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AUTHORITYGroup-4 DoDD 5200.10, 26 Jul 1962; OAG,D/A ltr., 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYowCR OF T4t MJUTAMT WGRAL

WASHINTON.b . W10,,

IN ILY WElal TO

UlJU(O9) OWstam2 67)u - 02 itzS4 Diae w

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned,Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division for quarterly period ending 31 October1966. Information contained in this report should be rtviewed andevaluated by CDC in accordance with parasraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARCin accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations andcorrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days ofreceipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Com-mandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in thefuture from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adaptedfor use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 InclKENNETH C. WICKHAM

as Major General, USA

DISTRIBUT ION: The Adjutant GeneralConmanding General

US Army Combat Development CommandUS Continental Army Command

CommandantsUS Army Command and General Staff CollegeUS Army War College 331 U AmeSrUS Army Air Defense School VW e aLm I=US Amy Artillery and Missile School ZAVM ZuMA uUS Army Armor SchoolUS Army Chemical Corps SchoolUS Army Engineer SchoolUS Army Military Police SchoolUS Army Infantry SchoolUS Army Intelligence SchoolUS Army Medical Field Service School *

(oumsuu an 166 2) 19 Jo/

CONFIDENTIAL

. .. . - . . . .. " r ' V . - I

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)US Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Quartermaster SchoolUS Army Security Agency SchoolUS Army Transportation SchoolUS Army Signal SchoolUS Army Special Warfare SchoolUS Army Civil Affairs School

cqles turniLs"tAssistant Chief of Staff for Force Da Mo0Office, Chief of Sftff, U Arx (lISA)Research Ananlyls Crpoation (Library)Security Officer Zoo Alams Scientific laboratoryOffice of the Dizetor of Defense Research A Inglaeerig, OW(SUA)" OMENational Aeromatics & Space Aftiaistration, Office of Defense AffairsSouth hkt Asia Porces, Office, Secretary of Defense (SA)1st Battulica, 50th Meaxmtry Mach.

I.h

Offl'oee JToit Chief of Staff (SS),ATM: Statistical Divison

2

CON FIDENTIAL

'CONFIDENTIAL

4 /

DOWNGGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; - ,.

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. Dl LD C00 O 5200.10 rn nr?'

Ii DEC1 U IJ67

i B'

READY TO STRIKE....i ANYWHERE,

ANYTIMECONFIDENTIAL

4 -I

CONFIDENTIAL

ignd.fioa t Orgai.sations. Aivities I

Opera*4ors 11. 0.iwrsl I

2, KCKOHEW I

. HU 2

4, MHLUIL 2

5.AMS 2

6. IPAPA 2

7. SUNSET BMA( 3 ~IANIM

9. KALI~ 410, LQO, "E"A

10. KAMIZA 4

Artillez7 Support

AnW Aviation 5

.. V. Ativity

2o Iong Ran R onnai.ssane ]Patro(LRI) 12 *

3. iaisoni 12.

4, CounteritAl.gsence 12

CHEOMI4'44 13

6@ Taftica2. IMgszy Interpretation Facility 23* I giOsti5 3Administration 17

CONFIDENTIAL

Clvia Aabim~ 20

PQOI Iolosioal Operetiona 23

14.dico3 268d.via1 28

Trnirdng 28

Oonw sm Anmlyeuu/Rooomfandatioaa 30

Cozauandez', Recounendation5 3

Observtions30

1 , eronel 32. 0pemrtione 30

3. Intelligenae 39

4. Logiatics 45

5. Civic Action 52Appendicu C oSIsI str~. t

1. R0W-

12 4u

9. fturews

~DQ

2MII INFAN? DIVISI1ON

AVMI A 8an franclao 96225 U

S U M Operational Report for 4arterly Period Wing 31 October 1966,

TO: See Distribution

Operational Report for oarterly Period (RO CSF0M-65)Locktiont Vicinity, Cu CHi (IT64715:3), RYNReporting Offtoort Major General Fred C, Weyan:Pipmd by: Najor George J. awtin, 0 18th Mflitery HistoryDetachmnt

.1o SigiMant Organivational Asivitiso

a . (C) paio.

(1) Generale There were 10 major (1k or higher) oprationsand 1211 bm" urdt actions conducted by the 25th Wi i -) during tnisaquarter. All major and 113 small unit actions resulted in enex contact.

2) KO HUAD ( Jay. - 6 Aug). The 2d Die Task Fore (IatBn 7h mt (-)j 2d Bn, 27th Inf (-)lot Bln ()s th f and lot E.n 8thArty (+)) conducted airmobile assaults and S3 operations in oonjunction withARVN forces. Joint US/ARVN Operations Centrs at BAO TRAI (2I545049) andTRAM BAIG (IT490195) wore operational. Fire support bases were establishedat DUC HUE, BAO TRAI, TRUG BANG, And TRUN LAP. Prom 23.5 JuAly, the lotBn (M), 5th Wnt oondacted a recormnissance in force and 80 operation vicZr699108. Thoy dostroyed several VC structures in which covurod ounkerewere located. In response to intelligonce information, elwownts of the 3dBn, 49th Rogt (ARVN)o and the 2d Bn, 27thInf conductud airmobile assaultsto MOOD. On 1 kuuetp two B52 airstrikes were flown in support of theoperation. There was eaenswe damage to tunnels and underground fortifica-tions .in both areas, In the followup 6peration, a VCC was captured who spokefluent English. Wde indiv.dual disclosed the location of his unit head-quarters atXT642243. A search of the area revealed a largo tunel complexwith concrete walls. Results of the operation we, e 11 VC KIA (BC), 31 VC

DA' (BC), 92 VC 1IA (poss), 82 VC BA (poss), 25 VCC, 113- VCS. In addition,a5 suill arms, 3400 lbs of rice, 35,955 rounds of anunition, and 04 nades.aere captured, Two hundred and eight VC structures$ 152 bunkers, 34 + el,42, samprm and other uisaollmnnous items were destroyed. (App 1)

DaRUMMED A~T 3 YEAR INTMRVAIS;~~DECLM3IFIM AFTER 12 YZ=PDCORIR 5200.10

DEIss3WAl 2UR

()OAHU (S-31 August). The lot Ed. Task Force (4th Rn, 9 .hla (-) 4th Bp 23d la (-4j; 2d n, 14th W and 7th Bni, 11th Arty) conductedoperations in TAX NINH Province to loote and destroy VC forces and supplies.and to support Operation BLUE JAY&, They secured and defen4ed the 196th Bdebase camp via TAY NI( Airfield (west). oensive S&D oporations' petalopand ambushes were conducted by the 1t Bde Task Force from the TAY NIMAirfield with only light enamy contact occurring in the northwest sector.On 14 Au& the let Bn (M), 5th Inf was attached to the lot Dde Task Forceand the 4th Bn, 9th Int was detached, The lot Ba (H), 5th Inf establisheda base ca via. TROUNG MT (XT4034) and conducted SOD and screening missionsnorth of Hfy '2 to prevent VC forces from interdicting the LOC to TAY NINH.On 25 Aug., the 4th Bn, 23d Inf was placed under the OPCOH of the let Div anddeployed to LAI KME. Resalts of Operation OAHU were 14 VC KIA (BC), 6 VCKBA (BC), 69 VC KIA (pose), 16 VC KCB (pose), 12 VCC and 110 VCS. In addi-tion, 16.3 tons of rice and 4 small arms were cqtured. Seventy-oight VCstructures, 33 undergrouird fortifi .ationa, 1 renoh and % tunnels were des-troyed. (App 2)

(4) LAMUwi& (7 Aug - 1.Sep). The 2d Rhi, 27th Inf conductedSD -operations in HAIU WAIA Province. Eagle flights of. platoon and ccmpanysise were found to be the fastest and , at reliable means of roacting tointelligence provided by the Joint Operations Center at BAO TRAL. Resaltsof Operation LAMAINA were 29.VC IA (BC), 51 VC KIA (pose), 40 VCC, 57 VCS.In addition, 18 small arm, 25 lbs of modical supplies, 763 hand grenades,and 42 lbs of documents were captured. Twenty-nine VC otr. turesp 14 under-ground fortifications and 40 tunnels wure destroyed. (App 3)

(5) AIMA (8 Aug -l Sep), The 1st Bn, 27th lnf established abae. camp vic XT526188 astride the major VC infiltration'rofte to the BOILOI Woods. Five BUDDY opurations were conducted with the 2d En, 49th Rest(ARVN) and 7RMG BANM HF/PP COmpnies. Rusults of Operation &M were 20VC KIA (Bc), J2: VC M (BC), 55 VC KIA (pose), 46 VC M (pose), 18 VCC, and206 VCS. In addition, 79 punji pits, 33 tunnuls, 48 underground fortifica-tionsa, 223 VC structures, and 5 -samps were destroyod. (App 4)

(6) KIPAPA (31. Aug - 12 Sep). This opuration was conducted inthe FILHOL Plantation (XT6720). Initially, two company SOI operations (Co Aand Co B, 4th Bn, 23d Inf) resulted in limited VC contact. On 2 Sep the 4thBn, 9th Int and 4th Bn, 23d Inf began separate operations in the east andwest, portions of the plantation. On 3 Sep, lot Bn (N)1 5th Inf (-).wasattached to the l et Edo and conducted operations in the northern Portion ofthe plantation. Three BUDDY operations were conducted with the 7th Regt,5th Div (1.VN). The ARVN forces ranged from a platoon to two battalions.Results of 0puration KIP.PA were 8 VC KIA (BC), I VC KBA (BC)" 24 VC KIA(poses), 8 VC KBA (pose). In addition, 12 VCC, 43 VCS, 52 AT mines, 47 grenades,9 82m mortar rounds, 36 105mm rds, and 4 weapons were captured, Fivepunji pits, 121 VC structures, 30 foxholes, 171 mines and booby trapsp 15.4tons of rice, 47 underground fortifications and 65 tunnels were destroyed.

A 0

2

(7) SMOST BACH (2 Sep - I1 Oct), The 2d Dde conducted oper-I ations in HAU MMIA Province to locate and destroy VC forces, supplie idbases, and interdict VC LOC'.. The operation, conducted in three phases,initially employed 2 infantry battalions (lont Bh, 27th mT and 2d % 2thInf) &Ad a mechanized platoon in eas aontigpous to population cepters andelection polling plaoft. In Phase II the 2d de employed the two infantrybattalions in areas remaed from election polling plaoes and population cor-tore 2h% lt ]E, ga th Inf established and operated frda a forward ecatbase vic TRAN DAU (XT5319) during Phases I & 0I. The 2d Bn, 27th Intoperated from CU CHI base camp in Phase I and by the use of airmobile aSaultsextended their influence into the AO. In Phase I1, 2d Ben, 27th Inf alsoworked from a fozrard combat base. Both units made the US presenca kownby uo of eagle flights, soarch and destroy operations, MDCAPS, and MDDYoperations. Phase III was a continuation of Phase II. The let Bn (X), 5thWt conducted reconnaissance in force along the periphery of the BOI LOI

Woods, ,Md assisted in the distruction of VC forces flushed by lot Bn, 27thnt oagle flights, Intolligunce was processed through the Joint Oprations

Centers at TRANG BANG and BAO TRAI. A total of 22 BUDDY opurations wereconductud With elements of the 25th Inf Div (ARYN) and RF/PF forces. Quickreaoti6n to CHIVU HOI information and agent reports processed through theJoint US/ARVN Operations Centor* at TRAMG BAiM and BAO TRAI was instruomntalin capturing or de3stroing VC forces and supply caches in the area of oper-ations. Total VC losses for the operntion were 80 VC KU (BC), 4 VO I (0C),128 VC [I (ose), 7 VC BA (pose), 46 VCC, 20 VCOS. In addition, 19 smallarms, 2 Lt's, 11 AP mines, 20 grenades, 2,409 blasting capes, 296 lb. ofTNT, 5 cameras with photographic supplies, 43 lbe of documents, 161 lbs ofmedical supplies, 11,400 lbs of rice, 200 lbe of salt and other supplies werecaptured. Ninety-seven tunnels, 151 VC structures, 20 sampans, 47 undergroundfortifications, 2 undergrtund. store areas, 164 foxholes, 20 punji pits,14#523 lbs of rice, 4 rolls of tin .and miscellaneous mnitions were. destroyed.

(8) LANIIKAI (15 Sep - Continuing). For the first time, a USbattalion is conducting operations in LONG AN Province. The 4th Bn, 9th Intis conducting SO opirantions, interdicting VC LOC's, supporting the ravolu-.tionary development program of the province, and conducting BUDDY operationswith iRVN forces. .The operation is in 4 phases. During Phase I-11, thebattalion moved by air and vehicle to N LUC (X3629765) and establihed abattalion base. Phase IV consists of SO operations in support of revulu-tionary development, aiding'RF/PF forces in construction of local outpots,and the conduct of joint US/ARVN S&D operations. A Joint Operations Centorhas boon established at M,11 LUC. On 10 Oct, the Bn (-) conducted a water-borno SO BUDDY operation with the d Bn, 50th Regt (ARVN) and one ARVN GOteam, resulting in a VC weapons and amio cache being captured. On 14 Octanother BUDDY operation was conduct,d with the 3d Bnp 50th Regt (ARVN)aWhile Co Bs 4th Bn* 9th Inf m.ived by lpnd to a blocidng position, the 3d Dha50th Regt (ARVN) movvd by boats to .inothor blocking position. Co A and Co C,4th Dn, 9th Inf then made a cuxfbat aussault and SM toward these blcks.Results of the action wore a4 VC KIA (0), 6 VC KIA (pose) and 3 weaponscaptured. The battalion hns c 2nductod 15 BUDDY operations with ARVN forcesin the X7N LUC area. Both aarial assault and River Assault Group (MG) boats

3

have been used as a means of transporting troops to an objective area. The (battalion continues with its HEDCAP program. They have also distributedJUSPAO school kits to the local school, and helpec. in the construction oftwo footbridges in the BEN LUC area. Results to date are M VC KIA (BC)*33 VC KIA (poss), 4 VCC and 36 VCS. In addition, 2 60M mortars (ewplete),10 small arms, 9 rifle grenades, 25 blasting caps, 1 demolition kit, 1 lof documents and other supplies have been captured. Aso, 15 Wou rds, 2460mm rds, 6,180 rds df small as mo, 29 mines,. 2 grenades, 11 VC struo-turess, 3 underground fortificationsp 5 trenches, 23 foxholes, 2,750 lbs ofrice, and otner supplies have been destroyed.

(9) KALIHY (17 Sop - Continuing). The 4th Bn, 23d Inf conductedSW operations in the FILHOL Plantation. Company asoi units were employedthroughout the artsa utilizing both ground and air assaults in an attempt tolocate VC forces. On 21 Sop, a BUDDY oprationtwaa conducted, resulting inlimited VC -contact. On 3 Octs, Co B, 4th En, 23d Inf with Trp B6 3d Sqdn,4th Cav conducted a two day SW BUDDY operation in the via =01182 with onecompany of the lat Bn, 7th Rvgt (ARVN). Botwien 4 and 11 October, airmobileassaults, S&D oprations, ambushes rd patrols continued throughout theFIHOL Plantation. On 12 Oct, the 2d En, 14th Inf conducted an airmobileassault and with 1 plat Trp A, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cay conducted SD operations innortheastern sector of the FILHOL Plantation along the SAIGON River. Thebattalion has conductad 3 SO BUDDY operations with the 1st BA, 7th Regt(ARVN). On 17 Oct, Co B and Co C, 2d Bn, 14th Inf attacked toward a blockestablished by the 1ot En, 7th Regt (ARVN) encountering an unknown VC force.Between 15 and 19 Oct, the 4th Bn, 23d Inf conddctud 5 SW BUDDY operationswith tho 4th Bn, 7th Regt (ARVN). On 22 Oct, working on information suppliedby a CHIET HOI., the Bn (-) conductid an S&D operation toward an attachedCay plat which was holding a blocking position. Light small arms fire wasreceived. Upon reaching their .bjoctivu arua, 1 VCS fdmale was apprehendedand a cache of rice, assorted tools, radio iquipmont, a movie projector,10 ruols of movies, =nd taor miscellaneous supplies wJra captured. Resultsof the operation to date are 37 VC KIA (BC), 165 VC KIA (poss), 3 VCC and60 VCS. In addition, 11 small arms, 667 rounds of small arms ammo, 6 lb. ofdocuments, 1 movie yxojector, 10 reels cf filra, and 1 tube tester were cap-tured. Also 2 mortars (ast 60m), 177 VC structures, 43 tunnels, 40 under-ground fortifications, 51 foxholis, 9 tunnels, 31 punji pits, 26 sampans,4.85 tons of rice =n other supplies wore dostr,.yod.

(10) WU'?A (20 Sep - 4 Oct). The 2d Bn, 14th Inf conductedSD opartiuns along the uastorn edge of the DOI 1 Woods via XT5042. Th&battalion ccnducted c..mbat assaults int- th AO t cover the Laximum areapossible and develop the onen)' situati:jn. Shallow penetrations were madealong the eastern edge of the woods. On 26 Sep the battalion, acting on in-formation obtained'from a ralliur, located over 280 tons 0f rice in sevenseparate lcationa. The 2d Bn, 1 t Inf was placed under OPCON of the 1stBde on 27 Sup to secure the cache. Upon their arrivol in the ries cachearea, 2d 1n, 14th Inf cntinued on the S&D operation while 2d Bn, Ist Infprepared to evacuate the rice. On 28 Sep, 50 laborers arrived from DLUTIENG on 5 ships to pick up and evacuate the rice to DAU TIMNf. By 1 Oct,

I'

F eaU edible rice had been evacuated (126.25 tons), and the resmainder, havingbeen inspected and declared inedible beoauee Of, varyg stages of deesy,was destroyed. The two battalions then conducted an am operation to DAUTIM and returoed to their respective bbsee at, CU OI ard TAY NINH. Resultsof the operation were 5 VC KIA (BC), 8 VCA (BC), 32 VC IA (poss), 41 VCKBA (pose), 3 VCC, and 18 VCS. In addition, I Hica(1 earbne 35. lb. ofdocumonts, 126.25 tons of rice, 2500 lb. of &Alt and other miscellaneoussupplies were capburod. Forty-four tunnelsp. 184 C structures, 14 under-ground fortitications, 5 trenches, 14 Optdor holes# 157.90 tons of rce,100 lbs of salt and other supplies were destroyed. (App 6)

(11) KAILUA (12 Oct - Cntinuing). 2d Bd is conducting oper-ations in the HAU NGHIA Province to locate and destroy VC foroes, suppliesand base coupe, and to interdict VC IOC's, This operation began with Co B,let Bn (M)p 5th Wt conducting saturation ambushes and security operationsvic X2695 . Both the let and 2d Bn, 27th Inf conductsd airmobile assaultsand SO operations resulting in limited VC contact. Between. 13 and 15 Octthe three battalions ostnblishd forward cbabat b.ases. Ovur 20 operationshave bion conduct 4i to date based on information roceiv-id through the TRAMBUIG and BAO TRAI Joint Operations Centers. The operations h.-.e r-sultedin numrous VO cachos bing discovured, and on sivoral occasions contactwith VC forces, Scout dogs hav proven useful to the Bdo forces, On 23Oct mt 0200 hours, a scout dog attached to the 2d Bn, -27th Inf alerted theunit to VC prosance in the area. The battalion engaged the VC force resultingin 7 VC ETA (BC). Numurous firing positions were locatod for both 600m. andglm mortars. The Brigade has particioted'in several BUDDY operations andhave conducted both CHIRCKPATE and PSOSMO 6perations. IDCAP3 have beenconducted throughout the operational area. To dato, over 1500 personnelhave been.treated. Results to date aro 51 VC KIA (BC), 118 VC KIA (pose),34 VOC, and 112 VCP. In "Adition, 7 small arm, 38 lb. of doa&wmnts,. 71,710$VN,: 26 grenades, 3 transistor radios, and 3' smpan motors wore captured.Also, 600 lbs of TfP, 35 bouby traps, 140 VC structures, 7 tunnels, 63 under-gr.Auid fortifications, 0 budges, 2 buat docks, 33 smpns, and 3.2 tons ofrice ware destruoyd. F

.b. (C) Arttllez' SuDort. During the quartur, 159,8 47 rmLuds ofartillery wore fired with tho fo' ng results: 107 VC KIA (BC), 650 VCKTA (poss).

a. (C) Air isinxt. Thero ware 2927 tactical air sorties duringth quartar, with the folliwd n rusults: 41 VC MA (BC), 229 VC K (pose),683 VC structures and 120 ounkors dastroyed, ani 45 secindary firee etartud12 secondary expl.osions, and 41 sampans destroyad.

d. - (C) Armi Aviation. There wore 9102 aram aviation combuat sortiesand 32,035 aviation support sorties rasulting in 35 KB'U,. 6 VCC," 27 structuresand 8 sampans dastr,,ed.

e. (C) Intelikence.

, .

-. 4(1) TO Activity.

(&) August 1.966.

I VC initiated activity decreased within the 25th InfDiv's TAOR and other ar;eas in HAU NGHIA Province in which division elementsoperated* The number of anti-aircraft ncidents decreased by approximately25% from those reported in July,. The decrease o? 65% in the nmber of roadobstacles during the period is attributed to the presence of. the lot Bn, 27thInf in the TRAM BANG area astride Route 1 where roadblock activity has beenheaviest in the peat. Reports indicate that the amount of VC movement withinHAU 11MMA Province remained approdzately the ame as that roportqd in July.One major unit, the 273d VC Regtv roportudly moved into the BOI W01 Woodsat the begining of August, but later moved to its present location north ofthe MICeIN Plantation vic XT5458. Reports indicated tho 273d VC Ragt wason a resupply and trAning mission.

Z One of the most significant indications of the VCIsintornal deterioration Is the rmrked incer.soe in CFIEU HOI returnees. Recordsat the Provincial CHIEU HOI Center indicate that 91 CIIU HOI's rallied dur-ing August, This is the hghest monthly figurd for the year and representsan incru-se of 86% over July. Most returnees complainad of the constanthardshipd and hazards they endured as VC soldiors. The VC's fear of thedivision's eagle flight operations w3s reflected in a recent captured docu-ment which indicated they could not defend against the operations, and theirefforts wore greatly afficted by the operations.

3 Quick ruction to intallience provided by theNational Police Headquartors and thru the Joint US/ARVN/NP Operations Centersin HAU ITGHUA Province r.stlted in nuwrous highly successful operations.Ebumples follow:

a On 4 Aug this heodquarters was notified that100 VC wure located in an orchard vic C1516006. Reacting rapidly to thisintelligence, n immeditw TAC airstrike was called. The intelligence sourcereturanud to the area and reported that VC losses were 20 VC killed to includea VC Company Commander. 'Two mortars -.nd 2 machine guns w-ire also reporteddamaged during the strike.

b On 11- Aug,. a joint operation by division elements,ARVI forcos, and elements of the Natio.nal Police was mounted. The intelli-gence source, a clptured VCC, was made available for the operation by theTIING BP.4G National Police Hendquartors. He located hidden VC rice cachosin A0 AN PHY Hamlet (Xa496173) containing a tital of 24.25 tons. Residentsindicated that tb. ri b was left there by the VC for st:,rage amd subsequentrecovery, faso during the operation, 8 VCS were apprehended and turned overto I Mt BANG District officials for further processing.

o On 17 Aug, intelligence received from SectorHeadquarters, BAO 'TIMI, revaled the lucation of an a=munition eacho at

CVX1~ 'Pe6

Co t

II NlO17,O An aerial reconnaissance was madej and on 19 Aug a Campaqy was air-lifted into solected areas to search for the cache. Two separate caches thatcontained the following wore uncovered: 136 booby trape, 732 handgrenades,13 rifle grenades, 583 rounds of SA ammo, 1-60ma homemade mortar with base plateand bipod#,,4q-6= avrtnru roundsj 1-57 m, t round. and 7 bang aore torpedoes.

d Based on intelligence provided by the TROI BAMJoint Operations Center, diision elements conductod a search and destroyoperation via XT52114 on 29 Aug. A VC platoon was encountered and iaedireaction sombined with skillful tactica maneuvering resulted in 6 VC MA(BC), 2 ZIA (pose), 1 VCC, -nd 11 VC5 approhondod. Fifteen bottles of

medicine and 47 rounds of SL a= were captured. Twenty-nine foxholes, 15lbs salt, 11 VC structures, I tunnel, and 7 underground fortifications weredestroyed.

e Based on intelligone provided by thb C1 OHDistrict Nahtional Police Cloh.f, a joint US/ARf operation was launched againstan assassination group known as the CU CHI Sapper Unit vic X605061 on 29Aug. The souroe a imembr of the assassination group, furnished a detailedsketch of his unit's hideout. The sketch was confirmed by mnp budy, detailedvisual reconnaissance, and aerial photography conducted by the 25th MI Dt.According to the source, the unit numbered 17 to 22 men. Based on the evalu-ation of the source and the study of the arVa, the mission was undertaken,results wore 8 VC KIA (BC), 13 VCC, 4 VCS, and 7 imall arms captured. Des-troyed in the saw area were 19 tunnels, 5 grenades, 1, booby trap, and 4sampan.. Evcuat6d were miscellanbous documents, clothing, and 303 roundsof small arms az.iunition. The source acconpmnied the 2d Bn, 27th Inf intothe area of operations. Through his personal efforts at l',st three VCCwere oaturwd together with their weapons. His detailed briefing onablad ourforces 4o utilize most effoctivoly a 14 man airmobile 3roup as a 'QuickDrop' force to head off VC escaping from the area of operations. Three ofthe VC iody count included in the total wore attaintt through this "QuidkDrop" technique. The operation hirhlights tha results that can be attainedfrom a rapid evaluation and rosponse to intollionco generated by jointUB/ARVN collection offorts.

SThe VC continue to bpe furcod from their b-so andsupply areas, and have ad an over incroasina problen of pruventing ralliorsfrm ruturning to tha ;avurnmont. The pros.nc of US fircas cuntir nes tomotivate .the populace into offoring infurmr.ti.,n concerning VC activities.Rapid reaction by division elements in responding to agent reports and infor-mation provided by returnos has 1-inied the VC the froedcn of movement theyprevlously unjcuodo

Total .VC porseiuiel, positions ami oquprnt losses1-31; AUg 66.

VC KU (BC) - 81 Returnees - 91VC I. (pose.) - 475 Small Arms - 30VCC - 52 Rico - 46 tors.

7

4

Vs- o5 Tiuin - 97Trenches - 31 Underground

b ep ce 196. fortifications - 200I(b) Septemr 1966.

1 VC initiated activity during the month of Septembercontinued at relatively the se level as that of August within the 25th InfDiv's TACR and HAU NEU Province, The eeption was an increase of anti-aireraft incdnts fr 4 to 50. Roadblock incidents drppd from 12 to 11,

continuing a downward trend initiated in August. VC .ovewnt reported withinthe division's arua of operations also remained relatively constant with thoserOportd for the previous wonth. The majority of roports placed confirmedunits within thuir normal opurational. aroas. The one exception was the move-mont. of the 9th VC Xiv Hq to an area south of DAU TIMIG, vic XT548385. Re-ports indicated that the division headquarters rsmainod in the ,irja for approx-

* imatily 2 weeks before it displacud to thu South Viitnwam-Cambodian border,vic XT560900. The location of 'the divition headquartd.rs and its subordinateregiments ro~ud the mbvewnt of US forces to the DAU TIM ,oa to countertho thruat. The .area which was the subject of the lnrost rnur of reportsconcorning VC movem t was along the OIMr.nJ"P.L River from the LOC GUIN ariasvia T4017. to the HOP tS HOE areas vie XT55,2

2 Intell-Ugnce provided division units by the JointUS/ARVN/NF Operations CUnter in HAU hCTHA Province reulted in 6 successfuloperations.

a On I Sop 66, a joint he.iborne operation was con-.ducted vie XT577035 in response to intelligpnco received from the MSS con-cerning the exact location of a VC propagand% activity associated with the:DUC IA District Oomitteo. The operation, involving 2 companies of the 2dBan Wth Wnf and elemnts of the 49th Rogt (ARVN), rusulted in 9 VC KIA (BC),22 VCCp and tho capture of 10 individual wuepons, 10 lhe of medical supplies,210 rds of SA ammo, and 40 lbs of documnts.

b On 5 Sep 66s basod on information provided by-theJoint Operations Contur at BlA T7R;, an airmobilo operation waa conduct-id VieXT526114, to locate 2 VC squads reported opirating in tho area. Contact wasmade and results of the operation includud the capture of 4 VCCP 3 individualweapons and 110 rds of SA amno. Interrogation of the VCC re~ealed the locationof 2 large mines which wre buried in a road and wired for cowmand detonation,

c On 15 Sep 66, a heliborne assault was conductedby 2d Bn, 27th Inf vie XfT6T1061 to exploit intelligence indicating'an estimated20 VC in the arua. The CU CHI National Police Chief accompanied assaulteluments along with 3 rocuntly captured VCC who hald knowl-dge of the generallocale. Results of tho operation includad the caure of 4 VCC., 7 VoS, 2.weapons, 800 lbs of peanuts, 300 lbs of rice, 100 lbs of tobacco, 6 dry cellbatteries, and 3 rolls of D-1 wiro.

V[

I d On 23 Sep 66, a joint operation was conductedvia XT6106 by the 2d Bn, 27th Inf and the AIU NGHIA Province IntelligencePlatoon. This operation was based on intelligence developed by the BAO TRAIJoint US/ARVN/NP Operations Center indicating the presence of a 12 man VC -squad located in the area, Results of the operation included 4 VC KIA (BC),3 VC KIA (poss) and the capture of 3 weapons, 20 hand grenades, 400 rds SAamno. Fifteen VOS were also apprehended in the Immediate area.

e. On 24 Sep 66, the 2d Bn, 27th Inf, utilizingintelligence provided by the BAO TRAI Sector 32 and NSS together with on thespot assistance of 2 CHIEU 1Ots, conducted an operation in search of a report-ed VO aid station and ordnance cache. While searching the area 2 VC wereengaged resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), I VC KIA (poss) and I weapon captured.The aid station was located at XS497972 and 145 lbs of misc midical supplieswere captured. VC were engaged with artillery resulting in 9 more VC KIA(pose). The arms cache was located vie of X5506970 resulting in tho captureof 377 rds SA aiimo, 100 lbs rice, 2 grenades, and 14 ammo magazinos.

£ On 27 Sep 66, the lst Bn, 27th Inf and a PFplatoon from TRANG BtM District conducted an operation vic XT463243 based oninformation provided by the TRANG BANG Joint Operations Contur indicating aVC platoon was located at the above coordinates. A series of snai. engago-ments and a thorough search of the area resulted in 14 VC KIA ), 8 VC KIA(pos6), and the capture of 3 VCC, 3 weapons, 1 lb of 4ocuments, arid theapprehension of 22 VCS.

The VC continue to be forced from their base andsupply areas and stll have the serious problem of ralliers returning togovernment contr.*. and assisting Free World Forces by providing informationon VC activities. An example of this wvs.. illustrtod on 26 Sep 66 when the2d Bn, 14th Inf, rjacting to information volunteered by a rallier, captured281 tons of rice.

On 11 Sep 66 at ITi32172, thorough search techniquesutilized by division troops resulted in the significant capture of VC photo-graphic equipmnt. The 2d Bn, 27th Inf located a 55 gal drum which had boencarefully concealed in a thicket and covered ith mud.. The contonts, whichinclUded 3"expensive movie cameras, Z-35mm cameras, 24 rolls of 35mm film,printing paper and daveloping chemicals, probably were utilized by a relativelysophisticated VC propaganda or proselyting activity operating in the area.

t. . The presence of US forces continues to motivate thepopulacu 'intQ offering information concerning VC activities. Rapid reactionby division olements in responding to agunt reports and infora.tion providedby returnees has deniod the VC the freodora of movemont they pruviously onjoyedat the beginning of the yuar.

6 VC Prsorniel, positions and equilvmnt losses 1-30September 1966:

* 9

vC KA (BC) -114VC KIA (pss) -281

VCS -231Returnees - 50Smel IrVs 34Rice -312,5 tons

Tunnels M 20

Underground fortifications ot152

(c) October 1966.

1 VC initiatid activity during the month of Octoberruained rolativaly the scmao ao that of Septembdr. Roadblock incidentsremained. the smve. Anti-aircraft incidents incrusocd fr;r 50 to 59 for an109 incruse. VC movennt within the division's area of oprations r~umainedstable,. with no significant aovumunt noteud. VC units operated in their normal• area of oporaticna.

2 Significant Operations.

a On 4 Oct, 4th Bn, 9th Inf discuvered a VC arms/mmo cache vie Z3676692. !nformation was pruvided by a CHIZU HOI, who ledthe unit to the oporational area. Includud in the cache :ore 3 CHICK car-ines, 2 French .Carbines, 1 BAR, I Thompson SMGs, 2-60am mortars (complete

with bipod, base plate and sights), 1-60= mortar sight and assorted amountof grenads* rifle grenades, 81=a and 60=e amunition, AT ninjs and demolitionequipwnt. This was a joint US/ARVN operation. The close cooperation betweenthe US and ARVN forces was instrumental in thu success o the operation.

b On 5 Oct, a well organized and smoothly functionigUS/ARVN Joint Operations Center in B&O T AI proved its value again. Reactingquickly tq, an agent report giving the location of a VC sqadj, 2d R% 27thInf conducted a heliborne operation into the via XT480049 - Vrt495055. Theresults of the operation included 3 VC KIU (BC), 6 VOC captured, 3 VCS appre-hended and.I 5 Mm kd6 S)4- and iLsc documents captured.

c On 7 Oct,9 2d Bn, 27th Inf with the assistanceof a CHIEU HOI searched the area vie JT89067. The operation resulted in 4VIC, 3 VC3 and 5 lbs of madic.al supplies located and evacuatod.

d 4th Bn, 9th Inf, with the assistanc, of the CHIMUHOI who led them to the cace on 10 Oct, found another cache vic X3675676.The cache included I CTCOM carbine, 6 turtle mines, 8 cylindrical mineas,150 AR mgnginas, 39 rifle grenades, 8-60am. mortar rcunds, 400 rounds of 12.7. B, assorted coumnications equipment, SA ammunition and weapons parts,.

o On 13 Oat, 2d Bn, 14th Inf conl;acted a VC companyvie Xr652227. Results of rhe engageoent wore 5 VC KIL (BC), 7 VC KU, (pose),f I VCC, and 2 CHICOM type 56 SMAO 2 CHICOM type. 56 carbines and 1 grenade

10,o

K!

94

1.441 launcher oaptured, The VC. revealed, under interrogation. that the o paqwas the 04 Co, 7th Bn# 165L regiment which had a strnth of 3"7 men. The

Sunderstrenrth oompaaq i~lustratN the fact that the division 1. tai gtollI of the 165A Rlegt

f D Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Ca. gunships observed 6 VCaMd 2 mortars (eat 6 0m) vc XT645238 on 16 Oct. Gunships and TAF engagedthe VC and suspected VC locationi resulting in 9 VC K (BC)o 13 VC RIA (pose)$2awtaxw(est 600m),. 23 VC structures, 2 mor.tar positions, 2 undergroundfortifications, ana 1 tunnel destroyed.

£ On 22 Oct, 4th Bnp 23d Inf captured an RCA 16mvproJectorj, 10 reels of 16nza propaganda film., a microphone and other assortedstgnal equipment and parts vie 3753203. The eqifipmant belonged to the SUGON-GIA DIIM Special Region ropaganda and Training Section,

h On 23 Oct$ 2d Bn, 27th I)f forward base area wasattacked by an ustimatud VC company via I563986. The attack consisted of SA,AW,. claymorel, 60Qi and Simn mortar fire. A well e'wcuted counter mortar planresulted in breaking the VC att&ck# and-7 VC KIA (BC), 20 VC KIA (poss), 7

MiC I VG3, 1 CIIICCK assault riflu, 2 haind grynndess 11 rifle grenades, 5C VICCII zlaoymore mines, 13 mortnx rounds and raisc SA sfunition were lost bythe VCo.

V. On 24 Oct, a CHIEU HOI who rallied to TRUMJ LAPRanger Training Cnter, votuntrily led 1st Bn (1), 5th Inf to a demolitionscache vie fl604258. Thu caii*e included 600 lbs of TNrT, 1 large shape charge;

AT mines and I hand gronadu. T~enty-fivo booby traps surrounding the cachewere dostroyjd, along with the cache itself. The intelligence value of theCHIEU HOI was again exploitod in the operation when ha led the unit througha boobr trapped ar,;,a to the cache.

SThe VC continued to be forced from their base andsupply areas by US operations. The loss of nJor supply 'caches vrill definitelyaffect the tactic a capabilities of the VC in the near future. The VC alsooontinue to have a serious probloz of ralliers returning to governmunt con-'rol and assisting Free World Forcqs with inforn.tion on VC activities,upply and b,se areas.

SThe presence of US forces continues to motivote thepc ple. An excellent examplu of this, occurred on 30 Oct when a f amale villag~rpointed out a mail pick-up to 2d Bn, 27th Inf. The unit located several VC

.. ..tors in the area vic XT476059. The presence of US forces in the area off operations has given the people now cunfidice in their government and in the

US effort to assist them. One gowd expple of US influence occurred in WIIOAN Province where the CHIEU HOI rate nearly tripled fiva September.

i VC Personnel and Equipment Losses 1-31 October 1966:

VC 1KA (BC) - 118

q1

vo u& (p3)-Va M 39 I.

ye5 M 272&ma.u Arm - 30Grain M 13,2 tons

(2) Long Range Roonnaissance Patrol (t2RP):

(a) Operations. During thp reporting pipod the divisionI/RP conducted 26 patrols in 5U WlHIA# TAX NNHp and LWG AN Provinces, ThetaP has conducted md.ssions for the AOof3S G2, the Brigades, and the 3d Bqdn,4th Car, In doing so the patrol has acquired the capability of operating at9xtended distances from the division base, When proper coordination and-support is provided, the LRRP c3n obtAin for units preoprational informationconcerning onoq nowmant pattuims, troop concentration, and installations,During operations, tho .LP has acted as point ruconnasaanoo and scrooningforco for infantrl battalions and cavalz7 troops% Aftor oporations, tho IMFhas oporatod as a stay-bohind foro to monitortrAffic of parsonnul and equip.mnt that has -returned to the operational aroa,

(b) Training., Durihg the period, the LMP has jonducteda 92 hour water-borne training progr , At the end of the instructionalperiod, the patrol conducted 2 water-borne operations, On'both operationssampans were used for the transportation of the IMP, In addition to thewater-borne training pmogram, members of the division IMP attended the 5thS1G (ProJect Delta) iMACV RMECODO Sohool, Of the I1 division personnel who%ttended the first courseo, onb beoce the Honor Student. Proeently the IaRPhas an additional 11 porsonnel attending tho course,

(3) Liaison: The G2 Section has increased its liaison capabilitywithin HAU WM1 and TAX NINH attenpting th insure that all intelligenceinformation originating within thesv provinces tu made available to the CUof the 25th US Division, In addition to tho daily visits to the 25th ARVNDiv HQ* Province Capitoal at BAO TRI, and subsector headqu rters, two officersare strategically posiftoned at key locations to assist in the reporting ofintelligence, One is at TAY NINH Province and the other is positioned atthe subeactor headquarters at TRAIG BAN. The value of this close liaisonhas proven itself on r4rous occasions when perishable information wasreceivedp and then relayed to division thus enabling a rapid and effectivedivision response,

(4) Counterintelligence: The influx of approximately 1200 dailyhire laborers into the division base. b* roquired intonsive nd continuouscounterintolligence adasures to noutralize VC espionage, Those measures haveincluded maintaining porsonal data files on all inrdiganous personnel havingaccess to the baso, naw chocks against records of known or suspected VC ofVC sympathisors, invustigation of information concerning VC alleged to be inthe division work fore., and dovelopment of informant who can report on poss-ible axpionage attempts, Cuntorintollipnco measures to date have resultedin the apprehension of 9 parsons on the division base who have admitted to

12

K

'U

eohduoting activities for the VC, In addition, approxiately 50 individualshave been detected with improper or false. indentification documnts.,

(5) c CICW TE

(a) The division CHEMATE prog'am of establishing cheak,points at randon locations along major transportation arteries in H4U HGHIAProvince has been continued during tbin reporting period. It has d6nied tothe VC the freedom of movomunt'ho onm enjoyed by covertly moving perso neland equipment through our TAOR. These cheock points were manned by elementsof tho 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav, C1 agents of the 25th N Detachwnt, and National

* Police.

(b) Twenty-six CU1 1 .7OMA wore conducted during the periodand a total of 28,757 personnel, 2874 vehicles, and 15 sanpans were screened.Results of these operations includod I VCC, 21 VCS# and 3 AP mines captured

(6) Tactical Imagery Inturpratation Facility (TIIF):

(a) The TIIF has been reived by this division and is

utilized by the Targeting Section. Its primary fuction is to afford theimagery intarpreter a highly sophisticated capability of interpreting photos.

t.(U) idlotics.

(1) Cass I Supply,.

(a) Status of rations at end of quarter:

MEPI RATION STOCKAGE OBJ3TTV (DAYS) OA W )

A 33B 5

C4 4(b) Fresh fruits and vegetables ware received through

SAIGON, from DAIAT, RVN, and C01HU. A substantial pureuntage of fruits andvegetables have been received in an inedible condition.

(.) Ice cream issues were made 3 times per week, Thisincluded some air delivery to elements at TAY NINJ.

(d) Ice issues,

I TYPE ICE AVG NO LB. M AVG NO IES/M A

Potable 19,300 *.6Non lot ble 78,300 6.o

I "3

c l rOw1 O iee'plant has been coaqleted at CU C"I. Oa- /t

ci l l average 14tons per' Wb Three more of these plants are needed toprovide pper allowance of potable ice to troops in U CHI

(e) The Class I yard has been partially surfaced withlatirltd. At the end of the quarter it is still not usuable for issue orstorago.

() ose monitoring of unit periodic logisAo eports trDivision supply personnel and" liaison with the supporting supply activitiesin SAIGON has kept critical shortages to a miniaum.

(2) Class II & IV supply.

(a) The number of itfms in critical demands has been re-duced.

(b) The ASL has boon increased by 204 line items. TotalASL is now 709 line items.

(3) ca"ss II Supp - Issues during quextr:

001f-WDITT DAILY -(AV GAL) QUARTRLY-(TOTAL GAL)

1bgas 12,000 1,004 2MDiaol 13,000 774s317JP-4 17,000 1,18,420Avga s 900 96,745

(4) GrAvos Registration.

(a) Doceased US personnol processed dring the quarter -12A.

(b) Deceased RVN porsonnel procossed during the quaator . 6.

(5) Services.

Laudry:

W oX63 budlos.

2 1#837 washer loads.

(6) Transportation.

(a) 1M.eago driven:

I Total - 163,791.

2 Average daily - 1.,758.elt4

K

COAOA "W2?V(b) Tonnage movedt

I Total - 2,,34.

& Average daily. 31.

(o) Troops moved by conwi

I Total - ,1p37.

Average daily- 88.

(d) Personnel moved locally by buss

I Total - 7,095.

.2 Average daily - 77.

(7) 725th Maintenanoe Battalion.

(a) Zhe number of job orders completed during the quarterwere as follows:

OWITY M, o . ,.2T

Aircraft 276Ar illery 482Chemical 55EngLneor 538Piro Control 974Office Machines 337Signal 3,931Smal. Arms 1,501Track Vehicles 129Wheel Vehicles 656

(b) Certain vehiclus waro modified with steel plating forprotection of drivors and passengers.

(8) 25th Medical Battalion. This unit supportod an average of23 division units with wdicU servica *nd supplies, as follow@:

Admissions

Disease 721NBI 134IR A '263

Dental 5,967Lab Tests 8.267

& ' W

1$

Sttal of 4#793 amical supply item were issued duringthe quarter,

(9) Transportation Office.

(a) Convoys were operated between CU CK and SAIGON tosupply the CU (U: Base Cew and between CU CHI:and TAX Nll to estabulihand resupply the base oamp for the 196th Infantry Brigade and the PhippinsCivic Action Group.

I CU CHI -SJAOON

Total Convoys 350Namber per day 4Total volum of vehicles 200955Average daily volum 235Number of vehicles involved 1,464in unit distribution

CU CHI - TAY NIM

Total Convoys 98Number per day 1Total vehicles 9P379lot Log Clod vehicles 5, 19CU CHI base camp vehicles 2#80196th W Bde vehicles 837PHILCAG vehiclas 521

(b) Air Fbrce Air-lift requiremwnts - The transportationoffice 6oordinatod Air Force airlift requiremnte for the 196th InfantryWrigadeo Highten missions wore requested and flom. Total carlp deliveredwas 8P,604 pounds.

(c) Section. The Division Transportation Officeestablishad the Division Bagg Section in September. During the first.six wooek of olWation, this ection has processed bae for 211 personnel,Total baggage weight process4 to date is 18,781 Vounds.

(10) Division Amvmition Office.

(a) Sto~c4k Objective.

I Stociage objective - 1,600 tons (7 days)

&Onhand - %d40 (8 days)

(b) Issuea

,1

MUM- AM(T0W)

16 Jul- 5 Aug 91.416 Aug-15 Sep 92.316 Sep - 15 Ot 32.7

Average for quarter 72.1 tons/day.

go Administration.

(1) Nrsonnel. During this period the personnel posture ofthe division has been excellent. Assigned strength (approaSately 100.2%)slightly exceeds the authorized strength. There is a shortage of infantryNOO's (10B 11B4O) in the grades of S-5 and. Z-6. The casualty rate of NOO'shas created a shortage in greater proportion than the rate of, fill. Ashortage also exiLsts* in armor intelligenoe ROO0Is (= 11 D40) in grades .3-5and 3-6. The fill action received in relation to the unprogrammed losseshas not been sufficent to maintain a good stragh picture in this area,Other citical shortages ae Infantry Operations and Intelligence Specialist(MS IF20), Ganeral Cryptographic Repair=an (NO 3IK20), nn ArtilldryMechanic (MO 45 120). These shorte"ges are the result of la* of fill actionon requisitions. In a majority of the above instances personnel in lowergrades$ lower skill lavel NOS, and OJT categories are performing in thesepositions, Although it does not show in the ovwr.all personnel picture asreported to higher HQp, this neovssary type of action results in 1,sign-ments, siutilization of porsonnel and tends to present a false strengthpicture in lower grades and MOB skill levels, Tho .overall officer strengthpicture within the Division is excellant. Howovar, there still remains agrcde imbalance betweuen okficwr and warrant officers. This imbalance, forthe most part, falls within the 25th Aviation Battalion; The non-availabilityof 11O aviatore and the subsequent fill of those positions with officers hascaused this. Currently that battalion has 37% of its authorized strength in"O and 175% of its authorized strength in officers.

(2) Key losos/gzans:

(a) 3 August 1966, Major Guy S. Maloy III assumod conmandof lot Battalion, 27th Infantry.

(b) 10 August 1966, SG Edward H. DeSaussure, Jr. assumedcounand of the 196th Light Infa.ntry Brigade.

(c) 22 August 1966, Lt Colonel William 0. Barott assumedcomnand of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry.

(d) 24 August 1966, Lt Cjlonel Felix Salvudore assuamedcoinwnd of the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery.

(e) 24 August 1966, Lt Colonel William D. Brown appointedDivision IG.

CONFIDENTIAL17

() 16 Sept . ber 1966, 1.0 George G. O'Connor appointedADC to 25th Infantry Division.

(g) 19 Saptembor 1966, Colonel Aaron E. Walker departedfor 1st Log Gounnnd.

(h) 21 Septembr 1966, L Colonel John W. Vessey, Jr.appointed Division A~illery Ireutive Officer.

(i) 23 October 1966, Lt Colonel Kenneth R. Hass, DivisionTransportation Officer, departed for Hq USARV.

(3) The Division FX remains in operation with 4,000 square feetof floor space and 4,000 square feet of storage space. Total sales from theDiviston Site EDchange was $1,840,681 .01 for the quarter ending 31 October1966.

(4) Strengths:

Division -) as of 31 October 1966:

OFF AGOAuth 11 3 1 1,28Angd 788 105 1.0,997 11,890PD! 746 97 10,725 11,568

(5) Losse~s. (I Aug - '41 Oct)

OFF WO EM. AGGKIA 5 0 74 79WU 65 6 774 845MIA 0 0 7 7DOW 0 0 19 19Non-Battle dead 0 0 3 3Non-Battle injured 0 1 64 65

(6) Gains (1 Aug- Oct).

OFF WO AG147 T 1,997 354

(7) Provost Marshal Activities.

(a) General. The Provost Marshal section and the 25thMilitary Police Company has continued to provide military police support toelements of the 25th InfantY Pivision engeged in combat operations whilesimutaneously supporting the bte cmp operations.

(b) Basu Cakp Operations.

- 18

I Due to the static semi-permanent nature of thedivision base camp operations, many military police functions normallyassociated with garrison type duties have been established for the propercontrol of personnel, military traffic and installation security to include:motorized patrols, both on and off post; gate guards at the installationentrances; sucuity guards at key facilities and headquarters within thecantonemnt area; and the processing of all indigenous laborers employed

within the baso camp.

2. Processing Indigenous Personnel. Approximately

1200 indigunous p.;rsonrne1 aro procaosud in a',nd out of the basui camp daily ex-cept Sundays. Specific working areas wthin the b*.se cartp ha.v, been designated

for indignous laborers, and iilitary polic- prohibit th.isr access into un-authorized aroas. Indigenous prsonnAl desiring to conduct official businesswith units or staff sections %re receipted for by US nilitary perm nnel atthe hain Gate and remain under their supervision wile inside the cantonomentarea,

cg W Collecting Point. A semi-permancnt facilityconsisting of one perimuter fence and eight individual enclosures capableof housing 120 personin l has been completed. A total of 262 detainees wereprocessed through the collecting point and subsequently clas ifiod as follows:H's - 16; Civil Defendants - 146; Returnees - 21; Innocent civilians - 79.All detainees are fed threu hot meals dci ly while at the A Collecting Point.All foods, except for purely American type dishes are well received by thedetainues, particularly mwats, as it is a rare item in their diet, Therehave been no disciplinnry or control problems concerning dutainees, nor dothey apponr to bu hostile toward the US Ilitary. Detainues subsequentlyclassified as innocent civilians are given "Helping Hand boxes" and solatiumpayments for each day detained prior to release to civil affairs personnelfor return to their villages or plac of capture.

& Convoy Escorts. lalitary police have escorted 365convoys, consisting of 23,707 vehiclas for a total of 428,106 vehicle miles

in support of Division tactical and re-supply operations. No significantproblem, areas were encountered.

, Rugistrztion. For the purpose of identificationand control of third national and local national personnl permuanntly em-ployed at the base camp, and the control of privately owned weapons, war

trophies, motor vehicles and pets, a registration section has been establishedwithin the Office of the Provost Marshal. Seventy-two identification cards

were issued to ARVN interpreters attached to units of the uDivision, 60ittifioation cards were issued to third nationals employed by PA&E, and197 privately owned weap.ons, 19 war tropiies, 5 motor vehicles and 23 petswere registered with the Pr.v(.st Marshal.

6 Dispcipline, Law, and Order; A total of 54 Class Iand 73 Class II offenses have boon reported resulting in thu initiation of43 Class I. and 6 Class II criminal invistig tions, and the identification ofof 73 offenders. A totil of 51 motor vehicle traffic accidents have occurred

19

94

resulting in 3 traffic fatalitiea, and a total property damage of $2,910.60. 4Other routine investigations involving division personnel were conductedwith no serious incidents or unusual problems.

(c) Division Tactical Support. During the period 1-31August 1966, the 1 at platoon, 25th Military Police Company, was attached wittwith the lit Brigade for movoemnt to TAY NINH to establish a base of opera-tion for the 196th Ligit Infantry Brigade. Support provided to the letBrigade included: convoy ascorts, check point opurations, TCP's, townpatrollin, base camp patrblling, VIP escorts and security, processing of118 detained personnel, and operation of an indigenous laborers check point.

h. (C) Civic Action.

(1) A special Assistant to the Co, miding Genaral for Revolu-tionary Devolopment was designated. This ,Avisor coordinates the overallGVN progrnm of long turin national growth (Ruvolutionery Douvlopownt) withdivision activitios.

(2) Statistical suzmar.

Au&st-October To DateHelping Hand recipients 31,00 56,000NEDCAP Pationts 28, 500 54,400Health & Sanitation 380 750Construction 168 303Transportation 41 88Commerce & Industry 22 69Agricultural & Natural Rosourcos 6 10Education & Training 51 119Community Relations 210 35AConmuications 35 107Refugee Assistance 19 31Public Affairs 46 107

(3) This quturtir marked the expansion of the division's originalcivic action progra into a larger area of influence on a recurring basis.Significant changes ware:

(a) let Bdo now has CA rosponsibility for one villago,the 7th ARVN Rogt dependent arua in PHU H0A District, BINH DUONG Province,and the 50th ARVN Regt dopendent ar-sa in LW I Province.

(b) 2d Bde conducts its civic actin program. in threevilln-es, and for all 25th ARVN dependents in three additional villages,

(c) Division Artillery now provides civic action supportfor two large villages, and the dependonts of two nrtillry Bns of the 25ttInf Div (ARVN).

20

ifo (d) Other divisun ulmrnts r curently t.ctive in three

t a (e) The- Lv3o a tion program was extended to PHU HOA"Distriflt BNH DUONG Province and LOIG AN Province,

(4) IMDCAP II. The division KMCAP program has seen an expan-Sion from 210 to 271 1=1C1S ari from 18,927 to 28,971 patients as compared*ith the last quarter. This expansion is due to increased use of ARVNmedics, intdrpretvrs, doctors cand nurses, M DCUS are using loudspeakers toAnnounce M2DpS, and other comunication devicos to keep pursonnel occupiedwhile waiting. There were two preventive medicine projects during the quarter,bne oonsistedin admiqistering smallpox and cholera inminization to schoolchildren, in TAY NIHo The other consisted of administration of eyedrop" toall children in TAN THOI when the MEDCAP slrgeon felt there was a possibilityof an ee infection. Additionally, a pronatal clinic is being conducted byDivision M.DCAP officers in TAN AN 1101.

(5) Helping Hand, The .Helping Hand program became more divrs-ified during the last quarter. On two occasions a need w-s generated forliving essentials. Once for 143 refugees and once tor 160 national policedependents, The refugees generatod by CIDG operations in UC HUI . Districtwere relocated to the HIEP HOA sugar mill. The national police dependentswere left homeless after the VC set fire to their quarters during an attackon 18 Oct. In both instances., Helping Hand was able to ruact imuidiatelywith refugee kits, There were two kits available; one for a family and onefor an individual. These kits are purchasad and-pre-packagad at Helping.Hand warehouse end oo.ntain the following:

FamilY Kit Individual1 Kit

Fry Pan Sleeping Yat2 Water Buckets Rice Bowl.Rice Cookur CupCooking Spoon Soup Spoon

Soup Bae Chopsticks

(6) In ugust 85 pallets of food, clothes, toys an d medicalsupplies were received through a program known as American Christma Trucksand Trains (ACTT) to supplement Hilping Hand Stocks. Additionally, 1,500ibs of tothpaste were receiva.' frum JUJSPA0 in September.

(7) Summ u of issues" (tte)..

Clothing . 126.8(30 pieces Dental kits - 7#000Canned go .,ds - 30,762 Soap - 36j722 barsPencils - 4,500 Toys -10,212Shower shoes - 915 pr Solatium boxes - 398

21.

(8) Children's Parties. To celebrate the aid-autumn childrenLs o4festival (children's TET) the division sponsored 10 mid-autumn children'sparties for 4,020 children. In most cases, the traditional lanterns and mooncakes were purchased by division ejb in keeping with the theme of theholiday, This was the division's first celebration of a strictly Vietnameseholiday and celebrations took place in four provinces , The parties werexweiied with enthusiasm.

(9) Construction projects increased considerably during thisquarter. Light constructizn work, to include road repair, is a part of allextended major tactical opuration. Construction continues to be a lastingand necessary contribution to the Revolutionary Development program. Asan example, in' CU CHI District, playground equipmunt was fabricated, then4tion-l police hoddquartors is being rebuilt and an unused school buildingin XCI HUW" was rep-aired "ith tho division prbviding the mterial for reno-vation and the villagers doing the work under the Self Help Program. Statis-tics to date include:

%4terd of road repair - 32,650Klaygrounds - 12Wells built or capped - 6Total projects - 263

Other significant projects, included gates and fencing, struoure repair,school refurbishing, and construction for local officials,

(0) RF/FF assistance. Closely related to construction has boenthe RF/PF assistnce program. Barrier materials to include barbed wire,sand bags, stvul stakos, and cdncertina have been delivered to 73 compounds.A pilot housing project in, TAN PHU TUV was compluted to be followed byconstruction of kitchens for each. family unit. Commodity assistance todependents by division units is occurring regularly to supplement the magorpay and allowances of the RF/PF.

(11) Operational Activities.

(a) Operption A"NIFAI. The most significant pacificationtype operation during the period commenced on 15 Sep in LONG AN. The move-ment of a battalion into the delta area with a pacification mission is doingmuch to assist Revolutionary Duvelopment in that province. The purpose ofthis operation is to us( joint US-ietnamaso civic action and limited combatoperations to improve the security of the- area whdle providing Vietnameseofficials with an opportunity to explain to the people the policies andintentions of the government. LANIKAI civic action is intensive and wasplanned prior to commencement of the operation by US and GVN, A friendshipCouncil meets once a week to monitor and review-the program.

(b) Operation KAILUA. As a part of.this operation anintensive civic action program was undertv!ken in THO I-, hamlet by the 2dBn, 27th Inf. This part of the operation was an excellent example of whatan infantry battalion can achieve in pacification, The buttalion used two

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I 0I c (return s to speak to the peoplq about why they returned to theGVN osudi, and to make commodity distribution. The peoplm were ell trqatedbh.the American-soldiers and it is felt that even though the US forces didnot remain in the area permanently, their actions will oounter any anti-Aerican prOpagonda of the Viot Cong in the future and mks the .people startto Judge for themelves the two ways of life that they have been exposed to.Troop activity in dtvic action projects started spontaneously as the soldiersbegan to assist the pooplo in their daily living. A footbridge was built,i=CP were conducted, stapiont water holis war6 drained, and necessarycomdity distribution of clothing and food were part of the program. Theprimary value of this entire endeavor was'a demonstration to the people ofthe advantages of living under government control.

i.(C) Psrcholo&&cql Onerations (PSY0P).

(i) Summary of activities.

(a) P8Y0P activities during the quarter weue directedmainly at t.pporting the numerous Revolutionary Development- oriented oper-ations conducted by elewnts of the division in HAU HIA, TAY NINH, andLONG AN Provinces..

(b) Leaflet drops and handouts wjre made almost daily.A total of 10,239*400 leaflets were distributed throughout the divisionoprational area. The division established its own basic load of leaflets

* during tho quarter. Stocks of the most coiony used standard 1)af'ets -are ...maintained er han division headquarters, and at the brigvdes. Requestsfrom sub',-; .- t. Aa" s are filled without delays and the leaflets for miss-ions flown by division aircraft are supplied from these stocks. Approximately~3,000j,000 l afl ts are now on hnnd with plans to increase the basic load toabout 5,000j,000 leaflets in the naar future. Ten' leaflets were developedand printed locally 7 immediate exploitation of propaganda opportunities.In addition, appro.. '.,tely 10,000 JUPAO magazines, newspapers, pamphltsand posters wore distributed during the course of tactical operations andcivic action activities- The propaganda media output for this qurter wasnatwly three times that for the preceeing quarter.

(c) Aerial and ground loudspenker broadcasts, were usedthroughout the period,. A total of 70 aerial loudspeaker missions were flownin support of division operations. Actual broadcast time was 23 hours and42 minutos. Nine of the missions wore flown by division aircraft, and theremainder wore flown by IIFFCRtCEV (246th PSYOP Co). The division now hasits own a)rial loudspeaker br-x-AIcast capability. Improvised systems havebeen developed for both the UH-1B/D and OH-23 aircraft. Presently, onesystem is being used by the PSYOP branch of the G5 section, and three othersare on loan to.subordinato units. Ground loudspeaker broadcasts were em-ployed extensively during D CAP, CMCKIATE, and other operations.

(d) IFF(MCEV provided the division with four PSYOP teamsfrom the 246th P3Y0P Co during the quarter. Ono of the teams advises the

V2 /

PBYOP .branch of the G3 section, antl the others were attached to brdades

during opekations. The tows proved extremely helpful by providin qdali-fied advice and assistance in- planning and implementing PSY 'OFP Activities,PSOP teams from the 25th Inf Div (ARVN) were used at brigade/iand bhttalionlevels for extended periods during four major operations, G S/US "Go Teams",one from U NHIA and one. from LOWQ AN, 'accompanied US units on a dailybasis during two dperations. The Vietnamese cultural tem sponsored byJUSPAO gave two performances in support of division operations. All of theseGVN te-ms provided valuable and affoctive assistance- to US units in theircontacts with the local populace.

(e) 'The division provided PSYOP support to elements out-side the division on five occassions. Two leaflet drop missions were flownfor the 49th Regt (ARVN), two for HLU INGHIA provincial authorities, and onefor the Special Forces detachmnt at HIEP HOf,.

(f) The CHIMU HOI program continued to be a major vrea ofapplication. Much of the division's propaganda output has CHIEU HOI thomes.Returnees statistics for provinces in which division units operated ares,

MIX !'J2HA LOW~ AN TAY NIDIH

August "91, 31 38September 53 3, 25October 4Z' 24

The marked increase in returne6s" for LO!M AN province is attributed to:

I The presence of US troops which forbed the fra~g-mentation of larger ViZ Gong units and their relocation-into villages and

hamlets. This, in turn, is considered to have caused any local cadrer todefect because of a loss of prestige and authority.

2 The misorable living conditions in Viet ong con-trolled areas due to extensivo floddig.

" A wider dissemination of propaganda, particularlyconcerning the CHIEU HOI program,

It is significant that in October for the first tae two returnees turnedtheimselves in directly to a division unit, lot Bn (15, 5th Inf in TAN PHUTRUNG. Interviews of 29 returnees wore conducted during the quarter. Eightwere immediately exploited with taped loudspeaker appeals, and seven wereexploited with the printing of porsonalizad leaflets. One of the returneeswas a ta'lentod singer and willingly sang his appeal. The PSYOP branch hasinstituted a CIZEU HOI returnee leaflets and tapes library. Returnee leafletsand tapes originated by- the division are held in the library for four monthsto permit immediate exploitation as soon as the returnee s unit is againlocated and targeted. Four of the returnees interviewed were main force,

2 wore local force, and 23 weru local gurrillaa. Of the returnees inter-view*ed, 26 statwd they had soon and read leaflets, and 25 said they had heard

24

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S loudspeaker boadcstsi, Most admittad that they were influenoed to brwith the Viet Cong by the leaflets and broadcats, Relatives and frij*Mnd wehad seen and heard GVi/U propagarda persuaded 15 rpturieem to defect, Allsaid that their Viet Cong cadre took "untarIasures against QVR/B prop..-ganda. The interviews reaffirmed Vie Cong PSYOP vunerabillties. The mostprevalent reasons for their returning were:

Fear of JV4UIv t%a P; &g#.Des msr -to i-oturn to "fainly.RIrdohips of Viut Gong life.

The CJIlU HOI program also wa' stpportid in other wqs. Helping Hand canodi.ties were distributed to 42 families of returnaas living in tho CU CM area.Food, oooking utensils, cots, azid mosquito rots wore provided to the CFMP"HOI Center at CU CHI -to improve that facility. EPploymnt for returnees wAcoordinatud with Pacific Architects and Engineers Corporation, the oompWpurformdng rdpair and utilitins sorvicos for Arq inotallations in Vietnam,To date, 14 formerly unemployed' returnoes have been hirod. A "FriondshipHousoP was built toaoawaxgte roturnevs while they arm with the division,SThis comfortably outfitted cottapo has dono much to taa~ b impress the

returnees and win their cooperation.

(g) During tho raporting poriod, 4he PSOP branch has boonexcpcndod by the assignuant of onu maJor and ono lioution " Justifidationfor this oxtpnsion is conta!mnd in tho ,QER. submitt-ud in early August. The

raO also provided for one oaptain w. a PSYOP officur in the. 55 section ofeach brigcAd hc-Adquarturs Tontativu approval has bn rec dio from .HQ,o ARFAC to procued in filling the positicns requested in the MOl. Thoseadditional persons spocifically responsible for PSYOP activities throughoutthe division aro expected to further onhcnoe the division PMOP prograu

/"(2) Analpi.

(a) In addition to the Improv~uonts mentioned abovo, diYw6ipion 1OP program progrossed during the qurrtur as evidenced by tho im.provud aness of the importance And effectvoness of EBIOP throughout tie,dii This has resulted in the more deliberate and thorough planning of

TYOP &tivities, the increased use of a griator vrriuty of PSYOP techniquesv4nd dvices during oper.Ations, and t1- more extansive and dense over:o ofoperotional areas. Indications that the propaguLh output is reaching andaffecting the intended t-.rget audinoes arethe returnee rates, "the favorablereports from returnees* and the reported negative reactions from Viet Congcadre,

(b) Locally fabricated field expedient Wunts for loud-spookor equipment cgn be ,Aapted to aira.tft availabla within the division,This givvs tho divipion its own wrial loudspeakur broadcast capability.

(a) Stockagu of coaonly usod standard leaflets at divisionand brigade levels permits fulfilling roquiretments without diairy.

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(d) It has been fbund that an onorgotic "mrohandl ,nghtof PSOP at lowr command lavels enhances the overall PSYOP program, Throughthe media of liaison visits and inspections the PSYOP branch has madn &concerted effort to orient commanders and staff officers at all levels onthe importance and potential benefits of PSYOP and the techniques and devicesavailable to them, The orientations have resulted in deliberate and effec-tive PSYOP being incorporatud into all operations.

j. (U) Wcuml.

(1) Personnel and Supporting edical Units.

(a) The Division at the end of the report p',rdod was short3 Medical Corps Officers, These shortages wore the Division Aviation MedicalOfficer in the Division 4urgoonts Section, and four in the 25th MedicalBattalion* We now have two MC Officer TDY from the 12 Evacuation Hospital.It is believed that this TDY program will oriunt hospital doctors with theDivision inidicUl functions and limitations.

(b) Eln nts of the 12th Evmcuation Pospital began movinginto W CHI during October. Fourteen quonsots have been o tmpled and con-struction is continuing Ln the area. Peksonnul we working with the 7thSurgical Hospital.

(2) Special Evants. On 5 September a special mtoorial wasdedicatod to CPT Authur B. Lmis, M, who was killed on 17 Mar 1966. TheBaso Comp Dispensary ums renamed Authitr E. Lewis Dispnsary in his honor.

(3) Provntive Mudicino.

Health of the Commnnd.

I Personal hygiene. The j6rsonwl hygiaan and physicalcondition of the troops are excellent. No significant skin disease problemoccurred during the third quartor 1966.

2 Disenso. The Division has buun very fortunato withrospct to disease. DuAIng the 7th, 8th and 9th months in RVN, no diseasesoccurred in large n-.ugh numbers to affoct the fighting strength of theDivision.

a Thu admission rates, rate/1000 ms/year, for

selected diseases .re as follows:

Disease Aug Sep Oct

Common Respiratory Diseases 29;7 25.0 30*4Diarrheal Diseases 15.6 26.5 39.5Psychiatric Disease 6.6 2.3 5.3Malaria 16.4 4.7 0.8

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Infectious Hepatitis,. 4;9 L.6 5.3Heat InJu 1.6 13,0 4.6

b Cmon' respiratory dia sue ranks first and diar.rheal disease ranks sooond n term of nunber of admissions contributing tothe noneffootivene.s. in persomnal.

a flaria has not' been a problem in the 25th znfan-try Division TAC9. While th majority of the cases were contracted on opn%-ations, at least one case occurred in an inavidual who did not leave theBase Oap# indicating the necessity for personal protective measuroe in the

d During July, 1966, the first caso of mlioidosisin RVN wns diagnosed in a m;bor of the 25th Infantry Division. SporAdicadses hnvo been oonfirmw. since then, Thus far, eight cases have occrred inDivision personnel. Three indivijaals havo expired from this disease.

a Venereal disease is being contracted at a steayrate,. There was a significant drop during September. The rates for Augst,September, and October were a78.0, 205.5 and 212,2 casesi /1000 men/yea rre4spectively. Qooccic conditions are by far the most con veneradisease, accounting for over 90% of cases, Chancroid and syphilis axe secondand third in the number of cases,

f The non-battle in'try rates were 60.7. 70.2 and57.8 admiosions/1000 men/yar for August, September, and October, reSpuctively.

(4) 14nviromntal Sartitition,/b(a) Water supply. The Division has boon supplied a highly

favorable quantity of potable wator by the enginoors. Approximately 10gallons/n/daq are provided. Potablo water has a 5 ppm residual at thu pointof distribution and 2 ppu at tw point of consumption. The non-potable wateris batch chlorinated to 8ppm to incroaso the degree of safety of this waterfor use in showvrs, etc.

/

(b) Insect and rodint control, Pacific Architects andEnginpors are beginning to asum= thQ rosponsibility of instict and rodentcontrol. However, the inM-n effort is still carried by Division personnel,

(c) Indigenous personnel, From a medi al standpoint theonly Vietnamese nationals having a potential offuct on the hoalth of thetroops are barbers. Those people are required to havu health cortiflcatesgranted by a USA medical facility.

(5) Vatorinary Data.

(a) During the quarter, a voterinwary food inspection special-ist was attached to the Division. His primary duty is to recomwnd and main-

27

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thin sianitaxy practices of food distribution at the Class I yard.

(b) An iou cream plant bogan opurations during the quarter.Initial!y. the product yielded excosxivuly high stnd-ard plate countd andooliforms on bacteriological studies. This has since been corrected,

/A(c) Support for rabies control is provided by the 4th

Medical Detachment, APO 96307. A veterianerian visits the Camp appraximatelyonce a month to immunise animals for rabies.

k. (U) Sim.." The Division Signal Officer and ADSO attended theArmy Signal Officers Conference. The ADSO became pArt of study group whichworked out plan for relationships bittuen 1st Signl Brig do troops, whowill provido b7se cimp comuncations, .nd tactic,%l units. The pln wasforwarded to USta for final approval, On 2 Sep the 86th Signal Bn Ilq Dotarived at CU CHI Bdso Camp. This unit will ultimately, be responsible forbae camp communications. On 3 Oct the DSO we visited by a team from theOffice of the Chief of Coaminmjtions and Electronics who desire to installIWACS into the base camp vrea to upgrade tilephone truidng service. -Hdafinitu date was given for the install.tion. The Division DistributionAuthority completed the modification of all A?/GRC-4to in the Div to operatewith the KW-7. Installation of TSEC/U-'8 voice cyphor equipment was cpletcd within the Brigades and Div' Arty.

1. (U) Training~

(I) August:

(a) Ropl,.camnt traiing continued throughout thu month ofAugust with emphasis pl.icud on wr;-,pons firing, tho use of specianl quipmint,and claymore mines. Classes on adjustment of artillery firv, prevention dfheat injuries, tunnel searching tuchniqus, =nd squad tactics were taught.4n orientation on the CIMEW HO progran and cl-sses on Rules of Sngnage.ntwith unphasis or inimiuing nonco:n£ir.t,-ant cnsultius was Givan. Special u-phasis has been applied to night trinirng to include night firing nd nightairmobile oporations.

(b) Thu Lightning A11bush Acadxuy conducted ambush train-ing for twelve rifle platoons during the wonth. Now aubush and counturadbushtechniques acquired through recent las.ns lejarnod -xe continually applied tothe progrnu of instruction.

(c) The reclntly acquired Scout Dog Pl.toon has conductedconditioning and proficiency drills between c.Ab:t Aissiuns.

(d) A progran to assist in the traiing of a IIFFOIICEVz-ero riflo platoon had been doval, pod and was scheduled to begin on 2 Sop 66.

(a) September: Ruplaconnt trainind, and refrusher trainingcontinued thrugh the ionth of Sup ember. Thu Xightning kAbush AcadenW'

28

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t'

S grcAatd its. 25th class on 30 September. gTrainin continued on specialequipment such as intrusion'devices, star3Al'* s copes, 'and claymore mines.Training emphasis oontinued on night training ,,amb.sh# countorambusho adjust-

27th In!, to &Vrlwop ,1i aero rifle platdon tot IIFFORC V'was terminated onV 30 Septembo. .Driver .fe'y training was initiated. at unit level in September

and will continue a8d quarterly training i-0quirmnent.

() October: Efforts du~ihf the month of October.were directodowards trainihg replacemont. "

(a) To recontly orga ized Division Replacomunt TrainingDetcchnWnt began trainngall r6pl-. c. nonte on 19 Oct 66. Initially, two60. man 4 .sas were: progrmed each week, Classes will continue for 4 dayswith .thi'fourth day devoted entirely to t~o preparation arnd conduct of an,ambush patrol. Other. subj.ects include Know Your EnunW Know Your Friends,The'CIUEU HOI Program., Rules of Engagosnt, VC Minos and Booby Traps, Adjust-mInt .of Artilljry Fires, Weaporm TrAining and Special Equipmont Training. Aaof 31 Oft 66, ond" hundred afd seventy-two porsonel havu receidA training.

(b) The Mines and Booby Trap course, constructed and operatedby the 65th Mnginer Battalion, conmenced forzal instruction on 16"Oct 66.The course consist of a four hour unit of instruqtion on identification ofUS =nd VC mines and booby trap devices, and the VC iathods of eoployman t ,Additionally students ard shown VC .tunnolss fortifications, spider holes,and a villago unvirorniunt. Six courses have beeo coupletod. Replacunnttrainees also receiv tMls trmining. The Lightning &mbush kcadwa graduatedits 38th platoon size clss at tho end of Oct 66, Additionall-y, officers.nd "NCOd from the 25th Inf Div (ARVN), 4th In! Div and PhILC;GV attonded

(e) Division schools in moss nanagmont, genurator'opero-tion, smal arms twIntnnco, and demolition -nd explosivs continued.

(d) Non Divisiunal courses .lso continudd with students srtto Recondo School at 1 TI x, and orientation courses Tt .GON and TASON Nwr.

Co

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2. (C) Com mdere Analysia/eom zndationS.

a. Ommanders Reommandations. Pacification operations in supportof .the. Revolutionary Development program are geared to winning over the localpopulace and underminin VC influence. Results thus far attained include:

(1) Furtheranoe of US and GVN aim axd policies.

(2) Extension of GVN influenco into more areas through thebuilding of bridges and road repairs to reopen civilian lines of cmunicationpreviously cut by VC. Traffic on LOC's in HAUNMUA opened during the lastreporting period continued with few VO incidents. Tho increased ARVN CAprograms, to include an ambitious RF/PF CA program in HAU NMIA for the lastquarter 1966 are a major step in improving VN civilian-military relationshipseEamples of these programs aro1 a dispensary boing constructed by 4th -%,50th Regt (ARVN) at ING HOA, the repairing and repainting of the Y IX)C schooliL LONG AN and rebuild.g of the adjacent outpost by the 46th Regt (ARVN).o a (3) A continued increase of voluntary informants and willingness

of VOS and VOC to implicate follow cell co nittee memb o .

b. Observations.

(1) Personnel.

IT=: Reporting of battlefield injuries.

DISCUsIOs- Administrativeo probles resulted when troop and platoon modicstrting minor battlefield injuries failed to prpare A MDD Form 1380. Allbattlefield injuries, no mattor how slight, should be carded as soun asfeaseble after the injury, and notification of in4ury should be given-to thedispensary.

OS3RVATION: Prepratiun and submission .f the 14 DD 1380 facilitatesk'epng -tack of all woundod, and expeditcs the owrding of Purple Heartswhen applicable.

(2) Operations.

I ": Marking of landing sonas for night airmobile opeortions.

DISOUSSION: During night airmobile operations# aircraft have landed as faras 2M0 "Wters from intended landing zoncs, duc to the difficulty of naviga-tion at night over foaturoIcss tcrrAs On sLvcral occasions landir zoneshave been succcsfully marked at night by using white phosphorus shells,O oocenonzo lluminating, shells' wor. used fe mvigatiorl.rounds fur a holicoptcr night c-traction of the Long Range ReconnaissancePatrol and proved to be very satisfactory.

30

I i TTION; White Phosphorus and Iluminating shefl3 can be used to plaMing aone at night, Close coordination between the Flight Ccindr andthe lire Direotion Genter'is essential to insure that the aircraft is notexlangeredg and that the aircraft It alvs6 enough to the landing soae toobserve the burst.

I14:Iaintuiapg cacumiat~ons on enemy contact.

DISCSION: Generally, in ar covbt situation, the leader and his radio arewar the front. NOh time upon ene=' contact the radio is daum-ed, -or the

leader or O are Incapacitated. Thus the platoon is mmentar1 wlthoutcoc mioatonm during a most critioal period.

OMBBRATIOU: The use of a beck-up radio at the rear of the..platuon with thee~ond in o nmd w'ill provide continuous comunicationa throughout enowi ontact.

flI: Gave of woinaded personnel.

DISCUSION: The rapid and proper oare pf wounded often interferes with theexploitation of contact with the onhz. One technique suocessfully employedto inbm this effect is to allow the elomcnt neking contect to fightwhile the elements following ocaro for the wounded. load elownts will usuallysustain the .ority of casualties. The ele nta followine eat be preparedto care for and ovacuate the casualties. This will allow the lead ole nt tofire and maneuver rather than get tied down by v acuatin.

OMUATIONs If this tactic is to be utilizod the eloments following must becapable to 1JreUM for and evacuating the wounded.

flTl: Use of gahips.

DISCMSION: Ounship ftring at distances of 40-50 tores from frienfly trwopsMe ben found to be very effective. The h -ug-ing-- tactics of the VO oftenpreolude the use of artillery. However, by marking fri ndly nositione withsmoke, gU' hips can very effectively support troops with machine V= androckets making their passes parallel to the line of contact.

OMRVATION: This tactic has proven very effective when the VC wert too closofor ue o friendly mortars or artillery.

ITS LZ selection/paddy areas.

DIBOUS8IOtI During the wet seasonp rlmost all paddies are inundated.Trf loility for foot trcops in the padeies varies with the status of th r

rice crop. Those areas where the rice hs been harvested with the stocks out,are muddior than where rice is still growing. To clear an LZ as quikly aspossible, the airlandod soldier nceds the beat possible fo,.ting.. LZ'sshould be picked whore the riec is still growing. These a easily beidentified from the air by their color, Brown fields are usually muddy whilegeen one's have a firmer fc..ting, Thove which have been iecently plowedshould be avoided at all costs.

31

*

OB8IRATIONs Cmmndos shoul, select padi.es which are Cram in oolo tfor

ITBHr Identification of captured supplies,

DISCUSSIONI When rmltiple unitt are opoatinrn in lare ocoho areas thesupplie founl should be marked or identified to preolule- du;61ioation inreportine.

OBSERVATION: Units shoule * develop SOPWs to establish identification ofsuppliae and equipment found in ]lAre onauh areas*

ITSK: Submission of ground fire reports by fliGht elements durine airaobileoperations*

DISCUSSIONt Accurate and timo3y rcpurtine of ground fire to the air mihssonccmander during airmobile operations is essential. These reports influence'docisions made concerning use of alternate approach -and departure routes,altornato LZ's ad PZtp wae of -mnships, additional afrstrikes, use ofartillery, and terminating or delayin the assault or extraction.

OBSERVATION: Reomuend that the vital importanco of accurate and timelygoud fir reports bo stressed with all aviators.

IM: Planring of alternate approach hnd departuro routes during airmobilooperations,

DISCUSSION" Th 'aviation battalion has learned through conduct of airmobileoperations that detailed ;l;anning of alternato approach and departure routesn a mst. Coupled with this plannine is the requirement for a detailed

briefing of fliht leaders ond all aircraft cumondcrs on those alternateroutes. By monitoring ground fire roports and altering the flight path ofsubsequent flight clemunts, damogo to aircraft by around fire can be reduced*

OBSERVATION: Recommend thzt on all airmobilc operations, planninc for ..altornate approach routos receive the same detail attention as selection ofprt-iiary zones,

ITEM: Lighting devices fur hasty hclijpds,

DISCUSSION. The aviation battalion is frequently called upon to conduct, medical evaouations. On occasions the ovactuation could have been-offected sooner if the troop unit possessed edequato lighting deviocs.

OBSERVATION: Rccomer. all patrols ari) units oprating in the field atnight carry sufficient devices to siCwil an.'. Luido a helicopter to a safelanding. These items shoul0 be. listcd on patrol loador3 -chock lists andall personnel instruotod in selection of hasty helipaod and the use oflighting devices.

32

r fl ,. Alternate cooan and control ;arty for ataiobi2e opratiome

DICU8SIONs Durl aimob3e operations an aiibom omand. and contr olparty Is osentiali Proyvibons mist be mado for a altOaoote ormond andcontrol party to assume the 'funotions of the prima port sho the needarise. The alternate party nust be responive to the asmmptoan of ammdshould the priary .party be foroed to leavo theo, peratioml area for .ofAagor in the event their aircraft is forced down b manhanoul fai2me or emWaotion.

OSERVATI :R ecomie..planning for all airmobile operations lnolmW.prMomisos for an alteite omanC and control party*

I4s Commictions for downed aircraft recovery operation.

* DISCUSSION: Experience ha shown that when an aircraft is downed d u'ng anairmbil operation a recovery force commander must be appointed*.. No isresponsible for securing the downed aircraft, *evauotaie the o e d andfinally ovacuati. the aircroft. Forces required to ccomplish i arcplaoed under his opeationml control. When the recovery fa1e elmont andthe air missinc ommandor utilio the m UVF requenmys the v oftranmilssions is so great that prompt cear co-mi tion s U 1wmathe,

OBSEVATION: ReoAd plans fcr an ai-mobile operation n resevl. a

sole umor uF frequenc for all downed aircraft recovery operatione

I14t IWropor utilisation of Firefly equtmnt.

DISCUSSION: Noro discwradnntion should b exmrcimsed In deatea.luW-tmvalidito Firefly missimed. &1vorse woather conditions and the tqpe ofterrain to be observed can almost ocapletol2y oliminote the effoCtlvowMi ofthis team* Surprise Is ope of the prinary advantages provded by the fUstlyteam. Continmc' or niohtly use in the General ores ros=a this deairblocharacteristic.

B0ERAvTI0. Use fifty teams sarinay and with *Oeath and mdesmcoensurate with its capabilities* The firefly team loa r'n oPInicn ofthe validity of the mission shuuld carry considerable W9 iht sne i hoUmore fully aware of the offectivnoss of the team in relatin.to conditumoxisting at the tim of the missi n roquest.

ITE: Bproer use of atuhi s 'in sauport of ground units.

DISCUSION: unships by their very nature are close suport eapo. m

hI mreuvab o and more responsive to changing aroa o060t sitUtlthan a- other coquicht available to the around ocmander. 3.1W prlmmfrole is to provide supwessive fire a_ainst onom targets and simll amdirectd against troops on the ground. or aircraft on an, iTmobila UvarimThe presenec of euribips in an area where fire is restricted or prohibitedis uselos,s and is only offorimg additional targets for the ouo Orbitiover an aroe for lone periods of time when not in contact with the eeqgreatly reduces the aircrafte "on station time when actually naded and

33

Imseuse mintonee burdens on the afLro ft

U~t. Ouns ips n suport of Mround elamutst after being brieM am''Vt of rial troops and the tactical situation, should rMiiion the- pound until a target is naiUtlble or.cunsbip suppurt can be used.O . should not be usod soVi3*'In an obasrvtif role r just as adeterrent beoause .of their preaencov

lrE: The use of red, liGhts for marking Wa by pethfner detachments boproved to be ineffective "

DIBM SIQs. On.recent night eirmobile operations, re L2,ghts in the form ofd wed by pathfinder personnal to mark the IWe The inbound fligbtof helicopters were able to distinguish the general area of the landingzone by observing the flashing ligbt gun used by the pathfiivlers. lHowevlthe toucdown point marked with the red. liht .TO. could not be seen. It boobeen determined that the red lights on the 1- bloded with the red lztrintand cockpit lights inside the aircraM.

OSRVATICs Reocmand that in future night pathfinder oporatios grew.*b].ue' or ' light. be used to mark IIg.. These color contrast withcockpit l.tghting ..and can readily be piked up by helicopters duri'theapproach to the landing sone,

I :- Briefing of supported aviation units,

DISCUSION: Aviation support fer brigados of the division is provided almostdaily by direct support afrmobile coupantd not organic to the division. Asa rule, these direct support aimobi2e ocauanies eto not habitually upportthe same brigades, but are assianed a direct support mission a a dallybasis depending on the requirements of I: Force. Frequently, these directsupport airmobile owpanies are not familiar with the area of operations.To insuro maximum efficienoy and safety of oporation, the liaison offloor ofthe direct support unit should receive a detailcd briefing by the supp-tedunit to include: rround tactical plan, location of friendly =its, eneusituation and the location of any around fire roceived by aircraft previouslyoperatino in the ar.ea.

O MIERVTIONs That either the Brigade Aviation Officer or the 83 representa% ve.,oi ase of an infantry battalion, the S3 brief the dirot sikportairmobile ompany linison' officer on the above listed items,

I.TE Inherent dangre of low l vOl flying.

DISCUSSN: On two different occasions within the -. st three months, oasualtiosa ustained from enemy gun fire by aircraft flying low level at an

altitude Just sufficient to clear tOrain obstacles. In both oases theaircraft vm 91ying low level in an off )rt to avoid gun target fire offriendly ,Artillery. Neither flight was made out of necessity, but rather tosave time. In both coses the flights could have boon conducted at on altitudebeyond the effective range of small orm=nd autowtio weepons with only aaltght deviation of course neacssary to avoid arti lery gun fire.

34

AWN: .&Aton'ft should.*no1t 1 e pexatad low l94020 nIMS at ofWRIILnecedsiib. Adduinhtrative flights's not be a nducted tair10

,s. NiSg, IlUmination $or haliborne tionso

1)IBCU8IONt Night heliborne operations fr some type of" Iiumetionover the Le if the operation is to be succeaa. in areas where.the conditionof the LZ and the eu oundin ternin . I unouh. Artilloz. flares WPartillery roud, "Firefly" air zraft n- Navy Pylare zuOd .II. Neave be=used with vryin degrees of succes, .

OBBLWATI0Ns Artillery flares are, nt eil a s hi uiottjni ozopid, the candlepowr . the lite- fla'sre in not of desired zIntensity andthe adjustment or plaoemnt of flare requiroe too much coordination forthe short period of tim that it will be used.

-A WP artillery round is desirable f'or zwrkinu-tho landizk one when noother form of artificial Mninotion Is- available. Th round should'beplaced in the 1a 2 iu mtea puo to the actual linding. This procedureinsures that the flight loqear will see the flash of the eplodine round andheadine on the inboaund M ht path can be adjusted. iOSW from the burningroxnd can bd seen by the 4iht leader 15004600 meters depunddi on themount of natural light available,

fumination of the LZ with the aid of the tloodlkhte mountd -on the

"Firefly" aircraft provides a ain Inl amount of light on the LZ, but becauseof the arrangment of the lights on the mount, they wil onr project afairly conoentrated beam of- light on a smanl portion of the LZ.

The Navy Rare, HK 24p Mod M dropped from a cirocling helicoptorprovides the best source of illumination of the LZ whan dropped vp wind twominutes prior to touchdown of the lift aircreft. Direct.oamunicationsbetweon the C&O aircraft and the flarc airorcft enables rapid adjustment ofbucceeding flaro drops if the initial drop is not in the desired location.

f..I: tLirmoble operations.

DI3CUSON: The suooss of eorjle flight operations (airmobilo assaults intoMrem of 6pportunity) depends lcrcoy upon the tearvork botwooi the infantryunit and supporting army aviation. Units which constantly work toGetharform a h degree of profipioncy in this type of operation, SupporMf.uo ocapanios which are not familiar with either the infantry mit orthe typo operation or the areas of operation experience difficlty insuccess performin the missions

OENRVZION Infantry battalions should be supported by the same ainuobileoam cn all operntions.

Meknixed infantry in sweepint operations.

/33

DISCUIO:Meschanised infantr'y should make rapid swe"p tkouuh th6e VPoEtheir AO on the first day or days of the operation to olow with

and destroy the fleeing V. Very little time, it Wn,, should be spent ondetailed searches the first..day of the operation. Detailed searches on thefirst day or days of the -operation should be conducted by additional troopsor by the dismounted troops of the meoha4ped infantry on its return sweepthrouah the area.OBSERVATIONr The major contacts 'and esa.n em" with the VO .oqw on the

- F-of to e operation.

I=: VO contact..

DISC SION: When omted is made the WO witfidraw through an area where eithertunnels, bvnkos or trenches are located. As US forces halt to conductsearches of these structures the VO break contact and escape. The VO break upinto two and three man teams, leaving one team in the bunker/tunnel location.

OBSERVATIONs Rapid maneuver and pursuit should be employod to close withand 'estroy the V0. Very little time, if any, should :be spent on searchesof tunnels and bunkers when VO forces witdraw through these areas. Reserveelements should be enployed in these areas as the major partof the unitobtinies rapid movement to close with and deptroy the VC force. After the

destruction 6f the flceinL VC force, elements should make a return sweepthrough the area and at this time detailed searches of tunnels and bunkersshould take place.

M: Explosives and demolitions carried in APCIs

DISCUSSION: Explosives and demolitions are carried in the cargo compartmentwith Uoops. On occasion vohicles carrying troops and explosivos hit anti-tank mines which cause the orplosivea. t. deton te. The dual explosionsincreased casualties aW damaCe to vhicles,

OBSERVATION: Only a mlinmu of demolitions should bo carried arn. additionaldemoiMtions brought out by rosu17 maanS. Tho carrier which is imcd tocarry the demolitions should have a mdiulmm number of personnel aboard toreduce" the number of porsonnol exposed to a sin[le explosion.

.. M_: Or;anisation of convoy escort by tho cavalry troop,

DISCUSSION: Each platoon is responsiblo for one serial which win have a;! 50 wheeled vohiclos. Scout 'squads arc placed at the beginning andond of each sorial, The lead squad moves far ahead of the column checkingthe ara to the front of the serial for amAushos and command detonated mines.The remaining vehicles of the platoon are dispersed throughout the serial.Tho platoon leader commnds each serial so that he can control the speed.A trail party consisting of the maintenance armored personnel carriers,wreckers, and *o headquarters APO's for security, is positioned at tho endof the convoy. The comnnications, track is placed in the last serial. Theconvoy comandor is habitually airborno,

CA),~96 C1,

94

*BWT~f rh ab ~rua1wtc tw bonf the bet mlUwd foreaow- ua convoy on !F rocuLv~r Wueise

Mjs Difituslntiou of trop in convoys.D1SCU8MI: Ow ne occasion the VO detnated a mmso apnnt a tru* oauyUStroc no . taMck mas the 1M0t vohilo Iin a odon of 120. SemJor.ty of the vhicles man afte xoopt for tree tmuk at the rear ofths. 6m coazwI troope. ' aine explosion wounded four i6 -Somvers,It oased no dane to the truck.

083IM!ATINt: ParsamW In truck convoys ahooA be evedy distriUted anmminumde tarcota far VO minine tncieents if tactical Itse itycan be sainiado

I s. Assault of trench lina and prepared positions by armored cavalry

DZSCUSU~s Rlecont3, a cavalry7 troop encounterd the VO In well pepared,~ concealed trench ayutm located in a rubber plantation area*

Tho aroe vws taken under artiory fire nd than thoraueh covered bymountod olamnta. After the conclusion of the artilley fire and mountedsearch, the er still occupied the underground tunnels and bunker aystm,

_____TON: The VC arc vol ontroichod, well concealed in their positi el cn ~o " rooto out only by dimounted action, A coordinated ftonk-

irifntry effort Is essential to effeotivey clear any arm*

XTF4s VC operations b pinst amor.

DI8MtW83DN; VC forces avoid di.roct entagoennt8 with armored eonto. WhMM VCroo€caCe on-oauing armor, they are in wUil concealed, weil constructedtrench and tunnol ccupaxxos. VC forces maka extensive use of mines and boobytrape. often p2oaoi them in vhicle tracks sihoc armor units mut frequsnttyrotur!- over the awm route duo to the limited trnfftacbility in vAIV azeas.COmand detonated airms are often rigged In troeeeio be emplqd againsbvehicle oreimen frca above. During the last 30 dnys there bo been a markedIncreaso in VC auployM n of RG-2 1s The !IPO-2's have been employed alnTeor in group (up to five) and have been habitually fired frcs close Inpositions thmt are vell oamouflaeod andnearly :nwacosoable to track vehiclos.

MUMRVAT"DN: VC forces avoid direct onvcoawonte with armored eiemen. V'oroos moke exensive use. of maiwa, to include ooaund clotoitod id.mm onfrquently travoled vohlolo routes. Thcre ha been an increase in theumplo t of IUPO-21s In the past month.

IUM: Contruction and teat of helicopter mounted grenade dispenser*

DISCUrSIOM. On the basis of sketches received from the 1st ov Div (Air-mobile)#-a'nd in conjunction with Co E, 725th Mintezanco Battalion theDivision Chemi=l Sectin constructed two sets of helicopter mounted

37

,. //

/

pz d daozuerg The dipenser we onstructed ut1iuiM 2%75 ijh rocket sshipping pode (4 tas pespbo).p AMIqg Imo Is used to fdm a reek fm' +M.td~~s and mountiflt the device *on the aircrzaft. One not of. diapene umconsttructed of ten pods per dispenser nuntmed in .to banim of Mew podseah -utilliin the fall longth of the tubes, The seond~ act ws cozutzwctedof six pods por dispenser mounted in two banits of three pods oach4 ftelength of'the tubes for the smaler dispenser moere out so. they wvui ho~A ft",genaded per tube, Total amounte of grawense that con be handled ts 32DPer lar .0 dispenser for a rall lad of 640 powdea per net and 120 pedaper smal dispenser for a tota of 24,0 genades per -set* Both dispenser setswere fligh tested and, are considered oporablo.

OEWTION: large p'emac'e dispensers When loading the -disponver grenades* ~~ Wtgro upside dawn duo to a lip in the tube about Wor Inches frcuw

tho botton. Grenade handlJes will hone on this lip if cz'inades are notInverted&. SmUi gr'enadel disponnert Grenad~es may be loaded either rigjt side/upZo upside down, since the lUp referred to above 'will be out off 'when thetubarO shortened* Due to fuse delay of grenades, an the drop altiq.is increased more of the enmade filling is dissipated In the air and ground/buftnin til in reduced.

TM4: Installation of Spiral Four Cable.

DISCUSION: In two instances hpri- a b ben installed outside ofMe aM.on existing polos in areas that were not considered secure! afterj

datrk* Ono coverod a distance of approximtely 3j miles andr ban not been /molested by tho VO in two months of operation. The second spival-4 cablecovers a distance of 10 3/4 miles and has been in operation for fi-D daYawithout Interruption.*

OBMUIATIOt: Spiral-I. cable con be used for rela tively showt circuitsZo rQj126"vii and IN traffic*

I=:_ VHF Antennae

DISCUSION: Whon ant-na sipAce is at a minimum or 'when installstio ti~iuse two VIW antenne reflectors (AT-I14) on one antennz at /

seetion (LB-235) for two VHf systems, To acomuplish this two moict .ovhave to be maote the top or cover of the antenna reflector support kaatobe reamoved to allow for the insertion of additional moot sections, am'l amodified wast section mst be =ade, The =ole ends of two moat ectictmust be constructed end to and for the continuance of additional i.vtsections for the seccn2 reflector.

0/

OBSERVIMTON: The antenna configntion affords 360 sMUte covere 1theither reflector an2 'will function perfectlyv at two mast section (AB-.)sepdtcation.

3M~: PA System.

II

38

I/4

I , I

t m Ist level i,- t ad oidto circult of the A Ar *4-- anpg.t fd acircuit by addInC a fredbuek rsistor isj

d from the olletorU to t t bass of tr aistwr Q.- Add a Unae anmtIVstasp, oomitetiJ of a .W capacitor and a 50 oai audiot.apped pot-oomn- vIn assi s ommo ted to the hI& aids of the output traMfox, 5,eoq3,me7 tothe cc~1otor of the driver stage (S& the other side of the irb transfoairmoorslrz est be conected to rmand.

aPA capeble of saftfying the no" damnuin

DO &Is For this p ircuit the foli n mus3t be -aocueplioed at the

MiXeo~ site .ooational Me opoate"' of t interconecting mystoU willhave to turn respeotivo 4 M1O chae model .4 - w switch to the 4w posltic.fte rin,,er comnspondi with the oannol mit also be n the 4w position..You .m, also run another 26 pair coble frm tho van to the patching panel froeitber Ale or 314, dopending on the systom boing vood. The patch panel wIUimake the necesary atong to coamlete th oi rcuit.

W ATIE: This typo of circuit l.nvasee the qmuit. of a voice o1rcuStiere s~ya station or relays are used vithin a systum.

(3) Lyeli nOo

I: iap coverage fur aviation units.

DMCTMSIONt Aviation units aleted for deployment in W1 shoul requisitionr mnve W hand prior to arrivl in cnmtry a ooplete coverae of map,

Vietnp ljSOOO . This is desirable sino tho looation assigmmiurt of maaviation units arrivine in RVN has beon chm d whilo the unit was m'outo.These cabne he romltod in the aviation units being unable to re d rmnxima avian support duo to non-evailability of mp co.vez e. Aviationunitm in RVN are also froqumAt called upon to provide aviation support Inadjacent corps o requiring mp coverage no normally carrid in the~unit basic. load*OER1NVATION: Rewcmend tbatall aviation units alerted for decplymnt in RVN

0 .%sa basic load of rope that will Givo them ompleto cov age of WDI.

ITI: VC emopoymnt of hcorchlJhts in an anti-aircraft role.

DISCUOsMo On two diffoont occasions in recent montls, and frma fourTaetfom, VO employment of searchlights in the anti-aircraft role havc beenreported. On both the sidtiness the 'airraft received autanctic Weaponsfire ftom locati,04 near the souree of the light in3icative that the VC areeupoying coordinatod ligt-Om twm. In one case the fire received vasostimted to be .50 caliber. Ono of the freroaft vas flying at an altitudeof 3,000 feot and reporto4.thot tm aircraft had boon *bathed" in liGhtswhich iri!ica ted the VC posess a considerable power source capability*

39

BBUVATM IO saamo,, that aircraft .ns and pilots be I pnall7i ne g at night for VC soazch2l.a. Easive action ahboia bo

takin 'lmedietely and a report rendered on the location as soon after aspossible.

IM Armed helicopter reo2mmiasbnoe and parking of WZ's prooedmso

D I 'CSIMI:I Iecent interrogation of a OIMU BOX .rnicates that arned bell-copters reconnaissancoe and marking procedures are possibly falling 1nt4 arepetitive and therefore donCerous pattern, The OIEU HOI related that vwue*=W troops first observe armed helicabers f2ylan low in the areaVcalculto thoy will havo about ten minutes before the troop oaA. 5o1-coptors will arrive. Their actions in this case are to hide end not to shootat the armed holicoptor. Thoir mortars and machine G= arc then laid on thesuspootcd landing none as detwdned by the interest of the armod heolOoptwWhon the troops arrive tho onoi ooaander givos the order to fire at thefozution.

ODSERVATIONt That aind helicopter reconnaissance and makling procedures besorutiz oM carefully in an effort to eliminate repetitive ,motiods. Posiblesolutions are: Extonsivo uop of acrial photographs in the planning and oonductof oairobile oporations to onablo troop corryina aircraft to land withou amarkj Armed helicopter roconnaissanoe and mark of false L's to prbvidodegaptionj D1wouoo the time interval of the -estriko and mark by armed boli-coptors to a mIDnimuW and we artillery and airstrikes in the vicinity offalse LZW's to assist in deception.

ITE: Ralliors to the GVN cause through t3e CHIEU 10 Program and capturedViet Cone are a potential source of intelligence information on theeffootiveness'of airmobilo u'm.iow.

DXMC5ION It ws recently determined that a rallier to the' GOV cause throv&MM OI Pro. rzm had been .involved in a VC Operation ,aanst a IS air-mobile operation. The aviation battalion prepared a list of both specific

and eeneral easontial elements of informtionp which was used to interzeoatothe rallier. The information Laizd throuGh this interrogation has prmptdpossible ohan es in tactics, The information has also provided valuableinsiehts on tho methods the VC use to shoot down helicopters.

OBSEVATION: Roomend that all aviation units prepare a list of essentialM or information pertinont to their operation to to made a part of the

routine interrocatd4n of mliers and captured VC.

I4: Ounship assistanceo imediately following airmoi-ile assaults.

DISCM3SIONt During o:at assault missions when a fire team is assigned theMai o reoconnirg, pro-strikinai and marking the Z, a secondary mission

of reconmaissanoe above tho opderational area can provide invaluallo intelli einforMation to groiux ccnanirs. This fire team is ideally suited for thisrole*

40

W A aWhen we ttw uttlow porit, the fin. team tht IWO"o outaand z b 8 1 "ai ua eland thesconaryl ioglirBe ovr the oln tioal area drn n ~lt

the hallomo assault, Pwth Uat this tom noritor the around coianderntacloal radio not tu ordser to L]ap arooas-of the taotioal BitustOM..

Mt Aircraft nportin of izt.limoe infoarmIn

D=MION, Due to the a paoe habitually ued by arw aircraft in vist,..,a ror-. In a -position to continau. provide iLiute infomatio1This Anfoiwtion 1n0l2x!96 but Is not limited tol roadblooka, group of peapleand vehicles alorZ higbmys which indicate a TO tax collecting point# trenhlines foxholes, and possaile gun mplace m; umnsual or suspicious wvamntrafic on atormys; smoke sudCmy oappear.ng along fliCht routes and inheliborn opertin areas. The VC are kown to use smoke as a iguel; freshlyused ox cart trail n i suspected VC areas of operation.; any large p ofpeople containtn Vietnamese males of draft age, especially in nonpopulatedareas and rice fields; strange aircraft whose neuvers or flight patternsarouse suspilon; any indication of possible Jamming or oimnmcatiodeception.

OftEWATION: Aviators should be encouraLad to observe and report as sQ=o anp---- a -- of the above conditions noted huring flight.

_Xi Ready reference to past activities in areas of interest.

D3CUSS s: A system of ready reference, by use of a historical mp msinitinted to provido immodiate information of past activities in the :rea of.intorest. The use of the pictap supplesmnt series L8MO, 1u25OOO withaoctate cover leaves has been found Veal for rocord;in the site of incidentswith pertinn marginal date written in black in'.ia ink* An index artaswas established for quick reference to a particular arev of interest, which

provides tyrpo of incidents, actions aW. se of VC contacts.

OBSERVI.TZ N: Duo to the influx of now personnel in key positio.,- a reedyreforonco to a]l past activity is necessary as a moans of providing continutity.

IM : Pictorial capability at battalion leve

DISOWSIONs Polaroid cameras were issued for use by battalion S2's and when-ool possb5la, a signal combat photographer accompanied units on ope ration.This givas tho unit the capability of mkir a visual record of bunker andtunnel cozqlexea, base camps, caches, and techniques of general auplcomentof mines. Sufficient copies -an be reproduced for distribution to all units,

OBSEFVtTION: Recent experience has proven that pictorial capabilities atbriCade and battalion level havo been instrumental in the collection of

ITD(: Proper tagginM of POW's.

N P41

t Pa "po and o*.tA mazinciz it PPi ' Ins an $ , .2al.b asset to.M t ft i .' tsmis. sam,.t -of om,.thPat i .teo Pt(Mn IMoUUP7to,' rit b, nsmtimby IM *am at bttalion,. .iade aul div'ia.ii 2lem.

4M ATlfft 72w poer tmgepg of 'P(Wts -to -- 31 dealed deedPticU o fW u"tans of oPw MoA .I i o. -

ta inextrocttvm information of tIiindlte'tatici ,1u.ib

mi Interrogation team at foint Opeations Genters

* nteproation attached to it Oparations Gant havete'rend-out facilities got VO captives and suspects. UMUlyR

U.. pvIce, -and dista'idt 82 files coutain a detailed list of known VO in theAou - AM, knoWledge of partiular hamlet. and villaoes have Uventl assisted

o units In the screening of VO suspecs,

OW AItO With irwoafiir m n iboiW at .wppcs azad cptured VCR modateavaouatiesto Joint Operations b eutere at district and Provinc. bseakparte

a o InteZoatin to m lochted at those center os at3.faciitaes -SLtO XPUtatgg Of tactical WnoaMUCtion

L .t Ue of provino. and district un.ltlseno ut on 3 operations,

D=MIO The incluuio of intelligeOne troops not only build topporto reo to alieo, but utilhles the tactical knowledg e oftnerrin and

tradition pridtd by Vietnaese soldierse In = asess Item have- aromethe suspicion of these troops which would1 hame been inotlood by 3 trocM6

ODBMA7TNo Past czporienoe boo prowe the value of inoludin at least an oou -ofprovn 'e r -district iskeli, enc troo an lUB opermtion s

IM Use of the spot S31..t rozat,

D M!BsI In order for Intellicence infortion to be of value to tGoonTL ft =at be timel., accurate$ and omp e U of the correct

spot report formt will assist the obsarvers to taing that the infotiena hA reported* Is coe rlotoe

ODSMVATIOI: YAM reports contirpo to be scat that are not in the corretSP 1pr fomte This results in qixostioriaa by hichor boaclquarterepimoowsiy radio traffic and, In turn* causes confuion and wasted tims.MU ivawblom can be oasily~ ollmira ted by use of the correct fouant whin makingreportao

3=i Interrogation of rotuxineose

DMOMm~s Interrogation* ot returnees rovealed that their willingness tocopmratwith Intelisnco pers onnel and lead M forces to the TC trooplocat 4onu and caches docreavos as be is exposed to the reducation techniquesand the security of a OW COEM 3)! Center* As he feels more secure therimze is lows willing to talm the risk involvedl in leadine US forces totoo locatione and caches.

4.2

#1 ATDU kpleit gat~i.eo ined frm the Intewomtion of a retisas soon as possIbUe

MI, Use of the nowe 1Utu'z'ptoR durift -the sagaaltation Of a aore

LICSS~ Centiaumd we of th. sem interroator whLU exploItIng a rdfrtqam results In tUs establbIng of a rapport betsen tbe neo orinit the soe wImch.leads. to sore oaqlste ooPeration of aoe. )hq'ema *on be found where a source warn Nvn m by the intlarptOZ' andruad* volamteers Infamtioan of int ofleo value which might othezvinehowa been witbhe3

G1D=TV VithIn operattionai l1Iitatio ns e azImm use of the rapport~IN 1; by famllIgwitW! of sourcoe and Intlarogator

I=$ A captivls. tactipal, loiatetion vabm gomml3Y deemen with eacham= step In mowitian.

DUWI(N. So shook of captwe Is grea test Imediately fo~LlowIn capture3? aWS.rq A. vC captwed, In close combat Is bost squainte with theiimediate tactical situntiot. The capuc =Ilt I~s In the best positionto exloit tactical infointion on the otlefteldo MumodiAte tacticalInterrogation by capturIn wAnt peroraW (wbtnecessarily oddll"ad intwrro - ozI)Iutilislug assigiud Iutprtm Is potentihlly more vabpabls In ter of.Wonto to ich Urth local ourmndme can ret than Infomtion ' iied

by IntearrogatIon posomil at hichsr bedqpartoz's since tbe latter t amllyIn -wos of 2Iwo hours olil.

COM1ATm~s Captoring vait should make inandiato tactical inutoznoftionof Er"Tved ang pemimwl,

1IM: Disposal of trash.

DISCWIONs Cumcnt division directives requize that all office classified_=_WaIfId waste, personal letters, and lik items be destroyed by

bmdgo ad that all material of potential vaiim to the VC be destroyedor rendered umablee Countuintcllgnc. covereo of the divIsion sanitazyfil Is initaend, to determine effoctivcnass and coiance ith tbas.diroottvea.,

Ofl7W AIOltI Supervision and control of treash disposal at unit level toR426-1VToo deaW aocoss to oprtiomal. infosion and supplic.. Erlyoriontation of nu~y arrivxi =.ta and il lsl Is a monto

fl!M4 Acowats trezuliteration of noerams frun Vietnamese to English

DM%!Qu ;70:lack of offLa. inohizmz adapted to the Virtmmse alphsaet%~i"It.d In a geneal disregard @1' ftfetnws diacriti~el markizge ccletters In favor of a rendition In the closest English, equIvalent, withresultant inacaunucy.

43

CA t: A recmendation has been forwurded by this hadquartsei Vid 9nui'1.o values to be substituted for diacritical mrkip and for

those Vietnmmae letters which es variants of English letters. If thisrecmwrAction in adopted by infomation'and dnto3 tnE agenoies of th MMuta, cireot V ton of Vietnamse prpr ae n be eodce4 -in

trea=Ationw fr Vietnamese to English lI%'h ffio bhey hand Thiszwomndation Is neoosary to avoid oonfion and arrorI n the identifioationot Individual) an dlacoes of lnt.ll noe Interat."

r t In ident book.

D WSSD3W In ord r to faoilitate the collection and diss mination ofnMton pertaining to enw initatod actio p It in rocammded hat anincident book be mintained in the Order of Battle Soction. is book ca bedivided into deaied areas# preferably covering 200 gri sqarae and oanprovide accurate reference of tncidents within a specific *e.

OFBERVATION: An -inident book can provide t1mely infOmation oonoeningenow~ son in a specific area,

P1124 09 trainin' ina -tow urg .

DISCUI09s In order to bettcr woparo 01 specialists fo their work in SouthTM ' Tt is roocmended that tho-O( ocouro of instruction at the US

In igen School, Fort HolibU4 Icnlodo mare instruotio on Order ofBattle tochniques tnvolvad in a o Ionsargoncy situation. The instructionshould be condnotod, if" at all possiblo, by ntig peraonel who boveservwd in South Viabnam.

CBER VTIO: Instruction of this nature would doorcaso tho aowt of tMezTwWVnontly roquired to train OB upcialisto to porfom his dutiein a satisfactory snmr.

ITE?: Briefing and debriefing of FMe and MsE.

DICO101: rho briefing and dobriofing of FACs and ACW has beme an2notapart of our operation, The Infotion obtainod is a great helpIn buldting a mae comlete targoting plan.

OMERVIATIOK The brieftng and dobriofing of aU FACe and ACe &= agenciesVIM "diwtion who ompport the viul reconmaissanoe preogz assistsin kooping targting data aunt.

1221 Length of mission (Long Range Roconnaissanoe Patrol).

DL9C ICit Durig the reporting period it wa found that the most aesfulliom"M-w were thooe that lasted mar than 3 days. When a L8p rwmi In anarea longer Utza3 days it obeorved that an increase in enu' activityumur ooowed$ prbably becavse the VC belive that riandly elemnts hadioved out of the areas

OMERVATION: Kingiom should be t.ree days or longer IS at all psesible,

a4

I= VCE booby traps-I ice adyap

DISC WsIN Three basic types of boqby...aX hove boen tfowx In rice -paddly.,: aia!! 1;pressure typs 'plaed on t .U with dike Junctions being tbo.met 11ka place of amplaoenuft (2) hbmd dee on -the dike with - trip

win acre s the dike, Apin dike oti hr e boon the most frequent placeof enp omontS (3) hand gnades placed -n the aide, of tQw. dike with the tripwir .extending -.out'-of the a ,- Usually -the band .SMe=-de t painted: reenWith the tripwin a. non-lustrous Lro or string.- A normal practice for theVC is to have bis booby trope in place.at all timaj, with safsty devices". ~lpoed until uch time as unfnd2y el'et approac. One the signal Is

-given for tf apoh of troops, the VO remove the safety davios. Theof booby traps armed are in direct relation to the amount of warnIg

time and prox1iily of troops when the signal In given* IThe lack of -booby,traps in a VC controlled area at arw one time is a good idication tas ( ()the IVe are using the dikes and paddies for movemMt; (2) a strong VO elementis in the area.

'O BERATION: The condition and extent of booby traps in rice ,paddy aieasS i te tao extent of VC activity in an area of operations.

MITJ4. Translation of captured documents.

DISCUSSION: Captured documents turned in through intellige'nce cha nels area O I-ource of information and also a morale booster for the capturing unit.Xany time documents are translated but the capturing unit is not 'givendefinite information on documnt content.

OBSMATION: A fully translated verslon of .ell translate4 documnts shouldbe M, d vaiabo to the capturing unit as soon as possible with azwexplanations of other definitive information. This will stimulate the intelli-genco ipthoring interost at the individual and small uit level.

()Locistics.

I= i 10.09 Howitzor ma intonanoe.

DISCUSSION: Proper maintenance procedures listed in TH 9-2330-10# 24-9-23%= and 14 6-88 must be strictly observed and serve as a ujnlimuguide, Section chiefs must be thoroughly trained on the maintenance of theirhowitsor*. Organisational maintenance porsonnal ust be trained to react witha high degree of skill and imagination.

OMASEVTION: Bore evacuator valves should be cleaned every 150 rounds insteadUTo300. rdilure to do this rosults in carbonod valves and valves tend tobreak when being removed., Lore ova cuators-should bo chocked daily to determineif the flat portion has aiy crocki around the oid... The flat portion hablown out on'4 evacuators to date. An EIR has been submett9qd

The howitzer can bc fired with only', of' the 6 bore evacuaton valves inplace. The missing valve should be at the top of the evcuator to reduce thepossibility of blowing out the bottom of the evacwator. The bore evacuator

434

lock My should be impected for seouity after each fire mlsaion A da d 7one time check is not sufficient. Thiee ;Ebilures have occurred which rein damage to the gun tube 'ohield, variable recoil gear* and variable recoilhousing. An .IR Iw been submitted.

Rectifier fan motors can be replaced with the personnel heater ventlUtionmotor until the proper fan can be obtold, 'An EIR has been subudtted.

Rectifiers can be replaced with the rectifier from'the MM(7 personnelcarrier. An MTR ha been submittedo

-Radiator failures occur at the top and bottom of the tank mounted on theloft side* Failures at the top, of the tank can be caused by failure to removethe 3" armor plating bolt installed when the howitzer in first shipped. Thebolt is supposed to be replaced by a lIn bolt when the howitzer is placedin service. An Efi has been submitted.

Radiators my be removed without removing the power pack.

Ael elbows connecting the upper and lower fuel tanks will fail and leak.Continued service can be accomplished by. filling the lower tank only toapprcximately 3/4 full providing a 100 mile cruisine distance, The hose'canbe installed without removing the power peck. An ER ba been subidtted.

Cab power electrical segments should be cleaned daily alone with theelectrical brushes* The mounting screws have a tendency to work loose anddamage the brushes causing the segments to arc and burn. Complete failureof the segments can result in no cab electrical power.

Breech block closing springs fail rpidly during continuous firing. Ifreplacements are not available, the breech block cfn be closed imaall untilreplcemerts are available. An EIR has been submitted.

Replacement of equilibrator seals can be facilitated in the field byremoving the ram from the bottom of the equilibrator without removing theoquilibrator. Repair time is approximately 15 minutes with an experiencedturret mechanic.

Breech block arriers can be damged by improper timing of the carrierrack. Some 'of these racks have two timing marks on them. One mark isincorrect and shouild be ground off.

Bore evaocuatorvalve cap look washers foil prematurely because ofcontinuod removal and installation of bore ovaountor valves. Several recotlhousings have been damaed by the valve caps becoming loose and blowingback hitting the recoil housinvg A split lock washer will work until theproper replacement is availab!t, If a split type lock washer is not avail-able, tighten the caps without any washers and ch ck for security after eachfire mission., An EI" has been submitted*

46

Pao teescope failures can be reduced by keepin the sigtcovered vhen not in use. Coves shodl"& bi plastic begs as tbey coewcondensation to aoct*alate on the eight. Canvas has been used auoejAfu3,L~ight failures can be reduced by Insuring the sight light switch io tuzmdoff before starting the engine. One float sight per firing battery shouldbe rw istAiod to inomm a replaaeot sight is readily.available. An3R ban been su.tted.

Firing pin retaners can be manufactured out of a brass welding rod.

CNbtmtor spindles require a closer inapoction. thfin In listed in theoperators manl. The vent hole not only ni be free of any obstmtionad clean but awat'be obacked for evidence of erosion. Thiu can best bedcone win a piece of vire and rur.ing it along the vent holo. Broded wallscon ouse artillery rdunda to 1111 sho t. An EI has bcon submitted.

Failure of the broooh blook to pon o closo caletoly can normallybe traoced to the brooch block detent plunger turning. The retaining pinis hollw and wears easily allowing the plunger to turn. Roplacement pimshou3d be solid. In an emoncy, 1-U rifle claning rods can be cut tothe correct length and used. An EIR ba boen submitted.

Damaogd brooch mechanism crank rollers are an indlcation of IVproperbreech opening cam adjustment. Damaged rollers can be replaced faster byreplacing the coUleto crank assembly.

IM: medical evacuation.

DISCUM IC : In order to obtain a modevac helicopter in the shortsct possiblofMTt iust be requested with the initial report of a casualty, When tbohelicopter has a trnveline time of 20 or more minutes, the probability ofutiizinC any other helicopter that becos available increasoes. This, inmny injstanoes, results in the du toff being canccllod while oarouto to therequestine unit. HvA6verj, had the unit filcd tu request tbo dustoff, thecasualty would have bocn required to =it an oven lon~or period.

OBSRATION: The conflict between the dsire to insure that the casulty bem€tM n the shortest possible time and desiring not to raqucat a heli-

copter unless it will actua y be utilized can be resolvod by bhav amodova capability available at all tio at the nearest secure basoto the area of oparations.

IM Mtorials used for overhead covor in forward tactical base.

DI3CUSSION: Scm tactical areas of operation afford little or no matorialsfor use in the employment of oworho4d covar. Although sanlag can bo usedfor building positions, the neod for overhead protection still exists incase of cnomy mortar attack,

47

OBUVAT'oN: The use of steel barrier rods (8 ft in loneth) hao beenemlyd cossflly as a substitute for natural overhead oovor These rodscan be pl4od over positions and sindboed to provide adequate. protectionagainst indirect fire weapon.. Resup3y and extraction of these rods presentsno major problem and oolmequently they can be used a*Vda on fthre opeationa.

f_ s 2.75m I Rockets.

DIS0BION: The Div iSR for 2.73mm HE rockots is inadequate in its supportof a'viation operations.* -I the aviation operation for the division Were

restricted to the TCE capability of the aviation battalion, adequate stookagunder the present command ASR structure would be plausible. However, in asmuch as -it is necessary for additional airmobile support being used; theexpendituro of 2.5m BE rockets has skyrocketed over the division ASR*causig a contant shortage. To control the continued use of 2.75oi. rocketsa daily density record le being mintained, recording nunber of iaocket beingloaded to transit non-organic direct support aviation units by unitidentification.

OBSERVATION: Quntities consumed in the abcvo manner are then requisitionidon a mono ?or one" basis to replenish the division ASR stocks.

ITE: UH-l power lose and reduced cngino life caused by dirty intakd' onturbine engines,

DISCUSSION: Sand and grease accumulation around the cnGino intake section areinested into the ctrossor section. In the c=rossor secticnp engine heattransforms the sand and grease into a ceramic typo coating. If this coatingis not removed, intake air is restricted and intornal engine vibrations areinduced. This results in a loss of power and onCino life,

OBSERVATION: Daily inspection and removal of all accumulated dirt around thebftr 3 sec'ion precluded dirt ingestion, If this condition is discoveredafter the ceramic film has formed, internal clcaninC will help restore engineperformance.

ITMI: Effect of dirt on Tcflon bearings (UH-I Helicopters),

DISCUSSION: If sand and grease are alloved to accumulate around toflon bearingsthe retrment life is reduced to approximatcly 1 of the expected avoraLo.

OBSERVATION: The bearings must be cloaned, Danily inspection and cleaning wilhelp to extend the service life of teflon bearings.

IMM: Suspension parts.

DISCUSSION: Due to the number of vehicles damaged by onamy minos, it isadvisale to stock a 30 day PLL of all suspension items until sufficientdemands are made to authorize additional stockago,

49P

V MAT1ON: All suepoImion pwrta for the M48&3 and- K133 (to* inolud 921.nuts.j -sheter vos, -and seals- from the hu out) should be .placed on PM.*

flO Brake shoes and. wheal oylindpz re

DIS SIONs During the rair seasons brako shoes and wheel cylinders show ahighmostlty;fsDetthmud odtnabrk linings on I tontrbake last ,pproximte 500 lesi on 2*ton tok 1000 mi.esl ontrucks$ 2500 milesI and on 3/4 ton trucku 1800 .miles.

f OBSERVATIONt The rei1 season has made it advisable to stock a 30.day PLL ofrinings, brake shoes and wheel cylinders until sufficient demands

are made to authorize additional stookage.

fl1s Amounition storage, care and .handlinC*

DCIS sION The oxtremo humid oLi.ate in Vietnam requires proper storage$caro, and hlncing of ammunition# The normal operation procedures as setforth in T! 9-1300-20 are applicablo. Special provisions shvuld be ac upto insuro that ammnition is inspected wooekly and thon *leaned. A cyclicchart of amuition on bnd and inspetion.of these items insures that each'typo of a*unition is rotatod or cleaned twice eoch month.

0SEVATIONt Maintenance, storores and inspection of ammunition is criticul

in tro izc u lmatos.

ITEM: Otitis problem in Vietnam (medical).

D3mCUSSION: The eomination of hoot, extreme moisture, and dusty environmenth a m i to ke extbreel otnti the most conmonly soon ailment amongthe troops. blost of those respon ! wcll to Burro T s wicks for 3-4 days. Those~n which swolling is marked have boon treated with .Cortiao-sporin wicks forthe sam period of time and have boon .resolved, Unfortunately the recurrencerate is high due to the conditions onnumoratod above, It has been necessaryto jlaco those patients on inside duty until the otitis clears, resulting ina significant loss of pereonnel activ in tho field,

OBSVATION: Ektornal otitis oontinuos to be tho lading malady of our troopsin Vio0tPjm.

M&a Doterioration of mwdicetions.

D33CU IC N: Both ooatod and uncoatod tablets dotoriornto rapid3y in thehId tropial climt unless they are stored in air tight contuineres.

O WERVATIONs Modications should be stored and dcisensed in Closs or plastia€onurp.i~

I=; Ration stookoeo objeotivo.

DISCUMICs During the quarter the rationd stookage objoctive was put to asore, tst when the HOC H4N briVNco wont out. Rations did not beccmo criticalbcause the stockso objoctiv "proved ocequato.

6Pk~rZ)Ar-~r1*d

F'!

M ATM N Stockaga objectives should manageablo. Howver, it should bb $a allow for lead time for recaipt and interruptions of supp3,y.

ITs TzimuM of fruits and vegetables.

DI3CtM8ION:. Fruits and vegetables deteriorate ver7 rapidly ii this climteaMboessive 'wate could result if said items aroe discarded inix. rcrminte,yo

OBSERVATION: Fruits and vegetables are inspected by a veteriarian corpsrepresontative and then trimmed to insure that =3,v inedible Oortions arediscarded.

IrM: Revision of "Day of Supply".

D33CUSION: "Day of Supply" oan and ometimes does vary from y to day andover groat perlods of time, It is affected by marked increase (or decreases)in vehicle density and operational comaitmentso

OBERVATION: Day to day varintions of demand cAn, for the mos part, beinorxve, hokd or, variation trends over a groat perod of time requirero-camputation of "Day of &U:pp2oq To be a realistic and valuLbie managemnttoo:. "Day of Supply" mast be re-computed at least every two weeks.

I_ : Critical shortage of package products.

D3MCUSSION: Because of the small domand for wma separate and varied packagedproducts, supporting class III activities tend to ignore tho dc nazs forthose itemasj, oreatine critical shortages of these itos,

OWEMVATION: Close coordination with the supporting class IM activity isnecessary to eliminate critical shorta es of packaged products.

M, Handling of daceased personnel.

DISCUSSION: Proper Identification and prcxration of deceased personnel,within t timo litits set forth in A RaW Hegulations, although very essentialat this level, sometimes proves difficult.

OBSUVATION: Stringent controls to insure strict compliance with Graves

Rei in regulations and procedurcs have resulted in an effective operatioe

r : Crackins of frames on 5 ton dump trucks,

DISMSIONs Prames of loaded 5 ton dump trucks cracked during cross countryoperations. Ropair of those hoat trotted framos was beyond tho capabilityof this unit and several were evacuated to back-up support. In some casesthis repair work also exceeded their capability anal somo were salvaged.

OWMEVATION:" -Agplcation of an external fish plate to all frames (cracked orOther-ie) curtalls the need for salvaginC the dvmp trucks. Smaller loadsand more pruaent operatinC speeds will reduce tho number of frame failures

50

h

f )

5' .. IM s Re r idler arm on the 4f]2 personnel carriors.

, Wea idler as on the K. personnel carriers have been ton1hI rate. Continuous enlcymont of the equipmnt in eoowtoporationi reaultiM in excessive strasses being placed on a point on theAPC which is iierenty Vbak, ie., steel ompononts are attadhed to analuminm hull at the point mwhrbe even xudor nozmal opertions, ecesivestrosses ire onoountpred.

OBS ATION: Idler atus were repaired at organiationa! and divisionwitnnnco shops. Howover, repairs proved to be saaeleiat ineffectivbecause propor fboilities and eqitpiont were not availolo. lat Log Cod.has this problem under advisement and is prosoent3,y orgzin teams toporform on-site reaimirs

=M1~: Exi*szive deadline rate for genertors and Mo.

DSCTSSIONs The non-availbility of sase repair parts for constructione uipment eeer tores and MM F asmed an ecessive deadline rate. Non-availibility"of these parts resulted primarL because of. the loy differentmodels on,hand and the low density of this equipmont, particularly in thearea of Lpneratoie. In aaditiono sco= of the aenrators had exood*d themxwima life expeotancy ond others no lonoe have repair parts 4vailablein. the systam.

OBEUVITIORt Combat on[ineers are atteptin to standrdise ,tho oquipntoRceip buildosors and military design 10W gonoratore ha snewimt

alew'atod the problm.e Ile Bad Ball supply stem and close oool'mtionwith other spply anl maintenance activities has also aided in keepthe

• acm engineer equipment and ME in operatina condition.

IM Balancl "g of helicopter rotor head assemblies.

DSCUSSIOM t TdDMe unit was unable to properly balance rotor bona asseoblieSon arrival in-countr7 due to non-availability of an air-tight# draft fteeroom* This sovre ly hpered the divisionts oporationsp sinco tall rotorasseublios must be balanced each 100 hows of oporation and the main rotorasseamblies each 200 hours of opertion or sooner, if vibrationis Ore*xperiawed.

OB VATI0R: Before a unit of this type Is 'deployo. to Vietnam, a suitableaable d tent or prefab building shul bo issued for balancin timrotor head assemblies.

MR Exoessive downtime of signal equipmi.-

DISCUSSION: Distribution of signal oquileont to division units,, withoutM ecaary spare parts pocka.,- (o.E. ANIGIM-061 AN/ UpC-4 man-paqkscl

porsowiol dotootor and night vision equipmant), has resulted in unnecesmarydeadline tim.

OBVATIONs All now equipmnt should be progrimad U include necessaryPOW '5 0 5.aM ArZV A#

(5) civic Acotion.

TMf Superficial iv'coses durinL IDC AP Operations.

DISCUSSION: An inoreasiM number of superficial mycoses ttim oruria* andtine WesLoolor mainly) have proved to be unreeponsive to local antilnaltherapy. In these cases we had to resort to systemic antifunpl therapy inthe foarm of Grlseofulvin. To date all the superficial upoes seen hav.responded to tba drug and there have been no doomented reaction to it,

OBSERVATION: Definitive therapy for this superficial ncosea may includesystemiO as vell as local antifungal agents..

IT0M: Genital oancre. during =CAP Operations.

DISCUSION: The frequent occurrence of genital ohancres has made the importanceof the di erntial diagnosis of Chancroid vs Pr=iry Lues obvious. It hasnot bon possible to tell in the early stages idah of thwe'dlseases arepresent, if not both. Current policy'regarding three darkfield examinatiosreports being negative before Lues can be ruled out is costly in tho delay oftreatment. Smears of the lesionssore likewise in many cases is non-specific.Consequently those patients have started on a combination of Penicillin 2*10e3M as wel as Tttracyline 500 mg po qid. If the dofinite diagnosis there-after is made Lues the Penicillin treatmont is continuod, wheres if Chancroldis finally diagnosed, the patient is continued on Tetracycline and started

OBSERVATION: The difficulty of diagnosis in genital chancres has led toinitial cOii therapy until definite diagnosis is ob'tain'ed*

IE,: Program for assistance to ARVN dependents.

D3CgUsIN: Civic action programs orionted toward ARVN depcndents ar5 65=effective in affecting harmonious relationships with associateARN units. The establishmont of dependent "organizations" to distributeHelping Hand item and to present instruction in sanitation, lst -id,midwifery, etc . have been a successful yet indirect moou of improvingeffectivonoss o tho AWN units*

OBSERVATION: Assistance programs oriented toward ARVN dependent -poups maya ssist in evoloping closed relationships at the unit level, and improvingeffectivoncess of the ARVN units,

C52

II1 .d

CONFIDENTIAL

&VFBO-H (18 Nov 66) let IndSUBJT Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

(ROCSFOCl-65)

Us HQ 11 Field Porse Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 7 JAN 1967

TOt Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army,Washington, D.C., 21310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned sumutted by the 25thInfantry Division for the quarter ending 31 October 1966 is forwardedherewith.

2. This headquarters concurs with the comnanders recommendationsand/or comments. Many of the observations are in the form of opinions;nevertheless, this headquarters does not take exception. Further, itappears that no action on any comment is required by this headquarters.

FOR THE COA u-

Inai

MajaARMORAct Aea AG.

R~egr'aded UN CLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL When Separated FromClassffied Incosures

I

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Members of Cb A, 4/9th Infj;2th mt~ Div wadethrough a muak:~oye swamp during a search~ anddestroy operation souath of BE~N LUJC.

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