Policy Solutions for Canada

Addressing the Yemen Refugee Crisis

The Intergovernmental Team for a Canadian Refugee Strategic Response Plan for the Yemen Humanitarian Crisis

Citlali Cruz: ADM, Ministry of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship

Denby McDonnell: ADM, Ministry of Finance

Heather Park: ADM, Ministry of Innovation, Science, & Economic Development

Guilherme Rosales: ADM, Ministry of Innovation, Science & Economic Development

The Policy Team

Context in Yemen

3 million forcefully displaced

15 million on brink of starvation

1.1 million with cholera

Worst humanitarian crisis

Risk of Inaction

Short-Term

Backlog and process issue reduces:

- Acceptance of refugees- Accessible services for

refugees

Long-Term

Lack of effective resettlement services negatively impacts:

- Canadian public perception of newcomers

- Canada’s ability to act as leader in global humanitarian efforts

Canada’s limited administrative capacity inhibits effective and timely resettlement of Yemeni refugees fleeing from a humanitarian crisis

The Challenge

Short-Term

Lack of efficiency in Canada’s refugee processing system

Long-Term

Absence of resettlement plan for

refugees in crisis

25,000 Syrian refugees arrived to Canada between Nov. 2015 and Mar. 2016

Key Takeaways

- Lack of sufficient planning to effectively deliver settlement services

- Insufficient intergovernmental & service provider coordination

- Communication gaps & lack of information

Lessons Learned from Syria

FinanceTime Social Impact

Criteria

Restructure Procedure

Renew Resettlement

Policy 1A: Address the BacklogPolicy 1B: Incremental Acceptance

Policy 2A: Increase Private Sponsorship Policy 2B: Economic Integration (Housing, Language, Employment)

Strategic Response Program

Policy 1A: Address the Backlog

Delayed hearings

Wait-time for privately sponsored refugees

Required hearing for refused applications only

1

Prioritize “express entry” for skilled new inland refugee claims

2

Ease verification of refugee status

3

1A

Policy 1A: Backlog Alternatives

Continue current hearings system

Continue current requirements for

privately- sponsored refugees

Increase employees in

Canadian government

agencies

Time

Social Impact

Finance

1A

Policy 1B: Incremental Acceptance

Incremental acceptance of Yemeni refugees to facilitate preparedness, monitoring, and action

Strengths

- Addresses coordination and information flows

- Short and long term strategy- Prepares for future

emergencies

Weaknesses

- Requires 3 months - Requires monitoring

1B

Policy 1B: Incremental Acceptance

Short-Term

25 000 refugees- 3rd month: 12 500- 6th month: 7 500- 9th month: 5000

Long-Term

- Strategic Initiative to be deployed for future refugee waves

- Online platform - Address backlog

1B

Policy 1B: Alternatives to Incremental Acceptance

Time

Social Impact

Finance

Lump acceptance of

Yemeni refugees

Develop online platform to

improve coordination

Increase funding to IRCC

1B

Restructure Procedure

Renew Resettlement

Policy 1A: Address the BacklogPolicy 1B: Incremental Acceptance

Policy 2A: Increase Private Sponsorship Policy 2B: Economic Integration (Housing, Language, Employment)

Strategic Response Program

Increase private sponsorship to 12,500 refugees through charitable tax credit incentive and enhanced advertisement

2A

Policy 2A: Private Sponsorship

Strengths

- Economically feasible- Stronger public-private

partnerships - Improve community

integration

Weaknesses

- Limited oversight

Relax information verification

Simplify application

process

Increased funding for program

2A

Policy 2A: Private Sponsorship Alternatives

Time

Social Impact

Finance

Construct modular housing communities on public lands

Policy 2B: Economic Integration - Regional Housing

2B

Strengths

- Timely construction - Job creation - Not infringe on affordable

housing market- Permanent address- Cost effective

Weaknesses

- Public perception of modular housing

- Availability of public land in different regions

Blended learning program

Policy 2B: Economic Integration - Language Learning

2B

Strengths

- Reduce strain on in-person resources

- Portability - Increase accessibility - Limit infrastructural

constraints

Weaknesses

- Comprehension of online delivery

Promotion of newcomer coding program access

Policy 2B: Economic Integration - Expanding Employment

2B

Strengths

- Minimize language barriers

- Fill existing job gaps- Utilize human capital - Accessible by all

Canadians

Weaknesses

- Transferability of skills

Housing Language Learning Employment

Cruise ship Increase resources for existing program

Improve transferability of formal qualifications

Hotel/ P.O. boxes

1 year access starts when begin accessing resource

Consultant service to access more welfare

2B

Policy 2B: Economic Integration Alternatives

Time

Social Impact

Finance

Cost-Benefit

Policy 2A

Cost

12,500 Privately sponsored $19 million

12,500 Government Assisted $150 million

Tax rebate on private sponsorship $20 million

BenefitPrivate Sponsor Cost

$132 million

Net Cost $57 million

Cost-Benefit

Policy 2B

Cost Modular Housing investment based on recent construction in Vancouver for 12,500 people

$687 million

Benefit Hotel room cost for 12,500 people based on 3-person per room in Vancouver

$400 million

Net Cost $287 million and benefit of long-term housing supply investment

Public Opinion and Political Risk

Majority of Canadians do not believe there is “too much immigration”

Widespread positive sentiment towards refugees in BC

Top 3 important issues: economy, environment, health care

Perceived “legitimacy” of refugees shapes public opinion

Provincial strategy, federally financed

- Clarify distinction between economic migrants and humanitarian crisis migrants

Communications Strategy

Restructure Procedure

Renew Resettlement

Policy 1A: Address the BacklogPolicy 1B: Incremental Acceptance

Policy 2A: Increase Private Sponsorship Policy 2B: Economic Integration (Housing, Language, Employment)

Strategic Response Program

Appendix

ReferencesIRCC (2016) Rapid Impact Evaluation of the Syrian Refugee Initiative. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/evaluation/pdf/evaluation-syrian-refugee-initiative.pdf IRCC (2018) Supplementary Information 2018-2020 Immigration Levels Plan. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/notices/supplementary-immigration-levels-2018.html IRCC How Canada’s refugee system works. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/canada-role.html The Conference Board of Canada (2017). 450,000 Immigrants Annually? Integration is Imperative to Growth. Retrieved from https://www.conferenceboard.ca/nic/default.aspx Robert Vineberg (2019). Canada’s Refugee Strategy: How It Can Be Improved. School of Public Policy Calgary. Retrieved from https://www.cgai.ca/canada_s_refugee_strategy_how_it_can_be_improved IRCC (2018) How we process privately sponsored refugee applications. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/help-outside-canada/private-sponsorship-program/how-we-process-applications.html IRCC (2017) Internal Audit of Operation Syrian Refugees Identification and Processing. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/reports-statistics/audits/operation-syrian-refugees-identification-processing.html Planigale Mark (2018). “PLANNING BETTER OUTCOMES FOR REFUGEES” retrieved from http://www.lirata.com/index.php/news/66-planning-better-outcomes-for-refugees UNHCR (2018) Improving the collaboration between humanitarian actors and the tech industry. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/app-best-way-help-refugees-improving-collaboration-humanitarian-actors-tech-industry/ Entisar Almasri (2018). Emergency Preparedness and Contingency Planning. Retrieve from https://sswm.info/humanitarian-crises/rural-settings/planning-process-tools/preparedness-immediate-response/emergency-preparedness-and-contingency-planning

ReferencesInnovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (2018). Innovation for a better Canada. Retrieved from http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/062.nsf/eng/h_00051.html IRCC (2018). Canada’s Immigration Plan for 2019–2021. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/annual-report-parliament-immigration-2018/report.html#plan Government of Canada. Charitable Donation Tax Credit Rateshttps://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/charities-giving/giving-charity-information-donors/claiming-charitable-tax-credits/charitable-donation-tax-credit-rates.html Friesen, Chris.15 February, 2019. Personal Interview. Director of ISSBC. UNHCR. Yemen Crisis. Retrieved from https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/yemen/ Government of Canada. (July, 2016) Evaluation of Resettlement Programs. Retrieved fromhttps://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/reports-statistics/evaluations/resettlement-programs.html#toc1-1 ISS of BC.(2016) ISS of BC Report Operation Syrian Refugees. Retrieved fromhttps://issbc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ISSofBC-Report-Operation-Syrian-Refugees-to-BC-Taking-Stock-Two-Years-After-Arrival.pdf Perkins Martha. (October 25, 2017) Average Hotel Night in Vancouver is $260; Airbnb is $150. Vancouver Courier. Retrieved fromhttps://www.vancourier.com/news/average-hotel-night-in-vancouver-is-260-airbnb-is-150-1.23074536City of Vancouver. Temporary Modular Housing. Retrieved fromhttps://vancouver.ca/people-programs/temporary-modular-housing.aspxImmigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada. Destination Communities Map. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/welcome-syrian-refugees/destination-communities-map.htmlHamin Zhang. (2014) Immigration and Crime: Evidence from Canada. Retrieved from http://www.clsrn.econ.ubc.ca/workingpapers/CLSRN%20Working%20Paper%20no.%20135%20-%20Abstract.pdfJohn K. Allard. (2018). How Are Crime & Immigration Linked in Canada. ImmiGroup. Retrieved from https://www.immigroup.com/news/does-immigration-cause-more-crimeBen Mason. (2018). Tech Jobs for Refugees: Assessing the Potential of Coding Schools for Refugee Integration in Germany. Retrieved from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/tech-jobs-coding-schools-refugee-integration-germany

Keith G. Banting. (2010). Is There a Progressive’s Dilemma in Canada? Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State. Retrieved from http://post.queensu.ca/~bantingk/Progressive's_Dilemma.pdfTeresa Wright. (2018). Canadians not confident that government can manage border crossings regulating asylum seeker entry: survey. Retrieved from https://nationalpost.com/news/government-closely-watching-public-opinion-on-asylum-seekers-documents-showKeith Neuman. (2018). Focus Canada Fall 2018 - Canadian public opinion on immigration, refugees and the USA. Retrieved from https://www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/focus-canada-fall-2018---canadian-public-opinion-on-immigration-refugees-and-the-usaNicholas A. Valentino. (2017). Economic and Cultural Drivers of Immigrant Support Worldwide. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/economic-and-cultural-drivers-of-immigrant-support-worldwide/02BBCF09B063FCD0C252B6D78E748DE8

References

Total average cost for Refugee Assistance Program (RAP) client for one year: $10,573.00

Total cost per application decision:

Government Assisted Refugees (GARs): $1388.75

Private Sponsored Refugees (PSRs): $1544.50

Policy 2A : Cost Benefit Analysis

Policy 1A: Addressing the backlog

Backlog 47,451 claims in-land asylum claims in different province

20 000 Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, UAE, Turkey

Problem Delays in hearings Waiting time for sponsored refugees

Required regulatory changes

- Reduce hearings to only refused applications

- Allow IRCC do the hearings

Limit Refugee status process

Benefits Reduces period of services provision for refused claimants

Incentives for private sponsors

By gradually eliminating the backlogs, successful applicants will take part of the settlement proposed policies

Resettlement

Settlement & Integration

Return Home or Canadian Citizenship

3 Phases of Refugee Resettlement

Gender Profile: GARs male 50%; PSRs male 54%, BVOR male 52%

Overall admissions: 26,466 GARs (53%), 22,737 PSRs (46%) and 313 BVOR refugees (1%).

Proportion of Adults: GAR 61%, PSR 70%, BVOR refugees 69%

Knowledge of Official Language: GAR 26%, PSR 38%, BVOR refugees 14%

Education: GAR 61%, PSR 48%, BVOR refugees 54%

Country of Origin: GAR: Iraq, Bhutan, Somalia; PSRs: Iraq, Eritrea, Ethiopia and BVOR refugees: Myanmar, Eritrea, Iran

Case Composition (% of single adults): GAR 47%, PSR 57%, BVOR refugees 56%

Family Composition: PSRs and BVOR refugees, more commonly arrived as a single adult as compared to GARs (57%, 56%, and 47%, respectively

Refugee Assistance Program Characteristics - Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada

Legal framework

● United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees ● Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees● The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ● The Safe Third Country Agreement (2004)● The agreement prevents people who first enter one country from applying

for asylum or refugee status in the other. Exceptions:1. Refugee claimants who have a family member in Canada; 2. Unaccompanied minors under the age of 18; 3. Individuals holding a valid Canadian visa; and 4. Those who have been charged with or convicted of an offence that could subject them to the death penalty in the U.S.

Previous policies

Immigration Act 1976

•Refugees still had to demonstrate that they would “be able to become successfully established in Canada”.

•This approach was criticized by other refugee receiving countries as “skimming the cream off the milk” rather than providing asylum to the most needy.

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and Regulations in 2002

•officers are still supposed to assess the ability to settle successfully, the criteria are much less stringent and the timeline for establishment is now three to five years

Balanced Refugee Reform Act 2010

•Every claimant has a hearing

•Supposed to solve in 60 days

•Advocates consider impossible to prepare a case in that timeframe

Canada’s Current Targets

Canada’s Immigration Plan for 2019–2021, the Refugees target is:● By 2019 58,500 ● By 2020 61,500● By 2021 64,500

Innovation and Skills Plan:Canada will increase the number of new permanent resident admissions in Canada to 340,000 by 2020, including 195,800 economic class admissions.

● 24% of the population is going to be over the age of 65 by 2040○ 65% of the Refugees are less than 29

● Refugees have the lowest contribution to the GDP. Worth consider:○ Age relates to adaptability ○ Contribution of 2nd generation immigrants

Impact evaluation of the Syrian Refugees (2016) 1/2

According to the 2016 Rapid Impact Evaluation (Dec. 2016):

GAR’s PSR’s

Language 83% no English or FrenchReported:

· Lack of availability· Lack of children spaces

79% higher knowledge of English

Employment 10% employed 50% employed

Education 81.3% secondary or less 44% above secondary education

Family size 56.5% 4 to 6 members 48% single

Impact evaluation of the Syrian Refugees (2016) 2/2

Compared with previous resettled Refugees:

● Syrian GAR’s are less educated ● Syrian refugees had less access to employment services and had gained less knowledge and skills

Early Resettlement and Settlement outcomes:

● Overall happy in Canada● PSR’s indicated more satisfaction of immediate needs● Lack of consistency in delivery of orientation, temporary accommodation, reception. Among others● Lack of enrollment in language training

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) considered it a success

Assessment of the 2015-2016 Syrian Refugee Initiative:

Between Nov 2015 and March 2016 25,000 Syrian Refugees arrived to Canada.

Current In-land claim process

Current resettlement refugee process