Repaso, Jurdelyn C. Admin Law (8:00-11:00am) SuLLB-2 1. AMERICAN TOBACCO vs. DIRECTOR OF PATENTSFACTS: Petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.

Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166 ), the Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the above-mentioned cases. Likewise, the Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases contains a similar provision, thus:

168. Original jurisdiction over inter partes proceeding. the Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. In the event that the Patent Office should be provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decision subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of notice of decisions. Such appeals shall be governed by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be P25.00.

The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by the Director of Patents and approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended the afore-quoted Rule 168: ...Such inter partes proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before the Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking official designated by the Director, but all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him.

In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein. Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes cases. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel The Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment of the rule is illegal and void as it should be the Director who must personally hear and decide inter partes cases

RULING: No. It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of the Act.

The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to determine the question of priority in patent interference proceedings, decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent, cancellations of patents under Republic Act No. 165, inter partes proceedings such as oppositions, claims of interference, cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law and other matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. The reduction of existing delays in regulating agencies requires the elimination of needless work at top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details often occupy far too much of the time and energy of the heads of these agencies and prevent full and expeditious consideration of the more important issues. the remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This sub-delegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail.

Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made.

The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them."

In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been prejudiced by the proceedings.

2. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

(261 SCRA 237)

FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. The Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. In a letter, Commissioner of Internal Revenue Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., to Deputy Minister Ramon Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, "the initial position of the Commission was to classify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to 'Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. Proof was also submitted to the BIR that 'Champion' was an original Fortune Tobacco Corporation register and therefore a local brand." Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands. A bill, which later became Republic Act ("RA") No. 7654, was enacted; It amended Section 142(c)(1) of the National Internal Revenue Code ("NIRC"). About a month after the enactment and two (2) days before the effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"), was issued by the BIR.

BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr., sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On 15 July 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate division of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9, 598,334.00. On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco and adjudged: WHEREFORE, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 reclassifying the brands of cigarettes, viz: "HOPE," "MORE" and "CHAMPION" being manufactured by Fortune Tobacco Corporation as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax on cigarettes is found to be defective, invalid and unenforceable, such that when R.A. No. 7654 took effect on July 3, 1993, the brands in question were not CURRENTLY CLASSIFIED AND TAXED at 55% pursuant to Section 1142(c)(1) of the Tax Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7654 and were therefore still classified as other locally manufactured cigarettes and taxed at 45% or 20% as the case may be. Accordingly, the deficiency ad valorem tax assessment issued on petitioner Fortune Tobacco Corporation in the amount of P9,598,334.00, exclusive of surcharge and interest, is hereby canceled for lack of legal basis. Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is hereby enjoined from collecting the deficiency tax assessment made and issued on petitioner in relation to the implementation of RMC No. 37-93.

In its resolution, the CTA dismissed for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration.The CIR forthwith filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, questioning the CTA's 10th August 1994 decision and 11th October 1994 resolution. On 31 March 1993, the appellate court's Special Thirteenth Division affirmed in all respects the assailed decision and resolutionISSUE: Whether or not RMC 37-93 is merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR which can thus become effective without any prior need for notice and hearing, nor publication, and that its issuance is not discriminatory since it would apply under similar circumstances to all locally manufactured cigarettes. RULING:

The Court must sustain both the appellate court and the tax court.

Petitioner stresses on the wide and ample authority of the BIR in the issuance of rulings for the effective implementation of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Let it be made clear that such authority of the Commissioner is not here doubted. Like any other government agency, however, the CIR may not disregard legal requirements or applicable principles in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers. Let us first distinguish between two kinds of administrative issuances a legislative rule and an interpretative rule. In Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc., vs. Department of Finance Secretary, the Court expressed:

. . . a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof . In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this connection, the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

Public Participation. If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure (revoking in the process the previous holdings of past Commissioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the questioned circular, "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes were in the category of locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign brand subject to 45% ad valorem tax. Hence, without RMC 37-93, the enactment of RA 7654, would have had no new tax rate consequence on private respondent's products. Evidently, in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes within the scope of the amendatory law and subject them to an increased tax rate, the now disputed RMC 37-93 had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR not simply intrepreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.

All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance.

3. HON. RENATO C. CORONA vs.UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINESFACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was created on 11 July 1974, by virtue of PD 505. On 23 December 1975, PD 857 was issued revising the PPAs charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 2 on 21 March 1985, which embodied the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. Subsequently, then PPA GM Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO 04-92 7 on 15 July 1992, whose avowed policy was to instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services. This was implemented by providing therein that all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of 1 year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.

The United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO 04-92 before the DOTC, but they were informed that the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPAs administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body. The Associations reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed the ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.

The OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services The OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. He concluded that PPA- AO 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section.6 of PD No .857, mandating it to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilo ts in any port district.Consequently, the Associations filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the RTC Manila. The trial court rendered judgment holding that the PPA, DOTC, and OP have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders, declaring that PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are null and void. From this decision, the PPA, DOTC and OP elevated their case to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the PPA violated the respondents' right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law in issuing PPA-AO No. 04-92, limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation.RULING:

The Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents' right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.

Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of the Constitution, viz.:

Sec.1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, . . .

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction.

Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government agencies" and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. The Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, where it declared that "(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."

In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, "which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots' examinations," was not consulted, the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted.

Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.

There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with establishment standards."A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed by actual training and practice. Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, "(a)ll existing regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only," and "(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance."

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.

4. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO ORDONEZFACTS: P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia.

Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoez filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an investigation of the complaint. According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission a verified complaint for violation of their human rights. They alleged that Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer, accompanied by his subordinates and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the private respondents who tried to stop them by showing a copy of a letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing. However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the ground by a member of Damondamon's group who proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!"

The CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appeal before the Commission for a dialogue. CHR Chairman Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her order and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders; the Commission denied the motion. The petitioner, through the Government Corporate Counsel, filed in this Court a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no clear, positive right to be protected by an injunction; that the CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the private respondent's complaint because the issue raised therein had been decided by this Court, hence, it is barred by prior judgment. The Court issued a temporary restraining order, ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders. The CHR asked for the immediate lifting of this Court's restraining order, and for an order restraining petitioner EPZA from doing further acts of destruction and harassment. The CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated.

ISSUE: Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of?RULING:

In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681, December 2, 1991, we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining from the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.xxx xxx xxx

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what were the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law" It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of Regional Trial Court in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.5. RUFINO O. ESLAO, in his capacity as President of Pangasinan State University vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT RULING:

PSU entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") with the DENR for the evaluation of eleven (11) government reforestation operations in Pangasinan. The evaluation project was part of the commitment of the Asian Development Bank ("ADB") under the ADB/OECF Forestry Sector Program Loan to the Republic of the Philippines and was one among identical project agreements entered into by the DENR with sixteen (16) other state universities. A notice to proceed with the review and evaluation of the eleven (11) reforestation operations was issued by the DENR to PSU. The latter complied with this notice and did proceed.

Per advice of the PSU Auditor-in-Charge with respect to the payment of honoraria and per diems of PSU personnel engaged in the review and evaluation project, PSU Vice President for Research and Extension and Assistant Project Director Victorino P. Espero requested the Office of the President, PSU, to have the University's Board of Regents ("BOR") confirm the appointments or designations of involved PSU personnel including the rates of honoraria and per diems corresponding to their specific roles and functions. The BOR approved the MOA, PSU issued Voucher representing the amount of P70,375.00 for payment of honoraria to PSU personnel engaged in the project. Later, however, the approved honoraria rates were found to be somewhat higher than the rates provided for in the guidelines of National Compensation Circular ("NCC") No. 53. Accordingly, the amounts were adjusted downwards to conform to NCC No. 53. Adjustments were made by deducting amounts from subsequent disbursements of honoraria. By June 1989, NCC No. 53 was being complied with.

Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at PSU, alleging that there were excess payments of honoraria, issued a "Notice of Disallowance" disallowing P64,925.00 from the amount of P70,375.00 stated in Voucher. The resident auditor based his action on the premise that Compensation Policy Guidelines ("CPG") No. 80-4, dated 7 August 1980, issued by the Department of Budget and Management which provided for lower rates than NCC No. 53 dated 21 June 1988, also issued by the Department of Budget and Management, was the schedule for honoraria and per diems applicable to work done under the MOA of 9 December 1988 between the PSU and the DENR. A letter was sent by PSU Vice President and Assistant Project Director Espero to the Chairman of the COA requesting reconsideration of the action of its resident auditor. In the meantime, the Department of Budget and Management ("DBM"), upon request by PSU, issued a letter clarifying that the basis for the project's honoraria should not be CPG No. 80-4 which pertains to locally funded projects but rather NCC No. 53 which pertains to foreign-assisted projects. A copy of this clarification was sent to the COA upon request by PSU.

COA denied reconsideration of the decision of its resident auditor. The COA ruled that CPG. No. 80-4 is the applicable guideline in respect of the honoraria as CPG No. 80-4 does not distinguish between projects locally funded and projects funded or assisted with monies of foreign-origin. PSU President Eslao sent a letter requesting reconsideration of COA Decision No. 1547 (1990) alleging that (a) COA had erred in applying CPG No. 80-4 and not NCC No. 53 as the project was foreign-assisted and (b) the decision was discriminatory honoraria based on NCC No. 53 having been approved and granted by COA resident auditors in two (2) other state universities engaged in the same reforestation project. PSU then submitted to the COA (a) a certification from the DENR to the effect that the DENR evaluation project was foreign- assisted and (b) the letter of the DBM. COA denied reconsideration. In the meantime, the DENR informed petitioner of its acceptance of the PSU final reports on the review and evaluation of the government reforestation projects. Subsequently, honoraria for the period from January 1989 to January 1990 were disbursed in accordance with NCC No. 53. A Certificate of Settlement and Balances was then issued by the COA resident auditor of PSU showing disallowance of alleged excess payment of honoraria which petitioner was being required to return. The instant Petition prays that COA Decision Nos. 1547 (1990) and 2571 (1992) be set aside.

RULING:

The COA apparently does not agree with the policy basis of NCC No. 53 in relation to CPG No. 80-4 since COA argues that loan proceeds regardless of source eventually become public funds for which the government is accountable. The result would be that any provisions under any [foreign] loan agreement should be considered locally-funded. We do not consider that the COA is, under its constitutional mandate, authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which, however, it does not agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set aside by the authorized agency of government i.e., the courts as unconstitutional or illegal and void. The COA, like all other government agencies, must respect the presumption of legality and constitutionality to which statutes and administrative regulations are entitled until such statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or until set aside in an appropriate case by a competent court (and ultimately this Court).

Finally, we turn to petitioner's claim for moral damages and reimbursement of legal expenses. We consider that this claim cannot be granted as petitioner has failed to present evidence of bad faith or tortious intent warranting an award thereof. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty must be accorded to respondent COA; its action should be seen as its effort to exercise (albeit erroneously, in the case at bar) its constitutional power and duty in respect of uses of government funds and properties.

Hence, the petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. COA Decisions Nos. 1547 and 2571, respectively dated 18 September 1990 and 16 November 1992, are SET ASIDE. The instant evaluation project being a Foreign-Assisted Project, the following PSU personnel involved in the project shall be paid according to the Budget Estimate schedule of the MOA as aligned with NCC No. 53:

6. FABELLA VS CA (283 SCRA 256)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cario issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in talk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period September 26, 1990 to October 18, 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things. Secretary Cario filed administrative cases against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations. At the same time, Secretary Cario ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive suspension.

The charges were subsequently amended by DECS-NCR Regional Director Nilo Rosas to include the specific dates when petitioner-appellees allegedly took part in the strike. Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990. Petitioner-appellees counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and demanded that he be furnished a copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and imposition of penalties. The teachers filed a an injunctive suit with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cario with fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further investigating them and from rendering any decision in the administrative case. However, the trial court denied them a restraining order. They then amended their complaint and made it one for certiorari andmandamus. They alleged that the investigating committee was acting with grave abuse of discretion because its guidelines for investigation place the burden of proof on them by requiring them to prove their innocence instead of requiring Secretary Cario and his staff to adduce evidence to prove the charges against the teachers.

Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a decision on August 6, 1991, finding the petitioner-appellees guilty, as charged and ordering their immediate dismissal. Then, the trial court dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. Petitioner-appellees moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied. The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court which, on February 18, 1992, issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial courts order of dismissal and reinstating petitioner-appellees action, even as it ordered the latters reinstatement pending decision of their case.

On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the teachers, it stated: ...the committee tasked to investigate the charges filed against petitioners was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment being violative of Sec. 9 of Rep. Act. No. 4670 hence all acts done by said body possess no legal color whatsoever. Anent petitioners claim that their dismissal was effected without any formal investigation, the Court, after consideration of the circumstances surrounding the case, finds such claim meritorious. The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary and violative of the teachers right to due process... From this adverse decision of the trial court, former DECS Secretary Isidro Cario filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, holding in the main that private respondents were denied due process in the administrative proceedings instituted against them. Hence, this petition for review.ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents (teachers) were denied due process of law.

RULING:

The petition is bereft of merit. Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of law.

At the outset, we must stress that we are tasked only to determine whether or not due process of law was observed in the administrative proceedings against herein private respondents. We note the Solicitor Generals extensive disquisition that government employees do not have the right to strike. On this point, the Court, in the case of Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals, has recently pronounced, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado:It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.

In the present case, however, the core issue here is whether in the course of the investigation of the alleged proscribed activity, their right to due process has been violated. In short, before they can be investigated and meted out any penalty, due process must first be observed.

In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the division. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670 read:

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.

Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9 of RA 4670, because all the teachers who were members of the various committees are members of either the Quezon City Secondary Teachers Federation or the Quezon City Elementary Teachers Federation and are deemed to be the representatives of a teachers organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.

We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers organization as its representative in said committee.

7. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC.,FACTS: Board of Investments (BOI), in its decision in BOI Case No. 92-005 granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.

Acting on the petition, respondent court required the BOI and petitioner to comment on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause why no injunction should issue. Respondent court temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. This temporary restraining order lapsed by its own terms on March 9, 1993, twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.

Petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. Respondent court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner decided not to file any motion for reconsideration as the question involved is essentially legal in nature and immediately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concernedRULING:

Yes. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.

It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court of Appeals. In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 provides that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision. The right of appeal provided in E.O. 226 within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision is clearly not in consonance with the present procedure before this Court. Only decisions, orders or rulings of a Constitutional Commission (Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections or Commission on Audit), may be brought to the Supreme Court on original petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days form receipt of a copy thereof.

Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.

Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal.

The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words "(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of the exclusions listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the following final decisions and interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute. Since in DBP v. CA we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded from Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of said law.

Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

IN THE MOTION TO RECONSIDERATION CASE:

Judicial review of the decisions and final orders of the BOI was originally provided for in the Article 78 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 (P.D. No. 1789). Art. 78 was thereafter amended by B.P. Blg. 129, by granting in 9 thereof exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over the decisions and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. When the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) was promulgated on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court was again granted. Thus, the present Code provides:

Art. 82. Judicial Relief . All orders or decisions of the Board in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay such order or decision: Provided, That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision.

By then, however, the present Constitution had taken effect. The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, 30 that "No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." This provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.

Now, Art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the BOI, increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it can never be deemed to have amended BPBlg. 129, 9. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it from the BOI must be deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, 9, to be exercised by it in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91. Indeed, there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must be directly appealed to this Court. As already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose of 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to provide uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial agencies, with the exception only of those issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. It is, therefore, regrettable that in the adoption of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the Constitution, had not been obtained in providing for the appeal of the decisions and final orders of the BOI directly to the Supreme Court. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied. 8. HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION VS. SECRETARY DEFENSOR

(G.R. NO. 163980, AUGUST 3, 2006)FACTS:Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association. Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center Administration Committee (Committee).Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC).

On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. n view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition

ISSUE: Whether or not petition for prohibition is an improper remedy since the writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.RULING:

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, the Court said that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the Courts taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Courts power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.

In a number of petitions, the Court adequately resolved them on other grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition may be dismissed based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned.

9. MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC VS. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FACTS: This is a review of the resolution of the Securities and Exchange Commission which would deny the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc., permission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange. Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. contends that the Commission has no power to impose it and that, anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust. Under the law, no stock exchange may do business in the Philippines unless it is previously registered with the Commission by filing a statement containing the information described in Sec. 17 of the Securities Act (Commonwealth Act 83, as amended).

It is assumed that the Commission may permit registration if the section is complied with; if not, it may refuse. And there is now no question that the section has been complied with, or would be complied with, except that the Makati Stock Exchange, upon challenging this particular requirement of the Commission (rule against double listing) may be deemed to have shown inability or refusal to abide by its rules, and thereby to have given ground for denying registration. [Sec. 17 (a) (1) and (d)].Such rule provides: "... nor shall a security already listed in any securities exchange be listed anew in any other securities exchange ... ."ISSUE: Whether or not Commission has the authority to promulgate and implement the rule in question. RULING:

It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him by the statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. In its brief and its resolution now subject to review, the Commission cites no provision expressly supporting its rule. Nevertheless, it suggests that the power is "necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it"; but it makes no explanation, perhaps relying on the reasons advanced in support of its position that trading of the same securities in two or more stock exchanges, fails to give protection to the investors, besides contravening public interest.

On the legality of its rule, the Commission's argument is that: (a) it was approved by the Department Head before the War; and (b) it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. In our opinion, the approval of the Department, by itself, adds no weight in a judicial litigation; and the test is not whether the Act forbids the Commission from imposing a prohibition, but whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit. No specific portion of the statute has been cited to uphold this power. It is not found in sec. 28 (of the Securities Act), which is entitled "Powers (of the Commission) with Respect to Exchanges and Securities." According to many court precedents, the general power to "regulate" which the Commission has (Sec. 33) does not imply authority to prohibit." The Manila Stock Exchange, obviously the beneficiary of the disputed rule, contends that the power may be inferred from the express power of the Commission to suspend trading in a security, under said sec. 28 which reads partly:

And if in its opinion, the public interest so requires, summarily to suspend trading in any registered security on any securities exchange ... . (Sec. 28[3], Securities Act.)

However, the Commission has not acted nor claimed to have acted in pursuance of such authority, for the simple reason that suspension under it may only be for ten days. Indeed, this section, if applicable, precisely argues against the position of the Commission because the "suspension," if it is, and as applied to Makati Stock Exchange, continues for an indefinite period, if not forever; whereas this Section 28 authorizes suspension for ten days only. Besides, the suspension of trading in the security should not be on one exchange only, but on all exchanges; bearing in mind that suspension should be ordered "for the protection of investors" (first par., sec. 28) in all exchanges, naturally, and if "the public interest so requires" [sec. 28(3)].

The Legislature has specified the conditions under which a stock exchange may legally obtain a permit (sec. 17, Securities Act); it is not for the Commission to impose others. If the existence of two competing exchanges jeopardizes public interest which is doubtful let the Congress speak. 12 Undoubtedly, the opinion and recommendation of the Commission will be given weight by the Legislature, in judging whether or not to restrict individual enterprise and business opportunities. But until otherwise directed by law, the operation of exchanges should not be so regulated as practically to create a monopoly by preventing the establishment of other stock exchanges and thereby contravening:

(a) the organizers' (Makati's) Constitutional right to equality before the law;

(b) their guaranteed civil liberty to pursue any lawful employment or trade; and

(c) the investor's right to choose where to buy or to sell, and his privilege to select the brokers in his employment. 13And no extended elucidation is needed to conclude that for a licensing officer to deny license solely on the basis of what he believes is best for the economy of the country may amount to regimentation or, in this instance, the exercise of undelegated legislative powers and discretion.

Thus, it has been held that where the licensing statute does not expressly or impliedly authorize the officer in charge, he may not refuse to grant a license simply on the ground that a sufficient number of licenses to serve the needs of the public have already been issued. ACCORDINGLY, the license of the petition to operate a stock exchange is approved without such condition. 10. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. (PASEI) vs.HON. RUBEN D. TORRESFACTS: The case before us appears compounded by the circumstance that the LOI in question was issued by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was clothed with legislative power, while the EO revoking the LOI was issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino at a time when she had already lost her law-making power after Congress convened on 27 July 1987. Although the EO issued by President Aquino is undoubtedly not a law but a mere administrative issuance, the parties here debate whether the LOI issued by President Marcos was a law or simply an administrative rule in view of his dual position then as chief executive and as legislative authority. Petitioners contend that the LOI is a law, hence, the EO cannot countermand it, while public respondent claims that the LOI is only an administrative issuance which may be superseded by an EO.

Article 25 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442, as amended) encourages private sector participation in recruitment and placement of workers under guidelines, rules and regulations to be issued by the Secretary of Labor. On 20 January 1982, President Marcos issued LOI 1190 withholding the grant of new licenses to operate agencies for overseas employment effective 1 January 1982 except as he may otherwise direct. On 19 March 1991, President Aquino issued EO 450 lifting the ban on new applications for licenses to operate recruitment agencies subject to guidelines and regulations the Secretary of Labor may promulgate. On 8 April 1991, respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment promulgated Department (DO) No. 9, Series of 1991, entitled "Guidelines Implementing Executive Order No. 450."

In this Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order filed 14 May 1991 petitioners Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), Philippine Entertainment Exporters and Promoters Association (PEEPA), and Association of Filipino Overseas Workers, Inc. (AFOWI) pray that EO 450 be declared invalid for being contrary to LOI 1190. On 16 May 1991, we issued a temporary restraining order directing respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment to cease and desist from enforcing EO 450 and DO 9 until further orders. Thereafter, three motions for intervention were filed, which the Court eventually allowed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 450 may repeal Letter of Instruction 1190 issued by then President Marcos while he was still exercising legislative and executive powers.

RULING:

As we view it, LOI 1190 simply imposes a presidential review of the authority of the Minister of Labor and Employment to grant licenses, hence, directed to him alone. Since this is undoubtedly an administrative action, LOI 1190 should properly be treated as an administrative issuance. Unlike Presidential Decrees which by usage have gained acceptance as laws promulgated by the President, Letters of Instruction are presumed to be mere administrative issuances except when the conditions set out in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile exist. Consequently, to be considered part of the law of the land, petitioners must establish that LOI, 1190 was issued in response to "a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter." The conspicuous absence of any of these conditions fortifies the opinion that LOI 1190 cannot be any more than a mere administrative issuance.

There is nothing in the LOI which repeals or runs counter to Art. 25 of the Labor Code, as amended. Instead, contrary to the perception of petitioners, LOI 1190 does not actually ban the grant of licenses nor bar the entry of new licensees since anybody could still apply for license with the Minister of Labor and Employment, although the grant thereof is subject to the prior authority of the President. In fact, the LOI did not modify the rule-making power of the Minister of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code; it only added another tier of review. Neither can petitioners consider this additional review by the President as an amendment of Art. 25, for this is within the scope of the exercise of his constitutionally sanctioned control over the executive departments of government. Implicit in that power of control is the President's "authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries." Moreover, if we discern the intent of LOI 1190 from the manner it was enforced, the unrebutted allegation of respondent that 319 private employment agencies secured administrative presidential approval from 1982 to 1989 shows that then President Marcos merely intended to regulate, and not ban altogether, new applications for licenses. For this reason, Marcos could not have contemplated repealing Art. 25 of the Labor Code.

Petitioners also contend that EO 450 cannot repeal LOI 1190 for Congress has not delegated that power to the President. We do not agree. There is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the LOI by way of an EO in view of our finding that LOI 1190 is a mere administrative directive, hence, may be repealed, altered or modified by EO 450, and DO 9 must consequently be upheld.11. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION vs.JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZFACTS: By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."

Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to: 1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company; 2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.; 3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.; 4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and 5. Capitol Wireless, Inc. or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner enable said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa. Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates thereof.

Petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. Petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months from the date of said order. When said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6) months, or up to September 16, 1988. The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates.ISSUE: Whether or not the enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTCRULING:

Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof. We conclude that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.

Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process. We find merit in petitioner's contention. In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a categorical classification as to when the rate-fixing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus:Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.This rule was further explained in the subsequent case ofThe Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al.to wit:It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law where it is said: 'If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ...'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.

The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor was the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.

At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert. Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date. It becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force pending the final determination of the case. An order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the prescribed period. The order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be nullified.12. RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONFACTS: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450,00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.

On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985, Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner