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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees. Office of the Solicitor General for appellant. Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

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This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.

It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429). Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years. It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted below:+.wph!1

SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

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Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned.+.wph!1

SECTION 1. Definition. Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as follows: (a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters of the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States and Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included. (b) Electro Fishing. Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may

be battery or generator-operated and from and available source of electric current. (c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee. (d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products. SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which shall be carried at all times. SEC. 3. Penalty. Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court. SEC. 4. Repealing Provisions. All administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked. SEC. 5. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days after its publication in the Office Gazette. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963). Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water." The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court." That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83. Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22, We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of electro

fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein). And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596). It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67). In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11. The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court." As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83. We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other

violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32). Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing. However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas. That decree provides:+.wph!1

SEC. 33. Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: ... The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704). The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing. Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years", a punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84. An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by

means of an administrative order. Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Mu;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712). The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6). The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osme;a, 68 Phil. 328). Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704. Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries." Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said

Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law." Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law (Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body. Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it." "department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 496-8). "Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law." The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558). In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the attention of technical men in the executive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to the importance and necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion. The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124). In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125, 1132). It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am.

Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527). In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing. The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries Law. Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and under the said administrative order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the United States only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code. Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island. This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order, the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence, the charge against Santos was dismiss. A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130). Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd 51). In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles supra). The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt, promulgate,

amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game. Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer, pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof." Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game animals. For that act, he was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission. It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute penalized was the taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of game, it could have readily said so. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case. WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur. Fernando and Antonio, JJ., took no part. Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.1wph1.t

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-9876 December 8, 1914 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADRIANO PANLILIO, defendant-appellant. Pedro Abad Santos for appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee.

MORELAND, J.: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga convicting the accused of a violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial. The information charges: "That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to the above-named accused having been exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Province of Pampanga, P. I.; that, on said place, the said accused, Adriano Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of working them." The defendant demurred to this information on the ground that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant duly excepted and pleaded not guilty. From the evidence introduced by the prosecution on the trial of the cause it appears that the defendant was notified in writing on February 22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the Director of agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Pampanga Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that said carabaos were accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral designated by an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by further order of the Director of Agriculture. It further appears from the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution that the defendant fully understood that, according to the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, he was not to remove the animals, or to permit anyone else to remove them, from the quarantine in which they had been placed. In spite, however, of all this, the carabaos were taken from the corral by the commands of the accused and driven from place to place on his hacienda, and were used as work animals thereon in the same manner as if they had not been quarantined. The contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof.

We are forced to agree with this contention.

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The original information against the accused charged a violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760 committed by the accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were in quarantine, to be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on his hacienda. An amended information was filed. It failed, however, to specify that section of Act No. 1760 alleged to have been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial. The only sections of Act No. 1760, which prohibit acts and pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. Section 3 provides, in effect, that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous communicable disease, or any of the effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands. Section 4 declares, substantially, that it shall be unlawful for any reason, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship, drive or otherwise take or transport from one island, province, municipality, township, or settlement to another any domestic animal suffering from any dangerous communicable diseased or to expose such animal either alive or dead on any public road or highway where it may come in contact with other domestic animals. Section 5 provides that whenever the Secretary of the Interior shall declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any island, province, municipality, township, or settlement and that there is danger of spreading such disease by shipping, driving or otherwise transporting or taking out of such island, province, municipality, township, or settlement any class of domestic animal, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to ship, drive or otherwise remove the kind of animals so specified from such locality except when accompanied by a certificate issued by authority of the Director of Agriculture stating the number and the kind of animals to be shipped, driven, taken or transported, their destination, manner in which they are authorized to be shipped, driven, taken, or transported, and their brands and distinguishing marks. A simple reading of these sections demonstrates clearly that the case at bar does not fall within any of them. There is no question here of importation and there is no charge or proof that the animals in question were suffering from a dangerous communicable disease or that the Secretary of the Interior had made the declaration provided for in section 5 or that the accused had driven or taken said animals from one island, province, municipality, township or settlement to another. It was alleged had been exposed to a dangerous communicable disease and that they had been placed in a corral in quarantine on the premises of the accused and that he, in violation of the quarantine, had taken them from the corral and worked them upon the lands adjoining. They had not been in highway nor moved from one municipality or settlement to another. They were left upon defendant's hacienda, where they were quarantined, and there worked by the servants of the accused. The Solicitor-General in his brief in this court admits that the sections referred to are not applicable to the case at bar and also admits that section 7 of said Act is not applicable. This section provides: "Whenever the Director of Agriculture shall order any animal placed in quarantine in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the owner of such animal, or his agent, shall deliver it at the place designated for the quarantine and shall provide it with proper food, water, and attendance. Should the owner or his agent fail to comply with this requirement the Director of Agriculture may furnish supplies and attendance needed, and the reasonable cost of such supplies and attendance shall be collectible from the owner or his agent." We are in accord with the opinion expressed by the Solicitor-General with respect to this section, as we are with his opinion as to sections 3, 4, and 5. the law nowhere makes it a penal offense to refuse to comply with the provisions of section 7, nor is the section itself so phrased as to warrant the conclusion that it was intended to be a penal section. The section provides the means by which the refusal of the owner to comply therewith shall be overcome and the punishment, if we may call it punishment, which he shall receive by reason of that refusal. It has none of the aspects of a penal provision or the form or substance of such provision. It does not prohibit any act. It does not compel an act nor does it really punish or impose a criminal penalty. The other sections of the law under which punishments may be inflicted are so phrased as to make the prohibited act unlawful, and section 8 provides the punishment for any act declared unlawful by the law. The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue, that section 6 is applicable to the case at bar. Section 6 simply authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among them, paragraph (c) "to require that animals which are suffering from dangerous communicable diseases or have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed by him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense." A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way

therein. Finally, it is contended by the Government that if the offense stated in the information and proved upon the trial does not constitute a violation of any of the provisions of Act No. 1760, it does constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code. It provides: A fine of not less than fifteen and not more than seventy pesetas and censure shall be imposed upon: . . . 2. Any person who shall violate the regulations, ordinances, or proclamations issued with reference to any epedemic disease among animals, the extermination of locusts, or any other similar plague.1awphil.net

It alleged in the information and was proved on the trial that the Bureau of agriculture had ordered a quarantine of the carabaos at the time and place mentioned; that the quarantine had been executed and completed and the animals actually segregated and confined; that the accused, in violation of such quarantine and of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, duly promulgated, broke the quarantine, removed the animals and used them in the ordinary work of his plantation. We consider these acts a plain violation of the article of the Penal Code as above quoted. The fact that the information in its preamble charged a violation of act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. The complaint opens as follows: "The undersigned accuses Adriano Panlilio of a violation of Act No. 1760, committed as follows:" Then follows the body of the information already quoted in this opinion. We would not permit an accused to be convicted under one Act when he is charged with the violation of another, if the change from one statute to another involved a change of the theory of the trial or required of the defendant a different defense or surprised him in any other way. The allegations required under Act No. 1760 include those required under article 581. The accused could have defended himself in no different manner if he had been expressly charged with a violation of article 581. In the case of United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. Rep., 740), the information stating the facts upon which the charge was founded terminated with his expression: "In violation of section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission, in effect on the 6th of February, 1902." In the resolution of this case the Supreme Court found that the facts set forth in the information and proved on the trial did not constitute a violation of section 315 of Act No. 355 as alleged in the information, but did constitute a violation of article 387 in connection with article 383 of the Penal Code, and accordingly convicted the accused under those articles and sentenced him to the corresponding penalty. In that case the court said: "The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the testimony of credible witnesses who heard and saw everything that occurred, show beyond peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as defined in article 387, in connection with article 383 of the Penal Code, has been committed, it being immaterial whether it is alleged in the complaint that section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission was violated by the defendant, as the same recites facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute the crime of bribery as defined and punished in the aforesaid articles of the Penal Code." (U. S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. Rep., 273; U.S. vs. Jeffrey, 15 Phil. Rep., 391; U. S. vs. Guzman, 25 Phil. Rep., 22.) The accused is accordingly convicted of a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, and is sentenced to pay a fine of seventy pesetas (P14) and censure, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs of this appeal. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur. Johnson, J., dissents.


Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT ManilaTHIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 159149 June 26, 2006 The HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Energy, petitioner, vs. LPG REFILLERS INC., respondent QUISUMBING, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decision1 and Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318, which nullified Circular No. 2000-06-010 of the Department of Energy (DOE). The facts are undisputed. Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders.3 The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.4 On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33, thus: SECTION 4. NO PRICE DISPLAY BOARD LPG Marketer/LPG Dealer/LPG Retail Outlet ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

letter

1st Offense

Reprimand/warning

2nd Offense Recommend suspension of business operation to the proper local government unit 3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit and initiate criminal proceedings SECTION 5. NO WEIGHING SCALE A. LPG Refiller/Marketer 1st Offense of P10,000 2nd Offense Fine of P5,000 Fine

3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit B. Dealer 1st Offense of P7,000 2nd Offense Fine of P3,000 Fine

3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit C. LPG Retail Outlet 1st Offense of P500.00 2nd Offense Reprimand Fine

of P1,000.00

3rd Offense

Fine

SECTION 6. NO TARE WEIGHT OR INCORRECT TARE WEIGHT MARKINGS. (REQUIREMENT ON ENGRAVED TARE WEIGHT SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR) A. LPG Refiller/Marketer 1st Offense for each cylinder 2nd Offense for each cylinder Fine Fine of P3,000 of P5,000

3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit B. Dealer 1st Offense for each cylinder 2nd Offense for each cylinder Fine Fine of P2,000 of P4,000

3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit C. LPG Retail Outlet 1st Offense for each cylinder 2nd Offense for each cylinder Fine of P1,000 Fine of P2,000

3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

SECTION 7. NO APPROPRIATE OR AUTHORIZED LPG SEAL A. LPG Refiller/Marketer 1st Offense for each cylinder 2nd Offense for each cylinder Fine Fine of P3,000 of P5,000



3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit SECTION 8. NO TRADE NAME, UNBRANDED LPG CYLINDERS, NO SERIAL NUMBER, NO DISTINGUISHING COLOR, NO EMBOSSED IDENTIFYING MARKINGS ON CYLINDER OR DISTINCTIVE COLLAR OR DESIGN (REQUIREMENT

ON SERIAL NUMBER AND DISTINCTIVE COLLAR OR DESIGN SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR) A. LPG Refiller/Marketer 1st Offense for each cylinder 2nd Offense for each cylinder Fine Fine of P4,000 of P5,000



3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit SECTION 9. UNDERFILLED LPG CYLINDERS A. LPG REFILLER/MARKETER

1st Offense for each cylinder 2nd Offense for each cylinder

Fine Fine

of P4,000 of P6,000

3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit B. DEALER 1st Offense for each cylinder 2nd Offense for each cylinder Fine Fine of P3,000 of P4,000

3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit C. LPG RETAIL OUTLET 1st Offense for each cylinder 2nd Offense for each cylinder Fine of P1,000 Fine of P2,000

3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit SECTION 10. TAMPERING, ALTERING, OR MODIFYING OF LPG CYLINDER THRU ANY MEANS SUCH AS BUT NOT LIMITED TO CHANGING THE VALVE, REPAINTING, AND RELABELLING BY ANY PERSON OR ENTITY OTHER THAN THE LEGITIMATE AND REGISTERED OWNER OF THE SAME. FOR THIS PURPOSE, LPG REFILLER, MARKETER, DEALER, OR RETAIL OUTLET, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO HAS POSSESSION OF SUCH ILLEGALLY TAMPERED,

ALTERED, OR OTHERWISE MODIFIED LPG CYLINDER SHALL BE HELD LIABLE FOR THIS OFFENSE A. LPG Refiller/Marketer 1st Offense of P5,000 for each cylinder 2nd Offense of P10,000 for each cylinder Fine Fine

3rd Offense Recommen d business closure to the proper local government unit B. Dealer of P3,000 for each cylinder 1st Offense Fine

2nd Offense for each cylinder

Fine of P5,000


3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit SECTION 11. UNAUTHORIZED DECANTING REFILLING OF LPG CYLINDERS 1st Offense cylinder OR

Fine of P5,000 for each

2nd Offense cylinder

Fine of P10,000 for each

3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit SECTION 12. HOARDING OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS INCLUDING LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS 1st Offense cylinder Fine of P10,000 per

2nd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit plus the filing of appropriate criminal action SECTION 13. REFUSAL TO ALLOW OR COOPERATE WITH DULY AUTHORIZED INSPECTORS OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY ADMINISTRATION BUREAU (EIAB) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR INSPECTION/INVESTIGATION, WHETHER REGULAR AND ROUTINARY OR COMPLAINT-INITIATED 1st Offense Fine of P10,000 business

2nd Offense Recommend closure to the proper local government unit

SECTION 14. REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO PAY FINE The Department of Energy shall recommend to the proper local government unit the closure of business of a respondent who refuses or fails to pay any administrative fine without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate criminal action if warranted.5

Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE, however, denied the request for lack of merit. Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trial court. After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the law.6 The court intimated that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under the law. The decretal part of its Decision reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court renders judgment declaring DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 null and void and prohibits the respondent from implementing the same. SO ORDERED.7 The trial court denied for lack of merit petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition, raising the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A CLOSE SCRUTINY OF BP 33, PD 1865 AND R.A. NO. 8479 SHOWS THAT OFFENSES LIKE NO PRICE DISPLAY [BOARD], NO WEIGHING SCALE, ETC. SET FORTH IN THE CIRCULAR ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR IN ANY OF THE THREE (3) LAWS. II WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A SCRUTINY OF THE NEW SET OF PENALTIES PROVIDED BY THE CIRCULAR SHOWS THAT THE PENALTIES THIS TIME ARE BASED ON PER CYLINDER BASIS; THAT BEING SUCH, NO CEILING WAS PROVIDED FOR AS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINES; THAT AS

ILLUSTRATED BY THE PETITIONER, FOR JUST ONE LPG CYLINDER FOUND VIOLATING AT LEAST SEC[TIONS] 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 AND 11 OF THE [CIRCULAR], A FINE OF P24,000.00 IS IMPOSED; AND THAT THIS WILL CLEARLY BE BEYOND THE P10,000.00 PROVIDED BY THE LAWS. III WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 16 OF PETITIONERS CIRCULAR WHICH AUTHORIZES THE IMPOSITION OF PECUNIARY PENALTIES WITH THE TOTAL FINE NOT EXCEEDING P20,000.00 FOR RETAIL OUTLETS VIOLATES THE PENALTY CEILING OF P10,000.00 SET UNDER BP BLG. 33, AS AMENDED. IV WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SINCE SECTION 5 (g) OF R.A. 7638 FINDS NO REFERENCE IN DOE CIRCULAR NO. 200006-010, THE SAME SHOULD BE DISREGARDED. V WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ON THE NEW OFFENSES INTRODUCED IN THE CIRCULAR SUCH AS SECTIONS 4, 5, 10, 13 AND 14 AND THE IMPOSITION OF THE GRADUATED PENALTIES ON A PER CYLINDER BASIS, THIS COURT FINDS [NO] REASON TO DISTURB ITS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENTMOVANT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY. X X X IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT BP BLG. 33 AS AMENDED AND P.D. 1865 ARE CRIMINAL STATUTES AND MUST BE CONSTRUED WITH SUCH STRICTNESS AS TO CAREFULLY SAFEGUARD THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT.

VI WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ASSAILED CIRCULAR SETS NO MAXIMUM LIMIT AS TO THE FINE THAT MAY BE IMPOSED ON AN ERRING PERSON OR ENTITY TO WHICH FACT MOVANT CONCEDES. FOR ONE (1) CYLINDER ALONE, NOT ONLY DOES THECIRCULAR MAKE THE FINE EXCESSIVE TO THE EXTENT OF BEING CONFISCATORY, BUT IT EVEN IMPOSES A PENALTY WHICH MAY EVEN GO BEYOND THAT MAXIMUM IMPOSABLE FINE OF P50,000.00 SET BY P.D. 1865 IN ITS SEC. 4 AFTER A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING.8 To our mind, the issue raised by petitioner may be reduced to the sole issue of whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasig erred in declaring the provisions of the Circular null and void, and prohibiting the Circulars implementation. Petitioner argues that the penalties for the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular are sanctioned by Sections 19 and 3A10 of B.P. Blg. 33 and Section 2311 of Republic Act No. 8479.12 Petitioner adds that Sections 5(g)13 and 2114 of Republic Act No. 7638 15 also authorize the DOE to impose the penalties provided in the Circular. Respondent counters that the enabling laws, B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 8479, do not expressly penalize the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular. Neither is the Circularsupported by R.A. No. 7638, respondent claims, since the said law does not pertain to LPG traders. Respondent maintains that the Circular is not in conformity with the law it seeks to implement. We resolve to grant the petition. For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.16

The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants. As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail 17 outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum moneetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties. Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in theCircular contravenes the law. Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public

interest. To nullify the Circular in this case would be to render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Circular No. 2000-06-010 of DOE is declared valid. The Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318, nullifying said Circular and prohibiting its implementation are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

DANTE O. TIGAAssociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice

ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate Justice Chairperson

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief Justice

Rollo, pp. 64-72. Penned by Judge Alicia P. Mario-Co. Id. at 73-77. 3 SEC. 2. Prohibited Acts. The following acts are prohibited and penalized: (a) Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products; (b) Adulteration of finished petroleum products, or possession of adulterated finished petroleum products for the purpose of sale, distribution, transportation, exchange or barter;1 2

(c) Underdelivery or underfilling beyond authorized limits in the sale of petroleum products or possession of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas cylinder for the purpose of sale, distribution, transportation, exchange or barter; xxxx [(b)] (D) Hoarding of petroleum and/or petroleum products; [(c)] (E) Overpricing in the sale of petroleum products; [(d)] (F) Misuse of petroleum allocations; [(e)] (G) Speed contests and rallies involving mainly the use of motor vehicles, motor-driven watercraft or aircraft utilizing petroleum-derived fuels, including car and motorcycle rallies and drag racing, without the permit from the Bureau of Energy Utilization; and [(f)] (H) Sky-diving, and water-skiing except when methanol is used for the power-boat operation. SEC. 4. Penalties. Any person who commits any act herein prohibited shall, upon conviction, be punished with a fine of not less than [two] TWENTY thousand pesos [(P 2,000)] (P 20,000) but not more than [Ten] FIFTY thousand pesos [(P 10,000)] (P 50,000). 5 Rollo, pp. 274-280. 6 Batas Pambansa Blg. 33 (1979), Presidential Decree No. 1865 (1983), or Republic Act No. 8479 (1998). 7 Rollo, p. 72. 8 Id. at 500-502. 9 SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the declared policy of the State to institutionalize as a national way of life energy conservation geared towards the judicious and efficient use of energy in order to enhance availability of energy supplies required to support economic, social and developmental goals. In view of the continuing uncertainty of the international oil supply, it is imperative that measures to conserve energy be strengthened and that acts and activities involving petroleum and/or petroleum products contrary to the intent and spirit of judicious usage and conservation of energy, which are inimical to the public interest and national security, be prohibited and appropriate sanction therefor be imposed. 10 Section 3-A (inserted by Section 3 of PD No. 1865) reads: SEC. 3-A. Rules and Regulations; Administrative sanctions for violation thereof. The Bureau of Energy Utilization shall issue such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act, subject to the approval of the Minister of Energy, after consultation with the affected industry sectors. Said rules and regulations shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.4

The Bureau of Energy Utilization is empowered to impose in an administrative proceeding, after due notice and hearing, upon any person who violates any provision of such rules and regulations, a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or to suspend or remove the license or permit of a hauler, marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or retail outlet: Provided, That hearing in any administrative proceedings may be waived by respondent. Provided, Further, That during the pendency of such administrative proceeding, the Bureau may suspend the business operations of such hauler, marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or retailer or retail outlet operator when the suspension is consistent with public interest. xxxx The administrative sanction that may be imposed shall be without prejudice to the filing of a criminal action as the case may warrant. 11 SEC. 23. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DOE, in coordination with the Board, the DENR, DFA, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Department of Health (DOH), DOF, DTI, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and TLRC, shall formulate and issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations within sixty (60) days after the effectivity of this Act. 12 AN ACT DEREGULATING THE DOWNSTREAM OIL INDUSTRY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 13 SEC. 5. Powers and Functions. The Department shall have the following powers and functions: xxxx (g) Formulate and implement programs, including a system of providing incentives and penalties, for the judicious and efficient use of energy in all energy-consuming sectors of the economy; 14 SEC. 21. Appropriations. x x x Subject to existing rules and regulations, the funds and monies collected or which otherwise come into the possession of the Department and its bureaus from fees, surcharges, fines and penalties which the Department and its bureaus may impose and collect under this Act, x x x shall be disbursed for expenses necessary for the effective discharge of the powers and functions of the Department under this Act. 15 AN ACT CREATING THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, RATIONALIZING THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES RELATED TO ENERGY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 16 See United States vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 608, 613-614 (1914). 17 DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010. SEC. 16. Maximum Total Penalty. In the imposition of pecuniary penalties the total fine shall not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P 20,000.00) for retail outlets.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 88709 February 11, 1992 NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, JUAN COQUINCO and CARLOS COQUINCO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORINO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Ex-Officio Sheriff of Bulacan, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, MANUEL L. CO, GOLDEN STAR INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN, respondents. Manuel T. Ubarra for petitioners. Encanto, Mabugat & Associates for UCPB. Mangalindan and Bermas Law Offices for private respondent. Federico Reyes for Manuel L. Co.

CRUZ, J.: We are asked once again to interpret the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court without stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, 1 this time in connection with an order of the trial court sustaining demurrer to the evidence. 2 The order has been affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals, 3 and the appellant has come to this Court in this petition for review on certiorari, invoking the said provision and alleging several reversible errors. In the complaint filed by the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, it was alleged that on January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. UCPB was the highest and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold to it for P3,558,547.64. On August 29, 1983, UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel Co, who on the same day transferred them to Golden Star Industrial Corporation, another private respondent, upon whose petition a writ of possession was issued to it on November 4, 1983. On September 6, 1984, NICOS and the other petitioners, as chairman of its board of directors and its executive vicepresident, respectively, filed their action for "annulment of sheriff's sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction." Golden Star and Victorino P. Evangelista, as ex officio sheriff of Bulacan, moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription, estoppel, and regularity of the sheriff's sale. Co denied the allegations of the plaintiffs and, like the other defendants, counterclaimed for damages. In its answer with counterclaim, UCPB defended the foreclosure of the mortgage for failure of NICOS to pay the loan in accordance with its promissory note and insisted that the sheriff's sale had been conducted in accordance with the statutory requirements. The plaintiffs presented two witnesses, including petitioner Carlos Coquinco, who testified at three separate hearings. They also submitted 21 exhibits. On April 30, 1986, Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page demurrer to the evidence where they argued that the action was a derivative suit that came under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission; that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed; that the sheriff's sale had been held in accordance with Act 3135; that the notices had been duly published in a newspaper of general circulation; and that the opposition to the writ of possession had not been filed on time. No opposition to the demurrer having been submitted despite notice thereof to the parties, Judge Nestor F. Dantes considered it submitted for resolution and on June 6, 1986, issued the following ORDER Acting on the "Demurrer to Evidence" dated April 30, 1986 filed by defendants Victorino P. Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial Corporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did not

file their comment/opposition and it appearing from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the Sheriff's Auction Sale conducted on July 11, 1983 was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135 under which the auction sale was appropriately held and conducted and it appearing from the allegations in paragraph 13 of the plaintiff's pleading and likewise from plaintiff Carlos Coquinco's own testimony that his cause is actually-against the other officers and stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos Industrial Corporation ". . . for the purpose of protecting the corporation and its stockholders, as well as their own rights and interests in the corporation, and the corporate assets, against the fraudulent ants and devices of the responsible officials of the corporation, in breach of the trust reposed upon them by the stockholders . . ." a subject matter not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court, the court finds the same to be impressed with merit. WHEREFORE, plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed. The Defendants' respective counterclaims are likewise dismissed. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction heretofore issued is dissolved and set aside. It is this order that is now assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the aforementioned constitutional requirement. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. They also stress that the sheriff's sale was irregular because the notices thereof were published in a newspaper that did not have general circulation and that the original date of the sheriff's sale had been changed without its consent, the same having been allegedly given by a person not authorized to represent NICOS. It is also contended that the original P2 million loan had already been paid and that if there was indeed a second P2 million loan also secured by the real estate mortgage, it was for UCPB to prove this, as well as its allegation that NICOS had defaulted in the payment of the first quarterly installment on the first loan. The petitioners complain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for the decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of Appeals. Rejecting this contention, the respondent court held: In their first assignment of error, appellants faults the court for its failure to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the order of dismissal is based, as required by Section 1, Rule 36, of the Rules of Court and the Constitution. An order granting a demurrer to the evidence is in fact an adjudication on the merits and consequently the requirements of Section 1, Rule 36, is applicable. We are not however prepared to hold that there is a reversible omission of the requirements of the rule in the Order appealed from, it appearing from a reading thereof that there is substantial reference to the facts and the law on which it is based. The Order which adverts to the Demurrer to the Evidence expressly referred to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff as showing that the Sheriff's auction sale conducted on July 11, 1983, was in complete accord with the requisites of Section 3, Act 3135 under which the auction sale was apparently held and conducted. It likewise makes reference to the allegations in paragraph 13 of plaintiff's pleadings and plaintiff Carlos Coquinco's own testimony that the case is actually against the other officers and stockholders of plaintiff NICOS Industrial Corporation and concludes, rightly or wrongly, that the subject matter thereof is not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court. We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while leaving much to be desired, substantially complies with the rules. This Court does not agree. The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution. It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor

of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision does not apply to interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it "refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters." 4 As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we have already observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 5 that The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis. xxx xxx xxx The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case. The order in the case at bar does not come under either of the above exceptions. As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, 6 it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is based. It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a judgment on the merits and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. There is no quarrel with this established principle. However, the rule would be applicable only if the case is dismissed on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and not when some other additional ground is invoked. A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed not only for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale. Regarding this second ground, all the trial court did was summarily conclude "from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff" that the sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135." It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it believed that the legal requirements had been observed. Its conclusion was remarkably threadbare. Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order. Significantly, the respondent court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction over the case after all. This made even more necessary the factual and legal explanation for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient. In People v. Escober, 7 the trial court in a decision that covered only one and a half pages, single spaced found the defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. Holding that the decision violated the constitutional requirement, the Court observed through then Associate Justice Marcelo B. Fernan: The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the Amended Information were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or the exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what "vital details" Escober could have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to be attended by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others" but did not particularly state the factual basis for such findings. While it is true that the case before us does not involve the life or liberty of the defendant, as in Escober, there is still no reason

for the constitutional short-cut taken by the trial judge. The properties being litigated are not of inconsequential value; they were sold for three and a half million pesos in 1983 and doubtless have considerably appreciated since then, after more than eight years. These facts alone justified a more careful and thorough drafting of the order, to fully inform the parties and the courts that might later be called upon to review it of the reasons why the demurrer to the evidence was sustained and the complaint dismissed. In Romero v. Court of Appeals, 8 the Court, somewhat reluctantly, approved a memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals consisting of 4 pages, single-spaced, which adopted by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Agrarian Relations. While holding that the decision could be considered substantial compliance with PD 946, Section 18, 9 and BP 129, Section 40, 10 Justice Jose Y. Feria nevertheless expressed the misgiving that "the tendency would be to follow the line of least resistance by just adopting the findings and conclusions of the lower court without thoroughly studying the appealed case." Obviously, the order now being challenged cannot qualify as a memorandum decision because it was not issued by an appellate court reviewing the findings and conclusions of a lower court. We note that, contrary to the impression of the respondent court, there is not even an incorporation by reference of the evidence and arguments of the parties, assuming this is permitted. No less importantly, again assuming arguendo that such reference is allowed and has been made, there is no immediate accessibility to the incorporated matters so as to insure their convenient examination by the reviewing court. In Francisco v. Permskul, 11 which is the latest decision of the Court on the issue now before us, we categorically required: . . . Although only incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of the regional trial court, Judge Balita's decision was nevertheless available to the Court of Appeals. It is this circumstance, or even happenstance, if you will, that has validated the memorandum decision challenged in this case and spared it from constitutional infirmity. That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following requirement, as a condition for the proper application of Section 40 of BP Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only byremote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of BP Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision. It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it was based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation. In Escober, the Court observed that the flawed decision "should have been remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new judgment" but decided nevertheless to decide the case directly, the records being already before it and in deference to the right of the accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. However, we are not so disposed in the case now before us. It is not the normal function of this Court to rule on a demurrer to the evidence in the first instance; our task comes later, to review the ruling of the trial court after it is examined by the Court of Appeals and, when proper, its decision is elevated to us. In the present case, we find that the respondent court did not have an adequate basis for such examination because of the insufficiency of the challenged order. It must also be noted that we deal here only with property rights and, although we do not mean to minimize them, they do not require the same urgent action we took in Escober, which involved the very life of the accused. All things considered, we feel that the proper step is to remand this case to the court a quo for a revision of the challenged order in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution. Review by the Court of the other issues raised, most of which are factual, e.g., the allegation of default in the payment of the loan, the existence of a second loan, the nature of the newspapers where the notices of the sale were published, the authority of the person consenting to the postponement of the sale, etc., is impractical and unnecessary at this time. These matters should be discussed in detail in the revised order to be made by the trial court so that the higher courts will know what they are reviewing when the case is appealed.

In one case, 12 this Court, exasperated over the inordinate length of a decision rife with irrelevant details, castigated the trial judge for his "extraordinary verbiage." Kilometric decisions without much substance must be avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at the factual findings, reaches the legal conclusions, renders its ruling and, having done so, ends. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10, for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986, conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with law. It is so ordered. Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes 1 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 14. 2 Rollo, p. 9. 3 Ibid., p. 43. 4 Mendoza v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, 51 SCRA 369 at 375. 5 186 SCRA 1 at 5. 6 Nepomuceno v. Commission on Elections, 126 SCRA 472 at 478. 7 157 SCRA 541 at 555. 8 147 SCRA 183 at 194. 9 Sec. 18. Appeals. . . . All cases of the Court of Agrarian Relations now pending before the Court of Appeals shall remain in the Divisions to which they have been assigned, and shall be with sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Decree. Provided, however, That if the decision or order be an affirmance in toto of the dispositive conclusion of the judgment appealed from, then the Court of Appeals may, instead of rendering an extended opinion, indicate clearly the trial court's findings of fact and pronouncements of law which have been adopted as basis for the affirmance. . . . 10 Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. Every decision or final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is based which may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision, order or resolution appealed therefrom. 11 173 SCRA 335. 12 People v. Molina, 184 SCRA 597.


THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 95694. October 9, 1997]

VICENTE VILLLAFLOR, substituted by his heirs, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC., respondents. DECISIONPANGANIBAN ,J.:

In this rather factually complicated case, the Court reiterates the binding force and effect of findings of specialized administrative agencies as well as those of trial courts when affirmed by the Court of Appeals; rejects petitioners theory of simulation of contracts; and passes upon the qualifications of private respondent corporation to acquire disposable public agricultural lands prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. The Case Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated September 27, 1990, in C.A. G.R. CV No. 09062, affirming the dismissal by the trial court of Petitioner Vicente Villaflors complaint against Private Respondent Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. The disposition of both the trial and the appellate courts are quoted in the statement of facts below.[1]

The Facts The facts of this case, as narrated in detail by Respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:[2]

The evidence, testimonial and documentary, presented during the trial show that on January 16, 1940, Cirilo Piencenaves, in a Deed of Absolute Sale (exh. A), sold to [petitioner], a parcel of agricultural land containing an area of 50 hectares, more or less, and particularly described and bounded as follows:[3]

A certain parcel of agricultural land planted to abaca with visible concrete monuments marking the boundaries and bounded on the NORTH by Public Land now

Private Deeds on the East by Serafin Villaflor, on the SOUTH by Public Land; and on the West by land claimed by H. Patete, containing an area of 60 hectares more or less, now under Tax Dec. 29451 in the (sic) of said Vicente Villaflor, the whole parcel of which this particular parcel is only a part, is assessed at P22,550.00 under the above said Tax Dec. Number. This deed states: That the above described land was sold to the said VICENTE VILLAFLOR, xxx on June 22, 1937, but no formal document was then executed, and since then until the present time, the said Vicente Villaflor has been in possession and occupation of (the same); (and) That the above described property was before the sale, of my exclusive property having inherited from my long dead parents and my ownership to it and that of my [sic] lasted for more than fifty (50) years, possessing and occupying same peacefully, publicly and continuously without interruption for that length of time. Also on January 16, 1940, Claudio Otero, in a Deed of Absolute Sale (exh. C) sold to Villaflor a parcel of agricultural land, containing an area of 24 hectares, more or less, and particularly described and bounded as follows: A certain land planted to corn with visible concrete measurements marking the boundaries and bounded on the North by Public Land and Tungao Creek; on the East by Agusan River; on the South by Serafin Villaflor and Cirilo Piencenaves; and on the West by land of Fermin Bacobo containing an area of 24 hectares more or less, under Tax Declaration No. 29451 in the name already of Vicente Villaflor, the whole parcel of which this particular land is only a part, is assessed at P22,550.00 under the above said Tax Declaration No. 29451. This deed states: That the above described land was sold to the said VICENTE VILLAFLOR, xxx on June 22, 1937, but no sound document was then executed, however since then and until the present time, the said Vicente Villaflor has been in open and continuous possession and occupation of said land; (and) That the above described land was before the sale, my own exclusive property, being inherited from my deceased parents, and my ownership to it and that of my predecessors lasted more than fifty (50) years, possessing and occupying the same, peacefully, openly and continuously without interruption for that length of time.

Likewise on January 16, 1940, Hermogenes Patete, in a Deed of Absolute Sale (exh. D), sold to Villaflor, a parcel of agricultural land, containing an area of 20 hectares, more or less, and particularly described and bounded as follows: A certain parcel of agricultural land planted to abaca and corn with visible concrete monuments marking the boundaries and bounded on the North by Public Land areaprivate Road; on the East by land claimed by Cirilo Piencenaves; on the South by Public Land containing an area of 20 hectares more or less, now under Tax Declaration No. 29451 in the name of Vicente Villaflor the whole parcel of which this particular parcel, is assessed at P22,550.00 for purposes of taxation under the above said Tax Declaration No. 29451. This deed states: xxx (O)n June 22, 1937 but the formal document was then executed, and since then until the present time, the said VICENTE VILLAFLOR has been in continuous and open possession and occupation of the same; (and) That the above described property was before the sale, my own and exclusive property, being inherited from my deceased parents and my ownership to it and that of my predecessors lasted more than fifty (50) years, possessing and occupying same, peacefully, openly and continuously without interruption for that length of time. On February 15, 1940, Fermin Bocobo, in a Deed of Absolute Sale (exh. B), sold to Villaflor, a parcel of agricultural land, containing an area of 18 hectares, more or less, and particularly described and bounded as follows: A certain parcel of agricultural land planted with abaca with visible part marking the corners and bounded on the North by the corners and bounded on the North by Public Land; on the East by Cirilo Piencenaves; on the South by Hermogenes Patete and West by Public Land, containing an area of 18 hectares more or less now under Tax Declaration No. 29451 in the name of Vicente Villaflor. The whole parcel of which this particular parcel is only a part is assessed as P22,550.00 for purposes of taxation under the above said Tax Declaration Number (Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Fermin Bocobo date Feb. 15, 1940). This document was annotated in Registry of Deeds on February 16, 1940). This deed states: That the above described property was before the sale of my own exclusive property, being inherited from my deceased parents, and my ownership to it and that of my

predecessors lasted more than

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