after the terror attacks of 2015: a french activist foreign policy here to stay?

8/20/2019 After the Terror Attacks of 2015: A French Activist Foreign Policy Here to Stay?

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AFTER THE TERROR ATTACKS OF 2015

A French Activist Foreign Policy Here to Stay?

ALEXANDRA DE HOOP SCHEFFER

MARTIN MICHELOT

MARTIN QUENCEZ

EUROPE POLICY PAPER


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A T A

A F A F P H S

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A H S , M M , M Q

1 Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer is a senior t ransatlantic fellow and the director of the Paris office of The German MarshallFund of the United States. Martin Michelot is a non-resident fellow at GMF’s Paris office, and director of research at theEUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague. Martin Quencez is a program officer in GMF’s Paris office.

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Defining France’s Strategic Environment: United States in Retreat, Europe in Trouble . . 3

The New U.S.-French “Special Relationship” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

The Symmetry of France in Europe and the U.S. in the World:“Leadership from the Front” Mirroring “Leadership from Behind” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

France’s Hyperpragmatic Diplomacy and its Domestic Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Implications for Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19


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After the Terror Attacks of 2015 1

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France’s post-Novemb13 th focus on the fightagainst terrorism athome and abroad willincrease its reliance onU.S. military leadershi

and capabilities in theMENA region, and onNATO’s and Europeanpartners’ resolve todeter Russia in the Eas

T he shock over the attacks in Paris hastriggered a turning-point in both France’sdomestic and international policies, and morespecifically in its military engagement in the Syriancrisis and the fight against jihadist terrorism. Yetdeeper trends in French foreign and security policyframe its recent initiatives on the internationalstage, accompanying President François Hollande’sdiplomatic activism and France’s strategic prioritiesin the European neighborhoods and at the globallevel.

This paper analyzes the shaping and theimplementation of France’s recent diplomatic andmilitary actions in light of shifts in the strategicenvironment and blurring lines between domesticand foreign policies. First, it highlights the maingeopolitical developments influencing France’sforeign policy: the redefinition of U.S. globalleadership, the numerous security challenges inEurope and the European neighborhoods, andthe emergence of new state and non-state securityactors at the global level. The paper also focuses onthe interests behind current French engagement in

the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,the French ability to exercise credible leadership inforeign and security affairs in Europe and beyond— as well as influence regional balance of power— and the implications for France’s “special” rolein the transatlantic security partnership. Indeed,French-U.S. military cooperation has recently

reached a new high, with France and the UnitedStates working closely together in Libya, Mali, theSahel, and now in Iraq and Syria. Paris has becomeWashington’s most reliable European partner forpower projection operations; the deepening ofthe French-U.S. strategic partnership parallels therelative decline of the U.K. strategic influence.Finally, the paper shows how Hollande’s activismon the international scene and the unique centralityof security policy are shaping the changingFrench political context. It highlights the currentsoftening of the traditional political divides on

strategic issues, as well as of the long-establisheddemarcation between foreign and domesticpolicies.

France’s post-November 13 th focus on the fightagainst terrorism at home and abroad will increaseits reliance on U.S. military leadership andcapabilities in the MENA region, and on NATO’sand European partners’ resolve to deter Russia inthe East. France’s expectations that its Allies willsupport this dual agenda may create tensions at theheart of the Alliance, as countries may be forced

to choose, due to limited capabilities, betweenpressures borne on one side from the pan-Europeanstruggle against terrorism, and on the other thecontinued necessity to contain Russia. In a NATOSummit year, it will be critical to strike a balancebetween these two, at times competing, sides.


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As activist as the newFrench posture may

be, its capabilities arelimited.

T he shocking attacks of January and Novemberof 2015 bookended a year of terroristattacks in France; the country was struckfive times in total. This violence left the publicdeeply unsettled and France “at war” with the self-proclaimed Islamic State group (ISIS). The shockfrom the November 13 attacks, called by many inFrance the “French 9/11,” has put immense pressureon the government to respond both domesticallyand abroad. Paris has stepped up its militaryengagement in Syria, and refocused on the MiddleEast and North Africa (MENA) and the threat of

jihadist terrorism. Many have seen a more activistFrench foreign policy resulting from the Novemberattacks. But the shift really started with the ArabSpring, and terrorism is only one reason for thenew French posture.

The terrorist attacks were not so much a turningpoint for French foreign policy but a crystallizationof trends that had been developing for a fewyears. From a French perspective, the country’sstrategic environment has faced three fundamentaltransformations over the last 15 years: the

redefinition of U.S. global leadership after thedecade-long military operations in Afghanistanand Iraq; the multiplicity of security threats in theEuropean neighborhoods, while the Europeanproject itself is being questioned by internal crises;and the emergence of new transnational challenges,involving both state and non-state actors, and

further blurring of the external and internaldimensions of security — as exemplified by theterrorist attacks in Paris last year — which requireFrance to rethink its role and commitment to fightterrorism at home and globally.

The result has been the birth of a newly robust andactivist French foreign policy that assumes moresecurity responsibilities and steps up its militaryand diplomatic engagement, despite limitedcapabilities and the risk of overstretch. A renewedfocus on the MENA region and terrorism has also

created a new symmetry between France and theUnited States. France has become Washington’smost reliable partner in Europe, but Paris’s relianceon U.S. support is also painfully obvious. Inparallel, the domestic context of foreign policy inFrance has changed, blurring the lines betweentraditional political positions and between domesticand foreign policy.

However, as activist as the new French posture maybe, its capabilities are limited. France’s expectationsof its European partners may be hard to meet.As tensions within Europe and crises aroundthe Union continue unabated, capabilities willfall short. Disagreement is likely to ensue, andEurope will face tensions over priorities, includingbalancing between deterring Russia and containingterrorism.

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The U.S. shift ofattention away fromEurope and its strategicretrenchment under theObama administrationhas also raised new

concerns in Paris and shaped its priorities.

United States Steps Back and Pivots Away

T he first half of the 2000s was defined by thetensions around the Iraq war, but French-U.S.relations have been strong since 2007. BothNicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande’s foreignpolicy and visions have been characterized asstrongly Atlanticist by their opponents, a term witha traditionally negative connotation in France. 1 KeyFrench strategic objectives, such as the securityof Europe and its neighborhood, the promotionof the European project, and the defense of theliberal international order and its institutions relyon a high level of cooperation with Washington,and more generally on strong U.S. leadership at theglobal level. However, the U.S. shift of attentionaway from Europe and its strategic retrenchmentunder the Obama administration has also raisednew concerns in Paris and shaped its priorities. 2

In 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clintonpresented the concept of a “pivot toward Asia” todescribe the new priority given to the Asia-Pacificregion in U.S. foreign policy after the decade-longoperations in the Middle-East and South Asia, anidea that was later confirmed by Barack Obamain a declaration to the Australian parliament. 3 Though the pivot was soon limited by the crises inUkraine and Syria, the strategic principles on whichthe pivot — or rebalancing — was built, based on

1 Anne-Cécile Robert, “Plus atlantiste que moi…,” Le MondeDiplomatique , April 2014

2 See for example “The Implications of U.S. Strategic Restraint

for the Transatlantic Relationship,” Workshop Report, TheGerman Marshall Fund of the United States, November 2013;and “Transatlantic Security Policy Towards a Changing MiddleEast,” Workshop Report, The German Marshall Fund of theUnited States, February 2015

3 “As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national securityteam to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a toppriority,” Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parlia-ment, November 17, 2011

the efforts of previous presidencies,4

will remainrelevant in the long term, and the need to furtherinvest in the Asia-Pacific region will continue toframe U.S. global priorities. Traditional partners ofthe United States, both in Europe and the MiddleEast, feared that the new focus on Asian affairswould translate into a significant reduction of U.S.security engagement in their regions. 5

In addition to strategic refocusing, the nature ofU.S. global leadership has also changed due tostrong financial constraints, which have reduced

U.S. capacity to act as a security provider andfurther prioritized growth-driven initiatives such asthe Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnershipand the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Indeed, althoughWashington is still able and willing to guaranteethe security of its closest allies and will continueto provide them crucial support, and France hasbenefited from such support in both Libya andMali,6 the political and economic legacies of theoperations in Iraq and Afghanistan — the longestwars in U.S. history — and the consequences of the2008 financial crisis have greatly reduced its power

of projection. The United States has engaged in along process of restructuring its defense budget,including the reduction of military spending andthe need for more burden-sharing with its allies,which have directly affected U.S. military andNATO capabilities, as well as their credibility at

4 During the 1990s, the G.H.W. Bush and Clinton administra-tions already attempted to respond to the emergence of newglobal powers in Asia by investing in new regional partnerships,

and the G.W. Bush administration pursued the same goal byincreasing its diplomatic, economic, and military engagement inthe region. See for example Hugo Meijer (ed), O rigins and evolu-tion of the U.S. rebalance toward Asia, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015

5 Gideon Rachman, “The U.S. Pivot to Asia — Should EuropeansWorry?,” Center for European Policy Analysis, April 2, 2012

6 Gabe Starosa, “Mission to Mali,” Air Force Magazine, November2013

3 D F ’ SE : U S R , E T

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As far as France isconcerned, the shiftsin U.S. foreign policyrequire all European

powers to step up andtake more strategic

responsibilities.

the global level.7

This has left Washington lookingfor willing and able powers to take the strategiclead. These new limits were highlighted in 2011with the notion of “leading from behind” used tocharacterize the U.S. support to the French andBritish-led interventions in Libya.

For France, the 2011 Libyan operation was aneye-opener. In August of that year, Sarkozysaid, “President Obama has presented a new vision of U.S. military engagement that impliesthat the Europeans must assume more of their

responsibilities. If we don’t draw the necessaryconclusions, Europe will wake up to a difficultreality.”8 Two years later, a French White Paper onDefense warned that

“financial constraints and the lessons learnedfrom recent conflicts will also have a stronginfluence on methods of intervention:the United States will probably seek moresystematically to share the burden of foreignoperations with its European allies, evenif this means, in some cases, ceding powerof initiative and command to them. Thecircumstances of the operations conducted inLibya and in Mali could provide a template forsituations where American interests are lessdirectly involved. Although not in the frontline politically and militarily in such situations,the United States could support Europeanaction, although Europeans would not haveany guarantee as to the capabilities that mightbe made available to them.”

7 Nora Bensahel and Jacob Stoked, “The U.S. defense budgetand the future of alliance burden-sharing,” Policy Brief, GermanMarshall Fund of the United States, November 2013, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/us-defense-budget-and-future-alliance-burden-sharing

8 President Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech, 19 th Ambassadors’ Confer-ence, August 31, 2011, as quoted in The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/world/africa/02nato.html .

The lack of assertive U.S. leadership in the Russianannexation of Crimea and aggression in Ukraine,and in the Syrian crisis, has allowed France to takethe diplomatic initiative (along with Germany inthe case of Ukraine), and to convince Europeanpartners to step up their military action in Syria. 9

As far as France is concerned, the shifts in U.S.foreign policy require all European powers tostep up and take more strategic responsibilities.The French perspective is therefore reactive:the evolution of U.S. leadership may create a

destabilizing power vacuum in Europe and itsneighborhoods, leaving France with no choice butto increase its power projection and activism at theinternational level. More specifically, Washington’slong-term focus on Asia and U.S. financialconstraints provide new incentives to take the leadon security issues related to traditional Frenchinterests, notably in the MENA region and inAfrica, particularly in the Sahel.

However, in his preview of the 2017 defense budget,U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced thatthe Pentagon was reshaping priorities to reflecta new strategic environment marked by Russianassertiveness and the rise of ISIS, signaling a partial“repivoting” of U.S. military power to both Europeand the MENA region. 10 The announcement ofthe quadrupling of U.S. military spending onits “European Assurance Initiative” from $789million to $3.4 billion, and the pledge to add “morerotational U.S. forces in Europe,” additional trainingexercises with NATO partners, “prepositioned”

9 The creation of the “Normandy Format” in June 2014, whichdoes not include the United States, was a response to the lack of

progress of all other frameworks of discussion on the Ukrainiancrisis. Similarly, the French decision to enhance cooperationwith the United States and with Russia in the fight against ISIS,following the November 13 th attacks in Paris, illustrate theFrench willingness to take the lead on an issue on which theUnited States has been reluctant to lead from the front.

10 U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, “Remarks Previewingthe FY 2017 Defense Budget,” Washington, DC, February 2,2016.

http://www.gmfus.org/publications/us-defense-budget-and-future-alliance-burden-sharinghttp://www.gmfus.org/publications/us-defense-budget-and-future-alliance-burden-sharinghttp://www.gmfus.org/publications/us-defense-budget-and-future-alliance-burden-sharinghttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/world/africa/02nato.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/world/africa/02nato.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/world/africa/02nato.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/world/africa/02nato.htmlhttp://www.gmfus.org/publications/us-defense-budget-and-future-alliance-burden-sharinghttp://www.gmfus.org/publications/us-defense-budget-and-future-alliance-burden-sharinghttp://www.gmfus.org/publications/us-defense-budget-and-future-alliance-burden-sharing


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Most significantfor Paris are themultiplication ofthreats in the EuropeanSouthern neighborhood

weaponry, and “infrastructure improvements” inEurope underscores a new sense of permanenceto the U.S. presence in Europe and enduringcommitment to European security and NATO’scollective defense. In Iraq and Syria, the UnitedStates has become increasingly frustrated withsome partners not doing what it considers enough,and is now seeking to step up its military campaignagainst ISIS. This is reflected in Carter’s promise toincrease the anti-ISIS budget by 50 percent, to $7.5billion.”

Europe Facing Divisions Within, Chaos AroundAs a key European power, France’s strategicenvironment is also shaped by the evolutionsof the European project and NATO, and moregenerally by the geopolitics of Europe. In recentyears, however, simultaneous and compoundingcrises have emerged both inside Europe, wheresolidarity and identity are questioned, and in itsnear neighborhoods, which has turned into a beltof chaos.

There is a solidarity crisis in Europe. The economiccrisis has forced austerity measures onto Europeanpopulations and increased national debts while alsoraising broader doubts about the EU’s capacity toprotect European economies. The recurring risks of“Grexit” have embodied the tensions over Europeansolidarity; in the French political landscape andmedia, heated debates focused particularly on therole of Germany in the EU and the Greek crisisthreatened the solidity of the “French-Germancouple.” The refugee crisis has further highlightedthe lack of political unity among Europeanpartners. Despite a shared sense of urgency, thedecision to force a deal imposing refugee quotashas not provided any reassurance on the EU and itsmember states’ ability to tackle the issue in the mid-

term future.11

As a result, the support in Francefor a “two-speed Europe” to address these complexissues has dramatically increased.

The European project is also facing a crisis ofidentity and objectives. Divisions have weakenedthe member states’ ability to reach constructiveagreements and have challenged the raison d’être ofthe European project. In most European countries,populist and Euroskeptic political parties havegained in votes and influence. The debate over a“Brexit” may foster further fragmentation among

European partners about the future of the Europeanproject and strengthen nationalist Euroskepticparties such as the Front National in France.

The Union is simultaneously confronted withpowerful external challenges. The Russian invasionof Crimea and the security crisis in Ukraine andits implications — from the U.S. and Europeansanctions on Russia to the revision of the EuropeanNeighborhood Policy and the reinforcementof the French-German cooperation under theNormandy Format and the Minsk agreements —have deeply transformed the strategic environmentin which France is operating. The Ukrainian crisisalso monopolized the attention of NATO. Theorganization has aimed to redefine its prioritiesand force structure following the end of theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF)mission, a process in which France took part asit reintegrated the active commandment of theAlliance in 2008.

Most significant for Paris, though, are themultiplication of threats in the EuropeanSouthern neighborhood. Since the so-called“Arab revolutions,” the risk of failing states in the

11 The 120,000 refugees included in the difficult Septembernegotiations constitute a very minor portion of the crisis, whichcould include 3 million additional migrants by 2017 according tothe European Commission. See “European Economic Forecast,Autumn 2015,” European Commission, Institutional Paper 011,November 2015


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The struggle againstIslamist terrorism hasbecome the absolute

security priority forFrance and many of its

neighbors.

MENA region has dramatically increased, andthe spill-over effects on Europe and France havebeen particularly destructive. The lasting war inSyria, the spread of ISIS, and the collapse of theLibyan state following the French and British-led intervention in 2011 are the most noticeableillustrations of the chaos in the south of theMediterranean Sea, and its implications for Europeand France in particular. The struggle againstIslamist terrorism has become the absolute securitypriority for France and many of its neighbors, andthe attacks in Paris have irrevocably made France a

frontline country in counterterrorism operations.Hollande has repeatedly declared that “Franceis at war,” and the lack of European and U.S.leadership in the fight against ISIS will force Paristo embrace a more assertive approach and convincethe international community of the necessity to“destroy” the group. 12 It also means that the crisesin the Southern neighborhood may overcome allother strategic priorities in the years to come, anddetermine French diplomatic and military efforts atthe global level.

An Activist France, Refocused on Terrorismand MENA

France continues to think of itself as a globalpower and to try to shape global and Europeanpolicy around issues such as climate changeand cyber security, to name just two. However,France’s strategic priorities have been cruciallyshaped by the spread of international terrorism innon-governed areas and by failed states and stateinstability. This phenomenon extends beyond theEuropean neighborhood, but particularly concerns

the MENA region. The collapse of state authority,which generally leads to critical humanitarian

12 Discours du Président de la République devant le Parlementréuni en Congrès [Speech of the French President in front of theParliament], November 16, 2015, http://www.elysee.fr/declara-tions/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-devant-le-parlement-reuni-en-congres-3/

situations, and the spread of terrorism have spill-over effects in neighboring countries. The rapidresurgence of terrorist groups in Afghanistanfollowing the withdrawing of U.S. troops in 2014and the atrocities committed by Boko Haram inNigeria and beyond are not just regional issues, butconstitute threats to all actors in the internationalcommunity.

Thus, against the backdrop of a United Statesthat was less engaged in the region, a particularlyactivist French foreign policy began in response

to the Arab uprisings in 2011. The 2013 FrenchWhite Paper on Defense and National Security wasprofoundly influenced by the major geopoliticalchanges taking place in the Middle East andNorth Africa, signaling a “repivoting” of Frenchstrategic priorities to Africa (Sahel) and the MiddleEast. The 2008 version of the White Paper hademphasized the importance of reducing the Frenchmilitary footprint in Africa, but the deteriorationof security in the region, which required the rapiddeployment of 3,000 French troops to Mali inJanuary 2013 to prevent an imminent takeover of

the country by Islamists, confirmed the usefulnessof pre-positioned forces in Africa. In August2013, France was ready to support U.S. militarystrikes on Syria after it was proven that the regimeof Bashar al-Assad had used chemical weaponsagainst Syrian populations. In December 2013,France sent another 1,600 troops to the CentralAfrican Republic (CAR) to prevent a humanitariancatastrophe there and from July 2014 designed anew strategic approach in the Sahel by operatingin close partnership with regional partners tocontain terrorism. In September 2014, France was

the first European country to join the U.S.-ledanti-ISIS coalition in Iraq. France has also beenheavily militarily engaged with the United Statesand within the NATO coalition in Afghanistan(2001-14) as one of the largest contributors to ISAF,with a peak deployment of 4,000 troops. However,

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French public opinion has gradually soured onthe Afghanistan mission, and a series of insurgentattacks that raised the French death toll triggeredboth Sarkozy and his successor Hollande to speedup the French withdrawal, which was completed inJanuary 2015.

Paris’s strategy rested on the assumption that therewas a link between protecting French citizens athome and assuming international responsibilitiesto increase stability; the ISIS-inspired terroristattacks in 2015 demonstrated how intrinsically

linked both priorities were. As a result, Parisdoubled down on its security measures at homeand abroad. France now deploys more soldiers indomestic anti-terrorism patrols (10,000 troops inOperation Sentinelle, formerly called Vigipirate)than externally (8,000 in five current active externaloperations, with more than 11,000 “prepositionedforces” in 10 permanent overseas missions, fromGuyana to French Polynesia). The extension ofFrench airstrikes against ISIS in Syrian territorywas justified by the need to prevent further attacksin France that might be orchestrated from Syria. In

the aftermath of the November attacks, the goal of

the airstrikes was broadened to the “destruction ofthe Islamic State group.”

After the January Charlie Hebdo attacks, Francehad already committed to increasing its defensebudget by €3.8 billion over four years from 2016(about 1.7 percent of the 2015 GDP) to ensure thearmy can tackle problems at home and maintainmissions abroad, notably in Africa and the MiddleEast. The Ministry of Economy estimated at theend October 2015 that French spending for militaryoperations abroad would reach €1.1 billion for

2015, and this figure very likely increased afterthe November 13 th attacks. The bulk of the moneygoes to the French-led operations in the Sahel(Barkhane), Iraq/Syria (Chammal), and in CAR(Sangaris).

These engagements are already affecting France’srelationships with its partners across the Atlanticand within Europe. France’s new activist foreignpolicy has dove-tailed nicely with softer U.S.leadership, creating a new level of partnershipbetween the powers — even before France sufferedits version of 9/11.

Paris’s strategy restedon the assumptionthat there was a linkbetween protectingFrench citizens athome and assuming

internationalresponsibilities toincrease stability.


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The French pushfor increased U.S.

commitment comesat a time when the

Obama administrations tending to reduce its

engagements abroad.

T en years after the invasion of Iraq, theturnaround in Franco-American relationsis impressive. For the first time since 2003,France and the United States have been carryingout air strikes in Iraq on ISIS targets and, sinceSeptember 2015, coordinating airstrikes inSyria. France was the first ally to join the U.S.-led campaign. In late February 2015, the Frenchaircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle steamed into thePersian Gulf to join the fight against ISIS and hasredeployed there in the aftermath of the November13Th attacks, in the temporary absence of the

U.S. aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt (whichneeded repairs), multiplying airstrikes capacity in asignificant way.

In this past year alone, the United States has beeninvolved in French interventions in Mali (providingaerial refueling and soldier transportation) andCAR (for financial support and provision of non-lethal equipment). However, the French push forincreased U.S. commitment comes at a time whenthe Obama administration is tending to reduceits engagements abroad. France has emerged as

Washington’s most reliable European partnerin power projection outside of Europe, bettereven than Washington’s “special relationship”ally, Britain. Dominique Moïsi, a senior adviserat the French Institute for International Affairs,

said: “France is in part replacing the U.K. as thedeputy sheriff when it comes to intervention.” 13 French performance in Mali earned the UnitedStates’ interest and endorsement, and the French-American counterterrorism partnership in theSahel reinforced military links between the twocountries.

Americans supply France with drones andintelligence as well as operating their own specialforces in the framework of the “OperationBarkhane” in the Sahel. From the operation Unified

Protector in Libya, to the Operation Serval in Mali,the U.S. military contribution has been critical.These operations have also revealed the depth ofFrench and European capability gaps, and over-reliance on U.S. capabilities.

13 Dominique Moïsi, quoted by Alissa Rubin, “Persian GulfBreach with U.S. Creates Opportunities for France,” The NewYork Times, May 13, 2015.

4 T N U.S.-F“S R ”


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European countriesare neither willing tofollow Paris’ diplomatiand military initiativesnor able to sharethe leadership of an

ambitious Europeanforeign and securitypolicy.

W hile France has been working ever moreclosely with the United States, andFranco-U.S. relations are strong, France’sactivist foreign policy is not a smooth fit withinEurope. By resorting to article 42.7 of the EUTreaty, which requires EU member states to provide“aid and assistance by all the means in their power”to a member state under attack after the November13 attacks, Paris is asking help from its EU partners,but also underscoring the need for Europeansecurity solidarity and leadership against ISIS.

However, as Jean-Marie Guéhenno has rightlysummarized: “there is something frustratingabout France’s role in European foreign policyat the moment: it is a leader that often has fewfollowers.”14 To a certain extent, France’s challengeresembles the same “partnership deficit” thatundermines the United States’ willingness toexercise leadership and power through partnershipsand alliances, rather than unilaterally. In 2011,David Ignatius highlighted what he saw as analmost intractable paradox: “This is a world thatresents American domination but is also wary of

sharing the burden. Our allies don’t want to befollowers, certainly, but they don’t want to shareleadership either. This deficit exists in every region,and it complicates Obama’s desire to offload someresponsibilities at a time when U.S. financialresources are stretched.” 15 Similarly for France,European countries are neither willing to followParis’ diplomatic and military initiatives, nor ableto share the leadership of an ambitious Europeanforeign and security policy.

In Syria, although the Obama administration

wanted to avoid the appearance of an U.S.-led waragainst ISIS, Washington’s outsize role became

14 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “French foreign policy: activism orleadership?,” Commentary, ECFR, March 7, 2014

15 David Ignatius, “Obama’s partnership deficit,” The WashingtonPost , June 10, 2011

quickly visible: three Western allies (France,Australia, and Canada) and five Arab allies (SaudiArabia, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UnitedArab Emirates) have carried out only 8 percent ofthe airstrikes in Syria since the operation began andabout 60 percent of the airstrikes in Iraq. The U.S.predominance became even more pronounced inSyria as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,and Jordan reallocated their firepower to fightingIranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. Bahrain’sand Qatar’s role has also been reduced. The newpledges of military support (by Germany, the

U.K., Denmark, The Netherlands, but also byGulf states) that followed the November 13 th Parisattacks will not reverse what has been a worryingtrend for the United States, as these contributionswill remain mostly symbolic. This means thatthe burden carried by the French military andFrench-European over-reliance on U.S. hard powerare unlikely to lessen in the near future, and willcontinue to characterize transatlantic militaryoperations.

With the United States disengaging from Europe,

France sees a rising need for a common Europeandefense stance. The July 2013 U.S. Senate report onEuropean defense was clear: “Mali was a test andEurope failed the test. There is no independentEuropean military capacity or any politicalwillingness to pursue a European defense policy.”It said: “Europe needs to be able to intervene,including when the United States does not wantto engage. It is futile to believe that there can be areal European foreign policy without a commondefense.” It concluded: “Without it, Europe iscondemned to be a ‘big Switzerland,’ a super-NGO

that pays but decides nothing.” 16 A few Europeancountries (Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the U.K.,Spain, and The Netherlands) have offered transport

16 French Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed ForcesCommittee, “Pour en finir avec «l’Europe de la défense» - Versune défense européenne” [“Let’s get rid of “Europe of Defense”.Towards a European Defense”], July 3, 2013.

5T S F E

U.S. W : “L F ” M

“L B ”


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The successfulimplementation of

ance’s strategy to fightISIS depends heavily

on other Europeancountries’ capabilities

and willingness to takea more active role.

and air-to-air refueling assistance in Mali and CAR,but the limits of these actions expose the failure ofFrance’s long-time efforts to persuade the EU todevelop a robust defense posture, with operationalcapabilities independent of NATO.

Hollande has been particularly frustrated by theEU’s two other big powers. Germany’s hesitanceto step up its military action against terrorism,and in particular its lack of engagement in Libyaand Mali, were seen as irresponsible in Paris. TheU.K. is perceived to have an increasingly inward-

looking posture, despite the close French-Britishmilitary relationship. However, there may nowbe a small shift. Recent military decisions inGermany have been met with approval in France.In addition to sending more German soldiers toMali and increasing the Bundeswehr’s efforts inNorthern Iraq to train Kurdish Peshmergas, inNovember 2015 Germany’s Cabinet approved amandate offering military assistance, including thedeployment of 1,200 German troops to the U.S.-led international coalition against ISIS in Syria,reconnaissance flights, and the use of a naval frigate

to the Mediterranean to help protect the Frenchaircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. And in theU.K., Parliament voted on December 2 in favor ofairstrikes against ISIS in Syria after Prime MinisterDavid Cameron made a strong case for militaryaction, a decision that was followed a few hourslater by U.K.’s first airstrikes in Syria.

The successful implementation of France’s strategyto fight ISIS depends heavily on other Europeancountries’ capabilities and willingness to take amore active role. But for this to work, Paris must

also invest more in building consensus withinthe EU before taking military action. Leadershipis based on the power to convince others tofollow. The limits of France’s approach wereillustrated at the December 2013 EU Councilwhere Hollande put his allies on the spot, callingfor the EU to create a permanent fund to finance

military operations undertaken by member states(such as France’s interventions in the CentralAfrican Republic or Mali). This proposal wasmet with a cool response, despite recognition byEuropean allies that the Sahel’s stability is criticalto Europe’s security interests. France had actedon its own because the other EU countries couldnot reach an agreement. French unilateralismhas provoked some push-back among Europeanallies who contend they do not have to pay formilitary operations decided by France withoutprior consultation. Sabine von Oppeln, a political

scientist at Berlin’s Free University, said: “On theone hand, France conducts a unilateral Africapolicy, on the other hand they demand solidarityfrom other Europeans.” 17

In addition to persuasion, there is also the issueof control. Just as Washington seems reluctantto genuinely “co-lead” and share intelligence andoperational control in conflicts, Paris has also notalways been willing to cede control to Europeancommand (Mali, CAR) or to NATO command(in the initial phase of the 2011 Libya operations).

Although France often acts in the European interest— for example in the Sahel — and is willing tocooperate with European partners where they agreewith its policy, it is also willing to operate outsidethe EU framework, especially when urgent action isneeded (Mali). “Co-leadership” has translated intoits most minimalist form, i.e., pragmatic “divisionof labor” with a few able and willing allies. In thiscontext, the French approach of internationallegitimization of its military actions has becomeincreasingly opportunistic, favoring ad hoccooperative arrangements that have the advantage

of being flexible and avoiding the heavy structuresof formal institutions. The Serval, Sangaris, andBarkhane operations are typical examples.

17 Quoted in “France pushing EU to fund military interventions,” AP , December 16, 2013


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In spite of its strong support for greater EUintegration in defenseand security matters,France’s tradition of“strategic autonomy” i

an obstacle to buildinga more integratedEuropean defense.

In spite of its strong support for greater EUintegration in defense and security matters, France’stradition of “strategic autonomy” is an obstacle tobuilding a more integrated European defense. Inkeeping with the German concept of “leadershipfrom the center” (“enabling others with fewerresources to make their vital contributions asequal partners” and “making others fit to assumeresponsibility for security in their own regions” 18),Chancellor Angela Merkel has been leading anambitious plan for military co-operation in Europe,calling for a permanent EU military HQ, combined

weapons procurement, and a shared militarydoctrine. The U.K., along with Poland, Romania,the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, insist that NATOshould remain the guarantor of security on theEuropean continent. When Commission PresidentJean-Claude Juncker and Merkel resuscitated theidea of a “European Army” in March 2015, FrenchPrime Minister Manuel Valls said that such an army“already exists,” as France de facto plays that rolefor Europe in the fight again terrorism and assumes18 Speech by Federal Minister of Defense Dr. Ursula von derLeyen, 51st Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 6,

2015

the heaviest burden each time the EU undertooka military effort abroad. Valls mentioned France’soperations in Mali and in the Sahel, and appealedto the rest of the EU to “better share the expenses.”France’s idea of a more integrated European defensehas more to do with a fairer division of labor acrossthe EU than with a European Army. This was alsoreflected in its choice to ask for help using Article42.7 after the November attacks, rather thanArticle 222 of the EU Treaty. Article 42.7 is moreintergovernmental (and allows France to keep thereigns) whereas Article 222 foresees a strong role

for EU institutions.

The new activism of French foreign policy is thusclearly contradictory within the European context.First, like the U.S. it faces the threat of overstretch,and cannot count on receiving the support itwants. Furthermore, while France is a strong forcepushing for stronger European security capabilities,its leadership will remain limited by its realpolitikinterests and its desire to retain strategic autonomy— a tension that is also visible in its alliances withother powers.


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utin has made himselfan indispensable

geopolitical player...This situation compels

Western powers toengage in a balancing

ct of containment andtactical cooperation

with Russia.

France’s Alliances: Economic Diplomacy withthe Gulf and Iran, Tactical Cooperation withRussia

T he November 13th attacks have forced France

to revisit some alliances and to consolidateothers — especially in the Gulf — to ask for

help from European allies, and most notably toinitially invite Russia to join a “grand coalition todefeat ISIS.” France’s rapprochement with Russiahas been purely tactical, considering that VladimirPutin has opposite views to France’s regardingAssad’s political future in Syria. In fact, Hollande’sgoal of turning two rival military alliances, aU.S.-led one that includes Sunni Arab States SaudiArabia and Qatar as well as Turkey (who aim toassist rebels in overthrowing Assad) and a Russian-led one that includes Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollahmilitia (which is allied with Assad’s forces), intoa single force focused on defeating ISIS appearedunrealistic. France’s efforts have very quicklybeen limited to “coordinating” with Russia andallies, rather than trying to build a fictive unifiedcoalition. The Obama administration has beenconcerned about French diplomatic moves, worriedthat additional French-Russian cooperation couldcome at the expense of EU sanctions against Russiaover Ukraine. However, despite disagreementsamong EU member states, they agreed onDecember 17, 2015, to renew the sanctions untilJuly 2016.

This important decision shows that EU memberstates have been able to separate the Ukraine-Russiaissue from the Syria-Russia issue. However, as is thecase with leaders in many other EU member statesand the United States, Hollande demonstrates thatdespite shifts in France’s Russia policy — evidentin the Mistral $1.6 billion contract cancellationin August 2015 — he continues to engage Russiadiplomatically to find a political solution inSyria. Putin has made himself an indispensablegeopolitical player. Bruno Tertrais, a senior fellow

at FRS, has said: in Syria, “Russia has been willingand able to bring significant firepower to bearagainst ISIS at a time when France is willing butnot entirely able, and the United States is able, butnot entirely willing to bring its full firepower tobear against ISIS in Syria.”19 This situation compelsWestern powers to engage in a balancing act ofcontainment and tactical cooperation with Russia.

There are also other contentious inconsistencies inFrance’s foreign alliances. Despite Paris’ focus oncombatting terrorism, France has been reluctant

to revise its relationships with Saudi Arabia andQatar, even given their well-known connectionswith Salafist movements. In fact, France has manyinterests and a long history of involvement inthe Gulf, which has been a market for France’sdefense industries since the late 1970s. Hollande’srealpolitik economic diplomacy with the GulfStates aims to sustain France’s global stature andcapitalizing on recent rifts in U.S. relations with itspartners, while turning a blind eye on their supportto radical groups.

France’s security concerns, international ambitions,and domestic economic pressures have convergedto emphasize important deals with key partnersin the Gulf and with Egypt. From 2010 to 2014,38 percent of French arms exports went to theMiddle East, making it the most important regionfor France’s arms industry. In May 2015, Hollandesigned a $7 billion deal with Qatar that includedthe sale of 24 French Rafale jets, along with trainingof Qatari intelligence officers. In June, SaudiArabia and France signed a $12 billion agreement,that included $500 million for 23 Airbus H145

helicopters, and in October signed an $11.4 billiondeal including contracts and letters of intentfor small and medium enterprise investments,satellites, urban transport, and energy. Egypt signed

19 Quoted by Paul Taylor, “Putin’s ‘realpolitik’ aims to makeRussia indispensble,” Reuters, November 24, 2015

6 F ’ H D D D


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Signing defense dealswith France allows GuStates to express theirdiscontent with U.S.policies. And France

seizes this opportunity

to fill the void: politicalosses for the UnitedStates translateinto French defenseindustrial gains.

a deal with France to buy two Mistral warships(with significant financing from Saudi Arabia) thathad been originally ordered by Russia.

Paris and Riyadh’s growing alignment wasaccelerated and facilitated by France’s tough stanceagainst the Iranian nuclear program, but alsoagainst the Assad regime, as well as its supportof the Saudi military campaign in Yemen. SaudiArabia’s growing interest in fostering a strongeralliance with France is also linked to the broadergeostrategic context, in which Washington’s

traditional Sunni allies have become frustratedand confused by U.S. foreign policy on the Arabuprisings, the so-called pivot to Asia, the U.S.backtracking on a Syrian chemical weapons redline, and the Iranian nuclear deal. Gulf States andEgypt have increasingly sought to diversify theirtraditional defense alliance with the United States.Signing defense deals with France allows GulfStates to express their discontent with U.S. policies.And France seizes this opportunity to fill the void:political losses for the United States translate intoFrench defense industrial gains. Domestically, the

French defense industry supports around 400,000 jobs, and thus remains one of the few relativelystable holdouts in an otherwise ailing economy.The recent arms deals are therefore celebrateddomestically, with officials claiming that the dealscreated around 30,000 jobs in France for 2015.

However, Saudi Arabia cannot expect France toreplace the United States as the power responsiblefor guaranteeing its security from foreignadversaries. Historically, and for the foreseeablefuture, the United States is the only country

capable of providing that security umbrella toSaudi Arabia. France does not have the politicalwillingness, nor the economic and militarybackbone to act as a credible security provider. Itwill more likely continue to deepen defense andeconomic cooperation through military deals andtraining support, without fundamentally changing

its strategic look at the region, and understandsthat the future U.S. administration may be astronger political and economic competitor inthe region. Finally, French domestic politics doesnot unambivalently support close ties with theGulf and Saudi Arabia because of those countries’conservative approach of Islam, which manyFrench citizens oppose. However, “the pragmatismthat can sometimes make Hollande appear spinelessin domestic matters is an asset in foreign policy. (...)Pragmatism was what made Hollande, two yearsago, the first leader to meet with newly elected

Iranian president Hassan Rouhani”20

and to invitehim for a state visit in January 2016 to relaunchFranco-Iranian cooperation. The result was thesigning of important deals, including the sale of 118Airbus planes, an oil contract with Total, and aninvestment by PSA Peugeot Citroën.

The Domestic Context of Hollande’s“War Presidency”

Hollande’s presidency, nearly four years in, hasalready taken on dynamics on the security anddefense policy fronts that bear little comparisonwith the previous presidencies of Nicolas Sarkozy(2007-12) or Jacques Chirac (1995-2007). As amatter of fact, Hollande, who has oft claimedhis desire to follow in the footsteps of FrançoisMitterrand, the last Socialist president (1981-95),has presided over what David Revault d’Allonnescalls “the birth and thriving of a warring social-democracy.”21 Through the unprecedented scopeand centrality of security policy in his mandate, thecurrent presidency will represent a model by whichany future presidencies will be compared.

It seems that Hollande has not been able to resistthe temptation of foreign adventure, partly inorder to bolster a faltering a domestic image. As

20 Pierre Briançon, “Hollande Unchained,” Politico, June 10, 2015

21 David Revault d’Allonnes, Les Guerres du Président [“ThePresident’s Wars”], 2015, Seuil: Paris.


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With the oppositioncriticizing how the

president conductedmilitary operations

ainst ISIS in Syria andFrance’s relations with

Russia, security policyhas become an issue

that is no longer asimmune from criticism

as it had been.

Revault d’Allonnes puts it, Hollande, “passionateabout political history, and a keen expert on hispredecessors, knew the dilemma that had troubledthem: the attraction of diplomatic action, anincomparable outlet to the inextricable difficultiesthat plagued the economic and social realms andillustrated all too well the structural powerlessnessof the executive.”22 While it has become increasinglydifficult for a president to influence the course ofevents on “low-politics” (domestic affairs), Frenchsecurity policy remains an executive shelter wherethe authority of the president is barely limited by

opposition parties, of which Hollande has madefull use. However, his large security policy footprinthas ushered in a change. Opposition politicalparties from all sides have started engaging more vehemently in partisan debates about securitypolicy — partly in order to be able to engage withthe president, rather than limiting their attacks tothe governments led successively by Jean-MarcAyrault (2012-14) and Manuel Valls (2014-present).

The new political party emphasis on foreign policywas reinforced by the November terrorist attacks:

security policy has become an object of contentionin French politics. The critical reactions of LesRépublicains (LR), Nicolas Sarkozy’s party, and theFront National (FN) of Marine Le Pen, not onlyregarding the level of security of France since theCharlie Hedbo attacks but also regarding bordercontrol in the context of the refugee crisis and thedeprivation of nationality for binational citizensinvolved in terrorist activities, have framed Frenchpolitical debates since November. 23 With theopposition criticizing how the president conductedmilitary operations against ISIS in Syria and

22 Ibid.

23 See for example: “Nicolas Sarkozy: ‘trop de temps’ a été perdudepuis ‘Charlie Hebdo’” [“Too much time has been wasted since‘Charlie Hebdo’”], Le Monde, November 18, 2015; “Le FrontNational lie les attentats à la crise des migrants” [“The NationalFront links the November attacks to the migrant crisis”], Le Monde, November 16, 2015.

France’s relations with Russia, security policy hasbecome an issue that is no longer as immune fromcriticism as it had been.

Thus the Hollande presidency has seen a newsaliency to, and new levels of partisan fightingover, foreign policy. But his administration has alsopursued a security policy of pragmatic coalitionbuilding that escapes ideological left-right lines. Inboth of these ways, Hollande’s foreign policy mayprove transformational.

French Strategic Culture Under Hollande:Balancing Between History and Pragmatism

Just a few days after Hollande officially took overthe presidency on May 15, he faced what wouldprove to be a strong marker of his presidency: theNATO Summit in Chicago on May 20 -21.

After 17 years of right-wing presidencies, theinternational community was uncertain, at best,about what a Socialist returning to power wouldmean for France’s posture toward NATO. Thefull reintegration of France in NATO’s military

command, decided in 2009 under Sarkozy, was theobject of Allied concerns, who perceived Hollande’scampaign promise to withdraw French fightingtroops from Afghanistan before the end of 2012 asthe sign of a deeper disengagement of France fromglobal affairs.

Any lingering questions about the unwaveringcommitment of France to traditional transatlanticalliance mechanisms were swept away after thepublication of a report 24 commissioned by thepresidency to ex-Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine,

which stated anew how France’s interests andobjectives would be carried out in the context

24 “Report for the President of the French Republic on TheConsequences of France’s Return to the Integrated MilitaryCommand of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship, and the Outlook forEuropean Defense,” November 14, 2012, http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article4114

http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article4114http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article4114http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article4114http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article4114


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This pragmaticapproach tocoalition buildingand internationalcooperation will provebe one of the strongest

markers of Hollande asa “war president.”

of the Alliance while promoting a stronger“Europeanization” of NATO. The conclusion ofthe report presciently laid out how French securitypolicy would be carried out during Hollande’spresidency, and unabashedly showcased howFrance would pragmatically carry out its securityinterests:

“Changes in American foreign and defensepolicies […] make it more necessary and lessimpossible for Europeans to play a greater rolein their own defense, with the expectation

that one day, they will assume most of theresponsibility for it, while remaining alliedwith the United States. This policy needs tobe implemented simultaneously within theEuropean Union, within NATO, and withinad hoc groups, using suitable tactics for eachcase and each organization and with an eye toanticipating events. It is a bold and forthrightpolicy to achieve greater influence withinthe Alliance, which will facilitate France’sEuropean efforts.” 25

This pragmatic approach to coalition buildingand international cooperation will prove to beone of the strongest markers of Hollande as a“war president.” An editorialist for Liberation evendubbed Hollande a “hyperpragmatic” diplomat, 26 illustrating the fact that France remains a part ofthe club, but can choose to play by its own rulesif the situation dictates it, whether in the EU orNATO framework. A high-ranked diplomaticadvisor of Hollande insisted that “pragmatism isnot a theory, but a sort of necessity. […] There isno overall plan for the resolution of crises. We do

not have a values-based agenda, nor are exportinga model. We are simply dealing with reality as it

25 Ibid , p.24.

26 Marc Sémo, “Hollande diplomate: l’hyperpragmatique”[“Hollande the hyperpragmatic diplomat”], Liberation, May 29,2015.

is.”27

This “reality-based” approach and the lack ofa “Hollande model” for French foreign policy havelead some to think that Hollande’s security policyideology has been formed on the fly, in responseto events and to the dynamics of domestic andEuropean politics.

Any sort of analysis of the impact of Hollande onFrench strategic culture must consider that in hisprevious position as first secretary of the SocialistParty, evidence indicates that he paid very littleattention to these issues. This is not unusual since,

as argued above, security policy is only minimallythe object of partisan debates in France. Therefore,it is tempting to think that Hollande arrived inpower with little structured thoughts on securitypolicies, and therefore that he lacked a strategy.Hubert Védrine, who served as foreign ministerunder the last socialist government (1997-2002),offers a damning indictment: “Hollande has nostructured doctrine, no vision, no anticipation andalert system that allows him to detect mistakes.There is just this idea that we are France, that wehave a universal vocation to incarnate human

rights and topple dictatorships; that, above all, wehave a special mission to fulfill just like the U.S.But there are very few countries in the world whoconsider that they are tasked with ensuring justicein the world. […] Hollande is practicing neo-conservatism without knowing it.” The accusationof “neo-conservatism” (for Védrine does intend itto be an accusation) targets the French tradition ofinterventionism, and draws the comparison withU.S. neo-conservatives. Hollande is seen to havetransgressed the accepted markers and (left-right)fundamentals of French security policy, which has

in turn led to a blurring of the traditional politicallines around these issues.

27 David Revault d’Allonnes, Les Guerres du Président [The Presi-dent’s Wars] , 2015, Seuil: Paris.


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War stood in as anescape from an

unforgiving domestic scene, as a tool of

self-aggrandizingand legitimation that

Hollande undoubtedlytook a shine to.

This “hyperpragmatism” attached to theaccomplishment of France’s role in the world, towhich has now been added the ever-so importantnational security aspects, could remain a strongfeature of French security policy in the years tocome. And it is not without consequences forthe relationship with European and transatlanticpartners.

War as a Communication Tool

Operation Serval, initiated by France on January 11,2013, in order to defeat terrorist factions in Mali,represents a turning point in Hollande’s presidency.It not only represented his initiation to the positionof commander-in-chief, but also symbolized whatcould be called his escapism. War stood in as anescape from an unforgiving domestic scene, asa tool of self-aggrandizing and legitimation thatHollande undoubtedly took a shine to. While notunprecedented — Sarkozy’s engagement in theGeorgia/Russia conflict or the Libya intervention—a tipping point was reached when Hollandeassigned such a high importance to war. Instead ofescaping the domestic fray, he brought the fray tosecurity policy. He also created the conditions foran opposition party to raise its profile by joiningthe security policy debate.

Why did Hollande need to escape? The firstyear of his presidency produced a wide gapbetween the expectations borne from a successfulpresidential campaign and the actual exercise ofthe presidency. The first major reform desired byHollande, the same-sex marriage law, mobilizeda large opposition that harbored doubts aboutwhether Hollande was fit to be president, andraised concerns in other parts about his seemingindecisiveness and difficulty to impose decisions.Concerns also surfaced over the ability of theSocialist Party to govern after so many years, asevidenced by constant governmental infightingand the tragicomic demise of the finance minister,

Jérôme Cahuzac, who pledged to fight against taxevasion but was eventually forced to step downafter it was discovered he kept a bank accountin Singapore. With low popularity figures veryearly into his mandate, Hollande was confrontedwith the need to raise his stature and assert hispresidentiality — and give a breath of fresh air tohis government — in concrete ways.

At this moment, claims journalist and reporterRevault d’Allonnes, “war just erupted in theHollande presidency. It is the first time, but not

the last. War will never leave the presidency andwill even become one of its most structuringelements.”28 In preparing Operation Serval, “theunusual drive” 29 of the president contrasts withhis seeming lack of direction in terms of domesticpolicy, illustrated by significant defeats in themunicipal and European elections in 2014, whicheventually led to the political demise of PrimeMinister Jean-Marc Ayrault, to be replaced by themore centrist Manuel Valls.

War also allowed Hollande to build his credentialsas a leader in Europe, which were at the heartof his presidential campaign. While making thestructured case for a renewed European defenseand presenting France as its leader, Hollande alsomade a campaign pledge to create a new balance ofpower in Europe, in which France would provide acounterweight to Germany’s influence on economicaffairs.30 When he realized that this was easier saidthan done, Hollande turned his sights to France’sleadership on security issues. The operation inMali, which was on the table since 2012 andhad even been considered under the Sarkozy’s

28 David Revault d’Allonnes, op.cit.

29 Ibid.

30 See “Discours de François Hollande sur la défense nationaleà Paris le 11 mars 2012” [“Speech of François Hollande onNational Defense in Paris, March 11, 2012”], March 11, 2012,http://www.gilbert-roger.fr/files/fh-de%25CC%2581fense-11-mars.pdf

http://www.gilbert-roger.fr/files/fh-de%25CC%2581fense-11-mars.pdfhttp://www.gilbert-roger.fr/files/fh-de%25CC%2581fense-11-mars.pdfhttp://www.gilbert-roger.fr/files/fh-de%25CC%2581fense-11-mars.pdfhttp://www.gilbert-roger.fr/files/fh-de%25CC%2581fense-11-mars.pdf


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Hollande’s [foreignpolicy] activity will hamanaged to achieveanother importanteffect: blurring thepolitical lines that

existed in Franceregarding securitypolicy.

presidency (before being shelved because it wouldhave taken place during the presidential campaign),supported the narrative of France as a leader onsecurity policy. Since the election, an operationhad been envisaged and international negotiationsopened to deploy the troops of the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS),and for a European training mission under theauspices of the United Nations. However, strugglingto form this coalition and under growing pressureat home, Hollande was convinced by DefenseMinister Jean-Yves Le Drian, one of his confidents,

to shelve the previous strategy of “global andindirect approach” in favor of a direct confrontationthat would “shatter the feeling of impunity andinvulnerability of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb[…] by stopping its military progress” 31 toward theMalian capital, Bamako.

The operation in Mali, and consequent operationsin CAR and Syria highlight how Hollande’s conductof foreign policy is based on the traditional Frenchnotion of “strategic autonomy.” But the militaryoperations also illuminate all the contrasts that

compose Hollande: an inspirational candidate anda driven commander-in-chief, but a lackluster, ifnot almost dispassionate, communicator aboutdomestic politics. These wars paint the pictureof Hollande as rising to the opportunity onlywhen there is an identified opponent and whenthere is a clear objective, and when decisions aremade among a smaller circle. War has provided,for Hollande, rare moments of clarity duringa presidential mandate that has often been onthe brink of self-destruction from political andpersonnel mishaps. At the same time, the foreign

policy escape may prove to have been temporary.

Besides the aspect of augmenting his presidentialstature, and despite the relatively low and short-term impact that successful military campaigns will

31 David Revault d’Allonnes, op.cit.

have had on his popularity, Hollande’s activity willhave managed to achieve another important effect:blurring the political lines that existed in Franceregarding security policy.

The accusation, levied by Védrine, of “neo-conservatism” marks the extent to which suchfrenzied military activity lies outside traditionalboundaries. While the activism of Sarkozy wasrelated to the fact that he was a self-avowed“Atlanticist,” existing political markers in Francewere unable to account for the role that Hollande’s

activism would give to France on the internationalscene. The central role of the minister of defense ininfluencing decisions about military engagement,and the inflexible position of the minister of foreignaffairs, Laurent Fabius, (sometimes referred to as“Laurent Cheney”32) on Iran and Syria, participatesin creating this image of an extraordinary policy asconcerns foreign and security policy. One strikingquote comes from a member of the president’sdiplomatic team, who, regarding the choice ofwords in communicating to the population aboutthe operation in Mali, argued that “there is no point

in doing a typical center-left public campaign onsomething like this,” highlighting the extent towhich this event has proven transformational onthe domestic front.

The use of the word of “war” in Mali, the first timeit had been used since the Algerian War (1954-62),set the tone for how France will respond to futurecrises, not only in its neighborhood but also on itsown soil with the attacks of January and November2015. In the latter case, Hollande talked about“acts of war” perpetrated by the terrorists, thereby

justifying the proportionality of the response, andsaying that “the [French] Republic will eradicateterrorism.” The use of such language is far frominnocent: it forces the right-wing, and also theFront National, to adapt their own responses in a

32 Ibid.


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The terrorist attacks,particularly those onNovember 13 th , alsoblurred another line

in France, which mayprove rather damaging

to Hollande: the onebetween domestic and

foreign policy.

position where the Socialist Party treads on theirproverbial lawns. This pushes Sarkozy’s party inan highly uncomfortable position, as it forces itto move further to the right in order to mark itsdifference, a space well occupied by the FrontNational; at the same time, this active presidencyalso forces the Front National to show its cardsregarding foreign and security policy, two frontson which its lack of experience and thinking can bedamaging.

The terrorist attacks, particularly those on

November 13th

, also blurred another line in France,which may prove rather damaging to Hollande: theone between domestic and foreign policy. Whenthe terrorists in the Bataclan yelled that “it is thefault of the Hollande, he shouldn’t be intervening inSyria”33 or that their goal is “to make [the concert-goers] suffer through what innocent people in Syria

33 “Au Bataclan, les assaillants parlent de la Syrie et ‘tirent’” [“Atthe Bataclan, the attackers speak about Syria and shoot”], Libéra-tion, November 14, 2015

go through,”34

and then ISIS claimed responsibilityfor the attacks hours later, an important barrier hasbeen broken, making Hollande fully accountablefor his foreign policy decisions, and allowingopposition leaders to criticize and question theefficiency of his military engagements and hisexercise of diplomacy. 35 Given the increasinglyclose connection between foreign and securitypolicy decisions and national security, securitypolicy will be central to political discussion inFrance.

34 Ibid

35 Nicolas Sarkozy spoke of a “poorly measured” intervention inSyria that led to an “elevation of the terrorist threat” in France.See “Sarkozy: ‘On a sous-estimé la menace après l’interventionen Syrie’” [“We underestimated the threat after the interventionin Syria”], Europe 1, December 2, 2015


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I n a NATO Summit year, with expectations of astronger role for the transatlantic communityin protecting the eastern border of the Alliance,France’s focus on fighting terrorism on the globalstage raises a certain number of issues. Firstly, whileFrance’s commitment to NATO will not diminish,its possibilities to contribute further to reassuranceon the Eastern flank will continue to be broughtinto question if further capabilities are to becommitted in the Middle East. For both historicaland societal reasons, France’s neighborhood policyhas been mainly focused on the Mediterranean

and the Maghreb (North Africa), notably giventhe unstable conditions following the Arabrevolutions. For France, “the future of Europe liesin the South,” 36 rather than in the East. The terroristattacks of 2015 have only underscored France’spriorities. France is particularly preoccupiedby the failed state-terrorism nexus in the Saheland the Middle East: “The possibility that wholeterritories can escape the control of a stateover a long period is a strategic risk of crucialimportance for Europe.” 37 This, combined withRussia’s engagement in Syria and the worryingdevelopments in Libya, is a challenge for commonEuropean policies and consensus within NATO.Furthermore, the expectations that France has of itsAllies in supporting this agenda may create tensionsat the heart of the Alliance, as countries maybe forced to choose, due to limited capabilities,between pressures borne from the pan-Europeanstruggle against terrorism and the continuednecessity to deter Russia, an agenda carried by aproactive but embattled Polish government. It willtherefore be critical for the allies to strike a balancebetween these two, at time divergent, sides.

France is facing a military overstretch, both onthe frontline of the fight against terrorism at

36 Nicolas Sarkozy, “Discours sur l’Union méditerranéenne,”Tanger, October 23, 2007

37 French White Paper on Defense and National Security , 2013

home (shelling out €2 billion for its security afterthe attacks, according to a preliminary estimate)and abroad in Africa and Iraq-Syria, despitethe EU’s direct security stakes in the region. Bydeclaring that the “security pact” will prevailover the “stability pact,” Hollande has pointed tocontradictory objectives defined at the transatlanticand European levels. The first one derives from theNATO Wales summit’s conclusion that memberstates need to spend more on defense (at least 2percent of their GDP); the second one is enshrinedin the EU’s stability pact that obliges member states

to cut spending to reduce public deficits. Hollande’sdeclaration that “the security pact prevails over thestability pact” has become the de facto unwrittenrule, and previews budget conflicts in the eurozone,since Germany will not be happy to loosen limitson state deficits.

Finally, there remain real questions about long-term strategies for the Middle East and NorthAfrican region. While there is an agreement on thenecessity to increase the frequency of strikes on thepositions held by ISIS, the ability of the coalition

writ large to agree on how future regional stabilitycan be secured hinges on dynamics (related tothe relations between Middle Eastern and Gulfregional powers, for example) that will be hard toachieve. This, therefore, begs the question of howFrance’s ambitions for the region can be framed,and whether Paris can articulate clear goals thatgo beyond the defense of national security. Theunsustainability of military engagement in theregion has been demonstrated by the United States,and it is one lesson from history that France, andalso other European partners, will keep in mind.

The expectationsthat France has of its

Allies in supportingthis agenda maycreate tensions at theheart of the Alliance,

as countries may beforced to choose, dueto limited capabilities,between pressuresborne from the pan-European struggleagainst terrorism andthe continued necessityto deter Russia.


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after the terror attacks of 2015: a french activist foreign policy here to stay?

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