance relative to the threat inany one of these areas can easily reverse the outcome of theengagement. Further, kill-to-loss ratios evaluate the entiretactical engagement spectrum because they measure finaloutcomes. Finally, this criterion is especially validbecause it is one of the few that directly compares theperformance of opposing forces, unlike most that deal morewith one-sided measures of unit efficiency.

However, kill-to-loss ratios can also be misleading.First, many of these ratios do not compare similaroperations. For example, kill figures for one side mayinclude destruction of all types of enemy aircraft, includingbombers, transports and even manned balloons. Conversely,the loss figures for this same side often include onlyfighter or fighter-bomber type aircraft destroyed by enemyfighters. This can lead to an "apples and oranges" type ofcomparison, which has little value for analysis.

Also, kill-to-loss ratios mean little in the short-term. The reason for this is the lack of direct relevancebetween such a ratio and the objectives of a specificmission. Killing many enemy aircraft while sustaining few


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friendly losses does not necessarily equate to missionsuccess. However, over the long-term, the kill-to-loss ratiobecomes more relevant because it provides insight intooverall unit performance trends and attrition of opposingforces.

Kills Per EngagementThis criterion is a measure of how many enemy

aircraft are killed each time an engagement with one or moreoccurs. It does not measure the tactical elements leading tothe fight, but simply evaluates performance after the fighthas begun. Generally, an engagement is considered to havebegun either when one fires a weapon at an enemy aircraft orwhen one must defend against an enemy weapon fired at him.Also, this criterion is unilateral; it makes no directassessment of enemy offensive capabilities nor any comparisonbetween forces.

"Kills per engagement" is a constructive measure inthat it helps the researcher compare various units on a morelevel basis by taking into account the element of"~pportunity."~or example, one unit in a particularconflict may have 100 kills to its credit, while anothersimilar unit in the same conflict has only 15 kills. But ifthe first unit scored its victories in a total of 500engagements, while the second unit fought only 20engagements, the latter is clearly more effective. Historyhas shown that certain units in every conflict shoulder more


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of the air-to-air combat load than others, so this criteriacan prove very helpful when evaluating combat effectiveness.

However, "kills per engagement" can also becompletely irrelevant to the issue of combat effectiveness.Mission accomplishment for many air-to-air mission categoriesis not dependent at all on killing opposing forces. Alldefensive counterair missions and many offensive counterairmissions fall into this category. These missions seek tostop friendly ground or airborne targets from being attacked;they are concerned solely with force survival, not large killtallies. If the protecting fighter forces can drive enemyaircraft away or force attackers to jettison bombs prior totheir targets, then such missions are effective even when nota single enemy aircraft is downed.

Percentage of Engagements SurvivedSurvival is, of course, of critical importance in

combat operations. An aircraft, and usually more importantlya pilot or aircrew, lost in combat may not be replaceable inthe near-term and sometimes not at all.

"Percentage of engagements survived" is concernedonly with the defensive aspects of air-to-air combat. Theengagement itself may begin from an offensive, defensive, orneutral posture, and roles may change during the course ofthe battle. Also, shots may be taken by any or all fightersinvolved; aircraft may even be hit by enemy fire. Thesefactors do not matter, however, for the purposes of this


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criterion. If a friendly aircraft is able to make it backand land in friendly territory, aircraft and crew havesurvived the engagement.

This criterion is generally used when evaluating thehuman element of air-to-air combat. This is particularlytrue for fighter units, such as surface attack or SEADsquadrons, that conduct other than air-to-air missions intheir primary role. These fighters, some carrying no air-to-air ordnance, are likely to be engaged by enemy counterairfighters and, thus, to begin the engagement from a defensiveposture. For them, simply surviving an air-to-air engagementis a major mission objective.

This criterion is useful in that it evaluatessurvival only in terms of air-to-air engagement outcomes.Measuring overall unit survival throughout a conflict orcampaign will not contribute to an understanding of air-to-air combat effectiveness because such a measure will includelosses unrelated to aerial combat. This measure can be usedto judge unit pilot proficiency in maneuvering relative toenemy fighters, a key element of air-to-air combateffectiveness.

"Percentage of engagements survived" can also be avery misleading indicator of effectiveness. By definition,one is engaged if either shooting at or being shot by theenemy. Therefore, this single criterion could be used tocompare one flight that began and ended its engagement


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continuously offensive with one that began completelydefensive yet survived so long that the enemy departed. Thisis not to say one flight was more or less effective than theother. Rather, the two events are simply not comparable.

Therefore, the most meaningful manner in which thiscriterion can be used is to compare survival rates fordifferent units using the same type of engagement startparameters (e.g., offensive, defensive, or neutral). This iseasily done in research projects like that at the U.S. AirForce's Human Resources Laboratory, in which relative startpositions and survival rates can be easily controlled andmeas~red.~ uch measurements are very difficult for combatoperations, however, due to the lack of appropriatedocumentation.

First Shot OpportunityThis criterion measures performance up to the point

at which one fighter, on either side, first enters a weaponsenvelope. This is the first possible time when a missile orgun can be fired within the parameters that "should" resultin a hit on the target. As an indicator of offensivepotential, which is necessary for victory in the air-to-aircombat arena, this measure presents a valid portrayal ofoverall combat effectiveness.

This measure has been used in two different ways.First, U.S. Navy (USN) research projects conducted in thelate 1970s determined that "first shot opportunity" could


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actually be used as a fairly consistent indicator of finalengagement o~tcome.~econd, this criterion is another thatdirectly compares friendly and enemy actions in combat. Foreach engagement, there is only one "first shot opportunity."Therefore, the flight or individual fighter that is able tomaneuver to shoot before the enemy can do so is certainlycontributing in a positive way to overall missioneffectiveness.

Virtually identical is the criterion "actual firstshot of engagement." The only difference is that the pilotactually initiates weapons launch or firing. Again, thismeasure is not concerned with actual weapon performance, butsimply with the act of flying to some parameters perceived assuitable for launch, and then doing so.

Percentage Of Engagement Time Offensive/DefensiveThe participant in aerial warfare may find himself

offensive, defensive, or neutral relative to the threat interms of position, maneuvering potential, and weaponscapability. The neutral status by definition yields noadvantage either way. But a measurement of the percentage ofengagement time spent either offensive or defensive producesa direct comparison of air-to-air combat effectiveness. Thiscriterion has been used in numerous academic studies andresearch efforts.

In 1989, the USAF Human Resources Laboratoryconducted one such research project designed to formulate a


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composite measure of performance for one-versus-oneengagements conducted in a flying ~imulator.~ilots flewagainst one another in the simulator, and the time spent byeach in offensive and defensive positions was measured. Thisfactor was combined with others to provide one overallassessment of air-to-air combat effectiveness. A similarstudy carried out by the U.S. Navy's Human Factors Laboratoryconducted identical research involving actual trainingmissions flown on an instrumented Tactical Aircrew CombatTraining System (TACTS) range.s

In these types of research projects, certain basicjudgments are made about the meaning of the time spent in acertain status. Typical judgments are: it is better to beoffensive than defensive; if offensive, it is better to havea short engagement (achieve a quick kill and get out of thethreat area); and if defensive and not able to get offensive,it is better to have a long engagement (the pilot survivesfor a longer time).g Most, if not all, fighter aircrewswould subjectively agree with such judgments.

The primary shortcoming of this criterion is what iseasily measurable and applicable in the simulator is not soin a real-world combat flying environment. Aerial combatvirtually never involves a single aircraft on either side.Rather, multiple aircraft are involved in large fights thatproduce situations in which one is offensive relative to oneor more enemy aircraft while simultaneously defensive


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relative to other threat aircraft. Providing a label forsuch a status becomes problematic.

Shots Per EngagementThis criterion does not relate to the entire

engagement spectrum, but, instead, focuses only on that partof the fight leading to weapons employment. It removes fromthe evaluation process the performance of the aircrew,aircraft, and weapon after the pilot actually commandsmissile launch or gun firing. Therefore, this criterion doesnot directly measure the effect of one's actions on theenemy, but rather the potential to destroy the enemy based onone's ability to take shots.

This criterion differs from "kills per engagement" inthat it only evaluates the aircrew and their tactics and doesnot concern itself with weapons effectiveness. Because theability of any fighter unit to maintain its aircraft systemsand weapons and to employ them accordingly are major aspectsof unit effectiveness, this measure is less complete thanthat of "kills per engagement." However, from the standpointof specific research into aircrew performance, this criterionplaces emphasis on the human factor and is, therefore,applicable.

Percentage Of Shots Valid At LaunchThis criterion completely removes post-launch weapons

system performance from the evaluation process. Instead.


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this is solely a measure of aircrew entry into andrecognition of valid launch parameters. Because this issolely a measure of the human element of air-to-air combat,it has been included in various studies of aircrewperformance.

For example, in 1990 the Institute For DefenseAnalysis conducted a DOD study investigating the relationshipbetween aircrew experience levels (i.e., number of flyinghours) and overall air-to-air performance.1 Researchersset up a simulation that assumed a probability-of-kill (Pk)of 1.0 (i.e., every shot that was valid at launch killed itstarget).ll This assumption, typical of such research,removes all but the human factor in the engagement.Therefore, "percentage of shots valid at launch" becomes adirect measure of engagement outcome and, by extension.overall air-to-air effectiveness.

The obvious limitation of this criterion is that noweapon ever made has a Pk of 1.0. In practice, no systemworks perfectly every time it is used. Therefore, asmentioned previously in regard to others, this criterion isalso limited in that it does not evaluate the completeengagement spectrum. By stopping short of a real-worldresult, this criterion provides only a partial evaluation ofair-to-air combat effectiveness.


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Kills Per Firing AttemptThis criterion is a measure of how many enemy

aircraft are destroyed every time an attempt is made to doso. It is concerned only with the last phase of the tacticalengagement and assumes the aircrew has done everything elserequired to obtain a position from which a shot can be taken.This criterion has historically been used in two distinctlydifferent ways.

First, "kills per firing attempt" is typically usedwithin an organization as a measure of weapons effectiveness.For example, during the war in Vietnam, the USAF 1st TestSquadron in the Philippines, responsible for testing fieldedair-to-air missiles, evaluated and tracked various units todetermine the reliability and capability of these U.S.weapons.12 From the standpoint of comparing the combateffectiveness of different units, the criterion, when used inthis manner, is of limited value.

The other way in which "kills per firing attemptu isused centers around the abilities of the pilot or aircrew.When concerned with air-to-air missiles, it measures howefficiently the aircrew has achieved and recognized validfiring parameters. When concerned with aerial gunnery, whichhas traditionally been the case, this criterion measures howskillfully the pilot can maneuver his aircraft relative tothe enemy and obtain a tracking solution of sufficient length


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to hit the target. When used in this manner, "kills perfiring attemptM is a useful measure of unit combateffectiveness.

Unfortunately, combat analyses of "kills per firingattempt" do not usually distinguish between these two usesfor this criterion. Therefore, one cannot know if an invalidshot was caused by pilot error or inability, or if the weaponitself did not function properly. Further, weaponseffectiveness is also dependent both on the performance ofsupporting systems onboard the launching aircraft and on theabilities of the weapons load crews. Thus it is possible tohave invalid shots for reasons completely unrelated to thosewith which we are concerned.

This measure can also be misleading because theunderlying assumption when using it is that any combinationof valid or accurate firing parameters and well-functioningweapons will result in a kill. This is not always the case.Certainly, there have been instances in which aircraft thathave been riddled with bullets or that have been hit withair-to-air missiles have not been "killed,' ut have beenable to limp home to be repaired and used again.

Air-to-Air Related AccidentsAs discussed previously, an aircraft can be

considered "killed" for a variety of reasons. Although onenormally pictures aerial dogfights ending with one of theparticipants "going down in flames," this is certainly not


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always the case. Many engagements in every major conflicthave resulted in one or more aircraft being killed throughaccidents caused by operator error.

These accidents are manifested in a number of ways.Certainly the easiest to perceive in combat is impact withthe ground. All fighter engagements descend lower and loweras the Eight continues due to loss of energy. Eventually,the participants may find themselves literally fighting attree top height. The slightest lack of concentration or lossof awareness of one's position relative to the ground can andoften has resulted in impact with the ground.

Another often seen result of air-to-air combatmaneuvering has been an out-of-control aircraft spiraling orspinning to the ground. All aircraft are designed to flyonly within a certain prescribed operating envelope. Butair-to-air combat is a contest for survival, and theaggressive pilot will push his aircraft to the very limits ofthis envelope. Unfortunately, the margin for error is oftenvery small, and exceeding designed operating parameters hasoften resulted in a fatal out-of-control situation.

In addition to pushing his aircraft, a fighter pilotmust also subject his body to stresses which man was notcreated to withstand. Spatial disorientation from operatingin a constantly changing three-dimensional fight can easilycause the pilot to lose all sense of direction and attituderelative to the horizon. Also, because modern fighter


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aircraft can withstand stresses far exceeding those of thepeople who fly them, it has become increasingly common forpilots to sustain so many "G" forces that they black outduring maneuvering. Both of these situations often result infatal impacts with the ground.

Finally, significant numbers of air-to-airengagements have ended in mid-air collisions. Although suchcollisions have certainly occurred in small engagements, theyhave most often taken place during swirling, confusing fightsbetween large numbers of aircraft on both sides. Many mid-airs have occurred with enemy aircraft, but many have alsotaken place with other friendly fighters, sometimes withinthe same flight. And more often than not, aircraft are lostand crews are killed in these accidents.

Studies have shown that both overall flying time andtime in the particular aircraft of concern are directly

related to accident rates.13 Generally, the higher one'sflying time, the less likely one is to have an accident. Byextension, the assumption is that those more proficient inair-to-air maneuvering are less likely to have an air-to-airrelated accident. Therefore, this criterion can be used tocompare the relative air-to-air combat effectiveness ofdifferent fighter units.

Incidence of FratricideOne of the most critical aspects of modern air-to-air

warfare is correct identification of one's target. In the


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days of gun-versus-gun aerial dogfights, when the target waswithin a thousand feet of one's guns, this identification wasa relatively easy task. But even then, fratricide occurred.As technology has advanced and provided the warrior withweapons that can kill from beyond visual range (BVR), thepotential for fratricide has increased exponentially.

This measure once again is intended to evaluate thehuman aspect of air-to-air combat effectiveness. Obviously,those units with fewer incidences of fratricide areconsidered more effective than those with more. There is,

however, one very fundamental problem with this criterion.One can reasonably assume that if a pilot knew he

was engaging another friendly aircraft, he would not do so.For this reason, no pilot in this situation reports an act offratricide, but rather his honest belief that he has downedan enemy aircraft. Unless another friendly fighter waswitness to this fratricide, the incident will never bereported as such. In the modern age of long-range air-to-airmissiles, the likelihood of not reporting this situation asfratricide is even greater. For this reason, "incidence offratricide" may simply not be accurately quantifiable.


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CHAPTER 3HISTORICAL INFORMATION ON

AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT

mtroductionAs discussed in Chapter One, the focus of this thesis

is on actual combat operations, as opposed to unit peacetime

training or air-to-air combat training exercises. To supportthis emphasis, this chapter presents information on fighterunits of the USAF, U.S. sister services, and those of othercountries that have fought combat air battles during andsince world War 11.

The two primary criteria I have used in decidingwhether to include detailed background information on aparticular unit have been the availability of data on theunit and the requirement that the unit qualify as single-rolein its approach to air-to-air combat. As discussed inChapter One, a unit need not have been formed originally inthe single-role air-to-air combat role to be considered inthis thesis as a single-role fighter unit. Rather, thedetermining factor is a unit's focused preparation for andexecution of air-to-air combat over a period of time in aparticular conflict.


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In some cases, I have not included relevant fighterunits because I have been unable to obtain sufficient data ontheir combat operations. The USAF's 27th Fighter Escort Wingin Korea, and Israeli fighter squadrons that fought in the1973 Yom Kippur War fall in this category. In other cases, Ihave excluded units whose operations have been greatlydetailed, but which can in no way be considered single-roleair-to-air units. This category includes dedicated air-to-ground squadrons, the vast majority of which have experiencedlittle or no air-to-air combat. Finally, multi-role fightersquadron operations are not detailed individually, butinstead form part of the overall multi-role data base for theconflict in which they fought.

This chapter is divided into two major sections. Thefirst section deals with the objective aspect of thisresearch. Single-role air-to-air fighter unit information ispresented in a narrative style to facilitate a betterunderstanding of each squadron's operations and therelationship of these operations to those of other units.Background is also provided on each unit and on each conflictto help further an understanding of the context in whichoperations were conducted. When applicable, reference ismade in each narrative to data supporting the criteria formeasuring air-to-air combat effectiveness discussedpreviously.


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Interspersed in this first section is generalinformation, primarily that of a statistical nature, onmulti-role fighter units. As opposed to addressing unit-specific details, these subsections present data bearing onoverall conflict or theater operations that relate to theissue of air-to-air combat effectiveness. This informationis included to help place much of the unit-specific data inits proper perspective relative to the effectiveness of othercombat fighter units operating at the same time or in thesame places.

The second section provides information of asubjective nature. Included in this section areauthoritative observations and analyses of air-to-air combatoperations that bear on the subject of single-role versusmulti-role fighter unit combat effectiveness. When the basisof authority is not evident, brief background information is

provided to establish the credibility of those referenced.Information in this section is directly related to thecriterion of "mission objective accomplishment'' discussed inChapter Two.

Qbiective Backaround InformationAmerican Volunteer Group In China In World War I1The American Volunteer Group (AVG) is the only World

War I1 fighter unit I have included in this thesis. TheFlying Tigers of the AVG are unique in that theirs were


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arguably the only squadrons in World War I1 intended from theoutset to be air-to-air fighter forces. Although near theend of its existence the AVG conducted limited dive bomboperations, this unit remained an air-to-air f0rce.lTherefore, the AVG is considered here as one of the very fewdedicated single-role air-to-air fighter units.

The day after he retired from the U.S. Army Air Corpsin April, 1937, Captain Claire Chennault left for China toserve as the chief air advisor to the Chinese Air Force.2When war erupted three months later between China and Japan,

Chennault took charge of the combat training of Chinesefighter and bomber squadrons. By the fall of 1938, theChinese Air Force had been so decimated that Madame Chiangapproached Chennault and asked him to form a flying foreignlegion to defend China.3 From this seed grew the FlyingTigers of the AVG.

Chennault was eventually able to obtain from the U.S.government a commitment to send China 100 P-40 Warhawkfighters. He then began recruiting sufficient numbers of ex-military pilots to man the three squadrons he was forming.When General Chemault requested pilots for his fledgling AVGsquadrons, he asked for men in their twenties who had atleast three years experience in fighters and a minimum of 300hours flying time.4 Of the 110 men who originally formed theFlying Tigers, only 12 met these qualificati~ns.~et


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Chennault took these men and turned them into some of thedeadliest fighter pilots of World War 11.

Almost to a man, the pilots of the AVG credited theirsuccess to the training given them by General Chennault.Each day Chennault conducted what he termed "Kindergarten,"an intense ground school designed to teach the AVG pilotseverything they needed to know about flying their P-40fighters and about the Japanese threat they would face in~ombat.~n addition, Chennault daily watched his pilotsthrough binoculars while they practiced their dogfightingskills directly above his position in the control tower.' Bymaintaining constant radio communications, he was able tocorrect errors and instruct his pilots on a real-time basis.

Chennault allowed his pilots to fly combat missionsonly after he was satisfied with their performance. SaidChennault: "I refused to throw a pilot into the fray until I

was personally satisfied that he was properly trained."8 Hewas so intransigent about this that in March, 1942, sevenmonths after beginning operations, Chennault still hadeighteen pilots he would not allow in combat because heconsidered them unready.9 Training was clearly the key tothe success of the AVG. Those who survived the rigors ofGeneral Chennault's training program felt more than ready tohandle the Japanese.

The primary role of the Flying Tigers was to preventthe Japanese Air Force from effectively interdicting the port


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of Rangoon and the Burma Road, which together formed the onlyviable supply lifeline into China.l0 To this end, the FlyingTigers began combat operations in December, 1941. For themost part, AVG missions involved bomber escort on raidsagainst various Japanese targets, fighter sweeps to seek outand destroy Japanese aircraft, and defensive CAPS at or nearthe AVG operating fields.

Despite the important nature of its work, or perhapsbecause of it, the AVG was extremely short-lived. It wasdissolved in July, 1942, and replaced by a more official

organization, the Army Air Corps' 23rd Fighter Group, afteronly eight months in existence and a mere six months ofcombat.ll Yet during this six-month period, the FlyingTigers were credited with 297 confirmed and 150 probablekills against Japanese aircraft, with the loss of only sixP-40s in air-to-air combat.12 The resulting kill-to-lossratio was an incredible 50:l. Further, these kills came ononly 311 total engagements, yielding a kill per engagementratio of .95.13

World War I1 - Multi-Role Fighter UnitsOn July 4th, 1942, the day the AVG Flying Tigers

became the 23rd Fighter Group Flying Tigers, the scope ofoperations for this unit changed dramatically. The unique,single-role air-to-air focus quickly changed to a broadmulti-role perspective.


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Although the 23rd continued to fly the same bomberescort and airdrome defense missions that the AVG had flown,the group also began flying extensive dive-bombing, armedrecce patrols (gun strafing), low-level skip bombing, anti-shipping attacks, and visual reconnaissance missions.14 AS aclear indication of how much the mission orientation of theFlying Tigers had changed, P-40s assigned to bomber escortmissions were themselves loaded with bombs so the pilots ofthe 23rd could carry out dive-bombing missions in the targetarea. 5

During the three years that the 23rd flew in Chinaduring World War 11, the group shot down 621 Japaneseaircraft and lost 110 fighters in air-to-air combat.16 Theresulting kill-to-loss ratio is 5.6:l. While nowhere nearthe 50:l kill-to-loss ratio achieved by the AVG, the recordof the 23rd far exceeds that of all multi-role Army Air Forceunits in the Pacific theater during the war. The kill-to-loss ratio of this latter group was 1.96:1, which represented8899 enemy aircraft shot down and 4530 friendly losses inair-to-air combat.17

USAF 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing In KoreaOn November lst, 1950, six jet fighters crossed south

of the Yalu River into Korea and engaged a flight of USAFP-51 Mustangs.18 Although able to escape, these Mustangpilots learned the hard way just how capable were the newRussian-made MiG-15s of the Chinese Air Force. The presence

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of the MiG-15 suddenly rendered obsolete the venerableMustang and every other U.S. and U.N. fighter in the FarEast.lg Unless immediate steps could be taken to counter theMiG threat, USAF leaders knew the air superiority enjoyed byU.N. forces would soon be lost.

Following hurried requests for additional forces,General Hoyt Vandenberg, the Air Force Chief of Staff,offered to send to the Far East a wing of new F-86 Sabrejets,but only if a suitable airfield could be prepared in thecombat area.20 Major General Earle Partridge, 5th Air ForceCommander, ordered that such preparation be made, and shortlythereafter the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing (FIw) arrived atJohnson AFB, Japan. On December 15th, 1950, F-86s from the4th FIW's forward detachment at Kimpo Airfield, Korea, flewtheir first combat missions.21

The 4th FIW thus became the first of two USAF wingsdedicated solely to air-to-air combat in Korea. On goodweather days, squadrons in the 4th flew four counterairmissions, two intercept missions, two escort missions, andone combat indoctrination mission.22 Occasionally, the wingalso flew search patrol and rescue air cover missions.Although they vary greatly in the mechanics of execution, allof these missions fall into the air-to-air combat category.But of them all, counterair became the trademark of the 4thFIW. These counterair missions, designed to aggressively


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seek out and destroy the enemy, took a massive toll on theChinese MiG-15 force.

Between December 15th, 1950, and July 27th, 1953, the4th FIW flew 45,143 sorties, scored 484 air-to-air kills, andlost 48 F-86s in air-to-air combat.23 The resulting overallkill-to-loss ratio in this first all-jet combat was anoutstanding 10:l. During the war, 520 pilots flew combatmissions with the 4th FIW. As in all wars, a few pilotsaccounted for large numbers of kills, while most pilots hadfew, if any, kills.

Nevertheless, statistics can be discerned to supportseveral composite measures of effectiveness in air-to-aircombat. Based on an average of 72 combat missions per pilot,the 4th FIW ended the war with a shot per engagement ratio of.45:1, a kill per engagement ratio of .21:1, and a kills perfiring attempt ratio of .47:1.24 These numbers include many

instances in which F-86 pilots never fired a shot, but inwhich MiG-15 pilots lost control during maneuvering andeither spun into the ground or bailed out. In thesesituations, the 4th FIW combat historian credited a kill tothe pilot and counted a "firing' to indicate the intensity ofthe Sabre pilot's attack.25

A great deal has been made of the tremendouslylopsided ratio of MiG kills to F-86 losses, and always thisamazing record is attributed not to any superiority inaircraft or equipment, but to the superior training of USAF


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pilots.26 AS a dedicated air-to-air fighter wing, the 4thexecuted and trained only for those air-to-air missionsrequired of them in Korea.

Although combat operations always took priority, the4ch FIW, like all units in Korea and Japan under the USAF's~ifth ir Force, conducted intensive training throughout thewar. Every pilot in the theater had to be certified by hiscommander as being capable of flying combat missions beforehe was permitted to do so.27 TO support this certification,each squadron set up a training program geared to pilotproficiency. In this manner, a World War I1 veteran withmultiple kills and thousands of hours of flying time was notrequired to complete the same training regimen mandated for ayoung lieutenant fresh out of pilot training. Instead, eachpilot received the training appropriate for him as anindividual.

Even after trained pilots were integrated intoflights within the squadron, they were not considered combatready pilots. Instead, each was scheduled for two or threemissions of shorter duration and under less dangerousconditions than was considered the norm. These "cherryrides" were, in effect, training missions flown under actualcombat condition^.^^ Much as was the case with the FlyingTigers, the 4th FIW trained in a superlative manner in itsrole as dedicated, single-role air-to-air fighter unit. Thistraining produced pilots both highly knowledgeable of and


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skilled in their craft; their results bear witness to theeffectiveness of their training programs.

Korea - Multi-Role Fighter UnitsAs already discussed, F-86 squadrons were brought to

Korea for only one reason: "to fly combat air patrol overNorthwestern Korea and to meet, turn back, and, if possible,destroy M ~ G S . " ~ ~espite the tremendous air-to-air combatsuccess Pnjoyed by the F-86 units, MiGs were still a factorwith which our other multi-role fighter forces had to

contend. As Table 1 shows, F-51s, F-80s, and F-84s of theUSAF Far East Air Forces (FEAF) did not fare well against theMiG-15.

Table 1. Korea: Air-To-Air Combat Results30

* 1 Nov 1950 To 31 Oct 1952

During the two-year period addressed in Table 1,these multi-role fighter forces combined for a total of only14 confirmed kills, but sustained 42 losses. The resultingkill-to-loss ratio is a poor 1:3. Further, if one makes thebest-case assumption that the "damaged" numbers accuratelyrepresent every MiG hit by a friendly fighter, then thecombined "kills per firing attempt" ratio is only .10:1.

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That the battle in Korea for air superiority wassuccessful for U.S. forces is beyond question. Consideringthe tens of thousands of U.S. sorties flown during the war,losses to enemy fighters were negligible. By the end of thewar, USAF FEAF and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces had lost atotal of 1986 aircraft: 945 to non-enemy causes, 816 toground fire, 78 to unknown causes, and 147 to enemyfighters.31 USAF F-86 forces shot down a total of 802MiG-15s and suffered 56 losses in air-to-air combat,resulting in an overall kill-to-loss ratio of 14.3 to

U.S. Navy F-8 Crusader Squadrons In VietnamFrom January 1964, to January 1973, ten U.S. Navy F-8

Crusader squadrons in seven different carrier air wings madea total of 29 Vietnam cruises.33 For these squadrons, aswith virtually all others, the war in Southeast Asia was, ineffect, two separate wars. From their first operations in1964, until the beginning of the bombing halt and prohibitionagainst flights into North Vietnamese airspace in the fall of1968, F-8 squadrons were among the most heavily tasked withmissions to the North. However, after the air war picked uptempo again in early 1972, F-8 squadrons were used in CAProles near the fleet and on other missions generally far fromMiG activity. heref fore, it is the earlier period of intenseactivity which is of primary concern.

In 1952, the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics set forththe required specifications for a new fleet defense


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air-to-air fighter. Chance Vought eventually won this Navycontract with their design for a state-of-the-art,supersonic, single-role air superiority fighter,"uncompromised by a multi-mission ~apability."~~hendeliveries began in December 1956, the F-8 possessed a sleekdesign and four 20mm cannons, followed shortly thereafter bythe addition of the new AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

This configuration was, however, short-lived. Whenthe last version, the F-8E ( F 8 U - 2 N E ) , was produced, itincluded hard points for up to 4000 pounds of iron bombs andfor the carriage of air-to-ground missiles.35 The result wasthat both prior to and during the war, F-8 squadrons werecarrying out very effective air-to-ground training programs.For example, in a 1966 Navy bombing competition, VF-211, anF-8 squadron, outscored the three dedicated attack squadronswith which it was competing.36 And when war came, all F-8

squadrons in Vietnam conducted a variety of air-to-ground andSEAD missions as well.

But as described above, the F-8 was originallydesigned solely as an air-to-air fighter, a f

air to air combat effectiveness

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