aimma - ulema article modified

8/14/2019 Aimma - Ulema Article Modified

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The Role of Muslim Scholars (ulema) and Prayer Leaders (imams)1 in

Formulation of Public Religious Policy towards Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan.

By Syed Akif and Kafeel Ahmed

Abstract

Religion is increasingly an important constituent of public policy discourse in

Pakistan. While numerous factors, most particularly the complicated geo-politics

of the region, have further convoluted the already complex relationships betweenthe sacred and the secular in Pakistan, it is important to make sense of the thought

processes of leading players in both realms, which come together at least five

times a day when police guards take up positions outside most mosques to protectworshippers. An important aspect of the religious discourse in Pakistan is sectarian

conflict between the two main Muslim faith streams.

As apparent from the title, the principal objective for undertaking this study was todetermine the public perceptions about the status of and actual role(s) played by

Muslim scholars and prayer leaders (ulema and imams) in the formulation of

public policy. While these two groups of public opinion leaders are undoubtedlyimportant in terms of the influence they exert on the thoughts and actions of

common Pakistanis through their very regular interactions, especially the formal

sermons on Fridays and in special congregations, it is important to determine whatexactly is the extent of their persuasive power. Given the fact that the public

canvas is a very large one, it was felt necessary to limit the scope of this study to a

particular area of focus. For this we chose the sectarian conflict between the twomajor faith streams, the Shia and Sunni, in Pakistan which in spite of havingreceded after peaking in the early part of this decade is never too far from the

public domain. It is certainly a weighty factor in the national religious and political

discourses, especially in places like Parachinar and the annual Muharramcommemorations.

The study is a primarily a quantitative one and employed a questionnaire to elicitresponses. Keeping in view the theme of the research, the generally perceived

awareness and intellectual level and linguistic skills of ulema and imams, their

division on sectarian lines, a detailed questionnaire was developed in Urdu to

facilitate responses by members of these groups who are generally not well versedin English.

1 Although the correct Arabic plural ofimam is aimma, this study uses the Anglicized plural imams as

the word has now come to be incorporated in English and is found in most contemporary English

dictionaries. However, the term ulema - the plural ofalim has been retained on account of its not

being so widely used in English.

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The questionnaire was administered through a random sampling process in

Karachi to 10 ulema and over 50 imams in Karachi; the respondents were

randomly selected from lists ofulema and mosques made available to the authorsby a national security agency in confidence. While no amount of care can ever be

perceived to be totally unbiased when it comes to religious issues in Pakistan

which is highly fragmented between various sects and sub-denominations, an

attempt was made to maintain a balance in the representation of various groups andsub-groups on the basis of what is arguably the best available official list (even

though the same may not conform to generally held perceptions.)

From findings of a pre-administration piloting, the form required between 30 and

40 minutes to fill out. As with any research study, there were constraints and

limitations. Some of the respondents were skeptical about the aims and objectivesof the survey and apprehended the involvement of some government security

agency working behind the scene for some hidden agenda under the prevailing

political circumstances. A number of them were hesitant to return thequestionnaire, in all likeliness on account of their perceived apprehensions.

Accordingly, only the voluntarily/freely responded replies have been analyzed forthis study.

Introduction

Historically, the ulema have considered themselves to be the successors of

Prophets2 and by association a group tasked by the Quran (3:104) and Prophet

Muhammad to propagate Islam throughout mankinds stay on this planet. Theyhave taken on as one of their prime responsibilities, partly self-assumed and partly

socio-culturally mandated, to advise not only common Muslims but more

specifically Muslim rulers and governments on Islamic tenets and issuesdemanding contemporary solutions. From the earliest days of Islam, ulema haveheld important positions in various governments and tasked with overseeing the

dispensation of justice. For instance Imam Abu Yousuf (d. ), the lead disciple

of Imam Abu Hanifa [Noman ibn Thabit], who provided the foundationalinterpretation and documentation of one of the four Sunni schools of religious

jurisprudence, the Hanafi Fiqh, was the Chief Justice of Abbaside government of

Haroon Rashid (786-809 CE).

In South Asia, ulema like Bahauddin Zakaria (d. ) and Qazi Abu Mansoor (d.)

occupied important positions like those of Qadi-al-Quda (Chief Justice), Sheikhul

Islam (Chief Scholar), and Sadar-ul-Sadoor (Chief Court Advisor) during variousMuslim dynasties that ruled parts of South Asia ever since the Muslims first ventured

there under Muhammad Bin Qasim (711-12 CE) and up to the Mughal Empire (1526-

1857). Burhanuddin Balkhi, a well known faqih (expert in Islamic jurisprudence) ofthe 13th century C.E. impressed Sultan Ghayauddin Balbun (d. )so much that he

2 This belief is based upon the Islamic tenet that Prophet Muhammad was the last of the Divinely

ordained messengers and owes its origin to a hadith a saying of the Holy Prophet appearing in a

chapter of the most widely acclaimed book of the Prophets sayings, Sahih Bukhari (Kitabul Islam)

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was made an advisor of the court. As late as the mid-19 th century C.E. the Sultan-

ul-ulema of the Shia state of Awadh (19th century) used to crown the new ruler.

On the other hand, ulema were never wanting of taking principled stands against

kings who naturally displayed extreme arrogance towards all persons and things they

considered to be hindrances in their political ascendancy. Some scholars like Shaikh

Shahabuddin and Chiragh Delhvi (d. 757 Hijra; c. 1350) annoyed Muhammad BinTughlaq and earned his wrath. Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi, who challenged Din-e-Ilahi,

the religious aberration of Mughal emperor Akbar (ruled 1556-1606 CE) was

imprisoned for a very long period. Not shy of intervening in political matters, scholarslike Shah Waliullah ( ) took on a very active role and invited foreign Muslim forces

like those of Ahmed Shah Durrani ( )to help stabilize the enfeebled Muslim rule

quell Hindu Marhatas who were on the verge of over-running the capital at Delhi( C.E.). Still others took up militant uprising themselves: Syed Ahmed Barelvi (d.

1831 CE) tried to establish an Islamic state in the Pashtun area of the Kaghan Velley

(now in Pakistan) in the early 19th century. Maulvi Liaquat Ali, Maulana MehmoodulHassan and others participated in 1857 War of Independence (a.k.a. as Indian

Mutiny) and were sentenced to life imprisonment in the Andaman Islands (calledkala pani or dark waters). Mufti Barkatullah tried to seek Afghan and Russian help

against British occupation.

For their part, the British also used the religious card by establishing and propping

up pro-government religious personages from amongst the Sufic orders who presidedover as administrators of tombs and shrines as Gaddi Nasheens. These official

molvis were used by colonial authorities to condemn the ulema who did not tow the

official line by branding them as Wahabis a very convenient ploy to discreditanyone by ascribing them a connection with the austere Islamic interpretation of 19 th

century religious leader and ideologue of the Saudi Arabian regime. Official reverence

was accorded to the graves of scholars and religious leaders from British times by thevisit of important officials and political leaders.

Owing to their delicate position which has demanded arbitration between

contrasting demands of orthodox religious doctrine and real-politik of rulers, veryoften genuine religious scholars (as opposed to the official or market-players)

have also faced the wraths of governments for speaking truth or not towing and

supporting the official line.3

The `ulema have also played an important role in knowledge-propagation by

establishing major Islamic educational institutions like Jamia Al-Azhar in Egypt,

Madarsa-e-Nizamia in Baghdad, Houza-e-Ilmia at Najaf, Islamic University inMadina and Indias great seminary at Deoband.

3Such examples are many and include the case of execution of Ahmed Bin Naser on the orders of the

Abbaside ruler Wasiq, torture of Imam Ahmed Bin Humbal on the orders of Abbaside ruler Mamoon

and imprisonment of Imam Abu Hanifa on the orders of the Abbaside ruler Mansoor. In recent times

also Muslim religious scholars have faced not just torture and imprisonment (Maulana Mawdudi in

Pakistan) but also death (Sayyid Qutub in Egypt); throughout Muslim lands.

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AIMS & OBJECTIVES

The main aim of this research was to determine the role played by ulema andimams in the formulation of public policies concerning religious affairs in

Pakistan. This important and sensitive segment of the society plays its role by way

of influencing its major constituency, the Muslim citizens of the country who form

nearly 99 percent of the population. It also addresses the government not onlythrough their direct participation in the political process but also indirectly by

exercising their social and cultural influence. On the one hand the ulema demand

legislative and administrative actions for promoting the causes of Islam as perceived by them and on the other they react to policies adopted by the

government, either for their repeal or instituting changes according to their points

of view.

It is a general perception that successive governments have been quite alive to the

issues relating to, if not actually wary and apprehensive of, the influence ofulema

on the Pakistani society and have generally put forth a guarded and defensive

posture, if not offering continuous appeasements. The unprecedented success ofthe religious parties led by the ulema in the 2002 national elections, especially in

the two provinces bordering Afghanistan, was an important development, in spiteof the fact that these were almost totally routed in the 2008 elections. The

government was, however, able to get the better of them by obtaining their support

on the issue of 17th Constitutional Amendment in 2003. However, with thegovernment having reportedly gone back on its commitments made to the ulema,

they felt betrayed and started flexing their muscles and displaying shows of force

which have surfaced many times not just in the insurgency hit FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas (FATA) but surprisingly even in the national capital

Islamabad where the Lal Majid incident of 2007 became an embarrassing

international headline.

The hypothesis of this study is that there is no consensus among the ulema as to

the nature of an Islamic state and hence on how policy formulation should take

place in a modern Muslim polity like that of Pakistan.4

With the nation being divided on almost every facet on national discourse, religion

is no exception.5The polarization is Muslim scholarly opinion has become morepronounced and prevalent in the post 9/11 era and thus warrants a middle course.

4

Justice Munir in his report on 1953 incidents of Punjab had probably correctly observed that no twoulema agree on the precise definition of a muslim or Islamic sate. [REFERENCE]5 . Four different groups, deriving inspiration from different phases of Islamic history, can be easilyidentified in present-day Muslim polities: the conservatives wantinga return toKhilafa (the

Caliphate), the traditionalists accepting malookiat(rule by non-democratic Divine Rightists),

progressives insisting on a re-interpretation of the Quran in the light of modern knowledge and the

secularists considering Islam only a social code. The first two categories primarily interpret Islam in

terms of practices and institutions of seventh-century Arabia and are not prepared to follow the Western-

oriented Muslim intelligentsia calling for brotherhood, equality, moderation, toleration and social

justice. They project Islam as merely a static collection of injunctions and prohibitions.

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The ulema and imams have not been able to adjust themselves to the changed

scenario.

The questionnaire devised to seek opinions and perceptions of ulema and imams

on policies having a religious aspect covered the following important themes:

(i) Basic concepts on what comprised a true Muslim, an Islamic state,Jihad, blasphemy etc.

(ii) Nature and direction of the Pakistan Movement, the ObjectivesResolution, PNA agitation against Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977.

(iii) ulema s perception and their role in Islamization.(iv) Sectarian strife, its characters and effectiveness of government

actions.

(v) Merits and demerits of Zakat system, Haj scheme, Ruet HilalCommittee.

(vi) Perception about registration of Madarsas, inclusion of modern

subjects in their syllabi, acceptance of government grant etc.

(vii) Response to changes/implementation of Blasphemy Act, HudoodOrdinance etc.

(viii) Impact of unity of religious parties on one hand and the five boards

of madarsas on the other.

(ix) Overall level of satisfaction with government policies.

METHODOLOGY ADOPTED

For the purpose of primary reach to collect data, a 28-item questionnaire was

developed in Urdu as most of the ulema and imams do not know English. It was

pilot tested on a number of imams who found no difficulty in attempting it. Theygenerally required 35-40 minutes to fill it. Thereafter, 12 known ulema and 60

madarsa teachers/imams were randomly selected from different sects. Their

regional/ethnic affiliation was not taken into consideration. According to figuresavailable with a number of civil authorities, there were 1084 Barelvi, 1082

Deobandi, 211 Shia and 62 Ahle Hadith registered mosques in Karachi. They were

mostly approached by trusted persons pretending to be students of higher classes

doing some assignment. Quite a few of them showed reluctance in giving aresponse apprehending some hidden motive behind the exercise which was

expected under the prevailing circumstances. Names of respondents, their sect,

place (mosque/Madarsas) etc., were not asked but recorded separately by the

worker. The secondary research was based on a survey of available literature(newspapers, magazines, books, government records etc.) and has already been

reflected in the introduction. Following is a denomination-wise break-up of therespondents:

S.No. Sect Ulema imams

i. Barelvi 04 21

ii. Deobandi 03 19

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iii. Shia 02 07

iv. Ahle Hadith 01 03

TOTAL 10 50

Limitations:

This survey was conducted as an academic requirement for completion ofpromotion requirement at the National Institute of Public Administration. With

the duration of the course being about three months and the pressure to perform in

a range of areas the study was limited in terms of the time duration available to the

researchers. Added to this was the fact that the fasting month of Ramadan fell thisperiod, further burdening the researchers in terms of shorter office hours on the one

hand and extra-occupation of ulema and imams in the heightened religiousactivities of the month.

Furthermore, while the survey was done through random sampling, it was felt that

the sample was small and limited to Karachi. The absence of training and pastexperience of respondents in engaging with similar surveys was another limiting

factor. This was similar to the poor performance of students on IQ tests to which

they are not accustomed. Yet another stumbling block was the lack of full trustbetween the surveyors and the respondents, many of whom remained skeptical

about the whole process.

FINDINGS

Following is a table summarizing the findings extracted from thequestionnaires. The serial numbers refer to the original questions in the form.

S.

No

.

Question / response options %

1

.

1

What are the minimum beliefs for being a Muslim? [Please mark as

many as applicable]

a) Tauhid (Unity of Godhead)b) Risalat (Prophethood)

c) Qiyamat (Belief in the Hereafter)

d) Imamat (Belief in an imam - a post-Prophetic guide)

e) Ibadat (a set of ritual worship)

f) Adalat (Justice)

g) Khatam-e-Nabuwwat (End of Prophethood withMuhammad)

100.00100.00

93.60

31.91

17.02

12.76

78.72

42.55

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h) Ikram-e-Sahaba (Reverence of the Companions of theHoly Prophet)

i) Any other

j) k) Dont know.

-

2

.

i

What are the minimum requirements for a state to be called Islamic.

a) Elected Amir (head of state)

b) Just Rulerc) Nizam-e-Salat (a state-run system for ritual prayer)

d) Nizam-e-Zakat (a state-run system for collection ofalms)

e) Any other

f)

44.68

65.9542.55

34.04

3

.

i

If any of country may be considered a model Islamic state, which of

the following would it be?

a) Saudi Arabia

b) Jamhoori Iran

c) c)Talibans Afghanistan

d) General Zias Pakistane) Malaysiaf) None

48.93

21.27

02.12

--14.89

4.

i

How can an Islamic system (of governance) be established?a) by bringing pressure to bear upon governments

b) by preparing / motivating the masses

c) by having a government ofulemad) Any other

e) Do not know

12.76

72.34

06.38

-10.63

5.

v

What was the nature of Pakistans independence (Pakistan Movement)

a) It was an Islamic movement

b) It was a political campaign

c) It was an economic struggle

d) Do not know

65.95

40.42

02.1206.38

6

.

What were the effects of adoption of Qarardad-e-Maqasid (TheObjectives Resolution a Statement of Principles that is now part of

the Constitution)

a) It set of the countrys ideological orientation

b) Created a confrontation between ulema andpoliticians

c) c) Do not know.

82.97

04.25

17.02

7

.

What was the outcome of the agitation was the opposition alliance

(PNA) against the Bhutto government led by religious parties

a) Partial implementation of Islamic way of life.b) Imposition of Martial Law.

c) Damage to religious forces.

d) d) Do not know

29.7825.53

14.89

44.68

8

.

Implications of Zakat System

a) Help to poors.

b) Creation of more beggers.c) Sectarian divide.

55.31

29.78

02.12

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d)Dont know. 17.02

9

.

Utility ofulema moved Bills in Islamization

a) Shariat Billb) Namoos-e-Sahaba Bill.

c) Husba Bill

d) None

51.06

21.27

08.51

34.16

10

.

Results of religious ritualsa) Stability of faith.

b) Sectarianism.c) Public annoyance.

d) Dont know.

53.1923.04

25.53

06.38

1

1

.

Effects of declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslim

a) Service to religion

b) Sectarian conflict

c) Defamination abroad.d) Dont know.

76.59

--

10.83

02.12

12

.

If any foreign country(s) abetted sectarian extremistsa) Saudi Arabia

b) Jamhoori Iran

c)Talibans Afghanistan

d) Saddams Iraq

e) Israel

f) Indiag) America

h) None

17.0225.53

21.27

-

48.93

31.91

26.6521.27

1

3

.

Who is authorized to initiate Islamic Jihad

a) Every muslim.

b) Any Islamic group.

c) Islamic Govt.d) Imam

e) Muslim Army

f) Dont know

06.38

04.25

72.3408.51

04.25

14.89

1

4

.

Who can be held responsible for sectarian terrorism

a) LJ (SSP)

b) SMPc) Foreign hand

d) Govt. Agencies

e) Dont know.

34.04

44.68

65.9619.14

14.89

1

5

.

The outcome of imposition of ban on extremists sectarian/Jihadi

groups

a) Terrorism decreased.b) Terrorism increased.

c) No difference.

d) Dont know.

51.06

06.38

34.04

10.63

1

6

.

Results of ban on misuse of loudspeakers

a) Iblagh-e-Din affected.

b) Sectarianism curtailed.c) Public satisfied.

d) Dont know.

36.17

27.65

27.65

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e) Ijma

f) Fiqah

g) Dont know

27.65

23.40

2

5

.

What is needed to make Blasphemy Act more acceptable

a) Equitable application.

b) No change

c) Abrogationd) Punishment if disproved

e) Dont know

82.97

-

-14.89

04.25

2

6

.

How the objection on Hudood Ordinance can be removed

a) Cancellation of law.

b) Criteria of witnessc) Transparent application

d) Something else

e) Dont know

04.25

17.02

74.46

06.38

10.63

27

.

Which of the objections on Haj policy are truea) Ballot/Quota

b) Increased expenses

c) Unsatisfactory residences

d) Long period of stay

e) Irresponsible Mauallameen

f) Plunder of tour operators

g) Something else

h) Dont know

23.40

76.59

80.85

02.12

17.02

29.78

02.12

06.38

2

8

.

In which degree govt.s religious policies are acceptable

a) Fully agreed.

b) Generally agreed.

c) Partially agreed

d) Slightly agreed

e) Disagreed

02.12

08.51

51.06

08.51

27.65

** Only one respondent (A Shia Aalim) gave detailed replies using extra pages.An Ahle Hadith Aalim also made some small clarifications.

ANALYSIS OF DATA

(i) Basic Concept

AS could have been expected, In this probe a complete consensus was found on

Tauheed and Risalat as the basic requirement for being a Muslim followed by 93.6

support to Qiamat (Quraanic requirements 2:62 & 3:114 Al-Quraan). Inaddition 73.72% respondents preferred Khatam-e-Nabuwwat and 42.55% (mainly

Sunnis) weight Ikram-e-Sahaba while 31.91% (mostly Shias) described Imamat

also as the minimum requirement. Ibadat were listed by 17.02% and Adal wasmentioned by 12.76%. It indicates that beliefs of Khatam-e-Nabuwwat, Ikram-e-

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Sahaba and Imamat have been given over emphasis in due course of time by

respective sects (Q. 1).

As regards the criteria for an Islamic state, a justice ruler has been preferred

by a majority of 65.95% rulers followed by 44.68% support to an elected Ameer.

42.55% respondents also necessitated Nizam-e-Salat while 34.04% ranked Nizam-

e-Zakat. It indicates that ulema prefer a justice ruler over the elected one. Theopinion about Islamic state of present day remained divided. 48.93% respondents

mostly the Sunnis choose Saudi Arabia while 21.27% mostly Shias took Jamhoori

Iran as an Islamic state. 14.89% respondents replied in negative while only 2.12%favoured ex-Taliban government. It is probably due to its non-existence now as

most of the Deobandis were in its favour in those days. No one considered General

Zias Pakistan as an Islamic state although, he introduced Nizam-e-Salat/Zakat andBlasphemy Act which have been weighed high in the subsequent questions (Q. 3).

As regards the mode of establishment of an Islamic system, a vast majorityof 72.34% urged for motivation of the masses. Besides 12.76% urged continuing

pressure on the government while only 6.38% desired an ulema s government forthe purpose. 10.63% respondents had no opinion on this issue (Q. 4).

Religious rituals have also been favoured by a majority of 53.19% as

contributory to stability of faith while a slightly lesser number has described the

same as the cause of public annoyance (25.53%) and sectarianism (23.04%)respectively (Q. 10).

The ulema appearing clear on the authority to initiate Islamic Jihad,overwhelmingly authorized Islamic government by 72.34%. Other options

attracted little support including Imam (8.51%) by Shias. 14.89% respondents were

not certain. (Q. 13).

(ii) Movements led/participated by Ulema

ulema having played an active role in the religio-political campaigns, describedthe Pakistan Movement as an Islamic movement by a majority of 65.95% followed

by 40.42% who identified it as a political movement as well. Only 2.12%

described it as an economic move. It is obvious because the secular and leftistlobby used to call it an economic movement. About the outcome of PNA agitation

a majority of 44.68% showed ignorance while 29.78% described the gain of

implementation of some Islamic rules while 25.53% identified it with the

imposition of Martial Law followed by 14.89% who saw damage to the credibilityof religious elements (Q. 7).

As regards the declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslim as a result of a massmovement led by ulema , a dominant majority of 76.59% described it a service to

the religion while only 10.63% gave weight to the defamation of the country

abroad (Q. 11).

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On the other hand the formation of MMA, a alliance of six religious parties

which performed well in elections 2002, was not given due importance by theulema . Only 30.74% respondents saw promotion of sectarian harmony due to itsformation, while a equal number of 31.91% did not see any impact and exactly the

same number remained ignorant of its effect. 4.25% witnessed creation of sectarian

divide. It indicates that vast majority of ulema /imams do not see MMA with a

positive eye atleast now (Q. 19).

The opinion about the impact of alliance of six Madarsa Boards remained

divided. 36.17% i.e a little more than 1/3rd observed a help to sectarian harmony,while 27.65% described it a routine affairs and 21.27% had no opinion whereas

19.14% apprehended a confrontation with government (Q. 20). These two issues

indicate lack of harmony/enthusiasm at lower level despite unity at higher levelprobably effected by compulsion of circumstances.

iii. Steps for Islamization

The adoption of objective resolutions on the pressure and basis of ulema 32- point, was pre-dominantly described by 82.97% as having set ideological

destination of the country. 17.02% showed ignorance about it (Q. 6).

Some 51.06% i.e a little more than half of the respondents consideredulema moved Shariat Bill important towards Islamization, while 21.27% alsosupported Namoos-e-Sahaba Bill and 8.51% also favoured Husba Bill of NWFP. A

little more than 1/3rd i.e 34.6 did not support any of these bills (Q. 9).

The Zakat system in practice was supported by a majority of 55.31%

including Shias as helpful for the poor while 29.78% have seen creation of a new

class of beggars. 17.02% are not clear. They are mostly not satisfied with themanagement of the system (Q.8).

Dissolution of Ruet-e-Hilal Committee as demanded by JUI-F, NWFP

recently was opposed by a vast majority of 70.21% who apprehended more thanone Eids otherwise. 31.91% also apprehended a sectarian divide in the absence of

the Committee. Only 10.63% respondents visualized an end of government

intervention into the matter. An equal number was uncertain about the outcome (Q.17).

Amongst the major objections on the existing Haj policy, a dominant

majority of 80.85% expressed dissatisfaction with the Hajis accommodation while76.59% respondents took notice of increasing expenses. Other complaints

including plunder of tour operators, ballot/quota system and irresponsible attitude

of guides was listed by 29.78%, 23.40% and 17.02% respondents, respectively (Q.27). Umrah system is also under criticism and mosque level protest was observed

on November 19, 2004 against mishandling of returning pilgrims by PIA in KSA.

iv. Sectarianism

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The view point of ulema /imams of the mosques about foreign

involvement in the sectarian extremism in Pakistan was divergent. The largest proportion i.e 48.93% held Israel responsible followed by 31.91% for India,

26.65% for US, 25.53% for Iran, 21.27% for Taliban and 17.02% for Saudi Arabia.

Sectarian divide was also visible in this ranking. Deobandis were generally found

against Iran while Shias against Taliban and Saudi Arabia. Israel, India and USwere the common foes (Q. 12).

As regards responsibility of sectarian terrorism, a majority of 65.95%including all sects held foreign hand responsible for it. Amongst local groups

44.68% accused SMP (Shia group) and 34.04% charged LJ/SSP (Deobandi) for the

same. A sizeable 19.14% of the respondents put the blame on governmentagencies. 14.89% remained uncertain about the matter (Q. 14).

The recent imposition of ban on use of loudspeakers for other than Arabicsermons and Azan is yet to show its impact as a majority of 38.29% was not clear

about the outcome followed by 36.17% who considered it an impediment forpreaching. 27.65% saw a check on promotion of sectarianism and an equal number

noticed rid of the public from a nuisance (Q.16).

Regarding checking of sectarianism 51.06% respondent favoured

government steps effective while 44.42% considered reconciliatory role ofulema

effective for the goal. 29.78% favoured creation of public awareness while 19.14%

desired other measures but did not give any suggestions (Q. 18).

v. Madarsa PolicyThe opinion ofulema and prayer leaders about compulsory registration of

their Madarsas remained divided. 38.29% agreed in principle with the proposalwhile 27.65% did not agree. A little more i.e 36.17% was not clear on the issue (Q.21).

As regards introduction of modern subjects into the syllabi of Madarsas,the response remained very encouraging. 85.10% favoured computer, 65.95%

opted for science, 38.29% advocated maths and 29.78% supported teaching of

English in order to improve academic and economic capabilities of Madarsastudents. Only 10.63% opposed inclusion of any such subjects. One Madarsa gave

practical proof of adoption of computer by reproducing the questionnaire on their

computer (Q. 22).

The opinion about acceptance of government aid for Deeni Madaris is

divided. Some less than half i.e 42.55% saw no harm in it while 36.17%

apprehended opening of government intervention into Madarsa affairs while27.65% feared a damage to the neutrality of the Madarsas (Q. 23).

vi. Blasphemy Act / Hudood Ordinance

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Although the respondents have overwhelmingly supported declaration of

Qadianis a non-Muslim minority (Q. 11 above), they were not clear about the

source of law of blasphemy. 57.44% each quoted Quraan and Hadith in this regardbut could not cite the exact verse/saying of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) describing

the guilt and its punishment according to scholars. 29.78% quoted Ijma, 27.65%

quoted Fiqah, 23.40% quoted act of Sahaba in this regard. 8.51% mainly Shias

described ruling of Imam. 23.40% a little less than 1/4 th were uncertain about thebase of legislation (Q. 24).

Despite above 82.97% respondents favoured an equitable implementationof the act in order to remove any doubts. 14.89% advocated punishment to the

complainant if proved in correct. No one supported abrogation or any change in

the act (Q. 25).

Same applies to the objection on Hudood Ordinance wherein almost 3/4 th

i.e 74.46% respondents urged transparent application of the law. 17.02% also urgedsoundness of the witnesses. 10.63%, however, remained uncertain while 4.25%

advocated cancellation of the law (Q. 26).

vii. Overall perceptionThe respondent were tested on a five stage scale ranging from full

agreement to disagreement with regard to religious policies of the government. The

general trend was not very much encouraging as 51.06% i.e just half showedpartial agreement while 27.65% exhibited a disagreement. 8.51% equally showed

general agreement and slight agreement on the right and left flanks respectively

(Q. 28).

CONCLUSION

ulema are a sensitive and important segment of our society. Besides performing

religious rites, they are also alive to issues, developments policies having a bearing

or connection with the religion. They appear touchy on some issues likeBlasphemy. Using the easy platform of pulpit and various religious occasions and

bodies, they ventilate their feelings on topical issues of their interest and

channelize the public opinion. They are perturbed with the current scenario but donot want a confrontation on religious issues. They are trying to adjust themselves

in the new environment and protect their institutions. From above study, the

following conclusions have been draw:

ulema s concept of minimum requirement for being a muslim is

beyond what has been prescribed in Quraan. Khatam-e-Nabuwwat has

gained undue importance over the years besides rituals. (Deletion ofreligious column from computerized passports is being criticized in the

same context).

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Pakistan movement was Islamic in character and passage of objectives

resolution has set its Islamic destination.

Religio-political alliances like PNA, MMA etc., have not contributed

much towards Islamization.

Islamization can be achieved principally by preparing the masses for itand at the same time keeping the government under pressure. A

government ofulema is least wanted.

Sectarian violence/terrorism is basically a foreign sponsored

phenomenon and US, Israel and India are to be primarily blamed. A

thin section also put it fingers on government agencies.

Imposition of ban on militant sectarian/Jihadi organizations has not

yielded sound results but continuing government action in the form of

raids/arrests/trials, confiscation of funds/subversive literature etc., isbound to achieve the goal.

Only an Islamic government and its regular army can initiate jihadagainst any hostile/infidel/atheist inimical force rather than any

individually or organization.

A kind/justice ruler is the prime requirement of an Islamic state.

Requirement of his election by people is secondary. Nizam-e-Salat and

Zakat come next.

ulema are not unanimous about the source of Blasphemy, yet theyconsider declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslim minority, a great

service to their faith, oppose any change in Blasphemy Act andnecessitate its transparent application. Same is their view about Hudood

Ordinance.

Opinion about registration of Madarsas, acceptance of government aid

for improvement and inclusion of modern subjects in their curricula and

ban on loudspeakers is divided but generally soft.

Existing Hajj policy is not popular on account of over increasing

expenses, uncomfortable residences, irresponsibility of mohtamim,uncertain return schedule etc. They are also not satisfied withmanagement of Zakat system.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Government may tactfully continue with its policy against terrorism but

assure transparency of the process.

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Blasphemy Act may not be touched for the time being, but its equitable

application be ensured.

Policy about Madarsas be pursued cautiously in consultation withulema bodies.

ulema may be engaged in social activities like primary teaching, first

aid, learns vocational skills for integration into the society learning

from experiences of Bangladesh and other countries.

Every effort be made to redress grievances about Hajj and Umrahpolicy particularly the return schedule.

Only clean and well reputed persons be engaged in Zakat admin at alllevels for the smooth functioning of this vital system.

***

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References

(i) Constitution of Pakistan (1956, 62 and 73).

(ii) Political systems of Pakistan by Dr. Varnider Groxerand Dr. Ranjna Arora (India).

(iii) Pak 50 years of Indpendence by Dr. V.C & Ranjna

Arora (India).(iv) Aab-e-Kausar/Raud-e-Kausar by S. M. Ikram (2002 &

2003 SBC Edition).(v) Muslim League Ka Daur-e-Hukoomat (1947-54) by Dr.

Safdar Mehmood, Lahore.

(vi) Pak Tareekh-o-Siasat (47-88) by Dr. Safdar Mehmood,Jang Publications, Lahore.

(vii) Tehreek-e-Pakistan Uska Siasi Pas Manzar by Asghar

A. Jafri.

(viii) Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas by Prof. Atta and Zafar UmerZubairi, Karachi.

(ix) Hukoomat Aur Siasat by M. Mujahid Farooq, Lahore.

(x) Official records.

(xi) Newspapers/Magazines.

References:1. Pages 158 and 364 Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas.

2. Pages 144, 145, 154 and 363 Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas.

3. Page 56, Khilfat-e-Bannu Abbas.4. Pages 367 and 404 Ab-e-Kausar.

5. Pages 75-77, 136, 190-93, 278-79 Raud-e-Kausar.

6. Pages 130-33 Raud-e-Kausar.

7. Press/Pakistan Ki Nazaryati Tareekh by Mujahid Farooq Lahore (Page66).

8. Weekly Takbeer, Karachi (June 1991/Nov. 2004) and Pakistan Ki NazaryatiTareekh by Mujahid Farooq Lahore (Page-401).

9. Printed material of JI/Newspapers/book of G.A. Parvez.

10. Weekly Takbeer, Karachi (June 1991/Nov. 2004)

11. Press.

12. Pages 168, 198, 206 and 232 Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas.13. Pages 262-64 Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas.

14. Pages 288-91 and 332 Khilfat-e-Banu Abbas.

15. Pages 94 and 115 Ab-e-Kausar.16. Pages 16, 25-6 and 207 Raud-e-Kausar.

17. Page-247 Raud-e-Kausar.

18. Special Branch Report on Sectarianism 1997.19. Raud-e-Kausar (Page-442).

20. Raud-e-Kausar (Page-430-31).

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The following question was also asked from a few respondents

verbally on personal interaction but they were found divergent rather confused:

What are Pakistans main problems in the order of priority:

(a) Islamization

(b) Provision of justice(c) Democracy

(d) Economic uplift

(e) Crime/law and order/terrorism(f) Feudalism/Tribalism

(g) Regionalism/sectarianism

(h) Not certain

While the West has long been comfortable with the established boundaries of thesacred-secular divide, popular forces driven in no small part by global politics of

the War on Terror have seized upon Islamic revivalism not only as an issue toforce through their local political demands for justice and devolution (as in Swat)

but also to bring to the fore a more wide spread dissent against the Pakistanifederation and its Western backers. Thus, it is not just the anti-Islamic symbols of

decadence like music and video shops and ski resorts which have been put to the

torch but anything seen to threaten ancient cultural ways like girls schools.

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aimma - ulema article modified

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