adversary proseeding - second amended complaint in new york

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT RETURN DATE: EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK---------------------------------------------------------xIN THE MATTER OF:ELENA SVENSON, CASE NO. 1-12-43050-ess

Debtor. CHAPTER 7--------------------------------------------------------x MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY,

Plaintiff/Creditor,v.ELENA SVENSON, Adversary Proceeding No. 12-01229-ess

Defendant/debtor,BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANA CONDOMINIUM NO. TWO; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INC.,

Defendants/Creditors, SECOND AMENDEDVICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS; BORIS COMPLAINTKOTLYAR, COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC; LANA KAPLUN, personally; FARID BADALOV, personally; BORIS MEYDID, personally; TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED JOHN DOE and JANE JOHNS, personally (fictitious names to be discovered),

Defendants.---------------------------------------------------------------x VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS and BORIS KOTLYAR,

Cross-Claimants,v.MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY,

Cross-Defendant.-----------------------------------------------------------------x

Michael Krichevsky, Plaintiff, Pro Se, sues defendants and under penalty of perjury

respectfully alleges upon his firsthand knowledge, except where it stated upon information and

belief, or where it stated that he verily believes it to be true:

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

This is an action where plaintiff, with “clean hands,” collaterally attacks NULL and

VOID documents, orders, contracts and liens. This is the action were plaintiff exercises his

Constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Said grievances aroused

when the defendants in contracting with plaintiff acted as predators, and some as vultures, to

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obtain their goal of enrichment by unjust and unlawful means. Individual defendants in this case

did not want to work hard and play by the rules as millions of Americans do. No, these

defendants are smarter than other Americans are, and deserve more – or so they think. Defendant

Svenson was the plaintiff’s girlfriend and business partner who never wanted work a day in her

life. After breakup with plaintiff, she wanted to continue her parasitic lifestyle. She did not want

to work and did not want to support her son. To achieve this goal, defendant Svenson attempted

to blackmail plaintiff by threatening to report him and his employer to IRS and FBI, thereby

making his life miserable by being subjected to their investigation and attorney’s expenses.

When her attempt failed, she, using money stolen from plaintiff, started a legal war against him

by unleashing against him four lawyer-bullies along with police, sheriffs and family court.

Defendant Svenson, through fraud, misrepresentations, defamation and violations of Penal Code

of the State of New York, obtained a void order of child support, which allows her not to work

and not to support her son. She and her attorneys committed and conspired to commit numerous

criminal acts in violation of Penal Code of the State of New York.

Defendants Svenson, Edelstein, Kotlyar and their attorneys conspired to extort money

from plaintiff and force him into the short sale of his condominium to Edelstein and Kotlyar.

Watching defendants Svenson, Edelstein and Kotlyar hurting plaintiff and hurting his

condominium interests by not paying common charges, Homeowners Association, its board,

agents and other individual corporate defendants, having fiduciary duty to intervene on behalf of

plaintiff and other homeowners, refused to do so when plaintiff requested help. This is the case

where these officers decided that they do not serve homeowners, but instead homeowners serve

them.

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All of the defendants decided that Plaintiff is weak and too busy defending himself so

they can walk all over him, empty his pockets “while he is laying unconscious and bleeding,”

loot and plunder plaintiff’s hard earned assets. Lana Kaplun, under pretext of acting in the best

interest of homeowners association ordered Farid Badalov and Boris Meydid to create artificial

controversy with plaintiff. In the process, she, using corrupt attorneys and vexatious litigation,

turned about $5000 of alleged debt created by her into about $50,000. Then she added post

factum additional litigation fees and expenses to common charges, filed unlawful liens, started

foreclosure of plaintiff’s unit and made homeowners fit her bills by raising monthly common

charges each homeowner must pay. Her behavior is akin to corporate raider like squeezing out of

minority shareholders.

This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief that challenges the constitutionality of

“Oceana’s Condominium.” bylaws, policy and procedures. Defendants have filed two liens on

Plaintiff’s property without his knowledge while he challenged alleged debt in court. This is also

an action that seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that challenges “Oceana’s Condominium”

practice of deactivating magnetic keys from the amenities, building entrance and gates. Plaintiff

seeks a declaration that Defendants failure to provide proper notice violated the “due process

clause” of the 5th and14th amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, paragraph 6

of the New York State Constitution

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. The plaintiff, Michael Krichevsky, at all times herein mentioned was and still is a

resident of the County of Kings and the State of New York.

2. The defendant, Elena Svenson, at all times herein mentioned was and still is a resident of

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the County of Kings and the State of New York.

3. All defendants did and are doing business and committed herein torts and crimes against

plaintiff and his property in the County of Kings and the State of New York.

4. Venue lies in this District pursuant to Section 1391(b) of Title 28 of the United States

Code.

5. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 1334 of Title

28 of the United Stated Code in that this proceeding arises in and is related to the above-

captioned Chapter 7 case under Title 11 and concerns alleged property of the Debtor,

validity of liens and certain debts in this case.

6. This Court has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to

Section 1334 of Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 157(b)(2) of Title 28 of the

United States Code,

7. This Court has the Federal Question Jurisdiction to hear cases in Law and Equity arising

under violations of Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to Constitution of The

United States - depravation of due process rights by state and federal actors. Additionally,

under 18 U.S.C. § 241: Conspiracy against rights.

8. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) as an

action under the FDCPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction for the state

law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Declaratory relief is available pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

9. This matter is primarily a core proceeding and therefore the Bankruptcy Court has

jurisdiction to enter a final order.

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10. The amount in controversy exceeds $75.000, exclusive of interest and costs.

PARTIES

11. Plaintiff, MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY (“KRICHEVSKY”), self-governed law-abiding

natural person. He was gainfully employed from 1988 until 2010. He lost his federally

protected job due to the torts committed by defendant SVENSON.

12. Defendant, ELENA SVENSON (“SVENSON”), was never gainfully employed since

1986.

13. SVENSON became KRICHEVSKY’s business partner and fiduciary when they in 1991

entered into confidential relationship, and later in 2000 into contracts to borrow money

from a bank and to buy a condominium unit (“UNIT”), which is subject of controversy in

this action. Since SVENSON was in confidential relationship with KRICHEVSKY, she

owed KRICHEVSKY a duty to disclose and the duty of good faith and fair dealings. who

individually committed and conspired with SVENSON and EDELSTEIN to commit

several torts against KRICHEVSKY, UNIT and OCEANA.

14. BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANACONDOMINIUM NO TWO (“OCEANA”) is

homeowners association and must represent ownership interests of:

15. KRICHEVSKY in the unit and common areas; and

16. other owners individually and as a whole.

17. OCEANA must act on behalf of unit owners as:

18. fiduciary; or

19. an agent; or

20. both.

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21. OCEANA, by individual officers and board members as whole, has duties, inter alia, of

care, good faith and fair dealings on behalf of unit owners and caries vicarious liability

for its unlawful or negligent operation; actions or inactions of its officers, members or

employees resulting in damages to both the units and unit owners due to negligence or

other misconduct.

22. LANA KAPLUN (“KAPLUN”) is unelected, de facto president of OCEANA since 2006.

23. KAPLUN is in privity with KRICHEVSKY, and

24. has a duty of care,

25. duty of loyalty;

26. duty to account;

27. duty of confidentiality;

28. duty of full disclosure;

29. duty to act fairly; and

30. duty of good faith and fair dealing.

31. KAPLUN must act on behalf of UNIT and/or unit owners and KRICHEVSKY as:

32. fiduciary; or

33. an agent; or

34. both.

35. Upon information and belief, from about 2006 and through 2008 KAPLUN, as an

accountant and president of OCEANA, or through agency relationship with real estate

management company, was in control of:

36. OCEANA’s mail box where checks for common charges were mailed by owners; and/or

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37. bank account where owners, as an alternative method of payment, electronically

transferred money using “ONLINE BILL PAY” service; and/or

38. the bank account checkbook of OCEANA from which she wrote checks to lawyers,

accountants and other contractors.

39. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INC, (“IRS”), unlawfully placed a void lien against

KRICHEVSY’s UNIT.

40. VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS is former tenant of SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY,

who individually committed and conspired with SVENSON and KOTLYAR to commit

several torts against KRICHEVSKY, UNIT and OCEANA.

41. BORIS KOTLYAR is a boyfriend of EDELSTEIN, who individually committed and

conspired with SVENSON and EDELSTEIN to commit several torts against

KRICHEVSKY, UNIT and OCEANA.

42. COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC (“COOPER”) is a real estate management

corporation, which by its officers and employees, has duties, inter alia, of care, good faith

and fair dealings, and must act on behalf of KRICHEVSKY and unit owners as:

43. a fiduciary; or

44. an agent; or

45. both.

46. Alternatively, COOPER must act on behalf of OCEANA and unit owners as:

47. fiduciary; or

48. an agent; or

49. both.

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50. COOPER, by its officers and employees caries vicarious liability for its unlawful or

negligent operation; actions or inactions of its officers and employees resulting in

damages to both the units and unit owners due to negligence or other misconduct.

51. FARID BADALOV (“BADALOV”) is licensed real estate agent and officer or employee

of COOPER.

52. BADALOV must act on behalf of the UNIT, unit owners and KRICHEVSKY as:

53. fiduciary; or

54. an agent; or

55. both.

56. BORIS MEYDID (“MEYDID”) is licensed real estate agent and officer or employee of

COOPER.

57. MEYDID must act on behalf of the UNIT, unit owners and KRICHEVSKY as:

58. fiduciary; or

59. an agent; or

60. both.

61. LANA KAPLUN, FARID BADALOV and BORIS MEYDID are natural persons who

are employed by COOPER or OCEANA. They claim to be the "authorized and

designated custodians of records" for all or nearly all of the accounts on which they file

liens and lawsuits against the unit owners. Defendants regularly collect consumer debts

alleged to be due to another. Defendants are "debt collector" as defined by the FDCPA,

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

62. Under New York law, a fiduciary relationship exists from the assumption of control and

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responsibility, and is founded upon trust reposed by one party in the integrity and fidelity

of another. KRICHEVSKY is in privity with KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID, and

sues KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID personally for breach of fiduciary duty, trust

and other misconducts as officers and fiduciaries of OCEANA and COOPER.

63. John Doe and Jane Johns are unidentified or unknown to KRICHEVSKY unlawful actors

of OCEANA or COOPER, or both who harmed him. They are persons associated with

OCEANA and/or COOPER who were involved in the violations of laws alleged in this

Complaint.

64. Also, KRICHEVSKY sues individual defendants personally because they each

committed torts:

65. on their own;

66. and against interests of homeowners they work for; or

67. intentionally and knowingly acted upon unlawful policy or order of superior, and/or

68. superiors themselves; and/or

69. conspired with other defendants to harm KRICHEVSKY and the UNIT. Their actions or

inactions were against public policy.

70. Alternatively or in addition, KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID sued by

KRICHEVSKY personally because they each committed torts:

71. on their own;

72. negligently, maliciously and recklessly acted against interests of KRICHEVSKY and

homeowners they work for; or

73. negligently and recklessly acted upon unlawful policy or order of superior, and/or

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74. superiors themselves. Their actions or inactions were against public policy.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

75. KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON, unmarried individuals, jointly entered into a written

contract with developer, Brighton Two LLC, to buy the UNIT, known as and located at

120 Oceans, Drive West, Apt. 5D, Brooklyn, NY 11235 as partners.

76. The purchase price for the UNIT was $420,000.00.

77. KRICHEVSKY owns in fee no less than an undivided one-half interest in said UNIT.

78. Said premises were conveyed by deed dated November 26, 2001 and recorded on

February 27, 2002, Reel 5494, Page 2289.

79. On or about December 2005, both SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY moved out of the

UNIT and entered into a one-year lease agreement with EDELSTEIN at a monthly rent of

$2,500. The lease contained an option to renew for an additional three years at 3% annual

increases.

80. At the beginning of 2008, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY decided to break up as couple.

81. However, they continued to be in fiduciary relationship because they had son and jointly

owned property.

82. At all relevant times, SVENSON starts using a legal advice of her attorneys to commit

series of torts against her son, KRICHEVSKY and the UNIT.

83. On or about April 2009, KRICHEVSKY notifies EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR through

their attorney, Nicholas Ratush, that SVENSON refused to pay KRICHEVSKY or

OCEANA common charges out of rent money she received from EDELSTEIN and

KOTLYAR.

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84. EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR violated, inter alia, New York Real Estate Law by refusing

to pay common charges to OCEANA out of rent money they paid to SVENSON.

85. KRICHEVSKY is informed and verily believes that since August 2008 until November

2009, SVENSON has collected and retained all rent monies received from EDELSTEIN,

which is at least $35,000.

86. Upon information and belief, SVENSON never paid any income tax from the above

amount of money.

FIRSTCAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON - Life Long Fraud/Fraud upon The

Court

87. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein.

88. On or about December of 1991 KRICHEVSKY’s friends, Galina and Fred, tell him that

they have mutual friend who is divorced.

89. They introduce SVENSON to KRICHEVSKY and she tells him that she is divorced.

90. KRICHEVSKY trusts SVENSON and enters into confidential relationship with her.

91. Averments stated below, were discovered by KRICHEVSKY on or about October –

November 2008 going forward to 2010 – 2012.

92. SVENSON (maiden name Gaber) fictitiously married Sam Svenson (“SAM”) in order to

emigrate from Germany through marriage with him as US citizen.

93. Upon information and belief, on October 10, 1991 SVENSON signs application for

naturalization in USA, Exhibit A. (same as in amended complaint and incorporated by

reference herein)

94. It is fraud and deceit to start dating KRICHEVSKY as divorcee on or about December

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1991,

95. move in KRICHEVSKY’s apartment in about spring-summer of 1992;

96. and, while living with him in his apartment,

97. on or about April 15, 1993

98. secretly from KRICHEVSKY meet with her fictitious husband, SAM;

99. and both go to tax preparer Rima Rubinstein;

100. and both sign under penalty of perjury joint Income Tax return as husband and wife

living together at 2580 Ocean Parkway, Apt 2M in Brooklyn for the year of 1992 in order

to submit this document to immigration authority and IRS.

101. It is fraud and deceit, secretly from immigration authority, IRS and KRICHEVSKY, a

few month later to file for divorce

102. on the grounds that SAM in 1992 left marital residence,

103. which they claimed to be at 2580 Ocean Parkway, Apt 2M in Brooklyn,

104. and constructively abandoned SVENSON.

105. Upon information and belief, their divorce papers state that SAM constructively

abandoned SVENSON on or about August of 1992.

106. In spring of 1992, SVENSON introduces KRICHEVSKY to her parents who, she says,

leave at 2580 Ocean Pkwy, Apt. 2M, Brooklyn New York. Accordingly, SVENSON and

SAM never leaved at said address.

107. These fraudulent and deceptive acts defrauded government, KRICHEVSKY and

constitute fraudulent concealment of her “fictitious” marital status.

108. Upon information and belief, the person named SAM SVENSON is fiction created for

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fictitious marriage of defendant SVENSON, maiden name Gaber.

109. Upon information and belief, the person named SAM SVENSON does not exist because

the Social Security number of fictitious SAM SVENSON belongs to the person named

ANISIM ZVIDRIN, likely a Gaber’s family friend.

110. SVENSON knew or should have known that there was a presumption by immigration

authorities that their marriage is fictitious and is made for SVENSON to obtain residency

in USA.

111. To rebut this presumption SVENSON and SAM required production of real and/or

documentary evidence that they live together as husband and wife.

112. Upon information and belief, to accomplish this they produced 1992 income tax return

and submitted it to immigration authorities and IRS.

113. Upon information and belief, by this trick SVENSON fraudulently conceals from

immigration authorities and IRS that she actually lives with KRICHEVSKY in his

apartment, and not at 2580 Ocean Parkway, Apt 2M in Brooklyn with SAM.

114. Additionally, the fact that SVENSON lived with KRICHEVSKY while married to SAM

constitutes adultery. That fact would make her a ‘person of bad moral character’ by

immigration authorities and make her not eligible to obtain a legal status in USA.

115. SVENSON knew that she was not divorced, because she was married from 1988 until

1994 to SAM. Accordingly, it was misrepresentation of material fact, known to be false

when made, to induce KRICHEVSKY to rely on misrepresented fact. KRICHEVSKY

justifiably relied on misrepresentation that she is divorced and honest with him. This

fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation later on detrimentally resulted in damages.

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116. In 1994 the parties’ child, David, was born.

117. Upon information and belief, in 1994 SVENSON breached KRICHEVSKY’s trust and

used KRICHEVSKY to further commit marriage and immigration fraud by inducing

KRICHEVSKY to name his newborn son David Svenson instead of David Krichevsky.

118. At all relevant times, she lied to KRICHEVSKY that she went to Astrologist and he told

her that she has to change her name to SVENSON from Gaber and her children should

have the name SVENSON as well.

119. Even though her marriage with SAM is fictitious, she knowingly submits her paperwork

for US Citizenship and Naturalization as if “David Svenson, Elena Svenson and Sam

Svenson are real family.”

120. Accordingly, SVENSON’s Citizenship, passport and other documents with the name

SVENSON are VOID, and this type of fraud upon the government has no statute of

limitation to prosecute.

121. The fact that SVENSON comes from GERMANY to USA, gets married to SAM, and at

the same time tells the world and KRICHEVSKY that she is divorced and looking to

form a family,

122. forms a family with KRICHEVSKY while married is an evidence of immigration fraud.

123. If immigration authorities knew the truth stated above, SVENSON would never receive a

legal status in USA and would be jailed.

124. If KRICHEVSKY knew the truth, he would act differently and would not even talk to

SVENSON.

125. As a direct and proximate result of fraudulent concealment, deceit and misrepresentation

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of material facts and reality, SVENSON induced KRICHEVSKY into relationship

financially supporting her for more than 15 years.

126. In the year of 2000, SVENSON tells KRICHEVSKY and his friends that she would

graduate from her medical school in 2001.

127. SVENSON, by the above false statement, on or about August 2000 induced

KRICHEVSKY into joint purchase of UNIT by intentionally misrepresenting to

KRICHEVSKY that in 2001 she would graduate from her medical school, will become a

doctor and will contribute to expenses associated with purchase of UNIT, as well as to

future expenses.

128. SVENSON induced KRICHEVSKY into joint purchase of UNIT by, knowingly and

intentionally, withholding the fact that from 1998 until 2001 she did not attend her school

at all.

129. SVENSON induced KRICHEVSKY to lend the money for her medical business.

130. SVENSON, instead of contributing and repaying money to KRICHEVSKY, fraudulently

concealed embezzlement, conversion or fraudulent transfer of at least $100,000 from

joint account to her personal accounts, friends and relatives, Exhibit B.(same as in

amended complaint and incorporated by reference herein).

131. Even though SVENSON, at that time, had several personal bank accounts, she

intentionally wrote several checks out of party’s joint checking account to her family

members and friends in Germany without KRICHEVSKY’s knowledge and consent.

132. After the sale of her cooperative apartment, she told KRICHEVSKY that she deposited

the check into party’s joint checking account, but she never did this.

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133. Accordingly, KRICHEVSKY’s contract with SVENSON to buy the UNIT is void due to

fraud at the inducement; and her title to the UNIT is void as well.

134. Additionally, every document signed by SVENSON is nullity.

135. KRICHEVSKY trusted SVENSON and justifiably relied on her misrepresentations and

fraudulent concealment to his detriment and loss.

136. Her misrepresentations, fraudulent concealment of truth and deceit continued from 1991

until present and KRICHEVSKY invokes doctrines of continuous violation and equitable

tolling to deny SVENSON’s affirmative defense of statute of limitation.

137. SVENSON acted unlawfully, maliciously and oppressively. KRICHEVSKY is entitled to

punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest,

expenses and attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and

treble damages to be determined at trial; declaratory judgment that SVENSON’s

citizenship is void due to fraud upon the court; alternatively that court refers this matter

to the Department of Homeland Security or other appropriate authority.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON - Breach of Contract/Constructive

Fraud


139. Before entering into contract to buy the UNIT from developer, SVENSON

misrepresented to KRICHEVSKY that she will graduate from her medical school in

2001, will start work or business and will contribute toward future expenses associated

with purchase of the UNIT.

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140. KRICHEVSKY reasonably relied on this misrepresentation and agreed to enter into

contract with SVENSON.

141. Thereafter, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY jointly applied for a loan from the bank in

order to buy that UNIT.

142. The doctrine of implied contract states that when parties jointly enter into contract with

third party, and there is no express contract between entering parties themselves as to

contract’s special terms and conditions between them, this fact gives an inference and

presumption that each party mutually intended to pay on their own for goods or services

delivered. Accordingly, by jointly entering into contract to buy the UNIT from the

developer, and by jointly entering and applying for the loan from the bank to buy said

UNIT, KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON bilaterally entered into contract with each other

to be duty bound to jointly pay, own, share and care for the unit.

143. The joint contract to buy the UNIT and joint loan application constitutes contract

between SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY for each party’s duty to contribute financially

toward paying off the loan.

144. Because this contract did not specify percentage of financial contribution by each party, it

implied and parties had orally agreed to own equal shares and equally share all costs and

expenses associated with the purchase.

145. At that time, SVENSON owned a cooperative unit located at 2580 Ocean Parkway, Apt.

2M, Brooklyn, NY 11235. SVENSON represented to KRICHEVSKY that she would

obtain a home equity line of credit ("HELOC") against her cooperative unit in order to

liquidate funds necessary for her to contribute her share toward down payment of the

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purchase price of the unit, closing costs and future renovation.

146. SVENSON's HELOC application was denied right before the closing and closing took

place without her contributing any funds.

147. Because SVENSON's HELOC application was denied, she represented to

KRICHEVSKY that she would sell her cooperative apartment and contribute funds later,

after the sale of it.

148. Due to denial of HELOC, KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON had to reapply for new, bigger

loan in order to perform by contract with developer.

149. The closing, which was delayed for that reason, took place on or about November 26,

2001 instead of September 26, 2001.

150. For the reason of delaying the closing, the seller charged buyers additional fees, which

were paid by KRICHEVSKY at closing.

151. KRICHEVSKY solely and completely contributed funds to buy the UNIT, which sums

exceeded 55,000.00 including the down payment and closing costs.

152. On or about November 26, 2001, KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON became the owners in

fee of real property known as and located at 120 Oceana Drive West, Apt 5D, Brooklyn,

NY by purchasing the property from Brighton Two LLC.

153. On or about November 26, 2001, KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON each executed a first

mortgage on the subject property for $378,000.00 held by JP Morgan Chase Bank.

154. SVENSON, by applying for the 30-year loan, enters into contract with KRICHEVSKY

and the bank that she will keep paying for up to 30 years for the unit until it paid off.

155. That required her to have a job or business and to generate income in order to be able to

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fill in loan application.

156. SVENSON knew or should have known that bank would not lend money to any person

without any kind of income.

157. To accomplish the above requirement, in 2000 or beginning of 2001 SVENSON enters

into medical billing and office management business.

158. The business required her to graduate from her medical school in 2001 and obtain a

driver license in order to devote the time for business and to be mobile.

159. She borrows $100,000 from KRICHEVSKY to start and run this business.

160. SVENSON promises to repay the loan when business starts paying back.

161. KRICHEVSKY requests that SVENSON takes over from him all tasks associated with

bookkeeping and banking of their affairs because he does not have time to do it due to

renovation he plans to start on the unit.

162. SVENSON agrees and takes over these tasks.

163. KRICHEVSKY relies on SVENSON’s misrepresentations that she would graduate in

2001, will run business, perform bookkeeping and banking, and lends her money.

164. SVENSON defaulted and breached her contracts and oral agreements with

KRICHEVSKY by failing to graduate in 2001 and obtain a driver license to be mobile.

165. When she graduates in 2004 as psychologist, she fails to find any meaningful job, while

her business goes under and closes with remaining Accounts Receivables.

166. At all relevant times, KRICHEVSKY substantially performs on said contracts by paying

all costs associated with purchase and carrying expenses of UNIT.

167. On or about October of 2002, SVENSONS’ cooperative unit sells for approximately

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$180,000.

168. However, SVENSON fails to contribute any funds toward the purchase of the UNIT.

Svenson's failure to equally contribute to purchase of this UNIT and pay any carrying

costs and expenses associated with the UNIT constitute a breach of the parties' contract to

equally share all costs and expenses associated with purchase of the UNIT.

169. Despite the parties' prior agreement to share costs and expenses, all monthly carrying

expenses including mortgage payments, utility charges, taxes and maintenance fees were

solely and completely contributed by KRICHEVSKY. Said monthly carrying expenses

were approximately $3,500.00.

170. In addition, on or about December 2001, KRICHEVSKY commences major renovations

in the UNIT, which includes a rehabilitation of the bathrooms, closets, kitchen, ceilings

throughout, plumbing throughout, and tiling throughout. Additionally, KRICHEVSKY

earns no less than $300,000 in “sweat equity” in the UNIT. Sweat equity included -

architectural design, decoration, research, supplying materials and labor.

171. All costs and expenses associated with the renovations, totaling over $75,000 (without

mortgage and common charges) were paid solely and completely by KRICHEVSKY.

172. On or about July 2005, KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON try to refinance their mortgage in

order to get a lower monthly payment.

173. Because SVENSON fails to find any job and does not pay her credit card bills on time,

her FICA score is low.

174. That fact makes KRICHEVSKY’s score lower as well, which prevents him from

refinancing.

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175. As the party’s relationship begins to deteriorate and at the advice of mortgage broker,

SVENSON enters into an agreement with KRICHEVSKY, whereby she agrees to

transfer her one-half interest in the subject property back to KRICHEVSKY in order for

him to be the sole borrower and owner, which would qualify him for a higher FICA

score.

176. Thereafter, on or about August 11, 2005, KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON refinance their

mortgage and enter into a loan consolidation, extension and modification agreement

whereby Washington Mutual Bank, N.A. becomes the holder of a consolidated note in

the amount of $565,000 and KRICHEVSKY becomes the sole borrower.

177. All monthly carrying expenses under the refinance agreement, including mortgage

payments, utility charges, taxes and maintenance fees, were solely and completely

contributed by KRICHEVSKY.

178. Said monthly carrying expenses were approximately $2,500 (ARM with negative

amortization).

179. Even though the bank approved SVENSON for a loan in 2001, her failure to

subsequently maintain an income stream forced KRICHEVSKY to pay her share of the

loan and carrying costs and expenses associated with the UNIT, causing KRICHEVSKY

to lose money and other business opportunities.

180. SVENSON has not worked or paid her share of the expenses, though demands have

repeatedly been made.

181. About a week after refinancing, closing agent told Krichevsky that transfer of

SVENSON’s share of the UNIT would cost KRICHEVSKY approximately $50,000.00.

22

182. About a week after closing, KRICHEVSKY learned from SVENSON of an

approximately $100,000 federal tax lien on the UNIT based on SVENSON's failure to

pay her personal income taxes for the 2002 fiscal year. These 2 events prevented

KRICHEVSKY from finalizing transfer of SVENSON’s share of the UNIT to him.

183. SVENSON’s unwillingness to work, constant excuses and promises that never kept plays

major role in break up with KRICHEVSKY in 2008.

184. In 2008, SVENSON secretly offers and negotiates a one-year lease to EDELSTEIN and

KOTLYAR.

185. SVENSON does not tell KRICHEVSKY or ask him whether he would agree with that in

breach of their partnership duties and agreement to do everything jointly.

186. From 2001 until 2008, KRICHEVSKY did not do anything with the UNIT without first

discussing it with SVENSON.

187. SVENSON's offer of a lease agreement to EDELSTEIN during the pendency of a

summary holdover proceeding commenced by KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON

constitutes an intentional breach of the parties' agreement to recover possession of the

UNIT and sabotaged parties’ ability to sell it.

188. KRICHEVSKY is informed by SVENSON’s former partner Gregory Belenkiy and verily

believes that in 2010-2011 she finally received some share of the profits from the

Account Receivable, but failed to disclose this fact to KRICHEVSKY, family court and

bankruptcy court.

189. SVENSON failed to repay KRICHEVSKY the business loan that she received in 2000-

2001.

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190. In 2010 KRICHEVSKY learned from SVENSON’s school record that from 1998 – 1999

until 2001 SVENSON did not attend her medical school at all. If KRICHEVSKY knew

about this fact, he would never enter with her into contract to buy the UNIT and would

never lend the money for medical business.

191. Because SVENSON in all these years, did have money to contribute, her failure to

contribute was fraudulent, unjustifiable, willful and intentional.

192. Svenson's actions have substantially damaged and continue to damage KRICHEVSKY in

an exact amount to be determined at trial, but no less than $600,000.

193. In addition, the defendant acted unlawfully, maliciously and oppressively.

KRICHEVSKY is entitled to punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the

trial.


treble damages to be determined at trial.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON-Waste


195. SVENSON had a duty of care for the UNIT and its value.

196. She knew or should have known that numerous liens on the property together with

foreclosure action diminish the value of the property.

197. She knew or should have known that foreclosure action leads to total loss of the UNIT.

198. She breached her duty and is liable.

199. From 2008 until present SVENSON engages herself in self-destructing behavior against

the UNIT and KRICHEVSY.

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200. SVENSON commits waste and injury upon the UNIT, by neglecting and failing to pay

her personal income taxes for the 2002 fiscal year; thus

201. causing a federal lien to be placed on the property; and

202. by neglecting and failing to pay the loan and common charges out of rent received from

EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR for the UNIT.

203. SVENSON commits waste and injury upon the UNIT by neglecting and failing to:

204. contact IRS and workout a payment plan; or

205. contact her accountant to work out a payment plan with IRS after KRICHEVSKY hires

an accountant for SVENSON; and

206. avoid placement of the IRS lien on the unit.

207. In spring of 2009, KRICHEVSKY’s attorney Daniel Singer, Esq. by OSC notifies

SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR that KRICHEVSKY is unable without rent to

pay and stopped all payments for the UNIT.

208. He warns them of imminent foreclosure and asks the court to order defendants to turn

rent to his escrow account in order to save the UNIT from foreclosure.

209. In reply, SVENSON, while collecting about $2850 in rent, refuses to give any money to

save the UNIT, and instead, knowingly and intentionally commits waste and injury upon

the unit by:

210. hiring and paying cash to numerous attorneys to obstruct and delay justice; and

211. conspiring with EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to

212. delay eviction action KRICHEVSKY starts in 2008 in Kings County Supreme Court and

Kings County Landlord & Tenant Court; and

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213. becoming in contempt of court when she settles for $7000 OSC Hon. Bert Bunyan

worked out with her toward paying expenses for UNIT, but

214. she fails to obey that order; and

215. becomes in contempt, but continues to pay her attorney, BIANCINELLO, to argue her

contempt with KRICHEVSKY and judge.

216. SVENSON knowingly commits waste and injury upon the UNIT by neglecting and

failing to:

217. appear in Civil Court to defend this UNIT when OCENA on or about October 2009 starts

action against SVENSON, EDELSTEIN, KOTLYAR and KRICHEVSKY; and

218. fails to pay common charges out of rent when OCEANA demands payment in court; and

219. defaults in that action while KRICHEVSKY appears to defend the UNIT; and

220. gives OCEANA an opportunity to add legal fees and expenses, late fees; and

221. gives them opportunity to place a lien on the unit due to her default.

222. SVENSON knowingly commits waste and injury upon the UNIT by defaming

KRICHEVSKY in family court; and by

223. defaming and harassing his employer in family court; and

224. personally demanding and causing employer to fire KRICHEVSKY, which in turn made

KRICHEVSKY unemployed and unable to care for the UNIT without an income.

225. Upon information and belief, her attorney Mr. Biancanello latter on dropped her

representation after realizing that he is aiding and abetting her commission of torts.

226. As a direct result or proximate cause of her deliberate self-destructive acts above, on or

about august 2009 Bank of America started foreclosure action against the UNIT.

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227. Above acts constitute an abandonment of her interest in the UNIT.

228. SVENSON's actions have caused KRICHEVSKY damages in an amount to be

determined at trial, but no less than $500,000.


KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial,

including interest and attorney’s fees.

230. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and


FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON – Promissory Estoppel


232. SVENSON should be held liable under the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. She on or

about August 2000 made a clear and definite promise to contribute to down payment of

the UNIT at the time of signing contract with developer to buy the UNIT. Closing was

scheduled to occur a year later.

233. KRICHEVSKY refrained himself from other investment opportunities on his own and

reasonably and foreseeably relied on SVENSON’s promise to his detriment. He was

injured by having to pay virtually all expenses when SVENSON did not keep her

promise.

234. In addition, SVENSON acted unlawfully, maliciously and willfully. KRICHEVSKY is

entitled to punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including

interest and attorney’s fees.


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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON-Constructive Trust/Unjust

Enrichment


236. SVENSON has received the benefit of the payments made by KRICHEVSKY to

purchase the UNIT and acquired a half of the interest in it without paying her half of

price and expenses.

237. During all material times, SVENSON had money available to contribute and pay but

fraudulently concealed it from KRICHEVSKY.

238. Svenson was contractually and equitably obligated to KRICHEVSKY, but fail to pay her

share to purchase said premises thought promised to do so.

239. SVENSON has received the benefit of the payments made from 2000 and continued to be

made by KRICHEVSKY until 2008 to cover all costs and expenses associated with the

subject condominium unit.

240. Contractually, in equity and in good conscience, SVENSON should be ordered to pay her

share of the acquiring and carrying costs and expenses, and should be ordered to transfer

all rent monies collected from the UNIT to KRICHEVSKY.

241. Svenson has been unjustly enriched at the expense of KRICHEVSKY in an amount to be


242. In addition, the defendant acted unlawfully, maliciously and willfully. KRICHEVSKY is

entitled to punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial.


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SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON-Conversion


244. SVENSON, without authority, has refused to provide KRICHEVSKY with his share of

profits derived from the rental of the UNIT.

245. Between 2000 and 2004, SVENSON, without authority, knowledge and consent from

KRICHEVSKY, transferred from parties joint bank account at least $100,000 to her

personal bank accounts, friends and relatives.

246. As such, Svenson has excluded KRICHEVSKY and has wrongfully converted

KRICHEVSKY’s property to her own.

247. KRICHEVSKY demanded that SVENSON returned his property, but she refused.

248. By reason of the foregoing, KRICHEVSKY has sustained money damages together with

interest, expenses and attorney’s fees in the sum to be determined at trial, but no less than

$175,000.


KRICHEVSKY is entitled to punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the

trial.



SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON-Accounting

250. KRICHEVSKY adopts every allegation above by reference herein

251. From about 2000 until 2004, SVENSON fraudulently transferred money from joint

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account to her own; wrote checks to her relatives and friends in Germany; did not deposit

$180,000 check from sale of her COOP.

252. From October 2001 until November 2008, the parties had agreed to pay the joint

obligations for the UNIT including but not limited to: down payment, bank loan, utilities,

maintenance, improvements, repairs and other expenses. Upon information and belief,

SVENSON has failed to pay any noteworthy portion of these expenses. It is unknown

what amounts, if any, have been contributed by SVENSON.

253. In addition, SVENSON has rented the premises without any notice to KRICHEVSKY

and has not accounted for the rents she has presumably received. Additionally, upon

information and belief, she received hundreds of thousands of dollars from her Accounts

Receivable, which she never accounted for.

254. Upon information and believe, SVENSON wired money to Germany or Luxemburg

using account #554 from company RIA.

255. KRICHEVSKY lacks sufficient knowledge of the exact amount of rents and profits due

and owing to him.

256. KRICHEVSKY lacks an adequate remedy at law, as such, an accounting is required,

257. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands order directing SVENSON and EDELSTEIN

to produce all books and records.

EIGHT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON-Partition

258. KRICHEVSKY adopts every allegation above by reference herein.

259. By SVENSON’s breach of the contract, waste and intentional pushing the UNIT into

foreclosure, she abandoned her interest and waved her right to this UNIT.

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260. SVENSON intentionally defaulted in every legal action involving her interest and right to

this UNIT.

261. She deliberately wasted and injured this UNIT and any equity in it she could have

disappeared.

262. She has no stake in it now and uses it as toll to harm KRICHEVSKY and unit owners.

263. KRICHEVSKY no longer able and desires to hold and use the property in common with

SVENSON and is entitled to an order partitioning the premises.

264. Now, the sale of the UNIT for a reasonable price is impossible due to loss of equity in it,

and it is "under water." If the UNIT is sold today, KRICHEVSKY will lose his interest

and money invested in this UNIT.

265. Actions of SVENSON brought about the following negativities that affect the price and

ability to sell the unit, which is: slander of title, clouded title, numerous liens, difficulty

for prospective buyers to obtain a mortgage, and OCEANA initiated additional

foreclosure of the unit.

266. Because SVENSON is literally acting as a "monkey on the back" of KRICHEVSKY, he

is unable to care for or save this UNIT from the future imminent foreclosure by the banks

or OCEANA.

267. SVENSON, having an income and funds is not planning to settle her debts with

OCEANA and KRICHEVSKY. SVENSON's actions have made partition appropriate

and necessary.

268. No settlement between the parties has ever been discussed and the property remains titled

in the names of KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON.

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WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands declaratory judgment awarding

KRICHEVSKY the whole title to the UNIT.

NINETH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON - Fraud upon the Family Court and

Bankruptcy Court


270. In New York, statute of limitation for fraud is six years and this claim is timely.

271. The Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction and the power to void and set aside any

State judgment or order obtained through deprivation of KRICHEVSKY’s constitutional

right to defend himself within due process of law.

272. The final order of the Family Court for child support is VOID due to fraud upon the court

and SVENSON’s attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, misconduct. During the child support

proceedings in Family Court the following KRICHEVSKY’s constitutional rights to due

process of law were violated and denied: the right to face his accuser and examine her

during proceeding, the right to bring a witness in his defense, the right to impeach a

witness against him, the right to discovery, the right to and meaningful opportunity to be

heard, and the right to a competent and unbiased tribunal. As the direct and proximate

result of the above deprivation of constitutional rights, KRICHEVSKY was deprived and

continue to be deprived of Liberty, Property and the Pursuit of Happiness by the State.

273. Before the child support proceeding started in November 2008, SVENSON spoiled the

evidence and filed false family offense petition in Family Court. Then she asked for an

order of protection from KRICHEVSKY. During the order of protection hearing,

KRICHEVSKY testified that immediately after evidence spoliation and false reporting of

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family offense incident SVENSON with son, David Svenson, went to KRICHEVSKY’s

place of employment and both harassed his employer demanding termination of

KRICHEVSKY’s employment. After KRICHEVSKY’s attorney argued that they,

contrary to affidavit for order of protection, were not afraid to meet KRICHEVSKY

there, and instead came in to harass his employer and provoke the violence on

KRICHEVSKY’s part, SVENSON withdrew her petition for order of protection before

the court had opportunity to rule. SVENSON destroyed and/or withheld important for

KRICHEVSKY’s defense his financial and tax records. Then her attorney, Yonatan

Levoritz, entered into evidence in 2009 child support proceedings KRICHEVSKY’s 2003

income tax return as the only available document. He admitted on the record to evidence

spoliation by SVENSON and that this 2003 income tax return was stolen from

KRICHEVSKY. However, when KRICHEVSKY attempted to restore destroyed records

and admit them into evidence, he objected, saying that they are created using Photoshop.

Mr. Fasone sustained his objection instead of sanctioning SVENSON for evidence

spoliation, contrary to law and common sense.

274. During the child support proceeding in August 2009, SVENSON, under oath in court,

and her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, both testified that she is looking for a job and that in

two months she will start work in order to support her son.

275. When one of the parents is going to school full-time, the child support hearing officer

may order working parent to support the non-working while in school. The reason behind

this is that after school is completed, the none-working parent will earn more money,

which will benefit the child.

33

276. Upon circumstantial evidence and belief, SVENSON’s attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, prior

to the next hearing date (October – November of 2009), coached her to lie and change her

prior testimony that she is looking for work and instead testify that she is going to school

full-time. The goal of new testimony was to receive bigger amount of child support than

if she would otherwise get if she would work and study. At that time the child was 14

years old and did not require mother to babysit the child, which made her able to work

and study as millions of mothers do. Because SVENSON already had diploma of

bachelor in psychology, she did not require further education and could find a job as

psychologist or social worker.

277. During a child support proceeding in October – November of 2009, she under oath in

court and her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, both testified that she is going to medical

school full time to become a nurse and she was not looking for a job.

278. SVENSON should have been judicially estopped from such drastic change in her

testimony. KRICHEVSKY’s attorney was surprised by this change of testimony and was

not ready to contradict or impeach it.

279. When hearing officer of family court, Mr. Fasone, asked her when she would graduate,

she told him that in 2012.

280. SVENSON knew that this statement is false because she was looking for a job, and on or

about March of 2010, few weeks after the final order of support was issued, SVENSON

dropped out of school and went to work as home attendant.

281. Alternatively, SVENSON knew that this statement is false because she did not attend her

school at all or dropped out of school during the child support proceedings in 2009-2010.

34

282. Alternatively, SVENSON willfully dropped out of nursing school right after the final

order of support was issued and did not intend to study.

283. Upon information and belief, in order to start working at health care agency, prospective

employee must study and obtain a certificate/license and pass a heath examination.

284. Upon information and belief, she started preparation for that work while testifying that

she is not looking for work and before the child support proceeding was over, thereby

perjured herself.

285. In the same court proceeding, SVENSON caused her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, to

commit Fraud upon The Court by preparing 2 perjurious financial disclosure affidavits,

which he filled in court.

286. Alternatively, her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, committed Fraud upon The Court by

preparing 2 perjurious financial disclosure affidavits without SVENSON verifying

information in them, which he filled in court.

287. Alternatively, SVENSON and her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, knew or should have

known that the statements on these affidavits are false and misleading because during the

court hearing these affidavits and her testimony were impeached by KRICHEVSKY.

288. Her lawyer, Yonatan Levoritz, knew or should have known that after impeachments of

these affidavits and statements of SVENSON, he had fiduciary duty as officer of the

court toward KRICHEVSKY to correct the record by correcting affidavits. He failed and

refused to do so.

289. These fraudulent statements and affidavits were used by Mr. Fasone to create an unjust

and unlawful order of child support.

35

290. At all relevant times, the amount of child support order was bigger than KRICHEVSKY

was earning or had available in cash.

291. Additionally, the child support order is VOID according to Maxims of Law “nobody can

give what he does not have” and “nobody is bound to impossibility.” Therefore, this

order should be set aside and new trial ordered in accordance with Constitution and New

York Civil Procedure Law and Rules.

292. In addition, this order is void because it is unconstitutional. Constitution prohibits

peonage and slavery, and this order turned KRICHEVSKY into a debtor-prisoner because

this debt is unlawful and cannot be extinguished through Bankruptcy. In fact, supervising

judge of family court Paula Hepner, set this order aside and ordered the new trial. She,

also, ordered Mr. Fasone to read and reply in writing to numerous motions that

KRICHEVSKY filed in court prior to her order for new trial. However, Mr. Fasone in

contempt of her order did not comply with all condition precedents to start the new trial;

it did not start and the void order stands.

293. In October 2012, KRICHEVSKY discovered from Bankruptcy Court file that in August

2009, SVENSON fraudulently concealed from the Family Court and KRICHEVSKY

material fact. This fact was that during Child Support and Contempt proceeding against

KRICHEVSKY she was working as home attendant from April 2009, while claiming that

her income is zero and she is going to medical school.

294. By law, she had an obligation to tell the court and KRICHEVSKY that she is working as

home attendant.

295. If SVENSON told the truth during child support and modification of child support

36

proceeding, the amount of child support order would have been different. In fact, it would

have amounted to no more than $298 per month as opposed to $2045 that is unlawfully

ordered now.

296. SVENSON’s discharge in bankruptcy court is VOID. SVENSON’s educational loans

made for the sole wrong purpose – to pretend and tell the Family Court that she is going

to school full time, therefore busy and does not have to work to support her son. Instead,

KRICHEVSKY has to support her while she is in school. She intentionally did not pay

$625 monthly common charges to COOPER out of $2825 monthly rent payments,

although was obligated. Debts that obtained for wrongful purposes are not dischargeable

in bankruptcy.

297. In 2008, KRICHEVSKY asked SVENSON to follow up with collection attorneys

regarding her medical business Accounts Payable and she replied that she did not get any

money yet.

298. In 2010-2011, her business partner Gregory Belenkiy told KRICHEVSKY that

SVENSON recently received her share of money from her medical business Accounts

Payable. He hinted that more is coming, but declined to tell KRICHEVSKY how much

and directed inquiry to SVENSON. In her Bankruptcy Petition and until today,

SVENSON never mentioned her Accounts Payable in Bankruptcy Court, which is fraud,

deceit and misrepresentation.

299. SVENSON intentionally did not report on her Bankruptcy petition any money she

collected from Accounts Payable, which is perjury.

300. KRICHEVSKY, as Creditor, has an interest in this Accounts Payable because he lent

37

SVENSON money for it and performed some work in her business.

301. This Accounts Payable is worth hundreds of thousands of dollars.

302. Alternatively, if she did not receive this money, which is not admitted, she has a claim for

hundreds of thousands of dollars against the Accounts Payable, which she intentionally

did not report as claim on the Bankruptcy petition. This is perjury and fraud upon the

bankruptcy court. KRICHEVSKY requests the court to reopen her case.

303. Out of this Accounts Payable, every creditor can get a relief, including KRICHEVSKY.

304. Alternatively, in fairness and equity, if she did not get any money from her partners,

KRICHEVSKY will ask the court and/or trustee to assign this claim to him for collection

as liquidated damages and/or quantum merit claim.

305. SVENSON denied in Family Court and did not tell Bankruptcy Court that she has about

$50,000 in jewelry. During the child support proceedings, she admitted in her affidavit

that KRICHEVSKY was buying her jewelry on the regular basis. Exhibit C

306. SVENSON did not tell the Family Court and Bankruptcy Court that she operates an

apparel smuggling business with her sister from Germany, and how much they make.

KRICHEVSKY will introduce witnesses in court to prove existence of this business.

307. Then, upon information and believe, she transfers money to Germany using money

transfer company RIA with office located on Brighton Beach Avenue in Brooklyn

through account #554

308. At present time, KRICHEVSKY overpaid SVENSON and demands refund and

restitution.

309. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was fired from his job,

38

suffered a stroke, became disabled and unemployable, lost 70% of his unemployment

benefits, could not sell his UNIT, lost his credit rating and equity in the UNIT

($100,000). All of the above, in turn, had “the falling dominos” effect on his finances and

business plans. KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged

in the future and demands verdict with the exact amount of damages to be determined at

the time of trial, including interest, expenses, and attorney fees.

310. In addition, defendant acted unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public

policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of

the trial.

311. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment declaring the child support order is

void; judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial,

including interest, expenses, and attorney fees.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST EDELSTEIN - Breach of

Contract/Constructive Fraud

312. KRICHEVSKY adopts FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION above by

reference herein.

313. At the termination of EDELSTEIN’s one-year term lease, EDELSTEIN requested that

SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY short-sell the UNIT to her for $650,000.

314. Because SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY declined this offer, EDELSTEIN declined to

exercise the option to renew this lease for another three years until 2009, and

315. requested that she remains as a month-to-month tenant while she explores options to

purchase her own residence, and while KRICHEVSKY tries to sell the UNIT for a higher

39

price.

316. She told KRICHEVSKY that a month-to-month tenancy would be mutually convenient

because it would allow either party to withdraw from tenancy on a short notice without

any future liability to each other. SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY believed her

representations, agreed to this tenancy and listed the UNIT for sale.

317. At all relevant times before May-July 2008, EDELSTEIN allowed KRICHEVSKY, real

estate persons and potential purchasers to see the UNIT.

318. On or about May-July of 2008, EDELSTEIN informed KRICHEVSKY that she found

some property to buy,

319. applied for a loan; and

320. is going to vacate KRICHEVSKY’s UNIT in one month; and

321. will not send KRICHEVSKY a rent check, but will not ask for refund of rent deposit.

322. About a month later, EDELSTEIN informed KRICHEVSKY that bank denied her

request for a loan.

323. At that time, EDELSTEIN told KRICHEVSKY that she would like to stay and renew her

month-to-month tenancy on prior terms.

324. EDELSTEIN told KRICHEVSKY that she would send him a rent check for prior month,

and

325. when requested, will vacate the UNIT.

326. KRICHEVSKY relied on her representations, agreed to new tenancy and accepted

EDELSTEIN’s check without the rent increase, even though a market rent was higher.

327. About a month later, KRICHEVSKY had an interested purchaser for the UNIT, but

40

EDELSTEIN refused to allow potential purchaser access to the UNIT.

328. She told KRICHEVSKY that her attorney advised her that because KRICHEVSKY

continued accepting her rent from 2006, she may deem her option to renew her lease for

3 years automatically exercised, and

329. will live in the UNIT until December 2009 against KRICHEVSKY’s will, and

330. will not show the UNIT to anybody.

331. KRICHEVSKY informed EDELSTEIN that he terminated her tenancy, would not renew

her month-to-month lease and will initiate eviction.

332. Nonetheless, EDELSTEIN refused to vacate the UNIT.

333. In New York, a month-to-month tenancy considered a valid contract, which requires

renewal every month.

334. Because EDELSTEIN would have to move out on the short notice, if requested by

KRICHEVSKY, she negotiated a lower-rent than the market price. This evidenced by

contrast between $2650 month-to-month rent that EDELSTEIN paid to KRICHEVSKY

and $2825 that EDELSTEIN willingly started paying SVENSON in addition to paying

attorney’s fees to litigate against KRICHEVSKY.

335. EDELSTEIN was duty-bound to deal with KRICHEVSKY in good faith and fairly.

336. EDELSTEIN was duty-bound to allow purchaser to see the UNIT, and

337. was duty-bound to vacate the UNIT if and when KRICHEVSKY requested.

338. Even if, which is not admitted, EDELSTEIN did think that she has a valid long-term

lease, she was duty-bound to show the UNIT to prospective purchaser who may buy that

UNIT with a tenant and gladly continue her tenancy.

41

339. EDELSTEIN failed to perform by contract and breached her duties by preventing access

to the UNIT by prospective purchaser, and by

340. refusal to vacate the UNIT when KRICHEVSKY requested,

341. despite the fact that KRICHEVSKY substantially performed by the contract.

342. Due to EDELSTEIN’s refusal to show the UNIT and later refusal to vacate the UNIT,

SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY started holdover proceeding in Kings County Landlord

& Tenant Court Index number 95633/2008 to protect their interests and show said UNIT

to above-mentioned buyer.

343. At the beginning of said Litigation, attorney for SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and

KOTLYAR, Yoram Nachimovsky made a settlement proposal by which EDELSTEIN

and KOTLYAR would buy the UNIT through short sale and assume KRICHEVSKY’s

loan.

344. EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew or should have known that they could not obtain a

loan to buy their own residence due to their low FICA score and/or financial meltdown of

2008 amongst the banks.

345. KRICHEVSKY believes that the real reason why EDELSTEIN did not allow access to

the UNIT – is to force KRICHEVSKY to short-sell the UNIT to her and KOTLYAR for

a much lower price and assume KRICHEVSKY’s loan under the threat of foreclosure.

Banks often allow assumption of loan when a property is in foreclosure and sold short.

346. Upon information and belief, after EDELSTEIN failed to obtain a loan in May – July

2008, she decided to misrepresent and conceal from KRICHEVSKY her above-

mentioned short sale plan in order to induce KRICHEVSKY to enter into a new month-

42

to-month lease. Thereafter, she would live in the UNIT paying below-market rate and

wait for KRICHEVSKY’s financial condition to deteriorate to the point that he will agree

to the short sale of the UNIT.

347. After failed short sale attempt of the UNIT, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR offered

KRICHEVSKY to buy out their unlawful lease for $23,000 in exchange for them moving

out. KRICHEVSKY treated this offer as extortion and declined.

348. Alternatively, EDELSTEIN decided to breach her contract after she entered into the new

month-to-month lease to extort money from KRICHEVSKY, using tenancy and threat of

foreclosure as the advantage.

349. Upon information and belief, between June of 2008 and November of 2009, there were at

least three (3) potential purchasers interested in the UNIT, all of whom EDELSTEIN

denied access to view the UNIT. All or some of said purchasers purchased different units

in the same condominium complex without an opportunity to see the UNIT.

350. From 2008, during the course of whole litigation, KRICHEVSKY hired three attorneys

and incurred litigation expenses to protect his rights and interests. When he run out of

money, he continued litigation pro se and incurred additional litigation expenses.

351. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY could not sell his UNIT,

lost his credit rating and equity in the UNIT ($100,000). This, in turn, had “the falling

dominos” effect on his finances and business plans. KRICHEVSKY was damaged,

continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict with the

exact amount of damages to be determined at the time of trial, including interest,

expenses and attorney’s fees.

43

352. In addition, EDELSTEIN was acting unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against

public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands determination of punitive and treble damages at

the time of the trial.



ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND

KOTLYAR – Torturous Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage.

353. KRICHEVSKY adopts averments above by reference herein.

354. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR knew that SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY

are selling their UNIT for $825,000. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR knew

that KRICHEVSKY’s expenses are more than the rent payments and he needed to reduce

his mortgage obligation in order to borrow money for his Seagate project (renovation of

the house). KRICHEVSKY introduced EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to Seagate project

and offered them participation in it, instead of short sale of the UNIT during the meeting

with them in 2006. They knew that if KRICHEVSKY sold the UNIT, he would be able to

borrow money and use equity left after the sale of UNIT for Seagate project.

355. They knew that KRICHEVSKY has business relationship with real estate brokers who

are trying to sell the UNIT.

356. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR acted with the sole purpose of harming

KRICHEVSKY or used dishonest, unfair and improper means to prevent KRICHEVSKY

from selling his UNIT.


44


dominos” effect on his finances and business plans. He was damaged, continue to be

damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants

jointly, severally and personally liable to him with exact amount of damages to be

determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorney’s fees.

358. In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously,

oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble

damages determined at the time of the trial.

WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages, punitive and


TWELVETH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND

KOTLYAR – Fraud Upon The Landlord & Tenant Court

359. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment in cause of action above by reference herein.

360. During the pendency of the holdover proceeding in 2008, EDELSTEIN alleged in open

court that prior to holdover preceding started, she and KOTLYAR, as tenants, had

entered into a one year lease agreement with SVENSON, as landlord, commencing in

October 1 2008 at a monthly rent of approximately $2,825.00 per month.

361. Said lease was fraudulently entered into without KRICHEVSKY's knowledge and

consent.

362. KRICHEVSKY in the possession of documentary evidence that shows said lease was

backdated by SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR in order to deceive the court and

KRICHEVSKY to materially rely on that lease in that action.

45

363. Upon information and belief, said lease was backdated and signed on November 7, 2008,

and not on September 20, 2008 as the lease signing date shows.

364. Upon information and belief, said lease was entered into the court record.

365. Their conduct constitutes conspiracy to commit perjury and fraud upon the court because

it was created with knowledge of false intent; and in order to produce to court and enter

into the court record.

366. This action was terminated in defendant’s favor due to perjury and fraud. But for this

fraudulent lease, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR would have been evicted from the UNIT

in 2008.



dominos” effect on his finances and business plans. He was damaged, continue to be

damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants

jointly, severally and personally liable to him with exact amount of damages to be

determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorney’s fees.




369. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and


THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR –

Aid And Abet Commission of Conversion

46


371. EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew that leasing of the UNIT was done without

KRICHEVSKY’s knowledge and consent.

372. EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew, or under the circumstances should have known, that

SVENSON committed fraudulent conversion of KRICHEVSKY’s share of the UNIT into

her own and leasing it to them. They knew or should have known that no one tenant, but

them would be willing to pay $2825 per month rent to SVENSON in addition to litigation

expenses they paid their attorneys to defend eviction.

373. EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew that by entering into a one-year lease with

SVENSON, the copy of it would be brought into landlord and tenant court to stop the

eviction of EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR. Moreover, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR for

more than a year continued paying the rent to SVENSON, while litigating against

KRICHEVSKY

374. . EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew that they are substantially aiding and abetting the

commission of conversion, because without their financial support in form of rent to

SVENSON, her conversion would fail.

375. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue

to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the

defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with damages determined at the

time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorney’s fees.



47




FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND

KOTLYAR- Fraudulent Conveyance

377. KRICHEVSKY adopts every allegation above by reference herein.

378. Since SVENSON never paid her share for purchase of said property, as well as any

expenses, she was indebted to KRICHEVSKY as to creditor.

379. During refinance with WAMU, she released her interest back to KRICHEVSKY.

380. The rent money that she received was even less than KRICHEVSKY had to pay as total

monthly expenses.

381. The alleged lease agreement entered into between SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and

KOTLYAR during the pendency of a holdover proceeding, without the knowledge or

consent of KRICHEVSKY constitutes a fraudulent conveyance.

382. As such, the lease agreement should be declared null and void.

383. KRICHEVSKY has been damaged, continue to be damaged and will be damaged in the

future. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for all applicable damages under the

law.

384. In addition, Defendants' actions were willful, wanton and malicious, and as such,

KRICHEVSKY is entitled to punitive and treble damages in the sum to be determined at

trial.

385. KRICHEVSKY should be entitled to a judgment for damages in an amount to be

48









WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment declaring this lease is void and

awarding damages, punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial.

FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND

KOTLYAR – Fraud Upon The Court, Conspiracy to commit Fraud upon the Court

and Obstruction of Justice

388. KRICHEVSKY adopts every relevant averment in ¶ ¶ of TWELVETH, THIRTEENTH

and FOURTEENTH CAUSES OF ACTION by reference herein.

389. At all material times, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR conspired and

committed fraud upon the court and obstruction of Justice.

390. When one attorney represents multiple clients with adverse and diverging interests, he

must advise them of potential conflict of interest, get informed consents in writing and

file consents in court (New York Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7.)

391. When KRICHEVSKY in the beginning of 2009 discovered conflict of interest between

defendant’s attorney Yoram Nachimovsky and all of the defendants, he reported this

49

violation to his attorney Mr. Rosenblatt. It was clear to KRICHEVSKY that Mr.

Nachimovsky is advising all of the Defendants how to act in concert; personally aiding

and abetting defendants‘ commission of conversion against KRICHEVSKY because they

were not sophisticated in law to figure out this scheme.

392. KRICHEVSKY’s attorney Mr. Rosenblatt later informed KRICHEVSKY that after

discussion with Mr. Nachimovsky, his law firm dropped representation of all of the

Defendants.

393. Starting from this paragraph, KRICHEVSKY did not know all the facts that he avers

below. They were discovered by KRICHEVSKY only in 2011, just before he filed his

motion to disqualify Mr. Nikolas Ratush (employee of Nachimovsky’s law firm) in state

court. Mr. Ratush in 2008 at the beginning of controversy between defendants in eviction

proceedings represented all of them against KRICHEVSKY.

394. Upon information and belief, Mr. Rosenblatt demanded that Mr. Nachimovsky resign

from the case due to conflict of interest. Mr. Ratush sent him a confirmation fax stating

that this firm no longer represents SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR, Exhibit D.

395. Upon information and belief, Mr. Ratush, Russian-speaking attorney of the

Nachimovsky’s firm, informed or should have informed in Russian SVENSON,

EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR that KRICHEVSKY objects to their representation of all

defendants because of conflict of interest that exists between them.

396. Upon information and belief, Mr. Ratush told SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR

that officially, law firm of Yoram Nachimovsky will have to drop their representation,

but in reality will continue it. He proposed to pretend that SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and

50

KOTLYAR left the firm as clients and EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR hired the attorney

Herbert Marek. He proposed that this way KRICHEVSKY would believe that

Nachimovsky no longer advises and represents all of the Defendants, and defendants no

longer act in concert. He proposed to make KRICHEVSKY believe that Nickolas Ratush

never worked for Nachimovsky, and instead to believe that he works for attorney Herbert

Marek. Later on KRICHEVSKY discovered that Herbert Marek is Nachimovsky’s friend

and acts as a front to cover up this scheme.

397. Upon information and believe, Mr. Ratush proposed that because KRICHEVSKY saw

only Mr. Nachimovsky, and never saw Mr. Ratush before, KRICHEVSKY will belief

that Ratush works for Herbert Marek.

398. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR agreed.

399. Accordingly, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR together with Nachimovsky,

Ratush and Marek conspired to hide from KRICHEVSKY and the court the fact that

SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR still represented by law firm of Yoram

Nachimovsky, where Nicholas Ratush continues to represent all of the Defendants still

acting in concert.

400. Due to the above, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew or should have

known that they conspired to participate in fraud upon the court by intentionally

concealing from court and KRICHEVSKY the fact that they still represented by law firm

of Yoram Nachimovsky.

401. Defendants knew or should have known that by acting in concert to conceal the truth,

they deceive the court and KRICHEVSKY by taking advantage of lack of knowledge.

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Indeed, from 2009 until 2011 KRICHEVSKY did not discover their scheme. “Silence can

only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or when an

inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.” U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297

(1977).

402. They knew or should have known that Nickolas Ratush is lying to the court and

KRICHEVSKY by signing pleadings, motions, affirmations, affidavits and addressing

envelopes stating that he works for Herbert Marek from his Long Island office.

403. KRICHEVSKY reasonably believed that Nachimovsky is no longer on the case and did

not object to Ratush’s representation of EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR in Kings County

Supreme Court, mistakenly thinking that Ratush works for Herbert Marek.

404. Mr. Ratush committed fraud upon the court by not filing written waivers of conflict of

interest from all three of the Defendants, which allowed him and all defendants not to be

discovered by KRICHEVSKY and/or the court. This scheme allowed the law firm of

Yoram Nachimovsky to continue aid and abet all three of the Defendants in commission

of conversion and other torts.

405. In addition to this fraud, SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR were supposed to sign

release or termination agreements with law firm of Yoram Nachimovsky, and

406. EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR were supposed to sign retainer agreement with Herbert

Marek.

407. The fact of signing the sham retainer agreements with Herbert Marek for the court is

perjury,

408. when SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR knew that these retainer agreements are

52

sham.

409. The fact of signing the sham retainer termination agreements with law firm of Yoram

Nachimovsky for the court is perjury,

410. when Defendants knew that they are still represented and advised by the firm of

Nachimovsky.

411. When KRICHEVSKY first time met Nicholas Ratush in Kings County civil court, he did

not know that Ratush is actually working for Nachimovsky, and Herbert Marek is just a

front for Nachimovsky.

412. KRICHEVSKY thought that new attorney, Mr. Ratush, would advise EDELSTEIN and

KOTLYAR that the advice of Nachimovsky law firm was unlawful and harmful to them;

that what they did was wrong, they are losing money to senseless litigation and they will

attempt to settle and vacate the UNIT.

413. However, KRICHEVSKY later noticed that Nickolas Ratush is acting against interests of

EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR, and instead helping SVENSON. For example,

KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON simultaneously filed motions to amend pleadings. Mr.

Ratush filed opposition against KRICHEVSKY’s amended complaint arguing that

amendments will prejudice, delay and make proceedings more expensive. However, he

did not object to SVENSON’s proposed amended answer to add counterclaims against

KRICHEVSKY, as if this will not similarly prejudice, delay and make proceedings more

expensive as well.

414. In another example, KRICHEVSKY filed an order to show cause to compel

EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to deposit rent money into escrow account instead of

53

giving it to SVENSON. Mr. Ratush opposed this motion (e.g., was paid by EDELSTEIN

and KOTLYAR) as if he or EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR should care that SVENSON

will be cut off from the money supply. In fact, KRICHEVSKY informed Mr. Ratush that

he might be committing legal malpractice by failing to inform EDELSTEIN and

KOTLYAR that in their best interest would be to withhold rent money from SVENSON,

and deposit it into escrow account until the court decides what to do with it.

KRICHEVSKY informed Ratush that it is likely that the court will rule against his

clients. In such a case, they will have money available for KRICHEVSKY’s

compensation. Mr. Ratush replied that KRICHEVSKY is wrong, because he discussed

the issue about escrow account and EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR directed (e.g. paid Mr.

Ratush) him to oppose this motion.

415. Shortly thereafter, Honorable Bert Bunyan of Kings County Supreme Court stipulated

with SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR that they in a month would jointly pay

$8000 to KRICHEVSKY’s attorney escrow account to save the UNIT from foreclosure

that was started by the bank.

416. Stipulation in court is a contract, which SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR

breached by not paying what promised.

417. SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR knew their statements to Judge Bunyan were

false and that they did not intend to honor this contract. That is fraud upon the court and

contempt of court.

418. SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR entered into this contract to frustrate

KRICHEVSKY and to delay proceedings. In fact, they delayed this proceeding for 4

54

years without any relief to KRICHEVSKY until SVENSON filed for bankruptcy, staying

this proceeding.

419. In conclusion, attorneys of Nachimovsky’ law firm, acting “behind the curtain” coached

SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR to lie in concert, produced frivolous pleadings

delaying resolution of controversy and attacking KRICHEVSKY. They even advised

defendants to become in contempt of court. Needless to say that all of the defendants

conspired and willingly followed attorney’ s advice.

420. Alternatively, SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR did not use their attorneys’

advice, but conspired to act in concert and to lie in concert, which produced unnecessary

pleadings and motions, delaying relief and attacking KRICHEVSKY. SVENSON,

EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR conspired to become in contempt of court and in concert did

not pay $8000 as stipulated by the parties in front of the judge.

421. As a direct or proximate result of this fraud and obstruction of Justice, KRICHEVSKY

spent almost 4 years and about $20,000 in attorney’s fees to litigate without any relief.

422. When Honorable Bert Bunyan of Kings County Supreme Court ordered SVENSON, but

EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR particularly, to sign written waivers of conflict of interest,

all defendants declined.

423. Mr. Ratush was disqualified.

424. SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR or just EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR knew from

the beginning of that litigation that they will not sign any waivers of conflict of interest.

425. Notwithstanding the above, they continued signing affidavits and paying Mr. Ratush to

oppose his disqualification for more than a year in a hope that Mr. Ratush survives

55

disqualification and will continue to obstruct Justice for KRICHEVSKY.




time of the trial.



damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorney’s

fees.



SIXTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND

KOTLYAR- Tortuous Interference with Prospective Economic Relationships


429. Defendants knew that SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY are selling their UNIT for

$800,000. They knew that KRICHEVSKY’s expenses are more than their rent payments

and he needed to reduce his mortgage obligation in order to borrow money for his

Seagate project. They knew that if he will sell the UNIT, he would be able to borrow

money for Seagate project. They knew that KRICHEVSKY has business relationship

with real estate brokers who are trying to find a buyer of UNIT.

430. EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR acted with the sole purpose of harming KRICHEVSKY

or used dishonest, unfair and improper means to prevent KRICHEVSKY from selling his

56

UNIT.

431. Defendants have intentionally and knowingly interfered with KRICHEVSKY's

prospective economic relations by refusing to provide access to potential purchasers to

the UNIT; and

432. by entering into a lease agreement without KRICHEVSKYs knowledge and consent

433. during the pendency of a holdover proceeding to recover possession of the premises.

434. Defendants were aware of KRICHEVSKY's intent to sell the UNIT.

435. Defendants have intentionally and

436. knowingly interfered with KRICHEVSKY's contractual obligations and ability to pay

expenses associated with the UNIT by conspiring not to pay KRICHEVSKY rent;

437. committing fraud upon the court by filing into the court record backdated lease;

438. disobeying the Judge’s Bunyan order to turn $8000.00 of rent to KRICHEVSKY’s

attorney escrow account;

439. conducting frivolous litigation;

440. drugging resolution of controversy until KRICHEVSKY lost his purchaser.

441. As a direct and proximate result of the forgoing: KRICHEVSKY defaulted on his

mortgage obligations;

442. the UNIT is in foreclosure;

443. KRICHEVSKY’s credit rating has been destroyed;

444. KRICHEVSKY’s existing credit lines were cut off;

445. new credit was denied,

446. KRICHEVSKY was prevented from renting out his UNIT.

57




time of the trial.




fees.



SEVENTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST OCEANA, COOPER, LANA

KAPLUN, FARID BADALOV AND BORIS MEYDID – Fiduciary Breaching Duty

to Principal


450. There was/is a principal - agent and/or entrustor - trustee relationship between

KRICHEVSKY toward OCEANA and COOPER.

451. There was/is an agent-principal relationship between COOPER and KRICHEVSKY.

452. KRICHEVSKY gave OCEANA authority to act in the best interest of KRICHEVSKY in

the day-to-day activities of homeowners association.

453. KRICHEVSKY entrusted his UNIT, undivided share and interest in common areas to

COOPER to maintain, care and protect it on his behalf.

454. The major reason for the existence of these entities is to benefit, serve and protect

interests and safety of the owners of condominium units and units themselves.

58

455. There is/are the written; and/or implied contracts and/or policies between OCEANA and

COOPER spelling out all the duties owed to KRICHEVSKY, as principal, entrustor and

beneficiary. KRICHEVSKY demanded these contracts or policies from COOPER’s

management people numerous times, but they refused to disclose and provide them.

456. There was contractual and/or fiduciary relationships between KRICHEVSKY and

KAPLUN when KRICHEVSKY voted for her in 2001 and/or 2002 elections of the board

members, when she promised to volunteer on his behalf and others.

457. There was fiduciary relationships between KRICHEVSKY and BADALOV, and

458. later MEYDID.

459. One of their duties as property managers were to investigate and report to him

creditworthiness of potential tenant, and

460. if KRICHEVSKY signs a lease,

461. process tenancy by issuing magnetic keys and instructing tenant about OCEANA’s

policy.

462. The other duties were to collect common charges checks and provide accounting for

same.

463. The authority to act OCEANA and COOPER derive from individual unit owner’s

directives and their consent.

464. Those duties were breached on or about October-November of 2008 and continue to be

breached until present. KAPLUN’s, BADALOV’s and MEYDID’s duties of care for

welfare of KRICHEVSKY entered into the conflict of personal interests and self-dealing.

They each on their own and in concert went against his interests and of unit owners by

59

rejection of KRICHEVSKY’s tender of checks and the lease (“TENDER”) to satisfy the

alleged debt.

465. After KRICHEVSKY told them about controversy with SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and

KOTLYAR and requested assistance, they became and continue to be disloyal,

belligerent and hostile toward him.

466. Upon information and belief, the law firm BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN,

LLP created condominium bylaws and/or amendments to it, which permits OCEANA’s

or COOPER’s employees to break the locks and enter into an abandoned by an owner

UNIT. Thereafter, OCEANA or COOPER can lease out this unit and even foreclose on it.

KRICHEVSKY believes that this condominium bylaw was abused or planned to be

abused by corporate defendants against him and the UNIT by preventing KRICHEVSKY

from leasing out his UNIT in order to keep the UNIT unoccupied.

467. On or about October-November of 2009 KAPLUN breached her fiduciary duty by failure

to seek legal advice from BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN, LLP, a law firm

that gets paid for business legal advice to board of managers, when she on her own

decided to reject KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER.

468. Alternatively, she did seek legal advice of BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN,

LLP, but went against such advice when she on her own decided to reject

KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER.

469. Alternatively, she did seek legal advice of BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN,

LLP and advice was to reject KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER.

470. KAPLUN did not have an authority to reject KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER without

60

meeting and approval of all board’ members.

471. Rejection of KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER went against his interest, welfare and interests

of all unit owners as well. Rejection of KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER shows disloyalty to

him and all unit owners, because it hurts welfare of each unit owner by forcing unit

owners to pay more for monthly common charges.

472. New York Law requires that KRICHEVSKY, OCEANA and COOPER use available

means to mitigate damages.

473. KRICHEVSKY informed corporate defendants that on or about October of 2008,

EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR entered into FRAUDULENT lease with SVENSON

without COOPER’s and KRICHEVSY’s knowledge and consent, and that SVENSON

and EDELSTEIN do not intend to pay the monthly common charges. BADALOV wrote

EDELSTEIN’s last name on the piece of paper and promised to be mindful of this matter.

474. KAPLUN on the phone promised KRICHEVSKY “to take care of this.” KAPLUN had

authority and/or duty to:

475. call or write SVENSON and demand monthly common charges, or

476. call or write EDELSTEIN and convince her to pay monthly common charges, or

477. direct BADALOV or somebody else to attempt to collect common charges from

SVENSON and EDELSTEIN, or

478. start inexpensive legal action in Small Claims Court to compel payments of common

charges on or about December 2008, noticing that common charges did not come in two

month indeed.

479. BADALOV had authority and/or duty to:

61

480. call or write SVENSON and demand monthly common charges, or

481. call or write EDELSTEIN and demand monthly common charges.

482. Upon information and belief, KAPLUN and/or BADALOV did not do some or all of the

above.

483. On or about June of 2009, KRICHEVSKY demanded that KAPLUN start legal action

against SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to collect money for common charges.

484. On or about August 2009, KRICHEVSKY demanded second time that KAPLUN start

legal action against SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to collect money for

common charges.

485. KAPLUN promised KRICHEVSKY to follow up on his demand.

486. It was a part of BADALOV’s duty to make sure that COOPER gets common charges

every month from every unit.

487. On or about October-November of 2009 BADALOV breached his fiduciary duty by

failure to seek legal advice from BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN, LLP, a

law firm that gives business legal advice to COOPER, when he on his own decided to

reject KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER.

488. Alternatively, he did seek legal advice of BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN,

LLP, but went against such advice when he on his own decided to reject

KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER.

489. Alternatively, he did seek legal advice of BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN,

LLP and advice was to reject KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER.

490. Alternatively, BADALOV acted pursuant to order or directive from KAPLUN or other

62

person to reject KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER.

491. KRICHEVSKY claims that KAPLUN and BADALOV each acting separately and in

concert, or after mutual discussion, conspired to rejected KRICHEVSKY’s possible

TENDER.

492. As a direct or proximate result of this breach of fiduciary duty, KRICHEVSKY had to

hire an attorney, pay him personally to protect his interests, as well as interests of other

unit owners because they would have to make up the difference in OCEANA’s budget.

493. To evict EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR cost KRICHEVSKY about $20,000 in attorney

fees.

494. As the direct and proximate result of breach of fiduciary duty, KRICHEVSKY did not

receive from the UNIT approximately $7476 in common charges, thereby unable to pay

the same to OCEANA for 2009.

495. Upon information and belief, that money, was paid collectively by other unit owners to

make up the difference in budget.

496. As the direct and proximate result of breach of fiduciary duty, eviction of EDELSTEIN

and KOTLYAR was delayed for more than a year resulting in KRICHEVSKY’s lost

opportunities and money damages.

497. As the direct and proximate result of fiduciaries’ failure to mitigate damages through

delay to act for more than a year, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR were not evicted until

about October-November of 2009.

498. Upon information and belief, after OCEANA or COOPER in October-November of 2009

disconnected EDELSTEIN’ access to health club and gym, EDELSTEIN and

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KOTLYAR vacated KRICHEVSKY’ UNIT.

499. Alternatively, after OCEANA’s legal action started, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR

vacated the UNIT.

500. Because these fiduciaries had another fiduciaries-attorneys BELKIN BURDEN WENIG

& G OLDMAN, LLP, who advise them about business decisions and other legal matters,

they knew or should have known that lease and conduct, which SVENSON,

EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR commit, constitutes CONVERSION.

501. They knew or should have known that conversion is unlawful act and they had fiduciary

duty, resources and authority to stop it.

502. It was not until November-December of 2009 that KAPLUN started legal action against

SVENSON, EDELSTEIN, KOTLYAR and KRICHEVSKY in Brooklyn’s civil court.

503. Upon information and believe inclusion of KRICHEVSKY in this action was frivolous

and done in retaliation for KRICHEVSKY’s critique of KAPLUN’s failure to work on

this problem.

504. These fiduciaries had fiduciary duty, resources and authority to order BELKIN BURDEN

WENIG & G OLDMAN, LLP to start collection action for unpaid common charges

against SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR in the beginning of 2009.

505. These fiduciaries intentionally, or

506. negligently waited for aggravation and/or escalation of wrong conditions, and

507. despite known conflict of interest between KRICHEVSKY and BELKIN BURDEN

WENIG & G OLDMAN, LLP,

508. ordered BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & G OLDMAN, LLP to start foreclosure against

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KRICHEVSKY in 2012.

509. As a direct and proximate result of the forgoing KRICHEVSKY did not collect any rent

from his UNIT, which made him unable to pay his mortgage.

510. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing KRICHEVSKY was not able to collect

a rent in the sum of about $35,000 per year.

511. As a direct and proximate result of the forgoing KRICHEVSKY’ UNIT entered into

foreclosure by the bank.

512. On or about January 15, 2010 KRICHEVSKY signed the lease with new tenant, Vladimir

Traynin.

513. On or about January 15, 2010, Vladimir brought this lease to BADALOV for processing.

514. On or about January 15, 2010 Vladimir called KRICHEVSKY and told him that

BADALOV said to Vladimir that until KRICHEVSKY pays his debt to COOPER, he

would not process Vladimir’s application for tenancy.

515. Without processing, security at the OCEANA’s gate would not let tenant’s truck with

belongings in.

516. On or about January 15, 2010 KRICHEVSKY brought in COOPER's office and tendered

to BADALOV:

517. two checks for $2900 each from new tenant, Vladimir Traynin, and

518. the lease agreement.

519. BADALOV should have welcomed tender and new tenant as that would remedy the

situation, mitigate damages and stabilize financial condition of KRICHEVSKY and other

unit owners.

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520. KAPLUN should have welcomed a new tenant as that would prevent foreclosure of the

unit, which in turn should stabilize equity and price of each individual unit as well.

521. KAPLUN and BADALOV should have welcomed a new tenant, as that would make

KRICHEVSKY to be able to pay common charges in the future,

522. thereby solving and crossing out this problem from their problem solving to do list.

523. BADALOV in bad faith rejected the TENDER, and

524. in bad faith refused to process the application for tenancy.

525. Upon information and belief, this rejection of TENDER was done in bad faith because it

was:

526. against business judgment rule, and

527. against any interest of unit owners and/or KRICHEVSKY.

528. Alternatively, even if, which is not admitted, KRICHEVSKY did not tender these two

checks, but only tendered lease, it would be financially beneficial for all unit owners to

forbear the debt and process tenancy than litigate, or

529. let KRICHEVSKY pay the debt over time than litigate.

530. Accordingly, KRICHEVSKY avers that they intentionally and without any justification

rejected this TENDER and tenancy in order to keep the UNIT unoccupied, drive

KRICHEVSKY's UNIT further into the debt and foreclosure, because

531. they knew or should have known that their actions or inaction will bring about

foreclosure of UNIT.

532. OCEANA instituted self-serving policy incorporated into By-Laws, were board have a

right of first refusal to arbitrary buy any condominium unit on sale using “people’s

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money.”

533. Accordingly, if KRICHEVSKY’s UNIT goes into foreclosure and sold at auction they

will be the first to buy it on the cheap to be able to resell for a profit.

534. This is the reason, KRICHEVSKY believes, KAPLUN and BADALOV conspired to

drive KRICHEVSKY's UNIT into foreclosure.

535. This is the reason, KRICHEVSKY believes, KAPLUN and BADALOV created

controversy; did not mitigate damages; and filed a lien on KRICHEVSKY's UNIT.

536. Foreclosure scenario was foreseeable by Defendants. OCEANA, in fact, filed foreclosure

action against KRICHEVSKY’s UNIT, but proceeding was stayed due to the bankruptcy

proceedings in this court.

537. Alternatively, KAPLUN and BADALOV attempted larceny and extortion of bribery

from KRICHEVSKY after which the tender would have been accepted.

New York Penal Law§ 155.05 Larceny; defined

1. A person steals property and commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.

2. Larceny includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's property, with the intent prescribed in subdivision one of this section, committed in any of the following ways:

(e) By extortion.A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will:(ii) Cause damage to property; or(iii) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or(viii) Use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or(ix) Perform any other act which would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is calculated to harm another person

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materially with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.

538. After KRICHEVSKY told BADALOV that his rejection of TENDER and refusal to

process tenancy leaves KRICHEVSKY no choice, but to sue him personally for damages,

he laughed and told KRICHEVSKY “to do what he has to do.”

539. KRICHEVSKY immediately called KAPLUN and complained about BADALOV’s

rejection of tender.

540. KRICHEVSKY requested that she speak to BADALOV and intervene on

KRICHEVSKY’s behalf.

541. KAPLUN replied that BADALOV has absolute right to reject the TENDER and refused

to speak with BADALOV.

542. Accordingly, KAPLUN and BADALOV attempted larceny by extortion through

calculated effort to compel or induce KRICHEVSKY to pay BADALOV or KAPLUN to

do their public servant duties to accept KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER and process tenancy.

543. They instilled the fear in KRICHEVSKY of losing his UNIT and harmed his business

and fanatical condition.

544. BADALOV and KAPLUN did not have the authority to reject KRICHEVSKY’s

TENDER.

545. For BADALOV to reject the TENDER, which would trigger confrontation and embark

KRICHEVSKY, OCEANA and COOPER on litigation, he needed higher authority –

from KAPLUN and/or the board of managers.

546. KAPLUN did not have such authority without board’s meeting and decision.

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547. Upon information and belief, there was no board’s meeting about KRICHEVSKY,

because BADALOV rejected the tender without second thought – right on the spot.

548. When KRICHEVSKY called KAPLUN to complain that BADALOV rejected TENDER,

she refused to intervene without second thought – right on the spot.

549. Alternatively, if there was such a meeting authorizing KAPLUN and BADALOV to

reject KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER, the board members were misinformed by KAPLUN

and/or BADALOV about true reason for controversy because KRICHEVSKY was not

present.

550. Because OCEANA or COOPER never notified KRICHEVSKY of their intention to file a

lien,

551. they violated KRICHEVSKY’ constitutional right of “notice and opportunity to be

heard,” and

552. New York State Lien law, which proscribes service by certified mail of notice of lien on

the property owner.

553. As the direct or proximate result of the TENDER rejection, KRICHEVSKY was unable

to collect $2900.00 per month in rent for the first year and $3000 for the second.



defendants jointly, severally, vicariously and personally liable to him with damages

determined at the time of the trial.



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fees.



EIGHTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST KAPLUN, BADALOV AND

MEYDID – harassment, private nuisance and constructive eviction


557. Upon information and belief, BADALOV, who created private nuisance in 2009 to harass

and constructively evict EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR by deactivating magnetic entrance

keys, was removed from managing OCEANA by COOPER due to complaints of unit

owners for his other misconducts.

558. MEYDID substituted BADALOV after he was removed from the management of

OCEANA.

559. MEYDID, following the order of KAPLUN or other person, or

560. COOPER’s supervisor, or

561. on his own continued private nuisance and begun harassment of KRICHEVSKY and his

guests by deactivating magnetic keys ( “keys”) to building’s entrance, in addition to

already deactivated health club and spa, meeting house and numerous gates including

gate to the beach (“amenities”). These actions continued numerous times within the past

two years.

562. Liability for a private nuisance arises, inter alia, from conduct, which invades another's

interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is intentional or

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negligent. KRICHEVSKY, as a UNIT owner, and his guests have the right to access

amenities since they are undivided common areas in which KRICHEVSKY has a rightful

ownership interest.

563. Deactivation of the keys as private nuisance and harassment by KAPLUN, BADALOV

and MEYDID resulted in dimunition of value of the UNIT to any would be renter.

564. When KRICHEVSKY with his guests would come to COOPER’s office to complain that

building’s entrance keys deactivated, MEYDID would torturously tell KRICHEVSKY

that some kind of computer virus constantly attacks their computer disabling entrance

keys.

565. KRICHEVSKY interviewed other residents of the building and concluded that their keys

were working properly on the days that KRICHEVSKY’s did not. These acts were done

in retaliation for KRICHEVSKY’s self-defense in court, and constitute private nuisance

and/or harassment, and/or constructive eviction by officers or employees of COOPER

and OCEANA.

566. MEYDID knew or should have known that his acts constitutes intentional interference

with the use and

567. enjoyment of the UNIT in lawful possession of KRICHEVSKY, which

568. would prevent KRICHEVSKY and his guests from entering the amenities that he owes.

569. After KRICHEVSKY’s order to show cause to compel activation of the keys was settled

by OCEANA, MEYDID, in contempt of court, activated only building’s entrance keys.

The settlement order between KRICHEVSKY, OCEANA and COOPER presumed

activation of all amenities.

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570. Alternatively, MEYDID activated all keys, but in a few days deactivated them again, in

contempt of court.

571. These unlawful and unreasonable acts substantially interfered with KRICHEVSKY’s use

and enjoyment of the UNIT.

572. As a direct and proximate result of numerous deactivations of the keys, lawsuits and

harassment, KRICHEVSKY was unable to receive services of COOPER. He was

prevented and deprived from the use of amenities, and could not rent out his UNIT.


to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that KAPLUN and

MEYDID personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial.

574. In addition, KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID conspired and acted in concert,

unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY

demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including

interest, expenses and attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages, punitive and

treble damages to be determined at trial, including interest and attorney’s fees.

NINETEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN,

KOTLYAR, KAPLUN, BADALOV AND MEYDID - torturous interference with

the contract


576. At the time of the unlawful acts of the defendants, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY, as

partners, were parties to a valid contract with OCEANA and/or COOPER which provided

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that COOPER and/or OCEANA perform several services to the UNIT, SVENSON and

KRICHEVSKY in exchange for their payment for such services to COOPER and/or

OCEANA, which payment called “common charges.”

577. All of the defendants either knew of the existence or, under the circumstances, should

have known of the existence, of that contract.

578. At the time of the commission of the earlier-mentioned tort, conversion, SVENSON,

EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR unlawfully excluded KRICHEVSKY from rent money due

to him from the UNIT. This, in turn, torturously and directly interfered with

KRICHEVSKY’s ability to pay common charges, as well as gain and profit from the rent.

As a direct and proximate result, KRICHEVSKY was induced to breach his contract

performance with COOPER and/or OCEANA.

579. KRICHEVSKY was informed by OCEANA and verily believes that neither SVENSON,

nor EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR ever contributed any money towards common charges

of the UNIT.

580. As such, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR intentionally induced breach of

KRICHEVSKY’s contract performance by refusing to pay common charges either to

KRICHEVSKY, or themselves to COOPER and/or OCEANA, even though they had the

ability and duty to pay under §339-kk of the New York State Real Property Law.

581. KRICHEVSKY filed an order to show cause in Kings County Supreme Court to compel

defendants SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to turn over rent money to

KRICHEVSKY in order for him to pay common charges.

582. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR maliciously opposed and became in contempt

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of court by not following court’s order to jointly pay $8000 into an escrow account.

583. KRICHEVSKY timely notified all of the defendants that he is unable to pay common

charges to COOPER because he was excluded from KRICHEVSKY’s share of rent.

584. SVENSON as partner and fiduciary of KRICHEVSKY, intentionally and maliciously

breached partners’ contract with COOPER and/or OCEANA by not paying common

charges even though she had an ability and duty to pay. The debt that SVENSON

intentionally and maliciously created by the breach of the contract with COOPER and/or

OCEANA, including damages to them, is not dischargeable in bankruptcy court.

Therefore, her bankruptcy discharge is VOID and she should indemnify KRICHEVSKY

and pay the COOPER and/or OCEANA compensation, including damages to them.

585. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR are jointly and severally liable to

KRICHEVSKY in addition to COOPER and/or OCEANA and should contribute and

recover KRICHEVSKY by paying the COOPER and/or OCEANA compensation,

including damages to them.

586. At the time of the unlawful acts of the defendants KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID,

KRICHEVSKY was a party to the contract with COOPER and/or OCEANA mentioned

above. Additionally, he was a party to a second valid contract with new tenant Vladimir

Traynin, which provided that he will pay KRICHEVSKY $2900 per month in rent for

one year with an option to renew for another year at a monthly rent of $3000.

587. Upon information and belief, at that time the keys to amenities were still deactivated by

BADALOV from his prior attempt to harass and constructively evict EDELSTEIN and

KOTLYAR from the UNIT.

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and MEYDID resulted in dimunition of services provided by COOPER or lack thereof.


and MEYDID resulted in dimunition of value of the UNIT to any would be renter.

590. Deactivation of the keys resulted in dimunition of the value of the services as per contract

between KRICHEVSKY and COOPER, while COOPER kept billing KRICHEVSKY for

the value of services not performed. In New York, billing a customer for the services not

performed calls fraud. Nonetheless, KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID caused 2 liens

of questionable legality and amounts to be recorded against the UNIT without the

approval of the court.

591. Nonetheless, KRICHEVSKY for the 2nd time attempted to gain control over situation and

start performing by the contract with COOPER through tender of 2 checks for sum of

$5800 and the lease with new tenant (TENDER), Vladimir Traynin. On or about January

15, 2010, KRICHEVSKY brought TENDER in the office of COOPER and presented to

BADALOV for processing. BADALOV refused to perform his duties by rejecting

TENDER.

592. As such, BADALOV induced KRICHEVSKY to continue non-performance of contract

with COOPER and/or OCEANA by rejecting TENDER and preventing him from renting

out his UNIT.

593. By refusal to process said lease, BADALOV induced new tenant to breach contract with

KRICHEVSKY and caused this tenant to void said 2 checks and enter into another lease

with another unit owner in the same building.

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594. Upon information and belief, said new lease BADALOV immediately approved, which

now causes KRICHEVSKY to question BADALOV’s legitimate reason for rejection of

TENDER.

595. KAPLUN ratified and approved rejection of TENDER by refusing to intervene and speak

with BADALOV on behalf of KRICHEVSKY.

596. After BADALOV was removed from the management of OCEANA, MEYDID

continued to carry on private nuisance and harassment of KRICHEVSKY and his guests,

with ratification and approval of such torts by KAPLUN and/or other unidentified

defendants. For the past 2 years MEYDID kept disconnecting several times entrance keys

to the building of the UNIT.

597. Said conducts resulted in KAPLUN’s, BADALOV’s and MEYDID’s torturous

interference with contracts between KRICHEVSKY and COOPER and/or OCEANA, as

well as contract between KRICHEVSKY and Vladimir Traynin.

598. KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID acted outside their duties,

599. in bad faith and

600. failed to collect common charges;

601. wrongfully filed liens against the UNIT;

602. failed to mitigate damages;

603. failed to correct conditions of breach of contract, and

604. interfered with contracts themselves in violation of business judgment rule.

605. According to business judgment rule, they were supposed to act in good faith and in

furtherance of legitimate purpose to create a profit. In this case the profit was actually a

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loss, and they knew or should have known what the outcome would be.

606. KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID together with SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and

KOTLYAR are jointly and severally liable to KRICHEVSKY in addition to COOPER

and/or OCEANA and should indemnify KRICHEVSKY by paying the COOPER and/or

OCEANA compensation, including damages to them.




time of the trial.


oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY is entitled to punitive and treble


fees.



TWENTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST KAPLUN AND BADALOV –

torturous interference with the contract


610. At the time of the unlawful acts of the defendants KAPLUN and BADALOV,

KRICHEVSKY was a party to a valid contract with new tenant Vladimir Traynin, which

provided that he will pay KRICHEVSKY $2900 per month in rent for one year with an

option to renew for another year at a monthly rent of $3000.

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611. KAPLUN and BADALOV in concert refused to accept KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER;

refused to process new tenancy and activate the keys to amenities. By refusal to process

said tenancy, BADALOV induced new tenant to breach contract with KRICHEVSKY

and caused this tenant to void said 2 checks and enter into another lease with another unit

owner in the same building.

612. As the direct and proximate result, KRICHEVSKY did not collect $2900 per month for

the first year and $3000 per month for the second year.




time of the trial, including interest and attorney’s fees.



damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest and attorney’s fees.



TWENTY FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST KAPLUN, BADALOV AND MEYDID

Abuse Of Process


616. In 2009 and 2010 KAPLUN, BADALOV, and MEYDID regularly issued two legal

processes against SVENSON, KRICHEVSKY, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR in Kings

County Civil Court, which were terminated in favor of KRICHEVSKY.

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617. OCEANA did not appeal these decisions.

618. In these two processes, OCEANA petitioned the court to issue money judgments against

KRICHEVSKY and others for nonpayment of common charges, to compel performance

of payments and award attorney fees.

619. Since KRICHEVSKY notified defendants that he is unable to pay common charges due

to above-mentioned conversion against him, defendants knew that they in good faith

could not compel KRICHEVSKY’s performance due to excusable defense of

impossibility.

620. However, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR, as a tortfeasors with ability and

duty to pay, could be in good faith compelled to perform. Though SVENSON defaulted

in these two processes and OCEANA could ask the court for a default judgment with

award of attorney fees against her, it failed to do so and abandoned these actions.

621. “It is well settled in New York that a prevailing party may not recover attorneys' fees from

the losing party except where authorized by statute, agreement or court rule” (see Chapel v

Mitchell, 84 NY2d 345, 349 [1994], quoting Hooper Assoc., Ltd. v AGS Computers, Inc.,

74 NY2d 487, 491 [1989]; Mighty Midgets, Inc. v Centennial Ins. Co., 47 NY2d 12, 21-

22 [1979]). Yet, OCEANA, as a losing party, rewarded itself with attorney’s fees, filed

two liens and in 2012 started foreclosure of UNIT in Kings County Supreme Court.

622. However, when KRICHEVSKY in 2010 obtained money and tendered payment of

common charges, BADALOV rejected it contrary to their demands in these 2 processes.

623. In addition to these processes, OCEANA administratively interfered with

KRICHEVSKY’s UNIT by disconnecting keys to amenities, thereby preventing him,

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8453920865882139371&hl=en&as_sdt=4,33






79

inter alia, to rent out his UNIT. This interference, too, terminated in KRICHEVSKY’s

favor as OCEANA and COOPER settled this issue in court, admitting wrongdoing by

signing stipulation of settlement and activating the keys.

624. In 2009 OCEANA demanded from KRICHEVSKY approximately $4900.

625. In 2011 OCEANA claimed that KRICHEVSKY owed already about $50,000.

626. In October 2012, in Bankruptcy Court OCEANA issued yet another regular judicial

process – motion to lift the bankruptcy stay. The stay was lifted and OCEANA claimed

yet another $2000 in attorney fees. It told the court that lifting the stay is necessary to

proceed with foreclosure action in state court. As of today, there is no movement in the

action of State court, because KRICHEVSKY’s challenge of validity of debt and liens in

2010 Civil Court action is not resolved in their favor and OCEANA’s right to foreclose

on the UNIT is still in question in any court of the United States of America.

627. The bankruptcy court should be the perfect forum to resolve validity of debt and liens for

OCEANA, if defendants believed that they are right.

628. Moreover, OCEANA filed yet another judicially issued regular processes – motion to

dismiss KRICHEVSKY’s case against it. This motion was frivolous, untimely and

designed to harass KRICHEVSKY.

629. These regularly issued judicial processes continued one after another from 2009 until

present and this claim is timely.

630. Accordingly, Defendants used these processes in perverted manner to wit: harass

KRICHEVSKY and torturously interfere with his contracts,

631. to obtain collateral objective of generating and adding attorney’s fees, expenses and late

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fees to account of KRICHEVSKY,

632. for filing two liens on the UNIT – yet another two regularly issued processes; and

633. instituting foreclosure to generate even more fees and expenses.

634. These corporate defendants planned and attempted to fraudulently obtain KRICHEVSKY’s

UNIT through foreclosure and unjustly enrich themselves.








fees.



TWENTY SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BADALOV and MEYDID –

Professional Malpractice


638. BADALOV and MEYDID are real estate salespersons licensed by New York State.

639. To have the position of the property manager, COOPER requires by law that property

managers have real estate license.

640. As such, BADALOV and MEYDID owed KRICHEVSKY a duty of care, good faith and

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fair dealings, which they breached by negligent actions against KRICHEVSKY’s and

OCEANA’s interests.

641. BADALOV rejected KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER of $5800 and refused to process the

lease between KRICHEVSKY and Vladimir Traynin.

642. MEYDID created nuisance to KRICHEVSKY and his guests by disconnecting magnetic

entrance keys numerous times.

643. BADALOV and MEYDID, acting in gross disregard to KRICHEVSKY’s interests,

followed unethical and unlawful orders of KAPLUN and/or other member of OCEANA

and/or COOPER. They engaged themselves in the conduct contrary to professional ethics

and responsibility of licensed real estate person. They embarked in a negligent departure

from the accepted standards of ethics and practice, which harmed KRICHEVSKY.

644. As the direct and proximate result of this departure, KRICHEVSKY was injured,

continue to be injured and will be injured in the future.

645. In addition to that, their conduct was willful and wanton and KRICHEVSKY demands

punitive damages.

WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages and punitive

damages to be determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and

attorney’s fees.

TWENTY THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST OCEANA AND COOPER-

Accounting


647. From about 2001 until 2009, OCEANA and/or COOPER did not credit all payments and

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interest they received from KRICHEVSKY and/or EDELSTEIN.

648. Additionally, they added unlawful attorney’s fees, late fees and expenses to

KRICHEVSKY’ account of common charges

649. KRICHEVSKY needs to verify amount of debt and liens they claim to be correct and

lawful. KRICHEVSKY believes that amount of debt is fraudulently overstated.

650. KRICHEVSKY lacks an adequate remedy at law, as such, an accounting is required.

WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands order directing OCEANA and COOPER to

produce all books and records.

TWENTY FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST COOPER, BADALOV AND

MEYDID – Aid And Abate Breach Of Fiduciary Duty


652. This is an alternative cause of action in case all of the defendants will deny breach of the

fiduciary duty to KRICHEVSKY. There is/was principal-agent relationship between

OCEANA and COOPER.

653. BADALOV and MEYDID knew or should have known that there is a fiduciary

relationship between KRICHEVSKY and KAPLUN. They knew or should have known

that KAPLUN owes a duty of care and loyalty to KRICHEVSKY.

654. BADALOV and MEYDID knew or should have known that by following KAPLUN’s

order to create nuisance and to harass KRICHEVSKY and his guests, she is breaching

her duty of care and loyalty to KRICHEVSKY.

655. BADALOV and MEYDID knew or should have known that by torturously interfering

with KRICHEVSKY’s contracts with OCEANA and COOPER, KAPLUN is breaching

83

her duty of care and loyalty to KRICHEVSKY.

656. BADALOV and MEYDID knew or should have known that if they refused to follow

KAPLUN’s orders, she would be unable to breach her duty of care and loyalty to

KRICHEVSKY and KRICHEVSKY will not be harmed.

657. If BADALOV and MEYDID did not disable magnetic keys, but instead accepted

KRICHEVSKY’s TENDER and timely contacted EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to

collect common charges, KRICHEVSKY would not be harmed, or would be harmed

substantially less otherwise. Accordingly, BADALOV and MEYDID substantially aided

and abetted KAPLUN’s breach of her fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to

KRICHEVSKY.








fees.



TWENTY FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST OCEANA, COOPER,

KAPLUN, BADALOV AND MEYDID – Declaratory Judgments

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661. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants failure to provide proper notice

before filing the lien against the UNIT violated the “due process clause” of the 5th and14th

amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, paragraph 6 of the New York

State Constitution

662. This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief that challenges the constitutionality

of OCEANA’s bylaws, policies and procedures.

663. Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) to stop "the use of

abusive, deceptive and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors," 15

U.S.C. § 1692(a).

664. This action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that challenges OCEANA’s policy and

practice of disconnecting keys from the amenities and gates; and filing harassing

lawsuits.

665. A debt collector may not "use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means

in connection with the collection of any debt," 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Such a prohibition

includes the false representation of "the character, amount, or legal status of any debt," 15

U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). KRICHEVSKY seeks declaratory relief that challenges

OCEANA’s validity and the amount of liens on the UNIT.

666. A debt collector may not "use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to

collect any debt," 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.

667. Nor may a debt collector "engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to

harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt," 15

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U.S.C. § 1692d.

668. Corporate defendants conspired and acted in concert, have filed three harassing lawsuits

using notoriously known “sewer service,” and two liens on KRICHEVSKY’s UNIT

without his knowledge and consent while he challenged alleged debt in courts.

669. If, which is not admitted, defendants believed that they can lawfully add a late fee

together with attorney’s fees to the amount of the lien without court approval, they did

not need to file lawsuits against KRICHEVSKY. All they needed to do, is to simplify file

the lien without notifying KRICHEVSKY.

670. Accordingly, filing of 2 lawsuits using “sewer service,” failure to later cure defect in

service and continue litigation to obtain a judgment against KRICHEVSKY or

SVENSON is an evidence of abuse of judicial proceedings intended to harass

KRICHEVSKY and generate litigation fees and expenses for debt collector. Additionally,

KRICHEVSKY avers that defendants attempted fraudulently obtain default judgment

against him by the use of “sewer service,” add fees and expenses to the amount of the

liens. Thereafter, corporate defendants planned and attempted fraudulently obtain

KRICHEVSKY’s UNIT through foreclosure. When KRICHEVSKY discovered their

plot, they abandoned these proceedings to avoid adjudication against them.

671. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants failure to provide proper notice before filing

the lien on the UNIT violated the “due process clause” of the 5th and14th amendment of

the United States Constitution and Article 1, paragraph 6 of the New York State

Constitution.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands the following relief: a declaratory judgment that

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Defendants failure to provide proper notice before filing the lien on the UNIT violated

the “due process clause” of the 5th and14th amendment of the United States Constitution

and Article 1, paragraph 6 of the New York State Constitution; declaratory judgment that

OCEANA’s bylaws and policy of debt collection are unconstitutional; declaratory

judgment that Defendants violated the FDCPA; declaratory judgment that debt and liens

on the UNIT are void; issuing an Order enjoining Defendants from committing similar

violations in the future; statutory damages, actual damages, attorneys' fees, litigation

expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action and defending Plaintiff’s rights in

other actions; any other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

TWENTY SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS

– Trespass On Land


662. KRICHEVSKY is the rightful owner of the UNIT and amenities.

663. At all relevant times, each defendant personally and all in concert, knowingly,

intentionally and maliciously interfered with KRICHEVSKY’s right to possess the UNIT

by preventing him to enter it, inspect or conduct business using it.

664. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR conspired and unlawfully prevented

KRICHEVSKY from entry, inspection and from selling the UNIT.

665. Alternatively, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR conspired and unlawfully

prevented KRICHEVSKY from entry, inspection and leasing the UNIT and collecting

rent.

666. At other relevant times, KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID conspired and unlawfully

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prevented KRICHEVSKY and his guests from entering amenities and apartment building

itself where UNIT is located. By disconnecting entrance keys and refusing to process the

lease application, they prevented KRICHEVSKY from leasing the unit and collecting

rent.

667. Disconnection of magnetic entrance keys to amenities had the effect of building a wall on

KRICHEVSKY’s land, thereby preventing his entrance to land.








fees.

WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble

damages to be determined at trial.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

Please take notice that Plaintiff demands trial by jury in this action.

Dated: Brooklyn, New YorkApril 8, 2013 _______________________________________________ MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se, All rights reserved

4221 Atlantic Ave Brooklyn, New York 11224

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(718) 687-2300 [email protected]

adversary proseeding - second amended complaint in new york

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