after iraq: the search for a sustainable national security strategy

8/6/2019 After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy

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AFTER IRAQ:

THE SEARCH FOR A SUSTAINABLE NATIONAL

SECURITY STRATEGY

Colin S. Gray

January 2009

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FOREWORD

A sustainable national security strategy is feasible

only when directed by a sustainable national securitypolicy. In the absence of policy guidance, strategy hasto be meaningless. The only policy that meets boththe mandates of American culture and the challengesof the outside world is one that seeks to promote thenecessary mission of guarding and advancing worldorder.

Dr. Colin Gray considers and rejects a policy thatwould encourage the emergence of a multipolar struc-ture for global politics. He argues that multipolaritynot only would fail to maintain order, it would alsopromote conict among the inevitably rival greatpowers. In addition, he suggests that Americansculturally are not comfortable with balance-of-powerpolitics and certainly would not choose to promote the

return of such a system.The monograph identies the various pieces of

the puzzle most relevant to national security strategy;surfaces the leading assumptions held by Americanpolicymakers and strategists; considers alternativenational security policies; and species the necessarycomponents of a sustainable national security strat-

egy.Dr. Gray concludes that America has much less

choice over its policy and strategy than the publicdebate suggests. He warns that the countrys dominantleadership role in global security certainly will bechallenged before the century is old.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

COLIN S. GRAY is Professor of International Politicsand Strategic Studies at the University of Reading,England. He worked at the International Institute forStrategic Studies (London), and at Hudson Institute(Croton-on-Hudson, NY) before founding a defense-oriented think tank in the Washington, DC, area, theNational Institute for Public Policy. Dr. Gray servedfor 5 years in the Reagan administration on thePresidents General Advisory Committee on ArmsControl and Disarmament. He has served as an adviserto both the U.S. and British governments (he has dualcitizenship). His government work has includedstudies of nuclear strategy, arms control, maritimestrategy, space strategy, and the use of special forces.Dr. Gray has written 22 books, including The Sheriff:

Americas Defense of the New World Order(UniversityPress of Kentucky, 2004), andAnother Bloody Century:Future Warfare (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005). In2006 he published Strategy and History: Essays on Theoryand Practice (Routledge). His most recent books areWar, Peace, and International Relations: An Introductionto Strategic History (Routledge, 2007; Potomac Books,2009), and National Security Dilemmas: Challenges andOpportunities (Potomac Books, 2009). His next book,recently completed, is The Strategy Bridge: Theory forPractice. Dr. Gray is a graduate of the Universities ofManchester and Oxford.


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SUMMARY

What should be the U.S. national security strategyafter Iraq? An answer cannot be given unless a logicallyand politically prior question is posed: What shouldbe the purpose and character of a sustainable U.S.national security policy after Iraq? Thus to answer therst question, one has to identify both the policy thatstrategy must serve as well as the components of thatstrategy.

Unfortunately for the convenience and self-con-dence of defense planners, although the 21st centurypresents no great difculty to America over its choiceof national security policy, the selection of a suitablestrategy is a far more difcult task. The challenge iscultural and material. U.S. national culture favors both asomewhat disengaged stance towards the world beyond

North America, as well as the active promotion of suchleading American values as freedom, democracy, andopen markets. On the material side, the country facesan exceptionally wide range of actual and potentialthreats to its vital interests by historical standards. Onthe one hand, there are nonstate terrorists and otherinsurgents of an Islamist Jihadist persuasion whocould threaten the stability of the global economy bymenacing commercial access to oil, and who may wellacquire a few weapons of mass destruction (WMD).On the other hand, the new century appears certain tosee the rise of some current regional powers to a yetgreater category, China and India specically. Whenwe add in current uncertainty about the future courseof Russian policy, the European Union as a possible

super state, as well as the future roles of Japan andIran, it becomes readily apparent that the years aheadoffer few certainties regarding U.S. threat priorities.


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U.S. national security policy can be sustainable onlyif it meets domestic cultural standards as well as the

externally-based demands to which American leadersmust respond out of a prudent concern for protectionof national interests. Therefore, it is necessary toappreciate the domain of necessity or nearly such, bothdomestic and foreign. U.S. policy and strategy have tosatisfy in two markets, at home and abroad.

Scholars debate whether American culture, ora supposedly objective foreign material reality,ultimately commands policy and strategy. The debateis foolish. In practice, Americans attempt what theyare able, as they perceive and interpret internationalconditions, in a manner that cannot help reectingAmerican cultural inuence.

In order to identify a sustainable national securitystrategy, it is essential to recognize, and take due

account of, the whole hierarchy of relevant ideas andbehavior. To specify, the strategy in question here isconditioned by the following factors:

Perceived state of the world U.S. role in the world Policy National security strategy Military strategy Military forces.

With which major working assumptions areAmerican policymakers and strategists forearmed?Individuals undoubtedly will dissent in some detailfrom any particular listing, but the following is aplausible summary of the principal assumptions that

equip the senior ranks of Americas national securitypolicymaking community:

War is endemic in the human condition. Thoughit is culturally American to be generically


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hopeful, U.S. defense planners cannot, and donot, assume that the 21st century will witness

the end of war. Warfare will both evolve and appear in several forms.

Future hostilities will be regular and irregular;among states as well as states and nonstatepolitical entities. Radically new technologieswill impact warfare of all kinds.

Global order is a meaningful concept; such order hasto be policed by someone or something. Theoriesof order promotion abound; most are illusory.The alternative to order is disorder, and thespectrum from tolerable order to intolerabledisorder is not usually smoothly linear; it ismarked eccentrically by tipping points. Also,orderdisorder is a condition that appliesacross several dimensions of global affairs, for

example economic-nancial as well as military-strategic. As a general rule, the path to ruin willbe unmistakably apparent only in hindsight.

War entails warfare, and warfare always is aboutghting. Americas armed forces must excelin warfare of all kinds, regular and irregular.This is not to say, however, that the two are ofequal importance; they are not. The countryshould continue to accord top priority to itsmilitary prowess in interstate warfare, evenif that prospective combat is anticipated to besignicantly asymmetrical.

New rst-class competitors/enemies will emerge(indeed, are emerging already). The relatively fewyears since 1991 have been remarkable in world

politics for the absence of a state or coalition ableto balance the U.S. superpower. They have notbeen remarkable as heralding a revolution in


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the functioning of that politics. Of recent years,no one has been strong enough to constrain

the United States. Such a power would, andpredictably will, attract follower-states in duecourse. World order in the 21st century willnot be overseen by an executive committee ofthe rather virtual world community, led by anever comfortably dominant America. If thatbenign arrangement truly were in the ofng, itwould be manifest in the behavior and normsof the United Nations Security Council. It is not.Rising states such as China and India are on acollision course with each other and possiblywith the United States. Emerging regional greatpowers, let alone new super states, will acceptU.S. leadership in some security matters only ifthat leadership serves their national interest in

helping to offset the strength of regional rivals.The structure of relative power and inuence,by region and globally, is dynamic. If a state,even a superpower, is not rising it is very likelyto be falling. History has not come to a happyconclusion with American dominance.

Surprise happens. There are unknowns, and evenunknown unknowns, in Americas future,as a recent Secretary of Defense observedwith eloquent opaqueness. A sustainable U.S.national security strategy needs to be surprise-proofed in the sense of being robust whenconfronted with the unexpected. Given therange of radical new technologies with potentialmilitary applications that should mature in the

21st century, and given a predictable contextof international rivalry or worse, U.S. defenseplanners are obliged to favor exibility andadaptability.


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U.S. policy to provide purpose and political

guidance to U.S. strategy in the future is usefullyapproachable by identifying four fairly distinctivealternative American roles in the world. These arereadily characterized as follows:

1. Hegemon-leader for global guardianship2. Anti-hegemonial offshore balancer and spoiler3. Disengaged lone wolf4. Moderate competitor and partner in a multipolar

world.

Of the four nominal choices, only the rst is trulypracticable at present and in the near-term future. Thepartnership in multipolarity, an idea that appeals tomany scholars, is awed in that the non-Americanpoles are not yet ready for prime time. Furthermore,

even if this were not the case, a genuinely multipolarworld would be prone to great power wars. Therich strategic history of multipolarity is far fromencouraging. The role of disengaged lone wolfsimply could not work. The United States is engaged inworld affairs by economic, environmental, and hencepolitical and potentially strategic, globalization. To bedisengaged would be to decline to protect ones vitalinterests. Moreover, Americas national culture, thoughmarked by a longing for disengagement, also stronglyfavors political missionary behavior. This latter valuerises and falls irregularly, but it always rises again.

The United States could try to effect a transitionfrom its current on-shore Eurasian strategy of forwarddeployment, to an off-shore posture keyed to a

policy role as spoiler of potential grand continentalcoalitions. As maritime-air-space balancer of largeEurasian menaces, the United States would both retain


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its political discretion over belligerency and favor itsnational strength in the higher technology features of

its armed forces. The problem is that this off-shore rolewould not sufce to defend the national interest. Thecountry would not be trusted, since it would eschewthe rm commitments that require local presence. Asmuch to the point, U.S. inuence would be certain todiminish as a consequence of a process of withdrawal,no matter how impressive the reach of Americasweapons through the several geographies of the greatcommons.

Almost by default, the United States should choose,perhaps simply accept, the role of hegemon-leader for aworld order that serves both its own most vital interestsas well as those of a clear majority of members of theworld community, such as it is. Contrary to the sense ofmuch of the contemporary debate, Americans have no

prudent alternative other than to play the hegemonicrole. But for the role to be sustainable, it has to restupon the formal or tacit consent of other societies. Onlywith such consent will America be able to exercise anational security strategy geared successfully to theordering duty.

What are the components of a sustainable nationalsecurity strategy, given the necessity for a guidingpolicy whose overarching purpose is to protect thenational interest by defending world order globally?Such a strategy must be rened and adapted to speciccases, but these are its generic constituents:

1. Control of the global commons (sea, air, space,cyberspace), when and where it is strategically essen-tial.

2. The ability to dissuade, deter, defeat, or at least largelyneutralize any state, coalition of states, or nonstate politicalactor, that threatens regional or global order.


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3. Adaptable and exible strategy, operations, tactics,logistics, and forces. Future wars and warfare will

occur all along the spectrum of regularity-irregularity.Asymmetry will be the norm, not the exception, evenin regular conventional hostilities.

4. Continuing supremacy in regular conventionalcombat. Prediction of a strategic future that will bewholly irregular is almost certainly a considerableexaggeration.

5. Competence in counterinsurgency (COIN) andcounterterror (CT). These activities should not domi-nate American defense preparation and action, butthey comprise necessary military, inter alia, core com-petencies.

6. Excellence in raiding, thus exploiting the leverageof Americas global reach.

7. First-rate strategic theory and strategic and military

doctrine. Ideas are more important than machines, upto a point at least.

8. A national security, or grand, strategy worthy ofthe name, in which military strategy can be suitablynested.

9. Policy choices and tactical military habits that do notoffend American culture.

10. A fully functioning strategy bridge that bindstogether, adaptably, the realms of policy and militarybehavior.

Our analysis concludes by identifying ve far-reaching points of great concern. First, the preferredoption, truly the necessary choice, for the UnitedStates in the world, here called hegemony-primacy-

light, is a policy condition, not a strategy. Americanshave proved vulnerable to the temptation to leapfrom policy selection to military operations, largely


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neglecting the essential levels of grand strategy andmilitary strategy.

Second, a denite strategy needs a denite enemy.This reality all but encourages oversimplication.America can wage war against al-Qaeda, but notagainst terror. Because the identity of most of thecountrys future enemies is uncertain, it must sufceto ensure that the components from which denitestrategies would be constructed are always readyfor play when the strategy coach calls on them toperform.

Third, the United States needs to beware of falsealternatives for its policy and strategy. In defenseof its national interests, the country has no prudentalternatives other than to play the hegemonic rolefor as long as it is able. Similarly, there is no sensiblealternative to some on-shore entanglements in Eur-

asia, though assuredly Americans should strive tosucceed more by raiding than by intervening in, andoccupying, alien territory. There are and will be caseswhen American boots must grind local dust. However,the U.S. hegemon should seek to tread as lightly as themission permits, lest its effort triggers a self-defeatingblowback from an outraged and formerly neutrallocal population. Unfortunately, more often than notstrategic and political effectiveness are much enhancedwhen the military has overwhelming force and appliesit.

Fourth, belatedly Washington has learned what ahandful of scholars, not to mention the World War IIgeneration of policymakers, knew, i.e., that culture asa force must never be underestimated. Understanding

of ones own culture as well as the culture of otherscan make the difference between success and failure inpolicy, strategy, operations, and tactics.


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Fifth, America must understand that its dominantrole in many dimensions of world affairs increasingly

will be challenged by those whose interests, anxieties,and honor are challenged by the U.S. hegemony. Nomatter how gingerly this hegemony is manifested inU.S. behavior, it will be resented and opposed.


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AFTER IRAQ:THE SEARCH FOR A SUSTAINABLE NATIONAL

SECURITY STRATEGY

If American hegemony is the answer, what was thequestion?

Anonymous

Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and

knows himself will not be endangered in a hundredengagements. One who does not know the enemy butknows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimesmeet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemynor himself will invariably be defeated in everyengagement.

Sun-tzu, ca. 400BC, 19941

In the 5th century, it was dawning on the Roman world,

especially Constantinople, that theirs was but one stateamong many: a perception which contrasted withthe 4th-century view that Rome comprised the entirecivilized world.

Ross Laidlaw, 20072

Introduction: Home and Abroad.

Strategy and policy are not synonymous. However,a sustainable strategy can serve only a sustainablepolicy. If the latter oscillates, the former becomesimpractical. This monograph targets primarilythe national, or grand, strategic level of analysis,but it cannot ignore the challenge of ascertainingand sustaining a coherent national security policy.

Carelessly or for stylistic variety, many politicians,analysts, and commentators employ the terms policyand strategy interchangeably.3 This malpractice does


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not scar these pages. The distinction matters cruciallyand needs to be maintained rigorously. Policy sets

goals, indeed may well change goals, while strategyis always instrumental. In the absence of a reasonablystable policy, strategy becomes literally meaningless; itmust lack political direction.

The rst epigraph above highlights both the core ofthe contemporary debate about Americas place in theworld, and reminds people of the need to be clear aboutthe underlying purpose behind a sweeping policy goal.The discussion that follows addresses both the nationaland the international levels of analysis. It probes theprobable structure and functioning of global politics aswell as Americas role. This is not an exercise in theacademic study of International Relations, but it cannotbe denied that it must bear directly, and draw upon,a major debate within the international community

of scholars.4

Specically, scholars of InternationalRelations are debating energetically the respectiveand relative inuence of the material structure of theinternational system of states (very largely), as opposedto the potency of domestic cultures (national, strategic,and military-institutional).5 For once, academics arefocusing on an issue area that has immense meaningfor U.S. policy and strategy. In fact, widespread expertmisunderstanding of the relationship between whatone can summarize for convenience as power andculture is misleading much of the current public debateon the subject of this monograph. The two should notbe presented as rivals; in practice both are players.

The second epigraph is essential, even though it isalmost tediously familiar. It points to the heart of what

must be the argument here. Specically, Americanshave to know themselves as foreign policy players.More to the point, they should recognize the uniqueness


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and content of their collective national culture. A largefraction of public debate about U.S. foreign policy and

national security strategy in the 21st century is all butirrelevant, because it refers to imaginary Americans.To state the twin basics of this subject: U.S. nationalsecurity strategy, and the policy it serves, has to be aresponse to the international structure of power, asstrategy is shaped, driven, or ne-tuned by U.S. nationalculture. To be truly blunt, Americans are what they areand believe what they believe. Their deepest values,assumptions, attitudes, and even behavioral habits arethe products of the national historical experience as ithas been, and is being, interpreted and reinterpreted. Anational policy or strategy that is not sustainable whenchallenged by the values of domestic culture must fail.6For example, the United States does not do balanceof power politics or multipolar systems of order, at

least it has not yet. Moreover, it shows no ofcial orpopular, as contrasted with scholarly, inclinationto shift seamlessly into such a novel and culturallyunwelcome groove.

The cultural claim registered immediately above isnot just a minor academic point. Rather, it amounts tothe statement that unless one takes generous accountof American domestic national culture, analysis of,and recommendations for, U.S. policy and strategyare near certain to be irrelevant. This is why so muchof the current still-burgeoning controversy over thefuture of American external behavior is by and largeoff the mark. The problem is not limited to the fact thatmany people do not take proper account of Americanideology. In addition, even when they do note the

unhelpful or complicating factor of ideas, they chooseto discount it.7


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To illustrate the huge scale of the problem thatunderlies this enquiry, consider the fundamental

challenge to the United States in Afghanistan andIraq. In both cases, Americans are attempting whatmay well prove to be a mission impossible. Neithercountryor seriously undergoverned space, tocoin a phrasehas given convincing evidence of beingripe for transformation into a market democracy. Thedifculty is that Afghans, Iraqis, and Americans cannothelp being who they are, with the beliefs that theyhave inherited and nursed. It is a matter of identity.By and large, Americans are not cynical exploiters,while Afghans and Iraqis are not generally ignorantand cowed, though there is certainly plenty of thatto be found. Each culture, with its subcultures, is theproduct of its geography and history and will changeonly slowly. As a prominent British historian has

written recently: The view that American ideologyand technology would transcend Iraqi political culturewas mistaken.8 Iraq can be transformed only withinits own complex cultural parameters, not in deanceof them, and then only by Iraqis.

Intrinsically, Americans have no free choice indeciding whether or not to stand for, and frequently tryto advance, their essentially liberal notions of democracyand of prosperity through free trade. It is not a questionof choice. As claimed already, democracy and freedomthrough the benets of a prosperous open economy arecentral to the American identity. This credo and thesevalues can be ignored in practice on occasion, therebyattracting well-merited charges of hypocrisy. But in itsprevailing direction, U.S. foreign policy and national

security strategy are certain to be inuenced by theculturally-driven desire to improve the world. Such isthe enduring signicance of culture. However, this is


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not the whole story by any means. What happens whenU.S. policy and strategy are frustrated, as has been

the case in Afghanistan and Iraq? And how does theUnited States react when it anticipates a global futureless hospitable to U.S. leadership than has obtained inrecent years? This is the fundamental dynamic contextaddressed here. How hard should Americans try toremain clearly the Number One power? The UnitedStates requires a national security strategy and policysustainable in what is sure to be a future quite hostileto American values and assumptions.

The long list of U.S. problems in Afghanistanand Iraq should not be misinterpreted. It would be amistake to conclude that: (1) the United States shouldcease to act hegemonically; (2) U.S. values (i.e., culture)are awed, for Americans and some others; (3) the U.S.armed forces have been demonstrably incompetent.

A more sensible interpretation of events would be thefollowing: (1) the United States is the only candidatefor contemporary hegemon, and world order needs ahegemon willing and able to serve as world policeman,even one that makes some policy errors9; (2) in majorrespects U.S. culture is highly attractive, which isfortunate since it is not easily alterable, but it does needto be advertised and applied with care and restraintabroad; (3) Americans have become very competent atwarghting, but that prowess has not extended acrossthe whole of the conict spectrum. In common with allgreat powers in the past, the United States has to learnto cope with occasional policy failure. Failure throughhuman error or sheer incompetence, friction, and badluck should not be mistaken for precipitate decline. Too

many commentators today are proclaiming the end ofAmerican hegemony. It is true that there are visible


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trends hostile to U.S. hegemony, the well-announcedrise of China and India, and one day, just possibly,

the EU/Europe, and even a long-delayed Japan andBrazil. But for the time being and for many years tocome, the United States will be the hegemon. This is tosay that it will be the global leader, certainly the mostimportant player, in any matter of grave signicancefor international security. This will be what one mightcall a default reality. It is, and will be, a consequenceof conscious American choice and effort. Also, U.S.leadership, notwithstanding the exception of itsbehavior towards Iraq, will rest upon a base providedby broad global consent, albeit not always of anenthusiastic kind.

Despite the discretion theoretically permitted bythe virtual geographical insularity of the U.S. home-land, American policy and grand strategy have been

unmistakably stable when historically viewed. Trulygreat debates on Americas place and role in the outsideworld, as well as on its high policy towards that world,have been few and far between. The current fermentof ideas and assertions is most unusual. In fact, notsince the late 1940s has there been a public debate onU.S. foreign policy and national security policy at allcomparable to the present controversy.

As for national security strategy, for the nearesthistorical precedent for the depth of contemporaryarguments one has to look back to the rst Eisenhoweradministration (1953-57), when the country struggledto come to terms with nuclear realities. In both foreignpolicy and military strategy, the United States settledupon what proved to be sustainable pillars. Americans

determined to lead and be the principal materialcontributor to a global anti-Communist alliance. Thatideologically and economically sustainable decision


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was undergirded by the decision to place heavyreliance upon nuclear deterrence. Washington realized

swiftly that there was little it could do, or was preparedto attempt, to prevent such deterrence from becominginconveniently mutual with respect to the Communistbloc. The basic thrust of U.S. policy and strategy wasnot to alter for 40 years, through no fewer than ninepresidencies. This is not to endorse the strategic choicethat was made, but simply to note the longevity of itsauthority.

If one looks to the longue dure, one nds that therehas been a distinctive geopolitical, hence geostrategic,pattern to U.S. national security behavior.10 Thosescholars who point to an oscillation in Americanpolicy between expansion and withdrawal, relativeintroversion and extroversion, are substantially correct.Ideologically, which is to say culturally, Americans

desire both to remake the world into a facsimile of theirown New World, and to effect that monumental taskat distinctly limited cost.11 This cultural conict lies atthe heart of todays American national security debate.From the time of Americas rst emergence as a playerof world politics, which one can date generously tothe defeat of Spain in 1899, until today, the countryhas intervened with massive force on the world stageon four occasions: 1917-18; 1941-45; 1946-91; and2001-present. In each case, the United States steppedin violently, twice by irresistible invitation (1941 and2001), to resolve problems of Eurasian security.

In each of the rst three periods, the UnitedStates stayed the course until the job was done,either militarily (1918, 1945) or politically (1991).

However, September 11, 2001 (9/11) was different.The announcement of a long war, a global war onterror (GWOT)both terms have now lost most of


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their ofcial favorhas come to appear as necessaryin broad policy principle as it may be misconceived in

some contemporary practice.12

The fact that 9/11 wasdirected at Americans at home compensates somewhatfor the historical reality that terrorism is in the lessercategory of threats to national security. Not many yearsago the U.S. defense community was anticipating thepossibility of the country suffering tens of millions ofcasualties, at the least, should there be a breakdown inthe stability of mutual deterrence. Even an al-Qaedaafliate improbably armed with, and able to deploy,one or two nuclear devices could not begin to pose amenace comparable in scale to the erstwhile Sovietdanger. Terrorism, especially terrorism with weaponsof mass destruction (WMD), may be the threat of theweek, but it is easy to exaggerate its potency.

As we have seen, the national culture commands

opposing impulses: on the one hand, to democratize/Americanize the world; on the other, to stay at homein the comfort and now only relative security of NorthAmerica. But despite those domestic realities, Ameri-cans have been quite steady in their approach to interna-tional security. One can argue that the United States de-clined to accept its responsibility as a newly minted verygreat power in 1919 and the subsequent two decades.However, it is well to recall that in those years Franceand Britain were still regarded widely as great powersand, de facto, were behaving, perhaps misbehaving, onbehalf of the United States, geostrategically.13 In EastAsia the United States eventually, by 1940, did acceptthe leadership of an anti-Japanese coalition. Neitherdeterrence nor coercion short of force could dissuade

Japan from its pursuit of continental empire in China,but Washington was rmly committed to resistingsuch Japanese imperialism.


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When Britain and France were demoted by thecourse of strategic history from the rst rank of

great powers, the United States did not delay longbefore it picked up the fallen ag for Western valuesand geopolitical interests. But since 1946, or 1941 ifpreferred, the United States has sustained resolutelyas much of an anti-hegemonic policy towards Eurasiaas it believed was needed.14 With the fall of the Sovietimperium, however, Washington was left by default asglobal hegemon, or world leader, the dominant power.Triggered by 9/11, the United States chose to becomethe hegemon with a predominant purpose, to conducta GWOT. Whether the long war against terrorists issustainable as the centerpiece of U.S. national securitystrategy, there are grounds to doubt. The principalreason for skepticism is not so much uncertainty overthe persistence of violent Islamism. Rather, doubts

accrue as to the prospect of a recognizable victory.Furthermore, other global developments are likelyto reduce the relative signicance of the terroristmenace.

When considered over the longer term, as in thismonograph, U.S. foreign policy, national securitypolicy, and strategy must reconcile the demandsof a domestic culture that can have dysfunctionalconsequences abroad, with the objective circumstancesof the outside world. It is almost entirely useless forAmerican or other scholars to write books and articlesurging a U.S. policy that affronts American culture.The beginning of wisdom has to be with Sun-tzusdictum on the necessity for knowledge of the enemyand of oneself. To be sustainable, American policy and

strategy must be broadly compatible with Americanvalues. Perhaps not all American values, and not allof the time. But any policy vision that is plainly un-


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American is certain to fail at home eventually. Foreignpolicy is born at home and has to succeed there if it is

to succeed abroad.The current debate to which this monograph relates

is replete with arguments about anticipated features ofthe 21st century that will prove desperately challengingto American national culture. It may well be that thiscentury will see a return of multipolar balance-of-power politics on a global scale. But when one consid-ers this possibility, even probability, one needs to re-member that American culture wants to reject what itregards as the cynical balance-of-power politics of expe-diency. Americans believe it is a mission of their uniquecountry to improve the world. If thwarted in this noble,even (in the opinion of many) divine, mission, they arelikely to insist that the country withdraw, adopting aminimalist foreign policy. Controversialist Christopher

Layne speaks for many Americans when he writes:Precisely because of its power and geography, thereis very little the United States needs to do in the worldin order to be secure.15 This is not a majority opinionat present, but it does express a powerful enduringcurrent in American culture.

Any and all discussion of a sustainable U.S. nationalsecurity strategy must be at least as attentive to thepersisting realities of American culture as it is to theconstraints and opportunities of the outside world. Inaddition, many scholars and even some ofcial plan-ners are apt to neglect the potent roles that can beplayed by eccentric personal preference, incompetence,error, pure accident, and unavoidable bad luck. Therealm of national security strategy is far from friction

free.16The body of this work opens with an explanation

of the structure of the subject of national security


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strategy; it then attempts to peer into the future toidentify assumptions that should be robust, albeit

with caveats attached. Next, the discussion speciesthe most desirable American role in the world of the21st century. From the American role, the analysismoves on to consider the most appropriate strategy.The monograph closes with observations and recom-mendations on national security strategy.

The Strategic Challenge.

Because of the inherent complexity of our subject, itis most important to appreciate both the whole structurethat is relevant and its parts, as well as how the structureof strategy should function. National security strategycan make no sense if approached in isolation.17 It is notself-referential. It must express and serve a national

security policy. In addition, it has to be implementedby agencies, military and civilian, whose capabilitiesroughly match the authoritative goals. The strategicchallenge in the title of this section is the difcultyof keeping ways, means, and ends approximately inbalance so that they are mutually supportive.18 Thistask is extraordinarily difcult to accomplish. Theprincipal source of difculty may repose with policygoals that overreach or underreach; with purposefulstrategy that does not advance policy, or even thecomplete absence of such strategy; or with military andother means that are excessive or inadequate. MichaelHoward offers the counterintuitive judgment that thestrategy adopted is always more likely to be dictatedrather by the availability of means than by the nature

of the ends.19 Although this view has major merit, itcan mislead. While it is true to claim that as a generalrule a government makes war, not as one would like


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to, but as one must,20 it is also the case that the UnitedStates often has suffered from a strategy decit.21

The whole structure of our subject has the followingcomponents:

1. Culture (e.g., values, vision)2. U.S. role in the world3. State of the world, international environment4. National security policy5. National security strategy6. Military strategy7. Military forces.

American national culture is always liable tocontribute signicantly to external policy. Cultureexpresses the nations dominant values and its visionof how the world ought to be and how the countryshould relate to that world. Just as it would be absurd to

interpret American history without regard to the ideasand beliefs that have shaped, even ruled, Americanminds, so it would be unsound to treat the futureof American national security policy and strategywithout accounting for the potential inuence ofculture. Americans do not and will not behave abroadstrictly as rational actors coldly assessing their nationalinterest in material terms. The United States assuredlywill seek to overbalance possibly menacing physicalpower. But Washington will assess, calculate, andbehave for purposes and in terms that are ideationalas well as material-structural. For example, the UnitedStates will strive not merely to keep the PeoplesRepublic of China (PRC) materially subordinate withreference to the power balance. In addition, it will

strive to improve China as well as Americas globaltrading partners and dependents. Beyond the nationalculture expressed in the ideals of liberty, freedom,


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democracy, and open markets, American culture hasstrategic and military-institutional branches. There is

an American way of war that reects the nationalgeography, history, and ideology.22 However, culture,though important, does not alone determine policyand strategy. Objective material realities are an everpossible source of constraint on national preference,as are the surprise effects of unexpected happenings.Culture is important, but it is not all-important.

Americas role in the world is much more the productof cultural choice than is usual for most countries.23 Onecan plead strategic necessity for many of the countryswars: for a supposedly peace-loving democracy, therehave been many such.24 But on close inspection, thenational geography truly donated a large measure ofpolicy discretion to Americas statesmen. Americansnow are more than comfortable with the idea that

the United States is Number One. The implicationsof unipolarity after 1991 (or 1989, with the collapseof the Soviet imperium) are not always plain, but theAmerican public has accustomed itself to the ideaof primacy, even hegemony in the sense of globalleadership.

To be the global hegemon is a role that only theUnited States can play, whether it performs well orpoorly. However, the country is not an ideologicallydisinterested, effectively neutral, guardian of worldorder. This sheriff aspires to extend the domain of itsinterpretation of good law, not merely to enforce it inareas already civilized.25 Very occasionally, Americansdebate the ways and means to implement their role inthe world, but the ends are constant and nonnegotiable.

Historically speaking, there have been few exceptionsamong American statesmen to those who have signedon in the Golden Book for freedom and democracy.


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One can always nd a stand-out, a true pragmatistuntroubled by the manifest desirability of operating

a value-free foreign policy. Richard M. Nixon and hiseminence grise, Henry Kissinger, spring to mind.26Nonetheless, one would nd it difcult to people adinner party of modest size with American leadersfrom all periods who were wholehearted practitionersof that game of nations, Realpolitik. Americas role inthe world should, not must, accommodate irresistibleexternal pressures and elements, but it will do so in anAmerican way. This way is not a single-lane highway.Nonetheless, no matter how particular Americanleaders play their hand in global politics, their stylewill reect the national culture which they share.

American culture has to function, even bow to,the external context. The dynamic state of the world,the international environment as scholars have come

to call it, is a complex objective reality that Americanscan do little to alter. This is not to deny that the UnitedStates is by far the most inuential player of globalpolitics. Furthermore, it is not to forget that the countryperiodically is inclined to exaggerate its potentialto reshape that reality to its own preferred image.The recent, and just about still current, U.S. (actuallyAnglo-American) crusade for democracy is a classicexpression of this American tendency to overreach.Whether or not there is a valid connection between thedemocratization of formerly politically pagan landsand progress in the GWOT is really moot. The worldcannot be democratized by American power and inu-ence and neither can it be converted by American do-mestic example. As a general rule, a stable democracy

has to be almost wholly a domestic growth. Appreciationof that aspect of the contemporary state of the world isnot much in dispute among scholars.


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The world political system is still unipolar, and itshould remain so for some years to come.27 Nonetheless,

there is widespread agreement that the United Statesis in relative decline, as other, currently regional,powers, increase their individual strength vis--visthe U.S. hegemon. Since 2003 in particular, whichsaw the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq on March17, some regional great powers, actual and aspiring,have made a habit of collaborating to try to clip theAmerican eagles wings.28 This political developmentwas inevitable. The only questions were, and remain,how soon would a coalition, probably only a looseone at rst, emerge to challenge U.S. hegemonism,how effective would it prove to be, and how wouldthe United States react? These are the questions thatunderlie contemporary domestic America and foreigndebate. Many scholars and journalists are fond of

identifying the course of current events as the turningof a historical corner. The metaphor is popular andbenets from an absence of temporal perspective. Atpresent, one can suggest the global political system isstill unipolar, broadly if unevenly policed by Americanculture, and, if needs be, by American threats or theactual use of military force. But Americas unipolarmoment allegedly is either passing or already hasreceded into history. It was foreshortened by themuscular errors that produced imperial overstretchin Afghanistan and Iraq, so the narrative runs.29 Inplace of American hegemonya complex reality thatrequires closer attention than it is usually granted,as the ever perceptive Jeremy Black reminds us30anew era of multipolarity allegedly is dawning. This

may be a sound prediction. Indeed, in the long run itis all but certain to be correct. But it is by no meansself-evident that Americas moment of unshared,


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unbalanced, strategic preponderance must vanish anytime soon. There is widespread agreement, therefore,

among the U.S. commentariat that multipolarity is thefuture. However, whether that future is near-term oneought to doubt. Furthermore, few of the prophets ofmultipolarity appear to understand the problems withthe condition they espouse.

The state of the world, the context wherein theUnited States must locate and exercise its role, isush with troubles, actual and for once fairly reliablypredictable. A sustainable U.S. national securitystrategy will need to be effective in coping with thefollowing leading threats to American and global well-being, presented here in descending order of probablesignicance:

1. Return of great power conict (i.e., multipol-arity).

2. Climate change: resource shortageswater, food,energy.

3. Overpopulation, illegal mass migration, policypressures in overpopulated countries, pandemics.

4. Globalization: economic, cultural, political,militaryvery uneven development and prosperity.

5. Nuclear proliferation and regional nuclear wars.6. Islamist terrorism.

These are not alternatives. They will occur inbunches, simultaneously and interdependently in somecases. Obviously, climate change, overpopulation,and uneven development comprise a witchs brewof menaces to international order. Scholars will differover an item or two among the six offered, certainly

in their suggested prioritization. But overall, these sixsources of trouble are postulated with high condence.It will be in the context provided by these dynamic


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difculties that Americans will seek to be strategicallyeffective in a sustainable way.

Next, it is mandatory that a clear distinction bemaintained between national security policy and nationalsecurity strategy. At some risk of banality, this analysisinsists upon crystal clarity in their relationship, eventhough there needs to be a continuous discoursebetween them. Civilian policymakers shouldinuence generals and vice versa. But that dialogue,appropriately termed unequal by Eliot Cohen becauseof the necessity for civilian control, should not transformpoliticians functionally into generals nor generals intopoliticians.31 A national security strategy must be a jointcivil-military product. It should be created, exercised,and, when essential, revised, with vital inputs fromboth civilians and soldiers.32 Nonetheless, nationalsecurity strategy can always only be instrumental. If

one seeks to understand what the strategy is supposedto achieve, one must lift ones gaze and examine policy.This is where political intentions have to be specied.

In practice, culture or material temptation sometimesdrives policy and strategy without the two engaging inhonest and realistic dialogue. Policy may specify goalsthat are chosen for desirability, with scant attentionpaid to feasibility. For example, U.S. policy has soughtto democratize Iraq and trigger a benign democraticrevolution throughout the realm of Islam. It is a seriousmistake to confuse national security policy, let alonenational security strategy, with foreign policy. Nationalsecurity, or grand, strategy, refers in all denitions tothe potential or actual orchestration of any and everynational asset for purposes selected by national security

policy. But those purposes need to entail some risk ofwar.33 Grand strategy can be pursued in time of peace aswell as war, but it is important to use the concept onlywhen the military dimension is prominent and the use


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of force is a distinct possibility, if not probability. In thesame way that strategic studies must not be subsumed

into an overly broad, all-dangers, security studies, sonational security strategy has to retain a strong militaryavor, despite its breadth of domain.34

Under the umbrella of national security strategy liesmilitary strategy. Confusion of the two is commonplace.Although war most essentially entails ghting, as Carlvon Clausewitz insists, not every exercise of nationalsecurity strategy requires warfare.35 Adroit diplomacyor cunningly applied economic coercion may removeneed for the spilling of blood. However, since nationalsecurity strategy has the military element at its core,it must follow that military strategy is nearly alwayscritical to the success of policy. If the United Stateschooses and conducts military strategy incompetentlyto the point of battleeld defeat on a theater-wide scale, it

is unlikely to be possible to nd adequate compensationthrough the skillful employment of other agencies ofnational power and inuence. Once committed to aconict, military force has a way of mattering morethan anything else. Even though ghting is not alwayspotentially the most effective source of strategic effect,if one loses in combat the ghting will assume the poleposition in relative signicance.

Most typically, the regular side in irregularwarfare cannot win the war as a whole militarily, butparadoxically, even ironically, it can be defeated byfailure in combat. In 1964, Bernard B. Fall expressedthe condition thus:

[G]uerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage

of a far vaster political contest and . . . no matter howexpertly it is fought by competent and dedicatedprofessionals, it cannot possibly make up for the absenceof a political rationale.36


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In both Iraq and Afghanistan today, growing U.S.competence in counterinsurgency (COIN) and

counterterror (CT) has not until recently been marriedto a political rationale sufciently favored by localpower brokers. As a result, it is uncertain as to whetherU.S. COIN efforts will produce the lasting politicaleffects sought by Washington.

In 1954, the defeat of the 17 elite battalions (only 10fought any one time) of the French Colonial Army atDien Bien Phu had conclusive political consequences,albeit not ones that fully satised the Vietnamese.37Ho Chi Minh was bullied by China and Russia intotolerating the temporary creation of a South Vietnam.For the exception to the rule that defeat in battle is fatal,it is historically accurate to note that although Frenchcolonial forces won the ghting in Algeria, France lostthe war.38 For further illustration, it can be persuasively

argued that the United States defeated the Viet Congand the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in resistingthe Tet Offensive in 1968, as well as in subsequentoperations, yet still lost the war.

This monograph recognizes the sovereignty ofpolitics over warfare and endorses the view that thereare some conicts that cannot be concluded successfullyby military means. But we also wish to contradict theall too prevalent notion that actual ghting is only ofsecondary importance. The view taken here is that theprimacy of politics, indeed of culture, does not meanthat tactical military outcomes are of little signicance.To stumble into that opinion is to overreach withthe sound argument that military success does notnecessarily translate into victory in a war overall.39

The nal piece of the puzzle tackled here is the armedforces: soldiers, their morale, institutions, doctrines,training, tactical skills, equipment, and combat


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effectiveness or ghting power. Military strategyshould change only at a pace consistent with actual

military prowess. If the armed forces cannot performadequately at their core or dening activity of ghting,then military strategy, national security strategy, andpolicy will be frustrated. The soldiers of the Third Reichcould not defeat the soldiers of Soviet Russia. Germanmilitary strategy faltered and collapsed in the face oftoo much distance, too large an enemy, and repeatedlogistical disasters and other systemic weaknesses.40In Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s, the U.S. armedforces, though markedly improving, demonstratedand publicly acknowledged a lack of expertise in theearly conduct of warfare against irregular enemies.41Irregular conict, as in Iraq today, the U.S. Armyspreferred type of war. This Army, at least until recently,has not been properly indoctrinated, equipped, and

trained to succeed in Iraq. As much to the point, onemust add, the soldiers have served generally faultymilitary strategy, and poor national security strategy,in ultimate pursuit of impractical policy goals. Strategy,operations, and tactics in Iraq all improved in 2007,culminated by claims of imminent military victory inlate 2008, but it may well be the case that Iraqi internalpolitical divisions will yet scuttle U.S. efforts.

Every layer in the national security architecture hasto function effectively enough. Not perfectly; one mustnot seek an impossibly immaculate performance. Nomatter which desirable policy goals are chosen, andregardless of the theoretical wisdom in the selectedstrategy, to repeat, if the military machine cannotdeliver sufcient success the entire project will fail.

Culture, policy, strategy, operations, tactics, andlogistics depend upon each other. The monumental


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task of combining policy intent with the necessary waysand means is the domain of strategy, both national

security or grand, and military.

Global Security and Future Warfare.

Clausewitz provides somber meditations on un-certainty, risk, chance, and friction as prominentfeatures of warfare.42 Of course, he is correct. But thegreat Prussian philosopher does bound his warnings,explicitly and implicitly. Notwithstanding his vigorousclaim that war is the realm of uncertainty and hisstriking simile claiming that [i]n the whole range ofhuman activities, war most closely resembles a gameof cards, his is not the counsel of despair in the face ofa blind chance.43 If we read On Warcarefully and reecton the meaning of the whole book, it becomes obvious

that the author judges governments and their militarycommanders to be far from helpless when chancestrikes a potentially cruel blow.44 First, Clausewitzpraises a process of detailed war planning, hardly anactivity that could be very valuable should chance reignsupreme.45 Second, he recognizes the role of genius incommand as offering some protection against cruelstrokes of fate.46 Genius appears on a sliding scale ofmerit and requires a competent military instrument forits realization in action. Often it is said that operationalplanning is of more utility for the training of plannersthan for the plans that it yields.

Uncertainty is a feature of war, rendering warfareexceptionally difcult to treat analytically. Uncertaintycan have a positive effect, as typically was claimed for

nuclear deterrence.47 But more generally it is a blightthat cannot be treated conclusively. Because the futurehas not happened, defense planning cannot help


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becoming guesswork.48 This guesswork generally isperformed carefully, though one should never forget

that the countrys military posture ultimately is notthe product strictly of a rational process of strategicnet assessment. In addition, perhaps preponderantly,the posture is the result of an essentially politicalprocess keyed to questions of money. Of recent years,the U.S. defense community has taken the principle ofuncertainty very much to heart. In fact, there is somedanger that a prudent recognition of uncertainty maybe accorded undue authority. As some scholars havebegun to notice, although war is beset by nonlinearity,uncertainty, chance, and even chaotic conditions, byno means is it impervious to purposeful direction.49If it were, there could be no place for strategy. Inhistorical practice, uncertainty, chance, and riskassuredly attend war and warfare, but they are simply

conditions under which strategically educated leadersmust labor. Clausewitz should not be characterized asa chaos theorist; he was not one such. To indicate howuncertain is the future, especially war in the future, isnot to claim that the course of events is beyond shapingand even control.50

Empirical historical studies of defense planning,usually called war planning, are fairly rare. Singlecountry works and treatises that are almost cookbookson how to do it correctly, are far more common. It sohappens that an edited book of unusual relevance toour concerns here has appeared recently. The previousmajor study a generation ago focused only on WorldWar I: War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914, editedby Paul M. Kennedy.51 In contrast, the recent volume,

The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military and StrategicPlanning Under Uncertainty, edited by Talbot C. Imlayand Marcia Duffy Toft, covers the great powers from


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1815 to 1961.52 Although the conclusions offered by theeditors are less than startling, their brief introductory

rumination is useful. For example, they offer thefollowing nugget which combines the blindinglyobvious with shrewd judgment:

But if the task of military planning is indispensable,it is also fraught with an uncertainty rooted in threebasic problems: that of identifying friend and foe, thatof understanding the nature of future war, and that ofdetermining its timing.

Timing probably involves the greatest uncertainty. Asidefrom cases of deliberate aggression planners cannotcondently know whether war will break out tomorrow,next week, next year, or in the next decade.53

The implication of Imlay and Tofts statement isthat war planning in peacetime cannot be performed

efciently.54 The problem of deciding upon adequatedefense preparation is the familiar one of insurance.How much protection should be purchased as a pru-dent hedge against threats that may never mater-ialize?

In this monograph, unless otherwise specied,defense planning refers to what used to be, and in

some quarters still is, known as war planning. Thisis planning for the countrys overall defense posture,as well as military planning for operations at the highend of the operational spectrum. The text recognizesthat the United States conducts planning at everylevel: from the political-policy, through the grand-strategic, to the military strategic, the theaterandlower, to the operational and tactical. In point of fact,

the staffs in the vast multilayered bureaucracy of theU.S. Government, especially in its military institutions,write and rewrite plans of different kinds all the time.


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Given that the mission here is to identify a sustainablenational security strategy, the discussion of plans and

planning generally refers to processes of discussion,decision, and action at that level.

It is well to develop and retain empathy fordefense planners, because theirs is a necessary thoughawesomely challenging task. Because one is unavoid-ably ignorant about the future, that does not mean thatthe vital subjects of this sectionglobal security andfuture warfarecan be neglected. Since one can onlyguess about the future of warfare, guess one must.55 Tocut to the chase, when one seeks a sustainable nationalsecurity strategy, a hugely immodest project, whatguidance can one seek, and from which sources? Mustthe future resemble the past? Unfortunately, history isall that is available for guidance. Yet history is not anobjective record of who did what to whom, when, and

why. Rather it is a confusion of competing historianswho have told what they believed occurred. Thelessons of history are notoriously short of authority.

Nonetheless, since the defense planners of todayhave to beware lest they project the current contextmindlessly into the future, and can know nothingdenite about the future, rival interpretations of thepast are the only source of inspiration extant. Of course,one could sever the anchor chain to history and electto go boldly into almost a wholly unfamiliar securityfuture. It is possible, some would say desirable, to planfor a 21st century which bears little resemblance tothe 20th and 19th. Attractive visions of global securityradically different from current conditions are not hardto invent, but the appeal does not survive close study,

at least it has yet to do so.56American defense planners are required to think and

prepare for a global domain. Even should a future U.S.


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administration express an inward-looking domesticmood and attempt a signicant reversal of todays

forward presence, it would soon discover that itssecurity concerns were distressingly global. The UnitedStates is too important an actor in all dimensions ofworld affairs, not least the nancial and economic (e.g.,maritime trade), to be able to pull up the drawbridgeand mind its own business, inoffensively, in NorthAmerica. This is not to claim that Americans haveno choice in their national security policy, and hencestrategy. But it does mean that because the countryis the most essential of players in a global system ofinternational relations, it must protect its vital nationalinterests by accepting at least some measure of foreignengagement. How much, of what kind, and to whatends, are the issues here. Also, it is necessary never toforget the literally vital logistical dimension of national

security strategy. Forward military deployment andbasing are key enablers of strategic effectiveness.57

It is with some discomfort that I mix descriptionwith prediction and prescription. Indeed, I amgenerally altogether averse to prediction. However,at this juncture it is necessary to specify the workingassumptions that should provide the bedrock, the rmfootings, for the architecture of a sustainable Americannational security strategy. Although these are chosenstrictly personally, they are widely shared, even if somereaders nd a few of them controversial. What shouldU.S. policymakers and military leaders assume aboutthe future of global security and warfare? What dothey believe they know about the future? Even if theyare not at all certain, what do they choose to assume as

a matter of prudence concerning distant hypothetical,threats. Here are six fundamental assumptions:

1. War is endemic in the human condition. Ofcialsshould not be distracted, let alone convinced, by


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scholars who write about the transformation of war,about new wars, about the end of war, or the end of

major war as we have known it.58

War, and its signatureactivity, warfare, quintessentially involving ghtingand killing, are here to stay. Aside from the years ofworld war, the period since the end of the Cold Warhas been as bloody as any, and bloodier than most, inthe 20th century. Those theorists, ofcials, and soldiers,who believed after 1991 that the future of conictwould be so constrained that Western forces would belimited to performing peacekeeping duties, OperationsOther Than War (OOTW), and occasional brief y-bybombardments, were seriously in error. Given thecontemporary enthusiasm for military modernizationaround the world, except for EU-Europe, there is nodoubt that this rst assumption is near universallyshared.

2. Warfare will both evolve and appear in severalforms. Because of its superior investment in militarytechnology, the United States is right to assume that itwill lead the process of military innovation.59 However,it is also correct in the relatively new assumptionthat advanced technology, though generally apt tobe useful, cannot guarantee even tactical success, letalone operational, strategic or political.60 Defenseplanners have to consider evolution in the grammarof war, as Clausewitz calls the mechanics of warfare,holistically.61 The U.S. military establishment mustrecall old practices that were effective, as well asinnovate, if it is to shine in future conicts. The future isnear certain to call on Americans to wage both regularand irregular warfare, often in the same trial of arms.

In some cases, the United States will be able to choosethe wars it ghts in the 21st century; they will be warsof discretion. However, it would be an over-bold


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prediction to claim that all of Americas wars will be ofthat sort. Similarly, it would be rash indeed to predict

that the character of Americas future warfare will bedictated in the large by Americans. Adaptability hasalways been essential; it will remain so.

To record a worrying thought, Americans are sohabituated to the blessings of technological superioritythat they do not often consider the perils of nonlineartechnical developments abroad that could placethem behind the curve of innovation and its militaryexploitation. What if the next revolution in militaryaffairs (RMA) leverages radically new technologies,and the leveraging is achieved preeminently byChinese, Indians, or Europeans?62 One brave butthoughtful prophet, Dale Walton, envisages withcondence the emergence of a new technologicalsuper-revolution. According to Walton, this super-

revolution, comprising interrelated revolutions inbiotechnology, nanotechnology, robotics, computerscience, and other areas will result in extraordinarilypotent war-ghting innovations.63 Walton goes sofar as to predict that given the pace of technologicalchange, it should be expected that within two decadesa new RMA, the successor to the increasingly matureSecond American RMA [nuclear and informationtechnology], will be in evidence.64

One needs to consider as well the fact that weare still only at the beginning of the military spaceage, while cyber warfare, though already rife, isthoroughly immature. America may out-resource itsactual and potential enemies by a country mile, but isit possible that those foes might invest more cunningly

and effectively, especially in the uses to which newtechnology can be put? So many and unfamiliar arethe military-technological possibilities of this century,that major outbreaks of warfare may be asymmetrical


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and historically nonlinear to the point of offeringwar-winning advantages to the more imaginative

and innovative belligerent. This is not a prediction,but anyone obliged to think about future warfarewould be foolish were he simply to assume that theUnited States will be wise and lucky in its technical,and consequential doctrinal, operational, and tacticalchoices.

3. Global order is a meaningful concept: such order hasto be policed by someone or something. Global order is avalue-charged idea, as is the claim that it needs to bekept. In practice, there may be extant no global conditionthat one could term orderly and no state, coalition, orinternational institution seeking to maintain order. Byorder, we understand a stable global context whereinthe principal actors behave predictably in a mannerthat does not challenge the legitimacy or regular

functioning of the prevailing pattern of internationalrelations.65 The United States has decided that terror-ism, most especially Islamic fundamentalist terrorism,now commonly referred to as violent Islamism, isa threat to global order. More to the point, perhaps,since 1991, albeit not without a wobble or two, theUnited States has sought to play the thankless but self-attering role of global guardian. Literally in everyplace in the world today that is experiencing seriousinstability, the United States is a relevant presenceserving the American notion of order, arguably withthe lonely exception of sub-Saharan Africa. While theUnited States is nominally committed to the concept ofglobal order for its own sake, it has been most activelycommitted, as noted already, to advancing a desirable

order through the promotion of democracy and openmarkets.

American national culture and world events haveproduced a situation wherein the United States is


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globocop. Americans are combating the illegal drugindustry in South and Central America (as well as

in Afghanistan); through the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO), they are on the line should theRussian Federation overreach in its harassment of therevived Baltic states, and one day possibly, Ukraineand Georgia; it is in the forefront of efforts to suppressviolent Islamism in the Middle East, South Asia, andEast Asia; and it is literally on the ring line in SouthKorea as well as prospectively in the Taiwan Straits. Allof these and other dangerous tasks can be rationalized,and indeed may be judged sound, strategically, but,like the British Empire, they have been acquiredpiecemeal. Although the judgment bears hard onAmericans, despite the pleasure of a sense of primacy,the global political system needs the United States asa policing agent. The system needs to be disciplined

by some factor additional to the universal operation ofenlightened self-interest and of good behavior normsas well as some laws.

States or other communities need to be disciplinedwhen they misbehave according to the standards thattypically prevail, and indeed that need to prevail ifthe existing international order is to remain tolerablystable. In cases of minor transgressions, or of aggressivebehavior by minor players, either internationalinstitutions or relatively strong regional powers maysufce to restore the status quo ante or compel asatisfactory compromise. But when the menace is ona scale, or has a geographical reach, that is more thanlocal or minor, the United States at present is the onlycandidate for the role of global policeman on behalf,

naturally, of its own notion of order.The role is expensive and often unrewarding

at best, and is certain periodically to be unpopular


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domestically. However, if the United States shoulddecline to establish a forward presence around the

world, off-shore or on-shore Eurasia, either materiallyor credibly in potential, then it would cease to be ashaping, let alone the most signicant, factor in thefuture of international relations.

After Iraq, Americans could well decide that thepossibilities of policy and strategic error are so largethat the country should not trust itself to play the globalguardian role. But one can predict that such a publicpolicy mood would not long endure. The consequencesof America-light purposeful behavior globally wouldcome to be too uncomfortable for most Americans.Admittedly, this is a bold, perhaps rash, prediction.But it expresses the view that were the United Statesto disengage seriously from actual and potentialsecurity duties around Eurasia, it would soon regret

the decision. This is not to neglect the possibility thatelements of such a process of American disengagementfrom Eurasia, on-shore if not off-shore, might becompelled by the political decisions and strategicadvances of others. Policy and strategy decisions maynot be wholly discretionary for Washington.

4. War entails warfare, and warfare always is aboutghting. Warfare is not only about ghting, butcombat is the signature behavior of armies. Moreover,as Clausewitz, the master thinker, insists in much-quoted words: The decision by arms is for all majorand minor operations in war what cash payment is incommerce.66 The U.S. armed forces currently are inno danger of neglecting their mandatory generic corecompetencyghting. Leaders of all armed forces,

everywhere, at least pay lip service to the connectionbetween their profession and warfare, but many ofthem have no serious expectation of ever having to re


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shots in anger. Moreover, of those military institutionsthat do have grounds to anticipate action, the force in

question is far more likely to be applied on behalf ofdomestic order than in the conduct of interstate war.Although American soldiers today are no strangersto warfare, it is a long time since they faced a rst-class regular enemy, even a distinctly asymmetricalone.67 It should be noted that all warfare is in somemeasure asymmetrical. The word is easily abused byoveremployment. Not since 1953 in Korea have enemyaircraft occasionally been a nuisance to U.S. groundforces, while a context wherein the enemy held airsuperiority has not been suffered since 1943 in Sicily.Americas foes in the GWOT or among the ranks ofroguish states are sometimes cunning, reasonably well-trained, experienced, and exceedingly determined, allof which count for a lot. But they lack the resources

to wage warfare on a major scale. Acquisition ofWMD should greatly reduce the political and strategicdisadvantages of such belligerents in the future, butthis is still largely a future prospect. Of course, NorthKorea already has its nuclear equalizer, and Iran is wellon the way to acquiring one also.

It has been a long time since the warriors of theUnited States have had to ght an enemy of approx-imately the same military weight, even if that enemywere to ght in a style that was highly asymmetrical. InWorld War II by 1943-45, the Wehrmacht needed to seekcompensation for U.S., British, and Russian materialsuperiority in its tactical skill, sheer determination,well-chosen terrain to defend, and some equipmentquality edge. Of necessity, it waged a poor mans style

of regular warfare. American soldiers, making theprudent assumption that there will be regular ghtingin their future, should not assume that materially well-


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endowed regular foes will ght in ways symmetricalto U.S. preferences and expectations.68

Assumptions are cultural, or nearly such, and donot alter readily, even in the face of evidence suggestingthey are ill-founded.69 As many commentators havenoticed, it has long been assumed by the U.S. armedforces that real warfare was regular in character.Today there is some danger that that assumption hasbeen dropped in favor of an expectation of COINand CT. As a corrective to the previous assumption,some swing in the direction of the irregular end of thecombat spectrum is welcome. However, it is unsafeto assume that Americas strategic history will beprincipally concerned with warfare against enemieswho must ght irregularly. On the one hand, there isa full house of potentially hostile states emerging inworld politics. On the other hand, it is neither desirable

nor politically feasible for the U.S. armed forces to becommitted principally to the conduct of major COINand CT campaigns.

By all means American soldiers should seek toimprove their understanding of the cultural dimensionof warfare. But one cannot expect and should not seeka transformation in the American way of war in favorof general prowess in irregular warfare. The U.S.armed forces are sufciently large to be able to affordspecialized capability for COIN and CT. Militaryforce, U.S. style, is strong on maneuver, certainly onmovement, and repower. This style is not tailor-madefor the conduct of counterirregular warfare, althoughit has its place, as does technological sophisticationdespite its limitations. Most of the U.S. armed forces

are designed to meet and defeat other regular forces.They should remain tilted thus in their competencies.Certainly they can acquire and hone skills at COIN and


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CT, and they should increase their cultural awareness,as indeed is occurring today. First and foremost,

though, they need to remain an adaptable instrumentfor combat against states.

5. New rst-class competitors/enemies will emerge(indeed, are emerging already). Some Americans havebeen so smitten with the ideology of primacy, despitethe experience in Iraq since 2003, that they cannotquite sign on to the assumption that a worthy superenemy or coalition of enemies will emerge over the nextseveral decades. But such an emergence is preciselythe prediction on the part of the author, and it is acurrent assumption of many, though by no means all,of Americas strategic theorists and commentators.Understandably and probably wisely, the governmentis publicly uncommitted on the subject of the durationof the American hegemony. Obviously, American

ofcials do not wish to predict their countrys declineand fall from ascendancy.

Regional great powers such as China, India, Russia,possibly EU-Europe, Brazil, and Iran, among others,must balance the value of a faraway U.S. hegemonwith a distant homeland, against the political insultand damage to local ambitions and interests thatsuch a hegemon inicts. Americans can assume withcondence that their current global role as guardian oforder increasingly will be opposed by rising states andcoalitions, most especially in East Asia. However, it isnecessary to remember that this region, the emergingcenter of world politics and the most dynamic sourceof economic globalization, has its own rivalries andmay be able to provide a regional balance of power

even without active U.S. participation. Because ofa long-time focus on Europe and the Middle East,many American analysts are wont to forget the unique


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geography, geopolitics, and geostrategic conditionsof East and South Asia. The distances are immense,

with the regions and subregions divided by extensiveforbidding terraindesert, mountains, jungleandwith the commercial and military contexts beinglargely geographically maritime. East Asia is about asdifferent from Europe as it can be, geographically andpolitically.70 Moreover, as Dale Walton perceptivelyobserves, East Asia is not a potential power vacuum,even should the United States greatly reduce itsforward presence.71 China, India, and Japan (not tomention Russia and Indonesia) are likely to provemore than capable of balancing each other. Indeed, ifone is worried about a credibly potential 1914 scenarioin the 21st century, indigenous East Asian balance ofpower politics is probably the subject to examine.72

6. Surprise happens. Finally, since uncertainty now is

accorded its ofcial due if not more than it merits, it isreasonable to claim that U.S. defense planners recognizethe certainty of future major surprises, favorableand otherwise.73 The future of warfare will recordextensive activity all along the spectrum of regularity-irregularity; no surprise there. But, it is also verylikely to contain some RMAs. Given the contemporaryimmaturity of biotechnology, space technology, andcyber technology, it is not exactly a bold leap into theunknown to predict further technology-led RMAs.Actually, it is unconvincing to predict that warfareof most kinds will not be reshaped by biotechnology,nanotechnology, robotics, and information technology(IT), just to cite the more obvious technical baskets.74Given that the U.S. defense community, along with the

Chinese, Russian, Indian, and many others, currently isstill low on the learning curve for the condent conductof cyber warfare, just one area of certain technical


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progress, the perils of specic prediction become alltoo obvious. The United States has to assume that

technology, culture (including political beliefs), anddiplomatic ties, as well as the consequences of climatechange, hold some nonlinearities that will threaten tomake the expectations of so-called long-term plannersappear distinctly foolish. So it was in the 19th and20th centuries. There is thus every reason to believethat the 21st will signicantly discomfort U.S. defenseplanners.75

The American Role.

What should be the American role in a futureworld that could well be as dangerous, if not more so,than that described and analyzed above? To behave insuch a manner that the U.S. national interest, singular

and plural, is best protected and advanced, of course.But how should that be done?that is the question.Perhaps the rst epigraph of this monograph providesthe vital clue: If American hegemony is the answer,what is the question? The Bush administration of 2002-03 vintage was in no doubt that active U.S. leadershipin the world was essential. Such forthright behavior,expressing a global moral and material primacyhegemony was not a favored termwas required inorder to ensure Americas safety. The vicious assaults of9/11 and the previous outrages in New York City andin Africa in the 1990s were undoubtedly a challenge tothe United States. But did they amount to a dare to thecountry to wage a GWOT? Was it not more likely thata global American response which favored military

intervention, forcible regime change, and other actionsof a violent character, was almost exactly the reactionthat fanatical Islamists sought to trigger? After all, their


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real target is the House of Islam, not the purportedlydecadent societies of West (and East). Be that as it may,

the United States chose to pick up the gauntlet andjoin global battle with al-Qaeda, its associates, and itsimitators.

As the more perceptive of American commentatorshave noted, U.S. national security policy in the 2000s,though not necessarily its strategy, is heavily inuencedby the national culture. Some of the persisting featuresof American culture produce the appearance and realityof history repeating itself. As this monograph seeks todivine the future of U.S. national security strategy andseeks in particular to discover the necessary elementsfor sustainability, the cultural contribution looms everlarger.

Compare the following statements, one by apresident who has become iconic and in life was a

conservative Democrat, the other by a president whoat present is less than iconic in a positive sense andis a muscular liberal Republican (on foreign policy).In his Inaugural Address on January 21, 1961, JohnF. Kennedy made the following solemn pledge:We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet anyhardship, support any friend, oppose any foe toassure the survival and the success of liberty.76 Thiswas not hollow rhetoric. It reected American valuesand self-condence. Vietnam was not the inevitableconsequence of the pledge, and others in similar vein,but the many decisions that led to Americas decade-long war in South East Asia were enabled by the globalrole thus identied. To fast-forward to June 1, 2002,one nds President George W. Bush declaring thus:

We will defend the peace by ghting terrorists andtyrants. We will preserve the peace by building goodrelations among the great powers. We will extend the


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peace by encouraging free and open societies on everycontinent.77

In that same seminal document, The National SecurityStrategy of the United States of America (September2002), President Bush could hardly have been clearerin his mixture of hard-headed realism and crusadingliberalism. The U.S. national security strategy willbe based on a distinctly American internationalismthat reects the union of our values and our nationalinterests. The aim of this strategyis to help make theworldnot just safer but better.78

And how is this to be accomplished? The answeris by the global promotion of the Big Three Valuesfreedom, democracy, and free enterprise. Based onthe Big Three just quoted, President Bush declared,The great struggles of the 20th century between libertyand totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory

for the forces of freedomand a single sustainablemodel for national success, As we observed

after iraq: the search for a sustainable national security strategy

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