X. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

1. Generally Ebarle v Sucaldito

Facts:

The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur Bienvenido Ebarle, was charged with various violations of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act. The charges are as follows

The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in general o nepotism under Sections 3(c) and (j) of Republic Act No.

3019 o exerting influence upon the presiding Judge of the Court of

First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur to award a certain parcel of land in his favor, over which the provincial government itself lays claims, contrary to the provisions of Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019

o and making untruthful statements in the certificates of appointment of certain employees in his office.

On the other hand, the complaints subject matter of G.R. No. 33628 involve charges

o of simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand for certain public works projects, in breach of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft statute;

o manipulating bids with respect to the construction of the capitol building;

o testifying falsely in connection with Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cad. Rec. N-468, in which the petitioner alleged that he was the owner of a piece of land, in violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code;

o and simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand in connection with another public works project.

For both of which petitioner requested the respective CFI and was granted a restraining order, but through the subsequent motion of the respondents, the restraining orders were lifted and the petitions themselves dismissed.

Thus a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction was initiated by the petitioner in the Supreme Court, which resulted in the stay of the implementation of dismissal order. Subsequently, the SC consolidated both petitions and considered the same submitted for decision.

The issue being asserted by the petitioner is that the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED,"

Wherein paragraphs 4 & 6 of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264 outlining the procedure by which complainants charging government officials and employees with commission of irregularities should be guided, states that

4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed with the Office of the President in case of provincial and city officials, with the provincial governor or board secretary in case of municipal officials, and with the municipal or city mayor or secretary in case of barrio officials

6. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring officials or employees can be soonest removed or otherwise disciplined and the innocent, exonerated or vindicated in like manner, and to the end also that other remedies, including court action, may be pursued forthwith by the interested parties after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted.

The court thus held that it is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints.

The ratio being that the very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.

Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local officials, reiterates, on the other hand, the Decentralization Act of 1967, while paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the provisions of the Police Act of 1966. Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there is no reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not because it makes such a resort a secondary measure, but because it does not intend to serve as a condition precedent to, much less supplant, such a court resort.

To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued forthwith by the interested parties, " but that does not, so we hold, cover proceedings such as criminal actions, which do not require a prior

administrative course of action. It will indeed be noted that the term is closely shadowed by the qualification, "after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted," which suggests civil suits subject to previous administrative action.

It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials or employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in construing the intent of the measure.

The court thus ruled that the petitions are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining orders are LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the petitioners

People v Purisima Refresher: This case is about the judges of the lower courts who acquitted people supposed to be punished under PD9(3) for illegal possession of dangerous weapon, saying that it needs a criminal intent to perpetrate rebellion, subversion for the said act to be punished. Doctrine: 1) Since the problem here requires to look into the intent and spirit of the decree, the court can use the "preamble" or "whereas" clauses which enumerates the facts & events which justify promulgation of the decree & the stiff sanctions stated therein. 2.) It is a salutary principle of stat con that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statutes is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.

Commission of Internal Revenue vs. TMX Sales Inc. FACTS: May 15, 1981- TMX Sales, Inc, a domestic corporation filed its quarterly

income tax return for the 1st Quarter of 1981, declaring a taxable income of Php 571,174.31 and consequently paying an income tax thereon of Php 247,010.00.

2nd - 4th Q- company suffered losses April 15, 1982- TMX filed its Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended

December 31, 1981 declaring: Gross Income Php 904,122.00 Total Deductions 7,060,647.00 Net Income (Loss) Php (6,156,525.00)

July 9, 1982- TMX thru SGV & Co. (external auditor) filed with the Appellate Division of the BIR a claim for refund representing overpaid income tax for the taxable year ended Dec. 31, 1981 (Amount: Php 247,010.00 paid in 1st Q). This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

March 14, 1984- TMX filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals against the Commissioner praying for the ordering of the refund.

The Commissioners defense was that granting, without admitting, the amount in question is refundable, the petitioner (TMX Sales, Inc.) is already barred from claiming the same considering that more than two (2) years had already elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the claim in Court ( March 14, 1984). (Sections 292 and 295 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended). The Tax Court granted the petition and viewed the quarterly income tax paid as a portion or installment of the total annual income tax due. The Commissioner seeks a reversal of the decision, hence this case. ISSUES(S):

WON the two-year prescription provided for in sec. 292 of the Tax Code should be counted from the date when the quarterly income was paid (May 15,1981).

RULING:

Petition of the Commissioner denied and decision of the Court of Tax Appeals affirmed. RATIO DECIDENDI:

WON the two-year prescription provided for in sec. 292 of the Tax Code should be counted from the date when the quarterly income was paid (May 15,1981).

No, it should start from the filing of the Annual Income Tax Return.

The filing of quarterly income tax returns required in sec. 85 and implemented per BIR Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income tax should only be considered mere installments of the annual tax due. These quarterly tax payments which are computed based on the cumulative figures of gross receipts and deductions in order to arrive at a net taxable income, should be treated as advances or portions of the annual income tax due, to be adjusted at the end of the calendar or fiscal year. This is reinforced by sec. 87 which provides for the filing of adjustment returns and final payment of income tax. Consequently, the two-year prescriptive period provided in sec. 292 should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of

income tax. Hence, the action has not prescribed since the prescriptive period starts from April 15, 1982 and the action was filed on March 14, 1984. 2 years have not elapsed.

(Sec. 292 if applied literally to the case, which involves quarterly income tax payments, may lead to absurdity and inconvenience. It was then interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law, which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity.

The other provisions are: sec. 85 which provided for the method of computing corporate quarterly income tax which is on cumulative basis; and sec. 87 that required the filing of an adjustment returns and final payment of income tax. Refer to p. 189 of the case for the original provision) NOTES on AIDS OF CONSTRUCTION - Generally: Sec. 292. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress. In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years fro the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: x x x.

INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FRIENDA EST, UT EVITATUR INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.

Ppl v Rivera: statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.

Some Aids Given:

1. Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute

2. To discover intent: the whole statute and not only a particular provision thereof should be considered.

3. Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.

People v Subido Refresher: Subido was contending that even though he couldnt pay the fine & indemnity imposed on him, he couldnt be required to serve the amount of fine & indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment bec the judgment didnt expressly & specifically provide for subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Doctrine: The aid to construction here is the use of punctuation marks w/c may be an aid in the interpretation of statutes when there is ambiguity (wherein you qualify the punctuation mark). As in this case, the court based its ruling on the use of a comma in the questioned decision. * sir stated however, that this must NOT be construed as controlling.

Hidalgo v. Hidalgo Refresher: The issue in this case is WON the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working from the purchasers thereof. They invoked the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of RA 3844. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code was given by respondent vendor to petitioners-tenants. The SC ruled in their favor saying that the very essence of the Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. Doctrine: Where the true intent of the law is clear such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof. Whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

2. Legislative History

Song Kiat Chocolate Factory [1957]

FACTS:

During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff-appellant imported sun-dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17% totaling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under Section 2 of Republic Act 601 as amended, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment; and its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines.

Section 2 of RA 601: the tax collected or foreign exchange used for the payment of

costs transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour * * * soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup * * * shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation * * *.

The suit was filed in CFI, wherein defendants filed motion to dismiss because:

1. complaint stated no cause of action as chocolate was not cocoa beans

2. it was a suit against the Government without the latters consent Judge sustained the motion, and dismissed the case by his order of

November 15, 1954. ISSUE: WON cocoa beans may be considered as chocolate for the purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by RA 601 as amended. RULING: NO RATIO: Appellants: dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably use the words chocolate, cacao, and cocoa.

COURT: quotations refer to cocoa as chocolate nut chocolate bean or chocolate tree. Legal exemption refers to chocolate not the bean nor the nut nor the tree.

Respondents: in common parlance the law is presumed to refer to chocolate and as a general rule, words used in a statute are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning.

COURT: agree, chocolate is a manufactured or finished product made out of cocoa beans or cacao beans as they are locally known. Cocoa beans do not become chocolate unless and until they have undergone the manufacturing process above described. The first is raw material, the other finished product. The latter is ready for human consumption, the other is not.

Rockwood & Co. vs American President Lines and In re: Schiling define chocolate as such.

Having in mind the principle of strict construction of statute

(since taxation is the rule and exemption the exception, the intention to make an exemption ought to be expressed in clear and ambiguous terms), petition is denied. BUT WAIT THERES MORE.

May 1954 suit was brought to court August 1954 Congress approved RA 1197 amending Section 2

by substituting cocoa beans for chocolate

Appellants: Legislatures intention is to include cocoa beans in the word chocolate. SUPREME COURT:

In approving House Bill 2576 (before it became RA 1197 it was HB 2576) in the Congress, the Congress agreed the bill is for a change in legislative policy:

1. to exempt cocoa beans instead of chocolate with a view to favoring local manufacturers of chocolate products, whereas the exemption of chocolate aimed to benefit the consumers thereof

2. not a declaration or clarification of previous Congressional purpose

HISTORY of the statute:

Section 2 of RA 601 -> amended by RA 814 -> amended by RA 871. In both amendments chocolate was retained.

Furthermore, a look at the deliberations of RA 1197 was that the prevailing impression, as the law then stood, chocolate candy or chocolate bar was exempted, but cocoa beans were not.

1. Sen. Peralta: we allow chocolate bar, chocolate candy to come into this

country exempt from the 17% tax when we do not allow cocoa beans, out of our local manufacturers can make chocolate candy, exempted

we allow chocolate to come here exempt and not exempt cocoa beans which is used by our manufacturers in making chocolate candy.

2. Sen. Puyat: In the original law the exemption is for chocolate, and the

version that we got from the Lower House is (cocoa beans) giving the impression that chocolate and cocoa beans are synonymous.

Presidents proclamation No.62 of September 2, 1954 exemption of cocoa beans shall operate from and after September 3, 1954. Appellants cocoa beans importation January-October 1953 i.e. before exemption decree. As a general rule, statutes operate prospectively. TO RECAPITULATE:

May 1954 suit was brought to court August 1954 Congress approved RA 1197 amending Section 2 by

substituting cocoa beans for chocolate Sept 2, 1954 Presidents proclamation specifying exemption of cocoa

beans from tax

Francisco v Bosier

FACTS Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA dismissing

complaint for redemption of property against respondent Petitioner Adalia Francisco and three of her sisters (Ester,

Elizabeth, Adeluisa) were co-owners of four parcels of registered lands

Sold 1/5 of their undivided share to their mother Adela Blas

August 8, 1986 Adela Blas, without the knowledge of her co-owners, sold her share to Zenaida Bosier, another sister of petitioner

Civil Case No. 15510 o August 5, 1992 petitioner received summons with a copy

the complaint in Civil Case No. 15510, filed by respondent demanding her share in the rentals being collected

o Petitioner informed respondent that she was exercising her right of redemption as a co-owner

o August 12, 1992 petitioner deposited P10,000 as redemption price to redeem the property permissive counterclaim

o Case was dismissed after respondent was declared non-sited and petitioners counterclaim was consequently dismissed

Civil Case No. C-17055 with the RTC o Petitioner alleged

30-day period for redemption under Art 1623 CC had not begun to run against her since the vendor, Adela Blas, never informer her and other co-owners about the sale

Learned about it only on August 5, 1992 after receiving summons

o Respondent contended Petitioner knew about the sale on May 30, 1992

when she wrote petitioner a letter informing her about the sale, with a demand that her share of rentals be remitted to her

Copy of Deed of Sale was attached to said letter Other letters were sent to the tenants of the

building informing them of the sale and requesting 1/5 of rentals be paid to her

Receipt of letter proved when petitioner wrote the buildings tenants advising them to disregard respondents request

o RTC dismissed petitioners claim for legal redemption Art 1623 does not prescribe any particular form of

notifying co-owners about a sale of property owned in common to enable them to exercise their legal right of redemption

Considered the letter with the Deed of Sale as a substantial compliance with the required written notice

30-day period should be counted not from receipt of summons (Aug 5, 1992) but the date petitioner wrote letters to tenants (June 8, 1992) petitioner failed to redeem property within period

CA affirmed RTC decision. Move for reconsideration denied.

ISSUE WON May 30, 1992 letter notifying petitioner of the sale and

attached Deed of Sale can be considered sufficient as compliance with the notice requirement of Art 1623 for the purpose of legal redemption

DECISION NO. Petition is GRANTED. CA decisions REVERSED. RTC ORDERED

TO EFFECT PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF HER RIGHT TO LEGAL REDEMPTION.

Receipt by petitioner of summons in Civil Case No. 15510 on August 5, 1992 constitutes actual knowledge on the basis of which petitioner may now exercise her right of redemption within 30 days from finality of this decision

RATIO RTC and CA relied on

o Distrito vs. CA Art 1623 does not prescribe any particular form of written notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying redemptioner

o De Conejero vs. CA and Badillo vs. Ferrer furnishing redemptioner with a copy of the deed of sale is equivalent to giving him the written notice required by law

Petitioner o Cited cases are not relevant because case at bar does not

concern the particular form in which notice must be given o Issue is whether a notice sent by the vendee may be given

in lieu of that required to be given by the vendor/prospective vendor

CA ruling that notice given by vendee was sufficient relied on Ectuban vs. CA

o So long as the co-owner is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars, the 30 days for redemption starts running, REGARDLESS of WHO (vendor or vendee) gives the notice

o Overturned Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons the notice required by Art 1623 must be given by VENDOR

HOWEVER, Slatandol vs. Retes decided a year after Ectuban, AFFIRMED Butte

o Notice given by the Register of Deeds of the province is insufficient

o Cites Butte Butte

o Effect must be given to the change in statutory language notice must come from VENDOR

Art 1524 of the former CC immaterial who gave notice (does not expressly specify), so long as the redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation, the redemption period began to run

Art 1623 of the new CC expressly prescribes that the 30 days for making the redemption are to be

counted from notice in writing by the vendor (expressly specifies notice must be given by the vendor)

o Logical that the notice should be given by the vendor Vendor is in the best position to know who are his

co-owners who under the law must be notified of the sale

Only vendor can remove all doubts as to the fact of the sale, its perfection, and its validity

In a contract of sale, the vendor is in the best position to confirm whether consent to the essential obligation of selling the property and transferring ownership to the vendee has been given

HOWEVER, it is UNJUST to further delay petitioners exercise of her right of legal redemption by requiring that notice be given by the vendor before petitioner can exercise her right since the sale has already been established before RTC, CA, SC

o Not immediately notifying the co-owner can delay or prevent the meaningful exercise of the right of redemption

o Serious prejudice to petitioners right of legal redemption o Minor adverse effect to vendor and vendee is sale could

not be registered non-binding insofar as third persons are concerned

THEREFORE, receipt by petitioner of summons in Civil Case No. 15510 on August 5, 1992 constitutes actual knowledge on the basis of which petitioner may now exercise her right of redemption within 30 days from finality of this decision

o Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court precedent Dispensed with the need for written notification

considering that the redemptioners lived on the same lot on which purchaser lived and were thus deemed to have actual knowledge of the sales

For 13 years, none of the co-heirs moved to redeem the property period for redemption expired

o Receipt of summons on August 5, 1992 amounted to actual knowledge of the sale from which 30 day period commenced

o Deposited P10,000 redemption price on August 12, 1992 exercised right of redemption within period (before

September 4, 1992) HENCE it should be given effect

Buenaseda v Flavier

FACTS

On September 10, 1992, this court required respondents to Comment on the petition and thereafter, received a Supplemental Petition and an Urgent Supplemental Manifestation from petitioners dated

September 14 and 22, 1992. On the same day of September 22, 1992, the court QUO pending filing of comments on the original supplemental manifestation. On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 and in a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said motion. On September 29, 1992, respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its Comment on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation in a pleading entitled Omnibus Submission. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them. On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Supplement to Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with the 22 September 1992 Resolution and on November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that xxx (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; xxx. This court, in the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, required respondent Secretary to comply with the said status quo order stating that: xxx the last peaceable uncontested status xxx was the situation xxx wherein petitioners were then actually occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their respective positions xxx, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their authority desist and refrain from performing any act xxx until further orders from the Court. ISSUE Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees. Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 Preventive Suspension The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charges against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect

in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. xxx. DISPOSITIVE PORTION WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. RATIO DECIDENDI The court held that Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 grants the Ombudsman power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, and that the status in question is procedural. In contrast to penal statutes, which are strictly construed, procedural statutes are liberally construed. As to the preventive suspension, it is imposed as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges. Under the Constitution, the ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. And in order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation where the need to suspend the respondents may arise to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner. The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers, as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. As such, said statute, particularly its provisions, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided. A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created. Further, as it can be inferred from the Ombudsman Law, the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of the whether they are employed in his office or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent is deemed to be in his authority and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspension.

In the claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting o lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges against them, the order for preventive suspension is validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative complaint and the Motion for the Preventive Suspension of petitioners; (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23cases f harassment by petitioners of the members of private respondent; and, (c) a preliminary conference wherein the complaint and the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and documentary evidence. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation. The motion for Contempt which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by he Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health cannot prosper. The motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was field, with the Ombudsman. The court find the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of their clients. However, the court take cognizance of the intemperate language used by the counsel for private respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel. A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his clients cause. The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes disrespect to dignity of the court of justice. As to the Motion for Disbarment, it has no place in the instant special civic action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. CONCURRING OPINION: BELLOSILLO, J. I agree as to the authority of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend any government official or employee administratively charged before him pending the investigation of the complaint to avoid prejudice in respondents continued stay in the prosecution of the case. But in the case at bar, the facts that were presented were not adequate to reasonably place the petitioners under preventive suspension. It is also

important to determine whether it is necessary to issue the preventive suspension under the circumstances. I do not see any sufficient basis to justify the preventive suspension. I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the parties if only to have enough factual and legal bases to justify the preventive suspension of petitioners. The court may be suspending key government officials and employees on the basis of mere speculation, which may not serve the ends of justice but would deprive them of their right to due process. Petition dismissed.

People v Yadao

Refresher: This is the case where Yadao & others were charged with offering someone for claiming a US Veteran benefits. However, LC held that Yadao can't be punished cause the law clearly states that it punishes persons assisting a claimant who shall a) direct/indirectly solicit b) attempt to solicit, c) shall have collected a sum of money in lieu of the assistance. In assessing the information charged, it was not shown that they ACTUALLY assisted the claimant. They only offered to assist. Yet, prosecution presents an earlier case which used a different law. Doctrine: But such adjudication is not conclusive because the statute therein construed differs materially form ours. It punishes "any person who shall directly or indirectly contract for excessive compensation. Section does not contain phrase "assisting a claimant" after the words "any person" & before the words "who shall". The phrase conditions each & every violation of Sec 1 RA 145. di nio gets? simple lang... old law not

applicable in case at bar.

3. Contemporary Construction

Nestle Philippines Inc. vs. CA

Refresher: Nestle increased their capital stock from 3 million to 6 million. They paid the necessary fees for the said increase. They issue 344,500 shares out of previously authorized unissued capital stock. They filed for an exemption fro payment which the SEC denied. SEC said it did not fall within the exemptions but could be considered under a different category. Doctrine: The construction given by the SEC should be upheld because interpretation and application of a statute given by the administrative agency charged with its application is entitled great respect and accorded great weight unless it is shown that such construction is in sharp conflict with the governing statute or Constitution and other laws. Officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the consideration pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law. Their competence,

expertise and informed judgment are given respect. The said interpretation by the SEC was done to make sure that the investing public is protected.

Philippine Scout Veterans Security & Investigation Agency Inc. v NLRC

Refresher: Regalado worked as a security guard for the petitioners & he requested for retirement pay w/c was refused. Labor Arbiter stated since Regalado has no Collective Bargaining Agreement (w/c entitles him to benefits), the other provisions of the Labor Code must be looked into; & the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Regalado. But the SC held that he wasnt legally entitled to retirement benefits despite the passage of RA 7641 (entitled benefits to those who retired bec of old age) Doctrine: It is a rule in stat con that all statues are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose & intention of the legislature to give them restrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied by the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. Contemporaneous Construction of a statute by executive officers tasked to enforce & implement said statute should be given great weight by the courts. BUT if such construction is erroneous or is clearly shown to be in conflict w/ the governing statute of the Consti or other laws, the same must be declared null & void.

4. Statutory Directives

Valderama v. NLRC Refresher: Andrea alleged that she was illegally dismissed by COMMODEX due to her pregnancy. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of her. In the dispositive portion, only COMMODEX was ordered to pay the backwages and damages. Andrea filed a motion for clarification to include Valderama, as the employer in the dispositive portion wherein the Labor Arbiter granted the prayer. Valderama contends that the Labor Arbiter's decision is final and executory hence cannot be amended. NLRC affirmed. The SC ruled in favor of Andrea. Doctrine: General rules of procedure are merely suppletory in character vis-a-vis disputes which are primarily governed by labor laws. Furthermore, as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code, all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be rendered in favor of labor. The rule that the NLRC may disregard technical rules of procedure in order to give life to the constitutional mandate for the protection of labor is well settled.