after fukushima japanjapans’s challenge –responding to … · after fukushima japanjapans’s...

Energy Security & Sustainability Challenges:The EU, Japanese & Asian Responses

Friday, 14 September 2012

Hiroshi TSUKAMOTO 1

After Fukushima Japan’s Challenge – Responding to theJapan s Challenge Responding to the

Energy Problem

14 September 2012

at European Commission, Centre Borschettep

Hiroshi TsukamotoHiroshi Tsukamoto

EUEU‐‐Japan Centre for Industrial CooperationJapan Centre for Industrial Cooperation

1. The impact of Fukushima Nuclear Accident

(1) The German Ethic Commission on a Safe Energy Supply

(2) The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation

Commission (The National Diet of Japan)

(3) IAEA International Fact Finding Expert Mission Report

2. Japan’s challenge for Energy Problem

(1) The Restart of Ohi Nuclear Plants

(2) Option for Energy and Environment 2030

3. Recovery from Great East Japan Earthquake

Recovery from Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials

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Hiroshi TSUKAMOTO 2

The 2nd Germany‐Japan Energy Symposiumat University of Cologne

The 2nd Germany‐Japan Energy Symposium was held at University of Cologne on Tuesday, 12th of September.

PresentersPresenters Dr. Michael Paul Member of the Committee on the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety of German BundestagMr. Nobuo Tanaka Former Executive Director of the IEA, Global Associate of Energy Security and Sustainability, IEEJ Mr. Hiroshi TsukamotoPresident of Institute for International studies and Training, General Manager ofPresident of Institute for International studies and Training, General Manager of EU‐Japan Centre for Industrial CooperationPD Dr. Dietmar LindenbergerDirector of Applied Research and Member of the Management Board of the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne (EWI) and lecturer at the University of Cologne

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Trio of objectives in energy policyPresented by Dr. Michael Paul

securesecure

affordableenvironmentally

friendly

Transformation of the energy system, one year on –where are we today and what lies ahead?

12.09.2012 4



Hiroshi TSUKAMOTO 3

Challenges and responses

Challenge Response

Carbon footprint Greater efforts with regard to energy efficiency:‐ Energy savings with regard to buildingsand road transport

Presented by Dr. Michael Paul

and road transport ‐ Combined Heat and Power Act

Feed‐in volatility ‐ Grid expansion and upgrades‐ Storage

Import dependence ‐ Eliminate domestic capacity congestion

Security of supply / network stability ‐ Grid Expansion Acceleration Act‐ Cold reserve (for a transitional period)‐ Construction of new power stations

Affordability of energy supply ‐ Easing of the burden on energy‐intensive businesses‐ EEG surcharge should not rise above 3.5 cents / kWh‐ New instrument to replace the EEG

12.09.2012Transformation of the energy system, one year on –

where are we today and what lies ahead?5

‐ Strong political will in harmony ith k t h iwith market mechanism

‐ Strategical and practical energy policy measures

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policy measures



Hiroshi TSUKAMOTO 4

The German Energy Change and the Debate about Green Growth

Dr. Klaus TöpferSeminar in Tokyo on 25th of July 2012

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Three things are important for this change in the perceived risk: Firstly the fact that the reactor accident occurred in a

The German Ethics Commission (Extract)

Risk of Nuclear plant

Firstly, the fact that the reactor accident occurred in a technologically advanced country like Japan. In view of this , the conviction that such an event could not occur in Germany, is waning.

Secondly, the impossibility even weeks after the accident of predicting an end to the catastrophe, of assessing the final extent of the overall damage or of conclusively defining the geographical region affected.

Thirdly, the fact that the accident was triggered by a process which the nuclear reactor was not “designed” to withstand without sustaining damage. This fact casts a light on the limitations of technological risk assessments.

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Hiroshi TSUKAMOTO 5

The dream that failedMar 10th 2012

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The path to a safe energy supply will be marked by conflicts between legitimate goals and interests.

Profitable electricity prices, climate protection, the socially just distribution of costs and opportunities, and a switch to renewables do not automatically add up to an optimal solution

The path Conflicts Seriously

optimal solution.

The conflicts that could potentially arise between different goals dictate that, in order to make up for the missing nuclear power, one must not

• simply buy power from nuclear power stations in neighboring countries, as this would contradict the principles of a responsible phase‐out;

• simply replace it by carbon‐emitting fossil fuels, since their use is restricted by climate policy;

• simply replace it by drastically speeding up the increased use of renewables, because there are limits to the strain that can be imposed on natural habitats and because the technical feasibility can easily be overestimated;overestimated;

• simply save electricity by rationing it, since this would contradict what people and business in a high‐tech country expect from life;

• simply compensate by imposing higher energy prices, because companies have to compete globally and social disparities exist within Germany;

• simply make it dispensable by dictating state‐imposed quotas, because this would not agree with the rules of democracy and of a social market economy.

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Hiroshi TSUKAMOTO 6


‐ Energy can be supplied safely, in an environmentally friendly and socially bl

Collective Effort “Germany’s Energy Future”

acceptable way

‐ At a competitive price. Industry, the crafts and the service sector together from the basis for employment in Germany

‐ And ensure the prosperity of present and future generations

‐ The transition to an age of rigorous improvements in energy efficiency and the use of renewables will make demands on the entire society

It calls for and allows the participation the conviction and the decisions ofIt calls for‐and allows‐ the participation, the conviction and the decisions of

a great many people in parliaments and governments, in cities and local

communities, at universities and schools, in companies and institutions.

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The National Diet of JapanThe Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

5 July. 2012 (Extract)

Our report catalogues a multitude of errors and willful negligence that left the Fukushimaand willful negligence that left the Fukushima plant unprepared for the events of March 11. And it examines serious deficiencies in the response to the accident by TEPCO, regulator and the government.For all the extensive detail it provides, what

this report cannot fully convey‐ especially to a global audience‐ is the mindset that supported the negligence behind this disaster.What must be admitted – very painfully – is

that this was a disaster “Made in Japan.” Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture:our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to “sticking with the program”; our groupism; and our insularity.

Kiyoshi KurokawaChairman

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Hiroshi TSUKAMOTO 7


(Extract)

A “manmade” disaster<A delay of implementation of structural reinforcement>TEPCO and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) were aware of the need for structural y g y ( )reinforcement in order to conform to new guidelines, but rather then demanding their implementation, NISA stated that action should be taken autonomously by the operator. The commission has discovered that no part of the required reinforcements had been implemented on Units 1 through 3 by the time of the accident.<Awareness of the risk>Since 2006, the regulators and TEPCO were aware of the risk that a total outage of electricity at the Fukushima Daiichi plant might occur if a tsunami were to reach the level of the site. They were also aware of the risk of reactor core damage from the loss of seawater pumps in the case of a tsunami larger than assumed in the Japan Society of Civil Engineers estimation. NISA knew that TEPCO had not prepared any measures to lesson or eliminate the risk, but failed to provide specific instructions to remedy the situation.

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<The relationship between regulatory agencies and operator>We found evidence that the regulatory agencies would explicitly ask about the operators’ intentions whenever a new regulation was to be implemented. For example, NSC informed the operators that they did not need to consider a possible station blackout (SBO) because the probability was small and other measures were in place.It then asked the operators to write a report that would give the appropriate rationale for why this consideration was unnecessary. It then asked the operators to write a report that would give the appropriate rationale for why this consideration was unnecessary.


Recommendations1. Monitoring of the nuclear regulatory body by the National

diet

2. Reform the crisis management system

3. Government responsibility for public health and welfare

4. Monitoring the operator

5. Criteria for the new regulatory body

6. Reforming laws related to nuclear energy

(“Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Nuclear Regulatory

Agency” will be established in September)

7. Develop a system of independent investigation commissions

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Hiroshi TSUKAMOTO 8

Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company by Japanese Government

The government‐appointed panel released its final, 448‐pages investigation report on July , p g g p y23, 2012.

The panel said the government and TEPCO failed to prevent the disaster not because a large tsunami was unanticipated, but because they were reluctant to invest time, effort and money in protecting against a natural disaster considered unlikely. “The utility and regulatory bodies were overly confident that events beyond the scope of their assumptions would not occur.

Mr. Yotaro Hatamura, Chairman Investigation Committee

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The panel also said that TEPCO had even weighed in on a report about earthquake risk and asked the government to play down the likelihood of a tsunami in the region. The panel’s report faulted an inadequate legal system for nuclear crisis management, a crisis‐command disarray caused by the government and TEPCO, and possible excess meddling on the part of the prime minister’s office in the early stage of the crisis. The panel concluded that a culture of complacency about nuclear safety and poor crisis management led to the nuclear disaster.

g

IAEA International Fact Finding Mission Report 24 May‐2 June. 2011 (Extract)

1. Given the extreme circumstances of this accident, the local management of the accident has been conducted in the best way possible.y p

2. There were insufficient defense‐in‐depth provisions for tsunami hazards.

In Particular:

• although tsunami hazards were considered both in the site evaluation and the design of the Fukushima Dai‐ichi NPP as described during the meetings and the expected tsunami height was increased to 5.7m (without changing the licensing d ) f 2002 h i h d d i ddocuments) after 2002, the tsunami hazard was underestimated;

• moreover, those additional protective measures were not reviewed and approved by the regulatory authority;

• severe accident management provisions were not adequate to cope with multiple plant failures.

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Hiroshi TSUKAMOTO 9

IAEA International Fact Finding Mission Report 24 May‐2 June. 2011 (Extract)

3. For the Tokai Dai‐ni and Fukushima Dai‐ni NPPs, in the short term, the safety of the plant should be evaluated and secured for the present state of the plant and it ( d b th th k d t i) d th h d h d i tsite (caused by the earthquake and tsunami) and the changed hazard environment.

4. Japan has a well organized emergency preparedness and response system as demonstrated by the handling of the Fukushima accident.

Nevertheless, complicated structures and organizations can result in delays in urgent decision making.

5 Dedicated and devoted officials and workers and a well organized and flexible5. Dedicated and devoted officials and workers, and a well organized and flexible system made it possible to reach an effective response even in unexpected situations and prevented a larger impact of the accident on the health of the general public and facility workers.

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National Policy UnitRoad to recovery

Government of Japan March 2012 18



Hiroshi TSUKAMOTO 10

Onagawa Nuclear Plant saved from Tsunami by one man’sStrength, determination

(Mainichi Newspapers)

Mr. Hirai (who passed away in 1986) was a person to "take responsibility for the results of his decisions." He wasn't the sort to believe that everything would be all right "as long as people keep to set standards " Rather though he paid careful attention to regulations compliance waskeep to set standards. Rather, though he paid careful attention to regulations, compliance was never his goal. Hirai was the kind of manager and engineer to exceed regulations and do the checks needed to get to the heart of a problem.

The breakwater that proved so inadequate to the task of protecting the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant from the ocean was 10 meters high. The one defending the Onagawa nuclear plant is 14.8 meters tall, and it turns out Hirai had to fight a one‐man war to get it built. The reason he was so determined was his careful study of the past, which revealed that in the year 869 a massive tsunami had hit the spot where the Onagawa plant now stands.

Hirai was apparently the only person on the entire project to push for the 14.8‐meter breakwater, while many of his colleagues said that 12 meters would be sufficient and derided Hirai's proposal as excessive. Hirai's authority and drive, however, eventually prevailed, and Tohoku Electric spent the extra money to build the 14.8‐meter‐tall shield. Some 40 years later, on March 11, 2011, a 13‐meter‐high tsunami slammed into the coast at Onagawa.

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Tokai No.2 Nuclear Power Plant

In 2007, Ibaraki Prefecture took action to shield the facility from tsunami with height of 5.7 metre, and additions to the seawall were made to a 6.1 metre height 2 days before

Tokai No.1 (right) and Tokai No.2 (left)

2011Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, 9 March 2011. A 5.4 metre tsunami arrived on 11 March at the plant. These fact are disclose to news media at the time of plant inspection by government on 13 February 2012.

Although most of the works were completed by September 2010, cable holes in the levee were still not fully covered. This work was scheduled to take place before around May 2011. When the tsunami did hit the Tokai plant in March, the waves were 5.3 to 5.4 meters in height, even higher than earlier estimations but still 30 to g , g40 centimeters lower than the last assumption. The Tokai plant suffered a loss of external power‐supply like it happened in Fukushima. Even the levee was overrun in Tokai, but only one of three seawater pumps did fail, and the reactors could be kept stable and safe in cold shutdown with the emergency diesel generator cooled by the two remaining seawater pumps.

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Nuclear Power in Japan

Tomari (Hokkaido), the last of Japan’s 54 operating Nuclear Plants shut down 5 May 2012. Ohi No.3 and No.4 restarted in July 2012. 21

The Restart of Ohi Nuclear Plants2011.10.18 Kansai Electric proposed the stress test report of Ohi No.3 plant to Nuclear and Industrial

Safety Agency

2011.11.17 Kansai Electric proposed the stress test report of Ohi No.4

2012.2.9 The stress tests of No.3 and No.4 were approved by a panel of nuclear experts

20 2 3 23 h l S f i i d h2012.3.23 The Nuclear Safety Commission approved the stress test reports

2012.3.29 The governor Yamada of Kyoto said that prefecture would not accept the restart.Later, The governor of Shiga, Kada also disagreed hasty decisions

2012.4.3 4 Ministers meeting

2012.4.6 4 Ministers meeting (New safety standard)

2012.4.10 Osaka prefecture and city expert conference proposed 8 items to restart Ohi Nuclear Plants

2012.4.13 4 Ministers meeting (Kansai Electric plan to restart was examined)

2012.5.19 Minister Hosono (Environment, Nuclear Disaster) met union of Kansai Governments

2012.5.30 Union of Kansai Governments approved on the presumption that it is a temporary safe judgment of a government

2012.6.16 4 Ministers meeting (Final decision to approve the restart)

2012.7.1 Ohi No.3 restarted. 2012.7.18 Ohi No.4 restarted

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Governors and Mayor discuss approve or disapprove Ohi reactor restart

Ohi Nuclear Plants

Toru Hashimoto, Mayor of Osaka.

Yukiko Kada, Governor of Shiga Prefecture.

Shiga Issei Nishikawa, Governor of Fukui Prefecture.

Keiji Yamada, Governor of Kyoto Prefecture.

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Large‐scale demonstration in front of the Prime Minister's official residence

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8 conditions proposed by Energy Strategy Council of Osaka Prefecture and City

1. To establish the Nuclear Regulatory Agency which Japanese people can rely upon.

2. To make a new safety standard under new authority.

3. To implement a complete stress test based upon the new safety standard by new authority.

4. To make a disaster prevention plan and a risk management plan on the assumption that an accident happen.

5. To conclude an safety agreement with local governments within 100km by getting local people’s consent.g g p p

6. To establish a final disposal system of used Nuclear fuel and to be able to have a prospect of its realization.

7. To examine electricity supply and demand situation completely.

8. To minimize the risk and the damage caused the accident.

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Disputes over Ohi Nuclear Plant

1. Fukui governor VS Kyoto, Shiga governor

(1) Jurisdiction

(2) Temporary or not

“A temporary safe judgment of a government” (Union of Kansai Governments)

“Restart of Ohi should not be considered like a seasonal sales by supermarket”

(Fukui Governor)

2. Industry voices

“ If electricity were cut off even for a few hours due to planned blackouts, clean rooms used to fabricate electronic components would not be able to restore the required level of purity.

a blackout would have a enormous impact on productivity”

(Nichicon Chairman, Takeda, Kyoto)

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Change of Public opinion on Ohi Nuclear No.3, 4 Plants

Agree Disagree

2012.3.12 27% 57%

2012.4.16 29% 55%

2012.5.21 29% 54%

2012.5.31 Osaka Mayor Hashimoto admitted to restart Nuclear plant.

2012.7.9 41% 42%

Asahi Shinbun Company

Anti‐nuclear demonstration in front of Prime minister’s office

Sympathize Not Sympathize

2012.7.29 47% 47%

<Gender><Generation>

Female 50%50’s 60’s 50% up

Male 52%20’s 63%

Are you saving energy now?

YES NO

2012.7.29 85% (very much 20%/a little 64% ) 14% (not at all 2%/not so much 12%)

Mainichi Newspapers27

Option for Energy and the Environment 2030

Prepare 3 scenarios;

(1) 0% scenario

(2) 15% scenario

(3) 20‐25% scenario(3) 20‐25% scenario

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Three Viewpoints to Promote Drastic Energy Structure Reform that Need to Be Addressed Whatever Options Are Chosen

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Four Important Perspectives in Choosing Energy Options

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Tariffs and Durations(PV, Wind, Geothermal and Hydro)

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Tariffs and Durations(Biomass)

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Photovoltaic Generation

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Wind Power Generation

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Geothermal Power Generation

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Restraining Costs and Preventing Hollowing-out of Industry(1)

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Restraining Costs and Preventing Hollowing-out of Industry(2)

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0% 15% 20～25%

42% 29% 15%10 July 2012

ASAHI Shinbun Company

43% 31% 11%5 August 2012

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Democratic Party of Japan adopts policy of nuclear‐free by 2030s (6, Sep.2012)

Three principles;

1) 40‐year maximum on the operation of nuclear reactors should be strictly observed.

2) Only nuclear reactors whose safety is approved by the soon‐to‐be‐established nuclear regulatory

i i b dcommission can be restarted.

3) Further construction of nuclear facilities and reactors should be prohibited.

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Platinum condition：energy sufficiency

80

90

100

Decrease by Efficiency

artifacts saturate and efficiency improved.

30

40

50

60

70

80

32/45 = 0.7

improvement

0

10

20

2008年 2020年 2030年 2040年 2050年

国産エネルギー輸入エネルギー

18%

32%renewable（solar・wind geo・biomass・hydro）

domestic importⒸkomiyama 43

Energy saving at the peak time of the electric power demandin comparison with 2010.

Power H kk id T h k T k Ch b H k ik K i h k Shik k K h

Comparison of the day which temperature were the nearest in the summer of 2010

CompanyHokkaido Tohoku Tokyo Chubu Hokuriku Kansai chugoku Shikoku Kyushu

Max Temperature 2010

25.5℃ 29.8 30.1 25.9 28.5 29.8 30.9 29.8 28.2

Max Temperature 2012

24.8℃ 29.2 29.4 26.7 29.7 29.6 29.2 30.4 28.6

‐6.9% ‐5.9‐9.8Use track

‐16.0‐17.7

‐11.0

‐17.6

‐10.3 ‐11.5

Use trackrecord

From the data of METI

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The provision for electric power of the Seven‐Eleven store

The home generation of electricity is carried out by solar panel installation.(7,000 store)

A high‐pressure electricity contract with a cheaper electricity bill. (10,000 and over store)

LED lighting is used for inside of a shop or a signboard. (14,000 and over store)

Carried out a power‐saving check for every equipment by a surveillance sensor. (14,000 and over store)

(Note) :The parenthetic number is an introductory plan of the term ended February, 2013. Reference data: 11.July 2012 Nikkei newspaper

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Recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake

Revitalization of local communityDevelop a secure and safe society in the devastated areas

Compatible achievement of quick recovery and environmental conservationExpedite EIA’s process while ensuring environmental conservationp p g

Recovery as a sustainable local society1. Develop low‐carbon society (promotion of renewable energy and energy saving), soundmaterial‐cycle society (disaster wastes treatment) and society in harmony with nature (recovery ofbiodiversity) while recovery from the earthquake

2. Ensure security and safety, e.g. environmental conservation and health damage prevention fromhazardous substances, prevention from scattering and exposing asbestos

3. Promote environmental research and technology development for disaster waste treatments, etc.

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Recovery from Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials

Promoting treatment of waste contaminatedwith radioactive materials discharged by theaccident, decontamination and othermeasures

Risk management of health impact of radiation and research of impacts on wildfauna and flora

Consideration of policy measures onradioactive contamination within legallybinding frameworks

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Conclusion

1. Safety of Nuclear Plant is the most important matter.

2. Comprehensive and long‐term strategy for Energy is very important.

However, details is also very important.

Der liebe Gott steckt im Detail.

Strategy should be revised and reinforced by detailed situation.

3. Energy should be considered from multifaceted views including international perspective.

Debate is very much required because the path toward desirable energy mix is different among party concerned.

4. Democracy should be respected. However, people’s opinion sometime conflict and fluctuate on Energy issue. The role of expert and statesman is important.

5. Technological break through can give us a good solution.

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“Demonstration of a Next‐Generation Energy and Social System”

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