afghan transnational networks: looking beyond repatriation · mohajer(in) refugee(s), migrant(s)...

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Synthesis Paper Series

August 2006

Afghan Transnational

Looking Beyond

Alessandro Monsutti

in collaboration withMohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, the Collective for Social Science Research,

Diana Glazebrook, Gulbadan Habibi, Gholamreza Jamshidiha,Hossein Mahmoudian, Rasoul Sadeghi and Elca Stigter

The project is funded by theEuropean Commission (EC), theUnited Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR) andStichting Vluchteling.

Networks:

Repatriation

About the Author

Alessandro Monsutti currently teaches social anthropology, Middle Eastern studies andmethods in social sciences at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, Geneva. Heis also a research associate at the Refugee Studies Centre of the University of Oxford andgrantee of the MacArthur Foundation, Chicago. He is the author of War and Migration: SocialNetworks and Economic Strategies of the Hazaras of Afghanistan (Routledge, 2005). Havingcarried out several field studies in and around Afghanistan since 1993, he is project adviserto AREU’s transnational networks research.

About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research organisationthat conducts action-oriented research and learning that informs and influences policy andpractice. AREU also actively promotes a culture of research and learning by strengtheninganalytical capacity in Afghanistan and by creating opportunities for analysis and debate.Fundamental to AREU’s vision is that its work should improve Afghan lives.

AREU was established by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has a boardof directors with representation from donors, UN and multilateral organisations agenciesand non-governmental organisations.

Current funding for AREU is provided by the European Commission (EC), the United NationsAssistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and the governments of the United Kingdom,Canada, Switzerland and Sweden. Funding for this research was provided by the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Commission (EC) and StichtingVluchteling.

Acknowledgements

This study is the result of a joint effort by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit(AREU), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Commission(EC), and two partner research institutions, the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Universityof Tehran and the Karachi-based Collective for Social Science Research.

This report is based on the results of field studies carried out by Gulbadan Habibi and ElcaStigter in Afghanistan, by Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, Diana Glazebrook, GholamrezaJamshidiha, Hossein Mahmoudian and Rasoul Sadeghi in Iran, and by the Collective for SocialScience Research in Pakistan. It makes extensive use of material in previous reports fromthis research project, which was not collected by the author. It is the result of a fruitfulcollaboration and must be considered as a collective work.

Thanks go to AREU staff, particularly Paul Fishstein, Paula Kantor, Meredith Lewis and AftabOpel, for their support and insightful comments, and to Salvatore Lombardo and EwenMacLeod (UNHCR), who provided invaluable feedback as well as personal encouragement.Many thanks to the Afghan interviewers, translators and drivers, whose efforts were invaluablein collecting the data for this project.

Last but not least, a word of thanks to all respondents: women and men, children and adults,who generously offered their hospitality and time to tell their stories. Let this work be anhomage to the people of Afghanistan, who have shown exemplary courage and dynamismin spite of life’s most challenging conditions.

Table of ContentsExecutive Summary ................................................................................... 1

1.1 Research context, definitions and methodology ............................... 31.2 Political context ...................................................................... 61.3 Multidirectional population movements

2. Research Sites

2.1 Pakistan .............................................................................. 9Historical and political context .................................................. 9Afghans in Karachi .................................................................. 10Afghans in Peshawar ................................................................ 11Afghans in Quetta .................................................................. 12

2.2 Iran ..................................................................................... 14Historical and political context ..................................................... 14Afghans in Tehran ................................................................... 16Afghans in Mashhad ................................................................... 17Afghans in Zahedan .................................................................... 19

2.3 Afghanistan ............................................................................. 19Returnees in urban Herat ............................................................ 19Returnees in rural Herat ............................................................. 20Returnees in urban Faryab ........................................................... 21Returnees in rural Faryab ............................................................ 21Returnees in Jalalabad ............................................................... 23

3. The Causes and Motivations of Migration ................................................... 24

3.1 War and migration .................................................................... 243.2 Mixed motivations ................................................................... 243.3 Population growth .................................................................. 263.4 Drought .................................................................................. 273.5 Uneven economic development .................................................... 273.6 Limited rule of law .................................................................. 283.7 Migration as a way of life ........................................................... 28

4. The Experience of Migration and Decisions about Return ................................ 30

4.1 Border crossings, smuggling networks and deportation ....................... 304.2 Remittances and the circulation of commodities4.3 Attitudes towards repatriation .................................................... 354.4 Transnational networks as key livelihood strategies ............................ 38

5. Conclusion and Key Policy Implications .................................................... 41

References ............................................................................................... 44

.......................................................................................... 3

................................................ 7

............................................................................. 9

............................... 32

1. Introduction

GlossaryAfghani (or Afs) Afghan currency

ansar helper (originally used to describe the inhabitants of Medina whowelcomed the Prophet Mohammad and his companions)

hawala money transfer

hawaladar person who undertakes the money transfer action

hijra migration (originally used to describe the migration of the ProphetMohammad and his companions from Mecca to Medina)

jihad holy war

kargar worker

mehmanshahr refugee camp (in Iran)

mohajer(in) refugee(s), migrant(s) (originally used to describe the companions ofthe Prophet Mohammad who fled with him to Medina)

mujahid(in) holy warrior(s) fighting in jihad

panahandegan refugees (in Iran)

sarparast caretaker, representative

sayed descendants of the Prophet Mohammad through his daughter Fatima

toman Iranian currency; US$1 = approx. 887.5 Toman

wasita patronage, connections

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Uniti


Acronyms

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit ii

Afghan Transnational Networks: Looking Beyond Repatriation

AREU

BAFIA Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs (Iran)

IDP internally displaced person

IOM

MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

NARA

NWFP North West Frontier Province

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNODC United Nations Office of Drugs Control

WFP

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

International Organization for Migration

National Aliens’ Registration Agency (Pakistan)

World Food Programme

This paper synthesises results that haveemerged from AREU’s three-country researchproject on Afghan transnational networksand sustainable reintegration. It draws onthe findings of nine case studies — three inAfghanistan (Herat, Faryab and Jalalabad),three in Pakistan (Karachi, Peshawar andQuetta) and three in Iran (Tehran, Mashhadand Zahedan)— conducted by AREU and itsresearch partners in 2004–05 whichdemonstrate that migration and the formationof transnational networks are key livelihoodstrategies for the people of Afghanistan.1

The study also highlights that migration is anancient phenomenon in the region — it is away of life and not only a response to warand poverty. This must be kept in mind whengovernments raise the need to stem its flow,recognising that more realistic policyprescriptions will involve managing populationmovements to the benefit of all involved.

Other important findings relate to thecomplexity of motivations behind migrationand the decision to remain in host countries.Afghans have continued to make constantjourneys back and forth as part of what is adynamic process that leads to complex socialadjustments. It is a cultural model, not asimple act of flight followed by integrationor assimilation in the host country, or returnto the country of origin. In fact, repatriationin the Afghan context does not imply the endof migratory movements, especially in morerecent years. The probability of furtherdepartures, at least of some householdmembers, is high due to the use of migration

Executive Summary

as a strategy to secure livelihoods. Factorswhich induce asylum-seeking are notnecessarily the same as those whichperpetuate migration and discourage returnto Afghanistan. Migrants have woven networksof contacts that make it easier to movebetween different countries. Addressing theoriginal causes of flight does not constitutea guarantee to bring current migratorymovements to an end, as the factorssustaining transnational movements of Afghanshave come to form more or less stablesystems.

The push factors in both Iran and Pakistan(such as more restrictive policies towardsAfghans, police harassment, withdrawal ofwelfare facilities and closure of schools)appear less crucial in further migration choicesby Afghans than the pull factors of economicopportunities and services available in thosecountries. Most Afghan refugees who leftduring the 1980s originated from rural areas,and while in Iran and Pakistan, many wentthrough a process of urbanisation. In manycases they lost their agricultural knowledgeand while acquiring other skills they developednew expectations of the level and types ofservices necessary for a good quality of life.For many of them, return to their village oforigin is not an option. There is also evidencethat attitude towards repatriation differsbetween genders and generations: womenand youth appear less willing to return. Thisis related to perceptions among women thatsecurity is not good in Afghanistan and thattheir spatial mobility would be limited, while

1 Case studies by: Collective for Social Science Research (CSSR), 2005, Afghans in Karachi: Migration, Settlement and SocialNetworks, Kabul: AREU; CSSR, 2005a, Afghans in Peshawar: Migration, Settlement and Social Networks, Kabul: AREU; CSSR,2005b, Afghans in Quetta: Settlements, Livelihoods, Support Networks and Cross-Border Linkages, Kabul: AREU; Universityof Tehran, 2005a, Return to Afghanistan? A Study of Afghans Living in Tehran; University of Tehran, 2005b, Return toAfghanistan? A Study of Afghans Living in Mashhad, Kabul: AREU; University of Tehran, 2005c, Return to Afghanistan? AStudy of Afghans Living in Zahedan, Kabul: AREU, G. Habibi, 2006, , Kabul: AREU; E. Stigter, 2004, The Kandahar Bus Standin Kabul: An Assessment of Travel and Labour Migration to Pakistan and Iran, Kabul: AREU (unpublished); E. Stigter, 2005a,Transnational Netwoks and Migration from Herat to Iran, Kabul: AREU; E. Stigter, 2005b, Transnational Netwoks andMigration from Faryab to Iran, Kabul: AREU. Also see: E. Stigter and A. Monsutti, 2005, Transnational Networks: Recognisinga Regional Reality, Kabul: AREU; I. Christoplos, 2004, Out of Step? Agricultural Policy and Afghan Livelihoods, Kabul: AREU;J. Grace and A. Pain, 2004, Rethinking Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistan. Kabul: AREU; A. Pain and S. Lautze 2002, AddressingLivelihoods in Afghanistan, Kabul: AREU.

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for youth it relates to access to education,employment as well as diversions.

Kinship is an important source of support toAfghans in exile as well as returnees, but itdoes not account for all ties of solidarity. Tospread risk, Afghans have developeddiversification strategies in their types ofcooperation, social relations, spatial resi-dence, income-generating activities, and —very often — political affiliations.

In formulating appropriate responses toAfghan population movements, the govern-ments of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan,along with the international assistancecommunity, should work towards:

• Establishing bilateral labour migrationframeworks that provide a clear legalidentity and rights for Afghan labourersin Iran and Pakistan.

• Acknowledging the reality that not allAfghans will choose to return, and makingappropriate legal arrangements for thesecases within their host countries........

• Implementing economic developmentstrategies and policies which will createquality employment in urban and ruralareas of Afghanistan.

• Supporting the Afghan government toinvest in health and other social services...

• Improving security, and the perceptionof security, in Afghanistan.

• Creating a formal but flexible creditsystem in Afghanistan to contribute tothe reconstruction of the Afghan economy.

• Increasing knowledge and awareness ofthe contribution, both in labour andotherwise, of Afghans to the Iranian andPakistani economies.

• Improving access to passports and visasfor Afghans.

• Continuing to uphold the refugee statusand protection of the most vulnerableAfghans abroad.

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit2


1.1 Research context,definitions and

Afghans have found refuge in Pakistan andIran since the Soviet occupation ofAfghanistan in the late 1970s. While initiallywelcomed in both countries under a notionalbanner of Muslim solidarity, the largenumbers of Afghans arriving through themany years of conflict, competition for jobsand housing, and the extended length ofresidence of “refugees” have contributed toa significantly cooler welcome for Afghansin both Pakistan and Iran. The establishmentof the interim government in Afghanistan in2002 further shifted the stance of both

countries towards full repatriation of Afghans,and led to the actual and threatened closureof refugee camps in Pakistan.

It is in the context of such politically chargedrhetoric about the status of Afghans inneighbouring countries that AREU conducteda study on Afghan transnational networksand their prospects for sustainable reintegra-tion. Its aim was to inform ongoing tripartitedialogue between Afghanistan, UNHCR, Iranand Pakistan, by demonstrating the past andcontinuing importance of transnationalmigratory networks between the countriesto sustainable livelihood strategies. This paperdraws on the findings of nine case studies –three in Afghanistan (Herat, Faryab, Jalal-abad), three in Pakistan (Karachi, Peshawarand Quetta) and three in Iran (Tehran,Mashhad and Zahedan)– conducted by AREUin 2004–05 which illustrate both theimportance of migration for the people ofAfghanistan, and that full repatriation is nota feasible, durable solution in the short tomedium term. The results point to actionsthat could be taken to reduce the costs,financial and otherwise, to Afghans movingback and forth to Iran and Pakistan, while atthe same time ensuring individual and statesecurity on both sides of the border.

Migration is often explained in terms of violentconflict or the attraction of labour marketsin rich countries or urban centres. Althoughmany other factors may be at play, such asnatural disasters (earthquakes, floods orprolonged drought) or particular developmentprojects which force people from their land(dam construction, land reform orprogrammes to settle nomadic populations),it is political or economic causes which areusually used to distinguish betweeninvoluntary and voluntary migrationrespectively. It is becoming increasingly clearthat this primarily causal framework cannotdo justice to the complexity of today’s globalmigration flows, including those involvingAfghans.

1. Introduction

Pakistan asks Afghans to go backor shift to camp

Xinhua 05/08/2006

ISLAMABAD – Pakistan has urged Afghansliving near the capital in Rawalpindi cityto go back or move to a refugee camp inanother city by the end of May, the UnitedNations refugee agency said Monday.

“They have an option of assisted repatriationby the UN refugee agency, or relocation toKot Chandna refugee camp in Mianwali, Punjabprovince,” a United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR) statement said.

According to the authorities, a total of7,335 Afghans in Rawalpindi will be affectedby this movement between May 15 and 30.

No reason is given for Afghans expulsionbut Pakistan has cited security concernsfor such decisions in the past.

Repatriating Afghans who had been verifiedby UNHCR were eligible to receive a travelgrant of between four U.S. dollars and 37dollars each, depending on the distance totheir destination inside Afghanistan, plusa grant of 12 dollars each to easereintegration once they were home, it said.

The decision to expel refugees from Rawalpindicame after Pakistan struck a deal with theUNHCR to issue identity cards to Afghanrefugees, who were allowed to stay inPakistan for three years.

Source: Moby Capital Updates, 9 May 2006



methodology

Afghans are found in a range of places,regionally and further abroad, formingnetworks, which are connected through thecontinuous circulation of people, money,goods and information. War and povertyhave compelled them to leave theircountry, but in response many have goneon to develop socioeconomic strategiesbased on high levels of circulation. They arenot resourceless people, and have maintainedstrong social relationships in spite of dispersion.

Neither the definition of “refugee” in officialinternational texts nor the various typologiesof migration offer a satisfactory analyticalframework to explain and understand themigratory strategies developed by thepopulation of Afghanistan. While many Afghanrefugees fled the direct effects of war, theirmovements have occurred within the contextof a longstanding tradition of migration andthe pre-existence of transnationalconnections.

Massive population movements, together withthe dramatic situation in Afghanistan from1978–2001, should not mean that refugeesare seen as passive victims, outside anyhistorical, political or sociocultural context.Despite harsh living conditions, many Afghanshave derived benefits from dispersion bydiversifying their socioeconomic activities.They have responded with courage andingenuity to their changed circumstances,and have proven their resilience.2

The view of migratory phenomena asmovements from one social environment toanother, involving a process of gradual yetprofound adaptation to a new way of life,remains dependent upon a unilinear modelin which migrants eventually lose contactwith their place of origin. This view does notprovide for an understanding of howmigrants maintain an active involvementin several places. In contrast, recognising

the coexistence of different sets of values amongmigrants and the broadening of their culturalrepertoire allows migration to be seen as amore complex process in which individualsmay become fully fledged social players in anumber of different places.

Box 1. Social networks

“Social networks” may be considered as systemsof relations. They are generally not limited to asingle territory and they are not based exclusivelyon kinship, ethnicity or residence. Links betweentwo distant persons may be intense, while certainrelations with close neighbours may be slack.Networks are a criss-crossing of the social relationspotentially or actually mobilised in particularsituations, rather than an integrated communitywith precise spatial and social boundaries.

2 Both P. Marsden (1992, “Afghan in Pakistan: Why rations decline”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 5[3–4]:289–99) and R. Colville(1998, “Afghan refugees: Is international support draining away after two decades in exile?” Refuge, 17[4]:6–11) stress thiscapacity of many refugees to become independent of humanitarian aid.

Box 2. Livelihoods

“Livelihoods” is used to mean the capabilities,assets (both material and social resources) andactivities used as a means of living – linked tosurvival and future wellbeing. A livelihood issustainable when it can cope with and recoverfrom stresses and shocks, and when it allowsmaintenance or enhancement of capabilities andassets, both now and in the future, while notundermining the natural resource base. Afghanhouseholds use a combination of strategies toachieve sustainability in their livelihoods:

• accumulation strategies to increase incomeflows and assets;

• adaptive strategies to spread risk bydiversifying income sources or adjustinglivelihood;

• coping strategies to minimise the impact ofshocks by seeking alternative sources of incomeor by altering the balance of existing assets;a n d

• survival strategies, which have the effect ofdepleting essential household assets andpossibly undermining the future viability ofthe household (Pain and Lautze, 2002).

Sources: R. Chambers, 1988, Vulnerability, Coping and Policy(editorial introduction), IDS Bulletin 20(2): p. 1–7; R. Chambersand G. R. Conway (1992), Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: PracticalConcepts for the 21st Century, Brighton: IDS, p. 296.



A study focusing on transnational networksis a fruitful approach because it takes accountof the rich diversity of migrant situationsoutside the limited framework of nation-states. It recognises the fact that migrantsretain links with their country of origin; itconcerns itself not only with adaptationprocesses and the forging of new identitiesbut also, and above all, with the socialrelations that migrants develop. This goesbeyond the notion that migration is a singleevent involving relocation.

In order to explore personal and familymigratory histories, livelihood strategies,social networks and attitudes towardsrepatriation, the main research methods usedby the three teams in Afghanistan, Iran andPakistan were: social mapping andobservation, structured questionnaires, semi-structured interviews and focus groups, in-depth interviews with key informants andlife histories. Interviews were held in informalgroups and with individuals. The reliabilityof the data was established by cross-checkingand comparing the collected data.

The main questions that guided the researchwere:

• What have been, and are, the causes andmodalities of Afghan individuals’ andfamilies’ migratory movements fromdifferent areas of Afghanistan to Iran andPakistan?

• What are the social strategies and intra-household decision-making patterns withregard to these migration processes?

• What ties of solidarity exist betweenpeople dispersed throughout Afghanistan,Pakistan and Iran? What kinds of socialrelations can Afghan refugees andmigrants rely upon for different types ofsupport?

• What transnational networks have beenestablished by Afghans between theircountry, Iran and Pakistan, in relation to

border crossing, remittances, debts andsavings? How do people move around? Towhom do they turn to assist in crossingborders, or obtaining a passport, a visaor a residence permit? How do they findemployment in Pakistan or in Iran? Howdo they send money or goods from onecountry to another? How do they keep intouch?

• What are the reasons for households toremain based in Pakistan or Iran?

• What livelihoods strategies do thesehouseholds have in their host country?

• What role does labour migration play inAfghan refugees’ and returnees’ livelihoodstrategies, particularly for returnees?How do livelihood strategies change uponreturn?

• How do Afghans in neighbouring countriessee their long-term future in relation toAfghanistan?

In analysing and synthesising the results ofthe nine case studies, an important objectiveof this report is to provide insight into theappropriateness, relevance and effectivenessof current policy towards people of Afghanorigin, in both Iran and in Pakistan.

1.2 Political context

From the time of the Communist coup d’etatof April 1978 and the Soviet invasion ofDecember 1979 until 2001, Afghanistan wastorn apart by war and civil strife. Thepopulation fled en masse to neighbouringcountries and further afield. This migrationcut across ethnic groups and socioeconomicclasses, and in 1990 Afghans constitutedamong the largest group of displaced personsin the world at 6.22 million, accounting fornearly half the total under the responsibilityof the United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR).3 Large numbers returnedafter the Soviet withdrawal (1989) and thecapture of Kabul by resistance forces (1992),but over the following years this trend was

3 Colville, 1998, p. 6.



reversed as more outward flows accompaniednew outbreaks of violence, especially in theKabul and Mazar-i-Sharif regions. In the 1980sthe majority of the refugees were from ruralareas, escaping from bombing and combat;in the 1990s they were often from urbancentres, first fleeing the mujahidininternecine fighting and later the policiesimplemented by the Taliban regime.

The attacks of September 2001 and thesubsequent intervention of an internationalcoalition force led by American forces—bringing about the fall of the Taliban in late2001 and the establishment of a governmentin Kabul backed by the internationalcommunity – set the stage for a new era ofhope for peace and prosperity in Afghanistan.Between 2002 and 2005, the countrywitnessed an unprecedented wave ofrepatriation: with the assistance of UNHCR,2.7 million refugees returned from Pakistanand more than 800,000 from Iran.

The voluntary repatriation operation thatfacilitated some of these movements tookplace within the framework of tripartiteagreements signed by UNHCR and thegovernments of Afghanistan, Pakistan andIran, which emphasise that voluntaryrepatriation is the key durable solution tothe refugee problem. During the same period(2002–05), spontaneous returns known toUNHCR amounted to almost 300,000 fromPakistan and about 570,000 from Iran.4 Thislevel of repatriation shows a degree ofconfidence in the renascent state, but alsoreflects expectations created by donorpledges to rebuild the country, and thedeterioration of living conditions in the placesof refuge. To some degree, it has beenaffected by both the Iranian and the Pakistaniauthorities increasingly implementing policiesto encourage Afghans to return home sincea government supported by the internationalcommunity has been established in Kabul.The political evolution of Afghanistan since

late 2001, as well as domestic concerns inPakistan and in Iran, have brought about achange in attitude towards people of Afghanorigin in neighbouring countries.

For the government of Afghanistan, suchlarge-scale and rapid return represents a voteof popular support, and for Pakistan and Iran,as well as the UNHCR and the donorcommunity, it represents a reduction in theburden of hosting and supporting a largerefugee populat ion. However thesustainability of such a large return move-ment has been questioned by many. Forinstance, Turton and Marsden’s5 assessmentof the repatriation operation, reintegrationopportunities, and the role and interests ofthe international community is that manyregistered returnees may be “recyclers” –repatriating to Afghanistan, receiving theassistance package and then going back toPakistan or Iran. Others may be seasonalmigrants with no intention of staying inAfghanistan on a long-term basis. Turton andMarsden also draw attention to the difficultiesreturnees face in resettling (particularlyduring the recent years of drought), leadingto a “backflow” of returnees to Iran andPakistan, and further movement withinAfghanistan.

1.3 Multidirectional populationmovements

Migratory movements follow a complexpattern within Afghanistan as well as to Iranand to Pakistan; they cannot be reduced tothe notion of a flight from danger followedyears later by a return to the place of origin.Return to Afghanistan does not necessarilymean the end of displacement, and it maybe followed by onward passage using a patternof multidirectional cross-border movements.Channels of pre-established transnationalnetworks exist between Afghanistan, Pakistanand Iran – the movement of individuals to

4 UNHCR, 2005, Afghan Repatriation Operation 2005, Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.5 Turton and Marsden, 2002.



seek work, to escape drought or to flee warhas been a common experience inAfghanistan.

Despite the high levels of return toAfghanistan, the number of Afghans still livingabroad is considerable. Individuals continueto move primarily in search of work to supporttheir families, and it seems unlikely that theback-and-forth movements will cease whilethey constitute a key livelihoods strategy.Many Afghans have been shifting from oneplace to the next for years – some neverreturning to their place of origin, others onlyon a temporary basis before deciding to returnto Iran, Pakistan or further afield. Youngmen, who have not necessarily travelledbefore, are still choosing to leave Afghanistan– suggesting that displacement is not onlycaused by conflict.

Migration to Afghanistan’s neighbouringcountries, and the very significant sum ofremittances sent home, can be seen not onlyas a response to war and insecurity, but alsoas an efficient livelihoods strategy for

households, and a key contribution to theeconomy of the country as a whole. Asustainable solution to the problem of largenumbers of Afghans still “in refuge” inneighbouring countries should not be equatedwith immobility – either assimilation in thehost country or the permanent return of allhousehold members to their place of origin.The pattern of multidirectional, cross-bordermovements and the ongoing, cyclical natureof migration blur the boundaries between“refugee” and “voluntary migrant”, and theconcept of a permanent resettlement orirreversible displacement does not take intoaccount this aspect of population movements.Through the continuous circulation of people,money and commodities, as well asinformation, Afghans who are spread acrossa range of locations remain linked. Thesetransnational networks, constituted by peopleinteracting and cooperating with each otheracross international frontiers, can make acrucial contribution to the reconstruction ofAfghanistan.

It is necessary to move ongoing tripartitediscussions beyond the three solutions usuallypromoted by UNHCR (voluntary repatriationto the country of origin, integration in thehost country or resettlement in a thirdcountry), which are based on the idea thatsolutions are found when people stop moving,and to imagine a more comprehensive solutionbased on a more nuanced understanding ofsocial practices. UNHCR is aware of thelimitations of its own approach in this (seebox 3). The objective of this report is toextend this awareness across all stakeholdersin order to make clear that migration is notonly a response to war, poverty, and to lackof rule of law. It is also a planned socialstrategy, a way of life through which Afghansspread risk and diversify their social, economicand political assets and thus is a key meansto support sustainable reintegration strategiesin the short and medium terms.

Box 3. Afghans living in countries of asylum aregrouped into four categories by the UNHCR:

• those wanting to return to Afghanistan whenconditions improve, who require proceduresfor voluntary return and to whom reintegrationprogrammes should be targeted;

• those in need of international protection andassistance who require a protection regimeand resettlement channels for individual cases;

• those who have entered temporarily foremployment reasons who need to be managedthrough the regularisation of temporarylabour; and

• those who had sought asylum and wereeconomically self-reliant with strong links totheir host country and wish to remain, whorequire advocacy in relation to an appropriatelegal status, as well as developmentcooperation for sectors and locations impactedon by their residence.

Source: UNCHR 2003, 2004



2.1 Pakistan

Historical and political context

Population movements between Afghanistanand Pakistan have a long history; they didnot originate with the war and political crisisin the late 1970s, even if their scale has beendramatically different in recent times. Armedconflict in Afghanistan since 1978 clearlyresulted in a spectacular increase in mobilitybetween both countries.

Pakistan, a country that has accommodatedsome of the largest numbers of refugees inthe world in the 1980s and early 1990s, hasnot signed the 1951 Convention Relating tothe Status of Refugees nor the 1967 Protocol(unlike Iran). Nevertheless, in 1981 thegovernment undertook the task of providingassistance to Afghan refugees under an

agreement with the United Nations, andrefugee camps (particularly in the North WestFrontier Province and Baluchistan) wereestablished under the supervision of theCommissionerate for Afghan Refugees.

There were several distinct waves of migrationfrom Afghanistan to Pakistan. The first andby far the largest was between 1979 and1989, during the period of Soviet occupationand Afghan resistance. Between 1989 and1992, after the Soviet withdrawal and thefall of Najibullah’s regime, a large numberof refugees returned to Afghanistan.Subsequent internecine fighting amongresistance factions between 1992 and 1996caused a new wave of departures, especiallyurban residents of Kabul. Although some ruralPashtuns who were reassured by theimprovement of security in many regionsrepatriated under the Taliban regime

2. Research Sites

Figure 1. Afghan refugee returns from Iran and Pakistan (assisted and spontaneous)

Source: UNHCR: Afghan Refugee Statistics (www.un.org.pk/unhcr/Afstats-stat.htm); andAfghan Repatriation Operation Weekly Statistics Report (May 2006).



(1996–2001), members of the urban middleclass and some ethnic minorities continuedto flee from Afghanistan in the late 1990s.The American-led intervention and the fallof the Taliban in late 2001 caused a dramaticrise in repatriation.

Reacting to the political evolution ofAfghanistan and domestic concerns aboutlevels of unemployment, Pakistani authoritieshave in recent years changed their attitudetowards people of Afghan origin. From aposition of openness and facilitation ofmigration and refugee movements (between1978 and 1989), in 1989–2001 Pakistani policymoved to a period of openness withoutfacilitation. After the fall of the Taliban inDecember 2001, Pakistan’s policy shiftedmarkedly, taking the position that all peopleof Afghan origin should be registered theneventually repatriated to Afghanistan.

A series of agencies have taken responsibilityfor the welfare of Afghans in Pakistan, andin doing this they have defined the refugeesas dependent. Nevertheless, Afghans haveproven themselves capable of mobilising theirown cultural resources to reorganise theirsocial existence and relations in asylum. InPakistan, they can be likened to threedifferent images of the refugee.6 The firstof these, to which the internationalcommunity primarily subscribes, draws onthe 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol,in which the refugee is defined in terms ofa victim of circumstances, in need ofassistance. Second, pashtunwali (the tribalcode of the Pashtuns) emphasises thetemporary asylum that armed and organisedgroups must be able to find among theirpeers. Third, people who flee an infidel-ruledhome country justify their decision on religiousgrounds with reference to the life ofMohammed, who fled from persecution inMecca and went to Medina. Afghans fleeing

communist rule in the late 1970s and 1980swere known as mohajerin (from hijra or“migration”), while Pakistanis welcomingAfghan refugees were known by the termansar (“helper”, originally an inhabitant ofMedina who welcomed the Prophet and hiscompanions). Both these terms also makereference to the notion of the mujahid orfighter who wages jihad.

Afghans in Karachi

Karachi is Pakistan’s largest metropolis, withan estimated population of over 12 million.In comparison to other places of Afghansettlement in Pakistan (such as the NorthWest Frontier Province or Baluchistan), thecity offers many opportunities to Afghanrefugees and migrants. It is the industrialand commercial hub of the national economyand offers a range of relatively remunerativejobs to new arrivals, especially inconstruction, wholesale and retail trade andtransport. Karachi is historically a city ofmigrants, and the Afghans who came herefound a place where the majority of theinhabitants were themselves either migrantsor first- or second-generation descendentsof migrants.

Karachi’s labour market tends to besegmented by social group. Afghans areinvolved in particular types of activities, afact which is neither atypical to the city norsurprising. They have become associated withlow-wage, unskilled labour in sectors suchas construction, market portering and wastecollection and recycling. In addition, Afghansare thought to have some involvement inillegal economic activities such as cross-border smuggling, trading in small arms anddealing in contraband substances such asmarijuana, opium and heroin.

The Pakistani government’s National Aliens’Registration Agency (NARA) estimates that

6 P. Centlivres, 1988, “Les trois pÙles de l’identitÈ Afghane au Pakistan”, L’Homme, 28(4):134–46. See also: I.W. Boesen,1986, “Honour in exile: continuity and change among Afghan refugees”, Folk, 28:109–24; and D.B. Edwards, 1986, “Marginalityand migration: cultural dimensions of the Afghan refugee problem”, International Migration Review, 20(2):313–25.



there are up to 500,000 people fromAfghanistan, predominantly ethnic Pashtuns,living in Karachi, most of whom arrived inthe 1980s. Afghans are concentrated in theoutskirts of the city along the mainKarachi–Hyderabad highway, near an oldervillage called Sohrab Goth. The land aroundSohrab Goth has been used by seasonalmigrants from northern Pakistan andAfghanistan setting up camp during the wintermonths since well before 1978.

Some refugees who were originally placed inrefugee camps made the decision to moveto Karachi while the UNHCR-assisted campswere still functioning; others left whenassistance dried up in the mid 1990s. Themain concern for both these groups was theneed to find employment. Some newcomersto Karachi did not come through UNHCRcamps at all – in particular the Ismailis.7

FOCUS, an Ismaili aid agency, has beeninstrumental in locating Ismaili Hazaras inKarachi. Groups of migrants were assembledin Kabul, and they would then be moved asa caravan to Peshawar and on to Karachi.Karachi was chosen because of the presenceof a significant Ismaili community. A senseof common belonging and solidarity emergedfrom the shared experience of losinghumanitarian assistance in the refugee camps— forging a new sense of community alongalternative lines that was no longer basedsolely on religion, ethnic identity, tribe orkinship.

People of Afghan origin in Karachi developeda wide range of livelihood strategies, fromsocially marginalised activities such as beggingand scavenging, to unskilled manual labour,skilled blue-collar work, owning and managingbusinesses and professional employment suchas teaching. Many Ismailis of Metroville hadaccess to blue-collar jobs in factories ownedby Pakistani Ismailis.

Afghans in Peshawar

Linking the Indian subcontinent with CentralAsia through the Khyber Pass, Peshawar is ahistorically important trade centre handlingexports of hand-woven carpets, precious andsemi-precious stones, wood furniture and dryfruits. It is close to the Afghan border anddirectly connected to Kabul by road. Beingon the frontline of Pakistan’s support for thejihad against the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan in 1978, the city evolved into amajor hub of the underground arms andnarcotics trade that flourished during thewar.

The movement of people across the borderat Peshawar has been a common phenomenonsince well before 1947, as the history of theIndian subcontinent attests. The commonlanguage and culture across thePakistani–Afghan border has been critical inattracting Afghans into Peshawar; for manyAfghans, particularly Pashtuns from theeastern provinces, the city provides a cultural,linguistic and social environment very similarto their own.

After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan,thousands of Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan,and by 1981, there were 292,917 refugeesrecorded there. A large number of Afghansremain unregistered, while the 2005 Censusof Afghans in Pakistan records the Afghanpresence as 3.05 million, 20 percent of whomlive in Peshawar district.

As a result of the nearby situation inAfghanistan during the 1980s, the city ofPeshawar was transformed, both economicallyand socially. First, the presence of refugeesin such large numbers changed thedemographics of the city. Second, a largenumber of international aid organisationsand NGOs used Peshawar as a base forassisting refugees, while resistance parties

7 FOCUS, an Ismaili aid agency, has been instrumental in locating Ismaili Hazaras in Karachi. Groups of migrants wereassembled in Kabul, and they would then be moved as a caravan to Peshawar and on to Karachi. Karachi was chosen becauseof the presence of a significant Ismaili community.



also took up headquarters in the city. Today,with a dramatic reduction in funding forAfghan refugees and closure of some refugeecamps, the city has changed once again. Thelarge-scale repatriation of Afghans fromPeshawar has had a negative impact on thecity’s economy, particularly in the carpetand transport sectors.

Peshawar remains a lifeline to the newAfghanistan; it is a vital source of trade andgoods, and its health and education servicesattract people from Afghanistan who arewilling to make the journey and pay theexpenses for health care that is not yetavailable in their own country. Labourersfrom Peshawar, both Afghan and Pakistani,cross the border into Afghanistan to work onreconstruction and infrastructure projectsthere. These links form the basis of newcross-border ties that supersede those bondsforged by the business of war over the past25 years.

The living conditions of Afghan refugees indifferent areas of Peshawar do not appearto be related to their length of stay or ethnicidentity. Many refugees who arrived at thetime of the Soviet presence in Afghanistanstill live in poverty in Jalozai Camp. On theother hand, some refugees settledcomfortably in Hayatabad from the time theyarrived. The Afghans living in Akhtarabad leftAfghanistan in the early 1980s after theirlivelihoods had been devastated by war; manyhad initially lived in camps, but as aid driedup they moved to the main city in order totake advantage of a relatively more vibrantcasual labour market.

Despite war and anarchy in Afghanistan, theAfghan community in Peshawar hasmaintained active links with their country.Some families are divided and live on bothsides of the border, visiting each other often.

Contact with relatives in Afghanistan has asignificant effect on their perceptions of theirhomeland and features prominently in theirdecision-making processes on whether or notto return. For younger Afghans, in the absenceof any memories of pre-war Afghanistan,these links have helped maintain some bondbetween them and their country of origin.

Afghans in Quetta

Quetta is the capital of Baluchistan, Pakistan’slargest but least developed province. Thecity has historically been at the crossroadsof continental trade. Commercial routes linkPakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and the CentralAsian republics. Cumin is brought to Quettafrom Hazarajat, iron and hides from Herat,and wool and fruit from Kandahar or Ghazni.Hides are sent on to Kasur in the Punjab,8

and the other goods are sold in Quetta,Peshawar, Lahore or Karachi.

There is limited official information on thegeneral migrant population in the district ofQuetta. While between the Census surveysof 1981 and 1998 the total population ofQuetta district grew from 381,566 to 759,941,9the percentage distribution of migrants fromother countries apparently dropped from 5.4to 0.9 percent. The Census reports do notmention Afghan refugees in these figures,which may explain why they do not reflectthe reality of Afghan presence at the time.The 2005 Census of Afghans in Pakistan reportsthat 11 percent of the 3.05 million Afghansin Pakistan (335,500) reside in Quetta district.

The ethnic configuration and politics ofBaluchistan have been directly impacted bythe arrival of Afghan refugees in the 1980s.Being majority Pashtun, their presencecontributed to the marginalisation of theBaluch in the province, adding to the alreadysignificant ethnic tensions.

8 See P. Titus, 2005, “Des vies marchandisÈes: les rÈfugiÈs afghans dans des rÈseaux de rÈseaux”, Ethnographiques.org 8.9 Population Census Organization, 1983, Quetta District Census Report 1981, Islamabad: Ministry of States and Frontier

Regions (SAFRON), Government of Pakistan, p. 20; and Population Census Organization, 2001, Quetta District Census Report1998, Islamabad: SAFRON, Government of Pakistan. p. 46.



Ethnicity was the primary reason for manyof the refugees to choose to move to Quettafrom Afghanistan, particularly for Pashtuns,Baluch and Hazaras who all have hostcommunities in the city. The vulnerability ofAfghans in Quetta and its vicinity variesaccording to their level of acceptance withinthe local population. One of the main sourcesof harassment for refugees and migrants isthe police: Afghans can be accosted andthreatened with the charge of illegal entryinto Pakistan, and may be forced to paybribes to secure their release. Lack of housingownership rights has left some vulnerable tolocal landowners, particularly in the areasof Jungle Bagh and Ghausabad.

For many Afghans, Quetta is a place of transitin a complex migratory itinerary. Differentcities across Pakistan (particularly Karachi)

as well as Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Europeand Australia are common destinations forAfghans from Quetta. With the large numberof Afghan labour migrants working in Iran,families usually have relatives there who areable to facilitate access to employment. Anelaborate network of human smugglers –controlled by local Baluch – has evolved tocater for this demand.

2.2 Iran

Historical and political context

The migration of people from present-dayAfghanistan to Iran motivated by economicdifferences and political crises has occurredfor centuries. Many Hazaras sought refuge inIran at the end of the 19th century duringthe centralist rule of Amir Abdur Rahman

Box 4. The network of a Tajik butcher in Quetta

Haji Baba can be viewed as the centre of a distribution network consisting of small scale wholesalers andretailers. Baba is Tajik. He came directly to Quetta when he left his home in Kunduz province in 1985. Helater bought land and built his home in an area south of the city heavily populated with refugees. Baba’snetwork consisted of both Tajik and Uzbek refugees. Live animals entered the network and their dismemberedbody parts flowed outward from it, both to consumers and to other business people. As a butcher, Babarequired two things from his network. One was an efficient means of distributing all the meat from theanimals he slaughtered, and the other was a consistent supply of meat to sell in his own stall.

The network of Haji Baba consisted of his son and apartner, Ali Jan, three other butchers, two brothersworking in partnership as meat wholesalers, and fivehotel owners. Haji Baba’s relationships with otherbutchers were reciprocal because each of them shiftedbetween needing to distribute and needing to obtainmeat. A butcher who hadn’t slaughtered on a givenday was a major customer for a man who had, takingfrom a fifth to a third of the animal's meat. The groupof hotel owners in Haji’s network included bothrefugees and Pakistanis. The third party in Haji Baba’snetwork were two Uzbek brothers who bought liveanimals and sold bulk meat at wholesale prices toBaba and other butchers.

The network provided flexible options through whichthose involved could obtain and distribute meat.Distribution could also be adjusted to accommodate

circumstances. Ideally animals and meat flowed one way through Haji Baba’s network and money flowedin the opposite direction. In fact there were significant delays in this flow since everyone bar consumersbought on credit. So, along with flows of flesh and cash, the network was held together by bonds of debt.The debt in a sense accompanies the animals and their body parts as they move through the network.

Source: Adapted from Titus (2005)



(1880–1901). More recently, in the early1970s, widespread drought and crop failurecaused the migration of many Afghans fromnorth and northwestern Afghanistan to Iran,as did the oil price-led construction boom inIran. The two decades of war from 1978 againprecipitated the arrival in Iran of Afghans enmasse.

Unlike Pakistan, Iran ratified the 1951Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,with reservations regarding articles 17 (wageearning employment), 23 (public relief), 24(labour legislation and social security) and26 (freedom of movement). With regard toarticle 17, recognised refugees with residencepermits would have to apply for work permitsin Iran, which would, in most cases, restrictthem to jobs involving manual labour (suchas construction, brick making, tile making,tanneries, glass blowing and agriculture).When Iranian men went to fight against Iraqin the 1980s, Afghan labour filled a majorgap in the informal labour market.

In 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistancoincided with the Islamic Revolution inneighbouring Iran, a sociocultural climate inwhich the Islamic principle of hosting refugeesand displaced people as enshrined in theQuran was particularly supported. The firstrefugee outflow in the 1980s received a warmwelcome in Iran, where the Iraniangovernment took pride in offering assistanceto approximately 2 million Afghans who hadfled the Communist regime. They were seenas fellow Muslims fleeing their own countryon the grounds that they were unable toproperly practise their faith, and were knownby the positive term mohajerin. Afghans wereissued with identification cards known as“blue cards”, and granted indefinitepermission to stay in Iran. They were allowedto live where they found work and had accessto subsidised health care and food, and freeprimary and secondary education. Eighty

camps or mehmanshahr were built, but lessthan 2.5 percent of the Afghan population inIran were recorded as living in these campsin 2001.10 Most Afghans settled in poorneighbourhoods on the outskirts of majorcities.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistanin 1989 and the fall of Najibullah in 1992,many Afghans returned to their country.However this trend came to a halt with theoutbreak of internecine fighting, and withthe advance of the Taliban, non-Pashtunsfrom central and northern Afghanistan inparticular sought asylum in neighbouringcountries. The Iranian government hadprogressively withdrawn from its earlierposition of formal support to Afghan refugees,and since the mid 1990s the majority of newarrivals have remained undocumented.Afghans seeking refuge were no longercategorised as mohajerin, but aspanahandegan (meaning refugee, but withoutthe religious dimension of the termmohajerin). While the former term isconsidered to be honourable, the latter hasa pejorative nuance.11

Policies to encourage the repatriation ofAfghans began with greater regulation andcontrol of the labour market, exemplified byan increase in raids on work sites by Iraniansecurity forces, and penalties given toemployers hiring Afghan labourers. Since1996, free education for all Afghan childrenwas stopped, with only documented childrenallowed to continue with schooling. As aconsequence, a half to one third of school-aged Afghan children started attendinginformal Afghan schools, with associated costsborne by Afghans themselves. After the fallof the Taliban, together with the activepromotion of repatriation of Afghans undera Tripartite Agreement signed by Afghanistan,Iran and UNHCR, BAFIA12 issued an order toclose even these informal schools as part of

10 UNHCR, 2004, Afghanistan: Challenges to Return, Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, p. 10.11 B. Rajaee, 2000, “The politics of refugee policy in post-revolutionary Iran”, The Middle East Journal, 54(1), p. 56–58.12 The government of Iran’s refugee matters are handled by the Bureau of Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs (BAFIA, under

the Ministry of Interior).



an overall campaign to increase pressure onAfghans, particularly families, to repatriate.13

Other measures have included restrictingopportunities to access higher education andpreventing access to housing, administrativeservices, bank accounts, interest-free loanassociations and insurance. Furthermore,formal documentation that had previouslygranted Afghans a legal identity waswithdrawn. The only Afghans who cancircumvent these measures are those holdinga valid passport or visa and residence permit.

The Iranian government’s disincentives forAfghans to stay in Iran have been felt hardestby families, while they have impacted lesson Afghan labour migrants who can generallycirculate using their own networks thatprovide social and psychological support,credit, information on labour markets andmoney transfer facilities. The large majorityof these single male migrants view their stayin Iran as economically necessary: they findwork and save money to sustain their familiesin Afghanistan and to fulfil their obligationas male caretakers of their households.Despite government restrictions on Iranianemployers, Afghan workers continue to behired – they clearly fill a demand in thelabour market in which their flexibility andhard work are sought after. Deportation stopsa few Afghans from returning, but themajority continue to make efforts to crossthe border. Many follow in the steps of otherswho preceded them, and in this waytransnational networks are perpetuated inspite of the difficult context.

The situation for Iranian women who havemarried Afghan men is problematic: they losetheir Iranian citizenship by marrying an

Afghan, and their children are not Iraniancitizens either. Their families risk beingdeported to Afghanistan. It has beenestimated that as many as 30,000 individualscould be affected by this.14 Furthermore,despite Iran’s hardening of policies towardsAfghans, Afghan women’s exposure to IslamicIranian practices and ideals has led them toadopt new cultural notions of women’s roles,gender relations and family structure.15

Women, especially widows, seem morereluctant than men to return to Afghanistan,in the short term at least.

Between 2002 and 2005, more than 800,000Afghans returned from Iran through theUNHCR-assisted voluntary repatriationoperation. Around 65 percent of Afghanreturnees from Iran were men of workingage. The following characteristics of Afghanreturns from Iran were noted by the UNHCR:

• the majority of returnees during 2002had left Afghanistan within the last fiveyears;

• a much higher than expected number(around 42 percent) returned to urbandestinations;

• approximately 40 percent (predominantlysingle, unregistered men) repatriatedoutside the official UNHCR-assistedvoluntary return process; and

• compared with the percentage of Hazaras(predominantly Shia) in Iran, far fewerthan other ethnic groups such as Tajiksand Pashtuns returned.16

In July 2005, it was estimated that a littleover 850,000 documented Afghans remainedin Iran, including 93,385 single Afghans.17

Addit ional ly, as many as 500,000

13 H. Hoodfar, 2005, Returning to a Home Never Seen: Afghan Youth Facing the Trials and Tribulation of Repatriation,Montreal: Concordia University (unpublished).

14 A. Strand, A. Suhrke and K.B. Harpviken, 2004, Afghan Refugees in Iran: From Refugee Emergency to Migration Management,Oslo: International Peace Research Institute; Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

15 H. Hoodfar, 2004, “Families on the move: the changing role of Afghan refugee women in Iran”, Hawwa: Journal of Womenof the Middle East and the Islamic World, 2(2):141–71.

16 UNHCR, 2004.17 UNHCR Iran and Population and Geographic Data Section, 2005, Afghan population and family status in Iran as of 01/07/05,

Amayesh and Repatriation database, UNHCR Statistical Summary Overview, Afghans in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Geneva:UNHCR.



undocumented labour migrants were said tobe in Iran, employed mainly in the agriculturaland construction sectors.18 They crossrepeatedly between Afghanistan and Iran insearch of employment, leaving their familiesbehind in Afghanistan.

Afghans in Tehran

Tehran is Iran’s capital and the largest metro-polis with a population of up to 12 million. Aheavy fog often hovers over the city,where neighbourhoods sprawl over theslopes of the Alborz Mountains, from theupper class high city, to the modestlower settlements. In July 2005, it was

estimated that a total of 224,473 registeredAfghans lived in Tehran. Afghans in Tehranare clustered in the areas of Shahr-i-Rey,Kan and Nematabad.

Shahr-i-Rey, located to the southeast ofTehran, has a population of around 1 millionincluding approximately 160,000 non-nationals: 10,000 Iraqis and 150,000 Afghansworking mainly as labourers, farmers, tailorsand stonemasons. Income and the cost ofrent there are both low, and as a result, thearea can be characterised as migrant-receiving, including migrants from other partsof Iran.

18 www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?subm=&ssm=&cid=118 (accessed 28 January 2006).

Box 5. Kinship relations among the members of a work team in Tehran

In Iranian urban centres, Afghan labourers who come without their families are moving all the time – fromone building site to another, following work opportunities often as a group. A skilful and enterprisingindividual may end by leading a work team. Members of the team do not necessarily know each other; theirrelations with the team leader are the important ones. They may be diverse: people who are members ofthe leader’s lineage; people from his mother’s or wife’s lineage (possibly from another village) or relatedto him in one way or another by marriage; people with whom he is not directly related but who are fromthe same hamlet or village; acquaintances met during migration. In other words, the groupings around theforeman are on the basis of patrilineage, kinship through the mother or wife (and women more generally),residential proximity and friendship.

An example of a work team in Tehran (2004): Yusuf, 40, is the foreman and has extensive experiencemigrating to Iran (he has been involved in the hawala business and in people smuggling in the past); Karim,20, Yusuf’s late brother’s son; Hanif, 24, from another lineage but from the same hamlet as Yusuf;Mohammad Jan, 21, Hanif’s brother, married to a paternal cousin of Yusuf; Husain Ali, 19, unmarried, fromthe same lineage of Hanif and Mohammad Jan (their fathers are distant paternal cousins); Habibullah, 19,unmarried, from the same lineage as Yusuf, but originating from another hamlet; Abdullah, 18, unmarried,family originates from the same district as Yusuf (but he was born in Pakistan and had never been toAfghanistan).

There are several sources of solidarity in this work group which partially overlap. But there is a workerwho has no direct relations with the other team members: a close relative of Yusuf met Abdullah on abuilding site and introduced him to the group. In this way, employment structures in Iran allow youngAfghans to diversify their social networks so that they are not only determined by kinship and residencein the country of origin.

The age differences are also interesting. The foreman is 40, while the other members of the team are intheir early twenties or younger. Such work teams are led by a mature and experienced migrant whosupervises younger men and adolescents. As the foreman, he is responsible for the quality of work, hiringworkers as they are needed, keeping attendance lists and communicating with the Iranian boss. The bossleaves him with the freedom to manage the everyday work; he hands all the wage money over to Yusuf,which is then distributed among the members of the work team. Yusuf came to Iran for the first time about25 years ago, for five years. He returned to Afghanistan with some savings and got married before migratingagain. Nevertheless, with the passing of time, his stays abroad became sparser and shorter.

Source: Adapted from Monsutti (2005b)



Kan is located around 25 km northwest ofTehran. It hosts about 700 Afghan households,the majority Sunni Tajiks. Most Afghanresidents are engaged in the constructionsector, gardening and shoe mending. Thereis one Afghan school and one governmenthealth clinic, as well as several private healthclinics.

Nematabad is approximately 10 km south ofTehran. There are 600–800 Afghan householdsin this industrial area, which features metal-turning workshops, fabric selling and tailoring.Afghans are employed in the carpentryindustry, the tailoring industry and inshoemaking production workshops, or theyare simple labourers and builders, hawkersor metal workers. Sixty percent of Afghansin Nematabad are Hazara, 35 percent areTajik, and the remainder are Qizilbash, Sayed,Pashtun and Uzbek. The majority of residentsare Shia. There are four Afghan communityschools.

Afghan labour migrants in Tehran reportsubstantial periods of unemployment, duringwhich they live from their savings or borrowmoney from family. However, respondentsstated that they remit an average of 690,000tomans annually to their families inAfghanistan. Their continued cyclicalmigration and subsequent return trips to Iran(over half had returned to Afghanistan atleast once) suggests that neither unemploy-ment nor fear of arrest are sufficient obstaclesto discourage this labour migration practice.

Afghans in Mashhad

Mashhad, which means “burying place”(especially of a martyr), grew around thetomb of Imam Reza, and it is a holy city forShias. It is the capital of the eastern provinceof Khorasan, the second-most frequenteddestination of Afghan families in Iran afterTehran with 31,805 households or 155,893individuals (but only the eighth-most

frequented destination of single Afghans,with only 3,495 individuals).19 Four mainresearch sites were selected because of thesignificant presence of Afghans in each.

Golshahr lies on the northeast outskirts ofMashhad’s residential area, and is inhabitedby many Afghans (local Iranians call thesuburb Kabulshahr or “Kabul City”). Accordingto informal data, 50–65 percent of theGolshahr population of 35,000–40,000population is Afghan, primarily Shia Hazara.Facilities include municipal water, gas,electricity and some welfare services, as wellas several schools. Most Afghan men work inthe construction industry as builders,labourers, plasterers, stonemasons and bricklayers; they also work as shopkeepers, weldersand agriculturalists.

Sakhteman is a very old neighbourhood onthe eastern outskirts of Mashhad. About 25percent of the population of 40,000–45,000are Afghans, both Shia and Sunni. Sakhtemanhas two health centres, one pharmacy, fouror five health centre branches, state-runprimary and secondary schools, and oneindependent Afghan school. The occupationalstructure of Sakhteman is similar to Golshahrexcept that there are fewer shopkeepers inthe former.

Altaymoor, northeast of Mashhad, has apopulation of about 15,000, of which abouta third are Afghans. Altaymoor has cityfacilities, but is generally less developed thanother areas in Mashhad. Welfare facilitiesinclude two health centres and governmentalschools (primary, lower secondary and uppersecondary). The structure of occupationsresembles Golshahr and Sakhteman exceptthat the majority Afghan men in Altaymoorwork in brick manufacturing.

Afghans interviewed in Mashhad as part ofthis study reported that they were still ableto find employment and enter into tenancy

19 UNHCR Iran, Amayesh and Repatriation Databases, November 2004



arrangements with landlords, in spite oflegislation restricting employment andtenancy to those who enter Iran with validpassport and hold a valid visa and validresidency permit. They participated activelyin regional and local social networks thatfunctioned as safety nets.

Data from the Mashhad case does notsubstantiate the hypothesis that in the eventof return to Afghanistan, and for the reasonof livelihood strategy, Afghan families wouldleave some members behind in Iran to remitmoney to help finance the family’sreintegration. The clear majority of Mashhadrespondents intended to return to Afghanistanas intact family units, however the majorityof respondents did not intend to return toAfghanistan in the medium term, and planned

to remain in Iran in the medium term if theywere permitted to do so.

Afghans in Zahedan

Zahedan is a frontier town near Afghanistanand Pakistan. It is the capital of SistanBaluchistan province, largely occupied by aSunni population with strong historical andcultural cross-border ties. In July 2005, itwas estimated that a total of 98,064documented Afghans lived in the province.20

Significant repatriation has occurred recently:almost 40 percent of the families and morethan 10 percent of the single Afghans livingin Zahedan returned to Afghanistan in 2004.21

Like other regions of Iran, the majority ofAfghans living in Zahedan are originally fromrural areas. Shia Hazaras comprise a small

Box 6. Afghan Shia Pilgrims in Iran

Karbala, the place in Iraq where Imam Husain was martyred, and Mashhad, the Iranian city where ImamReza is buried, play a pivotal role in Shia pilgrimage practices. Some Afghans explained proximity to ImamReza not in terms of making pilgrimage in the present, but in terms of burial and salvation in the hereafter.By virtue of physical association, burial in Mashhad, ideally in the cemetery of Imam Reza, renders thedeceased “in the presence of” Imam Reza. In the situation of displacement, pilgrimage is an activity thathelps bring about recovery from the terror of war and the violent disruption of their social relations throughflight and exile. Religious practice may sustain refugees in their processes of displacement and integrationinto the host society, providing emotional and cognitive support, and as a vehicle for community buildingand group identity.

To follow is a description of a group of Afghans returning to Mashhad after having been to Karbala:

The pilgrims are met at the bus terminal by a welcoming party including the local mullah, family andneighbours. Two sheep tethered nearby are later slaughtered for the shared celebratory meal. Aprocession goes from the place of arrival to the family’s house, and tea and sweets are distributed tothe members of the procession. Later, written invitations are issued to neighbours, friends and familyto attend a formal celebratory dinner. Prior to the dinner, invited guests contribute an amount of severalthousand tomans to the pilgrim. In a conspicuous display of their pilgrimage to Karbala, the entry tothe family’s house is hung with screenprinted “Welcome home from Karbala” banners, and shelves orracks display mementos and trinkets from the Karbala site lit up by coloured lights. Each guest mayreceive gifts. The respective roles and interrelationships of host and guest played out in such celebrationsprovide opportunity for mohajerin to build, strengthen and extend social attachments to their Afghanand Iranian neighbours and friends.

In Iran, the classification “refugee” has associations of both economic and social marginalisation. The titleof “Karbalai” accorded to returnee pilgrims offers to Afghan Shiites an alternative status which speaks oftheir religiosity rather than their national identity.

Source: Adapted from Glazebrook and Abbasi-Shavazi (2005)

20 UNHCR Iran and Population and Geographic Data Section, 2005, Afghan population and family status in Iran as of 01/07/05,Amayesh and Repatriation database.

21 UNHCR Iran, 01/01/05, Amayesh database (Sistan Baluchistan).



minority, about 10 percent, in Zahedan, whileSunnis are present in higher numbers: Tajiks,23.3 percent; Uzbeks, 23.3 percent; andPashtuns, 20 percent. Most Afghans arelocated in the eastern, northern and westernmargins of the city, and mainly work in theinformal economy as labourers, constructionworkers and grocers. Many live with the fearof arrest and deportation because they areworking without proper documentation.

2.3 Afghanistan

Returnees in urban Herat

Herat was once at the crossroads ofcivilisations on the old silk route. Untilrecently Afghanistan’s border with Iran wasnothing more than a political definition, whileon the ground the 900-km line through thedesert had neither fences nor border postson the Afghanistan side. Even during ZahirShah’s reign (1933–73) the border was open,which, along with a strong Iranian currency,stimulated trade, religiously motivated visitsand labour migration. Western Afghanistanhas historically looked towards Iran andCentral Asia for its cultural and economicinfluences, an outlook which is perpetuatedby the relatively weak central governmentin Kabul.

For this study, an urban neighbourhood inHerat was selected on the basis of: a highnumber of returnees; the intensity oftransnational links; and a mixed ethnic,religious and economic profile (even if themajority of the inhabitants consisted of SunniTajiks). The neighbourhood was entirelydestroyed by the Soviets in 1979, and mostof its inhabitants fled to Iran or elsewhere.Since this time, many families have occupiedthe ruins or rebuilt houses, mostly on atemporary basis. The transitory nature of thesettlement is still apparent in some streets,where people do not always know theirneighbours. Since 2002, former inhabitants

have increasingly been returning from Iran.Land and rent prices are rising rapidly becauseof the booming economy of the city. Maleheads of household in the neighbourhood aredaily labourers, businessmen and shopkeepers,real estate agents, NGO employees and lower-level government officials. In most cases,work, and therefore income, is irregular.

Returnees in rural Herat

The rural research for this study wasundertaken in a village in Injil district,relatively close to Herat city. The mainselection criterion for this research site wasthe high incidence of labour migration. Ofthe approximately 2,000 inhabitants, themajority is Pashtun, with a large minorityTajik. The two ethnic groups are foundthroughout the village, and intermarriagetakes place, indicating relatively stablerelations between the groups. The livelihoodsand coping strategies of people living in thisregion are traditionally diverse and welldeveloped. The main crop is wheat, whileothers include rice, corn and lentils, withoverall production down because of thedrought of recent years.

Despite its proximity to Herat city, wherethere have always been labour opportunities,a large majority of men continue to go toIran to seek work as they can earncomparatively better wages there — supportingtheir household in either accumulation orcoping strategies.22 Families and individualshave moved from this area for various reasonsover the past decades: during the Sovietoccupation, then the mujahidin era, and thenwhen the Taliban were in control of westernAfghanistan. Initially some families fled, butalso many young men left because of forcedconscription and the lack of employmentopportunities. Others left when Najibullah’sregime fell because of their governmentaffiliations. The Taliban regime prompted anexodus because of harassment and

22 Grace and Pain, 2004.



discrimination, along with the lack of employ-ment opportunities. Later in the 1990s thenumber of outward migrants multiplied as aconsequence of the drought.

Since the Soviet occupation, more than halfof the male respondents in this study areahave gone to Iran at least once, with almosta quarter reporting recurring movements.Those who have remained in the village eitherare relatively wealthy or have weak networks(and therefore no one to look after theirfamilies while they are away). Today, manyyoung men are crossing the border to Iranfor the first time in their lives — most belowthe age of 20, and either single or engaged.In general they migrate because of thedifficulties of finding well-paid work and theneed to save money for their marriage. Theyoften express their desire to join friends andto gain some independence from theirparents, and they usually spend a longerperiod of time in Iran compared to marriedmen, who generally return within a year.

Many current residents experienced adifferent culture and better infrastructureand services when they fled to Iran duringthe years of conflict. This has had a profoundeffect on aspirations and expectations,permeating all aspects of life and providingone significant cause of ongoing migrationto Iran.

Returnees in urban Faryab

Maimana, the provincial capital of Faryab,was on the main caravan route between Iran,the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia.During the reign of Zahir Shah (1933–73),Faryab was well known for its karakul sheepand their skins, leather, carpets, rice, wheat,grapes and raisins, pistachios and melons.However, in the 1970s it was, in comparisonwith other provinces, underdeveloped andreceived relatively little foreign aid. Thirtyyears later, the situation has changed little.Poor road access limits export and limitedfinancial assistance has hindered economicdevelopment. It remains an important

overnight stop for traders and travellersbetween Balkh and Herat, but commercialactivities are relatively minimal.

This s tudy looked at two urbanneighbourhoods in Maimana. Both wereethnically and professionally mixed: themajority of inhabitants are Uzbeks, with someTajiks and a few Pashtuns, all from a rangeof occupational groups. One site wascharacterised by the presence of governmentofficials and militant Junbesh youth. Theother had an intricate pattern of settlement,with extended families occupying housesadjacent to each other based on the families’original connections to the leather industry.

The migration patterns of the twoneighbourhoods’ inhabitants were similar.During the Soviet occupation many stayed inMaimana. Some families moved elsewherewithin Afghanistan for employment, whileothers left to work in the army, or, on thecontrary, to avoid conscription. The arrivalof the Taliban in 1998 caused a large-scaleexodus of Uzbeks, with families fleeing thearea because of attacks against them.

Wealth and professional backgrounds partiallydetermined subsequent migration patterns.Many government officials fled to Iran, leavingtheir families behind under the protectionof a male relative. Some young and middle-aged men first brought their families toShibirghan, Mazar-i-Sharif or elsewhere,ensured they were looked after by a malerelative, and then left for Iran, either becauseof fears of persecution, for work or for medicalcare. The presence of some family membersthere then prompted others to move to Iran.Upon return from Iran, onward movementoccurred in some cases, while in others therewas a prolonged stay in Herat before returningto Maimana, exemplifying the cyclical as wellas multidirectional movement of migrants.

The displacement history shown in Table 1illustrates the overlapping of motives formovement (conflict, work, social and familylife) and the complex pattern of movement



(within Afghanistan, to Iran), which cannotbe reduced to a flight from danger followedyears later by a return to the place of origin.

Returnees in rural Faryab

The rural area studied was selected primarilyon the basis of a high incidence of labourmigration to Iran. One Arab, one Uzbek andone Pashtun village were chosen in order toinvestigate inter-ethnic relat ions,

socioeconomic class and migration. Generally,each ethnic group lives in distinct hamlets.Local society is stratified and wealth isunequally distributed. With the arrival of theTaliban, Arabs left in large numbers, fearingharassment, looting, rape, taxation andimprisonment. After the fall of the Talibanin late 2001, Uzbeks turned against Pashtunsin yet another round in a cycle of abusescommitted between ethnic groups.

When Where to How long for With whom Reason forreturn or onwardmovement

Until the time of Maimana to Kabul many years parents, three conflictNajibullah sisters and one

brother

Until the arrival Kabul to Mazar 10 years parents, three Taliban attack inof the Taliban sisters and one Mazar(1987–97) brother (father

and brother die;respondent andone sister getmarried)

Taliban period Mazar to Maimana 4 months mother, two no work(1998–2001) sisters, wife

Maimana to 2 years mother, two no workShibirghan sisters, wife and

one child

Shibirghan to Iran 1 year alone (rest of respondent’sfamily left in brother-in-lawShibirghan) leaving Shibirghan

Iran to Shibirghan 2 months alone no work

Shibirghan to 4 months mother, two no workMaimana sisters, wife and

one child (onesister getsmarried)

Fall of Taliban Maimana to Herat 2.5 years mother, no work andone sister, house destroyedwife andtwo children

Karzai’s Herat to Maimana since summer wife and three increasing rentalgovernment 2004 children price in Herat,

other Uzbekfamilies leaving,family in Maimana

Table 1. An Uzbek man’s displacement history23

23 From Stigter, 2005b, p. 9.



Since 1979, primarily because of lack ofsecurity and employment opportunities, ahigh level of migratory movements hasoccurred from rural Faryab. A complex patternof dispersal has been established, featuringtransnational networks between Afghanistan,Iran and Pakistan. The level of male migrationincreased during the drought, which beganin 1997 and caused extremely low harvestsand widespread loss of sheep, goats and otheranimals. Though 2003 saw a major improve-ment with record harvests, in 2004 somelocalised pockets were threatened again asthe result of extreme weather conditions,the loss of groundwater, diminished snowpacks and less rainfall. Migration to Iran hasbecome one strategy for temporarily miti-gating the impact of natural events. Evenwith the agricultural situation appearing toimprove, the need to find work elsewhere islikely to continue because of the pressuresof population growth.

Many families in Faryab have at least oneyoung or middle-aged relative working inIran, clearly indicating the continuing needof family members to find employmentelsewhere. It also suggests that migrationhas become an established social strategy,making it easier for young men to depart forthe first time, and increasing the likelihoodof returning to Iran for those with previousmigratory experience.

Returnees in Jalalabad

Located in eastern Afghanistan, the provinceof Nangarhar shares a border with Pakistan’sNorth West Frontier Province (NWFP). Themajority of the population in both Nangarharand NWFP are Pashtun and, on both sides ofthe international border,24 Created by theBritish in 1893, the Durand Line separatedAfghanistan from British India, in effectdividing the Pashtuns who lived on both sidesof the border. In some locations, especially

in the tribal territories to the west of NWFP,this border is still not recognised by the localpopulation. Most people share a similar tribalstructure, language and religion, along withmany cultural traditions. Nangarhar’s capitalcity, Jalalabad, lies on an ancient trade routeleading from Kabul via the Khyber Pass toPeshawar and the Indian subcontinent. Theclose ties to NWFP socially, culturally andeconomically made Peshawar a logicallocation for resettlement for residents ofNangarhar fleeing conflict, drought and othercrises. There has been, and continues to be,a significant presence in or near the city ofPeshawar of Afghan refugees who leftNangarhar (mostly from the city of Jalalabador its surrounds) as family units at differentstages following the Soviet invasion in 1979.This study focused on the lives of householdsin Jalalabad in both peri-urban areas andmore distant villages, who lived as refugeesin Pakistan, in both camp and city, and havereturned to their home province in recentyears largely as intact family units. In bothPakistan and on return, the study found thatthey have been surrounded by relatives(khpilwan) and kinspeople (qawm) who haveprovided much social support. Theirtransnational networks have never beenextensive: only a minority have relatives stillin Pakistan, and just a few receiveintermittent remittances from abroad.

Regional migratory networks from Jalalabadare clearly orientated towards Pakistan; notone respondent interviewed as part of thisstudy had ever been to another country. Sucha result is explained by the proximity of thePakistani border, the existing cultural ties,and the long history of cross-border relations.Trade and movements of people (such asnomads moving north in summer and southin winter, labourers looking for seasonal workin the lowlands, and smugglers) were deeplyentrenched well before 1978.

24 Created by the British in 1893, the Durand Line separated Afghanistan from British India, in effect dividing the Pashtunswho lived on both sides of the border. In some locations, especially in the tribal territories to the west of NWFP, this borderis still not recognised by the local population.



The Nangarhar case is notable in that therewas a substantial group among the respon-dents who reported an increase in economicstatus since return. This group was morelikely to have owned land and a home priorto departing Afghanistan, in comparison tothose reporting no change or a decline ineconomic status. One other reason why theeconomic situation of many returnees

participating in the study improved was achange in employment status. A significantshare moved away from dependence on dailywage work and into business. This movementmay reflect the greater market connections“at home” and the ability to own businessand property — which Afghans are notpermitted to do in Pakistan.



3.1 War and migration

Although based on ancient patterns ofmobility, the first significant migration ofAfghans in recent times occurred in the 1970s,at the time of a severe drought in Afghanistanand the oil boom in Iran. A dramatic increasein outward movements followed theCommunist coup of 1978 and the Sovietintervention of 1979, while pressures relatedto population growth contributed to the needto seek employment outside Afghanistan.

Not surprisingly, for most respondents in thisstudy of Afghans living in Iran and Pakistan,the original reason for their migration wasto flee from the war. Other secondary causesrelated to war were also mentioned, such asescape from military service, deteriorationof living standards, lack of security and theirworsening economic situation. While thepredominant causes of Afghans’ movementinto Pakistan and Iran were often directlyrelated to the physical violence associatedwith war, the decrease in livelihoodopportunities brought by it was also animportant determinant of migration. Manyrespondents reported that the Soviets hadburned their farms and, more significantly,had destroyed their irrigation channels.Furthermore, with the destruction of transportinfrastructure, seed availability decreased.The breakdown of traditional agriculturalpractices forced migration across the borderin search of welfare and livelihoodopportunities.

One of the main attractions to Pakistan wasthe existence of refugee camps close enoughto facilitate male participation in the jihad.This seems to have continued beyond the eraof the Soviet invasion and well into the Talibantimes. Similarly, the presence of UN agencies,

NGOs (providing donor-subsidised health andeducational facilities) and even politicalagents of Afghan leaders also attractedrefugees. Refugee camps in I ranaccommodated relatively few Afghans andinternational assistance was not as important— instead it was the labour market thatallowed refugees to earn their livelihood andmaintain a certain degree of autonomy.

3.2 Mixed motivations

Each wave of migration can be differentiatedon the basis of the existing and potentialthreats faced by people at that time, whilecorrelations can be made between ethnicidentity, gender and age. Although generallyAfghans fled from war, their reasons formigration and the actual dynamics of thismovement are much more complex. Thephysical effects of war may be seen as aseparate issue to the disruption of traditionallivelihoods, the political and ethnicrepercussions of war and the economic falloutcaused by war.

The work of Connor25 on “self-settledrefugees” in Peshawar starts from theassumption that the choice of residence isinfluenced by the refugee’s past history andcultural framework, including geographicaland ethnic origin, social position (educationallevel, occupational experience) and politicalinvolvement (membership of a resistancemovement), time of departure fromAfghanistan and reasons for the decision. Sheseeks to close the gap between studies ofvoluntary migrants and refugees and to movebeyond the idea that the route taken by thelatter is always “forced, chaotic, generallyterror-stricken”.26 She proposes a causaltypology and considers that different“vintages” of refugees share a number of

25 K.M. Connor, 1987, “Rationales for the movement of Afghan refugees to Peshawar”, in G.M. Farr and J. G. Merriam (eds),Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival, p. 151–90, Boulder and London: Westview Press; K.M. Connor, 1989, “Factorsin the residential choices of self-settled Afghans refugees in Peshawar, Pakistan”, International Migration Review 23(1):904–32.

26 Connor, 1987, p. 152.

3. The Causes and Motivations of Migration



distinct characteristics. She shows thatAfghans left their country after events relatedin some way to their own particular sociology— they did not flee en masse.

It is not surprising that bombing and fighting,together with general pressure from theSoviet army and the Communist government,were the main reasons driving Afghans intoexile in the 1980s (rural populations weremore likely to suffer bombings and massacres,whereas citydwellers had more to fear fromwrongful arrest). However the percentagesgiven do not take into account the inevitableoverlap in motives. Back and forth movementsare not covered. Categorisation by “date ofdeparture” does not allow the details ofmedium- to long-term strategies to be drawnout. In seeking to group refugees by “vintage”and by sociocultural status and ethnic factors,the planned multilocation of families andkinship groups is neglected, as well as thecomplementarity of places of residence andoccupations.

Motivations and causes overlap. People mayleave Afghanistan for protection-relatedreasons, but seek work in Iran or Pakistan.While abroad, they have the chance toimprove their income and accesscomparatively better medical facilities, andin this time they redefine their priorities.The motivation to support the household isoften combined with more personal reasonssuch as, for young men, the urge to seek newexperiences or earn money to show that theycan fulfil their marital responsibilities.

Migration is also a way of spreading risk withina household (with more than one son) orbetween households (of various brothers). Itis a coping strategy to cover basic needs andrepay debts through remittances. Themigration of individual members of ahousehold may allow for their family to stayin their area of origin. For single migrantworkers the availability of pre-establishedtransnational networks facilitates themigration and influences the place of

25 K.M. Connor, 1987, “Rationales for the movement of Afghan refugees to Peshawar”, in G.M. Farr and J. G. Merriam (eds),Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival, p. 151–90, Boulder and London: Westview Press; K.M. Connor, 1989, “Factorsin the residential choices of self-settled Afghans refugees in Peshawar, Pakistan”, International Migration Review 23(1):904–32.

Box 7: Reasons for leaving Afghanistan in the 1980s

After analysing the responses of 771 heads of families, Connor identifies ten reasons for the decision toleave Afghanistan:

Reason Number Percentage

Bombing/fighting: fear for life 112 14.53

Bombing/fighting: obstruct livelihood 76 9.86

Avoid military 181 23.48

Anti-communism 93 12.06

Prison 68 8.82

Fear of arrest 52 6.74

Suspect family member 29 3.76

Harassment 23 2.98

Already in Pakistan 7 0.91

Other 14 1.82

Total 771 100

Source: Adapted from Connor (1987)



destination. Most labour migrants in Iran havebrothers living with their parents inAfghanistan, and they see their migration asa coping strategy that allows their family toreceive remittances to pay for daily needs,and to accumulate capital for investment inland and housing.

Migration studies have shown that the factorswhich induce population movements cannotbe reduced to the explicit motivations ofsocial actors. Furthermore, they are notnecessarily the same as those whichperpetuate it. Migrants weave networks ofcontacts that make it easier to move betweendifferent countries, and the gap betweendemand (the number of people wishing toenter an economically developed country)and supply (the number of visas available)creates a lucrative niche. A black market ofpeople smugglers establishes itself to workaround controls in the destination country,while NGOs justify their existence bydefending migrants and refugees from staterepression and providing them with legalforms of assistance. In short, addressing thecauses of migration does not constitute aguarantee to bring it to an end, as the factorssustaining migratory flows come to form moreor less stable systems.27

3.3 Population growth

The population of Afghanistan is thought tohave almost doubled since the Communistcoup of 1978. It was estimated in the late1970s at about 15 million, while in 2004 theUN quoted a figure of 29,863,000. It estimatesthat by 2050 Afghanistan’s population willhave more than tripled to 97,324,000.28

Despite the years of war and the extensiveAfghan diaspora, Afghanistan’s populationhas clearly increased dramatically over thepast 25 years, with a high proportion of young

people (currently 44.7 percent between 0and 14 years). This growth is apparent inrural areas as well as in cities and towns. Insome regions like Behsud, the populationdensity when recalculated on the basis ofcultivable land is greater than that ofBangladesh.29 The size of land parcels ownedby individuals continues to decrease witheach generation because of inheritancecustoms that stipulate the division of propertyamong the sons of a family. At the sametime, there has been insufficient economicgrowth in urban centres to absorb theincreased number of Afghans migrating fromrural to urban locations in search of work.Many IDPs (internally displaced persons) andreturnees are forced to settle in urbanlocations such as the large cities of Kabul,Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat, but also in smallertowns like Maimana, Ghazni or Pul-i-Khumri.They tend to stay together in neighbourhoodswhich are not always able to cope with sucha dramatic increase of population. This hasresulted in shifts in wealth, as some well-offfamilies lose their primary income source(agricultural land and livestock) while otherenterprising people set up new businesses tocapitalise on the changing circumstances. Ingeneral, long-term residents in urban centrestend to have more physical and social assetsthan the new arrivals.30

3.4 Drought

Rural Afghan families, both those with andwithout land and livestock, have had to adapttheir livelihoods strategies to deal with theimpact of drought. In particular, male out-migration emerged as a coping strategy inresponse to the effects of drought in the1970s and again in the late 1990s. Though2003 saw major agricultural improvementswith good rain and record harvests, in 2004at least 17 provinces were again faced with the

27 D.S. Massey, J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino and J.E. Taylor, 1993, “Theories of international migration: Areview and appraisal”, Population and Development Review, 19(3):431–66.

28 http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp (accessed 16 January 2006).29 C. Johnson, 2000, Hazarajat Baseline Study: Interim Report, Islamabad: UN Coordinator’s Office, p. 46.30 S. Sch¸tte, 2006a, Poor, Poorer, Poorest: Urban Livelihoods and Vulnerability in Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul: AREU; S. Sch¸tte,

2006b, Dwindling Industry, Growing Poverty: Urban Livelihoods in Pul-e Khumri, Kabul: AREU.



effects of ongoing drought, loss of ground-water, diminished snow packs and less rainfall.Aside from lack of water — exacerbatedby the fact that many irrigation facilitieswere destroyed during conflict throughmilitary aggression and neglect — plantdiseases and low-quality seeds have furtherdecreased yields. The situation has promptedmany men from rural areas, as well asformer tenants, sharecroppers and smalllandowners from semi-urban areas, toleave their place of origin in search of work.

3.5 Uneven economicdevelopment

Inequitable economic growth seriouslyundermines Afghanistan’s development, astrade opportunities tend to be monopolisedby the rich and powerful.31 The informaleconomy accounts for a large proportion ofthe Afghan economy, while the booming drugstrade is controlled by some commanders whokeep farmers under pressure to produceopium poppy.32 Even with some economicgrowth taking place in major cities since theend of the Taliban regime, large-scaleinvestments and national emergency anddevelopment programmes have reacheddifferent regions in Afghanistan unevenly.

In western Afghanistan, Herat is thrivingbecause of its trade with Iran, and the relatedcustoms income has allowed for majorinvestment in the city’s infrastructure.Although employment opportunities remainirregular and often insecure, most people(including returnees) with connections(wasita) have generally been able to findwork. A few kilometres outside of the city’sboundaries, however, overall employmentopportunities remain limited because of theyears of drought, relatively small landholdingsand population growth, and the fact that

only a few industries have been established.Across socioeconomic classes and ethnicgroups, many men from Herat continue toseek work in Iran.

In contrast, in a small provincial capital suchas Maimana in the northwestern province ofFaryab there is a lack of regular work forskilled and unskilled labourers in industry,construction and trade. Those with traditionalskills in small local industries like leatherproduction face difficulties obtaining creditand selling their produce because of poorinfrastructure and the impact of the globaleconomy. Not even being able to cover theneeds of its own inhabitants, provincial townslike Maimana have little hope providingopportunities for migrants from its surroundingrural areas.

3.6 Limited rule of law

More than two decades of fighting not onlydevastated Afghanistan’s infrastructure, italso weakened government institutions andresulted in limited rule of law in many partsof the country. Along with challengingsocioeconomic conditions, Afghans of allethnic groups continue to experienceinsecurity due to political instability.

At present, migration to Afghanistan’sneighbouring countries is prompted bypersecution and security-related concerns inonly a minority of cases. However, the levelsof protection-related departures are stillsignificant in some areas (as has beenreported, for instance, in Faryab). Whilemigration is primarily economically driven,motivations may overlap and many men stillflee their villages because of factionaltensions, and, particularly in northernAfghanistan, to avoid taxation andracketeering by some local commanders.

31 S. Lister and A. Pain, 2004, Trading in Power: The Politics of “Free” Markets in Afghanistan, Kabul: AREU.32 In 2004, Afghanistan produced 4,200 metric tons of opium, which represents more than 80 percent of the global opium

production (UNODC, 2005, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 5).



3.7 Migration as a way of life

For many Afghans from both sedentaryfarming families and nomadic groups,migration has become a way of life. Evenbefore the war, the economic differentialbetween Afghanistan and its neighbouringcountries has long led Afghans to migrate tofind work and enjoy the benefit of higherincomes. In the 1960s and 70s, withindustrialisation in Afghanistan negligible,there were insufficient employmentopportunities for the newly educated andthe growing rural populations. The oil boomencouraged many Afghans to go to Iran, andremittances to Afghanistan from abroad rose.Just prior to the Soviet occupation, severalhundred thousand Afghans were working inIran. Today, higher wages, as well as thepursuit of welfare, continue to prompt Afghanmen to cross the border, despite thedifficulties they experience in Iran.

Links between Afghanistan and Pakistan havebeen intense because of the cultural andlinguistic ties of the Pashtun populationsliving on both sides of the Durand Line.Nomads used to cross the border every year;they were not only herdsmen but also tradersselling hides, wool and dairy products inPakistan, and bringing back manufacturedgoods.

For many single young men their migration(to Iran in particular) may be a rite of passagefrom boyhood to manhood, in which theyideally return with enough savings to coverthe expenses of bride price and the wedding.Their time away from relatives, often withtheir friends, allows them to explore adifferent lifestyle and prove that they cansupport themselves.

The spread of migrants within the region hasmade it increasingly viable for those whohave never travelled abroad to seek work.

These recurrent movements are a con-sequence of transnational networks that aremaintained by the transmission of people,money, goods and information. Both menand women are crucial in the process ofreproducing these networks: men migrateacross the border to seek work, send remit-tances and bring savings home, while womentake care of the household — generallysupported by a male relative — and ensurethat news from home, including potentialemployment opportunities, is passed on.

In rural villages, migration to Iran, Pakistanor Gulf countries has become a social strategythat is expressed and reconfirmed bytransnational networks. After men havemigrated for the first time, the likelihood ofthem returning is greater: going a secondtime is made easier on the basis of theprevious migration experience. Besidesseeking employment and adventure, anothercause of departure may be the intention tocross the border between Iran and Turkeyand move onward to Western Europe.

Women seem to be less mobile than men anddo not travel anywhere without a malecompanion. However, although they receivelittle public recognition, this does not meanthat they do not play a role in the shapingof Afghan migratory strategies. The role ofa mother in deciding whether her son migratesis not usually acknowledged in public, but itwas found in many cases to be crucial.Furthermore, the reduced presence of menin their home villages may allow women toovercome the usual division of householdtasks and, in many cases, to engage inotherwise forbidden agricultural labour. Thesimple fact that so many young men havebeen, and are, absent has brought social andcultural changes to the division of the tasksbetween genders and generations, and hasallowed many rural and urban women to gainsome responsibilities and a new visibility.



Although migratory movements acquired anunprecedented scale during the war, theyhave existed for a long time in one form oranother and have remained in the collectivememory of all Afghan communities. They donot necessarily have the traumaticsignificance that is often attributed to them;individual mobility and the dispersion offamilies or mutual support groups are notalways experienced as destructivephenomena. Seen through the migratoryprism, the concepts of “economic migrant”,“political refugee”, “country of origin”, “hostcountry”, “voluntary” or “forced” migration,or even “return”, appear reductionist. Allthese categories overlap in the Afghancontext, with its unique combination ofpolitical, cultural, economic and ecologicalfactors.

4.1 Border crossings, smugglingnetworks and deportation

Since 1978, persistent insecurity, along withthe destruction of much of the country’sinfrastructure, has meant that travel hasbeen a potentially perilous undertaking.Numerous obstacles stand in the way ofAfghans intending to go to Iran, Pakistan orthe Arab Gulf states. Formal border crossingshave often been closed for periods of timeover the past 25 years, and the large majorityof migrants have resorted to using smugglersto cross international borders.

Official passports, visas and other legaldocuments are difficult — for some virtuallyimpossible — to obtain. In particular, for themajority of migrants from rural areas,obtaining a passport to cross the borderthrough formal border crossings is a time-consuming and costly experience. There is aflourishing black market that reflects thisand exploits potential migrants’ poverty andlack of knowledge of the official processes.

The main difficulties in acquiring passportsand visas are related to the centralist policiesof the Afghan administration and the factthat the system is highly bureaucratic. Mostprovincial administration offices are not ableto issue passports, and applicants must travelto a major city such as Kabul, Mazar-i Sharif,Kandahar, Herat or Jalalabad. The officialprocess involves showing proof of citizenship,sound financial status and non-existence ofa criminal record to the local passport office,which is supposed to verify the informationthen provide a letter of recommendation tofacilitate the process. When this has finally

4. The Experience of Migration and Decisions aboutReturn

Afghans protest against newIranian visa regulation

Excerpt from report by Afghan IndependentRadio Sahar

[Presenter] Hundreds of people who hadapplied for Iranian visas staged a protestin front of the Iranian Consulate [in HeratProvince] yesterday. Protestors, who hadspent several nights queuing to get a visa,are complaining about the recent announcementaccording to which all Afghan travellerswill need a letter of invitation to crossthe border.

[Unidentified man] The consulate does notissue visas. We are really confused.Corruption or nepotism may have caused thisproblem. I have been waiting here for fournights, but have not yet got a visa.

[Presenter] In the meantime, Najafimanesh,the Iranian consul, said that they hadlimits in issuing visas for citizens, addingthat the number of people applying for visashad recently increased considerably andIranian officials were unable to issue visasfor all of them. He stressed that travellingto Iran with legal documents was completelyfree.

[Najafimanesh] We have limited capacity inissuing visas and our employees cannot meetthe demands of the large number of peoplewho apply for them. However, I want toassure the people not to worry as they willnot face any serious problems.

Source: BBC Monitoring, 10 May 2006 (Radio Sahar,Herat, in Dari, 10 May 06)



been obtained, the costs of travel, board andlodging in the city are an extra financialburden.

For these reasons, many Afghans continue toresort to crossing borders illegally, withoutformal documentation. In the Iranian casemore than the Pakistan case this means relyingon smuggling networks, even though the tripis made risky by the presence of bandits aswell as Iranian police who can arrest anddeport the newly arrived migrants. Migrantsare said to have suffocated to death in theirvehicles, or been shot at by Iranian police.

Some migrants are guided by a sarparast,often a relative, neighbour or friend whotakes on that role as he is either the oldestor the most experienced when it comes totravelling to Iran. When younger men travel

for the first time to Iran, smugglers from thearea of origin often provide guidance, dealwith the Baluch smugglers, and hand overpayment on behalf of the group. The factthat a smuggler is often closely connectedto the migrants he accompanies, either fromthe same village, area or ethnic group,establishes a degree of trust in thetransaction. The smuggler sometimes joinsthe group all the way to Iran, and is likely tobe well connected in certain neighbourhoodsin the city of destination.

The smuggler sometimes acts as a source ofcredit for the migrant. The money is eitherpaid at the end of the trip, by relatives oracquaintances of the migrant in the place ofdestination, or the migrant is brought to anemployer who is known to the smuggler toenable him to start earning money

Box 8. Narrative of the border crossing to Iran in the 1990s

We got going very early in the morning. We were told it was the day to leave, that we had to set off. Thesmuggler brought a couple of Toyotas. It was 6am; each Toyota was crammed with 20–25 people. The roadswere bad. The cars arrived at the foot of the mountain, then we continued on foot. It was close to thefrontier; the mountain lies between the frontiers of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Altogether there werea good 100 or 150 of us. Well, we went in two groups; we went with the people who had been waiting forus, and we got together around 2pm. We had a bit of bread, but there wasn’t any water on the mountain;some had brought a little water, but others hadn’t. Then we headed off. There are always thieves in thosemountains, because the Baluch themselves know that a certain number of people will be passing throughthat day. They wait there quietly and then seize the migrants’ watches, rings, fine clothes and shoes; theytake whatever they fancy. People are left naked! Well, when we went there that day, half an hour earlier,we saw a lot of thieves waiting, but they thought we weren’t going to come and left. Really, they arealways posted on the road used by migrants. The road in the mountains was very long – three or four hoursof walking.

How did we set off? There were three or four smugglers in all, surrounding the migrants on all sides, onall four sides, and ahead were the Baluch guides. They knew the situation. For example, when there wassome danger, they told the people to sit down, then to start walking again, then to go faster or slower,not to make any noise, etc. So, they went on ahead. If the migrants made some noise, they beat themmercilessly, beat them with sticks. So, it was very dangerous. When we left the mountain we ran a lot.At night, when it was really dark, we slept before starting the journey again. This time we left very quickly;we came down to the frontier and arrived in Iran. It was desert; the migrants went into the undergrowth,because it was dark there and nothing could be clearly seen from outside. We stayed hidden there untilthe smuggler from Iran came to meet the group. The smugglers arranged to meet at such and such a place.Well, we waited, then some smugglers left to see what the traffic was like and whether there were anyIranian soldiers around. They got the picture and when it was quite dark, after nightfall, we set off. Acouple of Toyotas arrived; there were a hundred and fifty of us. Fifty people left, in those two Toyotas;they set off for Zahedan... It was seven in the evening when the first migrants were taken...the rest ofus waited and we stayed there until one in the morning. It was very cold, there was no water, and we werevery hungry. Sometimes people stayed a whole day in the undergrowth, and some died of hunger and thirst.

Source: Adapted from Monsutti (2005)



immediately to repay the debt. The secondcase carries the risk of a loss of freedom,and some migrants are in this way taken into“hostage” by smugglers involved in large-scale trafficking.

In the case of refugees from Nangarhar,crossing the border was not easy, and mostrespondents made the initial trip through themountains on foot, with the assistance ofdonkeys, camels or horses. Some householdssent individual males across the border tocheck the situation and make contact withrelatives who had previously moved toPakistan, but most families simply departed,often in groups with other relatives orvillagers. Migration in search of refuge oftenoccurred during periods of intense fightingbetween the government and variousmujahidin factions,33 and travel was oftendone at night. It was especially difficult forwomen and chi ldren under thesecircumstances. Some families hired or bribedcostly smugglers to assist them, while otherswere helped by mujahidin groups they knewor with whom they had party affiliation. Most,however, did not have any formal assistanceand rather relied on fellow refugees andtribal communities along the way. On thePakistani side of the border, tractors or carswere hired to take them to their destinationsin the North West Frontier Province, wherekinspeople were often anxiously waiting toreceive them.

In general the experience of deportation, aswell as the stories of experienced migrantsabout the difficulties of life abroad, fails todeter others from going. Those migrantsintercepted and arrested while crossing theborder or on their way to an Iranian orPakistani city, often try to cross again. Thecauses of migration, as well as the highfinancial expectations of relatives and thefact that additional debts may have been

taken on to enable the trip, are omnipresentand tend to eclipse all other concerns.

4.2 Remittances and thecirculation of commodities

One of the most striking aspects of migrationis the flow of capital that it draws towardsAfghanistan, or towards Afghans living in hostcountries. Money transfers themselves are amatter of interest for many reasons: theyreveal the existence of social networks linkingfaraway places; they are economicallyimportant for the areas from which themigrants originate; they sustain migration asa strategy of domestic groups; and theystimulate and orient future movement, sincemigrants pass on information aboutopportunities in various regions.

Afghans are part of transnational socialnetworks that function as safety nets andspan not only Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan,but also extend in some cases to Europe,Canada and Australia. These networks linkrelatives and neighbours, and are built onfriendship and common business interests.The remittance system is an integral part ofthe maintenance of transnational networks,as it allows for the transmission of moneyand goods to reconfirm social and economicrelations over a wide geographical space.

There is considerable variation in experiencesrelated to remittances across the study sitesand among different sub-groups ofrespondents — in terms of access, level,direction of flow and source. For example,remittances from single workers are muchhigher and more regular than from families,since the latter often do not have membersleft behind to send money to, and somepoorer families who live in Pakistan or in Iranrarely have much extra money to send backto relatives in Afghanistan.

33 As the resistance against the communist government grew and became more organised, seven major political partiesemerged, primarily based upon geographic location, ethnicity and religious sect. Most of these parties had their headquartersin Peshawar.



Remittances from abroad were mentionedas a source of income for many higher-incomefamilies across the research sites. In Pakistan,respondents reporting that they receivedsupport from Western countries were oftenliving in upper-income areas such asHayatabad in Peshawar or Hazara Town inQuetta, while people from Akhtarabad inPeshawar and Jungle Bagh or Ghausabad inQuetta were not socially and economicallyable to maintain such wide transnationalnetworks. Such external assistance flowingto Afghans in Pakistan may serve to reproducepre-existing inequities.

Findings from Iran suggest a different patterninvolving a contradiction between the extentof transnational networks with Westerncountries, and the amount of remittancesAfghans receive from abroad. Over half ofthe Afghans interviewed there had familymembers living overseas, and many had directcommunication with these relatives. Yet onlya minority claimed that they had everreceived financial assistance from theirrelatives living overseas. Within thesenetworks, cash, gifts and women as bridesare the main “objects” of circulation. Mostrespondents in Iran have maintained linkswith Afghanistan, however many claimedthat their own household’s economic situationwas too weak to support their relatives there.For instance, only one third of respondentsin Mashhad and a quarter of respondents inZahedan had sent money back, and then notas a regular remittance but rather in responseto a request by relatives for a particularurgent need. This is similar to what was foundin Tehran (where a little over half of therespondents interviewed had sent money torelatives in Afghanistan), but contrastsmarkedly with the data on single labourmigrants who remit substantial and regularamounts of money to their families inAfghanistan. Those in this category describedmigration as a coping strategy that allowedtheir family to pay for daily needs, resolvedebts or — in rarer cases —invest in newventures while the former often moved withtheir wider family, leaving few behind in

Afghanistan to support with remittances.

Those intending or needing to remit moneyfrom Pakistan and Iran, particularly labourmigrants, have had to solve the logisticalproblem of sending their savings to relativesin Afghanistan. This problem was especiallyacute in the 1980s and 1990s when no bankswere operational in Afghanistan. When anAfghan (kargar) working in Iran wished tosend his savings back to his family inAfghanistan, he entrusted the money to abusinessman specialising in informalremittances, known as a hawaladar (fromhawala, “payment”, “transfer [of money]”,and by extension “letter of credit” or“cheque”). Both kargar and hawaladar hadto belong to the same lineage or come fromthe same valley. If the relationship was anymore distant than that, a middleman wasneeded. The hawaladar passed a letter onto his partners stating the details of thetransaction (letter b in figure 2) and gaveanother one (letter a) to the kargar, whichhe sent to his family in Afghanistan througha friend going back home. The hawaladarsent the money through the official bankingsystem to Pakistan, where one of his partners(always a close relative) retrieved the money.He may have used it to make a profit throughcurrency exchange, or buy some goods fortrading (wheat, rice, cooking oil, sugar ortea, but also shoes, clothes, cooking pots andother goods). He would send these goods byroad to the family village in Afghanistan,where a third partner ran a shop. The goodswere sold and the proceeds were used toreimburse the kargar’s family. Depending onhow long the deadline for repayment was,and how close the relationship was betweenthe migrant and the hawaladar, thecommission charged was between 2–5 percent.

In the absence of any external guaranteefrom the state, an atmosphere of trust wasessential to ensure that the transaction wasrespected, and such trust could only arise ifthe interaction occurred regularly and overa long period of time. Members of each socialand ethnic group dealt with members of other



groups only when strictly necessary, such asto cross borders or travel in hostile areas.Despite the trauma of war and exile, Afghansmanaged in this way to take advantage oftheir geographic dispersion and the resultingeconomic diversification by developing newtransnational cooperation structures. Half-merchant, half-banker, the hawaladars’expertise in the transfer of funds has keptmoney and goods flowing without interruptionbetween Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan —playing a role that, like migratory movementsfrom Afghanistan, has a long history, butgrew to unprecedented dimensions duringthe war. In recent years, however, with therelative improvement of security in

Afghanistan, an increasingnumber of people are sendingmoney back to Afghanistanthrough a relative or aneighbour travelling thererather than using the hawalasystem.

Migration as a livelihoodsstrategy and the receipt ofremittances are of crucialimpo r t ance f o r manyhouseholds in Afghanistan. Inmost instances, remittancescover the cost of basic needssuch as food, clothes andmedicine. The benefits areoften perceived to be short-term, reconfirming a self-perpetuating cycle withoutcumulative effects. In somecases money remitted is usedto purchase luxury items (cars,cameras, televisions and videorecorders) or for accumulationpurposes, or invested in assetsto increase the wealth of thefamily at home (for examplethe construction of a house orshop) . The sys tem ofremittances was an efficientcoping and adaptive strategyduring the years of war, butto capitalise on it further, it

should be complemented by an accessibleand flexible credit system that would allowit to contribute more formally to Afghanistan’sreconstruction.

As noted, besides its economic dimension,the remittance system has an important socialfunction — allowing for the reproduction ofsocial ties over time and geographical space.The circulation of people, money, goods anddocuments exemplifies these transnationalconnections. One striking example of thecirculation of people is the transnationalcirculation of women through marriage. Linksbetween the members of solidarity groupsscattered throughout different countries have

Figure 2. Money transfers between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan

Source: Adapted from Monsutti (2004 and 2005)



been strengthened by the Afghan traditionof endogamy, which has often beenmaintained in spite of dispersion. Women inAfghanistan are sent as brides for Afghanmen living in Iran, while Afghan women livingin Iran are sent as brides for Afghan menliving overseas (Europe, USA, Canada andAustralia). Afghan women living in Afghanistanare said to subscribe to traditional valuesabout gender relations and family life, andthose from rural areas were considered ableto tolerate hardship and difficultcircumstances. Conversely, Afghan men inthe West are said to prefer Afghan womenliving in Iran as brides, as they are consideredto be more “modern” and readily able toadapt to a Western lifestyle. Such circulationof women as brides adds another dimensionto the practice of transnational networks inthe establishment and consolidation ofrelations between the respective families ofthe groom and bride.

4.3 Attitudes towardsrepatriation

The decision to repatriate is much morecomplex than the original decision to seekasylum in the first place. Section 3 illustratedthat war, the associated physical violence,and the conflict’s economic repercussionswere primary causes of large-scale populationmovements from Afghanistan. But it cannotbe assumed that a simple reversal of thethreats to physical safety is reason enoughto prompt repatriation.

Over the years of the Soviet occupation inAfghanistan, it was those originating fromrural areas who constituted the majority ofthe Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran.And after over two decades in Karachi,Peshawar, Tehran or Mashhad, they havebecome urbanised in many ways, and areoften unwilling to go back to their place oforigin. Social, ethnic, religious and economictensions played an influential role in thedecision to migrate, and many of thesetensions remain to this day. The rebuilding

of infrastructure — irrigation channels, roadsand water supply — is necessary to attractpotential returnees, but it is not sufficientin itself. While some migrants do have familymembers looking after the land they leftbehind, many do not, and they cannot besure of whether they will have access to theirown land if they go back. With insufficientincome from agriculture, many poor familieswere engaged in seasonal migration longbefore the Soviet invasion, and for them theincentives to repatriate to their villages oforigin are weak.

Lack of access to agricultural land in villagesplays an important role in decision-makingabout return. This is partly explained by thefact that as families have grown larger overthe last two decades, their land holdingshave remained the same, and it is thereforeimpossible for many refugees to go back totheir place of origin and rely primarily ontheir land for their livelihoods. The war andits displacement of populations has resultedin a sharp rise in land disputes issues acrossAfghanistan, which has influenced the decisionof repatriated Afghans to opt for settlementin cities. Many respondents mentioned thatthe Afghan government should providereturnees sponsored loans or some form ofland distribution. Prior home ownershipappears to have some bearing on people’sintention to return to Afghanistan, as doescurrent access to that property. People whohad arranged their house to be looked afterby relatives were significantly less willing toreturn than those who had leased their houseto non-relatives.

The decision to return cannot be consideredin isolation from the experiences of Afghansin Pakistan or Iran, their links withAfghanistan, and the local socioeconomicand political networks they have established.It also needs to be understood that a wholegeneration of Afghans has now been born andraised in Pakistan and in Iran. These youngpeople have minimal physical connectionswith Afghanistan; they have very differentaspirations and goals to those of their parents



and may not consider repatriation a viableoption. Exposed to a less conservative socialenvironment, and to social services includinghealth and education, public transport,electricity and telecommunication, Afghanshave experienced a standard of living almostunknown in Afghanistan.

Women and young people are particularlyreluctant to go back to their villages of origin.For them, a return to Afghanistan may meanan increased workload in the home, socialpressure to dress and behave in certain waysand restrictions on mobility. Iran and Pakistanoffer not only household utilities, but alsoeducation and health opportunities that theywould not have in Afghanistan. The closestoption would be Kabul, but living costs thereare high. The desire for services is particularlygreat for those who have spent years in Iranor Pakistan. A romanticised perception ofrepatriation may coexist with the need toresolve pragmatic issues, and education andhealth often appear as a stronger concernthan security.

Male members of refugee families have usuallybeen more mobile than women and children;they have been able to visit Afghanistan andmaintain stronger physical links with the areaof origin. Some women and children whohave not personally had these links perceivetheir country of origin as undeveloped andunsafe, with no health, education andsanitation facilities. Ambivalent feelings areoften present in the same person: many youngpeople assert their commitment toreconstructing Afghanistan (often associatedwith yearnings for the climate, fresh air andpure water), but they are also concernedabout the lack of facilities and underdevelop-ment.

With the development of telecommunicationnetworks in Afghanistan, media has taken onan increasingly important role in deciding torepatriate. BBC and Voice of Americabroadcasts in Dari and Pashto are regularlyfollowed as sources of immediate informationabout political and military events in

Afghanistan. But while Afghans are generallywell informed and discuss current affairs atlength, they do not fully trust the media.They depend largely on local sources ofinformation to guide their decision-makingabout returning to their places of origin.Many respondents said they relied onanecdotal or highly individualised informationin making their assessments regardingrepatriation and its dangers. There was someevidence that Afghans doubted the mediaand province-based reports they receivedfrom the UN regarding conditions inAfghanistan.

The challenges faced by returning familiesare alleviated through support provided bytheir relatives and friends, who can assist infinding work, housing and employment, andby providing credit and information. Undersuch conditions, the repatriation of only partof a family often emerges as a pragmaticstrategy. For example, rather than twobrothers going back to Afghanistan to cultivateland, one may try to find work in Kabul orstay in Pakistan and support family membersliving there. This shows a conscious effort torisk-share within a large family, and apractical intra-household allocation ofresources through the planned dispersion ofmembers of a family. However, data fromIran and Nangarhar challenge the notion thatin the event of return to Afghanistan, familieswould leave some members behind to remitmoney to help finance the family’sreintegration. In both of these sites, almostall the interviewed families intended to return(Iran) or did return (Nangarhar) as intactfamily units to Afghanistan.

Many Afghans, while claiming allegiance totheir country of origin and expressing theirdesire to contribute to nation building, werekeen to point out some key reasons forremaining in Pakistan or Iran. First, therewas a perception that the writ of the Afghanstate does not extend beyond certain urbanareas, limiting the protection that the statecould offer its citizens. Second, respondentswere of the view that warlords had not yet



been fully demilitarised. Third, and perhapsmost importantly, there was a generalconcern about the economic opportunitiesoffered by the labour market in Afghanistan.

In general, uneducated Afghans in Iranseem unwilling to return.34 Repatriation wasconsidered to be easier and more likely to besuccessful for those with capital or witheducation and vocational skills because ofthe widespread presence of UN agencies andinternational NGOs in Afghanistan. Some non-formally educated respondents expressedconcern that work opportunities inAfghanistan would be restricted to seasonalmanual labour. Even where respondents feltthat jobs were available, they were worriedabout uneven development in Afghanistanand considered these opportunities to belimited to a few urban centres.

Those who have set up lucrative businesses(this is the case in Pakistan more than inIran), such as carpet or hide trading, arereluctant to repatriate, but maintain highlevels of commercial activity and social tieswith Afghanistan. Those Afghans in Pakistan whoare less well-off and who rely on the casuallabour market are more likely to be optimisticabout returning to Afghanistan.

Many Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, in spiteof the hardship they face, have access tosome social services, including education,medical facilities, water supply, electricityand gas. There is a widespread perceptionthat such services will not be available tothe same extent in Afghanistan.

Finally, some respondents seemed to beconcerned about Afghanistan becoming a“westernised and un-Islamic” country. Theyworry that Islamic laws are no longerapplicable, and that people are indulging indrinking and gambling. These concerns were

particularly pronounced among parents whowere concerned that their children would“westernise” in Afghanistan.

Afghan willingness to return to their countryof origin under current conditions isdetermined by several factors:

• duration of residency outside Afghanistan,(long-term refugees are less willing toreturn);

• place of domicile in Afghanistan (originalrural-dwellers are less willing to returnthan original urban-dwellers because ofhardship and insecurity in rural areas);

• gender (women were less willing to returnthan men);

• level of education (those with a lowereducational level were less willing toreturn than those with a higher education)— several parents mentioned theirchildren’s education as a reason forremaining in Iran or Pakistan; and

• occupational and economic security (thosewhose financial situation had improvedwere less willing to return than thosewhose situation had worsened or notchanged).

4.4 Transnational networks askey livelihood strategies

The migration of Afghans is neither definitivenor temporary. The various displacementhistories of respondents interviewed in thisresearch project clearly show that migratorymovements are not unidirectional, but thatit is more appropriate to speak of recurrentmultidirectional movements. Individualmembers may separate from their householdsin search of work, making use of nationaland transnational networks during their periodof migration; some families have alwaysstayed in Afghanistan, while others went to

34 G. Jamishidiha and Y. Ali Babaie, 2002, “Determinants of Afghan migrants in Iran: Case study Golshahr Mashhad”, [Iranian]Journal of Social Sciences 20(1–2):71–90.



and returned from Pakistan or Iran as a unit.Some individuals and families returnedregularly to Afghanistan during the years ofconflict, exemplifying the recurrentmovements that characterise migration pat-terns. The image that this conjures up is along way from the figure of the refugeecompelled to leave his or her homeland inthe face of a towering threat, with the vaguehope of one day being able to return. Instead,migrating Afghans have established acirculatory territory, and by maintaining adispersion of family members they have takenadvantage of spatial and economicdiversification of livelihood strategies in orderto diminish the risks associated with insecurityand poverty.

A broad network of social relations is vitalto supporting population movements, andtherefore livelihood diversification strategies,because these movements are organised alongcertain cooperative structures andrelationships of trust which neither extendedkinship nor ethnic affiliation alone canexplain. Social relations must extend beyondthe more typical kinship or ethnic affiliations,especially in the context of migration andinsecurity where relations of trust are bothmore necessary and more difficult to establishand maintain than in the case of a localresidence group. Along the migratoryitinerary, relatives and acquaintances offersupport to each other in an environmentwhich is perceived as hostile. A distinctionmay be drawn between generalisedreciprocity, where the social dimension ofthe transaction is more important than thematerial aspect (and the relationship is notbroken if the beneficiary finds it impossibleto perform a return service), and balancedreciprocity, a direct and immediate exchangeof equivalent goods and services that is notwithout an instrumental dimension. Bothgeneralised and balanced reciprocity practicesenhance social ties: they reconfirm thetransnational networks that drew the migrantsto the place of destination in the first place.

In the absence of a genuine rule of law, illegalborder crossings as well as successful cross-border financial transactions depend upontrust and closeness among the people involvedin these activities. Many Afghan socialnetworks with an international dimensionremain compartmentalised along social,regional, religious or ethnic lines. This is theparadox of the migratory networks establishedby Afghans: they cover huge geographicalareas yet they rest upon narrowly definedsolidarity groups.

Poverty is not only related to a lack ofeconomic assets, but also to having few orpoor quality social relations (wasita). Lackof wasita limits the livelihood opportunitiesof Afghans in a range of ways. First of all,households with fewer social resources maybe poorly placed to migrate as a unit or tosend individual members away to earn moneyto support the remaining members, as thereis no one with whom to activate informalmechanisms of solidarity. This limits therange of livelihood diversification strategiesavailable, sustaining both conditions ofpoverty and existing inequalities. Most Afghanshave family members or acquaintances intheir neighbourhoods either in their hostcountries or at home, and most borrow moneyfrom, and lend money to, these contacts intimes of need (such as illness, accident,funeral costs, housing bond, marriage costsand smuggling fees for relatives). A lack ofsuch connections based on ties of kinship,tribe, ethnicity, language, religion andpolitical affiliation means a key social safetynet is missing, leading to higher risks ofpoverty. For returnees, employment is oneof the fundamental prerequisites for asustainable livelihood, as income is neededto cover basic needs including rent. Althoughemployment opportunities remain irregularand often insecure, returnees with wasitaare more likely to find work, and if socialnetworks are weak, the need to payintermediaries to find work becomes anadditional obstacle.



Humanitarian organisations assisting Afghanrefugees have not, to date, taken sufficientaccount of the fact that geographicaldispersion is likely to be a lasting phenomenonresulting from explicit choices made atindividual or household levels — often relatedto diversifying existing insecure livelihoods.Refugees and migrants are not resourcelessvictims; they are able to assess the limitedrange of options open to them and to choosestrategies that provide increased security.Labour migration or remaining in a hostcountry as long as possible are two suchstrategies. A greater focus on the strategiesand cycles of migration demonstrates thatmobility is not necessarily an anomaly or atrauma, and that increasingly the migrationof all Afghans cannot necessarily be definedas something forced. For young men inparticular, it is a means of realising personalautonomy, and plays an important role in theconstruction of masculinity. They often marryonly after they have spent a number of yearsin Pakistan, Iran, the Emirates or Saudi Arabia.

Migration is a way of diversifying social andeconomic assets (and it is in this way a survivalstrategy), and it is also a kind of rite ofpassage to adulthood for young men.

On the basis of the 1951 Convention Relatingto the Status of Refugees, and the 1967Protocol, international law distinguishesrefugees and internally displaced personsfrom migrants. This legal approach isnecessary for aid agencies and governments,but it does not correspond to the currentexperience of many Afghans, who, due tothe protracted nature of their refugeesituation, have moved from being refugeesin need of substantial humanitarian supportto being migrants seeking some form of legalstatus and secure livelihoods in their countryof residence. The management of Afghansliving in Pakistan and Iran could be improvedby integrating a livelihoods perspective whichwould recognise the blurring of boundariesbetween these categories which has occurredover time.



Policy options regarding Afghan migrationhave generally been framed within the“conflict-refugee” approach, which presumesthat Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan or Iranin order to escape from war, and that theywill return once the fighting is over. The casestudies carried out in Afghanistan, Pakistanand Iran approach the subject more broadly,from the perspective of “transnationalnetworks” – acknowledging the complexityof the experience for the population ofAfghanistan. The reasons for large numbersof Afghans remaining in their neighbouringcountries can no longer be reduced to theirexposure to armed conflict. While violenceand insecurity provided the backdrop fromthe late 1970s onward, the precise ways inwhich people were affected varied betweenindividuals, families, social classes and ethnicgroups. Furthermore, the decision to leaveAfghanistan was not unrelated to pre-existingconnections and prior economic expectationsabout their chosen destinations. It is commonto observe complex patterns of movementof individuals and families since the late1970s, including repeated departure andrepatriation. Pre-existing social networks,which cannot be reduced to kinship orethnicity but extend to and beyond tribe,religion or political affiliation, have beencritical in protecting, facilitating andsustaining Afghans on the move. The casestudies documented many examples of peopletravelling back and forth between their placeof origin in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Iran,despite the fact Afghans have been, sincelate 2001 and the fall of the Taliban,increasingly vulnerable to police harassmentin these host countries.

The reasons for returning to Afghanistan arenot simply the inverse of the reasons forleaving. The decision to stay away fromAfghanistan or to return is taken under a verydifferent set of circumstances than thosewithin which the decision to flee was made.

The political context has changed, but theexperience of migration itself has transformedrefugees; they have different expectationsand aspirations from those that they broughtwith them.

The refugee perspective that informs thecurrent policy paradigm of Iran, Pakistan andthe UNHCR is too simple a framework toincorporate the multiple dimensions andcomplexity of the Afghan migrationexperience. It is unrealistic to expect that acessation of conflict and political uncertaintywithin Afghanistan will automatically lead tothe return of all people of Afghan origin. Itwould be more accurate to see migrationbetween Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran asan ongoing historical phenomenon, whosescale dramatically increased with war butwhich will continue, as it did before, evenin the absence of military and political crises.The policies of regional governments mustmove away from the present-day frameworkand pay more attention to the actualstrategies and obstacles of Afghans.

Afghan population movements blur theboundary between forced and voluntarymigration, as the social strategies of peoplelabelled as refugees and those of economicmigrants are sometimes very similar.Considering the fact that ongoing migrationis an efficient survival strategy for so manypeople, that it may be seen as a tool ofreconstruction, and that it continues as aconstitutive feature of Afghan livelihoods,there is a real necessity to look beyond thethree solutions to the refugee problemsusually recommended and promoted byUNHCR: voluntary repatriation to the countryof origin, integration in the host country orresettlement in a third country. Such a legalframework is not sufficient for managing thepresent situation, as it is based on the ideathat solutions are found when populations’movements cease.

5. Conclusion and Key Policy Implications



Based on its experience in the region, theUNHCR itself has acknowledged the need fora new approach:

Return to Afghanistan is a much morecomplex challenge than previouslyrecognised. This is attributable not onlyto the challenges inside Afghanistan butalso to the changing nature of populationmovements and social and economic shiftsinduced by protracted exile. [...] Therehave been three major causes ofpopulation movements from Afghanistan– political conflict and violence, naturaldisasters, and economic migration. ManyAfghans cross borders to look for seasonalemployment, to trade, to access services,and to maintain social and familyconnections. These networks may havebecome a critical component in thelivelihood systems of many Afghanfamilies, including returnees.35

The absorption capacity inside Afghanistanis limited, and the national economy needsthe inflow of cash and commodities financedby Afghans living abroad. Full repatriation inthe immediate future is neither feasible nordesirable. Implemented at all costs, it coulddestabilise the fragile equilibrium of therenascent Afghan state and have negativeeffects on neighbouring countries.

Even if the causes of migration are addressedto the greatest extent possible in Afghanistan,and the government of Afghanistan isgradually able to provide more effective,authoritative and democratic leadership,migration will undoubtedly continue becauseof population growth, underdevelopment,localised lack of rule of law, and potentialnatural disasters, as well as the correspondingdemands of the Pakistani and Iranianeconomies.

To eliminate the costs – financial and

otherwise – to Afghan migrants who seekwork in Pakistan, Iran and further beyond,while ensuring both individual and statesecurity, the following recommendations aredrawn from this three-country study:

• Implement economic developmentstrategies and policies which createquality employment opportunities inAfghanistan. Even with the present influxof foreign money, Afghanistan’s economicdevelopment has not received muchfocused attention or investment. Evenextremely limited prospects in Iran andPakistan are clearly considered betterthan those at home in Afghanistan. Inorder to manage the risk of furtheruncontrolled outflows of population andto foster sustainable reintegration, specialattention should be paid to job creationand skill building, particularly in ruraland urban areas with high rates of return.

• Recognise the inventiveness and dynamismof Afghanistan’s population and startreconstruction programmes by surveyingexisting local potential instead of imposingpreconceived frameworks.

• Improve security in Afghanistan. Unrestis one of the most serious constraints toeconomic development, and it is amotivating factor for ongoing migration.The need to reduce unrest and improvesecurity constitute political governanceissues which must be addressed in order toachieve long-term stability and to fosterthe conditions that support sustainablereturn.

• Invest in health and other social servicesin Afghanistan. This would reduce theneed for Afghans to travel to regionalcountries (mainly Pakistan and India) forfairly routine health-related requirements.The establishment of schools that areable to provide quality education wouldincrease the perception that attendingschool creates life opportunities and

35 UNHCR, 2004.



reduce one of the reasons for families toremain in neighbouring countries –providing their children with qualityeducation.

• Establish bilateral labour and migrationagreements to manage rather thanprohibit movements. A continuedstrengthening of bilateral relationsbetween Afghanistan and Iran andbetween Afghanistan and Pakistan shouldinclude the establishment of a legal labourmigration framework and an increasedpresence of the Afghan government (theMinistry of Labour and Social Affairs) inIran and Pakistan. Such a frameworkshould facilitate formal labour migrationand provide a clear legal identity andlegal rights for labourers. There shouldbe a policy shift from limiting migrationto managing migration – with governmentsreaping the shared benefits of greaterinternational labour mobility and avoidingthe negative effects of people smugglingand corruption.

• Increase awareness of the contribution,in labour and otherwise, of Afghans tothe Iranian and Pakistani economies. Thiswould help reduce discrimination

against Afghans in Iran and Pakistan andpossibly increase interest in establishingmore open labour migration policies.

• Acknowledge and manage the localintegration of a certain percentage ofAfghans living in Pakistan and Iran whowill not choose to return. This wouldaffirm the well-documented realitythat certain groups of Afghans are wellestablished abroad and have feweropportunities at home.

• Improve the transparency of processesfor accessing passports and visas to reduceexploitation, costs and risks to Afghansintending to travel to Iran and Pakistan.

• Create a formal but flexible credit systemin Afghanistan to facilitate the contributionof remittances to the reconstruction ofthe Afghan economy. Accessible andflexible banking facilities would allow forthe conversion of money into loan andinvestment funds that could be used torebuild infrastructure and starteconomically productive activities.

• Ensure that the needs and interests ofvulnerable Afghans remaining in Iran orPakistan are met by upholding all meansof refugee protection.



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Collective for Social Science Research. 2006b. Afghans in Quetta: Settlements, Livelihoods,Support Networks and Cross-Border Linkages. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit.

Colville, R. 1998. Afghan refugees: Is international support draining away after two decadesin exile? Refuge. 17(4):6–11.

Connor, K.M. 1987. Rationales for the movement of Afghan refugees to Peshawar. In G.M.Farr and J. G. Merriam (eds), Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival, 151–90. Boulderand London: Westview Press.

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Grace, J. and A. Pain. 2004. Rethinking Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistan. Kabul: AfghanistanResearch and Evaluation Unit.

Habibi, G. 2006. . Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

Hoodfar, H. 2004. Families on the move: the changing role of Afghan refugee women in Iran.Hawwa: Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World. 2(2):141–71.

Hoodfar, H. 2005. Returning to a Home Never Seen: Afghan Youth Facing the Trials andTribulation of Repatriation. Montreal: Concordia University (Department of Sociology andAnthropology). Unpublished manuscript.

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June 2006 Going to Market: Trade and Traders in Six Afghan Sectors,Anna Paterson

June 2006 Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Land Tenure,Alec McEwen and Brendan Whitty

June 2006 Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Opium Cultivation inKunduz and Balkh, Adam Pain

June 2006 Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Animal HusbandryAnthony Fitzherbert

Floortje KlijnJune 2006

June 2006 Poverty Amid Prosperity: Urban Livelihoods in Herat, Stefan Schütte

Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan, Case Study 1: Herat,

May 2006 Water Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Baseline SurveyAlan Roe

May 2006 Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Social Water ManagementJonathan L. Lee

May 2006 Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Irrigation SystemsIan McAllister Anderson

May 2006 Continued Protection, Sustainable Reintegration: Afghan Refugees and

May 2006

May 2006 Provincial Governance Structure in Afghanistan: From Confusion to Vision?Sarah Lister and Hamish Nixon

Gaining Some Ground: Urban Livelihoods in Jalalabad, Stefan Schütte

March 2006 Afghan Returnees from NWFP, Pakistan to Nangarhar Province

April 2006 Searching for Security: Urban Livelihoods in Kabul, Stefan Schütte

Gulbadan Habibi and Pamela Hunte

Jan 2006

March 2006 Looking Beyond the School Walls: Household Decision-Making andSchool Enrolment in Afghanistan, Pamela Hunte

Dwindling Industry, Growing Poverty: Urban Livelihoods in Pul-e KhumriStefan Schütte

All AREU publications can be downloaded from www.areu.org.af.Hard copies are available by contacting the AREU office in Kabul.

Recent publications from AREU

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation UnitFlower Street (corner of Street 2)

Shahr-i-Naw, Kabul, AfghanistanWebsite: www.areu.org.af Email: [email protected]



Migrants in Iran, M.J. Abbasi-Shavazi and Diana Glazebrook

afghan transnational networks: looking beyond repatriation · mohajer(in) refugee(s), migrant(s)...

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