addressing integrated coordination in food security crises: four case studies

8/3/2019 Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises: Four Case Studies

1/38

Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 1

Addressing Integrated Coordination

in Food Security Crises:

Four Case Studies

Daniel Maxwell and John Parker


2/38

Table of Contents

Acronyms3

IntroductiontotheCaseStudies 5

Haiti 6

Pakistan 13

Kenya 21

CtedIvoire 29

Reerences 34

222

CoverphotographbyTheCGIARResearchProgramonClimateChange,Agricultureand

FoodSecurity(http://wwwfickrcom/photos/cgiarclimate/6149769051/)

2


3/38

Acronyms

ACF ActionContrelaFaim(ActionAgainstHunger)

ALRMP AridLandsResourceManagementProject

CERF CentralEmergencyResponseFund

CFS CommitteeonWorldFoodSecurity

CNSA CoordinationNationaledelaScuritAlimentaire

(NationalCoordinationorFoodSecurityinHaiti)

CRC CrisisResponseCenter

CWGER ClusterWorkingGrouponEarlyRecovery

DCO DistrictCoordinatingOcer

EFSA EmergencyFoodSecurityAssessment

EHAP EmergencyHumanitar ianActionPlan

ERC EmergencyRelieCoordinator

FAC FoodAidConvention

FAO FoodandAgricultureOrganization

FATA FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas

FEWSNET FamineEarlyWarningSystemsNetwork

M&E MonitoringandEvaluation

GFSC GlobalFoodSecurityCluster

GOH GovernmentoHaiti

GOP GovernmentoPakistan

HC HumanitarianCoordinator

HRR HumanitarianResponseReview

IASC Inter-AgencyStandingCommittee

IDP InternallyDisplacedPerson

IFRC InternationalFederationoRedCrossandRed

CrescentSocieties

333333


4/38

Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises

Maxwell&Parker

4

INGO InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganization

IOM InternationalOrganizationorMigration

IPC IntegratedFoodSecurityPhaseClassication

KFSM KenyaFoodSecurityMeeting

KFSSG KenyaFoodSecurityMeeting/SteeringGroup

KHPF KenyaHumanitarianPartnershipForum

KRCS KenyaRedCrossSociety

MCRAM Multi-ClusterRapidAssessmentMission

MINUSTAH UnitedNationsStabilizationMissioninHaiti

MT MetricTon

NDMA NationalDisasterManagementAuthority

OCHA OceortheCoordinationoHumanitarianAairs

OHCHR OceotheHighCommissionerorHumanRights

SAM SevereAcuteMalnutrition

SIDA SwedishInternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency

UNDAC UnitedNationsDisasterAssessmentandCoordination

UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram

UNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerorReugees

UNICEF UnitedNationsChildrensFund

USAID UnitedStatesAgencyorInternationalDevelopment

WASH Water,Sanitation,andHygiene

WFP WorldFoodProgram

WHO WorldHealthOrganization


5/38


Maxwell&Parker

5

Introduction to the Case Studies

TheollowingcasestudieswerebasedondocumentaryreviewandinterviewswithkeyinormantsinourcountriesTheyarenotabout

theactivitiesotheglobalFoodSecurityClusterperse,becausemost

othecasespredatethelaunchotheglobalclusterRather,thecases

explore a rangeo issues relatedtocoordination, aroundthe back-

groundtotheormationothecluster,andtheplethoraoissuesthat

ariseonthegroundinaoodsecuritycrisis

Asaresult,thecasestudieshighlightsomeissuesthatdirectlyrelate

totheoperationoclustersatthecountrylevel,andsomethatrelateto

clusterleadagencyresponsesandclustermemberresponsesThesearedierentromtheactualactionsotheglobalFSCitsel,buthighlight

thekindsoissuesonthegroundthattheglobalFSCwillhavetoei-

theraddressdirectly,orprovideguidancetocountryclustersattempt-

ingtoaddressthemThepurposeothecasestudiesisthereoreto

highlighttheseissuesassomeothechallengesacingtheglobalFSC

andtodrawattentiontosomeothelearningromthesecontextsthat

theglobalFSCcanbeinstrumentalintransmittingtoothercontexts

Thecasesgiveaquickoverviewothecrisis,thebackground,the

oodsecurityimpactsothecrisis,theresponse,coordinationissues,andlessonslearnedromtheexperienceThecoordinationissuesaris-

ingandthelessonslearnedweretheprimarydataortheanalysisin

therstpaperontherole,mandate,andchallengesotheglobalFood

SecurityCluster


6/38


7/38

77

andtheoustingotheprimeministerTocontrolinstability,theHai-

tiangovernmentanddonorcommunityrespondedbyimplementing

aricesubsidyprogram1andprovidingemergencyoodaidassistance

andshort-termemploymentprograms(SeelkeandHornbeck2008,AriasandCarneus2010)

OntheheelsoHaitisoodpricecrisis,threetropicalstormsand

onehurricanehitbetweenAugustandSeptember2008,causingover

700deathsandaectingover800,000peopleinnineoitstenregions

(Boutroue2008)InAugust2008,theclusterapproachwasrolledout

or the rst time inHaiti tocoordinate the humanitarian response

to the stormsThe ood responsewas coordinated by two separate

clusters:theFoodAidCluster,ledbyWFP,andtheAgricultureClus-

ter,ledbyFAOTheoodaidresponseinvolveddistributingoodtomorethan500,000beneciaries(Boutroue2008)WhiletheFoodAid

Clusterwasacedwithchallengesrelatedtoooddistributioninthe

urbansettingoGonaives,includinghighlevelsoviolence,longwait-

inglines,thepoliticizationooodaidorlocalelectioncampaigns,and

theexistenceoaparalleloodaidcoordinationsystemledbyUSAID,

theclusterwasconsideredwellorganizedandcommitted(Binderand

Grunewald2010)Theagricultureresponsetothestormsmainlyin-

volvedthedistributionoseedsandtoolstoaectedruralhouseholds

(Boutroue2008)ActivitiesintheAgricultureClusterwerenotveryeective,inpartbecauseohumanresourceissuesandinpartbecause

theglobalAgricultureClusterprovidedminimalsupportandguidance

(BinderandGrunewald2010)

In2009, theood security situation inHaiti improvedAmilder

hurricaneseasonandmoreevenlydistributedrainallcontributedto

betterharvests,whichhelpedtoincreasetheavailabilityolocalprod-

uctsinmarketsandloweroodprices(FEWSNET2009)

Food Security Impacts

Therelativeimprovementsinoodsecuritywereshort-lived,how-

ever,astheJanuary12,2010,earthquakecausedimmediateandse-

vereoodsecurityimpactsinbothearthquake-aectedareasandthe

countrysideInthedaysollowing,accesstooodandwaterbecame

particularlydicultinaectedareasThedestructionovitalinra-

structure,includingroads,bridgesandoodstorageacilities,aswellas

ashortageogasandvehiclesortransportation,shutdownoodsup-

plychainsTheearthquakedestroyedHaitismajorport,whichtem-

1 Thericesubsidyprogramwasdesigned tomaintain the sellingpriceromrice

importerstodistributorsatUS$43per50kgbag(AriasandCarneus2010)


8/38


Maxwell&Parker

8

porarily halted ood import anddistribution systems (FoodCluster

2010)Thelossoproductiveassetsandincome-generatingactivities

deterioratedhouseholdpurchasingpower

Therewas an immediate sharp rise in staple ood prices shortlyatertheearthquakeandbytheendoJanuarythepriceowheat

fourhadrisenbynearly70percent,localmaizeandblackbeansby

3035percent,andimportedriceby2030percent(CNSA2010)

Priceseventuallybegantostabilizeaterthewidespreaddistribution

oemergency ood aid (FEWSNET 2010)Anestimated 598,000

peopleletareasaectedbytheearthquakeorthecountryside,which

increasedtheburdenonregionsthatwerealreadyoodinsecureand

environmentallydegradedandcausedsomehosthouseholdstoresort

toextremecopingmechanisms(FAO2010,CNSA2010,GrunewaldandRenaudin2010)ArapidEmergencyFoodSecurityAssessment

(EFSA)carriedoutbytheCoordinationNationaledelaScuritAli-

mentaire (CNSA), in coordinationwithACF,Oxam, FEWSNET,

FAOandWFP,identiedatotalo1,280,000ood-insecurepeople

inaectedareas,theequivalento52percentohouseholdssurveyed

(CNSA2010)

The Response

The rst responders to the earthquakemainly consisted o local

civil society, but within 24 hours, UNDAC and urban search and

rescueteamsarrivedinPort-au-Prince,ollowedshortlybytheUS

military,otherUNagencies,andalargeinfuxointernationalNGOs

(GrunewaldandBinder2010)Withinthersttwodays,thecluster

systemwasactivatedandvekeyclustersweremobilized,including

theFoodClusterWhile thequickmobilizationo theresponsehas

been applauded, theinitial ooddistributionsoready-to-eatmeals,

deliveredromthebackotrucksorairdroppedromhelicoptersorparachute,were criticizedasbeingpoorlyplannedandcoordinated

whilepotentiallyendangeringbeneciaries (GrunewaldandBinder

2010,GrunewaldandRenaudin2010)Oncethegeneralooddis-

tributionsystemwas set up, theUNStabilizationMission inHaiti

(MINUSTAH)andUSmilitary subsequentlyplayeda largerrolein

providinglogisticalsupportThegoalothegeneralooddistributions

wastomeetimmediateneedsbyprovidingready-to-eatmeals,rice,

andulloodrations(IASC2010)Inadditiontogeneraldistributions,

targetedoodassistancewasprovidedinhospitalsandorphanagesandthroughmobiledistributionsandcommunitykitchens(IASC2010)

At the endoMarch, theHaitiangovernment called or general

ooddistributionstocease,duetotheirperceivednegativeimpacton


9/38


Maxwell&Parker

9

Haitisagriculturaleconomyandlocalmarkets(Atkisson2010,IASC

2010)MembersotheFoodClusterhad someconcern aboutthis

decisionduetouncertaintiesabouttheavailabilityolocalproductsin

marketsandtheabilityoHaitianstoaccessthemduetohigherprices(FoodCluster2010)BytheendoMarch,anestimatedourmillion

peoplehadreceivedoodaidAterooddistributionswerephasedout

attherequestotheHaitiangovernment,thetransitiontootherood-

relatedinterventionswasdelayed,resultinginatwoorthreemonth

gapbetweeninterventionsThistransitiongapwasnotduetoalacko

resources,butmainlytoinadequateplanning(Interview2011)

Theagricultureresponse involvedmainly theprovisiono seeds,

toolsandertilizer,butalsosupportedpreparednessactivities,includ-

ing cash-or work activities related towatershedmanagement andreorestation(IASC2010)TheAgricultureCluster,ledbyFAO,su-

eredromlimitedundingandtheundingitdidreceivewasdelayed

(Chan2010,GrunewaldandBinder2010)BytheendoFebruary,

theundingorAgricultureClusteractivitieshadonlyreceived8per-

centoitsrequest,makingitdicultorclusterpartnerstorellseed

stocks intimeor the plantingseason (Chan2010,Grunewald and

Binder2010)TheEarlyRecoveryCluster,ledbyUNDP,coordinated

cash-or-workprogramsandemployedapproximately200,000people

(IASC2010)Negativesideeectsothecash-or-workprogramswereuniormsthatbeneciarieswererequiredtoweartodistinguishdi-

erentcash-or-workprogramsTheuniormswereotencolor-coded

orbrandedwithNGOlogosandhavebeencriticizedorstigmatizing

beneciaries and undermining government legitimacy (Grunewald

andBinder2010)

Coordination Issues

Benetingromtheexperienceothe2008hurricaneresponse,theclustersysteminHaitiwasquicklymobilizedatertheearthquakeand

activatedve key clusters (Food,WASH,Health, ShelterandNon-

FoodItems,andLogistics)Whiletherapidset-uphelpedtomobilize

undingandstaorthesespecicclusters,itdidnotleadtooverall

improvedstrategicclusterleadershipandmoretimelyresults(Ren-

coretetal2010,GrunewaldandBinder2010)(Notethatagriculture

wasnotoneotheveclustersactivatedintheinitialresponse)The

cluster systemwasparticularlychallengedby the infuxo interna-

tionalNGOsarrivinginHaiti,manyowhichhadlimitedcapacityand littleunderstandingo the local context (Rencoretet al 2010,

GrunewaldandBinder2010)ThemassivenumberoNGOs,many

whicharrivedwithpre-determinedplansoaction,madecoordina-


10/38


Maxwell&Parker

10

tion extremelydicult (Stumpenhorst et al 2011)To adapt, some

clusterscreatedbabyclustersbyseparatingclusterunctionsintotwo

groups:ageneralinormation-sharinggroupopentoallactorsanda

strategy-developmentortechnical-guidancegroupwherekeyclustermembersdiscussedstrategyThisapproachwasidentiedasamoree-

ectivewayorcoordinatingactivitiesinahumanitariansettingwitha

largevolumeoactors(GrunewaldandBinder2010)

Theclustersystemdidnotsucientlycoordinatewithnationaland

localauthorities,generallyexcludedHaitiancivilsociety,andailedto

utilizelocalknowledgeIngeneral,governmentministrieswerenot

adequatelysupportedandrecognizedandparalleloperationalstruc-

tureswereotenestablished(IASC2010)Theabruptcalloranend

togeneralooddistributionsinMarchbytheHaitiangovernmentandPresidentRenPrval(whoeltthatlarge-scaleoodaidwasnegative-

lyaectingHaitianarmersandlocalmarkets)underscoresthelimited

interactionbetweenthegovernmentandinternationalhumanitarian

communityandhighlightstheirdierencesoopinionaboutthena-

tureotheresponse

Clustermeetingsheld at theLogisticsBasewere inaccessibleor

mostHaitians; the majority omeetings were held in English and

while some clusterstaspokeFrench, ewwere able tocommuni-

cateinCreole(Bolton2011,GrunewaldandBinder2010,Interview2011)EnteringLogBaseandgainingaccesstoclustermeetingsre-

quiredaliationwithaninternationalorganization,whicheectively

preventedmanycommunityleadersromparticipating(Heinzelman

andWaters2010)Commentingon thechallengesogainingaccess

toclustermeetings,oneHaitiancivilsocietyleadernoted,Evenor

myselIamconnected,Ihaveriendsinthosecircles,IhaveaUN

badgeIhaveincrediblechallengesaccessingtheclustersystemWhen

IwouldhavetogotoLogBaseitwaslikegoingabroadortherst

timeYouhavepeople,thekeypeopleinthesectorswhocantevengetintothemeetings(Interview2011)

Humanitarian responses were oten not coordinated with local

communitiesThiswasevidentintheoodaidresponse,asooddis-

tributionswereotencarriedoutinaectedcommunitieswithlittle

advancewarning(GrunewaldandBinder2010)Theclustersystem

hadchallengesutilizinglocalknowledge,ashighlightedbyUshahidis

crisismappingeort,avolunteereortthatmappedreal-timeneeds

orsearchandrescuethroughcrowd-sourcedinormation,relying

onweb-basedsocialmediaandmobilephonesUshahidiseortstointegratelocalknowledgeinto theclustersystems traditional-inor-

mationsharingactivitieswerestifedbytheclustersystemsinabilityto

aggregateinormationcomingromoutsidesourcesanddependence


11/38


Maxwell&Parker

11

oninormationromormalneedsassessments(HeinzelmanandWa-

ters2010)Thisproblemwasnotuniquetooutsideinormation, as

inormationsharingandmanagementwasweakacrossmanyothe

clusters,especiallyduringtheearlystagesotheresponse(IASC2010)Major challenges or cluster coordinationand inormationman-

agementwere high sta turn-over and varying levels o leadership

capacity,particularlyamongclustercoordinatorsWhiletheinterna-

tionalhumanitariancommunitydemonstratedastrongsurgecapacity

inHaiti,deployingmorethan400statoHaitiinJanuaryalone,ew

stayedlongerthanaewweeksandaninsucientnumberweresenior

andqualied(IASC2010,GrunewaldandBinder2010,Rencoretet

al2010)Theinexperienceomanyclustercoordinatorspresenteda

challengeorclusterleadershipAnevaluationotheNutritionClusteroundthattheclusterapproachwasnotullyunderstoodintheearly

stagesotheemergencybysomeotheHQ,regionalorcountrysta

(DolanandVervers2010,p6)Thisexperiencewasnotuniquetothe

NutritionCluster,butwasageneralissueacrossclusters(Interview

2011)

Despitetheseconstraints,clustermembersgenerallyvaluedcluster

coordinationasanimportantmechanismorexchanginginormation

andnetworkingwithotherhumanitarianorganizations (Grunewald

andBinder2010)Theclustersystemalsohelpedacilitatecloseco-ordinationwithinternationaldonors,enablingstrategiestobeshared

andadaptedThebenetsocloseclustercoordinationwithdonors

werehighlightedintheFoodCluster,whenUSAIDanditspartners

endedtheparalleloodaidcoordinationsystemthatexistedpriorto

theearthquakeandbegancoordinatingitsoodaidactivitieswiththe

clusterThepreviousparalleloodaidsysteminHaiticreatedprogram-

mingoverlapandduplications,asoneoodaidcoordinationsystem

was ledbyWFPandanotherbyUSAID, butwhereonlyUSAID-

undedagencieswouldmeet(GrunewaldandBinder2010)

Lessons Learned

The large inux of NGOs challenged cluster coordination.Thesheer

volumeoNGOsarrivinginHaiti,manyowhichwereinexperi-

encedinhumanitarianresponse,createdseriouschallengesorcoordi-

nationThecreationobabyclustersbyseparatingclusterunctions

intogeneralinormationsharingmeetings(involvingallclusteractors)

andstrategicadvisorymeetings(involvingonlytheclusterleadagencyandkeyclustermembers)hasbeenidentiedasagoodpracticeThe


12/38


Maxwell&Parker

12

globalFSCiswellplacedtosharethesegoodpracticeswithcountry-

levelclustersinsituationswhenclustersareacedwithalargeinfux

oactors

The cluster system did not adequately include local actors. TheclustersysteminHaitididnotsucientlycoordinatewithnational

andlocalauthoritiesandlargelyexcludedHaitiancivilsocietyAnd

itcouldnt absorb inormation rom local actors, evenwhen itwas

availablethroughplatormslikeUshahidiThisledtothecreationo

parallelcoordinationandoperationalstructures,poorcommunication

withbeneciaries,andinsucientintegrationolocalknowledgeand

inormation

Staff turnover and weak leadership constrained coordination and re-

sponse. Rapid turnoverandvarying levelso leadershipcapacityoclustersta,especiallyamongclustercoordinators,hamperedcoordi-

nationeorts,aectedthecontinuityooperations,andledtorein-

ventingthewheelInadditiontoclusterleadagencies,globalclusters

playanimportantroleinhelpingtominimizestaturnoverandacili-

tatingsmoothtransitionsbetweenclustercoordinators

Transition from food aid to other food security responses was delayed

due to inadequate planning and limited exibility. AtertheHaitian

governmentrequestedanendtogeneralooddistributions,therewas

a twoor threemonthdelay in startingup other ood security in-terventionsThe ood security responsewasnotsucientlyfexible

torespondtochangesinthepost-crisisdynamicandtheAgriculture

ClusterandEarlyRecoveryClusterwerenotinapositiontotakeover

andacilitatethetransitiontodierenttypesoresponses


13/38


Maxwell&Parker

13

Pakistan

InlateJuly2010,heavymonsoonrainsinnorthwestPakistantrig-geredlandslidesandfashfoodsintheprovincesoBalochistan,Khy-

ber Pakhtunkhwa, the FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas (FATA),

andPunjabAsintenserainallpersistedintoAugust,thefoodwaters

fowedsouthintoPakistanssouthernprovinces,breachingleveeson

thebanksotheIndusRiverinSindhProvinceandsubmergingentire

villagesalongthewayUltimately,thefoodscausedanestimated$65

billionworthodamageanddirectlyaectedover20millionpeople,

whichamountedtomorethanthecombinednumberopeoplea-

ectedbythe2005Kashmirearthquake,2010Haitiearthquake,and2004IndianOceantsunami(UnitedNations2011,Kronstadtetal

2010,Fair2011)Uponseeingthedevastationletinthewakeothe

foods,UNSecretaryGeneralBan-KiMoondescribedthedisasteras

aslow-motiontsunami(UnitedNations2011)

Background

Priortothe2010foods,theoodsecuritysituationinPakistanhad

beensteadilydeterioratingandcausingconcernduetothecumulativeeects o a seriesonatural, political, socio-economic, and security

crisesThemultipleshocksotheKashmirearthquakeo2005,the

2007foodsandCycloneYemyin,thecounter-insurgencycampaign

andescalatinginternalandregionalconfictandinstability,theassas-

sinationoBhenazirBhutto,risingoodanduelprices,andincreas-

ingpovertyandunemploymenthadadevastatingimpactonPakistans

levelsooodinsecurity(SDPI/WFP2009,KugelmanandHathaway

2010)From2003to2009,oodinsecuredistrictsinPakistanincreased

rom45percentto61percent(SDPI/WFP2009)ThedeteriorationooodsecurityinPakistanmirroredthecountrysworseningnutri-

tioncrisis,asthenumberomalnourishedPakistanisalmostdoubled

overatenyearperiod,romanestimated24millionin1997to45

millionin2008(BengaliandJury2010)

Although Pakistan had a bumperwheatharvest in200607 and

nearly5percentgrowthinagriculturaloutputin200809,agricul-

turalproductionvariedsignicantlybetweendistrictsduetoadverse

weatherconditionsandtheeectsoarmedconfict,resultinginlo-

calizedooddecitsinmanyoPakistansmostood-insecuredistricts(Suleri2009)HoardingandsmugglingowheattoAghanistan,com-

binedwiththe riseinoodpricesglobally, broughtaboutthenear

doublingowheatandwheatfourpricesinPakistanduring200708,


14/38


Maxwell&Parker

14

leadingtocivilunrestandriotsthroughoutthecountry(Suleri2009,

KugelmanandHathaway 2010)Meanwhile, rising uel pricestrig-

gereda150300percentincreaseinthecostoertilizerin2008,mak-

ingitunattainableormanyarmers,especiallysmallholders(Kugel-manandHathaway2010)

Manyothedistrictsmostaectedbythe2010foodswerealready

particularly vulnerableThe provinces with the greatest percentage

ooodinsecurepeoplein2009theFederallyAdministeredTribal

Areas(FATA)(677percent),Balochistan(612percent)andKhyber

Pakhtunkhwa(562percent)coincidewithareasthatwereseverely

impactedby the 2010foods (SDPI/WFP 2009) InKhyberPakh-

tunkhwa,Balochistan,andSindh,manyhouseholdswerestillrecover-

ingromthedevastationothe2007foods,whichresultedinmorethan25millionpeopletemporarilydisplaced;420dead;88,000houses

destroyed;andcrops,livestockandinrastructureextensivelydamaged

Meanwhile, confict, violence, andpolitical instability have severely

disruptedlivesandlivelihoods,exempliedbythelarge-scaledisplace-

mento27millionpeopleinFATAin2009duetoconfictbetween

thePakistanimilitaryandTalibanmilitias(UDin2010,Malik2010)

TheUNclustersystemhadbeenactivatedthreetimespriortothe

2010foods:duringthe2005Kashmirearthquake,the2007foodsand

the2009displacementcrisisTheclustersystemwaslargelyperceivedtobesuccessulduringthehumanitarianresponsetothe2005earth-

quake,especiallyorthoseclustersthathaddirectsupportromthe

governmentoPakistan(GoP)andthePakistanimilitary(IASC2006)

Despite the overall success o the cluster system during the earth-

quakeresponse,severalgapswereidentied,includinganinadequate

understandingotheclusterapproachbythecountryteam,insu-

cientparticipationoNGOs,weakinter-clustercoordination,limited

supportorearlyrecovery,andoverlapbetweenclusterresponsibilities

andagencymandatesTheseresultedinclustersbeingdrivenasmuchbyagencyprioritiesasbyclusterresponsibilities(IASC2006, p 7)

Duringthe2007foods,however,theclustersystemgenerallyailed

toliveuptoitspost-earthquakeexpectationsduetotheverydierent

emergencycontext,thechallengesorespondinginconfict-aected

areas, disagreementswiththeGoPand thenewly-createdNational

DisasterManagementAuthority(NDMA)onthenumberoclusters

andthescaleotheinternationalhumanitarianresponse,andinsu-

cientlearningandimplementationolessonsromtheearthquake

(Young etal 2007)Theoverall response to the2009displacementwasgenerallyconsideredsuccessul;however,theclustersystemexpe-

riencedsomeothesameproblemsaspreviously,namelyoverlapping

clusterandagencyresponsibilities,poorleadershipandinadequateun-


15/38


Maxwell&Parker

15

derstandingo theclusterapproachamongclustercoordinators,and

thechallengesooperatinginaninsecureenvironment(Cosgraveetal

2010)Anadditionalchallengeacedbytheclustersystemduringthe

2009displacement(andalsoduringthe2010foods)wasthedualroleplayedbythegovernmentoPakistan,whichwasbothapartytothe

confictandproviderohumanitarianassistance,andwhosedecision-

makingwasoteninfuencedbypoliticalandmilitaryconsiderations

overhumanitarianneeds(Cosgraveetal2010)


With over 80 percent o households in food-aected areas de-

pendentonagricultureortheirlivelihoods,theimpactsothe2010foodsonoodsecuritywereparticularlydevastating(UnitedNations

2010)Thefoods,whichstruckattheoutsetothemonsoon(khari)

seasonharvest,destroyedanestimated33millionhectaresostand-

ingcrops,includingrice,maize,cotton,sugarcane,ruit,orchards,and

vegetablesProductionlossesodamagedcropsamountedtoapproxi-

mately133metrictons(MTs)Anestimated24millionhectareso

agriculturallandweredamaged,over15millionhectaresinPunjab

provincealoneOverhalamillionMTsowheatseedstocksusedor

thewinter(rabi)plantingseasonwerelostApproximately12millionlivestockandsixmillionpoultryperishedAgriculturalinrastructure

wasdestroyedthroughoutfood-aectedareas,especiallyroadsandir-

rigationsystems(FAO2010)

Manyhouseholdsandvillageswerecutorommarkets,severely

restrictingtheiraccesstooodstocksAccordingtotheMulti-Cluster

RapidAssessmentMechanism(MCRAM),some30percentosur-

veyedcommunitiesreportedthattheirnearestmarketwasnolonger

unctioningaterthefoods(IASC2010)Disruptionomarketsand

lossooodstockscausedasharpriseinpricesostapleooditems,rangingroma10percentincreaseinSindhProvincetoover80per-

centinonedistrictinKhyberPakhtunkhwa(WFP2010)

Householdsreportedusingadversecopingstrategies,includingshit-

ingtheirconsumptiontolesspreerredoods,skippingmeals,women

eatinglessthanmen,andincreasingborrowing(UnitedNations2010)

Widespreadmalnutritionwasexposedasacriticalproblematerthe

foods;however,highsevereacutemalnutrition(SAM)ratesaremore

likelyrepresentativeoPakistanslong-standingnutritioncrisis,rather

thantheimpactothefoodeventitsel


16/38


Maxwell&Parker

16

The Response

Therstrespondersconsistedmainlyothelocalpopulation,the

Pakistanimilitary,anddistrict-levelgovernmentsThemilitary,inco-ordinationwiththeNDMA,mobilizedquicklyandplayedacritical

roleintherst72hours,evacuatingpeopleandprovidingessential

reliesuppliesThemilitarys initial responsehasbeencreditedwith

havingpreventedlarge-scalelossolie(Pollastroetal2010,Houseo

Commons2011)Duetotheunprecedentedscaleothedisaster,the

GoPrequestedinternationalassistanceandbyearlyAugustthecluster

systemwasrolledoutAsduringthe2007foodresponse,theNDMA

requested thatthecluster systemprioritize lie-saving activities and

activateonlyourkeyclusters(ood,shelter,health,andWASH);how-ever,theUNoptedtorolloutallelevenclusters(Pollastroetal2010)

Whilethehumanitarianresponsehelpedtopreventalargedeath

toll,ithasbeendescribedaspatchyandreactive(HouseoCom-

mons2011,Pollastroetal2010)Supportotenarrivedtoolateand

inmanycasesresponseswerebasedonassumptionsandnotonac-

tualneeds(HouseoCommons2011)Theinternationalhumanitar-

ianresponseocusedmainlyonrelieinterventions,withoutsucient

support andplanning orearly recovery (Pollastroet al 2010)The

UKHouseoCommonsreviewothePakistanfoodresponseoundthatthequickestandmostorganizedresponseswereinthenorthern

provinces(HouseoCommons2011)Whilethisispartlyattributed

thefoodsrecedingearlierinthenorthernprovinces,theresponsein

theseprovinceswasalsostrengthenedbytheexistenceohumanitar-

ianresponsesystemsthatwereputinplacebytheGoPaterthe2005

earthquakeInareaswithlessdisasterpreparednessandlimitedexperi-

encerespondingtodisasters,suchasinSindh,thelocalresponseell

short(HouseoCommons2011,p8)

TheFoodClusterresponse,ledbyWFP,beganwithin24hoursotheonsetofooding,whenWFPinitiatedthedistributionoemer-

gencyoodassistanceBytheendoAugust,34,000metrictonso

oodaidhadbeendistributedtomorethan3millionpeopleDuring

September,oodaidbeneciariesincreasedto63millionandthen7

millioninOctoberAnestimated70percentooodaidbeneciaries

weresupportedbyWFP,whiletherestweresupportedbyotherFood

Clustermembers, includingNGOs, theGoPandPakistanimilitary

(UnitedNations2010)Withintherstsixmonthsothefooding,

membersotheFoodClusterhaddistributedanestimated500,000MTsooodWhileWFPwashighlysuccessulatdeliveringoodin


17/38


Maxwell&Parker

17

anextremelychallengingenvironment,nosystemswere inplace to

inormthemaboutwhoultimatelyreceivedthe oodor its impact

(Interview2011)

InSeptember,theFood,Health,NutritionandWASHClustersde-velopedajointresponsestrategy,knownastheSurvivalStrategy,that

targetedessential interventions to save lives inpriority areasWhile

theSurvivalStrategyhasbeenwidelypraisedasastrongexampleo

theinter-agencyapproachinrespondingtodisasters(UnitedNations

2011,p64),ithasalsobeendescribedasareactiveidea,mainlyappeas-

ingdonors,thatwasimplementedtowardstheendotheemergency

inonlyoneprovince(Interview2011)Jointneedsassessments,such

asMCRAM,wereexamplesoanattempttoimproveinter-cluster

coordination;however,jointprogrammingeortsbasedonthend-ingsotheseassessmentswerenotablyabsent(Pollastroetal2010)

Asfoodwatersreceded insomeareas,WFP initiated early recovery

activities,consistingoood-andcash-or-workprograms,andully

transitionedtoearlyrecoverybyApril2011(UnitedNations2010)

Ingeneral,earlyrecoveryinitiativeswereindividual-agencybasedand

uncoordinatedacrossclusters(Pollastroetal2010)

The GoP initiated additional cash transer programs during the

emergencyphaseAninnovativecashtransermechanism,knownas

Watan,providedanATMdebitcardtoeachheadohouseholdOver-all, theWatan systemwas considered tobehighly successul at re-

vivinglocalmarketsandsupporting livelihoods,althoughithasalso

beencriticizedasbeingcorruptibleandoverlybureaucratic,excluding

vulnerablegroups(especiallywomen),anddependingonbasicinra-

structure(ATMs)thatdidntexistinmanyareas(Pollastroetal2010,

HouseoCommons2011)

TheAgricultureCluster,ledbyFAO,ocusedontheprovisiono

seeds,ertilizersandtools;therehabilitationoinrastructure;andthe

vaccinationandsupportolivestockOverhalamillionhouseholdsreceivedseedsandertilizertopreparethemorthewinter(rabi)plant-

ingseason;62,000food-aectedhouseholdsreceivedasecondpack-

ageoseedandertilizerinputspriortothekhariplantingseasonThe

AgricultureClusteralsosupportedcash-or-workactivitiestoreha-

bilitateirrigationinrastructureDonorresponsetotheundingappeal

oragricultureactivities,andearlyrecoveryinterventionsingeneral,

wassignicantlyslowerthanorlie-savingactivitiesForexample,

whileFAOeventuallyreceived91percentotheirtotalundingre-

quirement,theyhadonlyreceived$205millionoutoatotalundingrequiremento$107millionbytheendoSeptember2010,represent-

ingan$865millionundinggap(OCHA2011)


18/38


Maxwell&Parker

18

Coordination Issues

Theperormanceotheclustersystemasacoordinationmecha-

nismduringthe2010foodswasmixedatbestandineectiveatworst(HouseoCommons2011,Pollastroetal2010)Inadditiontobeing

challengedbythe sheerscaleothedisaster, successulcoordination

wasinhibitedbyweakstrategicleadershipandalackoqualiedper-

sonnel,especiallyamongclustercoordinators;inadequatecoordination

andalignmentwithGoPandNDMApriorities;theoverwhelming

numberoorganizationsparticipatinginsomeclusters;andinsucient

integrationoapproachesacrossclusters

ReviewsotheclustersystemsperormanceduringthePakistan

foodresponsehavedescribedtheclustersystemsleadershipaspoorandlackingatboththehumanitariancoordinator(HC)leveland

amongclustercoordinators(HouseoCommons2011,p16)Atthe

HClevel,manyeltthatexperienceinlarge-scalehumanitarianre-

sponsewaslackingandthatdecision-makingwasinfuencedbythe

prioritiesotheHCsownagency(HouseoCommons2011,Pollas-

troetal2010)Similarly,insomecases,clusterleadstendedtopriori-

tizetheirownagencysinterestoverotherconcerns,resultinginwhat

aGoPdistrictcoordinatingocer(DCO)describedasequivalentto

having11captainso thesameteamona ootballpitch(Pollastroetal,p48)Clusterleadershipandperormancewasalsoaectedby

insucientsurgecapacityocapableandqualiedstaandbyhigh

ratesoturnover,partlyduetothehumanitariansystemalreadybeing

overstretchedbytheHaitiearthquakeresponse(HouseoCommons

2011)

WhiletheNDMA,linedepartments,andUNagenciesmetdaily

tocoordinateactivitiesandshareinormationthroughtheclustersys-

tem, thiscoordinationturnedintoparallelmechanismsovertimeas

someclusterleadsbegancoordinatingwithlinedepartmentsratherthantheNDMA(Pollastroetal2010)Thiswasnotthecaseorall

clusterleads,however,asFAO,orexample,coordinateditsactivities

with theMinistryoAgriculture and Livestock, inadditiontoco-

ordinatingwith theNDMA (Interview2011) Ingeneral, however,

theclustersystemdidnotalwaysalignwiththeprioritiesotheGoP

andNDMA,largelyduetogenuinedierencesoopinionbetween

theGoP and the international humanitariancommunity about the

natureotherequiredhumanitarianresponseThiswasevidentrom

thestartotheemergencyresponsewhentheUNdecidedtorolloutthetraditionaleleven-clustersetup,ratherthantheGoP-avoredour


19/38


Maxwell&Parker

19

lie-savingclusters2Manyeltthatbyactivatingelevenclusters,the

clustersystembecameunwieldyanddetractedromcoordinationand

theeectivenessotheresponse(Pollastroetal2010)

ThelargenumberoorganizationsparticipatinginclustermeetingsaectedoverallcoordinationDuetothesheernumberoorganiza-

tionsinsomeclusters,clustermeetingstendedtoocusexclusivelyon

inormationsharingratherthanstrategicplanningandprogramming

(Pollastroetal2010)Theclustersystemacedchallengesinitsability

toengagewithlocalcivilsocietyInmanycases,thecapacityandreach

olocalcivilsocietyorganizationsgreatlyexceededthatointerna-

tionalNGOs;however,thesesmallorganizationstendedtobeothe

radarodonorsandagenciesand,inmanycases,theydidnotseethe

valueocoordinatingwiththeclustersystem(Interview2011,HouseoCommons2011)

CoordinationacrossclusterswasgenerallylimitedWiththeexcep-

tionotheSurvivalStrategy,clusterstendedtooperateindependently,

withlittlestrategicplanningandcoordinationThiswasespeciallythe

caseorearlyrecoveryinterventions,whichwerecarriedoutwithno

overallstrategyandlimitedcoordination(Pollastroetal2010)

Lessons Learned

Learning from previous cluster system experiences in Pakistan was

inadequate. Manyothe gaps andweaknesses othe cluster system

duringthe2010foodswerethesameasthoseidentiedinprevious

humanitarianresponsesinPakistanIssuessuchasweakstrategiclead-

ership,inadequateinter-clustercoordination,disagreementswiththe

GoPandNDMAoverthenumberoclusterstorollout,andlimited

supportorearlyrecoveryhavebeencitedasweaknessesduringthe

2005earthquake,2007foods,2009displacementcrisis,andonceagain

duringthe2010foodsIneffective strategic leadership and a lack of qualied personnel weak-

ened the cluster system.PoorstrategicleadershipbytheHCandcluster

coordinatorsandinsucientlyqualiedclusterstadiminishedthee-

ectivenessotheclustersystemasacoordinationmechanism,resulting

induplicationsanddelaysLeadershipwascompromisedinsomeclus-

tersas,insomecases,clusterleadstendedtoavortheirownagencys

interestsoverother prioritiesThe cluster systemwas overstretched

duetotheHaitiearthquakeresponse,whichlimitedsurgecapacityand

theavailabilityoexperiencedpersonnel

2 Itshouldbenoted thatsomeothenon-lie-saving clusterswereestablished

inagreementwiththeGoPandNDMA,suchastheAgricultureCluster(Interview

2011)


20/38


Maxwell&Parker

20

Coordination among clusters was inadequate, especially in the early

recovery response. WhiletheSurvivalStrategyandjointneedsassess-

ments,suchasMCRAM,weremechanismsorimprovingcross-sector

analysisandplanningamongclusters,theclustersgenerallyoperatedindependentlyooneanotherClusterleadagenciestendedtopur-

suesectoral-basedstrategiesthatwerelargelyinfuencedbytheirown

agencysmandateThiswasespeciallythecaseortheearlyrecoveryre-

sponse,wheredonorsupportwasslow,andstrategiccross-sectorplan-

ningandimplementationoearlyrecoveryinterventionswaslimited

TheexperienceotheMCRAMsuggeststhatjointanalysisisabetter

platormorjointprogrammingeorts,butnotsucienttoensure

thatjointprogrammingactuallytakesplace


21/38


Maxwell&Parker

21

Kenya

In2011,largeareasoKenyawereaectedbyoneotheworstre-gionaldroughtsinrecentmemory,aectingsome34millionpeople

inKenyaaloneasoJuly2011Someareashavereportedthelowest

rainallinhalacenturyThiswasawell-predicteddrought,coinciding

withtheLaNiaeectthathadcausedwidespreaddroughtinthe

GreaterHornoAricaonmanypastoccasionsTheKenyasituation

wasquicklyovertakeninattentioninthepressbythedeclarationo

amineinSomaliaonJuly20andthewell-publicizedextremecondi-

tions there, but the situation inKenya remained very seriousnot

leastbecauseoasubstantialinfuxoreugeesromSomaliaDespitebeingoneothemoreadvancedeconomiesintheGreater

HornoAricaregion,Kenyahasexperiencednumerousoodsecurity

crisesinthepast,andhasbeenthethlargestrecipientooodaid

globallyinrecentyears(WFP-FAIS,2011)Majordroughtemergen-

ciesoccurredin19992000,200506,and2009Whileaccustomed

toslow-onsetnaturaldisasters,Kenyaalsoexperiencedamajorhu-

manitarianemergencyinearly2008whenthecontestedpresidential

electionsoDecember 2007resulted inviolence anddisplacement

Thepost-electionviolencetriggeredtheUnitedNationstoorganizetheclustersysteminKenya

Background

Kenyahas longhadawell-unctioning,government-ledood se-

curitycoordinationmechanism,theKenyaFoodSecurityMeeting/

SteeringGroup(KFSSG,seebelow)Thiswasoriginallysetupunder

theArid Lands ResourceManagement Project, a donor-supported

projectintheOceothePresidentTheprojectcoveredearlywarn-ingandresponse,aswellasriskreductionanddevelopmentprograms

TheCentralandWesternProvincesoKenyaareblessedwither-

tilelandandreliablyadequaterainall,soaremajorsurplus-producing

areas,butthree-quartersothelandareaoKenyaissuitableonlyor

livestockproductionTheseareasaresubjecttoperiodicdroughts,and

KFSSGwassetuptomanagethepredictionoandresponsetothese

droughtsThecoordinationmechanismhasoodsecurityinitsname,

butgrewtobecomeamulti-sectoralcoordinationmechanismover

theyears,incorporatingtechnicalworkinggroupsinavarietyoareasinadditiontoagricultureandoodassistanceTheclustersystemwas

introducedinKenyain2008inresponsetothepost-electionviolence

TheKFSSGtechnicalworkinggroupsandseveralotheclusters(not


22/38


Maxwell&Parker

22

allothem)havesincemergedtheirunctions,soeachtosomedegree

retainsaseparateidentity,dependingonthesituationMorerecently,

OCHA set up aKenyaHumanitarian Partnership Forum Eacho

theseisbriefydescribedbelowTheKenya Food SecurityMeeting/Steering GroupTheKenya

FoodSecuritySteeringGroup(KFSSG)isatechnicalbodyunderthe

AridLandsResourceManagementProject (ALRMP),nowhoused

intheMinistryoSpecialProgramsinthegovernmentoKenyaThe

KenyaFoodSecurityMeeting(KFSM)istheoverallpolicybody,o

whichtheKFSSGisthetechnicalbodyTherearetechnicalworking

groupsinvarioussectorsundertheKFSSG,includinggroupsonood

aidandagricultureandlivestock(SeeFigure1)

Figure 1: KFSM/KFSSG Structure

Source: KFSSG

TheKFSSGisalong-standinggroup,ormedinthemid-1990sto

managetheresponsetodroughtemergenciesinKenya,linkedtothe

earlywarningacilitiesotheALRMPThiscoverssome30districts

oKenya,butnotthehigh-rainallandhigh-potentialareasoCentral,

RitValley,Western andNyanzaProvinces Itsmainactivitiesareto

leadassessmentsinthearidandsemi-aridareas(initiallytwiceperyear,

exceptionallyourtimesperyear),toissueestimatesothenumber

opeopleaectedbydroughtandoodinsecurity,andtocoordinate

responsesTheKFSSGhasappointedNGOsandotherorganizations

Kenya Food Security Meeting

Kenya Food Security

Steering Group

Data and

Information WG

Health and Nutrition

WG

EmergencyEducation WG

WESCORD

Disaster

Management WG

Food Aid Estimates

Agriculture and

Livestock WG

Information & Reporting Flow

Management Support


23/38


Maxwell&Parker

23

toleadresponsesatthedistrictlevel,andcoordinatestheseresponses

withDistrict SteeringGroupsthemain government coordination

mechanismatthedistrictlevel

WFPandFAO,aswellasotherearlywarningandemergencyre-sponseorganizationssuchasFEWSNETandOCHA,aremembers

otheKFSSG,asaregovernmentministriesInthissense,KFSSGhas

beentheover-archingcoordinationmechanismoroodsecurityanal-

ysisandresponseinKenyaTheKFSSGischargedwithoverseeing

bothhumanitarianresponseandlonger-termoodsecurityconcerns

Intermsocoordination,itulllstheclassiccoordination3-W(who,

what,where?)unctioninemergenciesButastrongelementalsoex-

istsocoordinatingrecoveryandrehabilitationeorts,andtheintentis

tomovemoreinthedirectionocoordinatinglong-terminvestment,disasterpreparedness,andmitigationItscoordinationmechanismson

theground,theDistrictSteeringCommittees,aredenitelynotsim-

plyemergencyresponsemechanisms

The cluster system during the post election violence From an

OCHAperspective,priortothe2008post-electionviolenceemer-

gency,therewasaprolierationocoordinationstructuresatnational,

sub-national andregional levels (Cooper2009), denedmainly in

termsooodsecurityandoodaidinparticularThesemechanisms

weremainlyordrought,butalsodealtwithlonger-termdevelopmentissuesDisastersweredened in termso ood aid needsWiththe

postelectionviolence,Kenyaacedanemergencythatwasnew,and

orwhichcoordinationstructuresdidnotparticularlytTherewere

manynewhumanitarianactorsmostlyNGOsthatwereunamiliar

withtheoperationalenvironmentAndthegovernmentorpolitical

partieswithinthegovernmentwereengagedintheprovocationto

violence,makingthegovernmentlessabletoplayanimpartialrolein

humanitariancoordinationIntheevent,theKenyaRedCrossSoci-

ety(KRCS)wasdesignatedbygovernmenttobetheleadagencyorresponseandcoordinationarolethat,romOCHAsperspectivewas

rathermoreexclusivethaninclusiveInresponse,OCHArolledout

theclustersystemandhadtenclustersunctioningbythetimeothe

CERFapplicationandfashappealRelationsbetweentheKRCSand

theUNweretenseduringtheheightothecrisisEventually,anar-

rangementwasworkedoutorKRCStojointlyleadseveralclusters,

alongwithUNagenciesInsomecases,atechnicalworkinggroup

alreadyexisted(aswasthecasewithood-relatedclusters);inothers,

nonedid (protection, or example,whichwas a huge needduringthedisplacementcrisisintheatermathothepost-electionviolence)

Given the lack o amiliaritywith the cluster system,much o the

coordinationmechanism reliedonpeoplewhowere seconded and


24/38


Maxwell&Parker

24

didntknowtheKenyaoperatingenvironmentwellanddidnothave

establishedrelationshipswithgovernmentpersonnelThissituationre-

sultedinbothduplicationandgaps,andsomedamagedrelationships

(Cooper2009)AccordingtoOCHA,theKFSSGbecametheoodaidcluster

orthedurationothepost-electionviolenceresponse,whileaprevi-

ouslyexistingagricultureandlivestocktechnicalworkinggroupunder

KFSSGbecametheoodsecurityandearlyrecoveryclusterledby

FAOandUNDPThiswasbothanoddcombination(giventhatear-

lyrecoveryincludedanyotherissuesparticularly,inthecontexto

post-electionviolence,thesaereturnoIDPsand,inmanycases,re-

buildingshelterorIDPswhosehomeshadbeenburnedorotherwise

destroyed), andunusual leadership or oodsecurity concernsOnerespondentnotedthatwhentheoodsecurityclusterwasintroduced

aterthepostelectionviolence,itwasseenasaparallelmechanismto

theKFSSGTheclustermandatewasunclear,anddiscussionsocused

moreonthepurposeotheclusterratherthanonthecoordinationo

theactualresponse

Fromclusterstosectoralworkinggroups,andtheKenyaHumani-

tarianPartnershipForumAterthecoalitiongovernmentwasormed

inFebruary2008andsomesemblanceonormalityreturnedtoKe-

nya,somecoordinationunctionsreturnedtogovernmentTheoodsecurity and earlyrecoveryclusterwasdescribedas slow toreturn

togovernment control (Interview 2011)Thenameo theOCHA

mechanism changed to theKenyaHumanitarian PartnershipTeam

(laterForum)andwasexpandedtoincludeINGOengagement

ClustershavemetamorphosedbacktosectoralworkinggroupsTwo

clustersareormallylistedbytheUNanagriculturecluster,witha

coordinatorappointedbyFAO,andaoodaidcluster,withacoordina-

torappointedbyWFPAtthemoment,thesearebothre-incorporated

intoKFSSGssectoralworkinggroups(agricultureandlivestock,andoodaid) In2010,mucho the inrastructureo theALRMPwas

dismantledwhendonorsupportortheprojectwasterminatedThe

projecthasnotbeenrenewed,despitesomequantitativeevidenceo

reducedvulnerabilityinthedistrictsservedbyALRMP(ILRI2011)

TheMinistryoSpecialProgrammesand theMinistryoStateor

NorthernKenyanowdirectlyoperatevariouscomponentssuchasthe

KFSSGACrisisResponseCenter(CRC)wassetup,alsounderthe

MinistryoSpecialProgrammes,buthastodatenottakenoncoordi-

nationunctionsTheKFSSGcontinuestobethemainood-securitycoordinationmechanism,butitsrelationshiptotheHumanitarianFo-

rumisnotclearlyspelledout(Interview2011)


25/38


Maxwell&Parker

25


AsoJuly2011,some24millionpeoplerequiredimmediateood

assistance,withanotheronemillionexpectedtorequireassistancebySeptember(Figure2)Duetoresourceshortalls,WFPwasonlyable

toaddressneedsin20o30aecteddistricts,withresponsibilityor

theremainingtendistrictsallingtothegovernmentoKenyaFood

prices inKenya had increased by nearly 100 percent compared to

theve-yearaveragealreadyhighduetothe2008oodpricecrisis

(OCHA2011)

Giventhesehighpricesandlimitedresources,large-scalelocaland

regionalpurchaseooodoraecteddistrictswasunlikely,andthe

possibilityoalarge-scalecashresponsediminishedSoitwasnoten-tirelyclearhowneedsweregoingtobemetintheshorttermThe

KenyaHungerSaetyNet,undedmainlybyexternaldonors,wasable

toabsorbsomeothebruntothecrisis,butonlyinlimitedareasand

oralimitednumberogroupsLivestocko-takeoperationswereon-

going,butnotyetatthescalerequiredEmergencywaterandnutrition

operationswerealsoongoing

Figure 2: KFSM/KFSSG Structure


26/38


Maxwell&Parker

26

Coordination Issues

AnumberocoordinationissuesariseoutothereviewotheKe-

nyaexperienceThesearebriefydescribedbelow,butwiththeintentohighlightingissues,notprescribingthebestwaytoaddressthem

TherstissueistheocusooodsecuritycoordinationOCHA

anddonorstendtotaketheviewthatcoordinationandthecluster

systemshouldbelimitedtopurelyemergencyresponses3Thegov-

ernmentoKenyaandmostotheimplementingagencies(including

someUNsta)tendtoadvocateamorecomprehensiveapproach

addressingoodsecurityconcernsmorebroadly,includingriskreduc-

tionandpreparednesspriortoacrisis,astrongemphasisonprotecting

livelihoodsduringacrisis,andcoordinatingresourcefowsandpro-gramsaimedatrecoveryandrehabilitationinthepost-crisisphaseIn

act,theALRMPwaspartlyresponsibleordevelopingthedrought-

management-cycleapproachthathasinormeddisasterriskreduction

anddisastermanagementmuchmorebroadlyintheHornoArica

Mostood-securityexpertsavorsuchanapproach,butsomehumani-

tariandonorsviewitasmissioncreep,andbeyondthemandateo

OCHASimilarly,thehumanitarianexpertiseoOCHAisrequired

inemergenciesasaretheresourcesohumanitariandonorsThough

morebyaccidentthanbydesign,thecurrentsysteminKenyaactuallynegotiatesthisdividereasonablywell,withmanyothelonger-term

disasterandriskmanagementconcernsarisingingovernment-ledo-

rums,whileOCHAandthehumanitariandonorsstepinduringacri-

sisIn2011however,somestaogovernment-ledorumssuggested

thattheKHPFwasduplicativeandunnecessary(Interview2011)

Asecond,andcloselyrelated,issueconcernswhoshouldleadunder

whatcircumstanceTraditionally,thegovernmentoKenyahasledon

coordinationasituationthatmost,inotallobserversagreeispreer-

ableDuringthepost-electionviolence,somesawthegovernmentasapartytotheconfict,whichundermineditsabilitytocoordinatean

impartialresponse(politicalleaderswerethemaininstigatorsseveral

owhomarenowunder indictmentby the InternationalCriminal

Court)Inthatinstance,theKenyaRedCrossSocietywasdesignated

asthe lead,particularlyinrst-responseand insettingupcampa-

cilitiesorthedisplacedAndclustersweresetupAtertheviolence

subsided,theleadgraduallyreturnedtogovernmentcontrolButthere

areother issues regardingwho leads, including the speedatwhich

3 Notethatemergencyresponsecanincludeliesavingorlieprotectinginterven-

tionsaswellasthosethatprotectlivelihoodsThequestionhasmoretodowithtran-

sitionalprogramingandlonger-termdisastermanagementincludingriskreduction

activities,preparednessplanningandsocialprotection


27/38


Maxwell&Parker

27

emergenciesaredeclaredGovernmentsgenerallyhavelessincentive

todeclareanemergency,particularlyinadroughtorslow-onsetcrisis,

andthusresponsemaybedelayedInthe200506Manderatriangle

drought,thegovernmentoKenyadelayeddeclaringanemergency,andtheresponsewasreducedtolie-savingactivities(ODI2006)even

thoughthelessonslearnedromin19992000wereclearlyaboutin-

terveningintimetoprotectassets,particularly livestock(Akliluand

Wekesa2002)ManyobserverseltthegovernmentoKenyawasslow

todeclareanemergencyin2011aswell(Interview2011)

AthirdissueisabouttheoverlaporclaricationorolesTheco-

ordination rolemovesback and orth, and it isnot alwaysclear to

either the government ortheUNwhat the other isdoing Soar,

thishaslargelynothinderedoodsecurityoperationsontheground,butintheeyesooneobserver,itlookslikeduplication(Inter-

view2011)Forthegovernmenttoeectivelylead,resourcesneedto

beconcentratedAtthesametime,KFSSGunderstandsthatOCHA

playsacriticalroleinUNcoordination,UNappealsandtheCERF

Claricationotheserolesinpredictabledroughtemergenciesand

inmoreunpredictablecrisessuchasthepost-electionviolencewill

beanincreasinglyimportantitemontheagendaotheoodsecurity

andhumanitariancommunityinKenyaThatsaid,allpartiesagreethat

currentlyworkingrelationshipsaregoodbutbasedasmuchonindi-vidualrelationshipsasonwell-worked-outinstitutionalarrangements

Thenalissueisabouttheoverallcoordinationoresponsesand

innovationsGiventhecurrentcircumstances,sectoralcoordinationis

reasonablygood,butnosinglecoordinationmechanismworksacross

allsectorstomaximizetheeectivenessoanoverallresponsetoa

crisiswhetheronaturalorman-madeoriginForexample,while

agoodnutritionsurveillanceandresponsesystemisinplace,itisnot

directlycoordinatedwithgeneralooddistributionAsimilargapex-

istswithregardtolivelihoodssupportDonorsandagenciesareex-perimentingwithnovelapproachestooodassistance,market-ledap-

proachestolivestocko-take,etc,butthisexperimentationismostly

coordinatedbyadonorgroupnotOCHAandnotKFSSGInor-

mationandlearningisshared,butoverallresponsebeyondthesectoral

workinggroupsiscoordinatedonlytoalimiteddegreeA2010con-

sultancywascommissionedtolookintothisbroadercoordinationis-

suewhichrelatestooodsecurityissuesbutisboarderinscopebut

itsreportisnotyetavailable


28/38


Maxwell&Parker

28

Lessons Learned

Food security is both a purely humanitarian concern and a develop-

ment concern.Almostbydenitioninchronicallyrisk-proneareas,thecoordinationooodsecurityresponseisgoingtorequireadisaster-

management approach, rather than a purely humanitarian-response

approachWhileclustersaremandatedtoguideonlythehumanitarian

response,withregardtooodsecurity,sometensionislikelybetween

thesetwoapproachesatleastintheperspectiveosomeobservers

TheglobalFoodSecurityClustercanandshouldprovideleadership

onhowtokeepunctionsandmodalitiesclearlydelineated,butdeal

withoodinsecurityinaholisticmannerAttemptingtoincorporate

oodsecurityandearlyrecoveryintooneclusterdidnoteectivelydealwiththequestion

Different actors can work together effectively. Althoughtherehave

beentensemoments, theKenyastory includeselementsoeective

coordinationamongthegovernmentoKenya,theUN,donors,and

internationalandnationalNGOsClarityorolesandclarityaboutthe

prioritizationoresponsesunderdieringcircumstancesarecriticalto

makingthesystemworkIndividualleadersorcoordinatorsmakeabig

dierence,particularlywheninstitutionalrolesarenotwelldened,or

wherenopreviousagreementonrolesexistsGood sectoral coordination is necessary but not sufcient for effective

response. Agreement iswidespread thatsectoral coordinationworks

airlywellinKenya,butorinnovationbeyondtriedandtruere-

sponses,donorsdidnotlooktoestablishedcoordinationmechanisms

toleadThisisatleastinpartbecauseseparatesectoralworkinggroups

handledsomeotheinnovationsdonorswereattemptingtopromote

Abetter-preparedoodsecurityclusterthatincorporatesbothood

assistanceandlivelihoodresponsesandworkscloselywithanutrition

clustercouldprovidethiskindomechanismorcoordinatinginnova-tiveresponses

Knowledge of context is critical. Beyondtheotherknowncompe-

tenciesorclustercoordinators,knowledgeothecontext,theback-

ground,andthecontemporaryactorsiscriticalorstawholeadin

theeventoasurge


29/38


Maxwell&Parker

29

Cte dIvoire

OnDecember2,2010,theIndependentIvoirianElectoralCom-missionannouncedthattheoppositioncandidate,AlassaneOuattara,

haddeeatedtheincumbent,LaurentGbagbo,inCtedIvoires2010

presidentialelectionsWithin24hoursotheElectoralCommissions

announcement,CtedIvoiresConstitutionalCounciloverturnedthe

pollresultsanddeclaredGbagbothewinnerManyinitiallyviewedthe

2010Ivoirianelectionsasanopportunitytousherinaneweraosta-

bilityandprogress;however,asGbagborejectedinternationalcallsto

stepdown,arenewedwaveopoliticalviolenceandinstabilityensued

insteadBythetimeGbagbowasarrestedonApril11,2011,thecrisiswasresponsibleoranestimated1,000civiliandeaths,overonemillion

internallydisplacedpeople,andan additional100,000reugeeswho

hadfedtoneighboringLiberia(Strauss2011)

Background

During therun-up to the201011 post-election violence,Cte

dIvoirewasexperiencingabrieandragileperiodopeaceThesign-

ingotheOuagadougouPeaceAgreementinMarch2007endedaour-and-a-hal-year civilwar between the government-held south

andtherebel-heldnorth,which,atitsheightin2003,haddisplaced

11millionpeopleacrossthecountryThe200207civilwarcame

againstabackdropodecliningcommoditypricesorthekeyIvoirian

exportsococoaandcoee;increasingtensionsbetweenethnicgroups

and between Ivoiriansand oreignersdue tolimited access tonew

arablelandandewemploymentopportunities;andstrugglesoverpo-

liticalparticipationandrights,whichcontributedtoeelingsomar-

ginalization,especiallyamongnortherners(Cook2011)Despitethesigningothepeaceagreementin2007,theoodse-

curitysituationinCtedIvoireremainedprecariousThelong-term

eects o the civil war on agricultural production and a growing

dependence on imported staple commodities contributed toCte

dIvoiresheightenedvulnerabilitytotheeectsorisingoodprices

Inthe2000s,duringaperiodorisingooddemandduetopopulation

growthandurbanization,CtedIvoiregrewincreasinglydependent

onimportedrice,themaindietarystaple(Moseley2011)Whileper

capitariceconsumptionroserom55kilogramsin1988to74kilo-gramsin2006,CtedIvoirebecametheseventh-largestriceimporter

intheworld,withimportedriceaccountingorover60percento

nationalriceconsumption(ARC2007,Bassett2010)CtedIvoires


30/38


Maxwell&Parker

30

vulnerabilitytodisruptionsintheglobalricesupplywasunderscored

duringtheglobaloodpricecrisiso200708ByApril2008,pric-

esor imported rice inCtedIvoirewere52percenthigher than

inSeptemberothepreviousyear, substantiallyreducinghouseholdpurchasingpowerandsettingoriotsinurbanareasthroughoutthe

country(FAO2008)

Beoretheonsetothepost-electionviolence,anestimated14per-

centothepopulationwasundernourished,thepovertyrateinrural

areaswasover60percent,andanestimated517,000peoplewerestill

displacedduetothe200207civilwar(FAO2010,UNHCR2011)

The cluster system was ormally established inCte dIvoire in

2008,althoughonecluster(theProtectionCluster,ledbyUNHCR)

waspreviouslyintroducedin2006Priortotheintroductionotheclusterapproach,theprinciplesotheclustersystemwereappliedin

varioussectoralgroups,whichincludedWaterandSanitation(ledby

UNICEF),Education(ledbyUNICEF),FoodSecurityandNutrition

(co-ledbyFAOandWFP),Health(ledbyWHO),andGovernance

andEconomicRecovery(ledbyUNDP)Duringthehumanitarian

response toaddress IDPneeds in2006, theProtectionCluster and

sectoralgroupswerecriticizedorprioritizingpoliticalinterestsover

immediateneeds(Derderianetal2007)AccordingtoDerderianet

al (2007), instead o addressing emergency needs throughoutCtedIvoire,theUNresponsetargetedtheirinterventionsalmostexclu-

sivelyinthetownoGuiglo,inanattempttoimproverelationsinan

areawhereanti-UNriotshadbeenwidespread


Thepost-electionviolencehadimmediateandsevere impactson

ood security inCte dIvoire, with repercussions throughout the

WestAricaRegionShortlyatertheonsetotheconfict,thefowogoodsromoodsurplusregionsinthenorthtoooddecitareasin

thesouthwasalmostcompletelydisrupted(FEWSNET2011)Bythe

endoDecember,thesupplyogoodstomarketsinAbidjanslowed,

leadingtoshortagesandtriggeringrisingoodprices,particularlyor

cereals, tubers, andmeats By January, ood priceshad increased 39

percentorcookingoil,50percentorsugar,and50percentormeats,

comparedtotheirpre-electionlevels,whichhadalreadybeenextraor-

dinarilyhighdue totheoodpricecrisis(WFP2011)OnJanuary

24, inaneort tooustGbagbo rom power,Ouattara imposed anexportbanoncocoaproducts,amajorincomesourceorGbagbo

Thecocoaexportbanbroughtaboutasharpdeclineinthepriceo

cocoalocally,causingarmerstosellcropsatdepressedprices(OCHA


31/38


Maxwell&Parker

31

2011)BylateMarch,over1millionpeoplewereinternallydisplaced

duetotheconfict,puttingsignicantstrainonhosthouseholdsand

causingshortagesooodandwaterinreceivingcommunities(United

Nations2011)Beorefeeingtheirhomes,manyhouseholdssoldotheirassets,includingharvestedcrops,livestock,andseedstocks,while

remainingstandingcropsweredestroyedthroughoutconfict-aected

areas(OCHA2011,FAO2011)

Thecrisis aected ood security beyondCte dIvoires borders

ByApril,anestimated100,000reugeeshadfedtoLiberia(OCHA

2011)Thissuddeninfuximmediatelydroveupthedemandorbasic

staples,urtherincreasingoodpricesthatwerealreadyhighdueto

underlyinginfationBylateJanuary,pricesorcassava,palmoiland

gasolinewere25to35percentaboveaverageinLiberiancountiesneartheCtedIvoireborder (FEWSNET 2011)Many reugees fee-

ingtoLiberiastayedwithrelativesinNimbaCountyintheLiberian

borderregion,puttingtremendouspressureonlimitedhouseholdre-

sourcesArapidhouseholdoodsecurityassessmentinNimbaCounty

conductedinMarch2011oundthat80percentobothreugeesand

host householdshad poor ood consumption patterns and over 60

percentoreugeeswereemployingadversecopingstrategies,suchas

skippingmeals(TambaandAnderson2011)Theimpactsothecrisis

wereeltthroughouttheWestAricaRegion,aspricesorcookingoilandsugar,bothowhicharenormallyimportedromCtedIvoire,

increasedbyasmuchas40percentbetweenDecemberandFebruary

inBurkinaFaso,Mali,Mauritania,andNiger(FEWSNET2011)

The Response

ThecrisisinCtedIvoirecaughttheUN,theclustersystem,and

thehumanitariancommunityoguardSincethesigningothe2007

peaceagreement,thepoliticalandoperationalocusotheUNanddonorsinCtedIvoirehadshitedincreasinglytowardsdevelopment

objectivesandewhumanitarianagencieshadmaintainedasubstantial

in-countrypresence(Baldeetal2011)Asaresult,thereweresigni-

cantdelaysinreestablishinghumanitarianresponseandcoordination

mechanismsandtheclustersystemwasnotormallyre-activateduntil

mid-January,overamonthaterthecrisisbeganAtimelyresponsewas

urthercomplicatedasalmostallinternationalsta,withtheexception

osomeclustersta,wereevacuatedromCtedIvoirebytheend

oDecemberduetothedeterioratingsecuritysituation(Baldeetal2011)

TherstrelieoperationsinCtedIvoirebegantheweekoJanu-

ary17,sixweeksaterthecrisisbegan,whenWFPbegantargetedood


32/38


Maxwell&Parker

32

distributionsWFPtoIDPsitesAroundthistime,theclustersystemwas

activatedatboththenationallevel,inAbidjan,andinthreeregional

siteswheresignicantdisplacementhadoccurred:Man,Danan,and

DukouGainingaccesstodisplacedpopulationswasdicultduetotheintenseghting, especially inAbidjanandCtedIvoireswest-

ern region Fundingorthehumanitarian responsewas particularly

slowtomaterialize,partlybecausethecrisisinCtedIvoirecoincided

withtheeventsinTunisia,Egypt,andLibya(TheEconomist2011)By

April2011,only14percentotheEmergencyHumanitarianAction

Plan(EHAP)hadbeenunded(OCHA2011)

Duringtheearlystagesothecrisis,theFoodSecurityClusterre-

sponse consisted primarilyogeneral ooddistributions targetedto

communitieshostingIDPsandtoIDPcampsFooddistributionsini-tiallytargeted25,000people,butasthesituationdeterioratedinearly

March,generalooddistributionswerescaledupsignicantly,target-

ing125,000peopleinCtedIvoireandanadditional186,000people

inLiberia(WFP2011)Astheviolencesubsidedshortlyaterthearrest

oGbagbo,FAObeganthedistr ibutionoaproductionkit,consist-

ingocerealseeds,cowpea,okra seeds, tools,andbasic ertilizersto

anestimated9,000householdsinareasaectedbythecrisis(OCHA

2011)InJune,FAO,WFP,andotherFoodSecurityClusteractorscar-

riedoutajointcountry-wideneedsassessmenttomapoutoodandagriculturalneeds(OCHA2011)InJuly,FoodSecurityClusterpart-

nerscarriedoutacashandvouchereasibilitystudy,andacashtranser

interventioninAbidjantargeting10,800beneciarieswassettobegin

inAugust(WFP2011)

Coordination Issues

Theclustersystemsperormancewashamperedinpartbythechal-

lengingoperatingconditionsothe crisis, butalsobecause thehu-manitariansysteminCtedIvoirewasill-preparedtodealwithsuch

asituationAnevaluationoUNHCRsresponsetothepost-election

crisisoundthatmany(thoughnotall)othemembersothecluster

systemwerehighlycriticaloitsperormanceOneintervieweenoted,

Clustersshouldbea orumorresponse,heretheyarea orumor

stone-throwing(Baldeetal2011,p46)Theexclusiononational

andlocalactorsromtheclustersystemwasidentiedasaparticularly

concerningissueAlthoughcivilsocietyorganizationsplayedacritical

roleinacilitatingaccesstoaectedpopulationsduringtheearlystagesothecrisis,theirparticipationinclustermeetingshasbeenminimal,

especiallysincethegrowingreturnointernationalNGOs(INGOs)

toCtedIvoire(Baldeetal2011)


33/38


Maxwell&Parker

33

CoordinationintheFoodSecurityClusterbenetedgreatlyrom

FAOandWFPspriorexperienceworkingtogetherasco-leadsothe

FoodSecurityandNutritionSectoralGroupduringprevioushuman-

itarianresponsesinCtedIvoireThisexperiencehelpedtoacilitateaairlynaturalprocessomergingoodassistanceandagricultureac-

tivitiesduringthepost-electionresponse(Interview2011)However,

whilecoordinationbetweenco-leadsunctionedrelativelysmoothly

atthecountrylevel,situationsaroseinwhichconfictinginormation

waspassedonromthegloballeveltothecountrylevelandviceversa

Onerespondentidentiedaneedorexternaltechnicalguidance,

especiallyinrelationtocashandvoucherprogrammingandinorma-

tionmanagementFoodSecurityClustermemberswereeagertoroll

outcashandvoucherprograms;however,becausethesewerenewac-tivities,technicalsupportwasrequiredtodeterminetheeasibilityo

scalingupStrongertechnicalguidancewasneededalsobecausemany

INGOFoodSecurityClusterpartnershadarrivedinCtedIvoire

shortlyaterthecrisisbeganandhadlittleothecontextualknowl-

edgeothecountryneededtoinormprogrammingdecisions(Inter-

view2011)

Lessons Learned

Limited preparedness delayed the humanitarian response. Withthe

signingothe2007peaceagreement,donorsandagencieshadshited

the ocus o their programming romhumanitarian todevelop-

mentandewhumanitarianactorsmaintainedastrongpresencein

CtedIvoireTherenewedviolencein2010caughtthehumanitarian

systemoguard,whichresultedinthelateactivationothecluster

systemandanoveralldelayed responseThishighlights theact that

transitionscangobothwaysandunderscorestheimportanceopre-

paringorunexpectedchangesandpossiblesetbacksTechnical guidance is needed from the global level, especially for new

types of responses. FoodSecurityCluster partners inCtedIvoire

wereeager torolloutcashandvoucherprograms;however, as this

wasanewtypeoactivity,externaltechnicalsupportwasneededto

guidetheirplanningandimplementationTheCtedIvoireexample

underscoresthepotentialrolethattheglobalFSCcanandwillplay

inprovidingtoolsandguidancetocountry-levelclusters,especiallyin

thecaseonewtypesoprogrammingTechnicalbackstoppingdoes

notnecessarilyhavetocomeromglobalFSCsta(asitissmallandboundtobeoverstretched);however,iitisgoingtobeprovided,it

requiresabudget


34/38


Maxwell&Parker

34

References

Haiti Case Study

Arias,Diego,andMaximeCarneus2010UnintendedConsequences

oFoodSubsidies:TheCaseotheHaitiRiceSubsidyWashington

DC:WorldBank

Bolton,Matthew2011HumanSecurityaterStateCollapse:Global

SecurityinPostEarthquakeHaitiLondon:LondonSchoolo

EconomicsGlobalGovernance

Boutroue,Joel2008AnnualReportotheResident/Humanitarian

CoordinatorontheUseoCERFGrantsPort-au-Prince:Central

EmergencyResponseFund

Cavallo,Eduardo,AndrewPowell,andOscarBecerra2010Estimating

theDirectEconomicDamagesotheEarthquakeinHaitiThe

Economic Journal120(August)Oxord:RoyalEconomicSociety

Chan,Cindy2010AgricultureinPost-QuakeHaitiThe Epoch Times

February24

Conceico,Pedro,andRonaldUMendoza2009Anatomyothe

GlobalFoodCrisisThird World Quarterly 30(6)115982

CoordinationNationaledelaScuritAlimentaire(CNSA)2010Rapid

Post-EarthquakeEmergencyFoodSecurityAssessmentPort-au-

Prince:CNSA

Dolan,Carmel,andMijaVervers2010CountryandGlobalLevel

ClusterCoordinationExperienceandLessonsLearntField

Exchange: Emergency Nutrition Network September(39):27

FEWSNET2010ExecutiveBrieHaiti:ImplicationsotheEarthquake

onFoodSecurityinHaitiFamineEarlyWarningSystemsNetwork

Port-au-Prince:USAIDandCNSA

FAO2010SpecialBrie:HaitiEarthquakeRome:FAOandEuropean

Union

Faubert,Carrol2006EvaluationoUNDPAssistancetoConfict-

AectedCountries:CaseStudyHaitiNewYork:UnitedNations

DevelopmentProgramEvaluationOce

FoodCluster2010DratFoodClusterFoodAssistanceStrategyPort-

au-Prince:FoodCluster

2010FoodClusterMeeting:Monday,July5,2010Port-au-

Prince:FoodCluster


35/38


Maxwell&Parker

35

Grunewald,Francois,andAndreaBinder2010Inter-AgencyReal-

TimeEvaluationinHaiti:3MonthsatertheEarthquakeGlobal

PublicPolicyInstituteandGroupeURD

Grunewald,Francois,andBlancheRenaudin2010Real-TimeEvaluationotheResponsetotheHaitiEarthquakeo12January

2010:MissionReportPort-au-Prince:StrategicAairsDirectorate

otheFrenchMinistryoDeense

Heinzelman,Jessica,andCarolWaters2010CrowdsourcingCrisis

InormationinDisasterAectedHaitiWashingtonDC:United

StatesInstituteoPeace

IASC2010ResponsetotheHumanitarianCrisisinHaiti:Following

the12January2010EarthquakeInter-AgencyStandingCommitteeGenevaandNewYork:IASC

IOM2010HaitiEarthquakeDisplacementandShelterStrategy

InternationalOrganizationorMigrationPort-au-Prince:IOM

Mazzeo,John2009Lavich:HaitisVulnerabilitytotheGlobalFood

CrisisAnnals of Anthropological Practice32(1):11529

Pelling,Mark,andJuhaUitto2001SmallIslandDevelopingStates:

NaturalDisasterVulnerabilityandGlobalChange Environmental

Hazards 3:4962

Rencoret,Nicole,AbbyStoddard,KatherineHaver,GlynTaylor,and

PaulHarvey2010HaitiEarthquakeResponse:ContextAnalysis

ALNAP,DACNetworkonDevelopmentEvaluationandUNEG

Seelke,ClareRibando,andJFHornbeck2008Haiti:Legislative

ResponsestotheFoodCrisisandRelatedDevelopmentChallenges

WashingtonDC:CongressionalResearchService

Stumpenhorst,Miriam,RolStumpenhorst,andOliverRazum2011

TheUNOCHAClusterApproach:GapsbetweenTheoryandPracticeJournal of Public Health (7April):16

Suarez,Carlos,andNicolasRubio2010Haiti:RiceProductionand

TradeUpdateSantoDomingo:USDAForeignAgriculturalService

GlobalAgriculturalInormationNetwork

Weisbrot,Mark,JakeJohnston,andRebeccaRay2010UsingFoodAid

toSupport,NotHarm,HaitianAgricultureWashingtonDC:Center

orEconomicandPolicyResearch


36/38


Maxwell&Parker

36

Pakistan Case Study

Bengali,Kaiser,andAllanJury2010HungerVulnerabilityandFood

AssistanceinPakistan:TheWorldFoodProgramExperienceInHunger Pains: Pakistans Food Insecurity,edsMKugelmanandRM

HathawayWashingtonDC:WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenter

orScholars

Cosgrave,John,RiccardoPolastroandFarwaZaar2010Inter-Agency

RealTimeEvaluationotheHumanitarianResponsetoPakistans

2009DisplacementCrisisGenevaandNewYork:IASC

Fair,ChristineC2011Pakistanin2010:Flooding,Governmental

IneciencyandContinuedInsurgencyAsian Survey51(1)

FAO2010FAOsRoleinthePakistanFloodsEmergencyResponse

PlanRome:FAO

HouseoCommons2011The Humanitarian Response to the Pakistan

Floods.London:HouseoCommonsInternationalDevelopment

Committee

IASC2006Real-TimeEvaluationCluster:ApplicationotheIASC

ClusterApproachintheSouthAsiaEarthquakeInter-Agency

StandingCommitteeIslamabad:IASC

Kugelman,Michael,andRobertMHathaway2010Hunger Pains:

Pakistans Food InsecurityWashingtonDC:WoodrowWilson

InternationalCenterorScholars

Kronstadt,KAlan,PervazeASheikh,andBruceVaughn2010Flooding

inPakistan:OverviewandIssuesorCongressWashingtonDC:

CongressionalResearchService

Malik,Roshan2010TheFoodSecurity-GovernanceNexusin

PakistanInHunger Pains: Pakistans Food Insecurity,edsMKugelman

andRMHathawayWashingtonDC:WoodrowWilsonInternational

CenterorScholars

MCRAM2010Multi-ClusterRapidHumanitarianNeedsAssessment

(DratorComment)Multi-ClusterRapidAssessmentMechanism

ACAPS

OCHA2011TheFinancialTrackingServiceOceorthe

CoordinationoHumanitarianAairstsunochaorg,Accessed

October5,2011

Pollastro,Riccardo,AatikaNagrah,NicolaiSteen,andFarwaZaar2011

Inter-AgencyRealTimeEvaluationotheHumanitarianResponse

toPakistans2010FloodCrisisDARA


37/38


Maxwell&Parker

37

Suleri,AbidQaiyum2009FoodCrisesinDevelopingCountries:The

RoleoNationalGovernanceBoston:BostonUniversity,Frederick

SPardeeCenterortheStudyotheLonger-RangeFuture

SDPI/WFP2009FoodInsecurityinPakistanSustainableDevelopmentPolicyInstituteandWorldFoodProgramIslamabad:

SDPI/WFP/SDC

UDin,Najam2010InternalDisplacementinPakistan:Contemporary

ChallengesLahore:HumanRightsCommissionoPakistan

UnitedNations2011Pakistan Floods: One Year OnIslamabad:United

NationsFloodResponse

2010PakistanFloodsEmergencyResponsePlanRevision

NewYork:UNOCHA

WFP2010PakistanFloodImpactAssessmentIslamabad:WFP

Young,Nicholas,SabaGulKhattak,KaiserBengali,andLuciaElmi2007

IASCInter-AgencyRealTimeEvaluationothePakistanFloods/

CycloneYemyinGenevaandNewYork:IASC

Kenya Case Study

Aklilu,Yacob,andMikeWekesa2002Drought,Livestockand

Livelihoods:Lessonsromthe19992001EmergencyResponsein

thePastoralSectorinKenyaHumanitarian Practice Network Paper40

London:OverseasDevelopmentInstitute

Cooper,Jeanine2009HumanitarianCoordinationinKenya

PresentationortheIASCWorkingGroup,Nairobi,November11

OceortheCoordinationoHumanitarianAairs2011EastArica

Drought:HumanitarianSnapshotOCHA,July14

HumanitarianPolicyGroup2006SavingLivesthroughLivelihoods:

CriticalGapsintheResponsetotheDroughtintheGreaterHorn

oAricaHPGBriengNoteLondon:OverseasDevelopment

Institute

ILRI2011TheImpactsotheAridLandsResourceManagement

Project(ALRMPII)onLivelihoodsandVulnerabilityintheArid

andSemi-AridLandsoKenyaInternationalLivestockResearch

InstituteNairobi:ILRI


38/38


Maxwell&Parker

Cte dIvoire Case Study

AricaRiceCenter(ARC)2008AricaRiceTrends2007Cotonou,

Benin:AricaRiceCenter(WARDA)Balde,MamadouDian,JeCrisp,EwenMacleod,andVickyTennant

2011ShelterromtheStorm:AReal-TimeEvaluationo

UNHCRsResponsetotheEmergencyinCtedIvoireand

LiberiaGeneva:PolicyDevelopmentandEvaluationService,

UNHCR

Bassett,ThomasJ2010ReducingHungerVulnerabilitythrough

SustainableDevelopmentProceedings of the National Academy of

Sciences of the United States of America 107(13):569798

Cook,Nicolas2011CtedIvoiresPost-ElectionCrisisWashington

DC:CongressionalResearchService

Derderian,Katharine,EricStobbaerts,IeshaSingh,SimoneRocha,and

DavidMelody2007UNHumanitarianReorms:AViewromthe

FieldHumanitarian Exchange Magazine39(June)

FEWSNET2011WestAricaFoodSecurityAlertFamineEarly

WarningSystemsNetworkWashingtonDC:USAID

FAO2008CtedIvoire:InitiativeonFoodSoaringPricesRome:FAO

2011FAOsRoleintheCtedIvoireandNeighboring

CountriesEmergencyHumanitarianActionPlan2011Rome:

FAO

Moseley,WilliamG,JudithCarney,andLaurenceBecker2010

NeoliberalPolicy,RuralLivelihoodsandUrbanFoodSecurityin

WestArica:AComparativeStudyoTheGambia,CtedIvoireand

MaliProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States

of America107(13):577479

The Economist. 2011ChaoticCtedIvoire:DontForgetItMarch12

UnitedNations2011EmergencyHumanitarianActionPlan:Cte

dIvoireandNeighboringCountriesWestArica:UNOCHA

Strauss,Scott2011ItsSheerHorrorHere:PatternsoViolence

DuringtheFirstFourMonthsoCtedIvoiresPost-Electoral

CrisisAfrican Affairs 110(440):48189

Tamba,SaybaY,andEmmanuelAnderson2011NimbaReugeeAssessment:LiberiaIvorianReugeeInfuxandFoodSecurity

Monrovia:WFPandGovernmentoLiberia

WFP2011CtedIvoirePost-ElectoralCrisisDakar:WFP

addressing integrated coordination in food security crises: four case studies

Documents