The First Definition ofUnrealityPart 1- Introduction||shrI gaNeshAya namaH || || shrIviTThalaM namAmi || The advaita-siddhi is regarded as one of the most important polemical works of advaita. It is MadhusUdana sarasvatI's brilliant and successful defense of advaita in response to the objections of the MAdhvas, the dualists. Shankara states that his doctrine of brahmajnAna (brahmajnAnamapi vastutantrameva - brahma-sUtra-bhAshhya 1.1.2) is a "vastu-tantra", a doctrine based on facts, as opposed to a "purushha-tantra", a doctrine based on the knowledge of an individual. One can raise objections against individual opinions but facts cannot be objected to; they can possibly be misunderstood. One can possibly express ignorance of facts but not argue against them. So one may ask: how is it possible for the mAdhvas to raise objections against advaita that is based on facts? It is not possible. What the MAdhvas, the dvaitins, have done is to express misunderstandings, not objections. It is, therefore, proper to answer the so-called objections of the mAdhvas by clearing their misunderstandings of advaita. But it must also be mentioned that, in some cases at least, it appears that the misunderstandings are not genuine misunderstandings but misunderstandings introduced on purpose to A) misrepresent advaita first and then, B) to try to refute the resulting misrepresentation. Nevertheless, advaitins should remove all misunderstandings, whether they be genuine or otherwise, and no advaitin has done this better than MadhusUdana SarasvatI, the great logician from Bengal. I endeavor here to present some glimpses of the advaita-siddhi's great treasures, treasures that are to be cherished for all time. In a forum like this one, it is hard, if not impossible, to do justice to such a monumental work as the advaita-siddhi. So I will endeavor to present only a few discussions with translation, consulting the explanations of Balabhadra BhaTTAchArya in his advaita-siddhi-vyAkhyA, of BrahmAnanda in his GauDa-brahmAnandI (laghuchandrikA) commentary on the advaita-siddhi, and of ViTThala upAdhyAya in his commentary on the laghu-chandrikA. All these works, namely the advaita-siddhi, siddhi-vyAkhyA, GauDa-brahmAnandI, and also the viTThaleshopAdhyAyI commentary on the GauDa-brahmAnandI, all in the original Sanskrit, have been edited by Pandit Anantakrishna Sastri and published by Parimal Publications, Delhi, in 1988. A few words about the authors. MadhusUdana sarasvatI is a towering giant among advaitins. An oft quoted verse regarding him is: madhusUdanasarasvatyAH pAraM vetti sarasvatI | pAraM vetti sarasvatyAH madhusUdanasarasvatI || (Only) the Goddess of Learning, sarasvatI knows the limits of (knowledge of) MadhusUdana sarasvatI. And MadhusUdana sarasvatI knows the limits of (knowledge of) Goddess sarasvatI! He is said to have had three illustrious gurus. He learned mImAMsA from mAdhava sarasvatI, vedAnta from rAmatIrtha, and took sannyAsa dIxA from vishveshvara sarasvatI. Apart from the advaita-siddhi which is MadhusUdana's "crest-jewel", he is said to have written numerous other works, including a lucid commentary on the gItA called gUDhArtha-dIpikA, and a work called "advaita-ratna-laxana", a refutation of the work "bheda-ratna" by the logician shankara mishra. MadhusUdana demonstrates his ability as a master logician in the advaita-siddhi, which he wrote as a response to the nyAyAmR^ita of the mAdhva exponent, vyAsatIrtha. MadhusUdana was so accomplished in navya-nyAya (logic) techniques that the following verse is quoted about him when he visited navadvIpa, the center for learning in nyAya-shAstra. navadvIpe samAyAte madhusUdanavAkpatau | chakampe tarkavAgIshaH kAtaro .abhUd.h gadAdharaH || When MadhusUdana, the master of speech, came to navadvIpa, MathurAnAtha tarkavAgIsha (who was the foremost navya naiyAyika during those times) trembled (with fear) and GadAdhara (another logician of great repute) became afraid. Balabhadra BhaTTAchArya, the author of siddhi-vyAkhyA, is said to have a been a favorite student of MadhusUdana. BrahmAnanda, the author of gauDabrahmAnandI (laghu-chandrikA), wrote the work as a response to the nyAyAmR^ita-taraN^giNI of the dvaitin (dualist) rAmAchArya. BrahmAnanda was the student of nArAyaNa tIrtha, a student of MadhusUdana. Finally, ViTThalesha upAdhyAya, a brAhmaNa of the Konkan region, has also placed the followers of advaita under his debt for writing a lucid commentary on the gaUDa-brahmAnandI. || shrIvishhNave namaH || Verse 1 of the advaita-siddhi ----------------------------- mAyAkalpita-mAtR^itA-mukha-mR^ishhA-dvaitaprapaJNchAshrayaH satya-GYAna-sukhAtmakaH shruti-shikhottha-akhaNDadhIgocharaH | mithyA-bandha-vidhUnanena paramAnandaika-tAnAtmakaM mokshhaM prApta iva svayaM vijayate vishhNur-vikalporjjhitaH ||1 || Translation based on siddhivyAkhyA of Balabhadra bhaTTAchArya and GauDa-brahmAnandI (laghu-chandrikA) of BrahmAnanda VishhNu shines supreme, He who is the substratum (basis) of the world of duality beginning with the notion of cognizer (mAtR^i), of duality that is false and fabricated by mAyA, He whose nature is Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss, He who is realized by the undifferentiated (undivided) direct experience arising from the mahAvAkyas of vedAnta, He who by shaking off the false bonds (of mAyA) has attained, as it were, mokshha wholly consisting of supreme bliss, and He who becomes free from all variety, manifoldness (vikalpa). (1) BrahmAnanda clearly identifies VishhNu with jIva, the individual soul, the pervader. vishhNuH vyApakaM jIvasvarUpam.h | This individual soul (jIva) attains as it were, mokshha or liberation and shines as VishhNu, the supreme Brahman. What is mokshha and what is bandha (bondage)? The vArtikakAra has said: "avidyAstamayo moxaH sA cha bandha udAhR^itaH" Mokshha is the complete dissolution of avidyA, and bondage is that avidyA. BrahmAnanda interprets "mithyAbandhavidhUnanena - vikalpojjhita" as brahmAtmaikya-aGYAnarUpabandhasya tAdR^ishhAstamayena dR^ishyashUnyaH. Bondage is the ignorance of the identity of Brahman and Atman (individual self). Once such ignorance is fully removed, there is nothing "seen" (as only the seer dR^ik remains). Balabhadra interprets shrutishikhottha-akhaNDadhIgocharaH as vedAnta-janya-akhaNDasAxAtkAravishhaya, that thing which is the content of the indivisible (undifferentiated) direct experience arising from the (mahAvAkyas) of vedAnta. viTThaleshopAdhyAya explains the whole process described in the first verse of the advaita-siddhi as follows: vishhNuH (jIvaH) vastutaH satyaGYAnasukhAtmako .pi san.h, mAyAkalpitamAtR^itAmukhamR^ishhA-dvaitaprapaJNchAshrayo jAtaH, mukto .api san.h aGYAnena baddhatvena bhrAnta ityarthaH | tatashcha vastuto baddhasya tattvena bhrAntasya mumuxAsaMbhavAt.h sa mumuxu san.h gurumanusR^itaH tataH tadupadishhTa-shruti-shikho- ttha-akhaNDadhIgocharo .abhUt.h | nishhkAmakarmopAsanAnushhThAn- ena shraddhaikAgrachittaH san.h AtmAnaM satyaGYAnasukharUpabrahm- atvena sAxAtkR^itavAn.h | tatashcha mithyAbandhavidhUnanena vikalpojjhitaH mithyAbandhApagamAt.h tatprayuktavikalpena duHkhena rahitaH san.h paramAnandaikatAnAtmakamoxaM prApta iva | avAstavasaMbandhabhramasyaiva satvAt.h moxarUpasya tatsaMbandha- abhAvAchcha iva ityuktam.h | IdR^ishaH san.h vijayate svaprakAsha- rUpotkarshhavAn.h ityarthaH | VishhNu (as the jIva), even being actually of the nature of Reality, Consciousness, and Bliss, is the substratum of the false world of duality beginning with the notion of cognizer that is fabricated by mAyA. Even though He (the jIva) is liberated, due to being bound by ignorance, He is under delusion. (If) He is actually bound and (really) deluded by reality, from that (it follows that) desire for liberation is impossible. (But this is not so.) Being desirous of liberation He follows a (worthy) Guru. From the vedAntic teachings of that (Guru), He has comprehended the undivided Brahman. By performing actions without desire for fruits thereof and by performing upAsana (worship and meditation), being of one-pointed mind and dedicated, He has directly realized the Self as the Brahman which is essentially Reality, Consciousness, and Bliss. Thereupon, by the removal of the false bonds (of mAyA), and being freed from the associated sorrow, (He) has attained mokshha or liberation which is wholly bliss. Because of the presence of the illusion of being related (to duality in the state of bondage), which is not real, and because of the absence of that relation in mokshha, the (word) "iva", as it were, is stated. Being so (liberated and in His real state), He (VishhNu) shines supreme by His own brilliance.

Next, MadhusUdana pays respects to his three Gurus who taught him mImAMsA, vedAnta, and initiated into sannyAsa. shrIrAma-vishveshvara-mAdhavAnAmaikyena sAxAtkR^ita- mAdhavAnAm.h | sparshena nirdhUtatamorajobhyaH pAdotthitebhyo .astu namo rajobhyaH || 2 || May salutations be to the dust that on contact removes darkness (ignorance), the dust of the feet of shrI rAma, shrI vishveshvara, and shrI mAdhava, who have directly realized the parabrahman (mAdhava) as identical with themselves. The first occurrence of "mAdhava" denotes the Guru, mAdhava, but the second stands for parabrahman, per gauDa-brahmAnandI - mAdhavAnAM parabrahmaNAm.h . bahubhirvihitA budhaiH parArthaM vijayante .amitavistR^itA nibandhAH | mama tu shrama eshha nUnamAtmaMbharitAM bhAvayituM bhavishhyatIha || 3 || Many knowledgeable people have composed lengthy works that are excellent and for the sake of (educating) others. But this effort of mine will only be for fulfilling my own objective. ViTThalesha states here that MadhusUdana has expressed his lack of conceit, garvarAhityapradarshana. In the next verse, MadhusUdana briefly states the purpose of his work. shraddhAdhanena muninA madhusUdanena saN^gR^ihya shAstranichayaM rachitAtiyatnAt.h | bodhAya vAdivijayAya cha sattvarANAm-advaitasiddhiriyamastu mude budhAnAm.h || 4 || This advaita-siddhi has been composed by the sage MadhusUdana, whose sole asset is dedication, with great diligence, after collecting the truths of the shAstras. May this advaita-siddhi be useful in imparting (correct) understanding and in gaining victory over disputants (with opposite views) to those who are too busy (to read lengthy works) and may it be a (source of) joy to the learned! Here, BrahmAnanda sees a link between "iyam.h" (this) in the current verse and the final verse of the advaita-siddhi: siddhInAm-ishhTa-naishhkarmya-brahmagAnAmiyaM chirAt.h | advaitasiddhiradhunA chaturthI samajAyata || After a long lapse of time since the "siddhi"s of ishhTa, naishhkarmya, and brahma, this advaita-siddhi, the fourth siddhi, has originated. The three other siddhi's being referred to are the ishhTa-siddhi of VimuktAtman, the naishhkarmya-siddhi of Sureshvara, and the Brahma- siddhi of maNDana mishra. MadhusUdana :- tatrAdvaitasiddherdvaitamithyAtvasiddhipUrvakatvAt.h dvaita- mithyAtvameva prathamamupapAdanIyam.h | Since the establishing of unreality of duality is the antecedent of establishing the truth of nonduality, only the unreality of duality is to be established first. siddhivyAkhyAkAra (balabhadra) :- nanu advaitasiddhAvadvaitasyaiva pratipadanIyatayA tadvihAyA- gre dvaitamithyAtvopapAdanaM kriyamANamasaN^gatamityata Aha tatreti | tasyAmadvaitasidhhau dvaitamithyAtvameva prathamam- upapAdanIyamityarthaH | tatra hetuH advaitasiddherityAdi | tathAcha dvaitamithyAtve upapAdite .advaitaM sUpapAdamiti dvaitamithyAtvopapAdanamadvaitasiddhyanuguNatvAnnAsaN^gatamiti dhyeyam.h | An objection can be raised: In advaita-siddhi, only advaita should be discussed. Discarding that (objective) in the beginning, the establishing of unreality of duality that is being done is irrelevant. In reply, (MadhusUdana) states tatra, etc. In advaita-siddhi (establishing the truth of non-duality), the unreality of duality is to be established first; this is the meaning. The reason being "advaitasiddheH", etc. ie. "since the establishing of nonduality is preceded by establishing the unreality of duality." And also, when the unreality of duality is established, nonduality is easily established; by the establishing of unreality of duality, the truth of nonduality follows. Therefore, it is to be considered that (such establishing of unreality of duality) is not irrelevant.

Part 2- Review of navya nyAya concepts

A review of some concepts and terms from nyAya is in order before we proceed further. Please see "Materials for the study of Navya Nyaya Logic" by Ingalls or "The Navya-Nyaya doctrine of negation" by Bimal Krishna Matilal for more details.

Process of inference:

Every noneternal entity, according to nyAya, must be a result of an instrumental cause (karaNa) and an operation (vyApAra). An inference (anumAna), that is a means to knowledge of man and hence noneternal, must have an instrumental cause and an operation by which the cause brings about the inference.

In the process of inference, the operation is called parAmarsha or consideration, and the instrumental cause is the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyApti), also called pervasion. This vyApti corresponds very roughly to logical implication in Western logic.

In the inference, "the mountain possesses fire because it has smoke", the instrumental cause, karaNa is the knowledge of the invariable concomitance, "smoke is the invariable concomitant of fire", vahni-vyApyo dhUmaH, ie. where there is smoke there is fire. The operation, vyApAra is the consideration (parAmarsha) that is a knowledge of the occurrence of the concomitant in the subject (pakshha) where the inference is being made. In the inference, "the mountain possesses fire because it has smoke", the parAmarsha will be of the form, "the mountain possesses smoke which is an invariable concomitant of fire" - parvato vahni-vyApya-dhUmavAn.h

In polemical treatises and debates, an inference is stated tersely by listing the inference (conclusion) followed by a single word representing the application of the consideration and the invariable concomitance. For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain possesses fire because of smoke."

In every inference, there are evident three terms, called 1) sAdhya or that which is to be proved, 2) the hetu or linga, the concomitant, and 3) the subject or pakshha, that in which the hetu is known to occur.

In the inference, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire because of smoke", the sAdhya is vahni (fire), the hetu is smoke, and the pakshha is parvata (mountain).

In the standard form of inference, the three terms are placed as follows:

pakshha sAdhya-with-possessive-suffix hetu-in-ablative-case

For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire because of smoke."

The definition of vyApti is very important. It is defined by the bhAshhA-parichchheda (of VishvanAtha) as:

vyAptiH sAdhyavadanyasminn-asaMbandha udAhR^itaH |

Invariable concomitance is said to be the absence of relation of the (hetu) to anything other than what possesses the sAdhya.

Here the relation should be the same as the relation under consideration for the vyApti. As per this definition of vyApti, smoke is an invariable concomitant of fire (or smoke is "pervaded" by fire) because it is not the case that there is something that has smoke but not fire. However, fire is not an invariable concomitant of smoke. There are things such as a red-hot iron rod that has fire but no smoke. So fire is not an invariable concomitant of smoke.

A relation between two entities is often explained as the superimposition of one entity on the other. Here, the entity that is superimposed is called the superstratum or Adheya. The entity on which the Adheya is superimposed is called substratum or locus. Sanskrit names for "substratum" is AdhAra or Ashraya or adhikaraNa. In the example, bhUtale ghaTo vartate, "there is a pot on the ground", the superstratum is the pot (ghaTa), the ground (bhUtalam.h) is the substratum or locus, and the relation is "contact", saMyoga.

Another way of looking at relations (saMbandha) is to differentiate between what Ingalls calls "occurrence-exacting" and "non occurrence exacting" relations. Relations such as inherence (samavAya) are always occurrence exacting. samavAya or inherence is the relation between a whole and its parts, a genus or class (jAti) and a particular instance of the class, etc. Contact (saMyoga) can sometimes be occurrence exacting but sometimes not.

In relation between two entities, one of the entities is an adjunct or pratiyogin, and the other is a subjunct or anuyogin. If a relation is such that one entity is a locus or substratum (AdhAra) of the other which must be the superstratum (Adheya), then the AdhAra is the subjunct or anuyogin. The Adheya is the adjunct or pratiyogin. In the example, bhUtale ghaTaH, "there is a pot on the ground", ghaTa is the pratiyogin while bhUtalam.h is the anuyogin.

Two types of absences (abhAva) are distinguished in navya-nyAya. One is called anyonya-abhAva that is essentially a denial of identity between to entities. The other is saMsarga-abhAva or relational absence. Here, there are three kinds: 1) prAgabhAva, the absence of a thing before it is brought into being, 2) dhvamsAbhAva, the absence of a thing after it is destroyed, and 3) atyanta-abhAva, eternal absence.

The terms pratiyogin and anuyogin are also used in the context of absences. When we say "bhUtale ghaTo nAsti", "there is no pot on the ground", the pratiyogin of the absence is "ghaTa", pot, and the anuyogin is "bhUtalam.h", ground. The pratiyogin of this type should be called "abhAvIya-pratiyogin" to distinguish it from the relational adjunct, but naiyAyikas often write "pratiyogin" for both relational and absential adjuncts.

Some of the properties that are commonly used in naiyAyika literature are those that correspond to the terms sAdhya, hetu, pakshha, adhikaraNa (locus), vishhayin (knowledge), vishhaya (content of knowledge), visheshhya (qualificand), visheshhaNa (qualifier), prakAra (chief qualifier), etc.

The abstract properties or relational abstracts of these are formed by simply adding the suffix, "tva" or "tA" to each term. For example, one may write sAdhyatva to mean "the property of being a sAdhya" or "sAdhya-ness", hetutva or "the property of being a hetu" or "hetu-ness", etc.

A sentence of the form, parvato vahnimAn.h, "the mountain (parvata) has fire (vahni)", can be first rewritten as parvato vahnyadhikaraNam.h, "the mountain is a locus or substratum of fire". This is then analyzed by the naiyAyika as follows:

parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpitA |

The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by vahni.

Or

parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nishhThAdheyatA nirUpitA |

The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by the AdheyatA (superstratum-ness) resident in fire.

The most characteristic terms of navya-nyAya are "avachchhedaka" (limitor) and "avachchhinna" (limited). These terms are used in the context of relational abstracts or abstract properties. An entity, such as a pot (ghaTa), is said to be qualified by a qualifier, but a relational abstract is said to be limited by a limitor.

Let us take the same sentence, parvato vahnimAn, "the mountain has fire." Here, the mountain is a substratum (adhikaraNa) of fire which is the superstratum (Adheya). The adhikaraNatA in parvata is described by vahni (fire), but this adhikaraNatA is said to be limited (avachchhinna) by parvatatva. Similarly, the AdheyatA in vahni (fire) is said to be described by parvata but this AdheyatA is said to be limited (avachchhinna) by vahnitva or fire-ness.

So a navya-naiyAyika would write:

parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpita-parvatatva- avachchhinna-adhikaraNatA, vahni-nishhThAdheyatA sA parvata-nirUpita-vahnitva-avachchhinnAdheyatA |

The adhikaraNatA in mountain is described by fire and limited by parvatatva (mountain-ness), and the AdheyatA in fire is described by mountain and limited by vahnitva (fire-ness).

A generic relational abstract may also be limited. In the sentence, "a stick is the instrumental cause of a pot", daNDo nimitta-kAraNaM ghatasya, the assertion is not with respect to a specific pot and stick. The assertion is generally about all sticks and pots.

So the naiyAyika writes:

daNDatvaM ghaTa-nirUpita-nimitta-kAraNatva-avachchhedakam.h |

Stick-ness is the limitor of instrumental-cause-ness described by pot.

Part 3- The first definition of mithyAtva - objections Earlier, MadhusUdana set forth the objective of establishing the unreality (mithyAtva) of duality (dvaita), or in other words the unreality of the world (jaganmithyAtva).

After a brief digression of navya-nyAya, we will now look at the first definition of mithyAtva (unreality) that comes under attack from the mAdhva opponent. This definition is the one given by PadmapAdAchArya in his PanchapAdikA.

advaita-siddhi ---------------

atha prathamamithyAtva-vichAraH |

The opponent criticizes the definition of mithyAtva as follows: nanu kimidaM mithyAtvaM sAdhyate, na tAvat.h "mithyAshabdo- anirvachanIyatAvachana" iti panchapAdikAvachanAt.h sadasad- anadhikaraNatvarUpamanirvAchyatvam.h, taddhi kiM asatva- vishishhTa-sattvAbhAvaH, uta sattvAtyantAbhAva-asattva-atyanta- abhAvarUpaM dharmadvayam.h, Ahosvit.h sattvAtyanta-abhAvavatve sati asattva-atyanta-abhAvarUpaM vishishhTam.h |

Now, what is this unreality (mithyAtva) that (you) want to infer (as characterizing the world)? This unreality is by no means non-definability as defined by the statement of the panchapAdikA that the word mithyA (unreal) is denoted by non-definability, the non-definability being of the nature of NOT being the substratum (adhikaraNa) of either existence or non-existence. What is "not being the substratum of existence or non-existence"?

Is it 1) the absence of existence qualified by non-existence or 2) the pair of attributes of a. absolute absence of existence and b. absolute absence of non-existence, or 3) the property of the absolute absence of nonexistence during the absolute absence of existence, ie. being a common substratum of the attributes - the absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of non-existence?

nAdyaH, sattvamAtrAdhAre jagatyasattvavishishhTasattva-anabhyu- pagamAt, vishishhTa-abhAva-sAdhane siddha-sAdhanAt.h |

(You) cannot (claim) the first (regarding the world) because the world is the substratum of only existence (sattva) and existence qualified by non-existence is not admitted. And by proving the absence of existence as qualified by non-existence , (you commit the flaw of) proving what is already established (siddha-sAdhana).

[Please see Note 1 below]

na dvitIyaH, sattva-asattvayorekAbhAve aparasattva-avashyakatvena vyAghAtAt.h, nirdharmakabrahmavatsattva-asattva-rAhitye .api sadrUpatvena amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntarAchcha, shuktirUpye abAdhyatvarUpasattva-vyatirekasya sattvena bAdhyatvarUpa-asattvasya vyatireka-asiddhyA sAdhyavaikalyAchcha |

(You) cannot (claim) the second. Because, wherever there is an absence of one of existence and nonexistence, there the presence of the other is necessary; this leads to a contradiction. (Also), the world, just like the Brahman without attributes, even being without the attributes, existence and nonexistence, by (its very) nature of existence, is established as NOT unreal; this would lead to (the defect of) arthAntara, proving something other than what is to be proved. In the silver-in-nacre (example of illusion that is often quoted by advaitins to show the ontological status of the world), (we grant that) it (silver-nacre) is without existence whose nature is non-sublatability (noncontradicted-ness), (but) the absence of nonexistence, whose nature is sublatibility (contradicted-ness), is NOT established; this leads to the defectiveness of (your) sAdhya, what (you) seek to prove.

[Please see Note 2 below]

ata eva na tR^itIyaH, pUrvavadvyAghAtAt.h, arthAntarAtsAdhya- vaikalyAchcha

For the very same reason(s) as before, the third (alternative in defining mithyAtva, ie. the common substratum of the attributes, absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of nonexistence) cannot (be claimed) because of the fallacies of contradiction (violation of the law of the excluded middle), proving something other than what is intended, and defectiveness of the sAdhya.

MadhusUdana now begins his reply thus:

iti chet.h, maivam.h

If this is what you say, it is unjustified.

Notes ----- Note 1: BrahmAnanda points out that the siddha-sAdhana allegation made by the mAdhva in his criticism of the first alternative to defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva is not technically accurate. Here is why:

mAdhvamate alIkasyaiva-atyanta-abhAva-svIkAreNokta-vishishhTa- pratiyogika-abhAvaprasiddhAvapi matAntare tadaprasiddhirityapi bodhyam.h |

Even though the absolute absence of an alIka (fictitious entity) is accepted by mAdhvas and the absence of the qualified adjunct is (accepted) as exampled, in some other system (mata) it is not exampled (and, therefore, it is not accepted.)

ViTThalesha clarifies here that matAntare means naiyAyikAdi mate, among naiyAyikas, etc.

The argument is this. The first alternative to sadasadanadhikara- Natva is claimed by the mAdhva as leading to sidhha-sAdhana, establishing what is already accepted. But this is true only in the case of mAdhva's system, not in the case of others such as naiyAyikas who do not accept the negation of a purely fictitious entity. For example, the sentence "a hare with horns is not in the forest" is not accepted by the naiyAyikas because it involves the negation of a purely fictitious entity, a hare with horns. The naiyAyikas absolutely insist that what is being negated must be an exampled entity. The naiyAyikas are extreme realists as much as mAdhvas are. If any false knowledge creeps into the inference process, the naiyAyika feels that the whole process is suspect. Therefore, he insists that any and all terms that are used in an inference must be only exampled terms, not unexampled terms, fictitious terms. In fact, vAtsyAyana makes it clear in the nyAya-sUtra-bhAshhya that the conclusion that is to be proved must be possible - saMbhavastAvat.h pratiGYa.

In any case, the naiyAyika would also object to the first alternative in defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva, just as the mAdhva does, but for a different reason.

Note 2: Here, the opponent argues that the world (with duality) could be just like Brahman in that Brahman does not have existence as an attribute but existence is Brahman. So the duality of the world can also be such that existence is not an attribute but its very nature. If the advaitin admits this, he would be proving something other than what he wishes to prove.

Part 4- MadhusUdana's reply

Brief recap: We have seen that mithyAtva (unreality) can be defined as anirvachanIyatva (property of not being definable), and this anirvachanIyatva can further be explained as sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of either existence or nonexistence. The opponent lists three ways in which this sadasadanadhikaraNatva may be defined. He finds fault with each of these definitions. MadhusUdana disagrees and starts his counter-argument.

MadhusUdana's reply:

sattva-atyanta-abhAva-asattva-atyanta-abhAva-rUpa-dharma- dvaya-vivaxAyAM doshhAbhAvAt.h | nacha vyAhatiH |

In the intended meaning of "sadasad-anadhikaraNa" (not being the substratum of existence or nonexistence) as "the pair of attributes, absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of nonexistence", there is NO defect. There is NO contradiction too. (Why?)

sA hi sattvAsattvayoH parasparaviraharUpatayA vA, paraspara- virahavyApakatayA vA, parasparavirahavyApyatayA vA |

That (contradiction could result) only if 1) existence and nonexistence mutually negate each other or 2) they mutually pervade each other's absence (one's absence is the invariable concomitant of the other), or 3) they are mutually pervaded by each other's absence (one is the invariable concomitant of the other's absence). (PS: Recall the definition of vyApti in the third part of this series.)

tatra nAdyaH, tadanaN^gIkArAt.h | tathAhyatra trikAlAbAdhyatva- sattva-vyatireko nAsattvam.h, kintu kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratIyamAnatva-anadhikaraNatvam.h | tadvyatirekashcha sAdhyatvena vivaxitaH |

There is no (presence of the) first condition, because it is not accepted. It is so (not accepted) because the negation of existence, that is not sublatable at any time, past, present, or future, is NOT nonexistence, but (nonexistence means) NOT being cognized as existing in any substratum (at any time). The negation of that (nonexistence) is what is intended to be (part of) what is to be proved.

[Please see note 1 and note 2 below]

tathAcha trikAlAbAdhyavilaxaNatve sati kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratIyamAnatvarUpaM sAdhyaM paryavasitam.h | evaMcha sati na shuktirUpye sAdhyavaikalyamapi | bAdhyatvarUpAsattvavyatirekasya sAdhyApraveshAt.h | nApi vyAghAtaH, parasparaviraharUpatva- abhAvAt.h |

The conclusion to be established is that while being different from that which is never sublatable, it is (capable of) being cognized as existing in some substratum. And this being so, there is no defect of the sAdhya's (being absent) in silver-in-nacre. (This is) because the negation of nonexistence which is sublatable (always) does not form part of what is to be established (sAdhya). (What does form part of the sAdhya is the negation of nonexistence which consists in not being cognized in any locus or substratum at any time). (Therefore,) there is no contradiction too (here) because there is no mutual negation between (existence and nonexistence).

ata eva na dvitIyo .api, sattvAbhAvavati shuktirUpye vivaxita- asattvavyatirekasya vidyamAnatvena vyabhichArAt.h |

For this reason, the second condition (under which contradiction can occur) does not hold too. (There can be no invariable concomitance of the absence of existence or nonexistence with the other.) (The requirement for such concomitance to hold is not satisfied) due to deviation (vyabhichAra), since in (illusory things such as) the silver-in-nacre, there is the absence of existence, but the absence of the nonexistence with the intended definition (as above) is also cognized. (In order for the concomitance to hold, nonexistence would have to be present when existence is absent.)

nApi tR^itIyaH tasya vyAghAta-aprayojakatvAt.h, gotva-ashvatvayoH parasparavirahavyApyatve .api tadabhAvayor-ushhTrAdAvekatra sahopalaMbhAt.h |

The third condition does not cause contradiction. (For example,) cow-ness (the property of being a cow) and horse-ness (property of being a horse) are invariable concomitants of each other's absence (ie. where cow-ness is present, horse-ness is absent and where horse-ness is present, cow-ness is absent). Even so, the two properties (of cow-ness and horse-ness) are NOT present in the same locus such as a camel, etc., and (the absences of cow-ness and horse-ness are) perceived thus together (in the same locus).

[Please see note 3 below]

Balabhadra clarifies:

tatashcha sattva-asattvayoH parasparavirahavyApyatve .api tadabhAvayorekatra prapaJNche saMbhavAnna vyAhatiriti dhyeyam.H|

And therefore, even though existence and nonexistence are invariable concomitants of each other's absence, the absences of both CAN occur in the same place, ie. the world and due to (this) there is NO contradiction. This is to be thought of.

(To be continued)

Notes: ------ Note 1: MadhusUdana's definition of non-existence can also be understood in this way using Western-style logic.

Let us define a predicate S whereby S(X) means "X is sublated."

Also, let us say E(t) means the existential quantifier "there is a t", and U(t) means the universal quantifier "for all t." Let ~ stand for the negation operator.

Then the definition of existence (sattva or simply sat) is that thing, say X (Brahman) such that:

~ (E(t) such that S(X), for time t) ... (A)

In other words, sattva (Brahman) is that which is NOT sublated at any time.

Next, MadhusUdana defines nonexistence (of something X) NOT as simply negating the expression (A) above which would just be

(E(t) such that S(X), for time t) ... (B) this would mean "X such that there is a time t when X is sublated."

If the advaitins had defined nonexistence as (B) above, then the mAdhva opponent would have been justified in saying that existence and nonexistence are mutually negations of each other. Negating existence would be nonexistence and vice versa.

But, very significantly, MadhusUdana defines nonexistence (of something X) as, where C(X) means "X is cognized in a locus",:

(U(t): ~ C(X), for time t) .... (C)

meaning "for all time t, X is not cognized in a locus."

The negation of *this* type of nonexistence is:

(E(t): C(X), for time t) ... (D)

which means "there is some time t at which X is cognized in a locus." And this is precisely the negation of nonexistence that is characteristic of illusions such as silver-in-nacre, snake-on-rope, and finally, the world-on-Brahman illusion. The illusory thing is cognized as existing in a locus (substratum) sometime (the period of illusion). So such illusory entities CANNOT be said to be nonexistent in the same way as a fictitious entity, such as a hare with horns, which is never cognized in any locus.

Also, as MadhusUdana says, (D) is not the same as (A), and the negation of (A) is not the same as the nonexistence (C). So there is NO contradiction if both the negation of (A), ie. (B), and the negation of (C), ie. (D), both hold in the same locus. This exactly is the conclusion to be established - (B) and (D) both characterize the world of duality. There is a time (the illusion phase) when duality is cognized in a locus (Brahman) by super-imposition (adhyAsa). This establishes the (D) part of the conclusion. And there is a time (the dawn of jnAna) when the world of illusion is sublated. This establishes the (B) part of the conclusion.

Note 2: BrahmAnanda clarifies that pratIyamAnatvarUpaM means pratIyamAnatvayogyatvam.h, capable of being cognized.

ViTThalesha comments:

pratIyamAnatvamityatra laDarthavartmAnatvavivaxaNe pratIti- shUnyatvakAle mithyAtva-anupapattestadavivaxAM sphuTayati TIkAyAM - pratIyamAnatvayogyatvamiti |

The intended meaning of "pratIyamAnatva" that indicates the present tense does not indicate that mithyAtva (unreality) is not established during times when there is no cognition. To clarify this, (BrahmAnanda writes) "pratIyamAnatvayogyatvam.h" capable of being cognized, in the commentary.

Note 3:

This can be understood in this way. Suppose C(X) means X is a cow, and H(X) means X is a horse.

Now, we have:

C(X) -> ~ H(X) H(X) -> ~ C(X)

where "->" stands for "implies". If X is a cow then X is not a horse. If X is a horse then X is not a cow.

So 1) C(X) is an invariable concomitant of ~H(X), the negation of H(X). 2) H(X) is an invariable concomitant of ~C(X), the negation of C(X). This means it not possible to have:

(C(X) AND H(X)) for the same entity X. X cannot be both a cow and horse.

Suppose M(X) means X is a camel. Then the following is tenable:

M(X) -> ~C(X) AND ~H(X)

If X is a camel, it is neither a cow nor a horse.

This is what MadhusUdana is saying here.

Part 5- No arthAntara

After rejecting the claim made by the opponent that the definitions of sadasadanadhikaraNatva are faulty, MadhusUdana next shows that the charge made regarding arthAntara is also not valid.

MadhusUdana's reply (continued):

yachcha - nirdharmakasya brahmaNaH sattvarAhitye .api sadrUpavat- prapaJNchasya sadrUpatvena-amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntaraM- uktam.h| tanna |

And the (opponent) said: Just as the attributeless Brahman lacks existence (as an attribute) but (Its) very nature is existence, the very nature of the world too is existence. This establishes that the world is not mithyA (unreal). By this (it follows that you will have) established something other (than what you wanted to) - arthAntara.

(We say): It is not so.

ekenaiva sarvAnugatena sarvatra satpratItyupapattau brahmavat.h prapaJNchasya pratyekaM satsvabhAvatAkalpena mAnAbhAvAt.h, anugata-vyavahAra-abhAva-prasaN^gAchcha |

The understanding of sat (existence) as encompassing everything and everywhere is established by One (principle). (But) each and every thing in the world cannot be proved to be comprehended as (pure) existence in the same way as Brahman. And a contingency would arise due to the lack of a comprehensive system (of understanding, explaining, and discussing a large number of things and topics.) (Therefore, the claim that we would be committing the fallacy of arthAntara is not correct.)

MadhusUdana is making a crucial point here regarding what is technically called anugata-dharma or consecutive property in nyAya. When a property occurs in a number of different things, the naiyAyika would search for a common term or common concept to represent this common property and then refer to each of those things as possessing that common property. For example, if a pot is blue, a lotus is blue, and a cloth is blue, the naiyAyika would make "blue-ness" a common property and say that the pot possesses "blue-ness", the lotus possesses "blue-ness", and so on. Such a system wherein a number of things are explained using fewer concepts is said to have the advantage of "lAghava" or light-ness as compared to a system where a greater number of concepts are required, in which case a defect of "gaurava" or heaviness is said to prevail. This is directly related to the principle of "Occam's razor" as used in the West. If I can explain a certain number of things using some hypotheses and you can explain the same things using fewer hypotheses than mine, then your explanation is better than mine.

In keeping with the principle of "lAghava" or lightness rather than heaviness, the naiyAyika-logician is always looking for anugata dharma's or common properties to explain things. In the case at hand, the opponent says that just as Brahman is by Its very nature existence, the duality in the world is also similarly by its very nature existence and hence real. MadhusUdana points out two problems with this claim:

1) There is no comprehension of the existence of individual things in the world as Brahman is. One does not get the idea "this pot that I see now is eternally existent and is never sublated."

2) If the reality of each and every thing in the world is admitted, then it would take a significant number of "real" entities to explain what is meant by "reality." This theory would be too heavy, suffer from the defect of "gaurava" because of the lack of a common property or anugata dharma. An explanation using a single non-dual Reality is superior even from this strictly logical viewpoint.

In the previous part of the series, we have seen how MadhusUdana refutes the charge of arthAntara, ie. proving something other than what he intended to. Next, MadhusUdana shows how mithyAtva can be redefined so that the opponent cannot even dream (no pun intended!) of making the charge of arthAntara. MadhusUdana alternatively defines mithyAtva as the absolute difference from sattva and the absolute difference from asattva. It must be noted that this alternative definition is not a new definition; it is entirely equivalent to the one accepted so far, ie. the absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva. The alternate definition makes use of mutual absence or anyonya-abhAva as opposed to atyanta-abhAva in the first definition.

MadhusUdana:

satpratiyogika-asatpratiyogikabhedadvayaM vA sAdhyam.h | tathAcha ubhayAtmakatve .anyatarAtmakatve vA, tAdR^igbheda-asaMbhavena tAbhyAmarthAntara-anavakAshaH |

Alternatively, (we may define) the sAdhya (the unreality of duality, mithyAtva) to be the difference that has existence as its counter- positive AND the difference that nonexistence as its counter-positive. (Simply put, mithyAtva is that which is different from existence AND different from nonexistence as well.) And there is no scope for (charging us with) arthAntara due to this because such difference from both (existence and nonexistence) or difference from one of them is not possible (according to our other opponents- the logicians, the Buddhists, and the view of VAchaspati Mishra in the nyAyavArttikatAtparyaTIkA).

Explanation by BrahmAnanda and explanation of BrahmAnanda's explanation ----------------------------------------------------------------------- by ViTThalesha -------------- BrahmAnanda (in his laghuchandrikA): bhedeti AtyantikabhedetyarthaH |

By "bheda" (difference) (MadhusUdana) means "absolute difference."

ViTThalesha (in his viTThaleshopAdhyAyI):

nanu prapaJNchasya sadasadubhayarUpatAmate sadbheda-asadbhedayorapi avachchhedakabhedena tatra sattvAt.h siddhasAdhanaM ata Aha - Atyantiketi |

Now, even as per the view that the world is both real and unreal, the difference from "sat" and difference from "asat" are present there as limiting differences. This leads to siddha-sAdhana (doshha), establishing what is already established (since such a view is already held by VAchaspati Mishra in his nyAyavArttikatAtparyaTIkA.) Therefore, (in order to refute this charge) (BrahmAnanda) says "(the difference) is absolute."

( MadhusUdana uses the word bheda which BrahmAnanda clarifies to be not difference used loosely but absolute and complete difference. Otherwise, the opponent can say that as per the view that holds the world to be both real and unreal, a partial difference from reality and a partial difference from unreality can be said to characterize the world. And this would lead to the objection: "You are proving what has already been proved.")

BrahmAnanda:

ubhayAtmakatve iti| "bhramavishhayIbhUta-alIkasaMsargavishishhTAdirUpeNa prapaJNcho .alIkaH rUpAntareNa tu satya " iti nyAyapeTikAkAravAchaspatyuktapaxe ityarthaH |

(MadhusUdana says) "in (defining the world as having) the nature of both (sat and asat)." This means the view of VAchaspati Mishra in his nyAyavArtikatAtparyaTIkA according to which "As the world is the object of erroneous cognition (such as silver-in-nacre), due to being qualified by the false relation, it (the world) is false. But in its other capacity, the world is real."

ViTThalesha explains: "bhramavishhayIbhUta-alIkasaMsargavishishhTAdirUpeNa prapaJNcho .alIka" iti| idaMrajatamityAdibhrameshhu satye dharmiNi satyameva hi dR^ishyaM rajatAdikaM alIkasaMbandhena bhAsate, tatra svarUpataH satyayorapi-ida Mrajatayor-alIkasaMsargavishishhTa-rUpeNa-asatyattvaM,

In illusions such as "this is silver" (ie. illusion of silver in nacre), a real object such as silver appears in the real subject (but) with a false relation. In such a case, even though "this" and silver are real in themselves, due to being qualified by a false relation they are unreal.

[In the illusion, "this is silver", the "this" and silver indicate real objects of cognition. Silver in itself is a real object. So is the thing indicated by "this". The fact that I am seeing something which I call "this" is true. Also, it is true that I have seen silver before. But the mistake I make is in identifying "this" with silver when I say "this is silver." So VAchaspati Mishra holds that in an illusion, there is a false (alIka) relation between real things that are related by such a false relation. The relata are real in themselves but as relata of the false relation, they are unreal. The false relation in the illusion "this is silver" is the relation of identity (tAdAtmya). We will see next that this view is extended to define the world as being both real and unreal.] etanmate brahmaNi prapaJNchasya-alIkasaMbandhena bhrama iti na bhramitavyam.h | idami rajatasyeva tatra tattatpadArthAnAM bhramAnAdAyaiva sarvasyApi prapaJNchasya-alIkatopapatteH |

(But) this view should not be mistaken as (holding) that there is a case of illusion due to the false relation of the world with Brahman. For, just as in the case of (the illusion of) "this" and silver, the illusions of various things in the world cause the whole world to be established as unreal.

rUpAntareNeti| idaMtvarajatatvAdinA pramA-vishhayIbhUta-satyasaMsarga-vishishhTa- rUpeNa vetyarthaH|

(By) "rUpAntareNa tu satyaH" (is meant): (But) by the nature of being relata of a real relation that is the object of right knowledge, things denoted by "silver", "this", etc. (and the whole world) (are real).

[pramA is right or valid knowledge and bhrama is erroneous knowledge or illusion. In pramA, a real relation is cognized among real objects and so far as pramA is concerned, these objects are also real. In bhrama, a false relation appears to be existing among objects that are real in themselves. But due to the false relation, the reality of the relata of the false relation is also denied. Thus it is that the world is both real and unreal, since its objects can be relata of both real and false cognitions. This is the view of VAchaspati in his nyAyavArtikatAtparyaTIkA.]

[Next, BrahmAnanda explains what MadhusUdana means when he says "anyatarAtmakatve" ] BrahmAnanda: anyatarAtmakatve iti | bhramavishhayo .api saMsargo deshAntarastha- tvAt.h satya iti prapaJNchaH satya eveti paxe,

As per the view (of the realists, naiyAyikas), even though the relation (of identity, for example in "this is silver") is the content of erroneous knowledge, it is real because it occurs (as the content of valid knowledge, pramA) in other places. Therefore, (all things in the world are real and) the world is real.

[The naiyAyikas who are realists-to-the-core insist that erroneous cognition or illusion is really due some defect (doshha). "doshho .apramAyA janakaH" says VishvanAtha in the bhAshhA-parichchheda. When there is an illusion "this is silver" with respect to nacre, the memory of silver color, the similarity of the color being seen with silver, and other defects such as improper light, defective vision, etc. cause the illusion. But when real silver is being seen, the same cognition "this is silver" becomes a valid knowledge, pramA. So the cognition "this is silver", though erroneous due to defect(s) in one place, can become valid in some other place. Hence, there is no cognition of the unreal any time. And the world is real.]

BrahmAnanda:

GYAnAtiriktarUpeNa-alIka eva prapaJNcho vikalpavishhaya iti paxe chetyarthaH |

And, as per the view (of the vijnAnavAdi-bauddha's), the world is only false (unreal) because it is absolutely different from consciousness and is a figment of imagination. This is the meaning.

[Among the three views presented so far, it is obvious that absolute difference from sattva is not possible in the case of VAchaspati Mishra's view in his nyAya text and the view of the vijnAnavAdi- Buddhists cannot admit an absolute difference from asattva. The naiyAyika (logician) says the world is real, but then what MadhusUdana has said is that the world is absolutely different from both the real (sattva) and the unreal (asattva). Hence, none of the three views is identical to the advaita view. This means that there can be no arthAntara in establishing that the world is absolutely different from sattva and absolutely different from asattva. BrahmAnanda next clarifies that the definition given by MadhusUdana that includes absolute difference from sattva rules out any arthAntara charge made against advaita in the following manner. "Since Vachaspati's nyAya text says that the world is both real and unreal, this is equivalent to saying that the world is different from the real and the unreal. So your definition of the world as being different from sattva and asattva is not going to prove mithyAtva at all. It is going to prove the view of Vachaspati in his nyAya text which is not the view of advaita. Hence the arthAntara." ]

BrahmAnanda: anavakAsha iti | asattvAbhAvasya kevalaprapaJNche sattvasya tadupahitaprapaJNche svIkAre sattvopahitaprapaJNchasya kevala- prapaJNche tAdAtmyasattvAnna tatraikAntikaH sadbheda iti bhAvaH|

The purport of (Madhusudana's saying) "anavakAsha" is: (Even by) accepting the absence of asattva in the whole world which (also) depends on sattva (since the world is also said to be sat as per Vachaspati in his nyAya text), the world which thus depends on sattva and this sattva-dependent part is identified in the whole world, there is NO absolute difference from sat, (which is what our definition of sadasadanadhikaraNatva requires).

[Even though "both real and unreal" can be construed as "different from real and different from unreal", this view does not entail, for example, "absolutely different from real" which is what MadhusUdana's definition requires. So there is no arthAntara whatsoever].

Part 6- No aMshataH siddhasAdhana (no partially redundant proof)

MadhusUdana set the sAdhya, what is to be established, as the mithyAtva of duality, the unreality of duality. In defining mithyAtva, one of the definitions taken up was the one from the panchapAdikA of PadmapAda. MithyAtva is defined here as anirvachanIya, that which cannot be categorized as sat or asat. More specifically, this was defined to be sadasadanadhikaraNatva, which was clarified by MadhusUdana to be the absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva. The opponent had raised the objection of arthAntara against the definition of mithyAtva or sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of either existence or non-existence. MadhusUdana refuted these objections. He also offered an alternative definition of sadasadanadhikaraNatva, namely the absolute difference from existence and the absolute difference from nonexistence which rules out any possibility of arthAntara (proving something other than what is intended).

The opponent could, however, level another charge against MadhusUdana's definition. By defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva as the difference from existence and difference from nonexistence, there is at least a defect of proving something a part of which has already been proved. For example, if you seek to prove A AND B, when you know that one of the two, say B, is already proved, your proof will have the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana, ie. aMshataH siddha-sAdhana. Your proof will be partially redundant and one of the worst mistakes a logician can commit is being redundant! Here, the opponent claims, the partial siddha-sAdhana arises from the fact that the realists, including the navya-naiyAyikas and the mAdhvas, already have accepted the world's absolute difference from nonexistence, in the sense that the world is absolutely real. So the part of the advaitin's proof which establishes absolute difference from nonexistence is redundant.

But, MadhusUdana explains, the sAdhya in this case CANNOT be split into two terms A and B, such that each can be independently proved. We HAVE to consider the combined difference from existence and nonexistence. Why? Because, the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptiblity), in this case is the hetu for the CONJUNCTION (or combination) of absolute difference from existence AND absolute difference from nonexistence. (Recall that the sAdhya is to be inferred from the invariable concomitance of the hetu with the sAdhya.) Without further ado, let us hear the unassailable reply of MadhusUdana: Text:

nacha - asattvavyatireka-aMshasya-asadbhedasya cha prapaJNche siddhattvena-aMshataH siddha-sAdhanamiti - vAchyam.h | "guNAdikaM guNyAdinA bhinnAbhinnaM samAnAdhikR^itatvAt.h" iti bhedAbhedavAdiprayoge tArkikAdyaN^gIkR^itasya bhinnatvasya siddhAvapi uddeshya-pratItyasiddher- yathA na siddha-sAdhanaM, tathA prakR^ite .api militapratIteruddeshyatvA- nna siddha-sAdhanam.h | yathA tattvAbhede ghaTaH kuMbha iti sAmAnAdhi- karaNya-pratIteradarshanena militasiddhiruddeshyA, tathA prakR^ite .api sattvarahite tuchchhe dR^ishyatva-adarshanena militasya tatprayojakatayA militasiddhiruddeshyeti samAnam.h |

Translation:

(And you) cannot charge that there is the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana (aMshataH siddha-sAdhana) because the part (of the proof) consisting of (establishing) the absence of asattva (nonexistence) and the difference from nonexistence (in the alternative definition) is already established regarding the world. The (mAdhvas) hold that a quality and the substance that possesses that quality are different AND non-different from each other. In arguing with the tArkikas (the naiyAyikas, sAnkhyas, the bhATTas, etc.) who accept the difference (of a quality from the possessor of the quality), they (the mAdhvas) say: "the quality and its possessor are different and non-different from each other because they can be cognized to be related by a relation of non-difference." (So, they say,) there is no siddha-sAdhana because the intended cognition (CONJUNCTION of difference and nondifference of a quality and its possessor) is NOT proved , even though the difference (of a quality from its possessor) is already proved. Similarly, in (our) present case (of establishing absence of sattva AND the absence of asattva) too, the cognition that is intended (to be proved) is CONJUNCTION (combination of absence of sattva and absence of asattva). So (we) cannot (be charged with) siddha-sAdhana (redundancy in reasoning). (You may say that the CONJUNCTION of ours is not justified. But we say, no!) In the case of identical things such as a "pot" and a "jar" (which are terms that stand for the same thing), there is no cognition of difference and nondifference of the form "The pot is the jar." (Therefore,) the conjunction of difference and nondifference is intended to be established. (This is your stand.) Similarly, in the present case (ie. of absence of sattva and absence of asattva), perceptibility is not (a characteristic of) a totally nonexistent thing that lacks existence (sattva). (Therefore,) conjunction (of absence of sattva and absence of asattva, or equivalently, difference from sattva and difference from asattva) is a prayojaka (a necessary factor) for dR^ishyatva, perceptibility (which is the hetu) and (so) the establishing of that CONJUNCTION is what is intended.

Notes:

ViTThalesha describes that the hetu dR^ishyatva is an invariable concomitant (vyApya) of ubhayatva ("both-ness" or conjunction) of sadbheda and asadbheda.

dR^ishyatvasya sadbheda-asadbhedobhayatva-avachchhinnaM vyApyatvam.h

The vyApyatva (invariable concomitance) of perceptibility (the hetu in this case) is delimited (characterized) by the conjunction of difference from sat and difference from asat (or equivalently the absence of sattva and absence of asattva, in which case the proper term would be "sattva-abhAva-asattva-abhAvobhayatva-avachchhinnaM").

And as BrahmAnanda explains, such "ubhayatva" is the prayojaka in establishing dR^ishyatva:

tatprayojakatA- ubhayatva-vishishhTasya dR^ishyatvopapAdakatA

Discussion: ------------

Here the argument runs as follows:

mAdhva: We may make a charge or partial siddha-sAdhana against you, the advaitin, because the establishing of absence of sattva and absence of asattva has a part, the establishing of absence of asattva with regard to the world, that is already established by others.

advaitin: Well, in that case, we can make the same charge against you because your establishing of the difference and nondifference of a quality from its possessor has a part, the establishing of difference of a quality from its possessor, is already established by others such as the bhATTas, naiyAyikas, sAMkhyas, etc., who admit the difference of a quality from its possessor.

mAdhva: Not so. You cannot establish such difference and nondifference independently of each other. You have got to establish the conjunction of the two conditions, namely difference and nondifference of a quality from its possessor. The hetu here is "samAnAdhikR^itatva", which is explained as being capable of being the content of a cognition of a relation of nondifference in the same substratum where there is difference. Or, we can explain the hetu, samAnAdhikR^itatva, as being capable of being cognized as a qualifier (visheshhaNa) of the possessor of the quality. In the cognition, "the pot is blue", (ghaTo nIlaH), the blue color of the pot is cognized as the qualifier, visheshhaNa of the pot which is the qualificand, visheshhya. The particular instance of blue color of the pot is different and nondifferent from the pot (although the generic character of blue color is accepted to be only different from the pot.) If we split the sAdhya into bheda (difference) and abheda (nondifference), then we run into the following problem. The sAdhya abheda in itself CANNOT be a necessary factor (prayojaka) of the (sole) hetu. For example, there is no cognition of the form "the pot is the jar", where the terms "pot" and "jar" are synonyms and the hetu samAnAdhikR^itatva is present. Therefore, even though there is abheda between "pot" and "jar" here, there is no hetu. And in the case of the (erroneous) cognition "the pot is the cloth", there is bheda between the pot and the cloth but again there is no hetu, samAnAdhi- kR^itatva. Therefore, we need the conjunction of bheda and abheda as the sAdhya so that the sAdhya becomes a prayojaka of the hetu.

But, in your (advaitin's) case, things are different. You claim that the world is unreal (mithyA) or has the absence of sattva and the absence of asattva (or the difference from sattva and the difference from asattva), because of the hetu, dR^ishyatva, perceptibility. (What is perceptible or cognizable is mithyA.) Now, perceptibility is a characteristic of everything other than Brahman, as per your view. And Brahman is "sat". All you need to prove is absence of sattva or difference from sattva with regard to the world. Proving the absence of asattva (or difference from asattva) is redundant. Hence the charge of partial siddha-sAdhana.

advaitin: What you say is not justifiable. Just as in your case, the conjunction of bheda and abheda is a necessary factor (prayojaka) of the hetu, so in our case too the conjunction of absence of sattva and the absence of asattva (or equivalently the conjunction of difference from sattva and the difference from asattva) is the prayojaka of the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptibility). Here is why. If we make just the absence of sattva the sAdhya, then we run into a problem in the case of a fictitious entity (a chimera). A fictitious entity, such as the horn of a hare, has absence of sattva only. But here the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present. A fictitious entity is never perceived. Again, if we make just the absence of asattva the sAdhya, then we run into a problem in the case of Brahman. Here, we have absence of asattva, but again the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present in Brahman. Therefore, we need to have the conjunction of absence of sattva and absence of asattva as the sAdhya in order to make the sAdhya a necessary factor (prayojaka) of the hetu. The charge of siddha-sAdhana against us cannot be made. Notes:

1) The thrust of the argument is that the hetu for the sAdhya in the mAdhva's case as well as for the advaitin has to be a prayojaka, a necessary factor of the hetu. In other words, the hetu must occur exactly wherever the sAdhya occurs, no more no less. This is more restrictive than the general form of vyApti, as may be recalled from the introduction to nyAya in the third part of this series. When the mountain has the hetu, smoke and we infer the sAdhya, fire, the vyApti is less restrictive in the sense that we may allow the sAdhya fire to occur without smoke, although the smoke must always be accompanied by fire in order for the inference to be valid. But in the present discussion, we cannot allow the sAdhya to occur where the hetu is not found. The occurrences of sAdhya and hetu must exactly coincide. Here, the sAdhya for the advaitin is sadbheda and asadbheda and the hetu is dR^ishyatva. By defining a "tight" form of vyApti, what the advaitin is saying is:

Whatever is perceptible (cognizable) is different from sat AND different from asat.

The converse also holds.

Whatever is different from sat AND different from asat is perceptible (cognizable).

Symbolically speaking, if H is the hetu, and the sAdhya is the logical conjunction (AND) of S1 (sad-bheda) and S2 (asad-bheda), we may write:

H -> S1 AND S2 S1 AND S2 -> H

where "->" means "implies"

2) The mAdhvas' view here regarding the bheda-abheda of a quality from the possessor of the quality is used here by MadhusUdana as an example only. It does not necessarily mean that MadhusUdana endorses this view of the mAdhvas in a broader context, as for example, with respect to an exegetical context. Indeed, the mAdhvas seem to come under some heavy attack from the VishishhTa-advaitins for not recognizing the bheda (difference) between dravya and adravya as RAmAnuja holds. In his fourth volume titled "History of Indian Philosophy", Dasgupta outlines the criticism of the mAdhvas by the vishishhTa-advaitin, ParakAla Yati in his VijayIndra-parAjaya. Parakala Yati points out how several texts in the upanishads become absurd if the mAdhva position on dravya and adravya is held. Another major disagree- ment between the two schools of Vaishnavism is the Ananda-tAratamya position which is held by the mAdhvas but rejected by the vishishhTa-advaitins. The latter cannot accept (nor can the advaitins) that there is gradation in Bliss (Ananda) in the state of mokshha. This position is also criticized by ParakAla Yati on exegetical grounds as well. There is another vishishhTa-advaitin work named Ananda-tAratamya-khaNDana that is also mentioned by Dasgupta.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the advaitin's use of the mAdhva example on "guNa" and "guNI" is for illustration only. Any other example would also be fine.

The Second Definition of UnrealityPart 7- The second definition Continuing with the series on the advaita-siddhi, we will next study the second definition of mithyAtva that is defended by MadhusUdana SarasvatI. Other articles in this series may be retrieved by searching for "siddhi" in the subject line. It is especially useful to be familiar with basic nyAya terminology as explained in the third and fourth parts of the series. Without such familiarity, the discussion below may not make much sense at all!

advaita-siddhi text:

pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |

Alternatively, mithyAtva (unreality) of something is that which is the counter-positive or absential adjunct (pratiyogin) of an absolute negation (a negation for all three periods of time, past, present, and future) in the very substratum where it (the thing) is cognized.

This is the second definition of mithyAtva that is taken up by MadhusUdana in his defense of mithyAtva of dvaita. This alternative definition is based on shruti statements such as "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana", as BrahmAnanda says in his gauDabrahmAnandI, "neha nAnAstI"tyAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati sAdhyAntaramAha".

The second definition comes from the VivaraNAchArya, PrakAshAtman, the author of the PanchapAdikA-vivaraNa.

It is important to understand this definition and the significance of the terms involved. As in the case of the first definition of mithyAtva, what is alIka or a fictitious entity is NOT the mithyAtva that is used to describe the world.

The mithyAtva of the world is akin to the illusion of the snake over a rope or silver in nacre. Upon realizing that the snake is illusory, one exclaims "The snake is unreal. The snake was never there to begin with, it is not there now, and it will never be there in the future!" This is the mithyAtva (unreality) of the world that is being talked about.

One important point to remember is that the in order for a thing to be mithyA or unreal according to this definition, it MUST be cognized or perceived in some susbtratum. This is a necessary condition for something to be called mithyA. What is perceived is called mithyA. That which can never be perceived, a chimera such as the horns of a hare, is NOT being called mithyA. Rather it is asat. And Brahman is sat. MithyAtva is different from these two, ie. mithyAtva is sadasadvilaxaNa.

BrahmAnanda, in his gaUDabrahmAnandI commentary on the advaita-siddhi therefore, defines the term pratipanna-upAdhi as follows:

pratipannaH svaprakArakadhIvisheshhyaH ya upAdhiradhikaraNaM tannishhTho yastraikAlikanishhedho .atyanta-abhAvastatpratiyogitvamityarthaH |

pratipanna means the qualificand of the cognition that has the (thing that is mithyA) as the qualifier. Such a qualificand that is the substratum is "pratipanna-upAdhi". The counter-positive of the absolute negation or the negation for all periods of time in the substratum (is called mithyA).

This definition rules out equating what is mithyA with alIka, a fictitious entity. Yet another type of negation is also being ruled out in the definition. What is fictitious is not perceived anywhere. The other extreme is the negation that is always empirically perceived. For example, a pot is NOT perceived as existing in the threads that make a cloth. If the advaitin means by mithyAtva the fact that a pot is negated in the threads of a cloth, he is stating what is already established and therefore open to the objection of "siddha-sAdhana doshha". But this is type of negation is being ruled out by the term "svaprakArakadhIvisheshhya". In order for the definition of mithyAtva to apply to the negation of the pot in threads of a cloth, the pot will have to have been perceived as existing in the threads of a cloth. But no such cognition of a pot in threads of a cloth ever occurs. So the definition of mithyAtva does not apply to such obvious negations.

ViTThalesha (who comments on the gauDa-brahmAnandI) therefore remarks:

vastutastu svaprakArakatvopAdAnaM tuchchha-ativyAptivAraNAya

Actually, the mention of "having it as the qualifier" is for the purpose of ruling out something that is trivial (fictitious entity) and a definition that is too wide (ativyApti).

Another type of negation or absence is also being ruled out by the insertion of the term "traikAlika" in the definition. This is to counter an objection as follows. There is an absence of a thing such as a pot before it comes into being, called the prAgabhAva. After the pot is destroyed, there is another type of absence (abhAva) called "dhvaMsa-abhAva." Does the advaitin mean by mithyAtva an absence that is one of these types? Or does he mean the mutual negation (mutual-absence or anyonya-abhAva or bheda) that is perceived between things such as a pot and the pieces of the pot after it is destroyed? In either case, the advaitin is committing the mistake of siddha-sAdhana, proving what is already established.

In order to reject this objection, the definition of mithyAtva has the term "traikAlika". The negation that is being described in the definition is traikAlika, that holds for all times. In the case of prAgabhAva, dhvaMsa-abhAva, and bheda in the above examples, there is no absolute negation (atyanta-abhAva), that which holds for all times.

Therefore, BrahmAnanda says:

kapAladinishhThabheda-dhvaMsAdipratiyogitvamAdAya siddha-sAdhanaM syAdatastraikAliketi |

(The opponent may) charge us with "siddha-sAdhana" by taking the pratiyogitva (counter-positive-ness) of the abhAva (absence) to be the difference or posterior negation (dhvaMsa-abhAva) in things such as the pieces of a pot. (To counter this we have added the term) "traikAlika" in the definition.

In the next part, we will see how the opponent raises an important objection to this definition.

Part 8- Predicate Logic expression The only reason why I did not attempt to formulate the definition in terms of predicate logic is because the logical expressions tend to get "unwieldy" quickly as the definition gets more and more refined. The first definition of mithyAtva (please see "advaita-siddhi - 6") is refined by the second definition. All that the first definition really says is that mithyA is something that is different from the absolutely real Brahman and from a fictitious entity. As per the first definition, the thing that is mithyA should be 1) cognized in some locus (substratum) and 2) be sublated (negated) at some time. The second definition refines the first by saying that the thing that is mithyA is 1) sublated in the very locus where it is cognized and 2) and it is sublated so for ALL times.

At the risk of being unintelligible once again, I will attempt to formulate the second definition of mithyAtva in terms of predicate logic.

To explain the second definition in terms of Western-style predicate logic, we need to introduce different time frames of reference. Also, we need to consider the second definition as a refinement of the first definition. The second definition comes from the VivaraNa on the PanchapAdikA which contains the first definition.

The need for different time frames arises because of the following. In any case of illusion, there are two time frames. The first time frame, say T_A (time frame of avidyA), is that which holds when the illusion is in effect. During this phase, things are interpreted in terms of the illusion. For example, consider the illusion of the snake on the rope. When one is under the spell of this illusion, he/she thinks there is a snake. He/she may even interpret the movement of the rope due to wind, etc. as a movement of the snake! Note also that the second definition states that the thing that is mithyA is sublated in the same locus where it is cognized (pratipanna-upAdhau) and that it is sublated for all times (traikAlikanishhedha). Clearly, it is absurd to say that the illusion is sublated for all times DURING the illusion phase (avidyA) itself. This is akin to saying a dream is sublated during the dream. The dream is sublated only upon waking up, not while the dream is still occurring. Therefore, it is necessary to interpret traikAlikanishhedha as the sublation for all times in a time frame of reference that is different from the time frame during illusion. What is this other time frame?

The other time frame is the time frame that holds AFTER the illusion ends. Call this time frame T_J (time frame after dawn of jnAna). Once the illusion ends, the previous time frame T_A no longer applies. There is no snake. One exclaims "there was no snake there, there is no snake now, and there won't be the snake in future!"

What about the events of the old time frame T_A? These get re-interpreted or "mapped" into events in time frame T_J. For example, the movement of the snake in the illusory phase gets re-interpreted as "it must have been the wind that caused the rope to move in reality." In other words, the old events in time frame T_A that were in terms of "snake" get "mapped" into events in time frame T_J in terms of "rope". This is because there is NO "snake" in the time frame T_J. One may say that "history gets re-written" in time frame T_J!

In the case of a dream-illusion, the dream events may generally be thought of as being mapped into "non-events" or a NULL event in the waking state. Sometimes it IS possible to "map" dream events into waking-state events. Have you dreamed of temple bells ringing only to wake up and find that in reality your alarm clock is ringing?! :-)

Having defined the two time frames, the second definition of mithyAtva can now be described symbolically almost in the same way as the first definition. From now on, I follow the notation similar to that in the sixth part of this series ("advaita-siddhi - 6") with some additional notation. (Note: Sublated and negated mean the same.)

Let us define a predicate S whereby S(X,L,t,T) means "X is sublated in substratum L for time t in time frame T"

Also, let us say E(t) means the existential quantifier "there is a t", and U(t) means the universal quantifier "for all t." Let ~ stand for the negation operator.

Then the definition of existence (sattva or simply sat) according to the first definition of mithyAtva is that thing, say X (Brahman), such that:

~ (E(t) such that S(X,L,t,T), for time t in some time frame T and for some substratum L) ................................... (A)

or more concisely,

~ (E(T),E(t in T), E(L): S(X,L,t,T)) ....................... (A')

Brahman is NOT something that can be sublated for some time in some time frame in some substratum.

Next, MadhusUdana defines nonexistence (of something X) NOT as simply negating the expression (A) above which would just be

(E(t) such that S(X,L,t,T), for time t in some time frame T, and for some substratum L) ......................................... (B) this would mean "there is a time t in some time frame when X is sublated in substratum L"

stated more concisely as:

(E(T),E(t in T), E(L) : S(X,L,t,T)) ............................(B')

(Note: The terms locus and substratum are used interchangeably.)

Rather nonexistence (of something X) is defined as follows:

(U(t): ~ C(X,L,t,T), for time t in all time frames, and for all loci) ........................................... (C)

C(X,L,t,T) means "X is cognized in a locus L for time t in time frame T." Something (X) is nonexistent if and only if "for all time t in all time frames, X is not cognized in any locus." Stated more concisely,

(U(T),U(t in T ),U(L): ~ C(X,L,t,T)) ....................... (C')

The negation of *this* type of nonexistence is:

(E(t) such that C(X,L,t,T), for some time t in some time frame T, and for some locus L) ...................................... (D)

or more concisely,

(E(T), E(t in T), E(L): C(X,L,t,T)) .........................(D')

which means "there is some time t in some time frame T during which X is cognized in a locus." And this is the negation of nonexistence that is characteristic of illusions such as silver-in-nacre, snake-on-rope, and finally, the world-on-Brahman illusion. The illusory thing is cognized as existing in a locus (substratum) sometime (the period of illusion) and in the time frame T_A. The first definition of mithyAtva is : (B) AND (D). (please see advaita-siddhi - 6)

Therefore, the first definition of mithyAtva is written:

(E(t) such that S(X,L,t,T), for some time t in some time frame T, and for some locus L) AND (E(t): C(X,L',t,T), for some time t in some time frame T', and for some locus L') ............................................. (E)

or more concisely,

(E(T),E(t in T), E(L) : S(X,L,t,T)) AND (E(T'), E(t in T'), E(L'): C(X,L',t,T')) ..................(E')

Now, what the second definition of the PanchapAdikA-vivaraNa does is to refine the first definition, make it more precise and less ambiguous. After all, the first definition comes from the Pancha- pAdikA and the second from the VivaraNa on the PanchapAdikA. What the second definition does is 1) fix the time frames in (E) above , 2) fix the loci in (E), and 3) make the condition in the (B) part of the definition stronger by asserting that the sublation holds for all times. The second definition of mithyAtva may be written first by fixing the time frame in (B) as the time frame T_J (time frame after dawn of jnAna) and the time frame in (D) as the time frame T_A (time frame during the avidyA phase).

(B with time frame T = T_J ) AND (D with time frame T = T_A)

which is

(E(t) such that S(X,L,t,T_J), for some time t in time frame T_J, for some locus L) AND (E(t): C(X,L',t,T_A), for some time t in time frame T_A, and for some locus L') The second definition of mithyAtva may next be written by fixing the loci L and L' to be the SAME. The definition clearly states that the thing that is mithyA is sublated in the VERY LOCUS where it is cognized.

This makes the definition:

(E(t) such that S(X,L,t,T_J), for some time t in time frame T_J, for locus L) AND(E(t) such that C(X,L',t,T_A), for some time t in time frame T_A, and for locus L') AND (L = L')

Next, making the condition in the (B) part of the definition stronger means the sublation should hold for all periods of time in time frame T_J.

(S(X,L,t,T_J), for ALL time t in time frame T_J, for locus L) AND(E(t) such that C(X,L',t,T_A), for some time t in time frame T_A, and for locus L') AND (L = L') ....................................(F)

or more concisely,

E(L),E(L')((U(t in T_J): S(X,L,t,T_J)) AND (E(t in T_A): C(X,L',t,T_A)) AND (L = L') ) ................................(F')

Actually, if we wanted to be more picky and precise, we can say:

E(L),E(L')((U(t in T_J): S(X,L,t,T_J)) AND (E(t in T_A): C(X,L',t,T_A)) AND (L = L') ) AND (T_J != T_A)..........................(F'')

to insist that the time frame T_A and T_J must not be the same. "!=" means "not equals".

Introducing a predicate M(X) which means "X is mithyA", the predicate is defined as (using "" to indicate equivalence):

M(X) E(L),E(L')((U(t in T_J): S(X,L,t,T_J)) AND (E(t in T_A): C(X,L',t,T_A)) AND (L = L') ) AND (T_J != T_A)..........................(G)

We have arrived at the final form of the second definition of mithyAtva:

X is mithyA if it is sublated for ALL times in the very substratum where it is cognized.

"pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |"

The second definition, if it has to be a refinement of the first definition, must imply the latter. ie.

(F) -> (E)

It is easy to see that this implication holds.Part 9- Objections to the second definition

The objection of the opponent is based on the acceptance by advaitins of three orders of reality as defined in, for example, the Vedaanta paribhaashhaa of dharmaraaja adhvarin:

yadvaa trividhaM sattvaM -- paaramaarthikasattvaM brahmaNaH, vyaavahaarikaM sattvamaakaashaadeH, praatibhaasikaM sattvaM shuktirajataadeH |

The absolute reality of Brahman is paaramaarthika satya, the empirical reality of the objective world, which includes space etc., is vyaavahaarika satya, and the illusory appearance of silver in nacre (oyster-shell), etc. is praatibhaasika satya.

The Objection in brief:

The objection by the opponent is aimed to trap the advaitin in an unrecoverable position by pointing out defects in any assignment of ontological status to the negation (sublation) used in the second definition of the mithyAtva.

advaita-siddhi text:

nanu, pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhasya tAttvikatve advaita- hAniH prAtibhAsikatve siddha-sAdhanaM, vyAvahArikatve .api tasya bAdhyatvena tAttvikasattvAvirodhitayA arthAntaraM, advaitashruter- atattvAvedakatvaM cha tatpratiyoginaH prAtibhAsikasya prapaJNchasya pAramArthikatvaM cha syAt.h,

Translation:

Objection by the opponent: Now, if the absolute negation (of a thing, such as the world, that is being called mithyA as per the second definition) is absolutely real (pAramArthika), then the basic principle of advaita (non-dualism) is destroyed! (If the absolute negation) is only illusory (prAtibhAsika), then you are proving what is already established (ie. the reality of the world). Even (if the absolute negation) is empirical (vyAvahArika), you will be proving something other than what you intended because (such negation) will not be opposed to the absolute reality (of the world). The shruti texts that are non-dualistic will be incapable of revealing the truth. And (if it be claimed that) the world is illusory, (that will not hold) and (the world) would have absolute reality (pAramAthikatva).

Let us examine the opponent's objection in a little more detail.

The opponent says: You define three orders of reality - pAramArthika, vyAvahArika, and prAtibhAsika. And you have defined mithyAtva as the counter-positive-ness of the absolute negation (for all periods of time) in the very substratum where the thing that is mithyA is cognized. In essence, you would like to categorize the world as mithyA. Now, what reality do you assign to such a negation of the world?

1) Is this negation pAramArthika (absolutely real)? 2) Is this negation prAtibhAsika (illusory) ?

3) Or, is this negation vyAvahArika (empirical) ?

Regardless of the type of reality you assign to this negation, you run into problems.

1) The negation of the world is pAramArthika. In this case, you have a direct contradiction with the non-dual principle of advaita. BrahmAnanda explains the objection:

advaita-hAniH "neha nAne"tyAdishrutibodhitasya brahmaNi dR^ishya- sAmAnyAbhAvasya virodhaH

(There is) damage to the principle of non-duality as known from shruti statements such as "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana" (there is no manifold-ness here whatsoever) (because) of the contradiction due to the common absence of the "perceived" (dR^ishya).

If the negation of the world is pAramArthika, then you have two such realities - 1) Brahman, and 2) the said negation of the world. This compromises the non-duality principle.

2) The negation of the world is prAtibhAsika, illusory. In this case, you have siddha-sAdhana-doshha. BrahmAnanda explains:

siddha-sAdhanamiti | kapAle ghaTo nAstItyAdibhrame prAtItikasya- atyantAbhAvasya vishhayatvena siddha-sAdhanamityarthaH |

siddha-sAdhana means that in cases of erroneous cognition or illusion such as denying the pot in its parts, the absolute absence of the (erroneously) cognized negation is already established (in another system).

In other words, if you say the negation is illusory, such as the negation of a pot in its two halves, such a position is already admitted by another system. (A whole is said "inhere" in its parts as per nyAya. So a whole, such as a pot, cannot be denied in its parts. Any such denial is erroneous.)

In other words, if you say the negation of the world is illusory or erroneous, that is already admitted by the realist schools. So you are committing the mistake of siddha-sAdhana.

3)The negation of the world is vyAvahArika. In this case, what you are saying is that the negation of the world will itself get sublated upon realization of Brahman. What does this mean? The world itself CANNOT be vyAvahArika because it is absurd (a contradiction) to say that the world as well as its negation get sublated upon Brahman realization. Either the world or its negation can get sublated at the same time but not both! Therefore, you are left with two possibilities - a. the world is pAramArthika or absolutely real OR b. the world is prAtibhAsika or illusory. But you deny the world is illusory, and so the world can only be pAramArthika. This point is stated by BrahmAnanda as: prAtibhAsikatva-asaMbhavena pAramArthikatvameva balAtsyAditi bhAvaH |

(Since the world) cannot possibly be illusory it is forced to be absolutely real (pAramArthika) only. This is the purport (of the opponent).

Again, ViTThalesha explains why the world cannot be illusory when he comments on the term "prAtibhAsikatva-asaMbhavena" of BrahmAnanda: brahmaGYAnAnyAbAdhyatvAditi

(The world cannot be illusory) because (it is admitted by the advaitin) to remain un-sublated (not negated) by anything other than knowledge of Brahman.

So what is the result of accepting the world as pAramArthika and the negation of the world as vyAvahArika? These are the defects. First, you will have established the world as absolutely real which is different from what you set out to prove. This is the defect of arthAntara. Second, the shruti texts that speak of non-duality such as "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana" will have to be accepted as NOT revealing the ultimate truth because they can only reveal what is empirical ( vyAvahArika), ie. the negation of the world.

In response to the objection of the opponent, MadhusUdana now begins his reply:

iti chet.h? na |

If this is what you say, we say no!Part 10- MadhusUdana's reply To understand MadhusUdana's reply to the objection (advaita-siddhi 12), we need to find out what it means to negate something in the world.

Shankara states in his commentary on gItA 2.16:

sarvatra buddhidvayopalabdheH, sadbuddhiH asadbuddhiH iti | yadvishhayA buddhiH na vyabhicharati tat.h sat.h, yadvishhayA vyabhicharati tat.h asat.h|

There are two cognitions everywhere (in any cognition in the world) - cognition of the real and cognition of the unreal. That cognition which does not change is real (sat) and that which changes is unreal (mithyA).

[Please note that Shankara's usage of asat corresponds to mithyA.]

In the cognition, "the pot is" (san.h ghaTaH), the permanent factor is " is" which indicates the underlying existence. What is an illusion is "the pot". What is cognized is just this permanent factor but it is falsely understood to be a pot by the super-imposition (adhyAsa) of the name-and-form on the underlying Existence (sat). In another cognition, "the cloth is" (san.h paTaH), again the common, permanent factor is "is." What is an illusion has to do with "the cloth." In other words, between the cognitions "the pot is", and "the cloth is", what is common, constant, and permanent is the factor, "is." What we see above is a cognition where the cognizer gives a name to a cognized object, such as a pot, cloth etc. Another type of cognition tries to assert an adjective or attribute of an object. In the cognition, "the blue pot is", again what is common, constant, and permanent is the factor "is." What is illusion is "the blue pot." So what is being denied ultimate reality is the "blueness" and "potness" of the object but not pure existence indicated by "is".

Generalizing this to all cognitions, all objects are real as far as they are treated as pure existence, but the moment you start associating them with names and forms, the illusion begins. This Existence is the common, unchanging, and permanent factor among all cognitions.

Therefore, status of anything in the world may be said to be comprised of two components 1) a Real part and 2) an unreal part. This is somewhat similar to the Mathematician's expression of a complex number as (X + i* Y) where X is the real part and Y is the unreal (imaginary) part. (Electrical engineers prefer to write X + j *Y, using j instead of i.) But here we are not dealing with numbers, rather cognitions. So every cognition is made of two parts - a real part, E and an unreal part, X.