afghanistan’s bounty: from the farm to the arm

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FROMTHEFARMTOTHEARMBOUNTY

SPECIAL FEATURE

TRACKING THE GLOBAL NETWORK OF AN OPIATE ECONOMY

AFGHANISTAN’S

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In London, Reza Etesamifard anIranian migrant, injects heroin across the

river from the Houses of Parliament

JUNE 2011 | www.executive-magazine.com32

s the needle pierces Reza Ete-samifard’s skin in centralLondon, the heroin enteringhis blood stream is on the fi-nal stage of a journey thatmost likely originated inAfghanistan. The drug in hisveins has traveled more than

6,000 kilometers across battlefields, mountainranges, deserts, rivers and seas, changing handsdozens of times. Along the way it has crossed atleast 10 borders, eluding customs and law en-forcement agencies at every stage.

Only moments after Reza removes the sy-ringe, the heroin starts to kick in and he beginsto scratch his face irritably, a common symptomamong heroin users. As chance would have it,Reza is a refugee from Iran, one of the manycountries that the heroin he uses most likelypassed through en route to Britain. Unlike thevast majority of the United Kingdom’s users, hispath to addiction began by smoking opiumwhen still in Iran.

Reza would be the first to attest to how ad-dictive heroin is and confesses that he will doanything to get his next fix and avoid the with-

S P E C I A L F E AT U R E

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drawal pains, which he describes as being like“ants crawling around your skeleton.”

Although the 10 Britishpounds [$16.20] that he paysfor 0.2 grams of heroin on adaily basis may not seem likemuch, he is just one of morethan 11 million heroin addictsacross the world whose com-bined payments make the hero-in trade a $55 billion industry. Though highlyprofitable to some, the trade is lethal to oth-ers, with the United Nations Office on Drugs

An afghan poppy farmer walks through his field in southernHelmand Province. The harvest season is from late March throughearly May. These flowers are nearly ready for harvest, when their

bulbs will be scored with a sharp knife, causing a sticky sap tocollect on the bulb’s surface, which is then harvested

and Crime (UNODC) estimating that as manyas 100,000 people die from the use of Afghan

opiates every year. Some onemillion people worldwide areinvolved in heroin traffickingalone, while as many as threemillion Afghans play some partin the cultivation of poppyplants that yield the raw opiumfrom which heroin is made.

One of those poppy farmers is Wali Jon,who supplements subsistence farming withcash from poppy crops in order to help support

As many as three millionAfghans play some

part in the cultivationof poppy plants

Top: An addictprepares heroin forinjection by boiling itin water

Bottom: Addicts inKabul, prepare to“chase the dragon”,by inhaling thevaporised fumes fromheroin that has beenheated on tin foil


his wife and four children. Wali is from southHelmand Province, which alone produces halfof Afghanistan’s opium. If pricesare similar to last year he ex-pects to make about $250 fromtwo acres of poppy (8,093square meters), which he hopeswill yield four kilograms (kg) ofopium. Like many other farmersin the region he is fearful thatthe authorities will destroy hiscrop; when asked what he would do if they did,he to EXECUTIVE, “If somebody takes awayyour water on a hot day, what do you do?”

Reza and Wali are both tied to opiates —one through addiction and the other through hislivelihood — but the similarities end there. Rezaspends roughly as much on heroin every fort-night as Wali hopes to make from his wholecrop in a year, despite the fact that Wali will pro-

duce enough opium in that year to supply Rezawith heroin for eight years (given that it takes

seven kg of opium to produceone kg of heroin). In short, Rezapays for each hit approximately200 times what Wali was paid toproduce its raw ingredients(based on last year’s prices).

As with any commodity,prices go up and down at bothends but no matter how high

they rise, the Afghan farmers only ever see atiny proportion of the whole profit.

The many roads from AfghanistanSo how does Wali’s opium reach Reza as

heroin? Who actually makes the profits andhow did Afghanistan become the world’s lead-ing heroin producer? Although the herointrade is illegal, the answers lie in conventional


Reza pays for each hitapproximately 200 times

what Wali was paid toproduce its raw ingredients

A double amputee,who lost his legs toRussian landminesduring the Sovietwar, fresh from‘chasing thedragon’ — inhalingopiate vapors — inKabul’s back streets


Although the so-called “Golden Crescent” covers parts of Iran and Pakistan, virtually all of the opium production in this area now takes place in Afghanistan– half of it in Helmand Province alone, which by no coincidence is also the heartland of the Taliban insurgency. The “Golden Crescent” was named after the“Golden Triangle”, consisting of Burma, Laos and Thailand, which had previously been the largest opium producing area until the 1970s, when it was overtakenby Pakistan and subsequently Afghanistan. Most heroin processing occurs inside Afghanistan, but there is also significant processing along the Pakistani border.Once processed, most of the heroin transits through Pakistan, Iran and Turkey in bulk, where seizures of hundreds of kilograms (kg) at a time are not uncom-mon. Beyond this point, shipments are usually broken into much smaller packages with the average size of European heroin seizures in the tens of kg.

It is worth noting that seizures in Pakistan, Iran and Turkey alone accounted for 62 percent of global seizures in 2008 and almost half the Europeanseizures in the same year were made by just three countries, namely the United Kingdom (18 percent), Italy (14 percent) and Bulgaria (13 percent). The com-bined volume of heroin estimated to enter Iran is some 140 tons, of which 14 tons is consumed in country and 32 tons is seized, giving Iran the best intercep-tion record at some 22 percent of its overall flow, compared to 18 percent in Pakistan and 10 percent in Turkey.

Iran’s seizure efforts are not surprising given the scale of its heroin problem, with more than 400,000 addicts. Taking into account Iran’s international isola-tion, common ground in the fight against drugs serves as one of the few political bridges left to the West. As Jean Luc Lamahieu, the United Nations Office onDrugs and Crime’s representative in Afghanistan, explained: “It’s an area of rapprochement. Starting with counter narcotics issues we have to get the confidenceto discuss other issues of importance.” Although the map show flows away from Afghnaistan, some of the organized crime groups operating the routes also sendprecursor chemicals required for heroin processing and other drugs in the opposite direction into Turkey and beyond. There are several salient points on the map,most notably the price of heroin in Bahrain, by far the highest at $240,000 per kg (wholesale and retail), which can be partly attributed to the fact that Bahrainis a small island with few users and a strict state security apparatus that still has the death penalty for heroin traffickers.

Heroin trade routesFrom Afghanistan to Europe

Source: EXECUTIVE research, UNODC, SOCA

been identified by law enforcement agencies andbodies such as the UNODC and the EuropeanMonitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Assis-

tance (EMCDDA).Essentially heroin and opium

take one of three routes out ofAfghanistan; either the “North-ern Route” through central Asiaand into Russia, the “SouthernRoute” through Pakistan, or the“Balkan Route” via Iran andthen onwards through Turkey

and the Balkans to Western Europe. Much ofthe drugs that transit through Pakistan subse-quently also pass onto the Balkan Route.



economics that link supply to demand andmore importantly, reward to risk.

Unlike most other illegal recreational drugs,which are by and large produced and consumedwithin the same region, the vast majority ofopium production is restricted to only three ar-eas on Earth: Afghanistan, South East Asia(mainly Myanmar) and Latin America (Mexicoand Columbia). Since 2005, Afghanistan hascontrolled some 90 percent of the global total,at about 8,000 tons of raw opium per-year. Italso accounts for 85 percent of the world’sheroin, most of which is processed here or inneighboring Pakistan and Iran.

The net result of this concentration of pro-duction is a worldwide narcotics trafficking net-work emanating from Afghanistan, the likes ofwhich can only be rivaled, in both the reach andvalue, by Colombian cocaine trafficking.Afghan production single-handedly suppliesheroin to Western Europe and Russia, by far theworld’s two biggest markets, which togethermake up 47 percent of global heroin demand,and although Myanmar and Latin America arethe major suppliers for China andthe United States, respectively,small proportions of Afghanheroin also feed these markets.

By the very nature of illicitdrug trafficking there is no wayof saying with certainty howheroin has been smuggled fromone place to another. The routesare fluid and change frequently, with traffickerstaking advantage of loopholes as they appear.There are, however, established flows that have

Afghan productionsingle-handedly suppliesheroin to Western Europe

and Russia, by far theworld’s two biggest markets

Global opium production

Source: UNODC


The UNODC estimates that some 25 percentof all Afghan heroin (95 tons) leaves via theNorthern Route, 40 percent (150 tons) via Pak-istan and around 35 percent (130 tons) via Iran.From the combined Iranian and Pakistani routesaround 37 percent of Afghanistan’s total heroinproduction continues onto Europe via theBalkan Route (see map page 37).

The vast majority of the 95 tons of herointhat leaves via the Northern Route is consumedwithin Russia, while the Southern Route’s sup-ply satisfies Pakistan’s demand (19 tons) andthat of other destinations, including Iran (35tons), South East Asia (25 tons), Africa (20 tons)and the United Arab Emirates (11 tons), the

latter of which is almost exclusively for onwardshipment, mostly to China and South Africa. Ofthe Balkan Route heroin, after accounting forseizures and consumption in the countries enroute, some 88 tons make it to the high-valuesales in Europe, where four countries alone arethought to account for more than half the mar-ket, namely the UK (19 tons), Italy (18 tons),France (10 tons) and Germany (7 tons).

The Balkan Route carries the largest volumethe greatest distance and to the highest valuemarket. Heroin was smuggled along the BalkanRoute well before Afghanistan became the chiefproducer, during the period when it originatedfrom Pakistan and Burma.

US marines assist inthe eradication ofillegal drugs inHelmand Province, inthis case marijuana,but they also providesecurity for poppyeradication, which hasbecome a populartarget for insurgents

1. In the backstreets of west Kabul, twoaddicts ‘chase the dragon’ under a scarfused to trap heroin vapors2. In order to get their next hit, many ofKabul’s addicts make what little they canby begging3. An impromptu musical performance byone of the patients at a residential heroinrehabilitation clinic in Kabul4. A patient in withdrawal at a residentialheroin rehabilitation clinic in Kabul5. Members of the Afghan National Armyin Khost province, eastern Afghanistan,who made no secret of the fact they werehigh, probably having smoked hashish.Opium and hashish use are a significantproblem within the Afghan security forces,compounding the fight againstillegal drugs

Photographs and text by

Adam Pletts

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Laurent Lamiel, an analyst at the EMCDDA,described the route as “the illegal version of thesilk road.”

“Heroin was travelling on [the BalkanRoute] even when the Iron Curtain was in place,which shows how strong this route is and howdeveloped, protected and historical the net-works are,” he said.

Control of the routes“The thing that is very important to under-

stand is that the big players on the Balkan Routeare Turkish criminals and traffickers,” Lamielexplained. “[They] are able to concentrate alarge amount of heroin produced in Afghanistaninto their hands and act as wholesalers to theBritish market as well as other European mar-kets.” The UK’s Serious Organized CrimeAgency (SOCA) backs this assertion, believingthat some 140 Turkish networks control theheroin supply to Europe.

That Turkish criminal groups have takendominance over other criminal organizationsalong the route is hardly surprising, not only be-cause the route traverses some 1,600 kilometersof Turkish territory but also because Turkeycontrols the Bosphorus Straits, the most directaccess point to Europe from South Asia withouthaving to pass north of the Caspian and Black

Seas. Turkey also shares a long land border withIran, where heroin can be bought at prices sim-ilar to those in Afghanistan, and there are ex-tended communities of Turks in London andelsewhere in Europe, particularly Germany, whocan facilitate connections and legitimize travel.In a similar way, Pakistani groups that smuggledirect from Pakistan to the UK, by air or sea, ex-ploit their connections within the UK and theirclose proximity to the Afghan market, cuttingout middlemen to maximize profits on a routewhere they can buy at around $3,000 per kg andsell at $30,000 per kg; that route only accountsfor small volumes of traffic, however, at mostsome five tons between ships and flights fromPakistan to the UK or the Netherlands.

Although Turkish and Pakistani groupslargely control the Balkan and direct air and searoutes, respectively, individuals and groups frommany other countries are also involved, as thearrest figures for heroin traffickers attest. In theNetherlands, for example, which could be con-sidered the end point of the Balkan Route and isa key hub for onwards shipment to various Eu-ropean countries including the UK, Dutch citi-zens account for 20 percent of arrests, followedby Nigerians (19 percent), Turkish (16 percent),British (5 percent), Brazilians (5 percent) andAmericans (5 percent).

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Members of theAfghan National Policeinspect a seizure ofammunition and some2 kilograms of heroin(in the plastic bag)found in a farmcompound in southernHelmand


Similarly, at several points along the routeethnic groups that straddle national borders, orhave large diaspora populations, facilitate traf-ficking, examples being Kurds along the Iran-Turkey border, Aziris along the Iran-Azerbaijanborder across which a sub-route branches northfrom Iran into Russia or Europe, and Albanianswho are particularly visible in the trade inGreece, Italy and Switzerland.

The economics of the tradeEven though Afghanistan has a

near monopoly on global opiumand heroin production, the econom-ics of the trade conspire such thatthe country makes far from the li-on’s share of revenues. At retailprices the total world opiate value isapproximately $65 billion — $55billion for heroin and $10 billionfor opium. The market with the highest value,Western Europe, accounts for approximately$20 billion of the global total, followed by theRussian federation ($13 billion), China ($9 bil-lion) and the US ($8 billion). At best Afghanistanmakes a small fraction of the profits. In 2009 thecombined total paid to Afghan farmers was anestimated $400 million. When opium traffickingand opium processing into heroin are factored

in, the value of the opium/heroin industry to theAfghan economy was some $2.4 billion, which isroughly 3.5 percent of the global market value.Antonio Maria Costa, the executive director ofthe UNODC, quoted Afghan President HamidKarzai as telling him: “We take 3 percent of therevenue and 100 percent of the blame.”

Nonetheless, to a poor country likeAfghanistan this revenue is still substantial. To

put it in context, recent projec-tions for Afghan government ex-penditure this year estimate it at$4.5 billion, of which the govern-ment can only raise $1.9 billion it-self, the remainder being providedby international donors. Afghanheroin revenues are one-sevenththe size of the nation’s licit grossdomestic product, which accord-ing to the International Monetary

Fund was $16.6 billion in 2010, although eventhis figure is inflated by international donormoney, with an estimated $5 billion in annualaid fuelling the economy.

In general, the further away from Afghanistan,the higher the potential profits from heroin. Alongthe Balkan route, the wholesale heroin price variesfrom just $2,400 per kg in Afghanistan, to$11,000 per kg at the approximate mid-point in

Afghanistan has a nearmonopoly on globalopium and heroin

production yet makesfar from the lion’sshare of revenues

A US marine stepsover bags of heroin,morphine and opiumcollected from seizuresin southern Helmand,which would be worthas much as$60 million at streetvalue in the west


Turkey, to $30,000 per kg in the UK (see mappage 37). Part of the explanation for this is that,in broad terms, the route travels up two gradients:firstly from less developed to more developedcountries, where higher prices can be charged, andsecondly from an area of abundance to one of rel-ative scarcity. There is also the fact that the furtherthe heroin travels, the more hands it passesthrough and the more costs are in-curred, which must be recouped inthe eventual sale price.

“Although the UK is the highestvalue market in Europe, with someof the highest street prices for heroinanywhere in the world, there is moremoney flowing into Afghanistanfrom opiates consumed in Iran thanthere is from the UK,” explained a SOCA finan-cial specialist who requested only to be identifiedas ‘Richard’ due to the sensitive nature of hiswork. To understand this, one must break down

the price and look at where the revenues fromstreet sales go.

At approximately $30,000 per kg the UK’swholesale heroin price is below the Europeanaverage of $36,000 per kg. This perhaps re-flects the fact that, barring Russia, the UK hasthe single highest consumption in Europe andthe pull of the market pushes the price down

even after factoring in the risk todealers, which is considerable giv-en that the UK makes among thehighest number of seizures in Eu-rope. However, the street value ofabout $80 per gram is above theEuropean weighted average of $77per gram, so that UK dealers are ina privileged position of buying at

lower-than-average prices and selling at above-average prices.

The majority of the street value stays in theUK, with criminals making $50,000 for every

The UK is the highestvalue market in Europe,with some of the higheststreet prices for heroinanywhere in the world

The well-irrigated banks ofthe River Helmand, wheremuch of Afghanistan’spoppy cultivation takesplace, seen from a USmarines’ osprey aircraft


kg of heroin sales, albeit most of these sales atstreet level will be in very small quantities, typ-ically of 0.2 grams. Most of the wholesale im-port price of the heroin has to be paid down thechain of traffickers to pay costs incurred on theway, with any significant profits being retainedwell before Afghanistan by the controllingcriminal groups.

This model is widely applicable to the high-value European markets, meaning the largestrevenues from heroin sales are retained withinthe countries of final sale, even if they may bedistributed between large numbers of dealers.Richard makes the point that, “When you goback to the cultivators and the processors inAfghanistan the price has nothing to do with thedestination market, so they’re getting as muchfor each jirib [approximately 2,000 square me-ters] of land that they’ve cultivated whether theopium is smoked in Pakistan or the UK.”

Like so many things in life it’s a question ofwho you know.

“In reality if [Afghan traders] could get[heroin] to the UK themselves they would,”Richard said. “They’re entrepreneurs to a de-gree, but they can only sell it to the people theyknow who will buy it from them and they tendto be across the first border in Iran or Pakistan.”

Mechanisms of trade in AfghanistanIt is widely understood that the majority of

Afghan opium farmers make very modest prof-its and are simply trying to make a living. Infact, many are stuck in an economic trap notdissimilar to that of coffee plantation laborers invarious parts of the world who, after workinghard in the fields, only receive a fraction of theprofits that up-market Western coffee shopsreap. The difference is that poppy crops are ille-gal and there will likely never be a “fair herointrade” campaign. To this end the UNODC, to-gether with most organizations, do not general-ly consider that the line of criminality has beencrossed until the opium or heroin reaches the

Looking beyond the main trade routes that run through Iran and Turkey, the rest of the Middle East has inits own right been a player in the global heroin market. During Lebanon’s lawless civil war years, poppies weregrown extensively in the Bekaa Valley. According to Laurent Lamiel, analyst at the European Monitoring Centrefor Drugs and Drug Assistance (EMCDDA), Beirut has a long history as a drug port. “Beirut was a big connec-tion during the French era, when poppies were grown in Turkey and then the morphine or heroin was made inLebanon for export to France via Marseilles, in a Turkish-French criminal drugs venture,” he said.

But Lebanon, and also Egypt, have reported poppy eradication in recent years. Lebanon’s eradication fellfrom 0.67 square kilometers in 2004 to 0.08 square kilometers in 2007; Egypt has seen eradication increasefrom 0.15 square kilometers in 2002 to 0.98 square kilometers in 2007.

To this day the United Arab Emirates forms an important part of the heroin trade, not so much as a signifi-cant market destination but as a staging post for onwards shipment to other locations and a money launderingcenter. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime estimates that 11 tons of heroin pass through Dubai eachyear; by comparison this is more than half as much as enters the United Kingdom, Europe’s single largest mar-ket apart from Russia.

The trade has also become more sophisticated in its money laundering capabilities, as journalist andAfghanistan expert Ahmed Rashid told EXECUTIVE. “One of the benefits that Al Qaeda has offered the Taliban isto provide links that they didn’t have before. Of course drugs were going off to the Gulf well before 9/11 —they had planeloads of drugs landing at Sharjah, and this was all being facilitated by [Osama] bin Laden atthat point. I’m sure that whole route and source of funding and sales has expanded a lot.”

A financial specialist with the UK’s Serious Organized Crime Agency said that Dubai is crucial to the laun-dering process.

“Wherever you see flows of licit money you’ll see flows of illicit money tagged onto it,” he explained.“Dubai has a large money exchange market so it’s got the ability to act as a focal point for laundering of allkinds… There is a concentration on working with the Dubai authorities, the central bank and the police, tomake it as hard a market for [traffickers] to penetrate as possible but it does come up in a significant numberof our operations and other people’s around the world.”

The Middle East plays its part


hands of substantial traders. Nonetheless,Afghan farmers stand the risk of having theircrops eradicated by the Afghan National Securi-ty Forces (ANSF) and are often suspected ofhaving links with the Taliban who, although notnecessarily in control of the opium trade, do fa-cilitate and profit from it.

Often Afghan farmers have turned to opiumas a last resort in areas where the governmentprovides very few services or even basic security.In such places, the Taliban or other anti-govern-ment elements can be an attractive source ofsupport, especially in relation to poppy cultiva-tion. At a grass roots level they provide poppyseeds and small loans to farmers to prepare for

the harvest, as well as organizing collection ofthe opium. It’s in the Taliban’s interest to do sobecause the farmers in turn pay a tax on theiropium, known as ushr, direct to the Taliban,which is usually levied at 10 percent.

Further down the chain, the Taliban aremore closely involved with traders and labprocessors, who pay for protection, facilitationand, where necessary, logistical assistance inheroin processing, storage and packaging. Theyalso charge a zakat tax on traders, generally set at2.5 percent. Wherever they can, the Taliban levythese taxes on all goods, but with illegal cropsthey generally take payment in kind, knowingthey can get higher prices beyond Afghanistan’sborders. However, contrary to what is often por-trayed, the model is more one of the Taliban tak-ing advantage of pre-existing trade than their hav-ing direct control of it.

The Taliban are known to apply pressure onfarmers to grow opium but their decisions to doso are affected by a broad range of factors. Al-though it is true that opium usually fetches high-er prices than alternative cash crops, other practi-cal considerations must be taken into account. Inthe first place, with other crops farmers wouldhave to get their produce to market by their ownmeans, which can be difficult given the state of in-

An Afghan poppyfarmer sports a goldwatch. Although mostfarmers make amodest living, the landowning khans canmake considerablesums from their poppyharvests

Nowadays a large portion of the processing of opium into heroin takes place inAfghanistan, which is a fairly simple operation that can be carried out in nothingmore than a ramshackle shed. As a first step the raw opium sap that has been col-lected directly from the poppy flower is heated with lime in boiling water for severalhours, resulting in a frothy white foam on the surface, which is then collected. Thisis dried in the sun, producing a clay-like substance known as morphine base, thenboiled with acetic anhydride and concentrated through a series of four reactions, thelast of which involves ether and hydrochloric acid and can cause powerful explosionswhen not properly handled.

Adding value, Afghan style


frastructure in Helmand, or indeed most loca-tions in Afghanistan. Secondly, raw opium acts asa form of currency, which is particularly impor-tant in under-developed rural areas where nobanking facilities exist.

Some sort of transferable savings are especial-ly valued during times of war and uncertainty, asJean Luc Lemahieu, the UNODC’s representativein Afghanistan, explained: “Many people havebeen displaced, but if they are able to take theirraw opium with them and their opium seeds, theyhave an income which will stay good for 10years. Try to do the same with pomegranates,which only keep well for three weeks, after whichthey’re rotten in your pockets.”

To give some idea of the increase in earningsthat opium can bring to farmers, according tothe UNODC the average income of non-opiumgrowing farmers in 2006 was $2,370, while thatof opium growing farmers was $5,055. Thatsaid, the reality on the ground in Helmand andother poppy producing locations changes radi-cally from one place to another. According toRichard of SOCA, “It’s very much a moveablefeast. Village by village, prices change [and] in-tentions change, as does the role of authority andwhether the local tribal leader or key person issympathetic to the government or the Taliban.”

Price fluctuations and their causesThis year the average raw opium price in

Afghanistan is estimated to be much higher thanlast — some $280 per kg compared to just $80per kg in 2010. A very small portion of this risecan be attributed to successful eradication,which reduces supply and hence pushes upprices. However, there are two much more sig-nificant factors in the price increase: the first be-ing that widespread disease triggered a blight inthe crops last year and tightened supply, secondand more importantly, is speculation.

“The military operations mean that a lot offarmers are very uncertain about their futureprospects and so they start to stockpile opiumbecause in times of war it’s one of the best com-modities to have,” said Lemahieu,pointing out the similarities to theclassic economic model of the‘Dutch tulips’.

Essentially the opium farmers areasking the same questions that anyAfghan observer asks: “Is the troopsurge going to work?” The farmer,however, must think beyond this toask: “If the surge does work, will I be able to plantopium in the future and should I stockpile some ofwhat I have?”

As Lemahieu notes, “It’s Wall Street all overagain — except in Helmand and Kandahar —and these are not high paid bonuses for bank ex-

ecutives, these are poor farmersthinking ahead and saying ‘in thisuncertainty, I’m not selling. I wantto sit on it and see what happensto the price’.” The recent price ris-es are substantial enough so as tohave provided many farmers whohad previously abandoned poppycrops with the extra incentive to

renew cultivation. The UNODC estimates thatof the 20 provinces (from a total of 34) inAfghanistan that were for all intents and

Global heroin consumption

Source: UNODC

Division of revenue from 1kg of heroin(Based on UK street price of $80,000 per kg)

Source: Executive research, UNODC, SOCA

Raw opium acts as aform of currency in

under-developed ruralareas where no

banking facilities exist



purposes ‘opium free’ by 2010, thanks to eradi-cation efforts, at least four will see renewed cul-tivation in 2011.

Generally speaking, as the volume of opiumproduction has increased over the years, from just1,000 tons in 1980 to a peak of 9,000 tons in2007, prices have decreased, but previous largeprice fluctuations at the supply side are not un-heard of. Following the Taliban’s ban on opiumcultivation in early 2001 prices rose from less than$50 per kg in July 2000 to nearly $700 per kg inAugust 2001. The ban was strictly enforced, mak-ing it probably the quickest and most effective, al-

beit short lived, drugs eradica-tion program in history. TheTaliban partly put the ban inplace to appease Western gov-ernments in the hope that theywould recognize the regime, notthen aware that the movewould be rendered redundantby the events of September2001, which led to Western mil-

itary intervention, the removal of the Talibanregime and a resumption of opium production.

Although the supply side prices may be proneto fluctuations given shortages in production,this is no different from any other commodity.The farm gate price of opium, however, is so lowcompared to the eventual market prices of theheroin that these fluctuations have negligible ef-fect on heroin markets in distant locations,where the bulk of the price is driven by high risksto the dealers, combined with covering the costsof transport. Furthermore, the local mid-leveltraders take up some of the slack in the market,as Lemahieu explained: “[They] act as a pricecushion in between the demand and the produc-tion so that some of their inflated profits fromthe past have gone down over the last monthsbecause they are paying for the extra cost on theproduction side while higher prices are not real-ly reflected in the consumer side.”

Afghan production of opium has become sohigh that if it were all converted into heroin itwould outstrip global demand three times over.From what has become such a strong and steadysupply, European prices have gradually dropped,with the average heroin wholesale price fallingfrom $100,000 per kg in 1990 to just $36,000per kg in 2011. It suits the wholesale suppliers —in other words the larger organizing criminalgroups — to keep the prices steady.

“They’re no different to other commoditybrokers, which is essentially what they are, interms of the ways they absorb price fluctuationsand try to manipulate the market and the sup-ply,” said Steve Coates, deputy director of SOCA.

Becoming the sultan of smackIt is only since the early 1990s that

Afghanistan became the world’s dominant opiumand heroin supplier (see figure page 36) and, ef-fectively, the current war in Afghanistan has onlyconsolidated its position. There had always beensome opium production in Afghanistan but itwasn’t until the Soviet war through the 1980s

Afghan production of opiumhas become so great that if itwere all converted into heroinit would outstrip globaldemand three times over


that it became a major supplier. Previously, Pak-istan had been the world leader in opium andheroin production, but as the Afghan mujahedinwho were fighting the Russians began to use opi-um to fund their resistance, Afghanistan’s annualproduction started to increase.

As weapons were smuggled intoAfghanistan, largely by Pakistan’s Inter ServicesIntelligence (ISI) and partly funded by the Amer-ican Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), opiumwould be brought back and refined to heroin inPakistan. In the early 1990s Pakistan clampeddown on its production, virtually ending Pak-istani poppy cultivation, but elements within the

ISI continued to turn a blind eye to Afghan opi-um traders using the preexisting routes and pro-cessing infrastructure within Pakistan.

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, afierce civil war was fought between differentAfghan factions, all of whom used opium rev-enues to some extent to fund their war effort.The Taliban, who had conquered all but thefurthest northern reaches of Afghanistan by2001, were no different in their use of opium asfuel for war, a fact that continues to this day.

What has changed is that opium productionhas roughly doubled since 2005 and has becomeincreasingly concentrated in Afghanistan’s em-

A father leads his son bya chain after reportinghim to coalition forces,following his threat tobecome a suicidebomber. Heroin andopium revenues partlyfund the Taliban, allow-ing them to recruit in-surgents and pay forweapons. The familiesof suicide bombers inKabul have been knownto receive as much as$20,000 by way ofcompensation for theirloved one’s death


battled southern areas, while it was not until thelast decade that the majority of heroin began tobe processed inside Afghanistan.

An end in sightThe extent to which the Taliban profit from

the opium and heroin trade is often misunder-stood. Of the $2.4 billion value of the opiatestrade that is retained in Afghanistan, the UN-ODC estimates the Taliban’s total share wouldbe around $125 million, with other less conser-vative estimates suggesting it to be as high as$400 million. Even the higher figure gives theTaliban only a 0.6 percent share of the total rev-enue generated from foreign sales of Afghanopiates. As a portion of Afghanistan’s share ofthe global spoils, it is only 17 percent. Nonethe-less, in a country where entry-level policesalaries are less than $100 per month, this al-lows the Taliban to compete with, and often outpay, state security forces’ salaries.

Successfully ending the opium trade wouldcut off a significant source of insurgent funding,but eradication is a double-edged sword thatcan sometimes act to alienate Afghan farmers,pushing them closer to the insurgents. In thepast this has led US forces to back away fromtackling the drugs problem, which they haven’t

Until Marjah, insouthern Helmand,was taken by coalitionforces in 2009, itscentral bazaar was akey trading area forraw opium


considered part of their main mission. Thanksto a change of policy in recent years, a slow de-cline in cultivation is beginning to take place.

“The real change [regarding opium] cameabout two years ago when the US military decid-ed to go after the drugs, which they had not beendoing for nine years,” said journalist andAfghanistan expert Ahmed Rashid. “If [former USSecretary of Defense Donald] Rums-feld had not had that policy for somany years there wouldn’t havebeen such an awful situation.”

This year was the first that theUS marines had a permanent pres-ence in Marjah, previously one ofthe centers of the opium trade inHelmand. Although the farmers had been warnedthat eradication would go ahead many still plant-ed poppy. As the harvest period approached, gov-ernment tractors began to plow up the fields withmarines providing security. Usually the harvest isthe last quiet period before the Taliban’s yearlyspring offensive begins, but this year in Marjah

hostilities got off to an early start. No sooner hadthe tractors been sent into the fields than the driv-ers found themselves under fire from angry locals,some of whom had just crossed the line fromfarmer to insurgent. In a classic Catch-22, theeradication that is necessary to end the insurgencyhas also fueled it.

Until stability returns to Afghanistan it willcontinue supplying the worldwith the deadly by-product of itswars. It is estimated that there aremore than 10,000 deaths per yearfrom heroin overdoses in NATOcountries, more than four timesthe total number of NATO troopsthat have been killed in

Afghanistan since hostilities began in 2001. AsRashid sees it, “You cannot eradicate drugs un-til the war comes to an end. That’s the bottomline. When that happens, you can talk about anationwide policy but you can’t really effective-ly tackle the problem until the war is over.”

The problem, however, is not simply to de-feat the insurgents but to extend the govern-ment’s reach throughout Afghanistan. In manyparts of Southern Helmand the first real evi-dence that the farmers had seen of any govern-ment action was the eradication of their pre-cious poppy crops, before alternatives were putin place or any significant services provided. AsWali Jon, the poppy farmer, insists, “If the gov-ernment provided any services or alternatives, Iwouldn’t grow poppy.”

That certainly doesn’t seem like a reality inthe near future and in the distant streets of Lon-don, Reza Etesamifard, has little concern thatsupply will dry up. As he strolls comfortablyaround his adopted city he points out the manylocations where it’s easy to score heroin, from So-ho back alleys to upper class suburbs.

“In every part of London there are dealers;it’s an epidemic and nobody is dealing with it,”he said. “Plenty of users hold onto a job — itsonly the ones who have lost everything thatyou notice.”

Reza is frank about his addiction; he knowshe’s lost everything. Although young, bright andenergetic, he is homeless, penniless and withouta friend he can trust, willingly confiding that theaddicts he spends his time with would put hero-in before their friendship, no matter the cost.The only thing forming any structure to his lifeis the acquisition of his next pain-staving, eu-phoria-delivering fix.

“If the governmentprovided any services

or alternatives, Iwouldn’t grow poppy”

A blood covered syringe fresh from beingused to inject heroin in a London park

afghanistan’s bounty: from the farm to the arm

Documents

grams of heroin

heroin addictsacross

heroin traffickingalone

addictive heroin

poppy crops

poppy farmers

cultivationof poppy

fromtwo acres of poppy