aid program performance report...

Aid Program Performance Report 2013-14 Afghanistan

September 2014

Aid Program Performance Report 2013-14 1

Key Messages

This Aid Program Performance Report (APPR) reviews progress towards the objectives of the Afghanistan-Australia Program Strategy 2013-14: enhancing basic service delivery in health and education, supporting rural development and livelihoods, improving governance and the effectiveness of the Afghan Government, and supporting vulnerable populations.

This APPR finds:

› Afghanistan remains one of the most challenging countries in which Australia delivers a major aid program. Ongoing conflict is the primary challenge to development, but the program’s effectiveness and sustainability is also impacted by Afghanistan’s low development base, the high-risk environment (both security and fiduciary), and the fact that Australia’s aid constitutes only a small part of international assistance.

› Notwithstanding these challenges, Australia made the progress it expected against all four objectives in 2013-14. DFAT’s efforts in strengthening the strategic framework, consolidating the number of initiatives and sectors, and refining monitoring and evaluation has improved the program’s management, quality and effectiveness.

› The context in Afghanistan has changed significantly in the reporting year. While Australia has supported, and will continue to support, Afghanistan’s broader transition to self-reliance, the challenge now is to design and deliver a national-level program that remains flexible enough to respond to circumstances outside our control.

› Investing resources in policy dialogue and partnership engagement enabled Australia to be influential as a mid-level donor in 2013-14. The integration of the former Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) yields opportunities to enhance future policy dialogue.

Context The 2013-14 financial year heralded key moments in the parallel security, political and economic transitions in Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force is transferring sole responsibility for security in Afghanistan to the Afghan Security Forces, in a process due for completion by the end of 2014. In April 2014, Afghanistan held Presidential and Provincial elections, the outcomes of which will be crucial to the Afghan state’s functioning and legitimacy. Ongoing progress towards the longer-term goal of supporting the Afghan economy to become independent of aid flows continued via a robust, coordinated dialogue between donors and the Afghan Government. However, as international forces and donor spending draw down, Afghanistan’s ability to provide security and services to its population remains precarious, a situation exacerbated by the Afghan Government’s failure to make reforms to stimulate economic activity. These transitions will shape the future of Afghanistan, and the shape of Australia’s future aid program.

Since 2001, Afghanistan has made some remarkable development gains. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average rate of nine per cent between 2001 and 20121 and Afghanistan is on track to achieve the education and maternal health Millennium Development

1 World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, Washington DC, 2013


Goals by 2020.2 School enrolments have increased from fewer than one million in 2001 to close to eight million today (including about three million girls from almost zero).3 Basic health services are now available to 85 per cent of the population, up from 10 per cent in 2001.4 Over 12,000 kilometres of rural roads have been rehabilitated, encouraging economic activity by improving access to markets and essential services, increasing connectivity and offering employment.5

Nonetheless, Afghanistan continues to face immense challenges. It remains one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 175 out of 186 countries on the UN Human Development Index.6 Around a third of its population (roughly 11 million people) live on less than US$1.25 a day.7 Gender inequality in Afghanistan remains entrenched—the country ranks 150 out of 152 countries on the United Nations Development Program’s Gender Inequality Index8— and rates of violence against women are high, with 87 per cent of women experiencing physical or psychological violence.9 Life expectancy is short (58 years for men and 61 for women)10, infant mortality rates are high (71/1000 live births)11 and literacy levels are poor (the adult literacy rate is 31.4 per cent and only 17 per cent for women).12 Ongoing conflict, high levels of corruption and low government capacity pose fundamental challenges to development.13

Afghanistan’s current macroeconomic circumstances severely constrain the Government’s ability to protect gains and respond to challenges. Despite robust agricultural production in 2013, heightened uncertainty and ongoing security issues reduced private investment and stifled non-agricultural sector growth (especially in services and construction). As a result, economic growth only reached 3.6 per cent last year, down from 14.4 per cent in 2012, and will likely average 4-6 per cent over the next five years.14 The Afghan Government’s dependence on foreign aid for over two-thirds of its national budget and the recent decline in domestic revenue collection compound these challenges. With obligations to start paying for a share of their security and development expenditure, and without necessary reforms to stimulate increased domestic revenues, the Government is deferring or winding back important civilian expenditures. The World Bank estimates that Afghanistan’s fiscal gap will increase to US$7.8 billion annually from 2014-15.15 Closing this gap will require the Afghan Government to implement tax reform and improve enforcement from existing revenue sources, and support a secure environment that facilitates investment and expansion in sectors important to broad-based economic growth (agriculture, mining and construction).16

2 Afghanistan only signed the Millennium Declaration in 2004. The country has since adapted the MDG timelines and targets to make them meaningful to an Afghan context. This includes extending timelines to 2020 and adding a ninth MDG on enhancing security (UNDP 2008, MDGs Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Vision 2020 Annual Progress Report). 3 World Bank, ARTF Results Matrix 2013, Kabul, 2013. 4 World Bank. Afghanistan Overview, 2014. 5 World Bank, ARTF Results Matrix 2013, World Bank, Kabul, 2013. 6 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, Table 2: Human Development Index trends, https://data.undp.org/dataset/Table-2-Human-Development-Index-trends/efc4-gjvq, accessed 25 July 2014

7 Government of Afghanistan, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2011-2012, Central Statistics Organization, 2014 8 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, Table 4: Gender Inequality, https://data.undp.org/dataset/Table-4-Gender-Inequality-Index/pq34-nwq7, accessed 25 July 2014. 9 Global Rights: Partners for Justice, Living with Violence: A National Report on Domestic Abuse in Afghanistan, Global Rights, Washington DC, 2008 10 This measure is life expectancy at birth. World Health Organization, World Health Statistics, Geneva 2014 11 World Health Organization, World Health Statistics, World Health Organization, Geneva 2014 12 Government of Afghanistan, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2011-2012, Central Statistics Organization, 2014 13 Transparency International ranks Afghanistan as 175 out of 177 countries in 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index. http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/, accessed 25 July 2014. 14 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, April 2014. 15 World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, Washington DC, 2013 16 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, April 2014.


In line with transition, Australian engagement in Afghanistan changed in the 2013-14 financial year. The closure of the Uruzgan Provincial Reconstruction Team in December 2013 and the transfer of security responsibilities to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) meant that many of Australia’s Uruzgan-based development initiatives concluded by the end of 2013. Other Australian agencies—namely the Australian Federal Police and Department of Immigration and Border Protection—also finalised their national-level development assistance programs.17

Anticipating this swiftly changing environment, the Afghanistan program developed a two-year Program Strategy for 2013-14 (instead of the usual four-year strategy). This Strategy highlighted interventions that supported transition: delivering services that the Afghan Government is unable to provide in an environment of instability and insecurity; investing in rural development and agriculture to build resilience in remote communities; strengthening governance to support the Afghan Government to assume greater responsibility for security and development; and providing humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable.

Australia delivered this aid program in an environment dominated by other donors: in 2013, the US provided around $1.6 billion, Germany around US$565 million, the United Kingdom around $270 million and the European Union around US$260 million.18 In 2012, Australia’s aid investment represented approximately 3.5 per cent of the total international development assistance in Afghanistan.19 Australia maximises the effect of these investments by partnering with other donors through multilateral organisations and investing in areas that leverage Australia’s areas of expertise.

Australia supports its aid program to Afghanistan through policy dialogue with the Afghan Government and international partners. The integration of AusAID with DFAT helped to make Australia’s development assistance and diplomatic efforts increasingly mutually supportive. This has been particularly beneficial on issues that cut across both areas, including Afghanistan’s economic transition, engagement with the Afghan Government and international community on the Afghan presidential elections, and Australia’s contribution to the security transition and ANSF sustainment.

Australia is active in the ‘5+3+3’, a group of donors that coordinates aid and economic dialogue with the Afghan Government. This group oversees commitments under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), a compact signed by the international community and Afghan Government in 2012.20 Ongoing development assistance relies on the Afghan Government demonstrating progress against reform commitments including: tackling corruption, conducting credible elections, undertaking economic reform, and protecting human rights, particularly women’s rights. A Special Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board Meeting (January 2014) assessed progress against TMAF commitments and found that both the Government of Afghanistan and donors have made sound progress. The NATO Summit in Wales and TMAF Conference in London in 2014 will be key opportunities for the new Afghan Government and donors to discuss the Afghan Government’s security sector and development priorities.

17 Some of the development assistance programs funded by DIBP will continue to be delivered in out-years. 18 Figures provided by the Afghan Ministry of Finance. 19 Total ODA to Afghanistan sourced from Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2013: Disbursements, Commitments, Country Indicators, 2014. 20 Other 5+3+3 members include the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, European Union, Canada and the Nordics, and the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and International Monetary Fund.


Expenditure Table 1 outlines Australian expenditure against the objectives of the Afghanistan program strategy for 2013-14. Two initiatives—the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Development Assistance Facility for Afghanistan (DAFA)—cut across objectives.

Table 1: Expenditure in FY 2013-14

Source: Aidworks and Pipeline Plan

Australia committed $149.3 million in development assistance to Afghanistan in 2013-14, incorporating $7.6 million from DFAT’s regional aid programs (including the Eliminating Violence Against Women Program and assistance provided by the Australian Civilian Corps reported on in this APPR) and $10.9 million from other government agencies (also reported on in this APPR).

Progress Towards Objectives The Afghanistan program uses a performance assessment framework (PAF) to assess progress towards Program Strategy objectives. Over the past year, Australia maintained or improved the rating against all objectives, reflecting stronger program management and better expectation setting. By directly supporting Afghan Government programs through on-budget support across sectors, Australia’s funding to the ARTF is key to achieving all Program Strategy objectives. Given its broad nature and significance relative to overall aid expenditure in Afghanistan, this APPR will assess the ARTF as a single entity (pp.12-13).

Objective Current rating Previous rating

Objective 1 Enhancing basic service delivery in health and education Green Amber

Objective 2 Supporting rural development and livelihoods Green Amber

Objective 3 Improving governance and the effectiveness of the Afghan Government Green Amber

Objective 4 Supporting vulnerable populations Green Green

Note: Green. Progress is as expected for this point in time and it is likely that the objective will be achieved. Standard program management practices are sufficient. Amber. Progress is somewhat less than expected for this point in time and restorative action will be necessary if the objective is to be achieved. Close performance monitoring is recommended. Red. Progress is significantly less than expected for this point in time and the objective is not likely to be met given available resources and priorities. Recasting the objective may be required.

Objective 1: Enhancing basic service delivery in health and education Afghanistan has had some significant successes in health and education, including increasing school enrolments from less than one million in 2001 to close to eight million today (including about three million girls from almost zero).21 However, the Afghan Government does not yet have

21 World Bank, ARTF Results Matrix 2013, Kabul, 2013.

Objective A$ million % of program

Enhancing basic service delivery in health and education 11.1 8.5

Supporting rural development and livelihoods 23.3 17.8

Improving governance and the effectiveness of the Afghan Government 7.6 5.8

Supporting vulnerable populations 10.4 8.0

Cross-objective initiatives (ARTF, DAFA) 77.4 59.2


capacity to deliver education and health services to communities that are geographically isolated or in conflict. Education and health are critical needs that would address the lack of service delivery and improve perceptions of government legitimacy in Afghanistan during transition.

Australia aims to improve the quality, access and demand for health and education of children and their families, with a focus on providing services to women and girls and remote communities. This objective is rated green as all the initiatives met or exceeded their targets identified in the PAF, except for the Australia Awards initiative, which was suspended this year.

Assessment of Progress

Save the Children delivered almost half of Australia’s expenditure against this objective through the Children of Uruzgan program. This program delivers health and education services to remote populations. An independent evaluation found that—despite the challenges of operating in Uruzgan Province—the Children of Uruzgan Program is achieving remarkable gains.22 This program reached its targets, including providing 112,935 consultations (including 70,245 for females) and providing training on hygiene practices to more than 20,000 people. It provided community based education classes to 6,715 children, including 960 girls.23

CARE’s Empowerment Through Education initiative filled a critical gap in basic education services in remote and rural communities, particularly for girls. This initiative works closely with the Ministry of Education and follows the national curriculum, and will be handed over to the Ministry on conclusion. This initiative reached all its targets for 2013-14, including continuing providing education to 2,754 students (80 per cent girls) in 108 primary-level classes in Parwan and Kapisa, and supporting 12 lower-secondary classes in Khost Province (including 241 girls).24

The Red Cross Afghanistan Health Services initiative provides health services to more than three million people beyond the reach of Afghanistan’s national health care. This program reached its targets, including vaccinating more than 569,000 children against polio, and more than 198,000 children against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus.25

Afghanistan faces a critical gap in education quality. Australia sought to bridge this gap through an innovative trilateral initiative: the Malaysia Australia Education Project for Afghanistan (MAEPA). An independent evaluation found that MAEPA improved education quality by providing advanced training in literacy, Islamic education, and curriculum development to Afghan teacher trainers at the Malaysian Institute of Teacher Training in Kuala Lumpur. During the past year, MAEPA trained 279 master teacher trainers, teacher trainers and education sector leaders, including 71 women.26

DFAT suspended the Australia Awards program—including short-term Fellowship courses and long-term Development Awards and Leadership Awards—in August 2012 due to key outcomes of the program not being met and allegations of fraud that were the subject of a comprehensive independent investigation. The investigation concluded in March 2014 and DFAT suspended the program indefinitely. As of March 2014, of 111 students who have been awarded a scholarship

22 Coffey, Children of Uruzgan Mid Term Review, February 2014 23 Save the Children Annual Report, 2013

24 Care Australia, Mid-term Report, April 2014 25 No gender disaggregated data is available for these targets. Australian Red Cross, Interim Report: 1 July 2013 to 31 December 2013

26 MAEPA, Evaluation, December 2013


since 2009, 39 students have graduated and returned home to Afghanistan and 16 are still studying in Australia and Afghanistan.

Objective 2: Supporting Rural Development and Livelihoods More than 75 per cent of the Afghan population lives in rural areas where agriculture is the primary activity. In these areas, economic productivity is vulnerable to the effects of cyclical drought and flooding and poverty rates are high, partly because of the reliance on rain-fed (not irrigated) farming. Australia’s programs strengthen the resilience of people in rural areas by improving infrastructure, enhancing food security and lifting agricultural productivity through research.

Supporting rural development and livelihoods is also an Afghan Government priority. Boosting agriculture supports the economy: agriculture accounts for almost a third of Afghanistan’s GDP and formally employs around 60 per cent of the total Afghan workforce.27 In 2013, with the support of donors like Australia, the Afghan Government developed a Dry Land Farming Strategy to improve its efforts in the agricultural sector.28 Recognising the importance of rural development and livelihoods, between 2012 and 2014 the World Bank allocated over 50 per cent of ARTF project funds to programs in rural development, agriculture and infrastructure.

In 2013-14, progress against this objective is green as most projects are on track, improving the 2012-13 amber rating when a number of new activities had made uneven progress.

Assessment of progress

Australia dedicated 70 per cent of expenditure against this objective to two infrastructure projects in Uruzgan. The Rural Access Roads Project, delivered through the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), improves access to markets, enables access to essential services such as health and education, increases connectivity between communities, districts, and the provincial government, and provides employment. Independent monitoring and UNOPS reporting indicate this program is on-track to meet current schedules, with around 50 per cent of the work to construct and rehabilitate over 140km of one- and two-lane gravel roads complete.29

The National Area-Based Development Programme, delivered through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), improved access to arable land by constructing flood protection walls, bridges and wells. It is on track with anticipated progress, completing five kilometres of major retaining walls over 10 different sites.30 Work at a further 16 sites also progressed well; however, further flood damage may extend the end dates by six months.

In 2013-14, Australia contributed to enhancing food security in Afghanistan by supporting the World Food Programme’s first Strategic Grain Reserve facility in Kabul. This 22,500 tonne facility is one of a network of facilities that, when complete, will be able to feed two million people for up to six months in times of crisis. This means they will not have to sell their assets to survive and will be able to recover more speedily after a disaster. Outside disasters, the Reserve provides a buffer to dampen the shock of seasonal variations in the price of wheat.31

27 World Bank, Agriculture in Afghanistan: Growing the Economy, Jobs and Food Security , Presentation to the ARTF Strategy Group Meeting, Kabul, May 2014 28 This Strategy is awaiting approval by the new Afghan government. 29 UNOPS, Uruzgan Rural Access Project Quarterly Report, April 2014 30UNDP, National Area-Based Development Programme: 2013 Annual Progress Report, 31 World Food Program, Report on Capacity Development in Support of the Strategic Grain Reserve, May 2014.


Through ACIAR’s Afghanistan Agricultural Research Portfolio initiative, Australia helped to lift productivity through research on types of grain and practices that are more resilient to environmental factors in Afghanistan. This initiative exceeded its targets, training more than 500 participants (including 400 women) in better agricultural and horticultural practices, and running 253 dry-land farming field demonstrations. ACIAR also tested more than 2000 lines of improved wheat in Afghanistan and at international research centres.32

In 2013-14, Australia also commenced the Australia Afghanistan Community Resilience Scheme (AACRS) in partnership with non-government organisations. The AACRS promotes small-scale, inclusive private sector growth and resilience to shocks in rural Afghanistan through improved agricultural productivity and market linkages. In 2014-15, Australia will use ACIAR’s research to strengthen AACRS outcomes, such as increasing the uptake of improved wheat varieties.

Objective 3: Improving Governance and the Effectiveness of the Government For the Afghan Government to successfully take on increased security and development obligations throughout transition and effectively deliver services there is a need for strengthened governance, particularly around public financial management, public service capacity, the rule of law, addressing corruption and regulatory oversight.33 Australian support focused on improving economic and structural reforms and public financial management; strengthening democratic processes; and supporting national efforts to protect and promote human rights, particularly the rights of women. Overall, the rating is green as activities met their expected outcomes.

Assessment of progress

A recent independent review of Australia’s bilateral Public Financial Management (PFM) Program found the strong relationships formed between DFAT, the program team and target line ministries (especially the Ministry of Finance) increased Afghan Government ownership of the program. Civil servants in these ministries engaged proactively in training and mentoring. Through this program, public servants’ skills and budget processing times improved, supporting more efficient service delivery in the Ministries of Education, Public Works, Agriculture and Public Health. These ministries account for 40 per cent of national development budget spending in Afghanistan. Having exceeded the June 2014 targets (training 500 civil servants), the PFM Program helped improve the Afghan Government’s ability to spend allocated development budgets compared to previous years (51 per cent in 2012, to 57 per cent in 2013).34

Australia made an important contribution to the 2014 presidential elections by supporting voter engagement, independent observers and electoral institutions. These activities far exceeded their targets. The Afghanistan Capacity for Media and Elections program more than doubled its target of training and mentoring 300 journalists reporting on elections. It enabled impartial and educational news content to reach remote communities across the country.35 Australia’s support to the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission through the UNDP provided critical operational support for the elections. While claims of fraud marred the second round of elections, Australia and the international community used its partnership to advocate for robust dispute resolution processes, mitigating the risk of ongoing instability arising from disputed election results.36

32 ACIAR, Afghanistan Country Review Key Outcomes, September 2013. 33 World Bank (2013), Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, Washington DC. 34 The program provided training to 1,294 public servants across targeted ministries, of which 164 (13 per cent) were women. Jensen (2014), PFM Independent Mid-Term Review. 35 ACME trained 806 (156 female) journalists. Afghanistan Capacity for Media and Elections, Monthly Report, April 2014. 36 United Nations Development Program, Afghan Presidential and Provincial Council Elections: Facts and Figures, April 2014.


In 2013-14, Australia significantly supported national efforts to protect and promote human rights, particularly the rights of women, through its regional programs. In June 2013, Australia began supporting national efforts to eliminate violence against women (EVAW) in Afghanistan. It increased access to support services for women affected by violence; improved women’s access to justice; and attempted to reduce violence through advocacy and raising awareness.

The EVAW program demonstrated strong results in the first year of implementation. Between June 2013 and March 2014, the Women’s Protection Program managed by UN Women provided 1,903 services, including medical and legal aid, counselling, literacy and vocational training, to 1,397 women and girl survivors of violence.37 Over the same period, 3,586 people (1,464 women and 2,122 men)—including government officials, police, community members and teachers and students—received training on women’s rights and the EVAW Law.38

In addition, Australia’s ongoing partnership with the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) contributed to Australia’s efforts to protect and promote human rights, especially the rights of women and girls. The Commission launched the first national inquiry into honour killing and rape, bringing to light issues that had long been taboo in Afghanistan. The Inquiry identified underlying issues that deny women and girls their basic human rights and took early steps to find solutions. A recent evaluation found the AIHRC’s work on human rights education and women’s rights to be a particular achievement.39

Objective 4: Supporting Vulnerable Populations On top of ongoing conflict, Afghanistan also faces a drought every two or three years, with flash flooding in many of the alternate years. These factors, and the fragility of the Government, have led international humanitarian agencies to conclude that Afghanistan faces one of the worst protracted humanitarian crises in the world.40 Conflict and natural disasters mean that 12 per cent (3.6 million) of the Afghan population is displaced41, and a third of the Afghan population (7.6 million) regularly do not have enough food to eat.42 Years of heavy conflict have left their legacy, and Afghanistan remains one of the most land-mined countries in the world.43

In 2013-14, Australia provided equal funding to two of the most effective humanitarian actors in Afghanistan: the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Mine Action Service. In 2013-14, progress against this objective is rated green, as the initiatives exceeded expected outcomes.

Assessment of Progress

One focus area in 2013-14 was food security. Australia’s grant to the WFP in 2013-14 contributed to it distributing 106,000 tonnes of rations to 3.5 million people in 2013, including 1.6 million women and girls. The WFP distributed 65 per cent of these rations to vulnerable groups, including 230,000 pregnant and lactating women suffering from malnutrition; 76,000 children (36,700 girls) between 6-59 months suffering from severe to moderate malnutrition; 880,000 children (580,000 girls) in exchange for regular school attendance; and 32,000 women

37 UNWomen, Afghan Women’s Protection Program, Quarterly Reports 1,2 & 3. 38 UNFPA, Strengthening the capacity of Afghanistan’s Police and other Legal Actors Towards Combatting VAW , Quarter 3 Project Report , March 2014; The Asia Foundation, Strengthened Access to Justice for Women Affected by Violence, Quarter 3 Project Report, March 2014; UNWomen, Afghan Women’s Protection Program, Quarterly Reports 1,2 & 3. 39 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Strategic Plan & Action Plan Evaluation, Kabul, November 2013, p.6 40 For example, Afghanistan is seventh in the European Commission, Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment 2013, ECHO 41 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR country operations profile: Afghanistan, Statistical Snapshot, January 2014 42 Government of Afghanistan, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2011-2012, Central Statistics Organization, 2014 43 UN Mine Action Service, 1393 Integrated Operational Framework, Kabul


in exchange for livelihood training.44 In doing so, the WFP aims to break the cycle of poor health and educational outcomes that undermine broader efforts to reduce poverty in Afghanistan.

Mine action was another focus area in 2013-14. Australia funded the UN Mine Action Service in 2013 as part of a four-year program to demine more than seven million square metres of land in Afghanistan. Our support led to the clearance of more than 700 mines and 7,000 explosive remnants of war from 3.3 million square metres of hazardous land (exceeding the target of 1.15 million square metres), benefiting more than 61,000 Afghans.45

To support those who had already suffered an explosive or mine-related injury, UNMAS provided more than 4,000 people with prosthetics, orthotics, physiotherapy and health education services. UNMAS also taught more than 200,000 people how to identify, avoid and mitigate the impacts of mines and explosive remnants of war. By reducing deaths and injury, and by clearing productive and strategic land for use by Afghans, UNMAS contributes to economic growth and better health outcomes.

Mutual Obligations

The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (2012) has been the main vehicle through which the Afghan Government and international community has held each other to account for the extraordinary aid flows that Afghanistan receives. It outlines specific political, governance and human rights reforms, development priorities and approaches to the provision of aid.46 The Afghan Government has made some progress toward achieving the TMAF hard deliverables.47 Significantly, they implemented electoral reforms that led to Afghanistan holding democratic elections, enacted key legislation and regulations to increase revenue and encourage investment, and established democratic and human rights institutions (including the AIHRC). However, ongoing disagreements between the Government and the international community on what is required to meet each deliverable has hampered implementation and led to a process-heavy approach.

In line with our commitments under the TMAF, Australia aligns over 90 per cent of its support with Afghanistan’s National Priority Programs (NPPs) and provides 50 per cent of its support through Afghan Government systems or ‘on-budget’. Australia provides the majority of on-budget support through the ARTF, which aligns its spending with the NPPs. The World Bank’s ARTF Scorecard is one tangible way to measure Government progress against the NPPs. It demonstrated that the Government is meeting education and service delivery goals, but less reliably meeting agriculture and rural development goals (on-track in agricultural and/or irrigation services, but off-track on providing savings and enterprise support, and employment targets). In assessing organisational effectiveness, the ARTF scorecard found the capacity of the

44 Rations in the school feeding and training programs are provided to students during the school and training sessions themselves to ensure attendance. Take home rations for girls are provided subject to girls attending that day of school. WFP data indicates that actual distribution to school children and women were higher than planned distribution indicating that both programs are achieving results. World Food Program, Standard Project Report, 2013. 45 UN Mine Action Service, Support to Mine Action in Afghanistan: Interim Report for the Government of Australia, 2013 46 Complementary to this, Afghanistan is also one of seven pilot countries for implementing the New Deal for engaging in Fragile States: an agreed approach at the global level between development partners including Australia, and self-nominated fragile states, which has mutual accountability at its heart. Donors recognise the TMAF as being aligned with the New Deal, and puts into action many of its key principles. 47 A hard deliverable is a measure by which the Afghan Government and International Community have agreed to measure progress against TMAF goals.


Government as off-track (measured through the execution rate of the development budget and percentage of audit reports received on time).48

Australia also assesses and supports Afghan Government progress on financial reform by participating in the ARTF Incentive Program (IP) Working Group. Under the IP, the Afghan Government and World Bank (on behalf of ARTF donors) agree to a range of performance benchmarks that the World Bank reviews. Following the most recent review in May 2014, donors (including Australia) agreed that the IP should disburse US$54.1 million to the Afghan Government (of a possible US$182 million). That payment rewarded the progress achieved by the government in 2013, including improved revenue collection, external audit performance, operations and maintenance expenditure, and business licencing.

In the annual Development Cooperation Dialogue with the Afghan Finance Ministry (June 2014), Australia confirmed its continued commitment to the TMAF, including providing on-budget support through the ARTF and aligning programs with the NPPs. This year, Australia will develop Joint Financing Agreements with Afghan line ministries and/or the Ministry of Finance for Australia’s on-going bilateral commitments. This will enhance mutual accountability at the sectoral level and facilitate stronger policy dialogue on development issues. The immediate priority will be developing these agreements for the AACRS and EVAW programs.

Program Quality and Management DFAT used the Program Strategy and its accompanying performance assessment framework to pursue a more deliberate approach to all aspects of aid management. DFAT consolidated the program to the most strongly performing initiatives that align with the objectives—reducing from 21 to 12 investments—allowing program managers to focus on performance and quality. In addition, DFAT undertook evaluations of a number of programs to understand better the impact and effectiveness of our activities (Annex C provides a list of these and future evaluations).

Analysis of Quality at Implementation Reports DFAT managers use Quality at Implementation (QAI) Reports to assess the quality of individual aid investments. Investments are rated against five quality criteria set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development with a sixth criterion on gender equality (reflecting the value Australia places on the empowerment of women and girls through its aid program).

The Afghanistan program produced QAI assessments for the 13 largest investments in 2013. The results (in Annex B) reflect the positive assessments made earlier in this APPR and indicate that 12 of 13 Australian aid investments in 2013 were effective. The remaining initiative, the Afghan Scholarships Program, was suspended indefinitely in 2014.49 The results also show significant improvements since 2012, particularly in two programs previously rated as ineffective: NADBP and the ARTF.50

48 World Bank, ARTF Scorecard 2013: Integrated Performance and Management Framework, Kabul, 2013 49 Australia will make residual payments as the current recipients finish their degrees. 50 NABDP, implemented by the UNDP, was assessed as satisfactory only in one criterion in 2012, but in 2013 was assessed as satisfactory in five criteria, as it was in a better position to make progress in 2013. Similarly, the ARTF was assessed as only performing satisfactorily in three criteria in 2012, but by 2013, it was assessed as performing satisfactorily in five criteria. This improvement can, in part, be credited to the World Bank taking steps to improve monitoring and evaluation of the ARTF, responding to advocacy by Australia and other donors.


The QAI assessments highlight general trends in the strengths and challenges of the Afghanistan aid program. Table 2 demonstrates that initiatives are highly relevant to the context and generally effective. However, DFAT remains cautious about the sustainability of its investments. The uncertainty accompanying Afghanistan’s political, economic and security transitions means that it is difficult to confirm that the benefits of Australian investments will significantly outlive the investments themselves. However, DFAT’s approach of supporting the Afghan Government to achieve its own development goals through targeted investments that leverage Australia’s areas of expertise increases the chance that this will be the case.

Table 2: 2013 QAI ratings across the Afghanistan program

Five of the 13 investments did not make an adequate contribution to improving gender equality in Afghanistan in 2013. The two investments that rated most poorly against this criterion relate to infrastructure in Uruzgan, where ultra-conservative attitudes disallow women from participating in manual labour outside the home. DFAT is working with both initiatives to maximise the limited opportunities that exist, including ensuring that women are involved in determining infrastructure priorities. Of the remaining initiatives that did not perform satisfactorily, only the ARTF will continue through next year, and Australia is already working to improve its performance on gender, including by being a member of the ARTF Gender Working Group.

Performance of key delivery partners

Multilateral Organisations

Australia delivers approximately 65 per cent of its development assistance to Afghanistan through multilateral partners, with the majority through the World Bank-administered ARTF (discussed below). In a crowded donor environment, with high levels of security and fiduciary risk, multilateral organisations helped Australia avoid duplication, maximise efforts, pool risk and minimise administrative costs with other donors.51 The primary challenge is results reporting, as multilateral organisations do not disaggregate by donor and do not necessarily collect data that Australia wants. In coordination with other partners, Australia can influence multilateral organisations to improve program performance and results reporting, but this depends in part on the size of our aid contribution compared to others. Australian engagement in multilateral

51 World Bank, World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development, Washington D.C., 2011.

02468

101214

Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency M&E Sustainability Genderequality

Ratings of 1 and 2 Ratings of 3 Ratings of 4 Ratings of 5 and 6


governance mechanisms can also enable us to gain increased partner government access, and strengthen our donor profile with other development partners.

The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)

In 2013-14, Australia provided $62.5 million to the World Bank-administered ARTF. The ARTF pools donor resources and disburses them according to jointly agreed objectives and pre-defined fiduciary controls. It fully aligns with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and supports 13 National Priority Programs across education, agriculture, rural development, governance, human resource development, infrastructure and security. By contributing to the ARTF, Australia meets its international commitment to channel 50 per cent of its aid through Afghan Government systems. Australia’s contributions to the ARTF are non-preferenced.52

Australia’s engagement in ARTF governance mechanisms enables Australia, in coordination with other donors, to engage in high-level policy dialogue with the Afghan Government on progressing important economic, legislative and other reforms. One mechanism is the ARTF’s Incentive Program that assesses and rewards the Afghan Government’s performance against agreed financial and fiduciary reforms. Australia is on the Incentive Program Working Group, an advisory body that monitors achievement of reform benchmarks with the Afghan Government.

The ARTF’s recurrent funding mechanism contributed to strong results across Afghanistan, including in most of Australia’s focus sectors (excluding humanitarian action). For example:

› In education, the ARTF’s Second Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP II) increased enrolments in grades 1 to 12 from 6.3 million in 2008 to 7.7 million in 2013 (including 2.9 million girls), provided training to over 180,000 teachers, and awarded 3500 scholarships to women enrolled in teacher training colleges.53

› In rural development, the ARTF’s National Solidarity Program established more than 30,000 Community Development Councils, which in turn undertook over 53,000 sub-projects.54

› In governance, the ARTF’s Public Financial Management Reform Project (PFMRP II) and Capacity Building for Results Program trained 215 public servants.55

The ARTF is the primary mechanism through which Australia supports the Afghan Government to achieve its own development goals and transition to self-reliance. Australia’s bilateral programming cannot match the ARTF’s investment to outcome ratio. However, the sheer scale of the national ARTF programs means that they do not always match the quality of smaller, discrete, localised Australian bilateral initiatives, which are not as heavily reliant on or supportive of Afghan Government systems. For example, EQUIP II, which works through the Ministry of Education, requires improvements in monitoring and quality assurance of school construction quality and safety, implementation of independent monitoring, strengthened procurement processes, and improved coordination between the World Bank and the Ministry of Education. Australia is supporting an EQUIP II evaluation to strengthen these areas.

By choosing to maximise Australia’s investment by funding the ARTF we accept more limited control and oversight afforded to individual donors—it would be impossible for the World Bank 52 Analysis has shown that directing funding to specific sectors or provinces reduces the effectiveness of multi-donor trust funds. For example, see Scanteam, Flexibility in the Face of Fragility: Programmatic Multi-donor Trust Funds in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, Oslo, 2010. 53 World Bank, Implementation Status and Results report; Afghanistan Second EQUIP, 2013. 54 Abdul Raouf Zia [ed], Country update: the World Bank Group in Afghanistan, Washington DC, 2014. 55 World Bank, Implementation Status & Results; Afghanistan Public Financial Management Reform Project Phase II, 2014.


to meet each donor’s requirements regarding implementation, oversight and performance monitoring. However, through a best-practice ARTF Strategy Coordination mechanism, Australia effectively influences the Bank to improve ARTF performance by coordinating messages with other donors. For example, alongside other donors, we continue to advocate that the Bank identify results within defined and regular timeframes, provide consistent evidence of outcomes achieved against clearly identified baselines and targets, report against gender targets and provided sex disaggregated data for all activities, and improve sustainability. As a result, the World Bank has started to make appropriate improvements.

Non-Governmental Organisations

International non-government organisations implemented some of Australia’s key investments in service delivery, agriculture and EVAW in 2013-14, targeting communities that the Afghan Government does not have the capacity to adequately service. The majority of the implementing NGOs were Australian. NGOs can adapt to changing circumstances and emerging priorities, which enhances their effectiveness. Furthermore, many NGO partners demonstrated capacity to innovatively manage and monitor their projects in the challenging security environment. For example, Save the Children employed community-based remote monitoring and development teams and The Asia Foundation recruited joint female-male monitoring and evaluation officers to track the progress of the Strengthened Access to Justice for Women Affected by Violence program. Australia gained reputational benefits through these programs in 2013-14.

Nonetheless, administration and risk management of NGO programs can be time consuming and not always proportional to the level of investment. Ensuring sustainability is a challenge, as handing over activities to the Afghan Government on completion of Australia’s funding depends on linking NGO activity priorities to NPP priorities or Australian budget capacity to absorb the programs, particularly in areas of less priority for the Afghan Government, such as EVAW.

Managing Contractors

Australia established the Development Assistance Facility for Afghanistan (DAFA) to manage a number of projects in key sectors, including public financial management, the Australia Awards program, MAEPA and support to the agricultural sector. Using DAFA as a delivery mechanism provides flexibility and responsiveness. Attribution and influence are possible because Australia fully owns and directs the initiatives. Australia also uses these achievements to influence policy dialogue with other donors and the Afghan Government. For example, successes in the DAFA-run PFM initiative allowed Australia to advocate improving the ARTF program.

Nonetheless, managing DAFA has been highly resource intensive in both Canberra and our Embassy in Kabul. High levels of oversight and high operational and security costs mean with a decreasing number of programs, DAFA no longer demonstrates the value for money originally intended. In light of these challenges, DAFA will close by the end of 2014, and all existing projects will be finalised or managed directly through other implementing partners.56 A review of DAFA in September 2014 will examine the strengths and weaknesses of capacity building approaches used across the Facility to provide lessons for the broader Australian aid program.

56 DFAT will engage a new contractor to implement the Australia Awards in South and West Asia program in early 2015. International Relief and Development will implement the PFM program. MAEPA will not continue.


Australian Government Agencies

Other Australian Government agencies delivered almost seven per cent of Australian aid in Afghanistan in 2013-14. DFAT continues to engage closely with other agencies on Afghanistan. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet hosts a regular Afghanistan—Pakistan Steering Committee meeting attended by agency heads, and an Afghanistan—Pakistan Task Force meeting at Senior Executive Service Band 1 level. DFAT hosts working level inter-departmental committee meetings and provides advice to ministers and Cabinet.

Assistance delivered through the Australian Civilian Corps and other Government agencies

Australian Civilian Corps (ACC): On 18 June 2012, the Governments of Australia and the United States of America signed a Memorandum of Cooperation under which Australia agreed to provide three experienced lawyers to mentor and design and deliver training for Afghanistan defence lawyers at the Justice Centre in Parwan. The Justice Advisers helped improve case management systems and court administration. Their efforts supported and improved access to due process and the rule of law for Afghanistan detainees. A rising trend of acquittal rates in primary and appellate courts indicated significant improvement in the ability of Afghanistan defence counsels’ to present and argue cases. The mission ended on 10 April 2014.

Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP): Throughout 2013-14, DIBP officers assisted in the development of the migration management and border security capacities of Afghanistan. DIBP worked with Afghan Ministries, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to improve the integrity, efficiency and technical processes of Afghan passport issuing arrangements. The Afghanistan Passport Issuance System—Afghanistan Visa Issuance System ensures Afghan passports have higher integrity measures and meets International Civil Aviation Organisation standards. DIBP also engaged IOM to work with the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation on the development of migration policy.

Under the auspices of the 2011 Memorandum of Understanding on Migration and Humanitarian Cooperation between Australia, Afghanistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Australia continues to support capacity building and humanitarian activities to stabilise communities. In 2013-14, DIBP agreed to fund NGOs and international organisations to implement projects that support internally displaced communities and Afghan nationals returning to Afghanistan.

Australian Federal Police (AFP): In July 2013, the AFP had 14 officers deployed to Afghanistan. All officers were located in Kabul. Six officers provided training to Afghan National Police personnel at the Kabul Training College and the Kabul Central Training College. Two officers undertook advisory roles with the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan. An AFP Executive Level officer was the Senior Police Advisor within the Commander International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Police Advisory Cell (CPAC). Another AFP Senior Executive officer was positioned within the International Police Coordination Board Secretariat (IPCBS). By September 2013, AFP numbers had reduced to four. These officers maintained strategic positions within CPAC and the IPCBS. On 9 January 2014, the AFP withdrew entirely from Afghanistan.


Key risks Table 3: Management of key risks to achieving objectives Key risks What actions were taken to manage the risks

over the past year? What further actions will be taken to manage the risks in the coming year?

The security situation deteriorates to the point that Australian officials and/or major implementing partners withdraw from Afghanistan

› Prioritised the safety of Australian officials › Reviewed and strengthened security

settings › Diversified expenditure to assist with risk

management in the challenging environment

› Continue to monitor the security situation and update security protocols if needed

› Re-design program as necessary should the security situation deteriorate

The new Government does not constructively engage with the development agenda or the international community

› Delivered funding to the Afghan government through multilateral organisations to ensure fiduciary compliance

› Played an active role through TMAF in monitoring Afghan government progress against commitments

› Work with the international community to engage the Afghan Government early on the importance of reforms to ensure ongoing assistance

› Consider re-designing program if the new Government does not agree to continue reforms

Corruption and fraud result in the loss of public funds and adversely impact development outcomes

› Upheld a zero-tolerance approach to fraud › Investigated all allegations and secured

the recovery of funds › Complied with DFAT and Commonwealth

anti-corruption requirements in contracts › Monitored Afghanistan’s progress on anti-

corruption and governance reforms through the TMAF

› Improved monitoring and evaluation to mitigate against corruption

› Worked through trusted partners

› Continue current actions

Management Responses

To support the delivery of Australia’s aid program in Afghanistan in 2014-15, DFAT will:

› Extend the strategic framework that underpinned the delivery of good outcomes in 2013-14. DFAT will produce a 2015-2018 Aid Investment Plan (AIP) and Performance Assessment Framework. While the previous strategy only covered two-years, the consolidation of the program and the adaptation of our existing activities to the transition context now allow the Afghanistan program to adopt a longer-term outlook.

› Increase the sustainability of Australia’s bilateral activities by ensuring that they all align with the Afghan Government’s NPPs.

› Enhance mutual accountability and policy dialogue on development issues with the Afghan Government by developing Joint Financing Agreements for our on-going programs.

› Continue to work with our partners, including the World Bank, to improve monitoring and evaluation of all our activities.

› Embed women’s empowerment and address gender issues throughout implementation in target bilateral activities, identified in the AIP and measured by Aid Quality gender ratings.

› Continue actively participating in key Afghan-donor forums, including the ‘5+3+3 donor group’, the Oversight Coordination Board on Afghan National Security Forces Sustainment, the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, the London Ministerial Conference in November 2014, and the Kabul Senior Officials Meeting in 2015.


Annex A: Progress in addressing 2012-13 management responses

Management consequences identified in 2012-13 APPR Rating Progress made in 2013-14

Implement the 2013-14 Afghanistan Country Program Strategy Achieved › Program strategy published on DFAT website on 4 February 2014 › Performance Assessment Framework approved by FAS in October 2013 › Australian aid focuses on governance, rural and agricultural development and education, with

gender as a cross-cutting theme, and humanitarian response as ongoing component Reduce fragmentation across the aid program by moving from small-scale, short-term initiatives to larger, multi-year programs

Achieved › Number of initiatives in Afghanistan aid program reduced from 21 to 12 › Only four programs continue in Uruzgan, with three finishing by the end of 2014

Continue to improve M&E to inform decisions to reshape or end under-performing initiatives

Partly achieved

› In Uruzgan, Australia’s implementing partners piloted innovative remote monitoring techniques, including the Children of Uruzgan Education Program’s monitoring system using community-based remote monitoring and development teams; and UNOPS and UNDP using GPS tagging on the road building/maintenance initiatives

› Funded The Asia Foundation’s Survey of the Afghan People (alongside DFID and USAID): the only longitudinal study of Afghan people and the most comprehensive and consistent barometer of public opinion in Afghanistan

› Reporting through multilateral partners continues to be a challenge as Australia has little control over the timing, content or quality of results

Contribute to broader international thinking on Afghanistan by funding research and analysis

Achieved › Research through Chatham House (through our support of the “Opportunity in Crisis” program) has been well targeted

› Chatham House has been responsive to our requests for more information (including through direct engagement with the Kabul Embassy)

› Reports have allowed Australia to contribute to substantial and progressive global thinking on Afghanistan

Continue to play an active role in key Afghan-donor forums on implementation of TMAF commitments

Achieved › Australia has continued to be active in a number of key Afghan-donors forums, including participating in the TMAF Senior Officials Meeting on 3 July 2013, and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) meeting on 23 January 2014

› Australia was an active member of Kabul-based TMAF coordination groups through the 5+3+3 (a group of key donors in Afghanistan), which met frequently at the ambassador and working levels to review the achievement of TMAF reforms and coordinate engagement with the Afghan Government

› DFAT Canberra has also participated in 5+3 meetings between Capitals, coordinating policy direction and messaging

› Following the JCMB meeting, Australia led a process on identifying “lessons learnt” with other donors and UNAMA, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank

› Australia is coordinating with other key donors and the Afghan Government to prepare for the Ministerial-level Conference in London in November 2014

› Australia participated in all International Contact Group meetings of Special Representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, which facilitated strategic level discussion among donors and with the Government of Afghanistan.


Achieved. Significant progress has been made in addressing the issue Partly achieved. Some progress has been made in addressing the issue, but the issue has not been resolved Not achieved. Progress in addressing the issue has been significantly below expectations

Enhance engagement with the World Bank to progress the broader ARTF reform agenda Achieved › Throughout 2013, the Australian Embassy in Kabul increased and improved the depth and consistency of our engagement with the World Bank on the ARTF reform Agenda via both active participation on the ARTF Strategy Group and through on-going advocacy and engagement in the 5+3+3.

› Because of Australia’s advocacy alongside other donors, the World Bank released a Results Framework, improved transparency, and access to results information. This has included the Bank reporting on innovative remote monitoring tools they are using to collect accurate time- sensitive data on key projects.

› In the Incentive Program Working Group, Australia has contributed to decision-making regarding disbursement of ARTF incentive funds, encouraging and rewarding the Afghan Government’s progress on economic and structural reforms. Following the most recent review in May 2014, donors (including Australia) agreed that the IP should disburse US$54.1 million to the Afghan Government (of a possible US$182 million).

› Australia’s bilateral Public Financial Management (PFM) program focuses on improving core development budget processes in service delivery line ministries supported by ARTF projects, which are responsible for 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s national development budget: Education, Public Health, Public Works and Agriculture

Continue to prioritise the security of Australian personnel working in-country Achieved › DFAT has maintained its high-level of resourcing to ensure the security of Australian personnel working in-country

› DFAT reviewed, updated and implemented new security protocols following attacks in Kabul that targeted foreigners

› Staff numbers in Afghanistan decreased when Australian civilian agencies withdrew from Uruzgan and staff numbers in Kabul have reduced to the minimum required to achieve operational outcomes.


Annex B: Quality at Implementation ratings

Investment name

Appr

oved

bud

get

and

dura

tion

QAI y

ear

Rele

vanc

e

Effe

ctiv

enes

s

Effic

ienc

y

Mon

itorin

g an

d Ev

alua

tion

Sust

aina

bilit

y

Gen

der e

qual

ity

Scholarships Afghanistan $3.7m 2008-2017

2013 3 3 3 4 3 4 2012 3 2 2 2 2 3

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund $275m 2009-2017

2013 6 5 5 4 4 3 2012 6 4 5 3 3 3

Strengthening Community-Level Service Delivery $7.5 m 2010-2017

2013 5 4 5 4 3 3 2012 5 4 4 3 3 3

DAFA Phase III $76m 2011-2015

2013 5 4 3 3 3 3 2012 5 3 3 3 3 4

CARE - Empowerment through Education $5.7m 2011-2015

2013 6 5 5 6 4 5 2012 6 5 5 5 5 5

Support to Mine Action in Afghanistan $20m 2011-2015

2013 6 6 5 5 5 4 2012 6 5 4 4 4 4

Uruzgan Health & Education Program $36.2m 2011-2015

2013 6 5 4 5 4 5 2012 6 4 3 4 4 5

Afghanistan Health Services Program $6.8m 2011-2015

2013 5 5 5 4 4 5 2012 5 5 5 4 4 4

Electoral Assistance in Afghanistan $22.1m 2011-2016

2013 6 5 4 4 4 5 2012 6 4 4 4 4 4

UNDP NABDP for Uruzgan province $6m 2011-2014

2013 5 4 4 3 4 2

2012 4 1 2 3 3 2


Infrastructure $27.7m 2011-2017

2013 5 4 3 3 2 2 2012

ACIAR Afghanistan Agricultural Research Portfolio $17.7m 2012-2017

2013 6 5 4 5 5 4 2012

World Food Programme in Afghanistan in 2012 & 2013 $24m 2012-2016

2013 6 5 4 4 5 4 2012 6 5 5 5 4 4

Definitions of rating scale: Satisfactory (4, 5 and 6) = 6 = Very high quality = 5 = Good quality = 4 = Adequate quality, needs some work Less than satisfactory (1, 2 and 3) = 3 = Less than adequate quality; needs significant work = 2 = Poor quality; needs major work to improve = 1 = Very poor quality; needs major overhaul


Annex C: Evaluation and Review Pipeline Planning List of evaluations completed in the reporting period

Name of Investment Aidworks number

Name of evaluation Date finalised Date Evaluation report Uploaded into Aidworks

Date Management response uploaded into Aidworks

Published on website

ACIAR Afghanistan Agricultural Research Portfolio

INK459

ACIAR Wheat and Maize projects in Afghanistan

2013 N/A N/A Published on ACIAR website

Uruzgan Health & Education Program

INJ857 Children of Uruzgan Mid-Term Review

Sep 2013 Mar 2014 Apr 2014 Intend to publish

Malaysia Australia Education Project for Afghanistan

INJ768 Malaysia Australia Education Project for Afghanistan – Evaluation Report

Feb 2014 May 2014 May 2014 No

Afghan Capacity for Media and Elections

INK032 Afghanistan Capacity For Media And Elections - First Mid-term Review

Feb 2014 July 2014 N/A No

Afghan Capacity for Media and Elections

INK032 Afghanistan Capacity For Media And Elections -Second Mid-term Review

July 2014 July 2014 N/A No

List of evaluations planned in the next 12 months

Name of Investment Aidworks number Type of evaluation Purpose of evaluation Expected completion date Support to Mine Action in Afghanistan

INJ821 Partner led and managed. DFAT contributed to Terms of Reference.

Assess the effectiveness of the investment to inform ongoing management

31 December 2014

Ending Violence Against Women Program

INK880 DFAT-led Management Review Assess whether the EVAW Program is on track to achieve intended targets and to provide management with options to inform decisions regarding the most effective use of the remaining budget allocation

25 September 2014

DAFA Phase III

INJ768 Independent Completion Review Identify the strengths and weaknesses of different capacity building approaches under DAFA III

31 December 2014

Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacities for Tomorrow Phase II

INK032 Independent Evaluation UNDP-drafted independent evaluation of the second phase of its program of support to the Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission

August 2014

Public Outreach for Democracy and Elections

INK032 Independent Review Desktop evaluation of program October 2014


Annex D: Performance Benchmarks 2014 -15

Aid objective 2014-15 benchmark Rationale for selecting this performance benchmark

Enhancing basic service delivery in health and education

Maintain 2,000 students (80 per cent of which are girls) enrolled in primary-level community education classes.

This benchmark aligns with the Australian Government’s investment priorities including a) education and health; and b) gender equality and empowering women and girls, as well as Afghanistan’s National Education Strategic Plan. This benchmark also recognises the importance of capabilities in literacy, numeracy, and vocational skills for improving the status and opportunities for women and girls. To achieve this DFAT is working with trusted civil society organisations that can operate in areas the Afghan Government cannot reach.

Supporting rural development and livelihoods 1300 persons trained in strategies to improve livelihoods and 1000 farmers using better agricultural technologies

Australia will support the Afghan Government’s National Priority Program on National Comprehensive Agriculture Production & Market Development, which aims to improve agriculture production and productivity, rural livelihoods, and contribute to achieving food security and rural development. This benchmark represents results of both programs managed through the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research and the first year of the community resilience scheme, Australia’s flagship program in the agriculture sector. As the program is commencing, there is no baseline for this benchmark.

Finalise construction of 58 kilometres and maintenance of an additional 90 kilometres of rural roads in Uruzgan

Australia will continue to construct and maintain roads in Uruzgan. This aligns with the Afghan Government’s NPP of a National Rural Access Program that promotes equitable economic growth by providing year-round access to basic services and facilities in rural Afghanistan. This performance benchmark represents currently approved and contracted activities being implemented solely with Australian funding. Construction commenced in 2013-14, but no works have been finalised.

Improving governance and the effectiveness of the Afghan Government

70% of civil servants trained in public sector management have improved their work practices and ability to perform their job.

Successive analysis have found that, along with corruption and political will, capacity of government staff and robustness of their budgeting and other financial processes are fundamental constraints to public service delivery and accountability/ transparency in Afghanistan. Improving these processes is critical to safeguarding Australia’s on-budget contributions to the Afghan Government, and fills a gap in existing donor assistance. Performance against this benchmark will be measured through specific indicators identified at program inception, covering timeliness and quality of procurement, project design, accounting and financial administration processes. There is no baseline for this benchmark as assessment of training outcomes commences in 2014-15.

1,500 women and girl survivors of violence receive services

Supporting Afghan women and girls is a key priority for Australia in Afghanistan. This benchmark aligns with and reflects mutual commitments by both the Australian and Afghan governments to address violence against women (VAW). Increases in the number of women and girls who access of services indicates increased women’s empowerment and positive change in community attitudes toward VAW and women’s rights. The high levels of VAW (87.2 per cent57), low levels of current service provision and operational challenges for those providing services make this target sufficiently ambitious given current Australian investment to the sector. In 2013-14, 1,397 women and girl survivors of violence received services through Australian support, and this is expected to increase to 1,500 in 2014-15.

57 Global Rights: Partners for Justice, Living with Violence: A National Report on Domestic Abuse in Afghanistan, Global Rights, Washington DC, 2008, p. 1.


Management effectiveness and supporting the Afghan Government’s transition to self-reliance, including strengthening TMAF as a mechanism for supporting economic growth and development

The effectiveness of TMAF mechanisms in monitoring progress against mutual commitments, supporting the Afghan Government’s reform efforts, and coordinating donor efforts is strengthened from Australia’s participation in the 5+3 group. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) performs effectively across indicators for program and operational effectiveness, alignment with the Afghan Government’s National Priority Programs, and linkages to donor and Afghan Government mutual accountability commitments. [As Australia’s ARTF support comprised 6.8% of total donor contributions to the fund for 2013, this benchmark reflects the effectiveness of all donor contributions to the ARTF. Assessment of Australia’s impact on the ARTF’s performance and accountability for results must be proportionate to the scale of our contribution.]

The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) is the key mechanism through which the Afghan Government and donors agree mutual commitments for key political, governance and human rights reforms; development priorities, and approaches to the provision of aid in Afghanistan. A TMAF donor group has been formed, and Australia’s membership of this donor group enables us to participate in the assessment of Afghan Government and donors’ progress towards their TMAF commitments, and discussions on improving aid coordination and mutual accountability for Afghanistan’s development. In accordance with the TMAF and to support the Afghan Government to achieve its own development goals and transition to self-reliance, Australia provides 50 per cent of its aid on-budget. This on-budget support is channelled through commitments to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which fully aligns with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and supports 13 Afghan National Priority Programs across agriculture and rural development, governance, human resource development, infrastructure, and security. Australia delivers 50 per cent of our aid to Afghanistan through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The ARTF provides on-budget support to the Afghan Government to enable it to progress its development goals and National Priority Programs such as education, agriculture and rural development, governance, human resource development and infrastructure. Australia and other donors use the ARTF Scorecard to assess the effectiveness and results of all aid delivered through the fund. This includes program and operational effectiveness, alignment with the Afghan Government’s National Priority Programs, and linkages to donor and Afghan Government mutual accountability commitments. In 2013, of the 24 ARTF Scorecard indicators for which data is collected, the ARTF was rated ‘on-track’ for 17 indicators; ‘slight delays’ for 5 indicators; and ‘off-track’ for two indicators.

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