afm vol.2 gen_en-basic, pt.2 tactical doctrine 1995
TRANSCRIPT
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D/HQDT/18/34/47 ArmyCodeNo71583(Pt2)
THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL
VOLUME II
GENERIC ENEMY (BASIC FORCES)
PART 2
TACTICAL DOCTRINE
Prepared under the direction ofthe Chief of the General Staff
1995
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CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
(ApplicabletocopiessuppliedwithMinistryofDefenceapprovaltoCommon-
wealthandForeignGovernments).
1. ThisinformationisreleasedbytheUnitedKingdomGovernmenttotherecipientGovernmentforDefencepurposesonly.
2. ThisinformationmustbeaccordedthesamedegreeofsecurityprotectionasthataccordedtheretobytheUnitedKingdomGovernment.
3. ThisinformationmaybedisclosedonlywithintheDefenceDepartmentoftherecipientGovernment,exceptasotherwiseauthorizedbytheMinistryof
Defence(Army).
AMENDMENTS
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AL1Cover&FacingPage
DISTRIBUTION
(see Catalogue of Army publications, Part II)
RegularArmy(otherthanthosementionedbelow).....................................ScaleC TA............................................................................................................... ScaleC
JointServicesDefenceCollege................................................................. 100
StaffCollege............................................................................................... 350
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RMCS......................................................................................................... 50 RMAS......................................................................................................... 100
ArmsSchools............................................................................................. 50
CATC.......................................................................................................... 100
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AllBBGTs.................................................................................................... 10 Division/DistrictHQs....................................................................................10 BdeHQs......................................................................................................5
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CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE ii
CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Section1 TheGENFORCEArmedForces TD11
Section2 TacticalPrinciples TD11
Section3 CommandStyle TD12Section4 Communications TD17
Section5 CombatOrganizations TD110
CHAPTER 2 - THE MARCH
Section1 GeneralPrinciples TD21
Section2 AdministrativeMarches TD21
Section3 TacticalMarches TD24
CHAPTER 3 - RECONNAISSANCE
Section1 GeneralPrinciples TD31
Section2 Resources TD32Section3 MissionsandMethods TD35
CHAPTER 4 - OFFENSIVE
Section1 GeneralPrinciples TD41
Section2 TheAttackfromtheMarch TD46
Section3 TheAttackfromaPositionofCloseContact TD411
Section4 Combat&ServiceSupportintheOffensive TD412Section5 TheMeetingBattle TD427
Section6 Pursuit TD430
Section7 AttackingtheEnemyinDepth TD431
Section8 TheOffensiveinSpecialConditions TD435
CHAPTER 5 - THE DEFENSIVE
Section1 GeneralPrinciples TD51Section2 OrganizationandConductofPositionalDefence TD52
Section3 Fortifications TD56Section4 ConductoftheDefence TD59
Section5 ManoeuvreDefence TD512
Section6 CombatSupport TD515
Section7 DefenceinSpecialConditions TD521
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PREFACE
GENERIC ENEMY BASIC FORCES
GENFORCE
1. ThepurposeoftheGenericEnemyForce(GENFORCE)istoprovideabasisforthegenerationofenemyforcesforallexceptthemostspecialisedtrainingneeds.Itisdesignedtobeusedflexibly,inamodularfashion,tocraftenemyrequire-
mentsfortraining.
2. GENFORCEoffersthreetypesofartificial,yetchallengingandrealistic,opposing
forceoptions. Itwillbeissuedinaseriesofthreepackages:
Basic Forces: Thisenemyhasheavyandlightarmouredforces,predominantly
equippedalongFormerSovietUnion(FSU)lines. ItsTacticalDoctrineandOp-
erationalArtaremodelledonarevisionofArmyFieldManualVolumeII.
Mobile Forces: Thisenemyisfuturistic,moreadvancedintermsofequipment
andTacticalDoctrine,withanOperationalArtgearedtowardslessdensebattle-fieldscenarios.
Rest of the World Enemy (ROWEN): Thiscompositeenemyhasabroadrangeofequipmentsofmixedorigin. ItsTacticalDoctrineandOperationalArtarede-
signedtosupportspecificoperationalenvironments:normal,desert,mountain,
FIBUAandjungle.
GENSCEN
3. The TrainingSupportTeamattheCombinedArmsTrainingCentrehasdevel-
opedanevolutionaryscenariogenerator(GENSCEN)tobeusedwithGENFORCE.
GENSCENwillprovidearangeofcountry/infrastructureoptionstosupplement
andbringtolifetheGENFORCEselectedforaparticularexercise. Backgroundinformationisprovidedinaformatsimilartoreallifeintelligencedocuments,in-
cludingaselectionofcountrybriefs,withoptionsforpoliticalandmilitaryperson-
alitiesandsupportingdatainavarietyofforms.
BASIC FORCES
4. ThefirstofthethreeGENFORCEpackages, Basic Forces,isissuedinthree
separatefoldersasfollows:
Part1OperationalArt Part2TacticalDoctrine
Part3ORBATsandTablesofOrganisations&Equipment
5. GENFORCEBasicForcessupersedesArmyCode71357fortraining.However,
thelatterpublicationshouldberetainedandwillremainavailableondemand.
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
SECTION 1 - THE GENFORCE ARMED FORCES
1001. General. Asamajorlandpower,withextensiveborders,GENFORCEhasalwayspossessedalargeandformidablearmy.GENFORCEmilitarydoctrinehasbeenlargelywrittenbygroundforcesofficersandtheotherarmedforceshavegenerallybeenheldinlesseresteem. Thelandcommanderhastradi-
tionallyheldoverallcommandinjointoperations.
1002. Equipment. GENFORCEisamajorindustrialpowerandhasbeenabletosupplyitsarmedforceswithwelldesigned,ruggedandreasonablyuptodate
weaponry.
1003. Manpower.BecauseofthesizeofthecountryanditsarmyGENFORCEhas
alwaysreliedonconscriptiontofilltheranksofitsarmedservices. Itsofficercorpshoweverisaprofessionalandwelleducatedbody,trainedinexcellent
militarycollegesandacademies. Asmilitarytechnologybecomesmorecom-
plex,theproportionoflongservicesoldiersintheranksisgrowing.
1004. History.GENFORCEhasalonganddistinguishedmilitaryhistorywhichre-mainsasourceofpridetothecountryanditsarmyandisthemaindatabase
onwhichitsmilitarydoctrinehasbeendeveloped.
1005. Terrain.MostofGENFORCEswarshavebeenfoughtonaverylargescaleovercomparativelyfeaturelessopenterrain.AsaresultGENFORCEmilitarydoctrineemphasizesmassandmanoeuvre. Itsarmedforceshaverelativelylittleexperienceofoperationsonothersortsofterrain.
SECTION 2 - TACTICAL PRINCIPLES
1006. Tactics and Operational Art.AsexplainedinPart2GENFORCEOperational
Art,Chapter1,inGENFORCEdoctrinetacticsaresubordinatetooperational
art.Successattheoperationallevelisconsideredthekeytovictory.Itisthere-
forenotsurprisingthatGENFORCEprinciplesofoperationalartandtacticsare,inoutline,identical.TheseprinciplesarediscussedindetailinPart2but,forconvenience,arebrieflydescribedbelow.
1007. GENFORCE Tactical Principles.
a. Selection & Maintenance of the Aim. Themissionsetbytheseniorcom-manderwilldeterminetheaimtobeachieved.Oncethathasbeenidenti-
fied,everyeffortmustbeconcentratedonitsachievementwithinthetime
allocated.
b. Surprise.Surpriseiscrucialinwinningtheinitiativeandthrowingtheen-emyoffbalance. Thebasicplanningofconcealmentanddeceptiontakes
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placeattheoperationallevel;tacticalcommandersmustconformtothat
plan.Atthetacticallevelthereisusuallyneitherthetimenortheresources
forcomplicatedschemesandtheenemymaybesurprisedbysimpletech-niques,suchasspeedofmovementandreaction,feints,theuseofsmoke
oranunexpectedaxis.
c. Activeness and Speed. Tacticalcommandersoperateunderconstantpres-sureoftime;delaypermitstheenemytorecoverhisbalance. Theuseoftacticaldrills permits thecommander tousehis initiative toachieve theoperationalobjective.
d. Concentration. Theapplicationofsuperiorforceatthedecisivetimeand
placebringssuccessandcanbeachievedbymanoeuvreofforcesandfire,deceptionandskilfultacticalgrouping.Theneedtoidentifythedeci-
siveaxisandconcentrateforceonitisdeeplyingrainedinGENFORCE
tacticalcommanders. Economyofforceisvitaltothisendandtoshareassetsequallyamongsubunitsisalientosuchcommandersthinking.
e. Action Throughout the Enemys Depth. GENFORCEcommandersareex-
pected tousethe firepowerandmobilityoftheir resources tothefull to
striketheir immediateenemyindepth. Theyequallyexpect theirsenior
commanderstousethemindeepoperations,forexample,asraidingor
forwarddetachmentsorasairmobileforces.Thustheyareaccustomedtotheideaoffightingoutofdirectcontactwithfriendlyflankingorfollowon
forces.
f. Realism. Thevery detailed tacticaland logisticnormsdevelopedbyGENFORCEhelpcommanderstoavoidthetwinerrorsofovertaskingtheirtroopsorwastingresources.
g. Coordination. Moderncombatisacombinedarmsbattleinwhichitisthe
commandersresponsibilitytoensurethathisown,attachedandsupport-
ingforcesworkeffectivelyandefficientlytoachievetheaim.
h. Preservation of the Combat Effectiveness of Own Troops. Thisheading
coversawiderangeofactivity,fromactiveandpassivemeasurestopro-
tectonesforcesfromenemyattacks,throughlogisticsupportandthemain-tenanceofmorale,toactiontorestorecombatcapabilityafterenemystrikes.
SECTION 3 - COMMAND STYLE
1008. Image of the Battlefield.Part2GENFORCEOperationalArthasdescribed
theimageofthemodernbattlefieldwhichdominatesGENFORCEthinking. Itisanincreasingly openscene,withnoclearlydefined front line,nosecure
flanksandnosaferearareas.Theforcesofbothsideswillinevitablybeinter-
mingledoverwidefrontsandindepth. GENFORCEbelievesthatitsdoctrine
andcommandstylearewellsuitedtothissortofbattlefieldanditisattempting
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toexploitmoderninformationtechnologytosupportcommandersfightingfast
movingandrapidlychangingbattles.
1009. The Role of the Commander.Ateverylevel,GENFORCEcommandershave
soleresponsibilityforthefulfilmentofthemission.Althoughthisfocusesdeci-
sionmaking itcanalsodiscouragesubordinatesfromacting independently.Becauseofthestressontheoperationallevelofcommand,tacticalcommand-
ersareoftenquitejuniorandmaylacktheexperienceoftheircounterpartsintheBritishandotherwesternarmies. Initiative isnotdiscouragedin junior
commandersbutitshouldbeexercisedstrictlyinaccordancewiththesenior
commandersplan.Atthemostjuniorlevelsofcommand,officerscannoteas-
ilydelegatetotheirmostlyconscriptjuniorNCOsandcanbeoverwhelmedby
theweightofroutineadministration.
1010. Use of Drills. TacticaldrillsarewidelyusedbyGENFORCEinordertoallevi-
atesomeoftheseproblems. Theadvantagesofdrillsare:
a. Training.Drillscanbemosteasilytaughttoconscriptsoldiers,savingtrain-ingtime.
b. Planning. Theoverloadonjuniorcommandersisreducedbysimplifying
theplanningandorganizationprocess.
c. Flexibility. Byusingstandarddrillsthroughoutthegroundforces,
GENFORCEmakes iteasier for subunits tocooperatewitheachother
andforhigherlevelsofcommandtoregrouptheirforcesasthebattlefield
requirementchanges.
d. Speed. Thetimesrequiredforbattlepreparation,deploymentandchang-ingplansareallreducedbytheuseoftacticaldrills.
1011. The Commanders Decision.EverythingintheGENFORCEsystemstems
fromthecommandersdecision. Thedecisionmakingprocessbeginswhenthecommanderreceivesacombatorderorwarningorderfromhisseniorcom-
mander.Hisfirststepsaretoclarifythemissionandassessthesituation:
a. Clarification of the Mission. Thecommandermustunderstandtheseniorcommandersconceptofbattleandhisownunitsroleinit. Atthispointhealsomakesatimeappreciationand,throughhischiefofstaff,setsintrain
anymeasureswhichareimmediatelyrequiredandissueswarningorders
tosubunits.
b. Assessment of the Situation. Theassessmentisconducted in these-quence:enemyforces;ownforces;flankingforces;terrain;chemicalsitua-
tion;weatherandtimeofday.
1012. Components of the Decision. Havingclarifiedhismissionandassessedthesituation thecommandermakeshisdecisionandmarksitonhismap. Thecomponentsofthedecisionare:
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a. Concept of Battle. Thecommanderspecifieswhichenemygroupingsare
tobedestroyed,withwhatresourcesandinwhatorder;thesectorofmain
effort;theorganizationofcombatgroupingsandthegeneralplanforma-noeuvre,concealmentanddeception.
b. Tactical Missions. Thesearelaiddownfororganicandsubordinatedsub-units.
c. Coordination. Thecommanderindicatesobjectives,phaselines,targetsandtimings.
d. Organization of Service Support and Command and Control. Oftenthese
questionsarelefttothechief ofstaff. Indeed,whentimeislimited,thecommanderconfineshimselftodefiningthemostimportantobjectivesand
everythingelse is left tothe staff,who thenproduce theirplansfor the
commanders approval.
1013. Putting the Decision into Practice. Thedecisionmust firstbereportedtotheseniorcommanderforhisapproval.Thedecisionisthenpassedtosubor-
dinatesandthechiefofstafftranslatesitintofullerplansandorders. Detailed
instructionsforcooperationandcoordinationareproduced. Uptothispoint
thecommanderwillbeworkingprimarily from hismap. Iftimepermitsthe
decisionwillnowberefinedontheground. Thecommandermayattendtheseniorcommandersgroundreconnaissanceandthenstudythegroundwith
hisownsubunitcommanders. IntheGENFORCEviewtoconductground
reconnaissancebeforemakingadecisionwouldbetowastevaluabletime.
Thedecisionmaybemodifiedasaresultofthegroundreconnaissanceandthenverbalorderswillbegiven.Thecommandersupervisesthepreparationsofhissubordinates, eitherpersonallyorthroughhisdeputyorchiefofstaff. At
theappointedtimehereportsthereadinessofhisunittotheseniorcommander.
1014. Tactical Norms.GENFORCEhasdevotedagreatdealofefforttoanalysing
pastwars,modelling futureonesand thusdevelopingmathematical normsexpressedincalculations,chartsandnomogramsand,increasingly,programs
forcomputersandelectroniccalculators.Althoughthesemayseemoverfor-
mal tooutsiders, theuseof thesetoolsspeeds the commandersdecision
makingprocessandtheworkofhisstaffindevelopinghisplans. Itisalsoanapproachwhichlendsitselftotheuseofautomatedcommandsystems.
1015. Command Posts. ItisinkeepingwiththeGENFORCEviewofthepersonal
significanceofthecommanderthatthetermcommandpostisused,rather
thanheadquarters.FromdivisionalleveldownwardsGENFORCEcommand
postsaregenerallysmallerthantheequivalentBritishheadquarters.InpartthisisbecausethelogisticresponsibilitiesofGENFORCEcommandpostsare
ratherlessthantheBritishcounterparts. Itisalsoaconsequenceofthecom-
mandstyleoutlinedaboveandarequirementoftheGENFORCEimageofa
fastmovingbattlefield.
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TABLE 1-1: DEPLOYMENT OF DIVISIONAL AND REGIMENTAL COMMAND
POSTS IN THE ADVANCE
CommandPost
Distance
fromFLUT
(km)
Number
of
Vehicles
Deployment
Area
(sqkm)
Remarks
DivisionalFCP 25 About10 Approx0.2 Movesconstantlywith
firstechelonuniton
themainaxis.
DivisionalCP 1020 About70 Upto10 Usuallydeploysbetweenfirstand
secondechelonsand
movesupto23times
daily.
DivisionalACP 1020 About3 Upto8 Asformain. Oftennotformedintheadvance.
DivisionalRCP 3040 About16 Upto5 Deployswithlogistic
elementsandmoves
upto23timesdaily.
RegimentalFCP 25 About4 Approx0.1 Movesconstantlywithfirstechelonsubunit
onthemainaxis.
RegimentalCP 58 About17 0.4 Usuallydeploysbetweenfirstandsecondechelons.
Movesbyboundsbehindfirstechelon.
RegimentalRCP 1015 About10 0.2 Deployswithlogistic
elements.
Notes:
1. Figuresareyardsticksonly. ThedistanceofaCPfrom theFLOTandthe fre-quencyofitsmoveswilldependonthetempoofcombat.
2. WithinCPs,dispersionispractisedtoreducevulnerability. Communicationscen-tresareremotedseveralkilometresawaytolessenthechanceofenemyDFactivity
leadingtolocationofCPitself. CPsaresitedsothatnosingletacticalnuclearweapon
willeliminatemorethanone.
3. TheprotectionofCPsbyairdefencetroopsisahighpriority,andengineersupportisusuallyavailabletodiginandhelpcamouflagekeyelements. Ideallytheyaresited
nearsecondechelon/reservestogainprotectionfromgroundorheliborneattack.
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1016. Command Post Deployments. The deploymentof CPs atdivisionaland
regimentallevelsissummarisedinTable11.
a. Command and Observation Post (COP). Formedat battalion,company
andplatoonlevelsonlyanditistheonlyheadquarterselementatthose
levelsofcommand. IntheattackfromthemarchCOPsaregenerallyvehi-cleborne,butindefenceandinanattackfromclosecontactCOPsmay
be duginpositions. ThebattalionCOPconsistsofthecommandersandchiefofstaffsvehiclesandmayincludethesignalsplatoonvehicle. The
commandersofattachedsubunits(especiallyartillery)areexpectedtobe
colocatedwiththeCOPofthebattalionorcompanytheyaresupporting.
b. Command Post (CP).Atregimentanddivision,thisisthefocusofcontrol.TheCPisrunbythechiefofstaff,whodirectstheformation/unitstaffin
translatingthecommandersdecisionintoplansandorders.Italsocoordi-
nates themovement and deploymentofallsubordinategroupingsandmonitorstheirprogressandcombatfitnessincluding supply states. Se-
lectedstaffofficers,thoroughlybriefedinthecommandersconcept,arefrequentlysenttosubordinateunitsandsubunitstoensurethattheyun-
derstandandimplementits spirit. TheCPusuallydeploysbetweenthe
firstandsecondechelons,butitisnotconstantlyonthemovelikethe
ForwardCP.NoStepUpisformed. WhentheCPmoves,iteitherretains
controlwhileonthemarch,or theForwardCPtemporarilyassumes thefullburden.
c. Forward Command Post (FCP). Commandersaremostconcernedthat
theirdecisions arebasedonthemostuptodateandaccurateevaluationofthesituation.Tothisend,theyformasmallarmouredFCPcomprisedoftheir mostimportantadvisors(chiefsoftheoperations, intelligenceandsignalsstaffs,thechiefofartilleryandanairforcerepresentative)andcom-
municationsmeans. TheFCPmoveswiththe firstechelononthemain
axis.Thecommanderisthusabletoacquainthimselfwiththesituationon
thekeysector,includingthenuancesthatarefilteredoutinsecondhandreportsandtoreactimmediatelytodevelopments. Hecanissueordersin
person, ensure thattheyareunderstood,personallysupervisetheirex-
ecutionandmonitorprogress.RegimentsdonotalwaysformaFCP,prob-
ablybecauseoflimitedmanpowerandequipment.However,aregimentalcommanderwilluseaFCPwheneverhefeelsthat hispersonalpresenceiscrucialtotacticalsuccess.
d. Alternate Command Post (ACP). Notfoundbelowdivisionallevelandonly
sometimescreatedbydivisions,mostcommonlyindefence.Itisareserve
CP,establishedatreducedmanninglevels,toassumecontroliftheCPisdestroyed. ItdeployslaterallyfromthemainCP.ACPsarealsoformed
whenoperatinginexceptionallydifficultterrain,ifthedivisionisdispersed
overawiderarea than usual and lateralcommunicationsaredifficult.
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e. Airborne. Inveryfluidsituations,ortomaintaincontrolwhentheCPmoves,
anairborneCPinahelicoptersuchastheHIPGmaybeusedatdivisional
level.
f. Rear Control Post (RCP). FromthisCP,whichislocatedintheareaofthe
rearservices(ie logistics) elements, the chief of the rearorganizeslogisticsupportforaconceptofbattlehereceivesfromtheCP. TheCP
keepstheRCPfullyandcontinuouslyinformedofoperationalrequirementsandRCP,inturn,keepstheCPabreastofsupplystates.
1017. Observation Posts (OP). Observationpostsarenormally reconnaissance
elementsdeployedwithinthebattalion.However,divisionsandhigherforma-
tionsandhigherformationsmaycreateOPsascommandandcontrolele-ments.Theywillbedeployedprimarilyawayfromthemainaxistoprovidethe
staffwithuptodateinformationontheprogressofoperations.Theyaremanned
byasmallnumberofofficersfromthemainstaff,withcommunicationsmeans.InstaticoperationsthecommandermayvisittheOPtoreconnoitretheground
himself.
SECTION 4 - COMMUNICATIONS
1018. General. GENFORCEcommunicationsreflecttheconcernofcommandersto
maintainuninterruptedtroopcontrol,flexibilityandsecurity.
1019. Division and Regiment. GENFORCEsignalstroopsuseradiorelaywithHF
backupandencryptionfacilitiesfromregimentrearwards. Severalnetsare
createdtocopewiththeexpectedvolumeoftrafficandstillprovideadegreeofflexibilityand redundancy incaseof interference throughphysicalorelec-tronicattack.
a. Command Net. Thisnet,whichisduplicatedwhenaforwardCPisformed,
linksthecommander,chiefofstaffandalternateCPtoallmajorheadquar-
tersandsupportingunits. Useismadeofskipechelonworking,ieena-blingthecommandertotalk twodown. Thisallowsthecommanderto
exercisedirectcontrol overkey subordinategroupings,ega divisional
commander may establish suchalinkwithaforwardor heliborneor
outflankingdetachmentofbattalionsize. Suchlinksmayalsobeusedtomaintaincontrolifanintermediateheadquartersisputoutofaction,thoughthenecessaryreconfigurationofthenetwouldbeaccompaniedbysome
delay.
b. Staff Nets.Certainprincipalstaffofficers,notablythechiefsofartillery,
engineers,reconnaissance,airdefence,aviation,chemicaldefence,andtherear,havededicatednetsto ensuretheuninterruptedflowofinforma-
tionandorders. Theyalsoprovidebackupnetsif thecommandnet is
interruptedoroverloaded.
c. Coordination Nets. Theseareestablishedwith flanking and secondech
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elonorreserveformationsandwithanygroupingsperformingspecialmis-
sionsinthedivisionorregimentssareaofresponsibility,suchasairas-
saultunits,orforwarddetachments.
d. Warning Net.AnetdevotedpurelytoairandNBCwarningandthepas-
sageofmeteorologicaldataisestablisheddowntobattalionlevel.
1020. Battalion. Theorganizationofbattalionradionetswilldependonthetypeofoperations.Intheadvanceandwhenattackingaweakenemy, allbattalionvehicleswill probablybeon thesame VHFnet. Againstawellorganized
defence,andgenerallywhenoperatingonfoot,companynetsareoftenused.
1021. Organization of Battalion Radio Communications.Diagram11showsatypical example of theorganisation of radio communicationsinareinforced
motorriflebattalionintheattack. Thefollowingpointsshouldbenoted:
a. Communication With Regiment. Thebattalionscommanderandchiefof
staffareallocatedextraradiosbytheregimentalsignalscompany,throughwhichthey join the regimentalcommandnet (battalioncommanderand
chiefofstaff)andtheregimentalstaff net(battalionchief of staff only).
Thesecondecheloncompanycommanderwhoisnominatedtotakeover
commandifthebattalioncommanderisputoutofactionwouldbegiven
onlythefrequenciesoftheregimentalnet.Theregimentalheadquartersisalso able tomonitorbattalionnetsandcommunicatedirectlywithcompa-
nies.
b. Battalion Nets. ThemainbattalionnetusesR123 vehicleVHFradios.Itiscontrolledbythebattalioncommanderandincludesthechiefofstaff,com-pany commanders,commanders of themortarbattery, thegrenadelauncher,airdefenceandtheantitankplatooncommanders,thesupply
platoonandthecombatreconnaissancepatrolcommanders,thecommand-
ersofsubordinatedorsupporting subunits(suchasanartillerybattalion
orchemicalreconnaissancepatrol). InadditionallsectionAPCsaretunedtothisfrequencymakingatotalof40stationsormoreonthenet. Strict
disciplineisrequired toavoidchaos. Theonlystationswithauthority to
transmitarethebattalioncommander himself,companycommandersand
commandersofreconnaissanceandchemicalreconnaissancepatrolswhenmaking reportsto thebattalioncommander. Inaddition, inmountedat-tacks,companycommanders,withthebattalioncommanderspermission,
use thisnettocontroltheirplatoons. Aduplicatebattalionnetis main-
tainedfordismountedoperationsusingR159VHFvehicle/manpacksets.
Thisnetconsistsofthebattalionandcompanycommanders,thechiefofstaffandthemortarbatterycommander.Battalionfiresupportassets,egtheairdefence platoon,maybeorderedtotunetheirvehicleradiostothenet.
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c. Company Nets. IfcompanynetsareformedVHFmanpacksets(R148)
areissuedtothecompanycommander,3motorrifleplatooncommanders
andthecommanderoftheantitanksection(inBTRunits). ThebattalioncommandermayjoinacompanynetusinganR123set.
d. Platoon Nets. InexceptionalcircumstancesmotorrifleplatoonsmaybeissuedwithR147orR157manpacksetstoformtheirownnets.InthiscasesectionswillreceivetheR147Pradioreceiveronly.Aplatoonnetwillonlybeestablished whentheplatoonisoperatingindependentlyofthemainbody.Battalionsupportweaponsnormallymaintaintheirownsub-
unitnets,forexample,betweenthemortarbatterycommanderandfiring
positions,orbetweenthegrenadelauncherplatoon commanderandhis
threesections.Thebattaliondeputyfortechnicalaffairsmaintainsatech-nicalsupportnettolink damagedvehicleswiththerepairandevacuation
group.
e. Supporting Elements. Subunitssupportingthe battaliongenerallymain-
taintheirownnetsandoftenhave theirownlinkswithequivalenthead-quartersathigherlevels.Artillerybatterycommandersareexpectedtobe
colocatedwith thecompanycommandertheyaresupporting.Thismeans
thattheartillerynetcanbeusedforcommunicationsbetweenbattalionand
companycommandersif thebattalioncommandnetisnotworkingprop-
erly.
f. Tank-Infantry Communications. Atankcompanysupportingamotorrifle
battalionretainsconsiderable independence in communications. The
companycommandermayjointhemainbattalionnetoralternativelythebattalioncommander maypasshisorderstothetankcompanybytempo-rarilytuningtoitswavelength.Tankplatooncommandersandlinetanksdonot monitorthemotorriflebattalionnet. Intimatecooperationbetweena
motorrifleplatoonandasupportingtankdepends largelyonvisualsig-
nals,especiallytheuseoftracer,flaresandcolouredsmoke.
1022. NonRadio Communications. Whileradiomust,inevitably,betheprincipal
meansofcommunicationinafluid, mobilebattle,GENFORCEiswellawareof
thethreatposedbyenemyDF,interceptandcommunicationsjamming. The
useofalternativemeanswhenpossibleisstressed. Lineisused extensivelyin defence,inwaitingareasandalongmarchroutes. Muchuseismadeofliaisonofficersinhelicoptersand lightvehicles,andofpersonalcontactbe-
tweencommandersortheirrepresentativesandsubordinates.Visualandsound
signals, egflares,flagsandvehiclehorns,areusedwithsubunitswhenoutof
contacttopasssimplemessagesandinstructions.Asageneralruleradiocommunicationsarekepttotheminimumuntilcontactwiththeenemyismade.Thusabattalionintheattack willbeforbiddentouseradiosuntiltheirsupport-
ingartillery beginsitsbombardment. Indefencelinecommunicationsarethenormuntiltheenemybeginshisartillerypreparationoftheattack.
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SECTION 5 - COMBAT ORGANIZATIONS
1023. General. ThestandardorganizationsshownintheGENFORCEORBATSinPart1arenotcombatgroupings. TheyarethebasisonwhichGENFORCE
commanderscreatetacticalgroupings.Thesegroupingswillbedeterminedby
aformationsorunitsmissionandthedegreeofreinforcementithasreceived,ontheterrainoverwhichitisfightingandbythestrengthanddeploymentof
theenemyitisfacing.ThissectionoutlinessomebasicprinciplesofGENFORCEcombatorganizationsbutitmustbeemphasizedthatthesearenothardandfastrules,butgeneralguidelines.Inparticular,theyapplyprimarilytostandard
typesofterrainand,asindicatedintheappropriatesectionsofthetext,require
modificationwhenappliedtospecialconditionsandterrain.
1024. The Division. Divisionsarethebasicbuildingblocksofoperationalcommand-
ers.Adivisionsorganicassetsaresufficientforittoattackordefendona
secondarysectorbutwhenfightingontheaxisofmaineffortitwillrequireadditionalcombatandservicesupport. Armycommandersmayalsoreinforce
somedivisionsattheexpenseofothers,forexampleelementsmaybede-tachedfromsecondechelondivisionstoreinforceafirstechelonformation.
Secondechelondivisionsmayalsofindthatthearmycommandertakesdirect
controlofaunitforaspecificmission,egasanantiair landingreserve. In
suchcasesthearmycommanderwilltrytomakegoodtheselossesbeforethedivisioniscommittedintobattle.
1025. Divisional Combat Organizations. AGENFORCEdivisionconsistsofthree
orfourregiments,organiccombatandservicesupportunitsandanyreinforce-
mentsattachedbyhigherlevelsofcommand. Mostdivisionsareeithermotorrifleortankdivisions,dependingonthebalanceofmechanizedinfantryandarmourwithinthem,butthereareasmallnumberofrifledivisionsforuseincertaintypesofterrain,mostlyverymountainousareas.Rifledivisionshave
threerifleregiments,whicharenotequippedwithsectionAPCs,andhaveonly
atankbattalioninsteadofatankregiment. Rifledivisioncombatorganizations
andtacticsareverysimilartothoseofmotorrifleformationsandmajorvaria-tionswillbedescribedatappropriatepointsinthetext. Themainelementsof
adivisionscombatorganizationare:
a. Echelonning of Regiments. Thedeploymentofregimentsisdeterminedbytheechelonstructureofthedivision,usuallyineitheroneortwoechelons.Twoechelonstructuresareappropriatewhenattackingordefendinginthe
main sectorofeffort, particularly against anenemydeployed indepth.
Groupingthreeregimentsinthefirstechelonandoneinthesecondisthe
mostcommonlyadoptedvariant.Atwoandtwodeploymentissometimes
foundinthedefence,onanarmysmostthreatenedsector,butismorerarelyseenintheattack.
b. Reinforcements. Theexact compositionofanyreinforcementsreceived
byadivisionwilldependonitsmission,theterrain&c. Theymaybere-tainedunderdivisionalcontrol,allowingthedivisionalcommandertopushsomeofhisownassetsdowntoregimentsormayevenbeallocatedto
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regimentsthemselves.Themostcommonreinforcementisartillery,allow-
ingadivisiontocreateadivisionalartillerygroup(DAG)whilereinforcing
regiments,particularlyonitsmainsector,toallowthemtocreateregimen-talartillerygroups(RAGs).
c. Organic Combat and Service Support. Althoughdivisionswill reinforceregimentsfromtheircombatandservicesupportassets,thecommanderwillalwaysstrivetokeepaproportionoftheseassetsunderhisowncon-trol. Hewillusuallyemploythemtosupporttheregimentsonthemainaxisbuttheyarehispersonalmeansofinfluencingthebattleandcanbeswitched
elsewhereasthe situationdevelops. Someof theseelementsmaybe
nominatedasreserves(eganantitank,engineerorchemicaldefencere-
serve)butitisraretofindfieldartilleryinareserve.
1026. Motor Rifle Divisional Combat Organizations. AGENFORCEmotorrifle
divisionconsistsofthreemotorrifleregimentsandatankregiment,withitscombatandservicesupport. ThedivisionmayhaveeithertwoBMPequipped
regimentsandoneBTRequipped regimentorviceversa. The rolesof thedifferenttypesofregimentinthedivisionscombatstructuremaybeassessed
bythefollowingrulesofthumb:
a. BMP Regiments.BecauseoftheBMPsfirepowerandmobility,regiments
equippedwithitaremostlikelytobefoundonthedivisionsmainaxisintheattackanditsmostthreatenedsector inthedefence. Theyarealso
likelytobeinthefirstechelon,althoughintheattackaBMPregimentmay
beconsideredforanexploitationroleinthesecondechelon. Battalionsof
aBMPregimentarealsomostlikelytobechosenforspecialmissionsbythedivisionalheadquarters,forexample,toactasforwardorraidingde-tachments.
b. BTR Regiments. BTRequippedregimentsaremoresuitedtosecondary
sectors. InfantryfromBTRunitsmaybemoreoftenchosenforheliborne
operationsbecauseoftheirmanportableantitankweapons.
c. Tank Regiments.Becauseoftheirlackofinfantrytankregimentsarenot
suitableforuseinthefirstechelonofmotorrifledivisionswhenattacking
reasonablystrongdefences.Theyaremorelikelytobeusedinthesecondechelon,wheretheycanrapidlyexploitsuccess. Atankregimentmightbeusedinthefirstechelonagainstaweakdefence,whentheaimistostrike
asdeeplyaspossiblebeforetheenemystrengthenshisposition. Inde-
fencethetankregimentisalsomostlikelytobeinthesecondechelon
becauseitsequipmentandorganizationfititforacounterattackorcoun-
terpenetrationrole,ratherthanforholdingground.
1027. Tank Divisional Combat Organizations. Tankdivisionsaremostsuitedto
exploitationrolesintheoffensiveandmaybeconfiguredforuseasanarmys
operationalmanoeuvregroup.Indefenceatankdivisionisalmostcertaintobedeployedinthesecondechelonofthearmytoprovideacounterattackforce.
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IfatankdivisionhastoattackprepareddefencestheBMPregimentwillprob-
ablybeinthefirstechelon. BMPequippedelementsarealsooftenconsidered
forvanguardandforwarddetachmentmissions.
1028. The Regiment. Theregimentisthebasictacticalandadministrativeunitinthe
GENFORCEarmy.Battalionsandcompaniesaresubunitsandarenumberedaselementsoftheirparent regiment 1stMotorRifleBattalion,10thMotor
RifleRegiment or9th TankCompany,3rd TankBattalion,100th TankRegi-ment.Theyarenotexpectedtooperateindependentlyoftheirparentregimentwithoutreinforcement,andthenonlyforalimitedtime.Amotorrifleregiment
hasthreemotorriflebattalionsandatankbattalion.Arifleregimenthasthree
riflebattalionsandatankbattalion. Atankregimentinatankdivisionhasthree
tankbattalionsandamotorriflebattalionbutthetankregimentofamotorrifledivisionhasnomotorriflebattalion.
1029. Motor Rifle Regimental Combat Organizations. ItisrareforGENFORCEmotorrifleregimentstobefoughtasfourseparatebattalions. Themostcom-
monoptionsare:
a. Inaoneechelonformation,toallocateatankcompanytoeachmotorrifle
battalion.Sometimesonetankcompany,withthebattalionheadquarters,
isinitiallyretainedunderregimentalcommand.
b. Inatwoechelonformation,toallocateoneortwotankcompaniestothe
twofirstechelonmotorriflebattalions,whileretainingtherestofthebattal-ionunderregimentalheadquarters. Tanksarenotusuallysubordinatedto
secondechelonbattalionsuntiltheyareabouttobecommittedintobattle.
c. Indefence,particularlyinBMPregiments,fourbattalionsmaybedeployed
(2up,2back).Eveninthiscasethetankbattalionmayloseacompanyto
thefirstechelonmotorriflebattalions(seeChapter5,Diagram54foran
illustrationofthisoption).
1030. Ofcourse,theregimentalcommandermaychoosetofighthistankbattalionas
asingleentityifhefeelsthetacticalsituationrequiresit.Thismighthappenin
ameetingbattlewhenapowerfularmouredfistismostnecessary.
1031. Tank Regimental Combat Organizations. TankregimentsoftankdivisionsaremostoftenorganizedwiththeBMPbattalionsplitbycompaniesamongthe
tankbattalions. InsomecircumstancestheBMPbattalionmayremainintact
andevenbereinforcedwithatankcompanyandotherassets.Thismayhap-
peniftheBMPbattalionisactingastheregimentsvanguardorifitistaskedas
a forwarddetachment,especiallywhenchosen,becauseof its amphibiouscapability,tosecurearivercrossing.Itisrareforthetankregimentofamotor
rifledivisiontobereinforcedwithmotorrifletroopsfromanotherregiment.
1032. Battalion Combat Organizations. TacticalgroupingofGENFORCEbattal-ionsneverinvolvestheexchangeofsubunitswithotherbattalions,egamotorriflebattalionwillnotexchangeamotorriflecompanyforatankcompanywith
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atankbattalion. Battalionsareeitherreinforcedwithregimentalassetsorare
themselvesusedasreinforcements. Withinthebattalionthecommanderor-
ganizeshisforceinoneortwoechelonsanduseshisownandanyattachedsupportingassetseithertoreinforcesubunits(especiallyonhismainaxis)or
toremainunderhisownhand.
1033. Restoration of Combat Effectiveness.Ifaformationorunitsuffersheavylosses,compromising itscombateffectiveness,measuresmustbe taken toreorganizeitasrapidlyaspossible. Wherelossesarenotcatastrophic,thisismosteffectively achievedbyreducing thenumberofsubunitsundercom-
mand,while retaining theoutlineof itsstructure. Thusa regimentmightbe
reorganizedwith fewerbattalions thanusualoracompanywith fewerpla-
toons.Ifaunitcompletelylosesitscombateffectiveness(whenlossesofmenandequipmentreach70%ormore)itisbettertocreatecompositesubunits
fromtheavailablemenandmateriel.Thecompositebattalionisthemosttypi-
calsizeforsuchanelementanditmaycontainalmostanymixofmotorrifleandtanktroopsandavailablecombatsupport,suchasartillery.
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CHAPTER 2
THE MARCH
SECTION 1 - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
2001. Significance. Withitsdoctrinalstressontheimportanceofmanoeuvreanditsexperienceoflandoperationsconductedonacontinentalscale,GENFORCEnaturallyemphasises the importanceofconducting marchesefficientlyandrapidly.MarchesareexercisedoverconsiderabledistancesandSOPswell
developed.
2002. Types of march. GENFORCEconsiderstwomaintypesofmarch,dependentonwhethercontactwithenemygroundforcesisexpectedornot. Inthefirst
case,whencontactwiththeenemyisnotlikely,administrativeproblemspre-
dominate,althoughtacticalconsiderationscanneverbetotallyexcluded.Therisksofairormissileattacksandthepossibilityofenemyairborneordiversion-
aryforcesoperatingintheGENFORCErearareaarealwayspresent. Evenadministrativemarchesmustbeorganizedsoastoallowasmoothandrapid
transitionto tacticalmarchformations. Tacticalmarches,whencontactwith
enemygroundforcesislikely,areorganizedtoensurethatthemarchingfor-
mationisreadytoenterbattleattheshortestnotice.
SECTION 2 - ADMINISTRATIVE MARCHES
2003. Strategic Movement. OutofcontactGENFORCEmakesconsiderableuseof
rail,seaandairlinkstopreservethemarchingcapabilitiesofformations,byminimizing fuelconsumptionandmaintenancerequirements. Heavyequip-menttransportersmayalsobeusedwhenroadmovementisessential. Theaimistoensurethatvehiclesbeginanoperationwithatleast3,600kmof
operablerangebeforemajormaintenanceworkbecomesnecessary.
2004. Road Marches. Byminimizingwearandtearonvehiclesbeforeanoperationbeginsandbycarefullyplanningroutinemaintenanceduringroadmarches,
GENFORCEhopestolimitthefalloutrateonthemarchtonomorethan12%
ofvehiclesperday. Tables21and22showtheaverageratesofmarchand
dailymarchperformancewhichGENFORCEexpectstoachieve.
2005. March Planning. Marchesareplannedonthemap,usingstandardnorms
andstafftables.Routeswillbechosentoprovidethebestpossibleprotection
fromenemyreconnaissancemeansandmarcheswillbeconductedatnightor
inperiodsofbadvisibilitywheneverpossible.Therouteisdividedintosectors
accordingtothetypeofterrainandreportlinesarepreplanned. Regularpe-riodsofrestallow routinemaintenance,refuelling,feedingandsleep. (See
Chapter2ofBasicForceOperationalArtfordetailsofmarchorganization).
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TABLE 2-1: AVERAGE SPEEDS OF MARCH COLUMNS (KM PER HOUR)
ColumnTypes
PavedRoads DryDirtRoads Muddy,Hilly,
UrbanRoads
Day Night Day Night Day Night
MotorisedColmMixedColm
30402030
25301420
20251520
18201215
10151012
81081
Notes: (1) Duringfog,reduceby2530%ofdayspeed.
(2) Performanceissharplyreducedinmountains,desert,arctic,marshy
areasandduringwinter.
Resthalts: *Shorthaltof2030minutesevery23hours(firstoneafter12hours).
**Longhaltof24hoursnecessaryifaforcedmarchof1214hoursis
beingconducted.
TABLE 2-2: DAILY MARCH PERFORMANCE OF MARCH COLUMNS (KM)
ColumnTypes PavedRoads DryDirtRoads Muddy,Hilly,
UrbanRoads
MotorisedColm 250350 180300 80180MixedColm 200350 120240 80140
Note: (1) Therouteismeasuredonthemapand510%ofdistanceisadded
onaverageterrainand20%inmountainousterrain.
(2) Calculationisformarchof1012hours. Remaining1214hours
spent:
(1) Technicalmaintenance34hours.
(2) Servinghotmeal111/2hours
(3) Deploymentandcamouflage111/2hours
(4) Movementtostartline111/2hours.(5) Rest48hours.
(3) Onamarchofover1,000km,andpossiblyeveninashorterone,
therewillbearestday,probablyintherestareabeforethefinalassemblyareaforessentialrepairandmaintenancework.
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2006 March Routes. Tworoutesarenormallyconsideredsufficientforadivisionon
anadministrativemarchanda regimentmovesononeroute. Howeveran
alternativeisplannedforeachroute,incasetheprimaryroutebecomesunus-able. Lateralroutesarechosen topermitmanoeuvre fromone roadtoan-
other. TheGENFORCEunderstandingofaroadisnotlimitedtothosewith
hardsurfaces.Countrydirttrackswillsufficeandwill,indeed,bepreferrediftheyofferatacticaladvantage.
2007. March Formations. Inamarchwhenenemycontactisnotexpectedcolumnsareorganizedprimarilyforadministrativeconvenience.Vehiclesofsimilartype,
speedandcrosscountrycapabilitymaybekeptinpacketsratherthanbeing
tactically grouped. Trackedandwheeledvehiclesmayusedifferent routes.
Howeverthedeploymentofcertainsubunitsisdeterminedprimarilybytacti-calconsiderations,evenonanadministrativemarch.
a. Security elements. Someformofmarchsecuritywillalwaysbedeployed,becauseofdiversionaryandairbornethreats. Inthedeepreartheseele-
mentsmaybequiteweakpatrols but theywill increaseinnumberandstrengthastheformationapproachesitslineofcommitment. Securitypa-
trolsandoutpostswillbedeployedaroundrestandassemblyareas.
b. Air Defence. Duringanadministrativemarchprimaryresponsibilityforair
defencelieswiththehigherformationthroughwhoserearareathetacticalformationismarching. Thehigherformationsairdefenceassetsprovide
earlywarningandwillengageenemyaircraftatlongrange.Airdefence
subunitswill,however, bedeployed throughout the tacticalformations
marchcolumns,operatingonelectronicsilenceuntiltheirformationisdi-rectly threatened. Priorityindeploymentofairdefencesubunitswillbegiventoheadquarters,missileandartilleryunitsandthefirstechelon.The
higherformationwillalsoconcentrateresourcestocoverobstaclecross-
ingsandotherchokepoints.
c. Combat & Service Support. Engineer reconnaissance, route clearanceandobstaclecrossingunitswillbedeployedthroughoutthemarchingcol-
umnsbuttheprimaryresponsibilityformaintainingrouteslieswiththehigher
formationsheadquarters.Chemicalreconnaissanceanddefencesubunits
willalsobetacticallydeployedwithincolumns,incaseofenemystrikesduringthemarch. Higherformationheadquartersarealsoresponsibleformaintaining,refuellingandfeedingunitsmarchingintheirrearareas,so
thatthoseunitsare,asfaraspossible,committedintobattleatfullstrength
andwiththeirbasiccombatloadsintact.
2008. Troop Control. Firmandcontinuouscontrol isessential,as isthemainte-nanceofsecrecy.
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a. Deployment of CPs. Withinunitsandsubunitscommandpostsleadtheir
columns(apartfromanymarchsecurityormovementsupportdetachments).
WithinformationsoneCPmustalwaysbedeployed. ThepreferredoptionisforthemainCPtomovesimultaneouslywiththetroops(usuallyinthe
firstechelon)whilecontrolisexercisedfromtheforwardCPwhichissitu-
atedinthenextdailyrestarea. WhentheformationmovesintotherestareatheforwardCPmovesontothenextone.
b. Traffic Control. Themilitarypoliceexercisetrafficcontrol.Themarchrouteisdividedinto5080kmsectors,eachbeingtheresponsibilityofasubunit.
Postsarealsoestablishedatallobstaclecrossings,defiles,bypassesand
populationcentres.
c. Communications. Communicationssecurityisverytight. Radiosarenor-
mallyallowedtooperateinreceivemodeonly. Radiosilenceisonlybro-
kenforairandchemicalwarnings. Withinsubunitsthemarchiscontrolledbyverbalordersandvisualsignals,suchasflagsorlights. Communication
betweenheadquartersisbymobilemeans,suchasliaisonvehiclesand,athigherlevels,helicopters. Inadditionunitandsubunitcommandersmay
usemilitarypolice linecommunicationsorcivilsystemstonotifytheirpas-
sageofreportlines.
SECTION 3 - TACTICAL MARCHES
2009. Definition. Tacticalmarchesareconductedwhencontactwithenemyground
forcesispossible. Theyusuallybegininanassemblyareawhereformations
andunitsreorganizethemselvesfromtheorderinwhichtheycompletedtheadministrativemarchandcarryoutfinalmaintenanceandlogisticchecks.Theirnewmarchorderwillbedeterminedbytheirmission,theterrainthroughwhichtheymustmarchandthenatureoftheenemythreattheyface. Theformation
mustpermitasmoothandrapiddeploymentintobattleinaccordancewiththe
commandersplanandmustincludesecurityelementstopreventtheenemy
disruptingthatdeployment.
2010. Planning Factors. Innormalterrainadivisionwillrequireazoneofadvance
approximately30kmwide. Withinthatzoneitwillnormallyadvanceonthree
routes,withanalternaterouteallocatedforeachone. Innormalterrainregi-mentsadvanceononerouteuntiltheybegintheirdeploymentintobattle. Adivisionsmarchcolumnswillbe80100kmdeepfromleadingmarchsecurity
elementstothetail. A firstechelonregimentwillrequireover40kmofroad
space;asecondechelonregiment(withlessmarchsecuritydeployed)needs
2030km.Atthenormalmarchspeedof2025kphadivisionwillrequire45
hourstopassareportline.
2011. Intervals. Thestandardintervalbetweenvehicleswithincolumnsis2550m.
Thisisalsothestandardintervalbetweencompaniesandplatoonswithina
battalionsmainbody.Intervalsofupto5kmaremaintainedbetweenbattalionpacketswithinaregimentsmainbody.Atnightandwhenweatherorroadconditionsarebadgreaterintervalsaremaintained. Whenitisnecessaryto
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crossopencountryunderthethreatofenemyPGMs,speedsareincreased,
vehicleintervalsareopenedto 100150mandgapsof300400mmaintained
betweenplatoons.
2012. March Security. Marchsecurityelementsaresentoutfromthemainbodyto
preventsurpriseattacksbytheenemy,preventtheenemysreconnaissancepenetratingtothemainbodyandtoassistthemainbodysdeploymentinto
battle. Thestrengthandcompositionofthemarchsecurityelementswillde-pendontheintensityoftheenemythreatandthetypeofterrain. Thegreaterthe threatand themoredifficult the terrain,thestrongerthemarchsecurity
required. Marchsecurityelementsmaybeclassified underthetitlesofvan-
guard,rearguard,flankdetachment,mobilepicquets(forward,flankandrear)
andpatrols.Diagram21showstheseelementsinrelationtothemainbody.Theirrolesareexplainedbelow:
SeeDiagram21
a. Vanguard.Avanguardisdeployedbyadivisionoraregimenttoensurethesecurityof itsmainaxis. Inopen,mobileoperationsadivisionmay
sendanentireregimentforwardasitsvanguard.Alternatively,avanguard
consistingofa reinforcedbattalionmaybesentoutoneachregimental
routeduringanadvancetocontact. Whenexploitingabreakthroughorin
pursuiteachfirstechelonregimentislikelytoemployareinforcedbattalionasavanguard. Motorriflebattalionsarefavouredinthisrole,thoughtank
battalionsmaybeused. Typicalreinforcementsareeitheratankoramo-
torriflecompany,anartillerybattalion,anairdefenceplatoon,with2S6,at
leastasapperplatoon,possiblywithspecialistequipmentandoftenachemi-cal reconnaissancesection. Whenthere islittle chanceofmeeting theenemydivisionsmayuseonlyabattalionasvanguard;regimentswilluse
forwardmobilepicquetsratherthanvanguards.
b. Rearguard.Arearguard,insimilarstrengthtothevanguardsdescribed
above,isdeployedbydivisionsandregimentsconductingawithdrawal.Whentheenemythreatisweakarearmobilepicquetmaybeadequate.
c. Flank Detachment.Aflankdetachmentisemployedwhenmarchingparal-
leltothefrontlineandispostedontheflanknearertheenemy. Inaddition,wheneveraformationhastooperatewithopenflanks,forexamplewhenexploitingintothe enemyrearorinmountainareas,aflankdetachment
maybeused. ItoftenoperatesinconjunctionwithaMobileObstacleDe-
tachment(MOD)andanantitankreserveandmaymoveinboundsfrom
oneblockingpositiontoanother.
d. Forward Mobile Picquet. Thisisareinforcedcompanysentaheadofafirst
echelonbattalionorabattalionoperatingawayfromthemainbody,ega
vanguard, aforwardorraidingdetachment. Whenthe threatofenemy
contactislowregimentsmaychoosetoemployaforwardmobilepicquetaheadon theiraxis, ratherthana vanguard. Motorriflecompaniesareoftenusedinthisrole,evenintankunits.Typicalreinforcementsincludea
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tankplatoon (ormotor rifleplatoon for tankcompanies),an artilleryor
mortarbattery,anantitankplatoon(withmotorriflecompanies). Asapper
element,oftenincludingMT55,mayaccompanyaforwardmobilepicquet,oraMovementSupportDetachment(MSD)maybemarchingintheimme-
diatevicinity.
e. Flank Picquet.Aflankmobilepicquet,incompanystrength,isdeployedonathreatenedflank;itmaybereinforcedwithantitankandminelayingas-sets,orcooperatewithanantitankreserveandanMOD. Flankmobilepicquetsusuallymarchlevelwiththeheadofthemainbodyandabout5
kmfromthemainroute. Staticflankpicquetsareoftenused,forexample,
toblocktheexitfromamountainpasswhilethemainbodypassesby.
f. Rear Mobile Picquet.Againareinforcedcompanyinstrengthwhichmay
betherearelementofarearguardortheonlyrearsecurityelementofa
divisionorregimentwithdrawingwhentheenemyisnotclose. Rearmo-bilepicquetsarealsopostedintheadvanceduringmobileoperationsin
theenemydepth.
g. Patrols. Themostcommonsortofmarchsecuritypatrol isthe forward
patrol,whichmaybefound throughoutadivisions formation. Thus the
forwardmobilepicquetsoffirstechelonbattalions,vanguards,forwardde-
tachmentsandsoonwillprobablybeledbyforwardpatrols. Secondech-elonbattalionsmayuseaforwardpatrol. Whenthelikelihoodofcontact
with theenemyis low, forward patrols may beused insteadof forward
mobilepicquets.Althoughforwardpatrolshaveasecondaryreconnais-
sancefunctiontheyshouldnotbeconfusedwiththereconnaissancepa-trolsdescribedinChapter3. Forwardpatrolsoperateclosertothemainbody(generallyabout35kmsahead)andtravelalongthemainbodys
actualroute. Theyare lessinclinedtoavoidcontactwiththeenemy,but
shouldnotbeexpectedtoattackanenemywhoisclearlystrongerorin
wellprepareddefences. Flankandrearpatrolsareemployedinappropri-
atetacticalsituations. Motorrifleortankplatoonsareusedasmarchsecu-ritypatrolsandtheymayincludeengineerorNBCreconnaissance. The
smallestformofpatrolisthescoutsectionorscoutvehicle.Thesemaybe
sent aheadofplatoonsorcompaniesoperatingindependentlybuteven
battalionsdeepinthemainbodyofthedivisionmayuseascoutsectionasaminimalmarchsecurityelement. Scoutsectionsarealsofrequentlyde-ployedontheopenflanksofsubunits.
2013. Reconnaissance & Movement Support Detachments.Aunitorformation
willalsosendout reconnaissanceelementsasdescribed inChapter3and
MovementSupportDetachments(seeParagraph2019). WhenmovingoutofcontactwiththeenemytheMSDmovesaheadofthemarchsecurityelements;
whencontactispossibletheMSDfollowsimmediatelyafterthevanguardor
forwardmobilepicquet.
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2014. The Order of March: Division. Thiswillbedeterminedbythemission,the
terrain,intelligenceavailableontheenemyandthustheanticipateddeploy-
mentintocombat. AvariantofamotorrifledivisionstacticalmarchformationisshowninDiagram22. Somepointstonoteare:
SeeDiagram22
a. Mission. Thedivisionisadvancingagainstacoveringforcescreeningastrongdefensiveposition. Ithopestoavoiddeployingthemainbodiesofthefirstechelonregimentsduringthecoveringforcebattlesothattheywill
beavailable forthebreakthrough battle in themaindefensiveposition.
Thedivisionisnotoperatingonthearmysmainaxis;ifitweretheArmy
ArtilleryGroupandotherreinforcementswouldbeincludedinitscolumns.Theterrainisstandardandthereisnomajorwaterobstacletocrossuntil
themaindefensivepositionhasbeenbreached.
b. Reconnaissance. Thereconnaissancescreenisnotshownindetailbutis
likelytoincludeareconnaissancedetachmentfromthedivisionalrecon-naissancebattaliononthemainaxisand reconnaissancepatrols from
divisionandfirstechelonregimentstocovertherestofthesectorofad-
vance. SeeChapter3formoredetail.
c. Forward Detachment. Thedivisionsseparatetankbattalion,reinforced,isactingasaforwarddetachment. SeeDiagram25afordetailsofitsmarch
formation. Theforwarddetachmentsmissionmaybetoseizeareserve
demolitionbeforethecoveringforcecanwithdrawthroughitortotakevital
groundforthemainbodysbreakthroughbattle.Notethattheforwardde-tachmentwilltrytoavoidbattlebeforeitreachesitsobjectiveandthatitmovesoffthemainroutesofthedivisionalcolumns.
d. Vanguards. Theseconsistofreinforcedmotorriflebattalionsfromthefirst
echelonregiments;seeDiagram25bforatypicalmarchformation. Their
missionistoclearthecoveringforcefromthepathofthemainbodyandtheyarethereforepreparedtofighttoachievethis. Itishoweverunlikely
thatstrongpositionswillbeassaultedfrontallyifthiscanbeavoided.The
preferredoptionwouldbetoturntheflankoftheposition,forcingthede-
fendertopullbackandtoattempttodestroythewithdrawingforceonthemove.Vanguardstrytomoveabout2025kmsaheadoftheirmainbodies,ieoveranhoursmarch,butthismaybereducedifresistanceorobstacles
areencountered.
e. Movement Support Detachments. Thesemoveimmediatelyafterthevan-
guardsandwilltrytoclearroutesthroughorroundanyobstaclessothatthemainbodyisnotdelayed. SeeParagraph2019fordetails.
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f. Main Body of the First Echelon. SeeDiagram24aforanexampleofafirst
echelonregimentsmarchformation. Althoughtheregimentsmarchpre-
paredtodeployintobattleasrapidlyaspossible,theywillhopetoavoiddoingso.Thedecisiontodeployortobypassanenemytoostrongforthe
vanguardtodislodgewillhavetobeapprovedbythedivisionalcommander.
g. Divisional Command Posts. Thedivisionalcommandertravelsinthefor-wardCPinthecolumnofthemainaxisfirstechelonregiment,closetotheregimentalCP. Thisensuresaspeedycommandreactionatthemostcru-cialpoint.ThemainCPaccompaniesthesecondechelonregimentonthe
mainaxis. Therearcontrolpostleadsthedivisionalrearservices.
h. Divisional Artillery Group (DAG). TheDAGiscomposedoftheorganicandanyattachedartilleryofadivision. Itmovesonthemainaxisimmediately
behindthefirstechelondivisionsothatitmaysupportanattackfromthe
march. Theantitankbattalionmovestocoveranexposedflank.
i. Divisional Air Defence. IfmarchingoutofcontactthedivisionalSAMregi-ment,andlowerlevelassets,arelikelytomaintainelectronicsilence,rely-
ingonarmyandfrontassetsforlongrangecoverandearlywarning. Elec-
tronicsensorswouldbecomeactivein theeventofadirectthreattothe
division. InthepresentcasetheSAMregimentwouldbeonfullalertand
possiblydeployedwithabatteryaccompanyingeach firstechelon regi-mentandtwoothersontheflanksofthesecondechelon.
j. Second Echelon Regiment. Thesecondechelonregiment generallymoves
ontheaxisofmaineffort.SeeDiagram24cforanexampleofitsmarchformation. Partofthesecondechelonmaybenominatedasanantiairlandingreserve.
k. Divisional Combat Support and Rear Services. Thesewillbedistributedin
accordancewiththeterrainandtacticalcircumstances. Inthiscasethe
bulkoftheengineerassets,lessrouteclearanceelements,arekeptinanengineerreserveinthesecondechelonofthedivision. Ifawaterobstacle
hadtobecrossedassaultcrossingelementswouldaccompanythefirst
echelonandsomemightbewiththeforwarddetachmentorvanguards;
divisionalbridgingwouldfollowthefirstechelonregiments. Thechemicaldefencebattalionwillprovidechemicalreconnaissancepatrolsthroughoutthedivisionalformation,andiftheNBCthreatishighdecontaminationas-
setsmayalsobesplitbetweenfirstandsecondechelons. Thebulkofthe
divisionalrearservicesareshownintheirtraditionalpositionattheendof
themarchformation. Howevermaintenanceandmedicalevacuationas-setsmaybedividedbetweenthetwoechelonsandinalongmarchindifficultterrainresupplyfacilitiesmayalsobesplit.
2015. Variations in the Divisional March Formation. Itshouldnotbeimagined
thattheformationillustratedwillbeusedinallcircumstances. Forexampleasecondechelondivisionmayadvanceontworoutes. Inverydifficultterrain,withpoorlateralcommunications,thedivisionmayadvanceinoneechelon,
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withastrongreserve. Whenexploitingabreakthroughamotorrifledivision
mightemployitstankregimentinthefirstechelon. Othervariationsarepossi-
bleandGENFORCEmarchformationsshouldnotfollowlimitedstereotypes.
2016. The Order of March: Regiment. Diagram23showsexamplesofthemarch
formationsoffirstechelonmotorrifleandtankregimentsandasecondech-elonmotorrifleregiment. Thefollowingcommentsmaybemade:
SeeDiagram23
a. Reconnaissance. Eventhoughdivisionalreconnaissanceismovingahead,
theregimentalcommanderwillwanthisownseparatereconnaissancepa-
trols, reportingdirectlyand immediatelytohis headquarters. Asecondechelonregimentwillnotdeploysuchpatrolsuntilitsmissionisconfirmed.
SeeChapter3formoredetail.
b. March Security.Firstechelonregimentswillusuallydeployreinforcedbat-
talionsasvanguardswhencontactispossible. Seediagram25bforanexample. Secondechelonregimentswillgenerallybecontentwithafor-
wardmobilepicquet. Note thattankregimentsareverylikelytousetheir
motorriflebattalionasthebasisof thevanguard, particularly inbroken
terrainorifawaterobstacleliesahead.
c. Routes. Beforecommitmentintobattlearegimentwillonlymoveonmore
thanonerouteinexceptionalcircumstances,suchasverymountainous
terrain.Howeverregimentalsubunitswithindependentroles,suchasflank
orbypassingdetachmentsmaymarchonaseparateroute.
d. Main Body Battalions. Thecombatgroupingoffirstechelonbattalionsmaydifferbetweentankandmotorrifleregiments. Atankregimentoftenallo-
catesacompanyofitsmotorriflebattaliontoeachofitstankbattalions
fromanearlystageinthemarch.Inmotorrifleregiments,however,the
tankbattalion,lessanycompanyallocatedtothevanguard,ismoreusuallyinitiallykepttogetheronthemarchandplacedattheheadofthecolumn,
immediatelyaftertheCP. Thisgivestheregimentalcommanderastrong
manoeuvreforceintheeventofasurprisecontactwiththeenemy. Then
ascommitmenttobattleapproachesthetankbattalionmaybeallocatedtofirstechelonmotorriflebattalions.Atankcompanymaybekeptdirectlyunderregimentalcontrol. Secondechelonbattalions,inbothtankandmotor
rifleregiments,receivelittlereinforcementbeforetheircommitmenttobat-
tle.
e. Artillery Elements.Aregimentsorganicartillerybattalion,oraregimentalartillerygroupifitisformed,maybeallocatedvariouspositionsinthecol-
umnofmarch. Whencontactwiththeenemyisimminenttheartilleryis
likelytobewellforward,perhapsclosebehindthecommandpostatthe
headofthecolumn.Thisarrangementisverylikelyifameetingbattleisinprospect. Insecondechelonregimentsandonotheroccasionswhencon-tactisnotexpectedtheartillerymaybefarthertotherear.Theairdefence
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battalionwillbedistributedalongthecolumnandsomeelementsmaybe
deployedinairdefenceambushesontheflanks.Amotorrifleregiments
antitankbattalionmaycoveranexposedflankormarchwelltothefore,dependingonthetacticalsituation.
2017. The Order of March: Battalion. Battalionswithindependentmissions,suchasforwarddetachmentsandvanguards,andfirstechelonbattalionsalltendtoreceivesimilarreinforcementsanditwillbedifficulttodetermineabattalionsrolefromitscombatgrouping.HowevercertaindifferencesdooccurandtheseareillustratedinDiagram24.
SeeDiagram24
a. Forward Detachment. Operatingwellforwardandperhapsevenaheadof
theregimentalreconnaissanceaforwarddetachmentrequiresatleastone
reconnaissancepatroltoavoidsurprisecontactwiththeenemy. Inamotorriflebattaliontheorganicreconnaissanceplatoonwillbeused. Atankbat-
talionislikelytouseaplatoonoftheattachedmotorriflecompany. Marchsecurityisprovidedbyaforwardmobilepicquet,whichmaydeployafor-
wardpatrolfromitsownstrength.Attachedartilleryiswellforward,espe-
ciallyifameetingbattleisanticipated. Engineerattachmentswilldepend
onthemissionandterrain,butgapcrossingequipmentislikelytobein-cludedanddivisionalassaultcrossingassetsmaybeattached.
b. Vanguard. Avanguardbattalionhaslessneedforadvancedreconnais-
sanceandmaythereforenotdeployareconnaissancepatrol,relyingin-
steadonaforwardpatrol.Amotorriflebattalionmayprefertouseanordinarymotorrifleplatooninthisroleandkeepthereconnaissancepla-tooninreserve. Itseemsequallycommontodeployanyattachedartilleryatthefrontorrearofthemainbody. Engineerassetswillemphasiseroute
clearancecapability,oranMSDmaymarchimmediatelyafterthevanguard.
c. First Echelon Battalion.Afirstechelonbattalionisunlikelytodeployacombatreconnaissancepatrolbeforeithaspenetratedtheenemysfirst
echeloncompanypositions,althoughaplatoonwillbenominatedtoactin
thisrolewhenthetimecomes. Marchsecuritywillprobablyconsistofa
forwardpatrol. Ifartilleryisattacheddirectlytothebattalion,ratherthankeptinsupportintheRAG,itismostoftenfoundattherearofthemainbody.
d. Second Echelon Battalion.Asecondechelonbattalionisnotusuallygiven
reinforcementsonthemarch,untilimmediatelybeforecommittalintobat-
tle. Inthisexamplethebattalionconfinesitsreconnaissanceandmarchsecurityeffort toasingle scout vehicle. The air defenceandgrenade
launcherplatoonsfollowthebattalioncommander,themortarbatteryfol-
lowsthemotorriflecompanies.
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e. Attached Tank/Motor Rifle Companies. Thepatternofdeploymentfollows
thatnotedatregimentallevel. Tankbattalionseitheruseanattachedmo-
torriflecompany,withatankplatoonandotherreinforcements,astheirforwardmobilepicquet,or,ifthisisnotnecessary,subordinateamotorrifle
platoontoeachtankcompany.Motorriflebattalioncommandersaremore
likelytokeepanattachedtankcompanyintact,lessanyplatoonwhichreinforcestheforwardmobilepicquet,andtoplacethetanksattheheadof
thebattalioncolumn.Ascontactbecomescloserthetankcompanymaybesubordinatedtothefirstecheloncompaniesofthebattalion.Tanksare
notallocatedtoasecondecheloncompanybeforeitentersthebattle.
2018. The Order of March: Company. Ifatankplatoonisallocatedtoamotorrifle
company,theentireplatoonmarchesattheheadofthecompanycolumn. Atankcompanyallocatedamotorrifleplatoonmayuseitasaforwardpatrol,if
oneisrequiredbythetacticalsituation. Otherwisethemotorrifleplatoonis
splitbetweenthetankplatoons,andindividualvehiclesfollowthetanksoftheirassignedplatoon.
2019. The Movement Support Detachment (MSD). Movementsupportdetach-
mentshavealreadybeenmentionedabove. TheMSDisaspecialistengineer
grouping,responsibleforrouteclearancewhichwillbeusedinbothadminis-
trativeandtacticalmarches.
a. Role. TheMSDmoveseitherbeforeorafterthevanguard,uptotwohours
aheadofthemainbody,andimprovestheaxisofadvance. Itfillsincraters
orconstructsbypasses,laysbridgesoverminorgapsandimprovesthe
approachestoandexitsfromthem,clearsandmarkslanesthroughminefields.TheworkoftheMSDisvitalbothtoarapidadvanceandtosecurity;ifitisnotcompletedintimethemainbodywillbeforcedtohalt,bunchup
andcreateatargetforairormissileattack. Oncethefirstecheloniscom-
mittedtobattletheMSDmovesbehindit,incaseitsadvanceischecked,
andtopreparearouteforthecommittalofthesecondechelon.
b. Composition. MSDsincludeengineerplantsuchastrackeddiggers,doz-
ers,cranes,dumptrucks,tankandtrucklaunchedbridges,minedetec-
torsandclearersandtruckstocarryexplosivesandmetaltrackway. They
mayhavemotorrifleandtanktroopsattachedfortheirprotection. Someofthetankswilloftenbefittedwithdozerbladesandthemotorrifletroopsmayalsoprovideextralabour.Chemicalreconnaissancetroopsoftenform
partoftheMSD. Withtheresourcesorganictoadivisionupto5or6MSDs
ofapproximatelycompanysizecanbeformed.
c. Grouping.AnMSDwillbeorganizedintwoorthreesubgroups.Theyarethereconnaissanceandclearancegroup(orseparatereconnaissanceand
clearancegroups)andtheroadbridgegroup. Someexamplesofthecom-
positionandgroupingof typicalMSDsaregivenin Table23. Grouping
dependsonterrainandthetacticalsituation. Itmaybevariedduringthecourseofoperations.
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2020. Countering RemotelyDelivered Mines. GENFORCEtakesthethreatposed
byremotelydeliveredminesveryseriously.AnRDMstrikemayhitthemiddle
ofaunitincolumnoranassemblyarea,wellbehinditsMSD,whichcannotbeexpectedtoturnandclearroutes. Unitsmustthereforetraintheirownmine
clearancegroups(atleastonesectionpercompany)intheuseofbasicequip-
menttoclearroutes. Individualvehiclecrewsareexpectedtoabletoclearasfarasthenextvehicleaheadinthecolumn.
TABLE 2-3: MOVEMENT SUPPORT DETACHMENT COMPOSITION
AND GROUPING
Reconnaissance and
Clearance Group
Road-Bridge Group
a. SapperGroup(2xBTR),MT55,
TankwithKMT6
SapperSection(2xBTR),BAT2,
TMMx4b. IMR,MTK,SapperSection(BTR) BAT2,TMMx4,FireEnginex3
Reconnaissance Group Clearance Group Road-Bridge Group
c. SapperSection(BTR)
MT55
IMR,
SapperSection(BTR)
2subgroups,each
EngrSection,BAT2x2
&TMMx2
d. Helicopter
SapperSection(Truck)
MT55, TankwithKMT6
SapperSection(Truck)
TankwithBTUdozer
blade
EngrSection,BAT2x2
TMMx4
Reconnaissance &Mine-Clearing Group
Obstacle-ClearanceGroup
Road-Bridge Group
e. SapperPl(Section)
(2xBTR)
TankwithKMT6
SapperSection(BTR)
IMR,TankwithBTU
dozerblade
MT55,TMMx2
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CHAPTER 3
RECONNAISSANCE
SECTION 1 - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
3001. The Importance of Reconnaissance. IntheGENFORCEviewreconnais-sanceisthemostimportantelementofcombatsupport. Intheirvisionoffuturecombatthebattlefieldwilldevelopveryunevenlyandneitherunitsnorforma-tionswillbeabletorelyonthesecurityoftheirflanksortheirrear.Friendlyand
enemy forceswillbecome intermingledandsituationsdevelopandchange
veryquickly.Reconnaissanceelementsmustwarntheircommandersofrap-
idlydevelopingthreatsandidentifyfleetingenemyvulnerabilities. GENFORCEcommandersaretaughtthatitisnecessarytolocate7580%ofpossibletar-
gets beforelaunchinganattackifitistohaveareasonablechanceofsuccess.
100%of thehighestpriority targets (egPGMs, reccestrikecomplexesandcommandposts)mustbelocated.Thisdemandsaveryhighlevelofskillfrom
reconnaissancetroopsatalllevels.
3002. Principles. GENFORCEreconnaissancetroopsaretaughtthat,tobeuseful,
reconnaissancedatamusthavethefollowingcharacteristics. Itmustbe:
a. Relevant. Reconnaissanceactivityisstrictlysubordinatedtotherequire-mentsofthe commanderand the fulfilmentofhismission. Reconnais-
sanceeffortswillbeconcentratedonthemainaxisandkeyobjectives.
b. Continuous. Commandersatalllevelsareresponsiblefororganizingcon-tinuousreconnaissance. Reconnaissanceisanallarmsmissionandnotsolelythebusinessofspecialistreconnaissancetroops.
c. Aggressive.Acquiringintelligenceabouttheenemywillalwaysbeastrug-
gleandthereconnaissancebattlemustbewagedaggressivelywhetherin
attackordefence. Reconnaissancetroopsmustdisplayinitiative,skillandresourcefulnesstodefeattheenemyscountermeasures.
d. Timely. Thebestintelligenceisuselessifitisnotreceivedintime. When
settingareconnaissancemissionacommanderwillalsosetthetimebywhichherequirestheinformationtobeprovided.
e. Secure. GENFORCEcommandersareawarethattheenemymaylearna
greatdealabouttheirintentionsbydiscoveringtheirreconnaissanceplan.
Theyacceptthatitisimpossibletohidecompletelythefactthatreconnais-
sanceisbeingconducted,butwillstrivetoconcealthescale,missions,targetsandnatureoftheirreconnaissanceeffortand,inparticular,willaim
nottorevealwheretheyareconcentratingtheirmainstrength. Itwillnotbe
easytoreconciletheneedsforspeedandsecrecy.
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f. Accurate. GENFORCEenthusiasmfordeceptionbreedsafearofbeing
deceived.Aneffortwillalwaysbemadetoconfirminformationfromone
sourcebyanother.
3003. Zones of Reconnaissance Responsibility.Eachheadquarters,fromdivi-
siontobattalion,hasazoneofreconnaissanceresponsibility,subdividedintothreeparts(seeDiagram31). Thepartsaredefinedasfollows:
a. Detailed Reconnaissance Zone. ThedepthofthiszoneisdeterminedbytheeffectiverangebeyondtheFEBAoftheweaponsystemscommanded
bytheheadquarters.
b. General Reconnaissance Zone. Withinthiszonetheheadquartersmustbeabletomonitorenemyactivitysufficientlytoensureitsownplansare
notdisturbedbyunexpectedenemymoves.
c. Rear Reconnaissance Zone. Withinitsownrearareatheheadquarters
mustbeable tomonitorenemyactivity,particularly theuseofchemicalstrikesorairmobileforces.
d. Thewidthof the zoneofdetailedreconnaissanceresponsibilitybroadly
equatestotheheadquartersfrontageofoperations,butinthegeneralre-
connaissancezonemayoverlapintothezonesofflankingelements. Foraregimentthezoneofreconnaissanceresponsibilitymaycover500600sq
kmandforadivisionitcanreach34,000sqkm.
SeeDiagram31
SECTION 2 - RESOURCES
3004. ThereconnaissanceresourcesorganictoaGENFORCEdivisionaresumma-
rizedbelowbut,giventhesizeof theareaofresponsibilityand the levelof
detailrequiredcommandersarealwayslikelytofeelashortageofassets.
3005. Command and Control of Reconnaissance. Indivisional and regimental
headquarterstheChiefofReconnaissanceisresponsiblefororganizingre-
connaissanceinaccordancewiththecommander'splan. Inbattalionsthechiefofstaffisresponsible.Divisionsandregimentsorganizespecificradionetstolinkreconnaissancesubunitswiththeheadquarters. Battalionsmaymonitor
thisnet,especiallywhenoperatingindependentlyofthemainbody(egasa
forwarddetachment)butdonotusuallymaintainaspecificreconnaissance
net. Everylevelofcommand isexpectedtomaintaina reconnaissancere-
servetobetaskedformissionswhichariseduringthecourseofoperations.
3006. Higher Formation Assets.Muchofadivisionsintelligencewillcomefrom
higherformations. TheGENFORCEair forcedeploysaconsiderablerecon-
naissancecapabilityusingthefullrangeofmodernsensors,andlongrangedronesarealsoinservice. Whilesortieswillbetaskedatarmyandfrontlevel,
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reportsmaygodirecttoconcerneddivisions,aswillrelevantIFREPs. Higher
formationsalsodeployaformidableSIGINTandSPFeffort,theproductsof
whichwillgotodivisionsasnecessary.
3007. Divisional assets. Themainassetisthedivisionalreconnaissancebattalion:
a. ThebattalionhastwoBMPreconnaissancecompaniesequippedwithBMPandBRM1Kwhichmayeitheroperateasacompany,formingaRecon-naissanceDetachment(RD),orbedeployedasplatoonsizedReconnais-sancePatrols(RPs). The companies will operate across thedivisional
frontageandtoadepthofupto50kms. Ifnecessarytheymayberein-
forcedbyadditionalRDsorRPsformedfrommotorrifleortanksubunits.
b. Thelongrange reconnaissancecompanyisinsertedingreaterdepth,up
to100kms. ThecompanyoperatesinteamsknownasReconnaissance
Groups(RG)whichmaybeinsertedbytheirorganicBTR,BRDMandUAZ-469 vehiclesorbyhelicopterorparachute. The companymayalsobe
usedtoprovideanairassaultcapabilityagainsthighvalueenemytargetssuchasheadquarters.
c. Theradioandradarintercept/DFcompanycaninterceptHFgroundwave
outtoabout80kms,andVHFto3080kms(low/highpoweranddepend-
ingonterrainmasking). VHFdirection finding(DF)maysometimesbegoodenoughtotargetMRLs. Itiscertainlygoodenoughtodirectother
reconnaissancemeanstorefinetheintelligencegained,ortodirectraidsorperhapsairstrikes.TURNSERIESBBVsarebeingreplacedbyMTLBu
SIGINTvariants,improvingthecompanyscapabilitiesandsurvivabilityintheforwardarea.
d. Forwardandraidingdetachmentswillprovidevaluableintelligence,evenif
thatisnottheirprimaryfunction. Unitsincontactmustalsokeepdivisional
HQuptodatewithinformationabouttheenemy.Formationsnaturallyalso
exchangeintelligencewithflankingheadquarters.
3008. Regimental Assets. Tankandmotorrifleregimentshaveareconnaissance
company. ItincludesaBMPplatoonwith2BMPvehiclesandaBRM1Kas
headquartersvehicleandaBRDMplatoonwith4BRDM2.Thecompanycandeploy2RPstocovertheregimentsfrontwhichusuallyoperate10to15kmsinfrontof theunitsFEBA. Itappearsnottobegeneralpracticetomixthe
companysBMPandBRDMvehicleswithinpatrols.AdditionalRPsmaybe
formedfrommotorrifleortanksubunits.
3009. Battalion Assets.Motorriflebattalionshaveanorganicreconnaissancepla-toonwithaBRM1KandeitherBMPorBTRvehicles. Inadditionordinary
motorrifleplatoonsmaybeusedasRPsorcombatreconnaissancepatrols
(CRPs). Battalionshaveshortrangeportablegroundradarscapableofidenti-
fyingvehiclemovementtosupplementtheirOPsinstaticphasesofbattle. Atankbattalionhasmuchmorelimitedrecceresourcesandmustuseordinary
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tankplatoonstoprovidereconnaissancepatrols,unlessamotorriflesubunit
hasbeensubordinatedtoit. Battalionsmaydeployavarietyof reconnais-
sancegroupings.Ascoutvehicleontheaxisofadvanceistheabsolutemini-mum,andasthebattalionapproachestheenemyaForwardPatrol(FP)will
usuallyformpartofthemarchsecuritygrouping. Inmobilebattles,forexam-
pleafterbreakingthroughtheenemystacticaldefenceandinmeetingbattles,andwhenthebattalionhasanindependentmission,suchasaforwarddetach-
ment,aCRPwillbeformed. Whentheterrainortacticalsituationdemandittwooreventhreepatrolsmaybeformedfromonebattalion.
3010. Other Reconnaissance Assets.
a. Air.Divisionshaveneitherdronesnortheirownhelicopterassets.How-everhelicoptersarefrequentlyusedbyengineerandchemicaltroopsto
assessroutesandobstaclesandareasofcontaminationbehindtheFLOT.
Thisisnotgenerallydonewithinenemyairspace,thoughopportunitiesmayariseinahighlyfluidbattle.Attackhelicopterswill,ofcourse,submitnor-
malIFREPsduringtheirmissions.
b. Engineer.Itiscommonpracticetoreinforcereconnaissancepatrolswith
anengineerelement. Thedivisionalengineerbattalionhasareconnais-
sanceplatoonandtheregimentsengineercompanycanprovidescoutsas
well. Theengineerelementmayconsistofasectionwithitsownvehicle(BTR,BRDMorIRM)oracoupleofsapperstravellinginoneofthepatrols
vehicles. InadditionEngineerReconnaissancePatrols(ERPs)maybe
despatchedtoexaminemajorobstaclesorimportantroutesindetail. In
defence,orbeforeanattack fromapositionofclosecontact,engineerobservationpostswillbeestablished.
c. NBC.Allsubunitsareresponsibleforcontinuousmonitoringoftheirown
NBCstate. Inadditiondivisionalandregimentalchemicaldefencesub-
unitscanprovidespecialist reconnaissanceteams. Theymayoperate
fromtheirownvehicles(BRDMRKhorRKhM)ortravelinapatrolsvehi-cles. Any reconnaissancepatrolmayhaveachemical reconnaissance
elementattachedandadditionalchemicalpatrolswillbedispersedthrough
unitcolumnstoevaluateenemystrikes.
d. Artillery.ArtillerytargetsacrossthewholedivisionszoneofadvanceareacquiredbyamixofmobileOPswithACRVsandPRP3/4(SMALLFRED)
deployedbyartillerybattalionsandelementsofthedivisionalartilleryob-
servationbatterywithsoundandflashranginglines,surveillanceradars
(withBIGFREDhavingapossiblemortarandhowitzerlocatingcapability)
andradarDFequipments(POLEDISH).
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SECTION 3 - MISSIONS AND METHODS
3011. Missions. Reconnaissanceelementsaretaskedtoacquirethefollowingtypesofdata:
a. Enemy Forces. Thecomposition,subordination,capabilities,locationandintentionsoftheenemyarenaturallyvitalinformationtothecommander.Thelocationandreadinessstateofprecisionandchemicalweaponsaregiventhehighestpriority.Headquarters,communicationcentres,defendedareasandartillerypositionsarealways important. At the lowertactical
levels detailsof the enemys fire andobstacleplansmustbeknownin
detail. Divisionalandregimentalcommanderswillalsowishtolocateen-
emyreservesandsecondechelons.Everyeffortwillbemadetodiscoverboundariesandopenflanksastheseareseenasweakspotsespecially
suitableforattack.
b. Topographical.MuchofGENFORCEsreconnaissanceeffortisdevotedto
findinggoodroutesformanoeuvreunits,especiallythroughdifficultterrainthattheenemymightconsiderimpassable. Lateralroutes,theidentifica-
tionofvitalgroundandofpossiblesitesforGENFORCEcommunications
equipmentandforassemblyareas&carealsoimportant.Timelyinforma-
tiononthenatureandextentofobstaclesisseentobeessentialifthe
advanceistocontinuewithoutpauses;especiallyimportantinthiscontextarepossiblesitesforcrossingwaterobstaclesandassessmentsofenemy
demolitionsandminefields.
c. Contamination. Areasofcontamination,resultingfrombothenemyandGENFORCEstrikes,havetobedetermined,togetherwiththedegreeofhazardinvolvedincrossingthem.
3012. Groupings.AgraspoftheterminologyusedtodescribeGENFORCErecon-
naissancegroupingsisvitaltoanunderstandingoftheirtactics.Thefollowing
termsareused:
a. A Reconnaissance Detachment (RD)maybeformedfroma reconnais-
sance,motorrifleortankcompanyoramotorrifleortankbattalion. Itis
usedduringmobilephasesofoperationsonthemainaxis,ortoreconnoi-trekeyobjectivesindepth. CompanysizedRDsaremostcommon. Bat-talionbasedRDsareusedtoreconnoitreobjectiveswhichitmaybead-
vantageous toseizeand hold for some time, for exampleamountain
defileorarivercrossing. RDssendouttheirownreconnaissancepatrols
andthusenabletheseplatoonsizedelementstooperatemoreindepend-
ently of the main forceand for longer periods. RDsareoftenallarmsgroupings;typicalRDsmightbecomposedofamotorriflecompanywitha
tankplatoon,engineerandchemicalreconnaissancesectionsora tankcompanywithamotorrifleplatoon,engineerand chemical reconnais-
sancesections.Anartillerybattery,airdefenceelementand(formotorrifletroops)antitankelementmightalsobeadded. Helicoptersmayalsobeassigned to cooperatewith theRD. SometimesanRDmaybe tasked
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duringamissiontoseizeakeyobjectivewhichhasbeenfoundtobelightly
defended,forexampleaweaklyheldrivercrossing. (SeeDiagram32for
thetacticalgroupingofan(RD).
SeeDiagram32
b. A Reconnaissance Patrol (RP)isaplatoonsizedelementwhichmaybereinforcedbyengineerandNBCreconnaissanceteams. RPsaresentoutbyreccebattalionsandcompanies,byRDsandbyleadingtankandmotorriflebattalions.AnRDalwayshasatleastone,andusuallytwo,RPsoper-
atinginitssector,atdistancesofupto10kmsfromtheparentbody. One
RPwillalwaysbeforwardontheRDsaxis. RPsareusuallysentoutby
motorrifleandtankbattalionswithindependentmissions(suchasforwardorraidingdetachments)orfirstechelonbattalionsinopenphasesofbattle.
InsuchcasestheRPmayoperateupto15kmsfromthebattalion. (See
Diagram33).
SeeDiagram33
c. A Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP)isaplatoonsizedelementsent
outbyandreportingtoatankorMRbattalionheadquarters. Againitmay
includeengineerorNBCreconnaissancetroops. CRPsarenotdeployed
byallbattalions;secondechelonbattalionsnormallyhavenorequirementforaCRP,unlesstaskedwithanantiairlandingmission. CRPsareoften
usedbyadvancedguardsandbattalionswithindependentmissionsand
firstechelonbattalionsareexpectedtodeployCRPsoncetheyhavepen-
etratedthefirstcrustofenemydefences. CRPsusedinclosecontactwiththeenemynormallyoperatenodeeperthantheirparentbattalioncansup-portthembyfire,butoutofdirectcontactCRPsmaybeseparatedbyupto
10kmfromthemainbodyofthebattalion.
d. A Forward Patrol (FP)isamarchsecurityelementsentoutbyaforward
picquetorbythevanguarditself. Itisnotprimarilyareconnaissanceele-mentbutwhilecarryingoutitsprimarymissionwillalsobeabletoprovide
intelligenceontheenemyfor theheadquarterswhichdeployedit. (See
Chapter2,para2012g. formoredetails).
e. A Patrol Section (Patrol Vehicle, Patrol Tank) is,asthenameimplies,asinglevehicle(ormotorriflesectioninoperationsonfoot)withareconnais-
sancemission. PatrolSectionsmaybetheonlyreconnaissanceelement
whentheriskofmeetingtheenemyislow.Theymayalsobesenttocover
theflanksorrearofasubunit.Allformsofpatrol(RP,CRPorFP)deploy
aPatrolSection(Vehicleor Tank) to thelimitofvisibilityaheadof them(4001200metres). (SeeDiagram33).
f. A Reconnaissance Group (RG)operatesindependentlyintheenemysrear
area. Withinadivisionit isalmostcertaintocomefromthe longrangereconnaissancecompany. RGsareusuallysectionstrengthandarepar-ticularlytargetedonPGMs,headquartersandreserves.
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3013. Tactics. Themostcommonmethodsofconductingreconnaissanceinclude
observation,raids,ambushesandpatrols.
a. Observation. Observationis,ofcourse,themostcommonreconnaissance
techniqueinallformsofbattle.Observationpostsassuch,however,aremostcommonlydeployedinmorestaticphasesofthebattle,suchasin
defenceandwhenpreparinganattackincontact.Theymaybereinforcedwithengineerandchemicalreconnaissancetroopsand,atnightorinbadweather,areoftensupplementedbylisteningposts.
b. Raids. Raidsareoftenusedwhen indirectcontactwith theenemyto
snatchprisoners,documentsorequipmentandmaybemountedbyeitherspecialistrecceormotorrifletroops. Specialistreccetroopsmayalsobe
taskedwithraidsdeeperintotheenemyrear,againstcommandpostsor
highprioritytargetssuchasPGMsystems.
c. Ambushes. Thevalueofreconnaissanceambushesisincreasinglystressed.Subunitsmaybespecificallytaskedtolayanambushtocaptureprison-
ers,documents&c.Alternativelyapatrolmaysetanambushduringits
operationsintheenemydepthwhenthiscomplieswiththeCommander's
intentions.
d. Patrols. Inopen,mobileformsofwarfarewhichGENFORCEexpectsto
dominatethefuturebattlefieldOPs,raidsandambusheswillbelesssignifi-
cantsourcesofintelligencethanpatrolssentoutbymarchingunits. The
typesofpatrolwhichGENFORCEoperateshavebeendescribedinthepreviousparagraph.Patroltechniquesaredescribedbelow.
3014. Patrol Techniques. Whateverthedesignationofthepatrol,itsmodusoperandi
isfairly standardized. Diagram33 summarizes thesetechniques. Onthe
moveapatrolusuallysendsapatrolvehicleforwardtothelimitofvisibilityand
supportbyfire.Obviouslythisdistanceisdeterminedbyterrain, timeofday,weatherandsoon,but itisusuallyexpressedas4001200metres. When
enemycontactisnotexpectedallthepatrolvehiclesmaybemovingatthe
sametime,butwhencontactisimminentthepatrolmovesmorecircumspectly
betweengoodoverwatchpositions. Thepatrolcommanderwillobservefromsuchapointwhilethepatrolvehiclemovescovertlytothenextposition. Inopenterrain,wherecovertmovementisdifficult,thepatrolvehiclemakesits
boundatbestspeed,followedbytherestofthepatrolonceitissafelyinplace.
3015. Whenenemycontactisnotanticipated thepatrolmovesalongitsassigned
axisatitsbestspeed. Whencontactispossiblethepatrolneverusestheaxisitself,butrathermovesbyboundsbetweenpositionsfromwhichitcanobserve
theaxis,makingeveryefforttoavoiddetection.Iftheenemyisdiscoveredinanunexpectedposition,thepatrolcommandermustimmediatelyreportthe
locationtohisownheadquarters. Ifapatrolobservesenemyreconnaissanceormarchsecurityelementsitstaskistoavoidcontactandpressontolocate
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themainforceasrapidlyaspossible. Intheeventofasurpriseencounterwith
asmallenemyforce,andwhenevasionisimpossible,thepatrolisexpectedto
actdecisivelytodestroytheenemy,captureprisonersifpossibleandcontinueitsmission. Onthewholereccepatrolstrytoavoidcombat,whichisalmost
boundtocompromisetheirmission.
3016. Thecombinationofthesereconnaissancegroupingsandtechniquesusedwithinadivisionalareawillvarywithcircumstances. Thefollowingparagraphsout-linetheorganizationofreconnaissanceduringdifferentphasesofbattle.
SeeDiagram34
3017. Reconnaissance In The Advance. (SeeDiagram34). WhenadvancingtocontactandpenetratinganenemycoveringforceaGENFORCEdivisionwill
cover its frontwith patrols,eachwitha23 kmsector. ARDwillprobably
advanceonthemainaxis;theremainderofthefrontwillbecoveredbyRPs.Thisscreenwillavoidcombatasfaraspossibleandpressontocontactthe
mainbodyoftheenemyforce. InameetingbattlesomepatrolswillthenstayincontactwiththeleadingenemyunitsastheyapproachtheGENFORCE
formationorunit,movingbackonaparallelroute. Otherpatrolswillattemptto
penetratetheenemymainbody.Iftheenemyispreparingtoholdamain
defensivepositionsomepatrolswillestablishalineofstaticobservationposts
andreportonthenatureofthedefences. Otherpatrolswillseekgapsoropenflanksandpressonintothedepthoftheposition. SomeRPswillbedeployed
ontheflanksofthedivision.Thenumberofsuchpatrolswillbedeterminedbytheclosenessoffriendlyformations. RGsmaybeinsertedbyvehicleorairat
leasttothedepthofthedivisionsmission.
3018. FirstechelonregimentswilldeploytheirownRPsbehindthedivisionalpatrols.
Theadvancedguardbattalionsoftheseleadingregimentsandanyforward
detachmentswilldeployCRPsandpossiblytheirownRPs. Battalionsinthe
mainbodyoffirstechelonregimentsmaydeployFPs,butwillnotemployCRPs
unlesstheyareabouttocontacttheenemy.Withinsecondechelonregiments,onlypatrolvehiclesarelikelytobeused.
3019. Reconnaissance In The Breakthrough Battle. (SeeDiagram35). Muchof
thedivisionsintelligencewillbeacquiredbyobservationpostsinthefrontline.Radars,DFandartillery reconnaissanceassetswillbefullydeployed. Thedivisionreconnaissancebattalionandfirstechelonregimentsreconnaissance
companieswilltrytofindgapsthroughwhichRPsmaybeinsertedtoidentify
targetsindepth. Snatchraidsmaybemountedbyreconnaissanceormotor
rifleunitstoidentifyopposingunits.Aconsiderableproportionofthedivisional
reconnaissanceassaultcompanyshouldbynowhavebeeninsertedintothedepthoftheenemydefences.
SeeDiagram35
3020. Reconnaissance By Battle. Ifthesesourcesfailtoprovidethedetailedtar-geting informationrequiredtoensurethesuccessofthefireplanitmaybe
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necessarytoemployreconnaissancebybattle. Thisison