ahmad - the shrinking frontiers of islam - 1976

8/10/2019 Ahmad - The Shrinking Frontiers of Islam - 1976

1/16

The Shrinking Frontiers of IslamAuthor(s): Aziz AhmadReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Apr., 1976), pp. 145-159Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162598.

Accessed: 23/05/2012 06:13

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Cambridge University Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

International Journal of Middle East Studies.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/162598?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/162598?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup


2/16

Int.

J.

Middle East

Stud.

7

(1976),

145-159

Printed

in

U.S.A.

Aziz Ahmad

THE

SHRINKING

FRONTIERS OF ISLAM

I

I

have borrowed

the

term

frontier from the

late

Professor

Joseph

Schacht'

for the Islamic marches where Islamic political power and Islam were once firmly

entrenched.

Unlike

him

I

would

apply

this term

also

to the Islamic marches

in

Europe:

Spain

and

Sicily.

Division of

Islamic

lands

into

geographical categories

The

Central Islamic Lands

and

the

Further Islamic

Lands,

has

also

been

adopted

in

the

recently published

Cambridge History

of

Islam.2

These Islamic

frontiers are:

Spain,

Sicily,

and

the

Balkans

in

Europe;

the

Qipchaq

steppes,

Crimea,

and

Central

Asia in what is the

Soviet

Union

today;

a

gradually

advancing

Islamic

frontier

in

Sub-Saharan

and

Tropical

Africa;

and

the

Indian

subcontinent,

Malaysia,

Indonesia,

and Mindanao in

South

and

South-

east Asia.

Like

all

frontier

regions,

the

frontiers of

Dar

al-Islam

have

been

exposed

to

external

danger

and

some of

these

frontiers have

totally

or

partly

collapsed.

In

some

of

these

frontier

countries,

after

the

end

of

Muslim

political

power,

Islam

as a

religion

has

disappeared

or is in

danger

of

disappearing.

Of these

regions,

in

Sub-Saharan

Africa,

Islam seems to

be

making gradual

headway.

In

Southeast

Asia,

it is

secure

in

Indonesia. With the

expansion

of

Malaya

into

Malaysia,

it

faced to

a certain extent

not

merely

the earlier

problem

of a

large

and

economically

influential

Chinese

minority

on

the

mainland but

also

that of integration of non-Muslim ethnic elements in Borneo. The Constitution

of the

government

of

Malaysia

has

been

able

to solve these

problems

successfully

retaining

the

predominantly

Muslim

personality

of the

state

of

Malaysia.

After

the

incorporation

of

Borneo into

Malaysia

the Inter-Governmental

Committee

recommended in

1963

that Islam should

be the

religion

of

Malaysia,

but that

there should

be no state

religion

for

the

Borneo

states.3

In

Southeast

Asia the

only region

where Muslims face

a

challenge

is Mindanao

and

the smaller southern

islands

in

the

Philippines

where

the

Muslims

have been

1

Joseph Schacht,ed.,

The

Legacy of

Islam

(Oxford, I974).

2

The

Cambridge

History of

Islam

[CHI],

ed.

P.

M.

Holt,

Ann

K. S.

Lambton,

and

Bernard

Lewis

(Cambridge,

I970).

3

Harry

Miller,

The

Story of

Malaysia (London,

1965),

p.

235;

see

also E.

I.

J.

Rosenthal,

Islam in the

Modern National

State

(Cambridge, 1965), pp.

287-306,

359-36I.

I45


3/16

I46

Aziz

Ahmad

reduced to

a

minority

by

the influx of

large

Christian

elements

from

the

north

and

where Muslims

rose

in

armed rebellion in

I973.

From other Islamic frontier

regions

Islam has either

totally disappeared

or

faces

a

threat

to survival

after

the

collapse

of

Muslim

political power.

This

his-

torical

phenomenon

shows a

certain common

pattern

of cause-and-effect

relation-

ships.

To

begin

with,

a viable

Muslim state disintegrates

yielding

place

to

smaller,

often

mutually

warring,

principalities

which are

unable

either to stand

individually

or to unite

together

against

a

rising

hostile

power.

The

Muslim doctrine

of

hijra

leads to

the

emigration

of

the

elite

from

these

areas to more secure

lands

in

the

Muslim

world.

In

due

course the masses

are

converted

to the faith of the hostile

political power,

and

Islam

ceases to

exist

or is

in

danger

of

extinction.

To illustrate this theoretical framework, I am selecting four frontiers of Islam:

Spain

and

Sicily,

whence

Islam

has

totally disappeared;

and

Russia

and

South

Asia

where

its survival

is

to

some

extent

threatened,

though

much more

so in

Russia

and

much

less

so

in India.

II

All

these four

regions:

Spain,

Italy,

the

Qipchaq steppes

and Central

Asia

in

Russia,

and

India

had

viable

and,

except

for

Sicily, powerful

Muslim states.

In

Spain

the

Umayyad caliphate

was

a bastion of Muslim

power,

but

it suffered

from

one

structural

weakness which was

to

a

great

extent

responsible

for the

limited

role

of

Islamic

power

and

presence

in

the Iberian

peninsula.

It

was

basically

an

Andalusian

state;

its

outlying

provinces

with their

capitals

at

Merida/Badajoz,

Toledo,

and

Saragossa

were the

lower,

middle,

and

upper

thughlir

or

Marches

of

the

Umayyad

caliphate.4

The

Umayyads

allowed considerable

latitude

to the

amirs

in

charge

of these

marches

and considered

them as territories of

secondary

importance.

As

a

result Islamization

there

did

not

progress

to

any

significant

extent

and

was

basically

confined to

a

comparatively

small

part

of

the

peninsula,

Andalusia.

The

'Amirid

dictatorship

which seized

power

from

the

Umayyads,

merely

nominally

acknowledging

them

as

sovereigns,

was a

continuation

of

the

Islamic

central

state

at

least for some

time. But

it

eroded

the

unity

of Muslim

power

by

drastically

reducing

the

prestige

of the

Umayyad

caliphal

house.

In the

end

it

was no match for

the

internal

strife

that

had been the

characteristic

of

Islamic

Spain

almost

from

the

beginning.

4

E.

Levi-Provencal,

Histoire

de

l'Espagin

miusulmane

(Paris,

1950),

I,

154

and

passin;

in greater detail, idem, L'Espagne

nlusu111anle anC

Xe siecle (Paris,

1932),

pp. 115-127; J. Bosch

Vila,

Algunas

consideraciones sobre

'Al-Tagr

en

Al-Andalus'

y

la divisi6n

politico-adminis-

trativa de la

Espafia

musulmana,

in Etudds

d'Orientalislme

dediecs

a la

Mwmoire

de

Levi-

Provencal

(Paris,

1962),

I,

23-33;

Hussain

Mones,

La divisi6n

politico-administrativa

de

la

Espafia

musulmana,

Revista

del

Instituto

de

Estudios

Islamicos

en

Madrid,

V

(I957), 88-98.


4/16

The

shrinking

frontiers of

Islam

I47

The

Christian

states

that

had

survived

in

the

north of

the

peninsula

presented

another

challenge

to

the

Umayyad caliphate

and to

the

'Amirid

dictatorship

alike.

This

was

the

re-Christianization of

whatever

territory

they managed

to

seize

more or

less

permanently.

They

settled

Christians,

either

of

their own

territories

or

refugees

from Muslim

areas,

on the

occupied

territories.5

Their

gains

were

thus

consolidated

from

the

very beginning

of what later

came to

be

called

Re-

conquista.

By

comparison

the

brilliant

victories of

'Abd

al-Rahman

III and

al-

Mansuir

were

ephemeral

and

contributed

in

no

way

either to

the

permanent

ex-

tension or

to

the

consolidation

of

the

Muslim

presence

in

the

peninsula.

In

Sicily,

the

Kalbite

principality

was a

viable,

though

not

a

powerful,

state.

It

was an

almost

independent

march

of the

Fatimid

caliphate.

The

Kalbites

con-

tinued to strike coins in the names of the Fatimid

caliphs

and to receive honorific

titles from

them.

It remains

to

be

investigated

whether

Kalbite

Sicily

was

more

closely integrated

into

the economic fabric of

the Fatimid

state

than the

Zirid

principality

before

al-Mu'izz.

Between

947

and

1039

the Kalbite

dynasty

remained

firmly

entrenched

in

Sicily,

though,

as in

Umayyad

and 'Amirid

Spain,

there

were

continuous

uprisings.

At its

height

the

Muslim

population

in

Sicily

may

have consisted

of half

a

million,6

settled more

densely

in

the western

and

south-

eastern

parts, especially

the

Val

di Mazara.

In

the

Qipchaq steppes

in

what

is

Russia

today,

Jochi's

Horde

developed

after

some time into the

powerful

khanate of the Golden Horde. The

greater

part

of

the clans

that formed

the

Horde were

Turkish,

and

in

language

and

culture

the

Turkish

element was

predominant.

The essence

of the Horde's

civilization

was

nomadic. Thus

in

I334

Ibn

Battfita

saw the

ordu

of

Ozbeg

moving

from

place

to

place

like

a vast mobile

city

with

mosques

and

bazaars.7 Had

they

remained

totally

nomadic the Tatars

(Turks)

of

the

Qipchaq might

have

disappeared

from

history

at

an

early stage

of

Russian

impact.

In

fact,

their

nomadism

was

counterbalanced

by

prosperous

urban centers

with

thriving

crafts

and

trade. Some

of

these

towns,

like

Sarai-Berke,

were founded

by

the Tatars themselves.

Even in the first and abortive

phase

of the Islamization of

Jochi's

Horde under

Berke

(I256-I267),

Islam

seems

to

have met with

considerable

success

in its

Mongol aristocracy.

Several

of

his

amirs had

imams

and muezzins

in

their ser-

vice.8

Berke's

foreign policy

was

oriented

strongly

toward

Islam,

especially

in

his

disapproval

of

Hiilagii's

action which

put

an end to

the 'Abbasid

caliphate

in

1258,

and in

his

subsequent

alliance

with

Mamlik

Egypt

against

the

Il-Khans.9

5

Levi-Provencal, Histoire,

I,

79

and

passim.

6

Denis

MacSmith,

A

History of

Sicily:

Medieval

Sicily

800-1713

(London, I968),

p.

II.

7

Ibn

Battuta,

Voyages,

ed.

C.

Defremery

and B. R.

Sanguinetti

(Paris, 1857),

II,

380.

8 Ibn 'Abd

al-Zahir

in W. F. von

Tiesenhausen,

Sbornik materialov

otnosjascikhsya

k

istorii

Zolotoi

Ordy (St.

Petersburg,

1884),

I,

54;

B. Grekov

and A.

Jakoubovski,

La

Horde

d'Or

et la

Russic

(Paris,

I96I), p. I53.

9

Tiesenhausen,

op.

cit.,

I,

202

(al-Dhahabi),

274

(Ibn Kathir);

B.

Spuler,

Die

Goldene

Horde

(Wiesbaden, 1965),

p. 213.


5/16


6/16

The

shrinking

frontiers

of

Islam

I49

religion.

His theocratization of the state

changed

the course of

the

subcontinent's

history.

III

In

all

the four

cases

under

study-Spain, Sicily, Qipchaq-Central

Asia,

and

India-the

viable or

powerful

Muslim

state

disintegrated

into successor

states at a

time

when

a

strong

hostile

power

was

emerging.

The

fragmented

successor

states

were unable

to face

the

challenge

of

the

rising

hostile

power,

were

unable to

unite

against

it,

and were

conquered

piecemeal.

In all these

lands Islam

ceased

to be the

ruling political power.

In

Spain

the

'Amirid

dictatorship

collapsed

about

Ioo9

and

gave

way

to

the

emergence

of

as

many

as

thirty

small

principalities.

These,

known

to

history

as

the

muluk

al-tawzt'if

or

reyes

de

taifas, represented

a

particularism

which

has

been

de-

scribed as

both

regional

and

ethnic

in

the

sense

that

some

of

them were

ruled

by

Arabs,

others

by

Berbers,

the

Thaqaliba,

and

by

the

local

Spanish

Muslims.15

Strangely enough

the three

thughur-Badajoz,

Toledo,

and

Saragossa-did

not

suffer from

the same

fragmentation

as the Muslim

heartland,

Andalusia.16

There

was not a

monolithic

hostile

power

in

Spain,

but the northern Christian

states, though not united, were individually stronger than the individual reyes de

taifas.

The

former

were

generally

successful

against

the latter.

Even the

principality

of

Seville,

the

most

illustrious,

if

not

the

strongest,

of

these

petty

states,

was

reduced

to

pay

tribute to its

Christian

adversary-a

significant

reversal

of historical roles.

Whenever the

Christian states

annexed

any

Muslim

territory,

they

continued

their

policy

of

settling

Christians,

now

mainly

the Christian

Mozarabes

from

Andalusia,

on

these lands. Thus

the

re-Christianization of the

peninsula

continued

in

a

move-

ment from north

toward south.

By

Io85

after

the fall

of

Toledo,

al-Mu'tamid

of

Seville

and some

other

Muslim

principalities felt so threatened that they had to invite the Almoravid Yfsuf ibn

T/ishufin

to

their

rescue.

Yfisuf's decision in

Ioo9

to

stay

on in

Spain

and to

incor-

porate

the

principalities

of

the

reyes

de

taifas

into his dominion

was

on

the one

hand

a

policy

of

empire-building

but

was

on the other

the

only

course

possible

to

restore

to

Spain

the

unity

of

Islamic

power

to stem the tide

of

Reconquista.

The Almoravid

rule

in

Spain

can

be

viewed

as

the

first

interregnum

during

the

historical

process

of the

fragmentation

of

Muslim

territories

into successor states.

It

reversed

the

trend of

fragmentation temporarily,

for

half a

century,

while it

delayed

the momen-

tum of the

Reconquista

for

only

a

little over

a

quarter

century.

The final

collapse

15

R.

Dozy,

Histoire

des

musulmans

d'Espagne (Leiden,

I86I),

IV,

1-2;

A.

Prieto

y

Vives,

Los

reyes

dc

taifas:

Estudio hist6rico-numismatico

(Madrid,

1926);

W.

Montgomery

Watt,

A

History

of

Islamiic

Spain (Edinburgh, 1965),

pp.

I03-III,

I47-I54.

16

Bosch

Vila,

Algunas

consideraciones sobre

'Al-Takr

en

al-Andalus',

p. 25.


7/16

I50

Aziz

Ahmad

of Almoravid rule

in

Spain

was

brought

about

by

the

inherent

disintegrative

trends

and revolts of

the

Spanish

Muslims.

Whatever was left

of

Muslim

Spain

in the

middle

of

the

twelfth

century

was

again engulfed

in

chaos. Once

again,

between

1145

and

1170,

there

arose

numerous Muslim

petty

states,

several

of them

paying

tribute

to Christian

Kingdoms.

The

extension

of

the

Almohad

empire

into

Spain

from

II70

to

1230

can be

de-

scribed as the

second

interregnum

during

the

period

of

Muslim

anarchy.

The

Almohad

victory

over

Alfonso

VIII

of

Castile

at

Alarcos

(July

1195)

gave

what

turned out to be

a

short-lived

promise

that at least a

part

of what

was

Islamic

Spain

could survive as a

united

state. This

hope

was

shattered

in

July

1212

when the

Kingdoms

of

Leon, Castile,

Navarre,

and

Aragon joined

together

to

inflict

the

fateful

defeat

of Las

Navas de

Tolosa.

Fragmented

Christian

states

joined

together

into

a

single

and unified

front

to shatter the unstable

unity

of

the

Muslim state

and

splinter

it

once

again

and

in

due

course

to

absorb

these

fragments

one

by

one. The

third

period

of

Muslim

successor states

after

the

Almohads

easily

succumbed

to

the

Reconquista.

The survival

of

Granada from

1235

to

1492

for

two and a

half

centuries as

a

tributary

and vassal of

Castile

had its

parellels

later in

other

Muslim frontiers.

The

Union of

Castile and

Aragon

with

Ferdinand

and

Isabella

(1479)

created

the

monolithic

hostile

power

that

in

1492

dealt

Granada

its

deathblow

and

ended

the

Muslim

chapter

of

Spanish

history

and

the

Spanish chapter

of Islamic

history.

The

difference

between the

Spanish

Reconquista

and the

Norman

conquest

of

Sicily

is

that

in

the former

case the

Spaniards

themselves

drove

the

Muslims

out,

and

in

the

process

of

doing

so

emerged

eventually

as

a

strong

power,

whereas

in

the

conquest

of

Sicily

it

was a

foreign

power,

the

Normans,

which,

though

aided

by

the

Christians of

the

island,

was

decisively

victorious over the

Arabs

by

dint

of

its

unity

and its

superior

military organization. Compared

with the

Spaniards,

the

Normans

were

also

much more

tolerant

of

the

vanquished

Muslims.17

As an Arab

writer

puts

it,

the

primary

cause of

the

ruin of the

Muslims

in

Sicily

was mutual discord.18 The whole of Muslim

history

in

Sicily

had been riddled with

turmoil

and

uprisings

which had been

kept

tinder

tenuous

control

by

the

Aghlabids,

the

Fatimids,

and the

Kalbites.

The

deposition

in

1052

of

the last

Kalbite

amir,

Hasan

al-Salmsaml,

proved

to

be the

point

of no

return

for Sicilian

Islam. Arab rule

broke

up

into small

fragments.

A

small

oligarchical

group

seized local

power

in

Palermo.

'Abd

Allah

b.

Mankit became

independent

in

Mazara,

Ibn

Hawwas

in

Girgenti,

and Ibn Thumna in

Syracuse.

Ibn Thumna

occupied

Palermo;

he

then

seized

Catania,

killed

its

potentate

Ibn

Maklati,

and married

his

widow

Mlaymfina

who was a sister

of

Ibn

Hawwas.19 Defeated

by

Ibn

IHawwas

near

Castragiovanni

17

F.

Gabrieli,

La

politique

arabe

des

Normandsde

Sicile,

Studia

Islanica,

IX

(I958), 83.

18

Ibn

Abi

Dinar,

Anno

484,

in

M.

Amari,

ed.,

Biblioteca arabo-sicula

(Ital.

vers.)

(Turin

and

Rome,

1881-82),

II,

287-288.

19

Ibn

al-Athir

(ed.

Tornberg),

X,

I3I.


8/16

The

shrinking

frontiers

of

Islam

15I

he

summoned the

Normans

to his aid.

Between

io6i

and

I09I

Roger

I

completed

the

conquest

of

Sicily.20

Coming

to the

Qipchaq steppes

in

Russia,

the

disintegration

of

the Golden Horde

began

in

1359

in

the

course

of

civil strife.

In

1362

it

was

defeated

on

the

Sinyukha

by

the

Grand

Principality

of

Lithuania.

Between

1376

and

1415

Tokhtamish

united

it

for the

last

time,

but

he

was twice

defeated

by

Timur,

in

1375

and

I379.

Tokhtamish's

effort

had

succeeded

in

creating

only

a

short-lived

interregnum

of

unity.

From

1438

there was

general

chaos

in

the

Qipchaq

steppes.

In the cities

and settled areas

commerce and

agriculture

continued,

and

out of

these

nuclei there

emerged

the

important

successor khanates of

Kazan,

Astrakhan,

and the Crimea.

In

Kazan

the Russians tried

to

retain

a

pro-Russian

khan

without

much

success

They

were able to make use of the non-Muslim elements of Kazan in their conflict

with

that

khanate.

Finally

Ivan

the

Terrible

annexed

Kazan

in

1552.

Astrakhan,

which

was

founded

in

1466,

accepted

in the

sixteenth

century

Ottoman

influence

to

a

limited

extent in

its own

interest.

With

the

fall of

Kazan

it was too weak

to

withstand

Russia

which

annexed

it

in

I556.

The Crimea

enjoyed

a

certain

measure of

independence

since

the end

of the

fourteenth

century,

which was

consolidated

by HIajji Giray (d.

I466).

In

I475,

under

Mengli,

the

Crimea

accepted

Ottoman

suzerainty.

The Ottoman sultans

assumed the

right

of

appointing

or

dismissing

khans

in

the Crimea

in

consultation

with the mirzcdswho were leaders of CrimeanTatar tribes, four of whom were

by

tradition more

predominant

than the others.21

The Crimea's

fate came to

be

bound

up

with

the

strength

or

weakness

of the Ottoman

Empire

vis-a-vis the

rising

monolithic hostile

power

of

Russia

which

had

already

overwhelmed

Kazan and

Astrakhan.

In

I570

the

Ottoman-backed

Crimean Tatars

were

strong enough

to

attack

and

burn

Moscow.

But

only

four

years

later

in

1574,

the

Russians were

able

to

impose

the

treaty

of

Kiichiik

Kaynarja

on

the

Ottomans,

by

which Crimea

became

theoretically

independent.

In

1783

the

troops

of

Catherine

the

Great

an-

nexed

Crimea

to the

Russian

empire.

In Central Asia, the three successor states of Shaybanid Ozbegs, Bukhara,

Khokand,

and

Khiva were

small,

disunited,

and

exposed

to

the

expanding

might

of Russia.

In

Bukhara,

the

Mangit ruling dynasty

was weaker than its

predecessor,

the

Janid.

Finally

in

I868

General

K.

P.

Kaufmann

occupied

Samarqand,

which

was

ceded to the

Russians,

and

the

khanate

of

Bukhara

became a

Russian

pro-

tectorate,

though

with internal

autonomy

and

religious

freedom.

The

region

of Khokand

asserted

its

independence

of

Bukhara toward the

close

of

the

seventeenth

century.

In the

middle of

the

nineteenth the

nomad and

the settled

elements

of

its

population

were at

strife. The

Russian

impact

on Khokand was

20

M.

Amari,

Storia

dei musulmanidi

Sicilia,

ed.

C.

A.

Nallino

(Catania,

1935),

III,

15-183;

U.

Rizzitano,

Ibn

Thumna,

El2,

III,

956; idem,

Ibn

al-Hawwus,

El2, III,

788.

21

C.

M.

Kortepeter,

Ottoman

Imperialism

during

the

Reformation:

Europe

and the

Caucasus

(New

York,

1972),

pp.

7-8.


9/16

I52

Aziz Ahmad

gradual,

but more

decisive

than in the case

of Bukhara.

In

1875

the

territory

of

Khokand was annexed and incorporatedinto the Russian empire.

The

Khanate of

Khiva had

its

period

of

expansion

under

Khan Muhammad

Rahim

between

I806

and

1824,

but

soon

after,

between

1827

and

1864,

it was

riddled

with revolt and

internecine

struggle.

Russian

encroachment

began

in

1834

and resulted

finally

in

the decisive

victories

of

General

Kaufmann

in

1873

which

reduced

that

khanate

to

a Russian

protectorate

in

the

sense

that its

foreign

policy

came to be

controlled

by

the Russians.22

As

in

Russia

the

Muslims

of

India

faced

challenges

of monolithic hostile

powers

in

two

stages;

in the

case of Russia

those of the

Czarist

regime

and the

Soviet

Union,

and in South Asia those of the British Indian Empire and subsequentlythe Republic

of India.

The

successor

states

to the

iMughal

empire

in India

were

non-Muslim as

well

as

Muslim.

In

fact,

the

non-Muslim successor

states,

especially

the

Maratha Confed-

eracy

and

the Sikh

state

in the

Punjab,

were more

powerful

than the

Muslim

successor

states,

like

Bengal,

Awadh,

and

Hyderabad.

Of

the

Muslim successor

states

only Mysore

under

Haydar

'Ali

and

Tipfi

Sultan

rose

to be

powerful

enough

to

wage

a

struggle

against

the British

and

the

Marathas,

and

finally

succumbed

fighting against

a

military

alliance between

the

British,

the

Marathas,

and

the

Nizam of Hyderabad.Under the British East India Companya numberof Muslim

successor states were annexed to the British

territory.

These

included

Bengal

and

Awadh,

the two

principal

successor states of northern

India. In

the

south,

Mysore

was

given

to

a

Hindu ruler under

British

suzerainty

while

Arcot was

annexed.

Of

the Muslim

successor states

only Hyderabad

and a

few

other

principalities

survived

as British

protectorates.

On

the

other

hand a

large

number

of

Hindu

successor states

survived as

protectorates,

though

with

reduced areas.

The

Muslim

successor

states

of

the

Mughal

empire

provided

employment

and

job

opportunities

for

the

Muslim

middle

classes.

Their

annexation led

to the

impoverishmentof Muslim elite and masses, especially in Bengal.23

The

Muslim

community

as

a

whole

did

not

suffer

much

under the

British.

In

fact,

after

the

I87os

it

developed

a sense of

political community,

and

in

due

course

a

political

separatism,

which

was

encouraged by

the

British.

The

separatism

was

motivated

by

an

apprehension

regarding

the

economic,

cultural,

even

religious

future

of

the

community

vis-a-vis

the

three-times-larger

Hindu

community,

which

would

inevitably

be

the

ruler

and decision-maker

in

India

when

parliamentary

institutions

introduced

by

the British

matured,

and the

British

empire

was

replaced

by

an

indigenous

democracy.

Muslim

separatism

led

eventually

to the

division

of

the

British Indian

Empire

22

B.

Spuler

in

CHI,

I,

468-494.

23

W. W.

Hunter,

The

Indian Musalmans

(London,

I87I),

passim.


10/16


11/16

154

Aziz

Ahmad

is

necessary

after the

conquest

of

Mecca.32 It is

not until

we

come to

Ahmad

b.

Hanbal,

who was

persecuted

for

his

strong

anti-Mu'tazilite

traditionalism

under

al-Ma'mfin

and

al-Mu'tasim,

that we meet an

emphasis

on

the

value of

hijra.3

It

was natural

that

the doctrine

of

hijra

should

have been revived

by

the Muslim

elite when the Islamic

frontiers were

on

the

retreat,

as

in

Spain

and

Sicily,

or

when

the heartlands

of

Islam

were overrun

by

hostile

forces,

as

during

the

Mongol

onslaught

and the

Crusades.

Large

numbers of the Muslim

elite

migrated

to

Egypt,

Anatolia,

and

India

after the

Mongol

conquest

of

Central

Asia,

Persia,

and

Iraq.

Ibn

Jubayr

denounces

those who

stayed

on

in

the land of

the

Franks

(at

Acre)

dur-

ing

the

Crusades,

served them

and

lived

with

the abominations

they

practiced.34

The

doctrine of

hijra

was involved

with

two serious

drawbacks from the view-

point

of

Islam

in

the lost

areas.

Only

the

elite,

which

formed a

very

small

percentage

of the

total

population,

had

the means to

emigrate

and

the

talent

or the

financial

resources

to

rehabilitate

itself in

new

surroundings.

The

other,

and the more

serious,

drawback

was that

the

emigration

of the

greater part

of

the

elite

left

the

Muslim

masses

leaderless

and

susceptible

to

conversion to

the

faith

of

the

non-Muslim

conquerors.

In

Spain,

the

Mudejares

(from

Arabic

mudajjan:

permitted

to

remain

or

subordinates )

had

in

the

early

stages

a

position

parallel

to

that

of

non-Muslim

comlmunities

in

an

Islamic

state,

observing

their

religious

rites

and

living

according

to their

customs

under

Muslim

qi'ids.

They

paid

a

capitation

tax,

just

as the

non-

Muslims

paid

jizya

in

a Muslim

state.

They

had to

wear distinctive

dress

and

to

live

in

the

Muslim

quarters

of the

towns.

In the

thirteenth and fourteenth

centuries

they

culturally

influenced

their

rulers;

but there must have

been

during

this

period

steady

migration

from

among

them to other

Muslim

lands.

In

the

fifteenth

century

the

lot

of

the

Mludejares

worsened.

Their

religious

survival

began

to

face severe

difficulties when the

Spanish regime

of

Ferdinand

and

Isabella took

over the

responsibilities

of

administering

the

Inquisition.

Cardinal

Ximenez

di

Cisneros influenced the

Spanish

government

to

such

an extent

that

copies

of the

Qur'an

and other Islamic literature were burned.

The insurrection

of the

Muslims

which

followed was

ruthlessly suppressed,

and

in

150I

the

Muslims

of

Granada

were

given

the

choice

of

baptism

or exile.

In

1525-1526

the

Muslims

of other

provinces

in

Spain

had to face the same choice.

The bulk of

Muslim

Spain,

most

probably,

accepted Christianity

while the

religious

and

commlercial

elite

migrated

to North Africa and the

Ottoman

empire.

In

1526

the

Moriscos of

Valencia were

expelled.

32

Bukhari

(Leiden,

I862-I9o8),

56:I,

26, 194; 58:22;

63:45; 64:53;

Muslim

(Cairo,

A.H.

I283/I866), 33:83-86;

Abfi

Da'fid

(Cairo,

A.H.

1292/1875),

15:2;

Tirmidhi

(Cairo,

A.H.

I292/I875),

19:33;

Ibn

Maja

(Cairo,

A.H.

1313/I895),

II:I2;

Nast'i

(Cairo,

A.H.

1312/1894),

39:9.

33

Ahmad

b.

Hanbal, Musnad,

II,

315;

III,

370

et

seq.

34

Ibn

Jubayr,

Rihla

(Beirut,

I959),

pp.

279-280.


12/16

The

shrinking

frontiers

of

Islam

155

In

1566

there was fresh

legislation

against

whatever

tiny

residue of

Muslims

had remained in

Spain.

The Moriscos

of

Spain

revolted

in

the

Alpujarras

in

1568,

counting

upon help

to be

provided

by

the Ottoman

beglerbeg

of

Algiers.

Finally,

the edict of

expulsion

promulgated

by Philip

III

in

I609,

followed

by

another

such

edict

in

I619,

forced the eviction

of

half a

million Muslims

from

Spain.

After

that

no

Muslims were left in

Spain.

Norman

Sicily

was

much

more tolerant

of

the Muslim

survival

than was Catholic

Spain,

and much

more

saturated with

Muslim culture. But here

also we

see the

same

process

at work.

A

large

number

of

'ulamn'

and staunch Muslims

migrated

from

Sicily shortly

after

the

conquest

of

the island

by Roger

I,

who

was

by

no

means

intolerant;

and

another

wave

of

migration

accompanied

the

retreating

forces

of

Ayyfib

b.

Tamim,

the Zirid.35

The

migration

of

the

intellectuals

and

other

elements of

the

Muslim elite

continued

throughout

the Norman

period.

While

in

the

cities

respectable

and some

times

prosperous

Muslim

communities

had remained under

the

early

Norman

rulers,

in

the

feudalized

countryside they

became

serfs and

villeins,

their lot

being

hardly

better

than

that

of

slaves.

The

counterpart

of

the

Norman

religious

and

cultural

tolerance of

the

Arabs

was the Norman

sovereign's

position

as

the defender and

helper

of

Christianity

(ndsir

al-nasraniyya),

his

relationship

with

the

Pope,

and

his

efforts

toward

the

establishment of the Catholic Church in

Sicily

at the

expense

of Islam. As the

power

of

the

Norman

sovereign

weakened

after

William

II,

the

feudal

hierarchy,

which held

the

rural

Muslim

population

in

tutelage

in

association

with

the

Catholic

church

which

regarded

conversion

to

Christianity

as

a

meritorious

work,

made

the

survival

of Islam

difficult in

Sicily.36

Even

under

William

II,

Ibn

Jubayr

noticed

the Muslim

elite

continuing

to

migrate,

seeing

no

future

for

itself

in

Sicily,

and

encouraging

its

daughters

to

marry

Muslim

visitors from

other

lands. The

temptation

as

well as the coercion

to

convert

to

Christianity

was

disrupting

the

patriarchal

Muslim life. Even the

tolerant William II would force some of his leading Muslim officials to renounce

their

faith.37

With

the

decline of

the

Norman house

of

Hauteville

the

position

of

the Muslims became

even

more

precarious.

The

year

II89-90

sealed their

fate,

with their

revolt and its

sanguinary suppression.

After

this

the Arab

element of

Palermo

almost

disappeared,

as

the

Muslim

population

of

other

Sicilian

cities

already

had.

Only

in

Val

di

Mazara in the

mountains did

Muslim

resistance

continue,

culminating

in

1222-23

in

the

resistance

of

Mirabetto

(Ibn

'Abbad)

during

the

reign

of Fredrick

II. The Muslim

revolt

was

finally

suppressed

between

1243

and

1246,

when

the

otherwise

liberal

and

Arabophile

Fredrick

exiled

the

remaining Muslim populationfrom Sicily to Lucera on the Italian mainland.This

35

Ibn

al-Athir,

Anno

484,

in

Amari,

Biblioteca

arobo-sicula

(Ital.

vers.),

I,

448-449.

36

Gabrieli,

La

politique

arabe,

Studia

Islamica,

IX

(1958), 92.

37

Ibn

Jubayr,

Rihla,

pp.

3I3-316.


13/16

156

Aziz

Ahmad

Muslim residue in

Lucera

was

consistently

under

pressure

from Charles

II

d'Anjou

to

convert

to

Christianity,

first

by

persuasion,38

and

in the end

by

regi-

mentation,

when the Arab

colony

of Lucera was

destroyed

by

his order in I300.39

Facts

are

not

available

as to

whether

any,

and

if

so what

percentage

of

Tatar

elite

migrated

from

Kazan and Astrakhan

after the Russian

occupation.

In

the

case

of

the

Crimea

it has been

estimated

that

possibly

half

the

Muslim

Tatar

population

migrated

to

the

Ottoman

empire

after

annexation

by

Russia.40

Russian

peasants

were settled in

the

Crimean

peninsula

as

well

as

the

steppeland

of the

Nogays.

The Tatars in

the Crimea

were thus

reduced to

a

minority,

while

the

Nogays

were removed

first to the

Kuban,

then

to

the

north

of the Sea of

Azov.

A

policy

of

forcible

conversion of

Tatars

to

Christianity

was

adopted

after

the

Russian

conquest

of

Kazan,

where a Christian Tatar

community,

that of the

Kryashens,

came

into

being.

This

policy

was

suspended

by

the liberal

Romanovs,

but was revived

by

Peter

the Great

and

continued

until

the

accession

of

Catherine

II.41

Conversely,

between

I905

and

I916

there was some conversion

to

Islam

among

the Finnic

people

of Middle

Volga,

such as

the

Maris,

the

Mordvinians,

the

Udmurts,

and

the Christian

Turkish

Chuvash.42

Around the

beginning

of

the

twentieth

century

and

during

its

first decade

the intellectuals

of

Muslim

Russia

formed

the

vanguard

of

the

propagation

of the

pan-Turkic

movement

within

Russia,

as

well

as

outside

it

as

an

intellectual

diaspora.43

When the Czarist

regime collapsed

during

the First World

War,

Russia had

the

third

largest

Muslim

population

in

the

world,

between

I5

and

I8

million,

and

next

only

to the

Muslim

population

of the British and the Ottoman

empires.

The

Muslim

population

was

dispersed

in

several

parts

of

Russia,

in

the

Volga-Ural

region,

in

Siberia,

in

Central

Asia,

and

in

the

Caucasus

and the

Crimea.

For

over half a

century

the

effort of the

Soviet

Government

has been to

absorb

this Muslim

population

within the

general

Russian ethnic

fabric,

and to

involve

it

in

the

Soviet state

ideologically

by de-Islamizing

it. This

policy

has fluctuated

according

to

political

necessity

and

expediency.

In

March

1918

the

national

miove-

ment of the Tatars of Kazan was

suppressed.

In

I923, teaching

of

religion

to

children below the

age

of

14

was

forbidden.

The

use

of

the

Arabic

script

was

abolished

in

1928-29.

The

period

between

1928

and

Russia's involvement

in

World War

II in

1941

was

that of direct

attack

on

Islam. The

hajj,

which

also

meant

contact

with Muslims

of

other

lands,

was

forbidden.

Between

I929

and

38

For instance

in

1294

Raymond

Lull

was

specially

commissioned

by

Charles

to

confer

with

the

Saracens

of

Lucera,

P.

Egidi,

ed.,

Codice

Diplomatico

dei Saraceni

di

Lucera

(Naples, 1917),

p. 32.

39

P.

Egidi,

La colonia saracena

di

Lucera

e

la sna

distrluione

(Naples,

1912),

pp.

75-76.

40

M. E.

Yapp

in

CHI,

I,

502.

41

A.

Bennigsen

and Chantal

Lemercier-Quelquejay,

Islam

in the

Soviet

Union

(New

York,

1967),

p.

12.

42

Ibid.,

p. 27.

43

S.

A.

Zenkovsky,

Pan-Turkism

and

Islam in Russia

(Cambridge,

Mass.,

1960),

passinm.


14/16

The

shrinking

frontiers

of

Islam

157

I939, 33,000

mosques

were

closed down in the areas

of

Muslim

concentration

throughout

Russia.44

Such policies were held in abeyance during the war years I94I to

I945.

In

1945

antireligious policies

toward the

Muslims

of

Russia

were

revived.

In

several

areas

in

Russia the

Muslim

majority

was

transformed

into

a

minority

through

large-scale

Russian

immigration.

Kazakhs

have become

a

minority

in

Kazakhstan. In

the

Bashkir

A.S.S.R.,

the Bashkirs are

today

a

minority.

In

the

Tatar

A.S.S.R.

the

Tatar

percentage

of the

total

population

is not

more

than

one-half.

The Tatars of the Crimea were

accused

of

collaborating

with

the

Germans

in

World

War

II

and

exiled en masse

to

Kirghizia.

The

colonial

objectives

of

the Czarist

regime

in

Central Asia were

two: To

develop

it as

a

raw cotton producing area to feed the Russian textile industry, and to settle

Russians

in

the

area.

Both

these

objectives

continue

to be

pursued

by

the Soviet

Union.

In

Russia,

according

to

Muslim and

Western

specialists, very

little

of tradi-

tional

Islam

has survived.

But

it

still

survives

as a social

bond of union

which

enables the

Muslims

to

differentiate

themselves

from the

Russians. 45

This

estimate of

Professor

Bennigsen

was

made some

years ago.

Now he

is

more

optimistic

about

the survival of Islam in

Russia.

His

optimism

is based

on

two

points:

First,

the

population explosion among

Muslims in

the

Soviet

Union

indicates that the Muslim population is multiplying at a much higher rate than

the Russian

population;

and

second,

the

effort of the Russian Muslims

to

conserve

their

identity by

refusing

to

migrate

voluntarily

from

the areas of

their

concen-

tration,

and

by

adhering

at least

symbolically

to

Islam

by

observing

strictly

the

rite

of

circumcision.46

This

optimism

may

have

to,

be

considerably

modified

in

the

face

of

Russian

coercive

measures,

which

may

lead

to

forced

migration

and

dispersion

within

the

Soviet

Union,

the

Russian

genius

for

assimilation,

and

a

possible

prohibition

of the

rite

of circumcision.

Compared

with the Soviet

Union,

the

Islamic

presence

has

a

considerably

better

chance of survival in South Asia, though there too it is beset with formidable

challenges.

The

Muslim

population

of

the

subcontinent

is now

divided

into three

states:

India,

Pakistan,

and

Bangladesh.

In India

it

is

about 10

percent

of

the

total

population,

which is

generally

Hindu.

The

government

of

the

Indian National

Congress

which

has ruled the

country

since

1947,

as well as India's

constitution,

declare India

to be

a

secular state.

The

British

government

in

India had

provided

a certain

measure

of

economic

and

educational

protection

for

the Muslims

of

India,

especially

since the

I87os.

This

patronage

was

withdrawn from

them

by

the

independent government

of

44

Bennigsen

and

Lenercrci-Quelquejay,

Islam in

the

Soviet

Union,

pp.

I49-15I;

Akdes

Nimet Kurat

in

CHI,

I,

627-639.

45

Bennigsen

and

Lemercier-Quelquejay, op.

cit.,

I83.

46

Bennigsen

in Seminar

at

the

University

of

Toronto,

November

1972.


15/16

158

Aziz Ahmad

India,

ironically

enough

in

the name of secularism. While

individual

Muslims

have

risen to

very

high

positions

in

India,

including

that of

the Head

of the

State,

the total

employment

of Muslims in

the

Central

and

Provincial

government

offices

is

less than

I

percent,

or

one-tenth

of

what

they

should have

had

according

to their

percentage

in

population.

There

are

no

Muslim

industrialists,

as

almost

all

of

them

migrated

to Pakistan

in

quest

of better

opportunities

and less

competition.

For the same

reason there are

few

big

businessmen.

There

are

a

large

number

of

Muslims

engaged

in

retail

trade,

but

they

are

very

insecure

owing

to

the

riots

organized

by

the

strongly

anti-Muslim

political

party,

Jana

Sangh,

second

in

strength only

to

the Indian

National

Congress.

The

pattern

of these

riots is to

sack

and

burn the

houses

and

shops

of the

Muslims,

taking

away

their means of

livelihood and even the roof over their

heads,

reducing

them to the level of a low

caste,

ironically enough

in

a modern

India

which

is

winning

its

fight against

the

traditional

iniquities

of

caste structure.

Recently

the

government

of

Indira

Gandhi

was

able

to control the anti-Muslim

communal

riots to

some

extent;

and if her

party

retains its

power

and

strength

there

is some

hope

of

security

for

Muslims.

If

the

Jana

Sangh

comes

into

power,

their fate

is

sealed,

though theoretically

it

concedes

that the

Muslims

may

worship

the

Islamic

way,

but

they

must live

the

Indian

(an

aphorism

for

Hindu )

way.47

The

Jana

Sangh

also

stands

for

the

unification of

India,

through

the

destruction

of

Pakistan.48

The secularism of the Indian government also has loopholes detrimental to

Muslims.

It

upholds

Hindi

to

be the

language

of

the

state,

not

merely

as

a twin

of

Urdu which

would

have

brought

the two

languages

and

the

two cultures

(Hindu

and

Muslim)

closer

together,

but

recommends

in India's Constitution

that

Hindi

draw for

its

vocabulary

resources

primarily

on Sanskrit. 49

This

hard attitude

was softened

to some

extent

in

the

report

of the

Official

Language

Commission

which allowed

borrowings

into

Hindi

from

Urdu.50

And

in

recent

years

apart

from

Kashmir,

where

Urdu is

the first

language,

Urdu

has been

accepted

as a

second

language

in

three

provinces.

But,

in

the meantime

a

generation

of Indian

Muslims has grown up, the majority of which, under economic and educational

stress,

cannot

read

or

write

Urdu,

the

language

of their

religious

and cultural

heritage.

The Muslim

masses

in

India

are

even worse

off

than

the middle classes which

are

reaching

a

point

of economic

disability

where

they

can no

longer

afford

to

send

their

children

to school.51 The

almost total

lack

of

employment

opportunity

for

the Muslim masses

may

force them in

the end

to

accept

Hinduism,

which

is a

highly

assimilative

religion;

but

so far there

is

no indication of that trend.

Actually,

47

The Organiser, December 31, I95I, p. 5.

48

Manifesto

of the

Jana

Sangh

in

the

Organiser,

October

29, 1951.

49

Constitution

of

India,

Article

35I.

60

Official

Language

Commission,

Report

(New

Delhi,

I957),

p.

235.

51

Abid

Husain,

The

Destiny of

Indian Muslims

(London,

I965),

p.

I32.


16/16

The

shrinking

frontiers

of

Islam

I59

with

the

intense

activity

of

two

religious

organizations,

the

Jama'at-i

Islami

and

the

Tahrik-i

fman,52

religious

instruction has

been

intensified,

syncretic

Muslim

communities have been won back to traditional Islam, and as Dr. Abid Husain

has

concluded,

though

there

was confusion

in their minds

and frustration

and

resentment in

their

hearts,

their

religious

faith never

wavered. 53

The

migration

of

Muslims from

India to Pakistan

can be classified into

three

categories.

By

far the

largest migration

followed

the

communal riots

of

1947,

through

an

exchange

of

populations,

the Hindus and

Sikhs

of

West

Pakistan

going

to

India

and the Muslims

of

East

Punjab,

Delhi,

and the

western

(listricts

of Uttar

Pradesh

to Pakistan. This

was

a mass

migration

including

all

classes

of

population.

The

second

category

consisted

of members

of

the Muslim

elite who

migrated

to

Pakistan for ideological reasons. The third category consisted of members of the

intelligentsia

and

some

groups

of common

people

who

felt

economically

insecure

in India

or

who

migrated

in

search

of

better

and

more secure

job

opportunities.

It

is

difficult

to estimate what

percentage

of the

Muslim elite

migrated

to Pakistan

and

what

percentage

chose

to

remain

in India.

By

far

the

greater

bulk of

the

Muslim

masses

remained

in

India.

The

basic

fact is that

though

the Indian

Muslims

con-

stitute

only

10

percent

of

the Indian

population,

this

Io

percent

amounts to

over

60

million. Their

number is

their

chief

strength

for survival.

Pakistan,

the

Granada of

the South Asian

subcontinent,

came

into

being,

at

least ideologically, as the state of the Muslims of India. But it has had difficulty

evolving

into a

single nation. Its

decision-making

elite

during

the

first

quarter

of its

existence

has

come

mainly

from the

dynamic

province

of the

Punjab.

It

has

exploited

other

regions

and

denied them

a

sense

of

participation.

A

strong

move-

ment

for

secession

in

East

Bengal

was

countered

by

severe

military

repression.

Indian

military

intervention

succeeded

in

defeating

and

splitting

Pakistan into

the successor states

(West)

Pakistan and

Bangladesh.

In

West

Pakistan

regional

and

disintegrative

trends

are

still

at

work;

its survival

or

ultimate

disintegration

cannot be assessed at this

stage.

Whatever

happens

to

Pakistan vast Muslim

population areas would remain, including Bangladesh, which survives at the

pleasure

of

India;

and

with

them the

Muslim

presence

in

the

subcontinent

is

likely

to

continue in the

foreseeable future.

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

52

M. Anwarul

Haq,

The

Faith Movement

of

Mawldnd Muhammad

Iylds

(London,

1972).

53

Abid

Husain,

op.

cit., p.

I34.

ahmad - the shrinking frontiers of islam - 1976

Documents