activity and participation in late antique and early christian thought

OXFORD EARLY CHRISTIAN STUDIES

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THE OXFORD EARLY CHRISTIAN STUDIES series includesscholarly volumes on the thought and history of the early Christiancenturies. Covering a wide range of Greek, Latin, and Orientalsources, the books are of interest to theologians, ancient historians,and specialists in the classical and Jewish worlds.

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Erica T. Hermanowicz (2008)

Justinian and the Making of the Syrian Orthodox ChurchVolker L. Menze (2008)

The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the ConfessorTorstein Theodor Tollefsen (2008)

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Activity andParticipation inLate Antique andEarly Christian

Thought

ByTORSTEIN THEODOR TOLLEFSEN

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Preface

I started work on this book several years ago with the intention ofclearing up some of the mist that surrounds the topic of essence andenergies in Byzantine and Orthodox theology. In the process it turnedout to be a study of the concepts of essence and activity (energeia) inlate antique and early Christian thought, with the aim of showing thatSt Gregory Palamas was a traditional thinker and no innovator in theByzantine tradition. The book is devoted to two rather obscure con-cepts of ancient Christian thought, namely activity and participation.It is my hope that those who are interested in the ancient roots ofPalamite theology will appreciate this investigation into his greatprecursors in the Greek Christian world. However, the book is notjust an attempt to justify the soundness of Palamite thinking, it isprimarily a study of developments in Christian thought in late anti-quity. The book attempts to highlight the connections as well as thetensions between pagan philosophy and Christian philosophy.I therefore think it will be of interest to students of the intellectuallife of late antiquity in general, and to students of early GreekChristian thought in particular. I am grateful to my good friendRonald Worley who helped me clarify the English in my manuscript.I am also grateful to JonWetlesen who made invaluable comments onan earlier draft of the manuscript. I should further like to thank myfriends in the Medieval Seminar at the Department of Philosophy,Classics, History of Art and Ideas at the University of Oslo, who arealways a source of inspiration to my work. I am grateful to Fr. AndrewLouth and Professor Paul Blowers for critical and constructive sug-gestions in the preparation of the final draft of the present book.

Torstein Theodor Tollefsen

Contents

List of Abbreviations ix

Introduction 1

1. Activity and Participation in Non-Christian Thought 13a. Plato and Aristotle 13b. Plotinus 21

2. St Basil and Anomoean Theology 33a. Introduction 33b. St Basil the Great, Letter 234 35c. Eunomius’ Doctrine of God 40

3. The Internal Activity of the Godhead 47a. St Gregory of Nyssa on Trinitarian Generation 47b. Dionysius the Areopagite on Trinitarian Generation 66c. St Maximus the Confessor on the Internal Activity of

the Trinity 71

4. The External Activity of the Godhead: Cosmology 83a. St Gregory of Nyssa on Creation and Participation 83b. Dionysius on Creation and Participation 101c. St Maximus the Confessor on Creation and Participation 118

5. The External Activity of the Godhead: Incarnation 133a. St Gregory of Nyssa on the Incarnation 133b. St Maximus the Confessor’s Ontological Analysis of

Essence and Activity 142c. St Maximus the Confessor on the Incarnation 147

6. The Road to Salvation 159a. St Gregory of Nyssa on Deification 159b. St Maximus the Confessor on Salvation and Deification 169

7. The Theology of St Gregory Palamas 185a. St Gregory Palamas on Energeia and Participation 186b. The Light of Mount Tabor 201

8. Concluding Remarks 207

Bibliography 221Index 227

viii Contents

List of Abbreviations

ACA Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, General EditorR. Sorabji.

Ad. Thal. St Maximus the Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium.

CAG Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Berlin 1882–1909.

Cap. gnost. St Maximus the Confessor, Capita theologica etoeconomica.

Capita 150 Saint Gregory Palamas, The One Hundred and FiftyChapters, (ed.) R. E. Sinkewicz (Toronto 1988).

Cat. Aristotle, Categories.

CE Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium.

CCSG Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, Brepols, Turnhout.

De char. Maximus the Confessor, Centuriae de charitate.

DN Dionysius the Areopagite: De Divinis nominibus.

GNO Gregorii Nysseni Opera, Leiden, Brill.

Myst. St Maximus the Confessor, Mystagogia.

NPNF Select Library of the Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers of theChristian Church, Originally published in 1886, reprintedby Hendrickson Publishers, Peabody, Mass. 1995 (secondprinting).

PG Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca, ed.J. P. Migne, Paris 1857–66.

Pyrrh. St Maximus the Confessor, Disputatio cum Pyrrho.

RCE Gregory of Nyssa, Refutatio confessionis Eunomii.

Th. Pol. St Maximus the Confessor, Opuscula theologica etpolemica.

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Introduction

This book is a study of two important concepts in ancient Christianthought, namely activity and participation. The two concepts areconnected, and both are, from a philosophical point of view, diffi-cult and partly obscure. A central idea in the philosophy of lateantiquity—in Neoplatonism as well as in Christian thinking—is thegeneral notion that the lower strata of being depend on higherprinciples in the way that these same lower levels are constitutedby some kind of participation in these higher principles. What is thestructure of this participation? How does it come to be? What isthe medium of participation? I suggest the answer may be that lowerreality has its share in being real because of an activity (K��æª�ØÆ)manifested from reality itself, and because this activity affects a parti-cipation in higher reality. At this point there seems to be a differencebetween the original Platonic notion of participation and later devel-opments of the idea: for Plato, what is participated in are the trans-cendent Forms themselves—a point of view that leads to severalphilosophical problems, as we shall see—while later Platonism andChristian philosophy have a more dynamic view of the matter. Ques-tions that arise include how higher activity works on the lower levels,whether lower reality participates directly in certain qualities or activ-ities of the transcendent reality itself or in created effects of this reality.I shall try to answer these questions. My topic is the character ofdivine activity; in what connections is participation considered to takeplace, how does it take place, and what is considered to be achievedthrough such participation. However, I am not primarily investigatingthese topics in pagan philosophy; rather I shall focus on how they areconceived within Christian thought.At this point I should highlight some concerns that hover in the

background, concerns that some readers may already have sensed. Ifinstead of ‘activity’ we speak of ‘energy’ and employ the expression‘essence and energies’, one might immediately associate this topic

with a Byzantine controversy of the 14th century. In modern Ortho-dox literature, and in modern books on Orthodox spirituality, onediscovers frequent references to the doctrine of the essence andenergy (or energies) of God, and to the importance this notion isclaimed to have for the understanding of the spiritual life. OrthodoxChristians believe the goal of the spiritual life is to participate in God,and participation in God culminates in deification. The doctrine ofsalvation is conceived as a doctrine of deification. But how couldweak, imperfect, corruptible creatures participate in the divine being?It is considered impossible for any creature to be elevated to the levelof the divine being itself and partake of its essence. Therefore, parti-cipation takes place because of divine energies. These are certainpowers manifested by God ad extra, and these powers perfect thatupon which they touch. The presence of divine energy makes thecreature participate in divine goodness, beauty, virtue, etc. ModernOrthodox theologians employ, therefore, the notion of a distinction(often said to be ‘real’) between God’s essence and energy.1

In the 14th century, there was a controversy over such a distinctionas defined in the works of St Gregory Palamas who wanted to defenda certain spiritual practice known as hesychasm.2 The distinction, inmodern times, has been an issue between certain Roman Catholicscholars and defenders of ‘Palamism’.3 Protestant scholars havereacted in different ways; some are critical while others appreciatethe ‘Palamitic’ intentions.4 However, the present book is not primar-ily another contribution to the debate on Palamism, even if Palamismis an inspiring factor behind these investigations of the concepts ofactivity and participation, and despite the fact that this book containsa chapter on Gregory Palamas, and which tries to show that Palamas’doctrine is on rather secure traditional ground and probably philo-sophically sound. I shall avoid, as far as possible, entering into the

1 Meyendorff (1987), 186; cf. Meyendorff ’s introduction to Gregory Palamas, TheTriads (1983), 19.

2 From an Orthodox point of view, the classical introduction to the controversy, itshistory, and theological issues is found in Meyendorff (1974). However, at least someof Meyendorff ’s results should be modified, and in this book I try to make acontribution to this, especially in chapters 7 and 8. For a more recent introductionto the first phase of the controversy between Barlaam and Palamas, cf. Gunnarsson(2002).

3 See the end of this introduction.4 Cf. Norris (1996).

2 Introduction

modern debate that argues for or against Palamitic doctrine, nor willI make use of what is written within the trenches for and against thisparticular issue. On the other hand, the topics of divine essence,‘energy’, deification, and participation will be central to this presentdiscussion. In my view, the modern reception of the controversialdistinction tends to blur the fact that the distinction and relationshipbetween such concepts as essence and activity, activity and participa-tion, originally belonged to a central philosophical considerationpartly developed to highlight the relationship between higher andlower reality, God and what comes ‘after’ God; originally in paganthought and later in Christian thought.The Christian God is the living God, the Creator, and Saviour

of the world. God is active. How are we to understand this divine‘activity’, which obviously has its foundation beyond the realm oftime and space?We speak of God as active, but how can the notion ofactivity that seems to involve the idea of change and time be accom-modated within the eternal life of God? And even if we define thenotion of activity in such a way that it gives sense to the eternal beingof God, how shall we understand the transposition of such activityinto the created realm in space and time? How are we to understandGod’s activity, both in His own internal life and in His dealings withcreatures other than God, in creation and salvation? What relation isthere between being God and operating as God in these regards? Inwhat ways do God’s external effects and works depend on the being ofGod? How should one understand the relationship between divineand created activity in the soteriological dimension?As mentioned earlier, this book is mainly a study of the Christian

idea of activity and participation, but we will start with a chapter onpagan thought because the terminology, certain concepts, and someimportant doctrines relating to the subject originated and were devel-opedwithin ancient and late antique philosophy (Chapter 1).However,there is no intention to investigate these ideas in detail from theirbeginning, but only to provide a background for Christian thought.It is natural, therefore, to comment on some aspects of Platonic andAristotelian philosophies, while Neoplatonism is discussed more ela-borately before moving on to some important Christian thinkers. Thetreatment of non-Christians will be limited to what is relevant to thedevelopment ofChristian concepts.When it comes to theChristians, itwill be evident that the topics of activity and participation, in differentways, becomes central to the basic doctrine of Trinitarian generation

Introduction 3

and the concept of the inner life of the Trinity (Chapter 2 and 3), thecreation of the world (Chapter 4), the Incarnation (Chapter 5), andsalvation (Chapter 6). Throughout, the primary discussion is aboutthree major Christian thinkers, namely Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysiusthe Areopagite, and Maximus the Confessor. There will be, as alreadymentioned, a chapter on Gregory Palamas (Chapter 7), wherein histheology will be considered against the background of earlier develop-ments of themain topic. The book ends with some concluding remarkson topics of philosophical relevance, such as divine transcendence,participation, and the relationship between uncreated and createdbeing, especially in terms of deification (Chapter 8).It is necessary to remark on the translation of two of the most

important terms in this discussion—ousia and energeia. In discus-sions of ancient philosophy, especially in connection with Aristotleand the Aristotelian tradition, the term �P��Æ is usually translatedas ‘substance’. In connection with Neoplatonist and Christian textsfrom late antiquity, the same term is normally translated as ‘essence’.I prefer the latter translation. The ousia of something is the unitarypresence of that which makes it into a being of a certain kind, i.e. thesum of (essential) properties that a thing must have in order to bea thing of this kind.5 This ousia could be viewed on the level ofindividual as well as on the level of specific or generic being. Theterm ‘substance’ ( ‘that which stands under’) is not the one best suitedto express this sense because of its materialistic connotations. On theother hand, one could probably say that ‘the sum of properties that athingmust have in order to be a thing of this kind’ expresses somethingsubstantial regarding the thing in question, so that the ousia is thesubstance of something in that respect. ‘Essence’ is an English transla-tion of the Latin essentia that is the literal equivalent of ousia.

The term K��æª�ØÆ, when used in the Aristotelian corpus, is oftentranslated as ‘activity’ or ‘actuality’. It denotes the ‘being in act’ of aparticular thing. This ‘being in act’ has, however, different aspects.We shall discuss at least some of these in Chapter 1. This book willmainly adhere to these translations, but I propose them with somereluctance. On the one hand, the text will avoid extensive use of the

5 ‘Property’ is not the best term here, since, according to the Aristotelian logic oflate antiquity, there is a distinction between predicates of ‘property’ and predicates of‘species’ or ‘essence’. However, for want of a better word, we may talk of propertieshere, understood as ‘essential properties’.

4 Introduction

term ‘energy’, because this word may partly obscure the philosophicalconcepts that are expressed by the word energeia. Admittedly, thereare contexts in which ‘energy’ is difficult to avoid. In some connec-tions it may make good sense and be the best alternative. Nowadays, itseems that ‘energy’ has become the established translation of theGreek energeia in spiritual literature and whenever the topic is relatedto Orthodox spirituality and ‘Palamism’. One can live with this, andthere is no ambition here to effect a change in this widespread usage.However, now and then one gets the impression that energy is akind of quasi-material force almost flowing into the human recipient.Of course, the saying that divine power is somehow flowing into therecipient is often a quite adequate description of what is experienced.But one should not conceive of or think about this divine power as ifit was some kind of material force or fluidum. This is not to deny thatdivine energy is manifested in the nature of material being, but oneshould beware of interpreting the divine power itself as a materialforce. Against the background of these considerations I choose totranslate energeia as ‘actuality, activity’, or—now and then—‘energy’,depending on the context, and the transcribed form of the Greek willbe used as well.There is one additional terminological point that should be made—

the terms ‘internal’ and ‘external activity’ are used here to describehow activity is related to essences. Internal activity denotes certainprocesses that take place internally within a being when it is turnedtowards itself in acts of contemplation, willing, and generation. In thedivine sphere, for instance, such activity is the foundation for externalactivities. A divine being acts ad extra because of an act or acts adintra. Internal activity and external activity are primarily associatedwith the philosophy of Plotinus—to whom we shall turn below—butI consider this a fruitful terminological device that may characterizeother systems of thought as well. It should be noted that these termsmay represent more than one concept, which means that one shallnot consider them Platonic or Neoplatonic terms, but philosophicalterms suitable for different contexts.It should also be noted that this is a book about concepts or

philosophical ideas, not about certain words. The concept of, forinstance, energeia may be expressed by other terms or formulas.I am attempting to understand and describe how a certain realitywas conceived and expressed, not to investigate the usage of a coupleof words.

Introduction 5

As far as I know, there are no books or articles that exactly coverthe topic identified above. The closest match is Bradshaw’s AristotleEast and West (2004), on which there are some remarks below, buthis subject is mainly the term and concept of energeia.6 The literatureI have found most useful is concerned with one or the other ofthe concepts I am attempting to bring together systematically. Onemight expect that there would be a large corpus of literature on eachof the topics individually, and in a sense there is. Almost anyonecommenting on certain Platonic dialogues (especially the Phaedoand the Parmenides) will probably have some remarks to make onparticipation.However, I have not investigated this literature system-atically since my impression is that modern commentators on Platousually make no more than passing remarks on this particular topicor point out certain well-known problems.7 What is said about Platoin Chapter 1 is, therefore, a commonly acknowledged starting-pointfor an obvious problem connected with the notion of participation.Plato sees this problem rather clearly. However, he neither proposesany striking solution to it nor does he bequeath such a solution tolate antiquity. It is in any case better to study the notion of participa-tion within the period of late antiquity itself, since late-antique‘systems’ of thought differ from those of ancient ‘systems’. A conceptof participation should be sought within the texts belonging to theperiod of our main study.If wemove on to late antiquity, Sweeney (1982) hasmade an effort to

highlight participation inProclus’ Elements of Theology, and he initiallydefines it in a similar way to how I defined it above:8 ‘“Participation” inthis context is the process by which (or the situation within which)what is lower is made real and becomes related to other realities (bothpeer and higher) by somehow receiving its intrinsic reality fromwhat ishigher.’ Further, there is an important article by O’Meara (1980) onPlotinus that, in my opinion, points the way to a reasonable definitionof how participation may be understood even in texts written by theChurch Fathers. O’Meara’s article was helpful when working on TheChristocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor (2008), which

6 My version of Bradshaw’s book is the paperback reprint from 2007.7 Hackforth (1972), 143–6, is an example of an interpreter of the Phaedo who does

not have much to say about participation as such.He seems to think that Plato has notdeveloped any concept in this regard.

8 Sweeney (1982), 140.

6 Introduction

contains a chapter on the concept of participation.9 However, thedescription of this concept is turned in a slightly different directionin the present book. Here the concept is described more dynamically,since to a much larger degree I develop what I now consider theobvious connection between participation and activity.Balás has made a substantial contribution to highlighting the con-

cept of participation in St Gregory of Nyssa. First we have his well-known �¯ˇS�` Y¯ˇ (1966) and in 1969, Balás published aconference paper on Gregory: ‘Participation in the Specific Natureaccording to Gregory of Nyssa: Aristotelian Logic or Platonic Ontol-ogy?’. In 1975 he published a paper on Origen: ‘The Idea of Participa-tion in the Structure of Origen’s Thought. Christian Transpositionof a Theme of the Platonic Tradition’. In the book as well as in thefirst-mentioned article he suggests definitions of Gregory’s conceptof participation. Balás summarizes this definition in the article onGregory:10 to participate in perfection means that one does not haveit by nature but receives it from a source; the result is a combinationbetween the subject that receives and the perfection that is participatedin; the subject participates in the perfection to a greater or lesser degreeaccording to its disposition; the subject should make progress in orderto increase its share in the perfection. All of this touches on topics to bediscussed in the chapters of the present book.However, I think there isa basic twist in Balás’ conception of participation that differs from myunderstanding of it: he seems to think that participation is aboutparticipating in certain ‘formal perfections’ from above—a point ofview that is rather common whenever there is talk of participation—while I think that the essential aspect of participation is that Godexecutes His ‘activity’ in the created sphere. I do not deny that parti-cipation in perfections occurs, but I think it occurs somewhat differ-ently from how one usually tends to think it takes place. The conceptsof participation and activity should be linked systematically in a wayI cannot see that scholars have done before. However, an exception isBradshaw (2004) to whom I shall return below. There is, however, onemore problem that concerns Balás’ book on Gregory, namely Balás

9 Tollefsen (2008), chapter 5.10 Balás (1969), 1082. In Tollefsen (2008), 152–6, 192, 224, I criticize some aspects

of Balás’ ideas in his book (1966). Even though I think his contribution to the topic ofparticipation is important, I still think my critique is essentially correct. There is moreon this below.

Introduction 7

seems to think that the perfections participated in are created.11 I shallreturn to this in the chapter on external activity below.When we turn to the term and concept of energeia, we meet

with a topic that has been much discussed in scholarly literature,especially in connection with Aristotle’s philosophy, particularly inMetaphysics book 9 (¨). My interpretation of Aristotle does notpretend to introduce something new, and, as far as my knowledge ofmodern discussions goes, I do not move beyond opinions shared byothers.12 However, a recent book should be mentioned, for severalreasons. Bradshaw’s Aristotle East and West (2004) covers some ofthe same ground as I do in this present book, but there are differ-ences. Bradshaw interprets Aristotle’s doctrine of energeia, and des-cribes certain features of the reception of Aristotle’s doctrine in latersystems of thought, mainly in late antique and early ByzantineChristian thinking and in scholasticism. In this connection he alsocompares Thomism and Palamism. Bradshaw addresses several im-portant subjects, and many of his discussions and observations areof great value, especially when he brings the two concepts of activityand participation into contact with one another.13

I should like to put forward an example of a sound and stimulatingsuggestion made by Bradshaw towards the end of his book.14 As far asI can see, what he suggests does not play any role in his argument, andsomehow what he says could pass quite unnoticed:

The Eastern conception of synergy depends on understanding energeiasimultaneously in two distinct ways: as an activity that can be shared,and as the natural accompaniment and manifestation of the innerpersonal being (ousia) of the one who acts.The Plotinian hypostases are not persons, however, so that the

external energeia is not yet a truly personal act.

Even if the issues connected with the theology of John Zizioulasform no part of the main argument of the present book, the topic of‘personhood’ has some relevance for the understanding of bothactivity and participation in some contexts below. This fact immedi-ately invites at least a comment on Zizioulas’ concept of personhood.

11 Cf. Balás (1966), 129–30, 163, and Tollefsen (2008), 155.12 Cf. Ross (1975, first published 1924). For some more recent contributions, see

Kosman (1984), Witt (1989), Frede (1994), Rabbås (1998).13 Bradshaw (2007), 172–82.14 Bradshaw (2007), 266–7.

8 Introduction

Even if Zizioulas brings forth some highly valuable insights, I do notthink his concept of personhood can be argued from late antiqueChristian sources.15 However, Bradshaw is correct that the Christianconcept of the hypostatic character of divine and human being in theconcrete life of activity and participation differs from the concept ofhypostasis in pagan Neoplatonism. This insight may make us sensi-tive to certain aspects of Christian ontology that may easily passunnoticed. We shall return to this in the relevant contexts in laterchapters.When it comes to Plotinus, I have profited much from Emilsson’s

ideas in an article of 1999, ‘Remarks on the Relation between theOne and Intellect in Plotinus’; these ideas are more developed in hisbook Plotinus on Intellect (2007). Emilsson interprets the Plotinianconception of causality as a doctrine of double activity. Of course,some scholars had written about double activity before Emilsson, forinstance Rist in chapter 6 (‘Emanation and Necessity’) of Plotinus—The Road to Reality (1967), who speaks of two acts that he considersto be the ‘formal account of the process of emanation’. Lloyd speaksof the two activities in chapter 4 of his The Anatomy of Neoplatonism(1990). When Bradshaw interprets what he calls Plotinus’ theoryof two acts in chapter 4 of his book, this bears witness to a growingawareness that Plotinus’ doctrine of energeia is what lurks beneath hismetaphors of emanation.Christian authors such as Dionysius the Areopagite, St Maximus

the Confessor, and St Gregory Palamas more or less systematicallybring together the notions of activity and participation. Earlier con-tributions to this topic are rather few. Ysabel de Andia has a chapter onparticipation in her Henosis—l’union à Dieu chez Denys l’Areopagite(1996). There is a study of importance on Essence et énergies de Dieu(1993) in Maximus by Karayiannis. Besides this book, the mostextensive treatment of the topics of essence, activity, and participationin Maximus is, as far as I know, in Tollefsen (2008). There is a greatdeal of literature on Palamas, and judging from the titles, much of it isrelevant. On the other hand, in my experience, what is written oftencarries the mark of polemics and tends to follow one main strategy:one wants to show that St Gregory Palamas is in accordancewith tradition by citing or referring to texts by the Early Fathers

15 Cf. Zizioulas (1985). A convincing critique of Zizioulas is worked out byTurcescu in an article available in Coakley ed. (2004), 97–109.

Introduction 9

that use the terminology of essence and energies. In my opinion, thisprocedure is futile, and, from a scholarly point of view, if one wants tosolve the problems inherent in the issues themselves, one has tochoose another strategy: it is necessary to penetrate the philosophicalchallenges and problems involved in such use of terms from author toauthor, from issue to issue, from controversy to controversy, andfrom century to century. The present issue is not resolved by citingauthorities, but by meditating on philosophical matters involved intheological conceptions. Of course, a number of books and articleshave been produced that are spiritually valuable, and many contri-butions have been made in order to shed light on the historicaldevelopment of the Hesychast controversy. For the historical as wellas some of the philosophical and theological matters, one shouldconsult Gunnarsson (2002) and interesting articles by Sinkewics (seebibliography). Concerning the theological vision and the spirituality ofPalamas I have profited from Meyendorff’s contributions, but espe-cially from Mantzaridis’ valuable The Deification of Man (1984), andfrom Lossky’s The Vision of God (1983). The latter book has animportant introductory chapter that considers the Western receptionand interpretation of Palamas’ theology. Lossky points out that thenegative reception of Palamas by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Roman Catholic scholars (Martin Jugie among them) largelydepends upon the negative reception of Greek and Palamite theologyof earlier centuries.16 In this vein, Adrian Fortescue and Siméon Vailhéwrote articles (respectively ‘Hesychasm’ and ‘Greek Church’) for theCatholic Encyclopedia (1903).17 Since I do not write on the Palamiticcontroversy as such, I do not investigate the Western criticisms at anylength. It is, however, interesting to see that these articles are stillaccessible on websites containing editions of theCatholic Encyclopedia.

16 Lossky (1983), 23–4. Cf. Bradshaw (2007), 263–5.17 The Roman Catholic website New Advent (www.newadvent.org.cathen/b.htm.)

gives access to the article ‘Greek Church’ in the Catholic Encyclopedia (visited03.10.2009), which presents Hesychasm in very negative terms, and ‘Palamism’ as akind of polytheism. The website Catholic Online (www.catholic.org), which also givesaccess to a version of the Catholic Encyclopedia with an entry on Hesychasm (visited03.10.2009), is rather negative as well. The East–West controversy over Hesychasttheology is seen as arising from the fact that the East and theWest assimilated differentphilosophical traditions, Neoplatonism versus Aristotelianism, and ‘Western ThomistAristotelianism’ is, obviously, considered sounder than Eastern Neoplatonism. None ofthese articles seems sound or just with regards to the treatment of their subjects, neitherphilosophically, nor theologically. We shall return to this in Chapter 8.

10 Introduction

www.newadvent.org.cathen/b.htm

www.catholic.org

Fortescue’s article shows a lack of knowledge of the Greek Fathersand claims that Platonism influences Byzantine theology. Vailhé talksof Palamas’ ‘monstrous errors’ and of ‘a resurrection of polytheism’.I suppose that what may be found in these encyclopaedias still repre-sents a Roman Catholic view, but if not, why are they still there?

Introduction 11

1

Activity and Participation in Non-ChristianThought

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a certain terminological andpartly conceptual continuity between pagan and Christian philosophyin the understanding of how lower ‘reality’ depends on the higherthrough divine activity and creaturely participation. This chapterseeks to show that the Christian application of the terminology andconceptual schemes of activity and participation is a further develop-ment of a general philosophical concern in the specific context ofChristian topics. It starts with Plato’s doctrine of Forms and how heconceives of the problem of participation, moves on to Aristotle’sconcept of enegeia, and ends in late antiquity with Plotinus’ doctrineof activity and participation as heir to the philosophical traditions ofantiquity. With Plotinus and Neoplatonism we are in the immediatevicinity of Christian thought.

A. PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

The doctrine of Forms and of participation emerged historically withthe philosophy of Plato, so that all later philosophies containing similarelements—even if they are very different from Plato’s doctrines—againand again suffer the fate of being labelled ‘Platonic’. The latter is, I hold,barely justified, since later thought is characterized by many new devel-opments, compared with Plato. It only serves to oversimplify and even

to distortmatters if this label is used too often.1However, the doctrine ofForms and, I suppose, a notion of participation originated with Plato,and he is the starting-point for a long development in philosophicalthought.Plato teaches that ‘Being’ belongs to the eternal ‘Forms’. These are

perfect essences and patterns for what is a mixture of being and non-being.2 Now, this mixture does not seem difficult to interpret, becausea thing in the world of becoming has being insofar as it is like theForm, non-being insofar as it lacks the characteristics of the Form.The cosmos depends, consequently, on the Forms. Such an under-standing of Plato’s philosophy gains support from what he sayshere and there in the Dialogues, and from some of Aristotle’s criti-cisms of the doctrine, while it leaves a number of questions about theexact nature of the doctrine to be solved.It seems to be a general Platonic notion that things at hand in the

sensible world have certain qualities or characteristics because of theirparticipation in the Forms: beautiful things are beautiful because ofbeauty itself etc.3 In other words: sensible things depend on intelligi-ble ‘things’ for certain attributes. This has given rise to the interpreta-tion that for Plato the Forms are a higher reality of perfectly existingeternal entities beyond time and space—a world of Forms separatefrom the visible world. One might ask, ‘what should be the pointof doubling the world in such a way?’ The answer is that there arecertain qualities or perfections or structures of ethical, aesthetic,logical, and mathematical nature that are beyond the fluctuations ofthis sensible world. The definition of these cannot be the definitionof something at hand within the sensible cosmos, but of a kind ofessential being beyond what we grasp through our senses.In a description of the pagan background for Christian philosophy

in late antiquity, there is no urgent need to find out exactly what Platohimself meant the Forms to be, but rather to discuss what becameimportant in later developments. One of these points is the problemof participation, a problem clearly grasped by Plato himself in the firstpart of his dialogue Parmenides. As it is presented, the problem ofparticipation according to Parmenides presupposes a distinctive viewof the Forms, namely as perfect essences of an intelligible kind.

1 Edwards (2002) has made some valuable criticisms of the application of the label‘Platonic’, cf., for instance, 5, 47.

2 Republic 477a–b. 3 Cf. Phaedo 100 d–e.

14 Activity and Participation in Non-Christian Thought

In Parmenides Socrates presents the doctrine of Forms in orderto counter an argument put forward by Zeno.4 Then the Eleaticphilosopher Parmenides is then put to the task of examining Socrates’doctrine.5 He asks if the participant (�e ��ÆºÆ ��) participates inthe whole Form or in a part of it. The point is that if the participantparticipates in a part, the Form cannot be an intelligible ‘thing’, sinceit is divided into parts. If, on the other hand, each participantparticipates in the whole Form, the one Form is somehow multipliedin relation to the many things that participate in it. Now, the termi-nology of participation lends itself to materialistic connotations. It issuited to describe the division and distribution of a substance, somewine or bread, among several participants. Socrates tries to counterParmenides’ argument by saying that the day (� �æÆ) is one and thesame while present in many places at once. It could be likewise withthe Form.6 Parmenides, however, asks using the analogy of a sail,if the Form was spread over many persons, would not a particularpart be over each person? Socrates admits that a part will be over eachand Parmenides draws his conclusion that then, by the force of theanalogy, the Forms can be divisible into parts, with the absurditiesthat follow.Should Socrates have accepted Parmenides’ analogy? One might

wonder. Whether the analogy is acceptable or not depends on howthe nature of the Form is conceived. If the Form is of an intelligiblenature one might wonder if there would not have been additionalpossibilities that may have been used to develop a defence of thenotion of participation without endangering the unity of the Form.We shall return to such a defence in Plotinus. Whatever Plato’sintention in letting Parmenides win the discussion at this point, itseems difficult to believe that he did not see additional possibilitiesfor a defence. Perhaps it has to do with the further development ofarguments in the dialogue, but however that may be we shall notfollow him into the intricacies of the hypotheses in the Parmenides.It is well known that Aristotle criticizes the doctrine of Forms,

especially in the Metaphysics. There is no need for us to follow himinto this critique. There is, however, another matter that is of someinterest in the present context, namely what Aristotle says aboutparticipation. In Book A (chapter 6) he says that the plurality of

4 Cf. Tollefsen (2008), 194–5. 5 131 a–c. 6 131 b–c.

Activity and Participation in Non-Christian Thought 15

things with the same name as the Forms possess being by participa-tion ( �Ł��Ø�) in these Forms. He further says that Plato only ex-changed the Pythagorean term ‘imitation’ ( � Å�Ø�) for the term‘participation’. Later in chapter 9, Aristotle says to claim that theForms are paradigms and that other things participate in them, areempty phrases and poetical metaphors. ‘For what is it that is makingthings look at the Forms?’—Plato could have answered by pointing tothe Demiurge, the divine figure in Timaeus, who fashions unorderedmatter into a regulated cosmos while contemplating the ‘pattern’.7

Aristotle, however, does not take this into consideration.It is obvious that Aristotle does not consider it a serious philoso-

phical theory that paradigmatic Forms are made immanent in thesensible cosmos by participation, but rather that these are empty termsand metaphors of a poetical nature. I suppose he sees quite clearly thematerialistic connotations of the participation terminology. Of course,later Neoplatonists had some difficulty fitting the two philosophicalgiants of antiquity into (hopefully) one coherent system. Simplicius,for example, argues that Aristotle counters popular views of theForms, not that he denies genuine Platonic Forms. Using the imageof the general and the army from Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 (¸)(1075a13), Simplicius argues that even Aristotle recognized the theoryof Forms in the mind of theDemiurge as the causative principle of thecosmos.8 It is quite obvious that the problem of participation isintrinsically connected with the notion of the Forms as an intelligible,essential reality that should somehow be ‘transported’ into a lower,material kind of ‘reality’. In late antiquity the whole picture is muchchanged with the introduction of the Christian Creator-God and thetenet that this God executes His energeia in His creatures.We now turn to the concept of energeia. Aristotle develops the

doctrine of energeia in order to address certain philosophical issues.As this doctrine emerges within his works one sees that there areseveral aspects to it. In one aspect energeia means the condition ofhaving emerged into the actual presence of form from the conditionof a potentiality suited to exactly that kind of presence. Energeia inthis sense may be translated as ‘actuality’. This aspect answers oneimportant ontological problem in the so-called central books of theMetaphysics (Z˙¨), namely how the relationship between form and

7 Timaeus 28c–29a. 8 On Aristotle Physics 2, ACA: 51, CAG 9: 295.


matter merges into one unitary thing or substance. Hopefully, thistopic may be highlighted if we turn to the definition of soul given byAristotle in de Anima.The definition that is most useful for our purpose is the following:9

‘The soul, therefore, is the first actuality (K��º�å�ØÆ)10 of a naturalbody, which potentially has life, and such will be a body that isorganic.’ An ‘organic’ body is a body with organs, such as is requiredby the soul in order to constitute a living being of a certain kind. Souland body are to each other as form is to matter, as actual is topotential ousia. The body will only be the potential ousia of a livingbeing if it answers the requirements of the soul-form as the actuality(energeia) of the complete entity. For the soul to act as the actuality ofa being, an organized matter—that is a visceral body composed oforgans adapted to the powers of the soul—must be present. The unityof the living being is realized in this way: the organic body, potentiallypossessing life, is activated by the soul-powers and emerges intoactual existence as this one living being. That the body, i.e. matter,meets the requirements of the soul-form shows clearly why theprimary ousia of the substance is its form. In the process of genera-tion the form has been the guiding principle (the final cause) throughwhich matter has emerged into a suitable and integral component ofthe composite. An existing thing, a composite substance consistingof form and matter, is a unity, one single presence, because of therelationship of actuality to potentiality (cf. the requirement of theform) and of potentiality to actuality (cf. the adaptation, organizationof the matter). The being (�e Z�) of the thing then consists in itsmatter being absorbed in an organized way in the presence of theformal being of a particular kind.To summarize, the sense of energeia we have met with so far is

‘actuality’, namely the complete realization (entelecheia) of some-thing. The relationship between potentiality and actuality (energeia)in this regard should be understood as the relationship betweenmatter and form; form as substantial form or the presence of aproperty, a power, a faculty, or a kind of capacity (virtue, art, science).Here ‘matter’ should be understood as being relative to the appro-priate ontological level. To make this clearer, matter might be the

9 De Anima book 2, ch. 1, 412a27–412b1.10 It seems that K��º�å�ØÆ means the same as K��æª�ØÆ here and in many other

contexts. Cf. Metaphysics ¨, ch. 1, 1045b32–1046a2.


matter of an animal body or an artefact, or matter as an entity’scapacity relative to its actualization.This leads us to a second aspect of energeia. It is presented, for

instance, in de Anima book 2, where one may learn to distinguishbetween two levels of energeia:11 in the first level, a manmay be learnedor well-instructed (K�Ø��Å ��), for example, in grammar or mathe-matics. But he may, at this moment, not be exercising his knowledgebecause he is asleep. Even so, he is in an actualized condition comparedwith a person who only has the potentiality for learning but who asyet has not received instruction. This will be ‘actuality’ in the sense wediscussed above. This sense is analogous with the sense of actuality thatarises in Aristotle’s definition of the soul in de Anima book 2, chapter 1:the soul, he states, is the first actuality of a body. The secondmeaning ofenergeia is the one where it seems natural to translate the term as‘activity’, because on the basis of possession of a certain knowledge onestarts using it and becomes active as a grammarian or amathematician,doing grammar or mathematics.There is still another aspect of the doctrine of energeia that needs

comment. InMetaphysics book 9 (¨), chapter 6, Aristotle distinguishesbetween ‘action’ and ‘motion’ (�æA�Ø� and Œ��Å�Ø�).12 An action is aprocess in which the end (�e ��º��) is present. As such it possessescompleteness. A motion is a process that has a limit (��æÆ�). When itstops at a certain point, the end is manifested beyond that limit. Amotion, therefore, is incomplete (I��º��) in terms of its character asenergeia, while an action is energeia in the proper sense, because itimmediately (– Æ) contains its fulfilment. In this instance, energeiamay be translated as ‘activity’ as well.To sum up, energeia, as understood by Aristotle, is the ‘actuality’ of

something or the ‘activity’ of something—on the one hand, the actualityof a house, of a living being, or of possessing knowledge; on the otherhand, the activity of building (which as a motion is incomplete), orseeing (which is complete in itself).In Metaphysics 9 (¨) Aristotle says:13 ‘It is obvious, therefore, that

the ousia or form is actuality. From this argument it is obvious thatactuality is prior to potentiality in ousia, and as we have said, oneactuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality ofthe eternal primemover.’According to the first chapter ofMetaphysics

11 Cf. De Anima book 2, ch. 5, 417a21–417b2.12 Cf. 1048b18-36. 13 1050b2–6.


book 12 (¸), there are three kinds of substances or essences (ousiai),namely: (i) the sensible and perishable, which are involved in the sub-lunar processes of generation and corruption, (ii) the sensible andeternal, i.e. the heavenly bodies, and (iii) the immovable, which is thedivine. In chapter 6 he argues that motion and time cannot be gener-ated or destroyed (as he also argues in Physics, book 8), but have alwaysexisted. This eternal existence requires us to posit a kinetic and pro-ductive principle that has no part in potentiality. The factual existenceof eternal motion requires a principle, he says, ‘whose essence isenergeia’ (w� � �P��Æ K��æª�ØÆ), which here probably means actuality.14

All these considerations came, in late antiquity, to inspire prolongeddiscussions about divine causality, about the limitation of or the limit-less character of the power of God, and about the corruptibility orincorruptibility of the cosmos and its timeless or temporal character.15

Aristotle argues for an unmoved mover that moves as an object ofrational desire.16 This presupposes, of course, that there exist entitiesin the cosmic building that can exercise such desire. It goes beyondthis topic to enter into the details of this scenario, but Aristotle’s ideais that the heavenly spheres have a share in intelligence and are ableto direct their desire for perfection towards what stands at a higherlevel of perfection in the order of being. The immediate object ofprocesses of generation and activity in the sublunary sphere is theactualization of the form in each being. These processes are a resultof an immanent final causality connected with the form. However,God is the basic principle for the existence of a world in which thereis a general striving for the actualization of form. This God func-tions, therefore, as the universal cause which, by just being what it is,keeps intact a cosmic ��Ø� according to which every being actualizesitself in its proper place.17

We shall consider the nature of this divinity a bit closer. God is aliving being, eternal and the highest good.18 Aristotle says that theenergeia of God is pleasure (��),19 and since the essence (ousia) ofGod is energeia, the divine essence consists in some kind of pleasant

14 1071b20.15 Cf. Sorabji (1983) and Sorabji ed. (1987). 16 1072b3.17 Bradshaw (2007), 29–32, tries to argue that Aristotle’s God is the efficient as well

as the final cause of the cosmos, almost like Ammonius in late antiquity, cf. Sorabji ed(2004), 164–8. Bradshaw’s arguments are interesting and challenging, but I am not yetcompletely convinced.

18 Metaphysics ¸, 1072b28–29. 19 Ibid. 1072b16.


energeia. How do we translate energeia in this connection? One couldprobably say that God’s ‘activity’ is pleasure, that his essence is‘activity’ (of a certain kind), i.e. the divine essence is a kind of pleasant‘activity’. This activity is the activity of thought, which is directed nottowards anything external, but towards thought itself.20 The divineessence is, then, the activity of contemplative thought, and Aristotlestrives to show how the subject and the object of thought immediatelycoincide in this essence. The activity of God is identical with what it isto be God. God, as the essential activity of self-thinking, is a con-templative act turned towards Himself. Could there be any better ormore perfect example of complete activity? In this instance it seemsquite difficult to distinguish sharply between energeia as activityand as actuality, since the execution of this essential divine activityis God’s actualized being. This may also be the case with mundaneenergeia, such as the human act of thinking. It is not just an activity,but also an actuality. One should probably not think of activity andactuality as two sharply distinguished senses of energeia.The way Aristotle understands the nature of the divine is interest-

ing in view of later developments. According to Aristotle, being andactivity coincide in God, and no mention is made of any will of God.This seems to confine God to an internal completeness and self-sufficiency that precludes any conscious external activity on behalfof the divinity.As far as I can see there is no external activity in the sense of an

efficient causality that creates the world. The divine activity is not akind of movement that accomplishes a result beyond itself. The onlyeffect God has on the cosmos is the influence the divine perfectionhas on the striving of the cosmic order. This is an instance of finalcausality. Therefore, the divine activity of perfect self-contemplationhas at least this kind of effect on the sphere of being beyond itself.Aristotle consequently lacks a doctrine of creation, something that isinteresting in terms of the much later philosopher Plotinus and theschool of Neoplatonism. This is especially the case because the seconddivinity of the Neoplatonic intelligible world, the Mind, has so muchin common with the Aristotelian God, and even so is involved in thecreation of the world. As a result of my investigation into Aristotle,I conclude that the Aristotelian God is locked up in Himself as the

20 Ibid. 1972b18–21 and 1074b15–35.


keystone of a well-ordered world, and that is all.However, this theoryleft a lot to be desired by the philosophical schools of Neoplatonists inlate antiquity, especially because of their dogma of the compatibilityand harmony between the two giants of antiquity, Plato and Aristotle.

B. PLOTINUS

I am not going to sketch a full history of Neoplatonism as a back-ground for discussing the Church Fathers. Rather, I shall concentrateon Plotinus and dwell on some important features of his thought. InPlotinus we find an elaborate doctrine of activity and participationthat had a great effect on later Neoplatonists and on the interchangebetween Platonism and Christianity—whenever that took place.Plotinus furnishes the background, and other representatives of themovement will be brought into the picture when relevant in connec-tion with my treatment of Christian thinkers.If people know anything at all aboutPlotinus, theywill sayfirst that he

teaches ‘emanation’ of all levels of being from a first principle, the One.This emanation doctrine is attested in many places in the Enneads.Plotinus speaks of a radiation (��æ�ºÆ łØ�) from the One, while theOne itself remains unchanged. This radiation is like the light of the sunthat passes around it.21 Plotinus also compares the radiation with thediffusion of scent from perfumed things.22 But these and other formula-tions of the so-called emanation doctrine are filled with metaphor.However, these metaphors are a means of expressing a philosophicaltheory that has been called ‘the doctrine of double activity (energeia)’.23

This doctrine, for instance, is expressed in Ennead 5.4.2. Plotinussays that while theOne remains ( ��Ø) as intelligible, something comesto be from it while it abides unchanged. Since the One remains asintelligible (‘thinkable’), something comes to be next to it, viz. thinkingor intellection (��Å�Ø�) as such. This thinking thinks that from whichit came and becomes, consequently, Mind (��F�). The explanation of

21 Ennead 5.1.6. 22 Ibid.23 I am indebted to Professor Emilsson for introducing me to this idea of Plotinus’

doctrine of causation. One could consult Emilsson (2007), the introduction and thefirst chapter for further detail. However, to the degree I contribute any further to thisline of interpretation of Plotinus, I take full responsibility for what follows.


this coming to be is given as a doctrine that in everything there is anactivity that belongs to the essence (ousia), and an activity that goes outfrom the essence. Here we have the double activity, the doctrine ofinternal and external activity that, according to Plotinus, belongs to allentities.Plotinus says that the activity of the essence is each particular thing,

while the derived activity comes from the first one and follows itnecessarily, being different from the thing from which it derived.Plotinus turns to an illustration (not an image or a metaphor) andsays that in fire there is heat that is the content of its essence andanother heat that comes from the first heat. There is, in other words,an immanent activity of heat as the essence of fire itself, and there isan externally affected heat that warms what surrounds it. Plotinusthinks that the principle of double activity is found in all completeentities. Just as the internal activity of Aristotle’s God is the actualityof the divine being, so in the same way the internal activity of anyessence, according to Plotinus, is its actuality.The One of Plotinus is not an intellect or a self-thinking thought,

like the Aristotelian God. The subject and object of thought coincidein the Aristotelian God as it does in the Mind of Plotinus’ system, buteven so these two entities have a certain dual character that the Onedefinitely transcends. It is not possible to conceive of any distinctionsat all in the simple being of the One. When the essence of the Oneis taken to be the same as itself qua internal activity, even thischaracterization could, strictly speaking, threaten its transcendentcharacter. To safeguard this character, Plotinus says the One isbeyond energeia.24 There is, however, no doubt that Plotinus wouldnormally allow the doctrine of double activity to apply to the One.In order to penetrate deeper into the distinction between internal

and external activity, we must pose some questions: How should theinternal activity of the One be characterized? Exactly how does theexternal activity arise? What is the connection between the externalactivity of the One and the being of the next level, that of the Mind?Now we try to focus on Plotinus’ doctrine of divine generation

and cosmic generation or creation. These two topics are intimatelyconnected, and this marks a major difference between Neoplatonismin general and Christian thought, as we shall see in chapters three

24 Ennead 1.7.1. Cf. Emilsson (1999), 271, note 2.


and four of this book. I shall now treat the three questions justenumerated.The One is not self-thinking thought. It does not think or con-

template at all. It is not even conscious of itself.25 When it comes tothinking, it is inactive (I��æª��), but even so—surprisingly, butnot unexpectedly—it is an activity.26 It is surprising because of what isjust stated, but not unexpected because of the need to describe thegeneration of intelligible principles. In Ennead 6.8.16 this activity iscalled ��æ��Å�Ø�. Even though such an activity is not conceivable bya human mind (or any mind), Plotinus seems to think that the One issome kind of mental act that transcends all characteristics that suchacts normally could be said to possess.There seems, however, to be one thing that definitely characterizes

the internal activity of the One, namely its ‘abiding’ or ‘remaining’.We find this in Ennead 5.1.6, where there is talk of the radiation fromthe One: ‘from it, while it remains unchanged’ (K� ÆP��F �b ��).The text continues: ‘All things which exist, as long as they remain inbeing (�ø� ��Ø), necessarily produce from their own essences.’ InEnnead 5.4.2 it is stated twice that when the Intelligible, i.e. the One,abides ( ��), something comes into being from it as it abides( ��) unchanged. There are other instances of this as well. Now,what does it mean?In Ennead 1.7.1 Plotinus says that the Good is not the Good by

activity or thought, but by reason of its ��. This probably meansthat the One is the Good in its condition of remaining as an objectof desire, not because it acts in a certain way. The ‘remaining’ iscontrasted with the conversion that the levels of being performtowards the Good: ‘It must remain ( ��Ø�), and all things convert(K�Ø��æ�ç�Ø�) towards it [ . . . ].’ The abiding of the One is its completestillness as opposed to the processes of proceeding from and convert-ing towards it, and both of these processes are activities.It is not easy to understand how this special energeia, which must

mean an actuality of abiding and stillness beyond all proper activitycan be the cause or source of generation. And still, the One producessomething other than itself. As we saw above, Plotinus says thatall things, as long as they remain in being, necessarily produce fromtheir own essences.27 The production depends on the power of these

25 Ennead 3.9.9. 26 Ennead 5.6.6. 27 Ennead 5.1.6.


essences and is itself established as a sort of image of a prototype.Plotinus illustrates this point, as I have mentioned above, with per-fumed objects that diffuse scent ‘around them’ (��æd ÆP��). In theChurch Fathers we shall later find a similar phrase, namely ‘aroundit’, that relates to a similar ontological phenomenon. All things, whenthey are perfected, produce, Plotinus says, and the One, being always(I��) perfect, produces everlastingly (I��Ø��).A comparison with Aristotle may shed some light on causality as it

is seen by Plotinus. The Aristotelian God fills the role of cause, butonly in the sense that it is the final cause of cosmic (celestial) move-ment. On the other hand, without God there would be no cosmicactivity in the lower regions and, consequently, no cosmos at all. Theperfect activity of the divine thinking process calls forth the activity oflove in the lower spheres. In some sense, there is an activity thatcomes out of the essence of God, namely the inspired longing experi-enced on the lower levels at the ‘sight’ of God. Even so, the God ofAristotle is not the maker of the cosmos, and the activity of love frombelow springs exclusively from the lower realities themselves. Initi-ally, the Plotinian God could be seen as playing a similar role as theAristotelian God in relation to the intelligible principles (the Intellectand the Soul) and the cosmos. The One, like an unmoved mover, isnot directed towards anything but itself. Everything has its basic goalin the One, because as Good it attracts the activity of the lower levelsof being.28 Without it, there would be no cosmos. The One, however,unlike the Aristotelian God, is somehow a creator—not in the Chris-tian sense, but in the sense that all lower strata of being results fromits internal energeia.Somehow it seems comparatively easier to sketch how the Mind

arises from the One than to say what the internal activity of the One islike. We should, however, work with a preliminary hypothesis (seebelow) of what the external activity of the One is like. Eventually, itmay be possible to justify this hypothesis, as I shall try to do below.For a start we should note that no process of time is involved in thegeneration of the Mind. Even so, we have to distinguish between theaspects of ‘first’ and ‘second’, which seemingly have a time reference,but in reality they point to a logical sequence here. If we then say thatfirst comes the procession and then comes the conversion, we do not

28 Ennead 1.7.1.


refer to time. These ‘movements’ are—from a temporal point of view—simultaneous moments within an everlasting activity.

The procession—which is a spatial metaphor—accounts for thedistinction between the first and the second hypostasis. The conver-sion (another spatial metaphor) accounts for the constitution of thesecond hypostasis and therefore for its identity in relation to the One.The procession of the second ‘being’ is, as procession, not yet hypos-tasis, not yet complete. It is completed in its conversion. From thisI think it is possible to venture upon what may be a probable inter-pretation of how Plotinus understands the constitution of the Mind.Here then is the hypothesis—the activity deriving from the essence

of the One is the procession, and this has two aspects: (i) the constitu-tion of the One as an intelligible object of contemplation, and (ii) theconcomitant emergence of a potential act of contemplation. Plotinussays the thinking that sees the Intelligible, i.e. the One, and turnstowards it is being perfected by it. By itself it is indefinite, but it isdefined by the Intelligible.29 Conversion has these aspects: (i) thethinking activity’s actual sight or contemplation of the One, which atthe same time is (ii) self-contemplation, i.e. contemplation of itself asderived from the One, and which at the same time is (iii) the constitu-tion of the thinking activity asMind and as Being. The activity analysedin the first two components above is, I believe, the activity based in theessence of the One. The activity analysed in the next three aspects isestablished as the activity of the essence of the Mind, which is the newsecond hypostasis. Thus what emerges changes from inchoate Mind toMind in the complete sense of the term. In short, these two sets describethe procession and the conversion.This account leaves several questions unanswered. For instance, if

the One has an internal activity, why must it have an external activityas well? Further, exactly why does the conversion occur?Why must the One have an external activity? I shall try to develop

an answer. The internal activity, as the remaining or abiding of anentity in internal activity is self-contained and intransitive.30 Thiscould be illustrated by the activity of walking. From an Aristotelianpoint of view, walking would normally be understood as an activity

29 Ennead 5.4.2. I construct my interpretation from a comparison of several texts:Enneads 5.2.1; 5.4.2; 5.3.11; 5.6.5; 1.8.2; 3.8.11.

30 Cf. Ennead 5.3.7, on the Mind: ‘there is nothing to which the activity is directed;so it is self-directed’.


undertaken for the sake of some determinate goal: every morningI walk to the railway station in order to catch the train that will takeme to my job. Plotinus, however, seems to deny the Aristoteliandistinction between movements and activities proper.31 Certain‘movements’ such as walking and cutting could be classified asbeing incomplete activities only with respect to a certain result. Onthe other hand, by their very execution, whether or not their object isspecified or in view at all, these activities will be defined as completeactivities: walking does not have to be undertaken for the sake ofreaching the train, or for achieving fitness. It could have no purpose atall, or have its purpose in itself; and even if it happened for somepurpose, the movement could be considered complete by its veryexecution.However, complete activities and movements quite often have

external results. Leaving footprints is an external result of walking(if taken as a complete activity), but is in no way intended as a desiredresult except in certain special cases, for example, when children (andsome adults) enjoy leaving footprints in snow or sand. Leavingfootprints is incidental to the act of walking as such, even if necessarygiven certain external conditions (when walking occurs in snow orsand of a certain quality). Plotinus says:32 ‘Well then, if someonewalking produces footprints, do we not say that he made them? Buthe did so out of being something else.’ This could put us in a positionto solve what seems to be an inconsistency in Plotinus. We saw abovethat the production of external effects seems to result by necessityfrom the internal activity. In Ennead 6.1.22 on the contrary, produ-cing is said to be accidental: ‘Or [we may say that] he producesaccidentally and the activity does it accidentally, because he didn’thave this in view.’ The point might be that the internal activity isconducted for its own sake and is thus intransitive. From this point ofview, making is incidental. The effect is incidental to the preoccupa-tion of the subject. On the other hand, when internal activity occurs,it necessarily leaves external (transitive) results.

With this background we may try to answer the initial questionabout why the One must have an external activity as well. The act ofwalking has the incidental result of leaving footprints, something thatnecessarily follows from the internal act itself, providing that there are

31 Cf. Ennead 6.1.16 and 22. 32 Ennead 6.1.22.


suitable external conditions. What then about the sphere of intelligi-ble being? The One as internal activity is for the sake of itself, and theproduction of external acts is completely incidental to this ‘for thesake of itself’. On the other hand, if this internal activity occurs, thenan external activity necessarily ensues—provided that the conditionsare suitable. But this, one can easily perceive, brings the problem ofgeneration on the highest level of reality into sharp relief, for howshould we conceive of suitable conditions in this sphere?Could we highlight this process of generation or creation? Do we

not have to know the internal activity of the One in order to say whythere will be a transitive effect? Let us assume, as suggested above, thatthe internal activity of the One is a certain perfect and transcendentmental act. As such it will be totally turned towards itself. On theother hand, is it not naturally a characteristic feature of being amental act, even if elevated into the beyond, that it is in principleintelligible, even if the act as such did not intend it, and even if no oneis in fact able to reach an adequate conception of it? If this is correct,the One qua Intelligible will be the fundamental aspect of the activityout of the essence of the One. To speak more carelessly: the intransi-tive activity of super-thought will have the possible transitive effect ofbeing an intelligible object of thought that originates as an image of it.It is almost as if a thinking process is expected to occur once suchan elevated intelligible object occurs. I admit this leaves a lot to bedesired, but at this stage I see no strategy by which Imay come closerto an understanding of the problem.According to my interpretation of Plotinus, it is difficult not to

sense the gulf that emerges between the One and everything beneathit, despite the fact that the whole intelligible and sensible cosmosdepends on the One for its being. Even if there is a beginningless actof creation, this act of creation does not involve the One, by its will orits thinking, in any continuity with what is below. On the other hand,this is not a picture of reality that Plotinus is perfectly satisfied with.Somehow, lower reality, Mind and Soul, and what emerges as sensibleNature in its tension between being and non-being, depends on thehigher realities, ultimately on the One, for its being. In short, thedoctrine of double activity has to be supplemented with a doctrine ofparticipation, according to which lower realities depend hierarchi-cally on the higher ones. Somehow, Plotinus’ thoughts on participa-tion are just an additional aspect of his doctrine of activity. We arestill in the terrain of the metaphysical and ontological question of how


generation takes place and how the hierarchic cosmos is preserved inits dependence on the first principles. Fortunately, there is a highlyinteresting text in the Ennead 6.4–5 (‘On the presence of being, oneand the same, everywhere as a whole’) that not only sheds light onPlotinus’ ideas of participation and shows how he is aware of Plato’sproblems from the Parmenides, but even brings forth perspectivesthat are similar to what we find in later Christian thinkers. At presentwe shall turn to Plotinus’ thoughts in the Ennead 6.33

Plotinus begins with the problem of how the Soul is made presentto the All, i.e. the sensible cosmos, since the All is diversified indifferent bodies.34 The Soul cannot be divided and distributed inaccordance with bodies, since it itself is a whole without parts. NextPlotinus distinguishes between the true All and the imitation( � Å Æ) of the All, and once more the problem is the same, sincethe true All is in nothing, but exists separately in the higher reality,probably in the Mind as a paradigm for the sensible world.35 The trueAll, if identical with the thoughts of the Mind, cannot, qua intelligiblesimplicity, be divided and distributed at a lower level.Plotinus’ solution to this problem has more dimensions. A first

point turns the ordinary perspective completely around.36 We areaccustomed to think of divine omnipresence—in Plotinus’ case thepresence of the Soul and the (higher) All—as if God is present in allplaces, for all bodies. This creates an image of a divinity bodilyextended in space, in accordance with the material distribution ofbodies. Not so, according to Plotinus. Rather it is the other wayround, namely that bodies, wherever they occur, ‘discover’ the in-telligible that is one and the same undistributed and undivided reality.Somehow, it is not the divine, the Soul or the All, that is presenteverywhere, but all things are everywhere (i.e. wherever they are)present to the intelligible. This is to say that we shall not think ofthe intelligible in accordance with sensible ‘reality’, but shall considerit in accordance with its completely different nature. There is afurther, closely related and complementary point:37 if anything isfirmly established in the All, such a thing ‘participates in it, coincideswith it and is strengthened by it’ ( ��ÆºÆ ��Ø ÆP��F ŒÆd

33 In this connection I acknowledge my debt to a very inspiring paper by DominicO’Meara (1980).

34 Ennead 6.4.1. 35 Ennead 6.4.2.36 Cf. Ennead 6.4.1–2. 37 Ennead 6.4.2.


�ı��ıªå��Ø ÆP�fiH ŒÆd N�å��Ø �Ææ’ ÆP��F). As we have seen, the thingdoes not divide the All but finds itself in it, Plotinus says, since it is thething that encounters being as a whole. The intelligible principle ispresent as a whole and it is wholly present to each and everything thatis able to receive it (�ı�Æ��E� �b ��Æ�ŁÆ� K��Ø�). The intelligibleprinciple does not move down, but things move towards it, andbecause of this movement from below, into the principle, thingsreceive into their own constitution what they are capable of receiving.Consequently, things somehow come to mirror the intelligible intheir own being.38 In Ennead 6.5.8 Plotinus addresses the topic ofparticipation in the Forms along the same lines.A couple of problems occur here. Firstly, how are we to understand

the urge of things to move into the intelligible? Plotinus talksof wanting (KŁ�ºÅ) to be present to the intelligible,39 and of thingsdesiring (KçØ� ��ı) the intelligible.40 Of course, if things are ensouledalready they may desire and want something, but if the general theorydescribes how even the soul-principle becomes present on the lowerlevel, it seems strange to talk of desiring and wanting. Secondly, thisraises the even more general issue of how lower reality is ultimatelyconstituted. Is there a movement into reality from below? Do ‘things’have a moment of spontaneous self-constitution that makes themcapable of moving into the condition of making themselves fit forthe reception of higher influences? However such questions may beanswered, Plotinus’ general view is that all things are generated fromabove, and nothing slips spontaneously in from below the level ofdivine power. It is worth noting that Christian thought avoids theseproblems because of a different conception of God andHis relation toHis creatures, as we shall see in the next chapters.We saw that things mirror the intelligible in their being. At this

point one further topic launched by Plotinus may be brought into thepicture. In Ennead 6.4.3 he speaks of ‘power’ and ‘powers’ (��Æ Ø�and �ı�� Ø�) from above that are effective at the lower levels.Plotinus puts forward a question: are the higher principles presentby themselves on the lower levels of being, or are the principlespresent by a certain power or powers they have?41 I do not think

38 Cf. Ennead 6.4.3. 39 Ennead 6.4.2. 40 Ennead 6.4.3.41 It is interesting to note that the pseudo-Aristotelian writing On the Cosmos

distinguishes between God and his powers (chapter 6). The powers are that by whichGod preserves and protects the cosmos. An ambiguity occurs in the text, because the


this is a new topic, but another way of talking about divine activity.On the other hand, Plotinus now needs to stress how the sensibleworld depends on ‘things above’, i.e. intelligible principles. He there-fore shifts the balance a bit in the direction of stressing the continuitybetween levels of reality, while the doctrine of double activity, at leastseemingly, made us sense a gap in reality between the internal and theexternal activity of things. While the power or powers are definitelyassociated with the external activity, what Plotinus now wants tomake clear is that the powerful influence downwards is based onthe factual essence of higher hypostases, i.e. on their internal activity.Plotinus says that where things do not preserve the complete

nature of the All, i.e. the All on the higher level, a power of the Allis present in such a way that the All is received to the degree that thething is able to receive it. The power, then, makes the All presentaccording to the thing’s capacity to receive it. The power, however, isnot an independent reality. It is not cut off from the All. Still, we arenot to think of the intelligible as moving down, but of things movinginto its sphere of influence, i.e., where the power is available. The Allis present as a whole to all things and likewise to each individual, butin such a way that what is received is that which the receptive entitiesare suited to receive.It strikes me that the so-called willing or desiring from below—

which we talked about earlier—might be explained as metaphors forsome kind of principle of limitation. Such a limitation must have beenintroduced into the being of entities that because of this limitation aredesigned to receive a certain amount of influence from higher entities.However, I don’t know if Plotinus has developed a theory that estab-lishes such an institution of limiting principles. It is difficult to conceivehow these principles should have been argued for or explained, givenhis doctrine of causation. On the other hand, such a theory is easierto conceive with the Christian conception of God, something we willreturn to in connection with St Maximus. For now, I would like toconclude this section by addressing what I think is Plotinus’ doctrine ofparticipation.To sum up: Plotinus avoids the vulgar notion of participation with

its materialistic connotations. Intelligible principles do not corre-spond to bodily beings, like bread, for instance, that may be cut into

powers first seem to be on a lower level of reality than the divine being itself, but lateron they seem to be closely integrated with the being of God.


pieces and received bit by bit by participants. Whenever intelligibleprinciples are present, they are present as a whole. They are notlocalized in extended space, but spatial bodies find the principleswherever bodies are located and then receive the whole of the in-telligible principle into themselves according to the limitations foundwithin their own constitution. The principle is received by the powerexecuted by it, a power that is not separated from the principle, butrather a power of the activity ad extra of the principle that is madepresent according to the receptive capacity of the recipient. We shallfind a similar view of participation later on in Dionysius and inMaximus the Confessor.Plotinus takes an important step beyond Aristotle when he makes

double activity the fundamental causal principle of his system. As wehave seen, Aristotle thinks that energeia in the proper sense is com-plete in itself. The concept of energeia as a complete act seems to havetwo closely related aspects, namely that of essential actuality and thatof the complete act of a psychical kind, such as thinking or seeing.Internal activity, according to Plotinus, is complete in itself, but evenso it generates an activity out of the essence. As procession, thisexternal activity is incomplete, but as conversion it is completed atthe level of the new entity. The moment of conversion is, I think, thepoint at which participation takes place: the new entity somehowturns towards the higher (cf. the wishing and desiring, commented onearlier) and is thus constituted as itself. It is further important to notethat while the activity of the essence is identical with the essence ofthe entity, the activity out of the essence is distinct—but not abso-lutely, as we have seen—from the entity in which it has its source. Allof this strikes me as being relevant as a background for the discussionof essence, energeiai, and participation in Christian thought. One lastobservation should be made: it seems that Neoplatonists think ofeffects as being inferior to their causes. One might think the reasonlies in the nature of causation as double activity, as conceived by theNeoplatonists. Normally what is generated seems to be an image, inthe lower levels of being, of a paradigm at the higher level. From aChristian point of view, however, this is an aspect of the Plotiniantheory that is not acceptable in relation to divine generation, as weshall see.


2

St Basil and Anomoean Theology

A. INTRODUCTION

The Plotinian doctrine of double activity and procession and conver-sion had great impact on the further development of Neoplatonicphilosophy. The doctrines of divine activity and the exitus-reditusscheme became commonplace notions in the intellectual climateof late antiquity. I would not say, however, that they were simplyimported intoChristian thought fromNeoplatonism, because notionsof procession and conversion were already present in Christian spec-ulation from other and earlier sources. In this regard some passages inthe letters of St Paul are relevant and opened Christian minds tothinking of certain structures conceptually and terminologically, pro-filing a Christian metaphysics that is similar on certain points to thosefound in the Neoplatonist schools. Paul says, for instance, in Rom 11:36, that all things come from God (K�), exist by Him (�Ø’ ÆP��F), andhave their goal in Him (�N� ÆP�e�).1 Further, Origen and the laterOrigenists nurtured a view of the cosmos as being moved in a kind ofcircle from God and back to God. Christian thinkers of early Byzan-tium were well aware, I believe, that they conceived the cosmos inrelation to its source in an exitus-reditus scheme like the philosophersof the Neoplatonist tradition. It is even possible that some Christiansread Neoplatonic texts or knew Neoplatonist doctrines and adoptedand adapted these critically from their ownChristian criteria.We shallreturn to this in some connections below.In the Cappadocian Fathers we find doctrines of divine energeia

and participation, together with the notion of exitus-reditus. The

1 Cf. 1 Cor 8: 6; Col 1: 16 and 20—cf. Eph 1: 10. For pre-Christian and non-Christian ‘metaphysics of prepositions’, cf. Dillon (1977), index.

latter means that creatures emerge from God in creation and convertto God in the process of salvation. The Cappadocians, however, didnot develop a philosophical doctrine explaining the principles of suchmovements in detail. We have to turn to later thinkers, such asDionysius and Maximus, in order to find a more advanced philoso-phy of procession and conversion.The doctrine of divine energeia, internal and external, is muchmore

important than the exitus-reditus scheme in Cappadocian thought.However, we shall see that in St Gregory of Nyssa the doctrine ofinternal and external activity is not identical with the Plotinian con-ception. He holds a doctrine of activity that is suited to Christianconcerns, but he does not thereby endorse or attack pagan philosophy.What is important is that he was confronted with a doctrine of divineenergeia in the theology of the Anomoean thinker Eunomius.We shallreturn to this below, first to Eunomius and later on to Gregory.

I shall first explain the term ‘Anomoean’. It is common usage tospeak of Aetius and Eunomius as Neo-Arian and to call the contro-versy over their theology the ‘Neo-Arian controversy’.However, theircontemporaries called them Anomoeans because they taught that theessence of the Son of God is ‘unlike’, I�� Ø��, compared with theessence of the Father. Further, I have come to doubt that it ishistorically adequate to talk of the Arian and the Neo-Arian contro-versy. This terminology leaves the impression that the fourth centurywas characterized by discussions, in two stages, of a more or lesscoherent theological system with minor internal differences. In fact,however, opinions differed so widely that it would not be fair to labelall theological conceptions that were not Nicene either ‘Arian’ and‘Neo-Arian’. It could be acceptable to talk of the Arian controversy ifone had in mind that opinions, on both sides, differed with regard totheological conceptions of an Arian kind. However, when it comes tothe theology of Aetius and Eunomius we are in a field of new devel-opments, and even if there is much in their thinking that reminds oneof Arius’ ideas, they developed their own conceptions beyond his.I therefore prefer to use the label ‘Anomoean controversy’. In order todescribe the whole tenor of the fourth-century controversy, we could,perhaps, talk about the Trinitarian controversy.2

2 Bradshaw (2007), 154, uses this term as a heading when speaking of the con-troversies of the fourth century.

34 St Basil and Anomoean Theology

According to Gregory of Nyssa, the essence or nature of God isbeyond comprehension. In His perfection God transcends every con-cept framed by any created intellect.3 This essence, however, is notsome level of being beyond the triadic structure of the Godhead.4 It isprecisely the essence of the triadic being of God that escapes knowl-edge. Even so, the Church confesses certain internal relations withinthis incomprehensible being of God, relations of ‘generation’ and‘procession’. These seem to be considered some kind of internalactivities of the divine being itself. The essence, on the other hand,should not be understood alongAristotelian or Plotinian lines as beingidentical with these activities. The precise relation between essenceand activity will be investigated below. Further, the tri-hypostaticnature is not only internally active, but acts out of its essence as well.There is an external activity that has to do with God’s relations withHis creatures. It will soon be clear that the doctrines of St Basil andSt Gregory are best understood within the context of the controversyover the Anomoeanism of Eunomius. To say this is not to delimit thevalue of their doctrines, because the teachings on essence and activityin these two saints are an integral part of their theological thought ingeneral. It is not just an external adjunct made for one particulartheological issue only.

B. ST BASIL THE GREAT, LETTER 234

Some comments on St Basil’s Letter 234 will lead us into the contextof the Anomoean controversy. The letter focuses on the distinctionbetween the essence and the energeiai of God.5 It opens with arhetorical question, as if put to Basil by an opponent: ‘Do you worshipwhat you know or what you do not know?’ As Basil makes clear, thepurpose of the opponent is to entangle the respondent in the

3 CE, GNO 1, 245–6, NPNF 5, 257.4 This remark should not be taken to indicate that I adhere to the so-called ‘de

Régnon Paradigm’, cf. Coakley ed. (2004), 2–6. I think it is time to reconsider thisparadigm and whatever corollaries that have been drawn from it.

5 The letter, from AD 376, is appealed to by some of those who defend the Palamiticdistinction between the essence and energies of God. Cf. Lossky (1973), 71–72; Habra(1957–8), 297. However, even if Basil makes such a distinction we cannot take it forgranted that he had the same thing in mind as St Gregory Palamas.

St Basil and Anomoean Theology 35

perplexity of a contradiction.6 There is a scriptural background forthe question, namely Christ’s meeting with the Samaritan woman atJacob’s well in Sychar, a city of Samara. Jesus says (John 2: 22): ‘Yeworship ye know not what. We know what we worship; for salvationis of the Jews.’ On this background the opponent knows that Basilcannot say he worships what he does not know. On the other hand, ifhe answers that he worships what he knows, the opponent may thenask what is the essence of that which is adored, since knowledgeof God is a tenet of Anomoean thought. Then, however, Basil willseemingly be trapped, because his theological vision does not allowhim to say we can know the essence of God. He would have to admithis ignorance.What then? Basil retorts that even if we admit that we do not know

the essence of God, we do not then say we are ignorant of God. Basilpoints out that our thought (��ØÆ) of God is comprised of severalattributes that we do know, such as greatness, power, wisdom, good-ness, providence, and justness. But how, may we ask, do we knowthese attributes? The answer is: from God’s activities. Now this is animportant principle in the theologies of the Cappadocian Fathers: weobserve certain activities and from these we entertain certain notionsof divine attributes. These so-called attributes are, basically, the divinenature being powerfully active.Basil makes his thoughts clearer in regard to the observations of

these divine activities. In the last section of the letter, he points to theexperience of saintly persons we read about in the Scriptures. Abra-ham was called, i.e. experienced the calling of God; the disciples sawhow creation was subject to Christ, for instance, how sea and windobeyed Him. They witnessed that he wielded an enormous might.Because of the call, Abraham worshipped God; because of the mightyacts, the disciples believed in Christ and recognized his Godhead,Basil says. ‘Therefore, the knowledge came from the activities, andthe worship from the knowledge.’ Consequently, Basil can claim weworship what we know.One major problem remains; a problem discussed shortly after the

opening of the letter. The opponents would assert the simplicity ofGod’s being. The many attributes belonging to His essence must benames applicable to this one essence.Consequently, they must all take

6 Cf. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric 3, ch. 18.


their basic sense from this simplicity and mean the same thing.7 Basiltries to reduce this contention to absurdity by asking, for instance,whether frightfulness and philanthropy are the same, or justice andcreative power. The obvious answer is no, and we are then left withthe one simple and unknowable essence and the many properties, thenames of which are recognized from the divine activities. We knowGod fromHis activities and these come down to us, whileHis essenceremains unapproachable. We must distinguish, consequently, be-tween what God is in Himself and His activities ad extra.8

‘His activities come down to us (�æe� � A� ŒÆ�Æ�Æ��Ø�), but Hisessence remains ( ��Ø) unapproachable.’ Even if these words stemfrom the depths of Basil’s Christian heart, they resound with concep-tions quite familiar to the Neoplatonists. God remains by Himself inHis inaccessible perfection, transcending all intellectual conceptions.On the other hand, He proceeds towards us by His activities ad extra.The �æe� � A� is a term well known from Aristotle, who says we shallstart our reasoning with what is more known to us, and proceedtowards what is more intelligible by nature.9 According to the Chris-tian Fathers, however, the divine nature is not intelligible to us. Whenit is said that ‘we know our God from His activities’, this means thatwe recognize His existence and we understand that certain propertiessomehow have to be related to what He is. It does not mean that weknow His essence.Basil’s thought is obviously more in line with Neoplatonic philo-

sophy than is his opponent Eunomius, who, in older research, washeld to be under the influence of Neoplatonism.10 Eunomius arguesthat the divine essence is known by its proper name of ‘ingenerate-ness’ (Iª��Å��Æ). He says that when we talk of God as unbegotten,He is not honoured in name only, ‘in conformity with humaninvention’ (ŒÆ�’ K��ØÆ� ¼Łæø��Å�), but in conformity with truth

7 This seems to be the teaching of Eunomius’ Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987)58/59. Cf. Kopecek vol. 2, (1979) 333. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa CE, GNO 2, 315. Cf. Behr(2004), 277.

8 Bradshaw (2007), 164–9, comments on this distinction in connection with theCappadocian doctrine of divine names. If I have understood him correctly, I think Iagree with what he says: divine names are names of the energeiai, and these energeiaiare God acting in the world. We have to distinguish, however, between God as Hecomes down to us, and God as He remains beyond our reach.

9 Cf. Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 71b33–72a5 and Metaphysics Z, ch. 4,1029b3–12.

10 Kelly (1977) 246, Balás (1966) 25.


(ŒÆ�’ Iº�Ł�ØÆ�).11 This expression contains an objection adducedagainst Basil, because in Basil’s scheme the names we use for Godare made from the observation of his activities and therefore count,according to Eunomius, as ‘human invention’ in the derogatory sense.According to Eunomius, proper names are natural, i.e., belonging tothe nature of something in an essential way. They therefore reveal thisnature and make it somehow intelligible. When speaking of the Son,Eunomius applies what seems to be a general principle:12 ‘We do notunderstand His essence to be one thing and the meaning of theword which designates Him to be something else.’ This must be thebackground for Eunomius’ famous saying, preserved as a fragment inSocrates Scholasticus, which claims knowledge of the essence of God asGod knows it Himself.13 This teaching was, of course, not acceptableto the Cappadocian Fathers, and hovers in the background of much oftheir polemic against Eunomius and his adherents.My impression is that modern scholars do not consider the thesis of

the knowability of the divine essence to be among the most basic inAnomoean theology.14 It is quite interesting, however, that St JohnChrysostom, in his On the Incomprehensible Nature of God (De in-comprehensibili Dei natura homiliae), makes this thesis his main targetin his critique of the Anomoeans. The Anomoeans claim, according toChrysostom:15 ‘I know God as God Himself knows Himself.’16 Theclaim, in my opinion, is strange. Even so, I think we find in this claim,not some piece of doctrine at the periphery of the Eunomian system,but rather a thesis central to the whole Anomoean theologicalmental-ity. Aetius and Eunomius have a different notion of rhetoric than theiropponents, and their philosophical attitude differs as well from that ofChrysostom and the Cappadocian Fathers.

11 Eunomius in Vaggione (1987), 41–3.12 Eunomius in Vaggione (1987), 49.13 Socrates, Ecclesiastical History 4,7; PG 67: 473b. Vaggione (1987), 168–70,

accepts the fragment as genuine.14 Vaggione (2000), 239–56, writes some interesting pages on terms, concepts, and

reference that culminate in an attempt to explain the knowability thesis. What he saysis important for a further investigation into these matters. However, I do not think hesees the problem I try to identify above. Of course, all this needs more elaboration,which I cannot offer here since it is beyond my main topic.

15 De incomp II, 157–8.16 Chrysostom thus becomes an independent witness to the knowability thesis, and

this is not noted by Vaggione.


In my opinion, the basic problem with Anomoean theology, com-pared with the conceptions of the Cappadocians and John Chrysos-tom, is that the former turns God into an object of knowledge, whilein the latter God is the terrifying and adorable mystery. One may, ofcourse, sympathize with the idea of God as an object of knowledge, atleast to the degree that theology, as speaking of God, has to be rationalto some degree. In his recent work on the Trinitarian controversyBehr said:17 ‘In their own writings, Aetius and Eunomius do not claimto know all there is to know about God, but that the words that areused of God, if used accurately, do actually refer to him as he is, forotherwise all theology would be fantasy.’ However, I am afraid thatthis overlooks the problem of the Anomoean idea. In what sense maywe truthfully claim that the words we use of God are accurate? If Godis conceived along Anomoean lines, He inevitably becomes an objectof knowledge. As such, He becomes a subject of predication, andconsequently He is something the nature of which may be the subjectof discussion. In this way the divine being is conceived as a substanceamong other substances, a thing among other things, even if He isthe most perfect and most eminent being that exists. The God of theCappadocians and of Chrysostom is not of this kind. What do theangels do, Chrysostom asks.18 Do they ask one another questionsabout the divine essence? Surely not! They glorify God. They adoreHim. They sing mystical hymns with great religious awe. Theystand before the mystery in holy fear. I think we may say that in theCappadocians and in Chrysostom predication is a philosophical andtheological art, and not a professional technique. I suggest we maytalk of a poetical predication or even a liturgical predication, and viewthis in connection with apophatic discourse, the use of metaphors,illustrations, and images.In terms of the knowledge of the divine essence, Eunomius does

not reason like a Neoplatonist. His conception of divine causality, onthe other hand, could seem to resound with some Neoplatonist notes,even if I don’t think there is any influence there either. A sketch ofEunomius’ position in this regard will at least provide us with someclues, I think, to Gregory of Nyssa’s doctrine of divine energeiai.

17 Behr (2004), 271.18 De incomp. I, 308–12, 321. It is interesting that at the end of the third homily

Chrysostom thinks the angels play a liturgical role.


C . EUNOMIUS ’ DOCTRINE OF GOD

This description is constructed from two sources, namely the textof Eunomius’ Liber apologeticus and the fragments of his Apologiaapologiae, preserved in St Gregory’s Contra Eunomium.19 Accordingto the Apologia apologiae, there is a hierarchy of three essences:20 theUnbegotten and perfect God is the first; the second exists by reasonof the first, and the third exists by reason of the second. There arealso certain activities that accompany the essences (�H� �ÆE� �P��ÆØ�

�Ææ�� ø� K��æª�ØH�). These activities are important for the ex-planation of the establishment of the second and third essences. Thisdoctrine has a certain superficial likeness with the Plotinian system ofthree hypostases, and the mention of activities ad extra could suggestthat Eunomius would like to explain the existence of the lower levelsin terms of a doctrine of double activity.He is rather vague on this point,however. He speaks of divine foreknowledge prior to the existence ofthe first-born, i.e., Christ.21 This is the condition on which the genera-tion of the Son takes place. It could be imagined as a kind of internalactivity in the form of a transcendent divine act of contemplation that isexpressed in the external act of making the Son. The causalmechanismfunctions in a similar way to the Plotinian principle, since a hierarchy ofthree beings ensues from themost perfectGod to the less perfect createdGod—that is Christ—to the Holy Spirit.Eunomius says the unbegotten Godhead does not share His being

with anything else. The activity that accompanies His essence is notsome kind of division or motion of the essence ( �æØ� e� j Œ��Å��

�Ø�Æ �B� �P��Æ� �c� K��æª�ØÆ�).22 It is not a division of essence, sincewhat is simple cannot be divided and communicated and participatedin by another. In short, Eunomius rejects what he takes as the notionof the homoousion. It is not a motion of the essence, because what issimple and perfect in itself does not move towards anything otherthan itself. This shows that the foreknowledge, mentioned above,remains a complete act within the Godhead, with no act of essential

19 Vaggione has reconstructed the Apologia apologiae from the fragments found inGregory’s Contra Eunomium. I point to GNO vol. 1 for these fragments. A translationof Contra Eunomium is found in the NPNF vol. 5. I shall give the page of thistranslation as well.

20 CE, GNO 1, 72, NPNF vol. 5, 50.21 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 64/65.22 Liber apologeticus,Vaggione (1987), 62/63.


generation taking place. All that issues from God is an act of creationthat has, as we shall see later, as loose a connection as possible withthe being of God. According to the Liber apologeticus, the characterof the activity should be judged from what it makes or affects. Firstly,since the effects have a beginning (and at least some have an end), theactivity must have a beginning as well. One might ask: what kindof beginning? Does he mean a temporal beginning? Secondly, in theApologia apologiae Eunomius lays down a further principle when hesays ‘its activities are bounded by its works, and its works commen-surate with the activities’.23 According to Eunomius it is not correctto say that the same activities produced the angels and the stars,the heavens and men. In other words, since the works differ, so dothe activities that made them. Further, he claims that the product of acraft is commensurate with the skill that produced it, and the workitself is neither more nor less than this skill.24 Eunomius holds to theprinciple that the activity itself has a limited character in accordancewith the work that is produced. For instance, if one examined apicture by a certain painter, one should be able to know the limita-tions of his artistic activity and by implication the limitations of hisskill. Gregory is sceptical about this principle, and finds it absurd tohold that all the resources of a craftsman are engaged to produce onesimple artefact. Therefore a product of a craft or a work of art onlyreveals so much of the activity that produced it as its own limitednature allows us to see.25 I believe Gregory’s criticism is correct: it is adubious method to conclude from the production of a single workanything about the character and limitation of the skilful activity thatmade it. In Eunomius, these ideas define one of his epistemologicalprinciples, namely that knowledge of the product makes it possible toknow the nature of the activity that made it, and, further, knowledgeof the activity provides the clue needed to understand the essence ofthe producer.26

In the Liber apologeticus Eunomius established that the Son is acreature, and the Father is His Creator. The Son, furthermore, createsthe Holy Spirit.27 According to Eunomius’ view, activities ad extraobviously have a beginning, and therefore the activity that made the

23 CE, GNO 1, 72, NPNF vol. 5, 50. 24 CE, GNO 1, 150, NPNF vol. 5, 74.25 Ibid. 26 Cf. Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 58/59.27 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 60/61 and 68/69–70/71.


Son is not without beginning. This activity should actually be identi-fied with God’s will (��ºÅ�Ø�), so that the Son is a creature of the willof the Unbegotten.28 But if this is so, it seems quite strange, sinceit means that the divine act or activity of will itself must have abeginning, and time seems to intrude into the realm of the highestmanifestation of divine activity.However, Eunomius says the Son wasbegotten before all things,29 and in his Expositio fidei he even says thatthe Son is created and has a beginning, but He is ‘genuinely begottenbefore the ages’ (IºÅŁH� ª��ÅŁ��Æ �æe ÆN��ø�).30 Eunomius, there-fore, could have defended himself against the charge that God’sactivity somehow involves time. On the other hand, at this pointhe exposes his doctrine to the charge of inconsistency, because in theLiber apologeticus he argues strongly that even divine activity is notwithout beginning and end.31Why does he do that? The reason is thatif the activity is without beginning, the effects of the activity must bewithout beginning as well. Of course, this is a corollary he, for obviousreasons, wants to escape. We are left with a rather strange picture: theSon is begotten before the ages, which must mean before time as weknow it. Further, the Son is begotten of a timeless activity that is stillnot eternal or unbegotten, but has a beginning and an end. One mightask about the kind of ontological or metaphysical sphere in which theSon’s generation takes place, but as far as I know, this is not discussedby Eunomius. What is required if Eunomius stands a chance of beingconsistent is a dimension of temporality that allows activities to havea beginning and end between eternity and time. I cannot see thatEunomius has given any thought to this.The terms ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ seem to lay claim to a definite

relationship between two entities, so that we could imagine a kindof communication of essence from the one to the other. This, how-ever, is denied by Eunomius.32 The divine essence is, as said above,simple and indivisible, and, therefore, nothing can be homoousioswith the Unbegotten. Actually, ‘Father’ is not a designation of theessence of God at all. It is the name of the divine activity.33 When StPaul says (Col 1: 15–16) that Christ is ‘the image of the invisible God,

28 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 64/65.29 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 48/49.30 Expositio fidei, Vaggione (1987), 152/153.31 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 62/63.32 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 52/53.33 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 66/67.


the first-born of all creation’, this means, firstly, that the Son is theprimary creature, and secondly, thatHe is the image of the Father quaactivity or will.34 While the term ‘Son’ makes clear the essence of thesecond being, the term ‘Father’ manifests the activity of the Unbe-gotten God.35 The Spirit is, finally, third in order, created by theactivity of the Son at the command of the Father, lacking godheadand power of creation.36

What is the exact relationship between the divine essence and thedivine activity in Eunomius’ scheme? In the Apologia apologiae hesays the activity follows alongside (the verb �Ææ�� ÆØ), and that itfollows or comes after (the verb �� ÆØ) the essence.37 As we haveseen, the activity is not an essential movement, because as such itwould be eternal by nature and have eternal entities resulting from it.Eunomius somehow has to conceive of an ontological distinctionbetween the divine essence and the activity that makes the productsin order to avoid bringing the created result too close into the sphereof the divinity as such. In other words, Father qua Father of the Son isan activity occurring ‘between’ the Unbegotten and its effect.

Gregory criticizes this understanding of activity.38 He asks what itmeans for activities to follow essences: does it mean they are some-thing else, besides the essences, or are they a part of the essences? Ifthey are something besides the essences, Gregory has problems withseeing from Eunomius’ words whether the activity is due to naturalnecessity (such as when heat follows fire). He cannot bring himselfto believe, however, that Eunomius can think that the activities area ‘part’ of the divine essence, since that would be to conceive of Godas a composite being. Gregory believes that Eunomius, despite hisvagueness, must teach that an essence must be moved deliberatelyand in a self-determining way in order to produce the result.I shall try, as far as I understand this, to summarize Eunomius’

teaching on the essence and activity of God. At first I would like to saythat contrary to what I believe is the common opinion on the matter,Eunomian theology seems to be a kind of patchwork pieced togetherin order to counter the different arguments of his opponents.39

34 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987) 64/65.35 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 66/67.36 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 68/69.37 CE, GNO 1, 72, NPNF 5, 50. 38 CE, GNO 1, 87, NPNF 5, 54–5.39 I suppose Eunomius would also be concerned with the shifting possibilities of

gaining or losing imperial or ecclesiastical favour.


God is the maker of the Son and, through Him (the Son), of theSpirit. How does this creation take place? From the point of view ofChristian theology, one cannot accept that the Son is an accidentalresult of God’s being. It cannot be that God the Father was withoutintentions or without any kind of internal activity as the ontologicalcondition of the Son’s being. Quite simple reasoning, therefore, re-quires of a Christian philosophy that it reckons with an internal act ofthe divine source. Eunomius thinks that there is such an internal act oractivity, namely, as we have seen, of foreknowledge that reasonablymust be interpreted as an act of contemplation within the divine beingitself. As such, this foreknowledge or contemplation is most likelyto be of eternal character. What results from this internal activity,however, is an external activity that has a beginning and, possibly, anend. It is plausible that Eunomius thinks this act is an act of powerfulwilling that is limited to or designed for the creation of just that sort ofwork God has contemplated within Himself. This activity is accom-plished as an act of constituting a new being, and is somehow residentwithin this new being. And then, in order to avoid any ontologicalcontamination of God by coming into touch with what is below, theactivity of God has to be transformed into something that ‘follows’God’s essence, almost as a reality ‘between’ God and the Son.Can we draw any conclusions regarding any positive Neoplatonic

influences on Eunomius’ thought? No, I don’t think we can. He isobviously in conflict with Neoplatonism with regard to the possibilityof knowing the divine essence. Further, a Neoplatonist would not haveagreedwith denying the divinity (although of a lower kind) of theHolySpirit. It is likewise obvious that Eunomius’ conception of divine willdiffers from theNeoplatonic concept of divine will; and aNeoplatonistwould generally have felt the tendency to introduce a kind of tempor-ality into the reality of the first principle to be an intolerable violationof its being (if that is what Eunomius does). On the other hand, theEunomian conception of an (external) activity that follows from theessence could be conceived of as much like the Plotinian externalactivity. However, I do not believe that Eunomius’ notion of externalactivity was derived from any Platonic source. The way it is presenteddoes not bear witness to any comprehensive philosophical context forthe notion; it only seems designed to cope with problems that are achallenge to the Eunomian system itself.Some decades ago, it was not unusual to say that both classical

Arianism and so-called Neo-Arianism were influenced by Platonic


and Neoplatonic philosophy. The trend has moved in quite theopposite direction, and the Arians and Neo-Arians are acknowledgedas mainly scriptural theologians belonging to one of several Christiantraditions that came into conflict in the fourth century.40 In the mainI accept this verdict. But I have become convinced that this is not allthere is to say about these heterodox theologies. There is a differencebetween the mentality of Anomoeanism and what eventually wasrecognized as orthodoxy, which I believe is due to an inspirationfrom outside the sphere of worship and church life.41

40 Compare Balás (1966), 25, and Kelly (1977, first published 1958), 246, withGregg and Groh (1981). See Behr (2004), 132–4.

41 On the education of Aetius and Eunomius, cf. Vaggione (2000), ch. 2. However,their education is one thing, how they applied it is another.


3

The Internal Activity of the Godhead

This chapter is devoted to ideas about divine generation and concep-tions about the inner life of the Christian God. In connection withSt Gregory of Nyssa, the focus is on Trinitarian generation, aboutwhich he has a great deal to say since he was involved in the Anom-oean controversy. St Maximus the Confessor, on the other hand, livedat a time when all major Christian thinkers accepted the theologicaloutcome of the fourth century as formulated by the CappadocianFathers. For this reason there is not much to be found in his thinkingon Trinitarian generation as such, but even so, the inner energeia ofthe Trinity plays a role in his theology. Maximus has important thingsto say about the inner life of the triune God that characterizes hisChristian conception of God, making a radical distinction from paganNeoplatonism.

A. ST GREGORY OF NYSSA ON TRINITARIANGENERATION

St Gregory of Nyssa envisages divine activity on two levels—internaldivine activity and an external activity.1 He does not use the terms‘internal’ and ‘external’ activity, but he definitely has a doctrine ofsuch activities. We shall acquaint ourselves with his terminologybelow. Now, in general the talk about internal and external activityis metaphorical. The Godhead is not characterized by any extension

1 Bradshaw (2007), 157–9, argues that Gregory does not apply the concept ofinternal energeia to God in order to counter an argument from Eunomius. I disagreeon this, as may be seen from the exposition above.

in space, and nothing could be internal or external to it in the spatialsense. ‘Internal’means that which pertains to the being of the Godheadas such. The term ‘external’ may be applied in two senses, namely,concerning the ‘structuring’ of the divinity (theologically), and con-cerning God’s activity towards created otherness, in creating, preser-ving, andmaking provisions for its being and salvation (economically).There is one important issue we must address at the start, concern-

ing the nature of double activity as conceived respectively by Plotinusand Gregory (and Maximus). There are similarities, but there is still atleast one major difference between the two thinkers regarding theirconception of divine causality. Plotinus says the maker is better thanwhat is made, because it is more complete.2 In the earlier sectionon Plotinus, we saw that even if external effects occur as incidentalconsequences of the internal activity of a higher hypostasis qua inter-nal activity, the internal activity would necessarily produce an externalresult on a lower level of reality. According to Plotinus’ view, this ishow causation as double activity works; and this is a conception ofcausality that cannot be generally accepted by a Christian thinker. TheNeoplatonist conception is worked out in detail by Proclus,3 and wasprobably well known to St Maximus the Confessor.Gregory’s idea of divinity is not the notion of three hierarchically

arranged hypostases in a system of subordination. Rather, it is thenotion of a triad of hypostases on the same ontological level. On theother hand, even according to Gregory’s Christian conception, oneof the hypostases plays a distinctive role in relation to the other two;namely that the Father is the cause or principle or source of theTrinity. This does not mean, as I have pointed out, that we havesomething like the hierarchy of Plotinus or an ontological differencethat would make the Son and the Spirit into lesser divine beings thanthe Father. Even so, according to Gregory, the Father is somehowessentially active, from an ontological point of view, as the conditionof the two activities of the generation of the Son and the proceeding ofthe Spirit. I think it is in accordance with Gregory’s intentions if wespeak of an internal activity of the Father that results in the twofoldexternal activity that culminates in the Son and the Spirit. As far asI can see, it is at this point Bradshaw makes the claim that Gregoryand the Cappadocians do not include divine acts internal to the

2 Ennead 5.5.13. 3 The Elements of Theology, cf. props. 7, 35, 56–65.

48 The Internal Activity of the Godhead

Trinity in the divine energeiai, since, as we have seen above, Eunomiustends to reify the energeia andmake it into a ‘something’ between Godand the Son, and this Gregory wants to avoid.4 I think, however, thatthis is a misunderstanding. Gregory wants to avoid the Eunomianunderstanding of energeia; still, he obviously presupposes a concept ofhis own since it would be quite strange to claim that certain internal‘processes’ in the Godhead are not energeiai.Gregory obviously has no doubt that this scheme of causality may

work well within the same ontological level as the cause. Effects neednot be conceived, therefore, as always being lesser than the cause. Itall depends on the level of nature where causation occurs, or therealm in which causation takes place, and on the nature of the causalrelationship in the actual case. In addition, Gregory could not accept aNeoplatonic theory of double activity for the creation of the world,because in a Christian system the cosmos could neither be incidentalin relation to God’s internal life, nor could it result by necessity fromGod’s being active internally in the Plotinian sense. Gregory hadto consider and work with the suppositions that: firstly, there shouldbe natural continuity within the sphere of the divine, but withoutessential subordination; secondly, there can be no natural continuitybetween God and creation; and finally, God is a creator by a certainmodified act of will. These three points will be of primary importanceto Maximus the Confessor as well.In addition to thismodification in the concept of causation, theremay

be other differences in detail. I shall now turn to Gregory’s theology.To even make a sketch of the theological (Trinitarian) controversies

of the fourth century would take us far off our track.5 The Cappado-cians introduced certain terminological distinctions to clarify whatthey understood to be the correct Christian belief and confession. In aletter from AD 375, St Basil sums up the basic position:6 one shoulddistinguish, he thinks, between the community of the essence (�eŒ�Ø�e� �B� �P��Æ�) and the peculiarity of the hypostases (�e N�Ø�Ç��

�H� ��ø�), something that had not been done in the past.7

4 Bradshaw (2007), 157–9.5 One could consult, for instance, Kopecek’s A History of Neo-Arianism (1979), or

the recent The Nicene Faith, parts 1 and 2 by Behr (2004). The bibliography in Behrprovides a great deal of information about relevant literature.

6 St. Basil, Ep. 210.5.7 Cf. St. Basil, Ep. 236.6. For instance, a look at Athanasius’ Tomus ad antiochenos

from 362, PG 26: 795–810, shows how confused the terminological situation was. One

The Internal Activity of the Godhead 49

Gregory opens his Ad Petrum8 with a complaint that the failure todistinguish between the essence as common and the hypostasis asparticular creates confusion: there are those who confess one essenceand who think that speaking of one hypostasis is equivalent, say, onthe level of nature. We have the converse situation when someoneconfesses three hypostases, and believes it to be correct to speak ofthree essences, namely, on the level of particular being. FollowingBasil, Gregory considers the distinction between essence and hypos-tasis to be equivalent to the distinction between common and parti-cular. An analogy used to illustrate the Trinitarian relation is takenfrom a relation that concerns human individuals. General terms, suchas ‘man’, are predicated on several subjects, but indicate a commonnature (� Œ�Ø�c ç��Ø�). One of them is no more man than any other.Proper names, such as ‘Peter’, make reference to the hypostases thatare concretely existing entities. The description of a hypostasis con-sists in a combination of particular notes of identity, a combinationthat does not exist in another human being. In God we have the onecommon divine nature, and if we add to this the particular notes ofidentity, we arrive at the three hypostases of the Godhead. The pointof this is that the Godhead could be viewed from two different angles:from the point of view of the essence and the point of view of thehypostases. Both of these should be retained as valuable ‘descriptions’(or predications), but to describe the mediation between them is thegreat challenge.However, some critics felt a difficulty inherent in this way of

formulating the doctrine of the Trinity. The difficulty was returnedto Gregory as the problem of three gods: if customary use of languageallows us to call three human persons three men, should we notlikewise be allowed to call the three divine persons three gods?9 IfGregory answers affirmatively, we should say he is a tritheist. If theanswer is negative, two alternatives emerge: we should ask whichof the persons is not to be considered God; or we should wonderwhether Gregory is a Sabellian.10 Of course, neither of the main

could also consult Stead (1996), chapters 14 and 15, which contain useful information,even though I am rather sceptical about Stead’s analyses.

8 The Ad Petrum fratrem de differentia usiae et hypostaseos was formerly held tobe St Basil’s Ep. 38. It is now considered to be a small treatise by Gregory of Nyssa,addressed to his brother Peter. Cf. Turcescu (1997), 63.

9 Cf. Ayres in Coakley ed. (2003), 17–8, for the charge directed against Gregory.10 He states this dilemma at the beginning of his Ad Ablabium.


alternatives could be admitted. Gregory does not feel free, however, tomove away from the analogy. He feels the urgent need to accommo-date the doctrine so that it is at least intuitively grasped by believers,and would therefore like to keep the analogy.11

In the Ad Ablabium Gregory says that the tradition of the Fathersmust be kept even if his own reasoning should not be equal to theproblem at hand—a reminder we shall return to below.12 He seems tohandle the problem by acknowledging a kind of philosophical realismboth in the Ad Ablabium and in the Ad Graecos. He argues that even ifit is customary to call three human beings three men, this is a custom-ary abuse of language. It could be allowed for lower nature (custom ishard to change, he says), but it could not be allowed when we speakabout God.13 The common nature is not just a linguistic phenomenon,i.e., a common term which extends to several particulars, to put it inmodern language. It is a structure of being inherent in the particulars:

[ . . . ] their nature is one, at union with itself, and an absolutely in-divisible monad, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution bysubtraction, but in its essence being one and continually remaining one,inseparable even though it appears in plurality, continuous, complete,and not divided with the particulars who participate in it.14

This is, however, said of sensible nature, but is obviously taken tobe typical for uncreated nature to a much larger degree. A commonterm, then, refers to common nature, and common nature is astructure of being shared by the hypostases.Gregory could not accept the corollary that if three human

persons are three men then three divine persons are three gods.Behind this corollary lies a kind of nominalistic idea that what is, iswhat is experienced as particular entities. Gregory, however, makesthe following presuppositions: first, even in ordinary life we distin-guish between universal and particular; secondly, that words differin connoting either the one or the other; thirdly, our words not onlyconnote, they even denote certain realities; and finally, universalterms denote the unity of essential being, and particular termsdenote the particularity of hypostatic being.

11 Cf. CE, GNO 2, 197 on the use of analogy.12 Ad Ablabium, GNO 3.1, 39.13 Cf. Ad Ablabium, GNO 3.1, 41. 14 Ad Ablabium, GNO 3.1, 41.


But even if this is so, it should be required that the being of thetriadic God must be intuitively grasped on the highest possible level ofabstraction from sensible analogies. Gregory sees this clearly as well.Could Gregory really hold that to speak of three men is an abuse

of language? It seems strange. Jonathan Barnes says in a lecture onGregory’s Trinitarian theology:15 ‘If he thinks, for the reasons he gives,that there is only one god in the universe, then he also thinks, for thesame reasons, that there is only one man in the world—and only onepig and one peacock, one lion and one lamb.’ One wonders whyGregory chooses to maintain the analogy in the face of the obviousproblems connectedwith defending it. It cannot be for its philosophicalvirtues. Could it be that he does not have an ideal of a scientifictheology, but rather feels himself free to cope with different modelsfor the divine mystery?One should keep in mind what I said earlier onthe differences in theological attitude between the Amomoeans andtheir opponents, illustrated with the case of St John Chrysostom.At this point it is tempting to return to the quotation from ProfessorBehr above: Aetius and Eunomius claim that the words we use of God,‘if used accurately, do actually refer to Him as He is, for otherwise alltheology would be fantasy’.16 I think the point is that we have no accessto a terminology or to certain theoretical conceptions that can lay claimto any scientific accuracy. Even so, Gregory of Nyssa could haveclaimed that theology is no fantasy. Theology is not, however, basedon logical deduction, but on the experience of the Christian commu-nity in the context of its history. To develop a satisfactory theologicalterminology is a philosophical challenge of quite another order thanthe activity conducted in a school.As a matter of fact there is a place in the Ad Ablabium itself that is

rather suggestive in this connection. First, we should note that inContra Eunomium Gregory argues that we do not know the essenceof the tiniest of things in this world, such as an ant, so how couldsomeone claim to know God?17 We only observe the activities. We donot know the essence directly. In Ad Ablabium Gregory says weperceive the activities of the power above and form our appellationsfrom them.18 The activities are probably observed in the sense that they

15 First Frede Memorial Lecture in Athens 8 April 2008, 19.16 Behr (2004), 271.17 CE 3,8 GNO 2, 238–9.18 Ad Ablabium GNO 3,1, 44, cf. 42–4 for the following.


are witnessed in the Scriptures. Maybe the Scriptures open our sensi-tivity to divine activity in nature as well. Then Gregory presents what Iconsider a rather radical principle: every name is interpretative of ourconceptions of the divine nature, but this nature itself is not included inthe meaning of any of the names we apply. The terms we use for God,then, when reflected upon, provide access, not to God Himself, but toour understanding of concepts or thoughts we have about God. LewisAyres, one of those scholars engaged in the praiseworthy enterprise ofrethinking Gregory, notices the saying, and says the ‘divine namesenable the investigation of our ideas of the divine, but do not directlysignify the divine nature’.19 Ayres, however, does not discuss theimportance of this principle at any length, and there is no hint at itsbroader meaning within the clash between two theological mentalitiesor worlds. Even so, Ayres comes close to the implications I will drawbelow. First, one has to ask by what criteria should names or terms forGod be sanctioned? Gregory himself suggests an interesting answer tothis question. The specific context of this suggestion is found whenGregory speaks of the one nature and three hypostases of the Trinity.20

I mentioned this above: Gregory says that even if we are not able tojustify the way we speak of the Godhead in a satisfactory manner, wemust adhere to the tradition of the Church. I think this could onlymeanthat the criteria for the selection of appropriate words is that the actualword or formula is given in traditional worship and in the Scriptures. Inother words, the terms we use for God must be in accordance with thecommon practice of prayer and the common sources of faith.21

Even if Ayres does not address the question of the criteria, he seemsto end up with the same conclusion:

Thus by reflection on what Scripture relates to us about divine action wemay slowly build up a series of terms, conceptions (epinoiai), which wethink it appropriate to apply to God—and which are licensed by God’sself-revelation in creation and in Scripture—even while we know that ina fundamental sense God remains always unknown.22

However, I think the distinction I made earlier between predicationas a professional technique and poetical or liturgical predication, is

19 Ayres in Coakley ed. (2004), 26. 20 Ad Ablabium GNO 3,1, 38–9.21 The author of the Dionysian corpusmaintains the same principle (or at least says

he does) in the introduction to the De Divinis nominibus, Suchla 107–8.22 Ayres in Coakley ed. (2004), 26.


highly relevant in the present context. The Cappadocian Fathers arekeenly aware that there is no adequate, scientific terminology fordivine mysteries in themselves, so the only thing we are able to dois to discover and use philosophical terms, images, and metaphorsthat may be sanctioned within the theological tradition of the Churchas a liturgical community. Our only access to God is through Hisactivities as they are manifested in created otherness.23

By the internal and external activity of the Godhead within its ownsphere we should, in connection with Gregory, think of the activity bywhich God is eternally established as a triadic being. The key-termshere are ‘generation’ and ‘procession’. The Son (Logos) is generated orbegotten of the Father; the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. TheFather is the cause of the other two hypostases, but they are notgenerated in such a way that the Son is subordinate to the Father andthe Spirit to the Son, which would be the Eunomian way to under-stand it. As regards divinity, the three are uncreated and co-eternal.The hypostasis of the Son is generated from the unbegotten Father,but the essence of the Son is the same unoriginated essence as theessence of the Father. So it is likewise for the Spirit. His hypostasis hasproceeded from the Father, but His essence is identical to the essenceof the Father. The essence of all three is the same unoriginated nature.In his Contra Eunomium and the Refutatio confessionis Eunomii

(written after Eunomius had presented his Expositio fidei in AD 383),Gregory gives an interesting analysis of generation.24 Generally, gen-eration means ‘to exist as the result of some cause’ (�e K� ÆN��Æ� �r�Æ�

�Ø��). Coming to be as the result of a cause may, however, mean atleast four things: firstly, generation from matter and the artisan’s skill(as when the art of house-building directs the construction of a housefrom certain materials); secondly, from matter and nature (as whenthe nature of the parents generates offspring from material subsistingin their bodies); thirdly, from material efflux (as when a sunbeamissues from the sun or the radiance from the lamp); and finally, whenan immaterial cause generates in the sensible way, through the bodyas instrument (for instance, the generation of a word by the mindthrough bodily instruments). These four modes of generation are well

23 It seems to me that many theological textbooks treat the terminology of theTrinitarian controversy as if a kind of scientific or philosophical strictness wasclaimed or pretended. Professor Stead (1996) strikes me as an example of this.

24 CE, GNO 2, 196–200 and RCE, GNO 2, 348–352.


known to human beings, Gregory holds. The divine mysteries, how-ever, transcend human thought. We need, therefore, the support ofanalogies taken from what is better known to us, and Gregory tries toadapt the four points as analogies for divine activities. We must first,however, exclude the corporeal sense attached to the words used.The first point (generation from matter and the artisan’s skill) is

relevant to the doctrine of creation, but not for the generation of theSon. When we speak of the creative power of the divine skill, we donot, as in human activity, include instruments, matter, or the materialconditions. God commanded and things came to be, without anypre-existent material. As just stated, we exclude the corporeal senseattached to the words.The second point (generation from matter and nature) is relevant

to the doctrine of divine generation. Natural generation, as when afather begets a son, is a useful analogy for the existence (o�Ææ�Ø�) ofthe Only-begotten from the Father. The use of this kind of language,though, is an adaptation to the limitations of the human intellect of adoctrine that surpasses thought and speech. The manner of the divinemystery is in itself unspeakable and beyond our power of under-standing. To speak of him as a ‘Son’ is to borrow a term that inhuman language conveys the idea of birth from matter and nature. Inorder to accommodate our understanding as far as we can to thehighest kind of ‘birth’, we must exclude all sensible connotations fromthe word Son (place, time, circumstances, and matter). We shall onlykeep the idea of nature, Gregory says, and this connotes that themanifestation of the Son from the Father shows the close affinity andgenuineness of the ‘offspring’ in relation to Him (�e �NŒ�E�� ŒÆd

ª��Ø�� B� KŒ ��F �Æ�æe�).25 Terms like son, father, and generationafford sensible analogies for what transcends perception and thought.When applied to the Godhead they are metaphors, elevated andsanctified by Scriptural usage.Because the second mode of generation is not sufficient to shed

light (analogically) on how the Son originates from the Father, thethird mode (material efflux) is added. When Gregory first introducesthis kind of generation he gives the following three examples ofmaterial effluence: the sun and its beam; a lamp and its brightness;and scents and ointments and the quality they emit. It is interesting to

25 RCE, GNO 2, 350–351.


see that Plotinus’ metaphors for emanation contain similar illustra-tions:26 the sun and its light, fire and its heat, the snow and its cold,and perfumed things and their diffusion. From these similaritiesalone no conclusion may be drawn, however, as to Gregory’s acquain-tance with Plotinus’ doctrines. But his metaphors are so strikinglysimilar that it is tempting to think that he read or heard similar things.It is interesting to see that when Gregory next turns to comment on hissubject, the examples he adduces are Scriptural, and not from any‘external’ source:27 the ‘brightness of glory’, the ‘savour of ointment’,the ‘breath of God’. Once again the expressions should be purified fromany material conceptions, and one should only adhere to what isworthy of God (�e Ł��æ��), namely, that the Son is both from theFather and with him (K� ÆP��F �� ŒÆd �� ÆP��F). Gregory says bright-ness is not separated from glory and savour does not exist by itself apartfrom the ointment. And likewise, no extension is set between the Fatherand the Son; that is: they cannot be separated just like the two thingsconnected in the metaphors.The fourth analogy (an immaterial cause generates in a sensible way)

concerns the bodily result of the immaterial process of thought: a word(logos) that issues from the mind. Here, as could be expected, Gregorypoints to the prologue of the Gospel of John. We must free ourselvesfrom the common notion of ‘word’ and consider that the Son is not justthe voice of the Father (çŁ�ªª�� F �Æ�æe�):28 ‘For this reason he [i.e.St John] prepares us at his first proclamation to regard the Logos as inessence, and not in any essence foreign to or dissevered from thatessence whence it is, but in that first and blessed nature itself.’Gregory does not draw any far-reaching and speculative conclusions

from his analogies. Rather, he is so sober that we should verymuch liketo squeeze some further insights from what he has said so far. We maylearn that the relationship between the two persons of Father and Sonhas to do with nature. They are not separated as two individuals withintime- and space-coordinates (there is no extension separating them),and the Son, being from the Father, is also in constant intimate com-munion with Him. The Logos is a being permanently present withinthe same essence as its cause. It is at least obvious that the analogiesproper to the great mystery excludes that the Son (as the effect of theFather as cause) can be understood as a creature. Gregory in effect

26 Ennead 5.1.6. 27 Heb 1: 3, Cant 1: 3, Wisd 7: 25.28 CE, GNO 2, 200.


argues that the Son is homoousios with the Father, and by implication,not just the Son, but the Holy Spirit as well.Gregory is reluctant to speculate about the precise character of the

divine activity of generation and procession. Gregory is convincedthat God is to be confessed as one essence and three hypostases,and that the three hypostases do not threaten the basic oneness orunity of the Christian God. In fact, he moves a bit further into themystery in Book 3 of the Contra Eunomium, and it is here we see hisapplication of a causal scheme of double activity.29 Even so, Gregorycontinues to emphasize that his argument is from analogy and re-semblance. This should be carefully noted so that when he talks aboutthe divine will, the good divine will, or divine goodness, he tries toreach for what is befitting of God (�e Ł��æ��), always conscious ofthe fact that the divine nature transcends our grasp. Gregory speaks ofthe relation between the Father and the Son, but what he says, ofcourse, is relevant for the Holy Spirit as well.Gregory criticizes the opinion of those who claim that the Father

first willed (��ıº�F�ŁÆØ), and then He proceeded to become aFather. Gregory is probably countering a Eunomian position thatclaims the Son has some kind of posterior existence. According toGregory, there is an immediate connection (¼ �� [ . . . ] �ı��ç�ØÆ)between the Father and the Son. The word �ı��ç�ØÆ means combina-tion, connection and even union. What Gregory wants to emphasize,I suppose, is that the immediacy excludes any before and after in thegeneration, and that there is an eternal togetherness (union) of thetwo (three) hypostases. This immediate togetherness, however, doesnot exclude the willing of the Father (�c� ��ºÅ�Ø� ��F �Æ�æe�). Thismeans we should accept the qualification that the first hypostasis isthe cause of the second (and the third).The causal principle of will is obviously the internal activity of the

first hypostasis as the condition for the activity of the generation ofthe second (and the procession of the third) hypostasis. Gregoryclaims that this will is not something that occurs between the hypos-tases, i.e., something that separates (�Ø��Å�Ø) the Son (and the Spirit)from the Father by inserting some kind of extension between them(u� �Ø �Ø��Å Æ ��Æ�f �Ææ� ��ı�Æ). The Father’s activity of willis, consequently, not to be conceived of as a Eunomian activity

29 CE, GNO 2, 191–194.


occurring as a strange being inbetween the hypostases, as if ‘follow-ing’ the being of the first hypostasis.It is in this connection that I perceive a problem with Bradshaw’s

interpretation. He says that Eunomius brings to the fore the questionof whether the divine energeiai includes internal acts of the Trinity,such as the begetting of the Son and the procession of the Spirit.30 Ofcourse, it is at this point that Eunomius introduces his conception ofactivity as ‘following’ the hypostasis of God, an idea we have alreadyseen Gregory criticize. Bradshaw, however, seems to conclude thatGregory, in fact, answers the Eunomian question negatively, whichmeans that there is no intermediary energeia between the threepersons.31 However, I think there has to be a certain energeia atplay in the structuring of the three-hypostatic being of God. Whatelse could generation and procession be? What else could an act ofwill be? As far as I can see, what Gregory tries to do in the context I aminterpreting is to define in a more exact way how such an energeiashould be conceived. Gregory obviously works with a concept of aninternal and an external divine activity in the sphere of the Godhead,and he tries to avoid establishing these activities as ontological struc-tures having a reality of their own that separates the divine persons.I think his investigation is greatly important for the whole concept ofactivity. Activity is not to be conceived of as a separate entity, as someseparate field of uncreated energies having a reality of their own. It isthe Eunomian energeiai that threaten to be some sort of separateentities, not the energeiai as conceived by the Cappadocian Fathers.I suspect that those who criticize the concept of uncreated energies inPalamitic doctrine think these are defined in the Eunomian way, butthat remains to be seen.32 Another matter, of course, is that we shouldnot think that the internal/external activity within the sphere ofthe Godhead and the external activity beyond the divine beingoccur in an identical manner. Internal/external acts within the sphereof the divine being itself must have an immediacy that external divineacts beyond God’s being cannot have since they are directed to theestablishment of what is other thanGod. The first kind of activity takes

30 Bradshaw (2007), 157. 31 Bradshaw (2007), 159.32 Bradshaw is definitely not among those who criticize the concept on uncreated

energies, rather he obviously thinks that the concept is meaningful. Balás (1966), 128,is rather critical. I shall return to his objections in connection with the doctrine ofcreation.


place within the sphere of the uncreated, while the second is directedfrom the uncreated to establish what is created. The one is directed to adifferentiated sameness, the other to pure otherness. The relations thatfollow internal/external activities must therefore be other than therelations that follow purely external activities. All of this, of course, is asubject of great importance, and we shall have to keep it in mind whenwe come to Dionysius, St Maximus, and St Gregory Palamas.As we have seen, according to Gregory the concept of generation

implies a causal principle, and in divine generation this principle isthe will of the Father. This will, as an internal activity of the Father,should not be thought to introduce any kind of separation of thehypostases in the sense of an ontological subordination, which wouldtransmit a lower kind of being to the Son and the Spirit. On the otherhand, the union (�ı��ç�ØÆ) of the hypostases should not blur orexclude the hypostatic distinctness of the three persons.At this stage one may discover some important differences by

comparing Gregory’s picture with what we found in Plotinus. Eventhough it is difficult to understand exactly what takes place accordingto Plotinus as well as according to Gregory, at least Plotinus’ causalconception seems to give sense to the procession and conversion(�æ�� and K�Ø��æ�ç�) of a new being that is hypostatically distinctfrom its cause. The Mind, as turned towards itself as derived from theOne, is constituted in its contemplative activity as something otherthan the One. This constitution occurs at a lower level because it is afall from the perfect simplicity of the cause. Gregory, on the otherhand, conceives of the hypostatic distinctness as being constitutedon the same level of being as that of the cause. It cannot take place‘below’ the first hypostasis. Further, the One, whatever may occur inits internal activity, wills only itself and is totally absorbed in itself,while the Father is essentially turned towards willing the tri-hypostaticdistinctness. However, the Father’s willing of the tri-hypostatic dis-tinctness and the One willing itself are both conceived of taking placeat the highest level of reality—‘highest level’ is, of course, an image,since transcendent realities are beyond such comparative conceptions.The point, therefore, is that while the One of Plotinus is a willedundifferentiated unity, the One of Gregory’s Christian philosophy isa willed tri-hypostatically differentiated unity.According to Gregory, the will of the Father is the activity that

structures the divinity from the Father as a tri-hypostatic existence inconsubstantiality. How should we understand this will? Gregory says


that this will is neither without purpose (I�æ�ÆØæ��ø�), nor does itstem from natural necessity (ŒÆ�� Ø�Æ ç��ø� I��ªŒÅ�). This couldbe intended as an anti-Plotinian statement. If not, Gregory makes acommon philosophical point that we should not think of the internalactivity of the Father as being the nature of God that moves byinternal constraint towards becoming three. The movement of willis purposive and not necessitated. By implication, the divine will mustbe free. But if that is so, at this point one might ask if the Father couldhave chosen to remain single. I suppose Gregory would have felt theneed to answer this negatively, since he surely conceives the triunecharacter of God as something essential to the conception of divinityas such. We should like to gain a better understanding of the char-acter of the divine will, in order to see if we can reach any conclusionsby which the present difficulty may be solved.Gregory says that our common experience in the sensible world is

that a wish and what we wish for are not usually present at the samemoment. In God’s simple and all-powerful nature, on the other hand,all is present together (› �F), both to will the good and to possess it.(Note how the concept of the good is brought into the picture asif immediately associated with the idea of God, something that israther common in both pagan and Christian thought.) The divine willcannot be conceived apart from the object of will (�e Ł�ºÅ��), i.e., theactivity of willing is immediately conjoined with the purposive willingof something. The will and its object, Gregory says, are indwelling andco-existing (K��Ø�� ŒÆd K�ı��Æ��), i.e., connected together in akind of immediate �ı��ç�ØÆ. Further, the will (�e Ł�ºÅ Æ) cannotarise from any separate principle and has no motive besides the divinenature. Rather, it originates from this nature itself.So the good will or the act of willing (� ��ºÅ�Ø�) coexist with the

object of will, and Gregory continues:

Since, then, the Only-begotten God is by nature the good—or ratherbeyond all good—and the good does not fail to be the object of theFather’s will, it is hereby clearly shown, both that the conjunction of theSon with the Father is immediate, and also that the will, which is alwayspresent in the good Nature, is not forced out nor excluded by reason ofthis inseparable conjunction.33

33 CE, GNO 2, 192, NPNF vol. 5, 202—However, I take responsibility for the abovetranslation.


I shall try to unpack these ideas systematically and analytically. Weshould note the qualification that the Son is beyond the good. This,once more, is an expression of the fact that what we are talkingabout is beyond the reach of human conceptions, even though theseconceptions are purged from sensible content and are carefullymade to reach what befits God. In the tenth part of the third bookof the Contra Eunomium,34 Gregory has some interesting remarkson the predicate ‘good’. It is a homonym, and it takes on a specialsense whenever it is predicated:35 God is the fountain of goodness andis named from it as well while creatures are called good by participatingin the goodness of the source. The primary instance of goodness is thesource, and the basicmeaning of ‘good’ is derived from this source. Theproper signification of the term good, therefore, is the divine one, buthuman thought has no adequate conception of this level of goodness.When beings other than God are said to be good, the significationmustbe adapted by degree to the ontological status of the participant.However, the term ‘fountain of goodness’ implies that the fountainitself and that of what it is the fountain should be distinguished. Theessence of God transcends the good. It is somehow a ‘good’ beyondgood, and the processes of divine generation and procession are withinthe sphere of this goodness beyond goodness.—The phrase ‘goodnessbeyond goodness’may seem rather strange. Does it make any sense atall? In Gregory’s scheme it surely does. We know and name God fromHis energeia, and since the manifestation of goodness is a divineactivity we say God is good. Even so, it is the act that is good, butwe should conceive of the source of the good act as good as well. Sincewe do not know the source, however, we at least may talk about theinconceivable Good beyond the good activities.The Father’s will immediately conceives the Good beyond good,

and qua immediately conceived this Good is immediately possessed.This is what is spoken of as the generation of the Son (and, byimplication, the procession of the Spirit). The process of generationseems to differ from such processes in Plotinus. Gregory tries in thisconnection to avoid speaking of an external activity resulting from aninternal activity. Rather he seeks to understand the constitution of thetriad by saying that the internal activity immediately possesses its‘object’. (As we shall see below, Gregory has more to say about this

34 CE, GNO 2, 308.35 Cf. Aristotle, Categories, chapter 1 and Owen (1979), 15–17.


so-called ‘object’ of willing.) The divine will is not under constraintfrom the outside, because there is nothing outside the divine being.Further, there is no internal constraint. The Godhead of the Father,being the one and only Godhead, takes its motive from its nature andacts according to this nature.Gregory’s objective is to argue continually against Eunomius and

to establish his own (and his brother Basil’s) doctrine of God, whichhe believes to be the doctrine of the Church. The way he has arguedabove shows clearly that, according to Gregory, the second and thirdhypostases are founded ontologically within the being or essence ofthe first hypostasis. In order to emphasize this point he says theFather has not begotten any new essence—as Eunomius says Hehas—rather, the begetting is in the essence contemplated within theFather Himself.36 The generation (and procession) spring, therefore,from the Father’s being and He is turned contemplatively towards Hisown essence as the willing of the Good beyond good.In another passage in theContra Eunomium, the relation between the

Father’swill and the being of the Son is formulated in away thatmakes itpossible to penetrate perhaps even further in the direction of a con-ceivable andproper language (discourse) of themystery:37 ‘the Son is thewill of the Father’. On this background we could say that if the Fatherwills his own essence as the Good (beyond the activity of good) this willis immediately the Son of the Father. Further, since according toGregory there are two generated hypostases, we must interpret him tomean that this natural impulse of will through the Father is dual: to willthe Son as well as to will the Spirit is quawill immediately constituted asthe Son and Spirit of the Father. Maybe we could even say that thenatural will of the Father is triadic; willing to have a Son and a Spirit iswilling to be the Father of the Son and the Emitter of the Spirit. In thisway, the triadic pattern of divine life emerges. But, we should note thatthis last speculationmoves beyondwhatGregory says in somanywords.Since divine generative activity is conceived within such a closely

knitted system, how are we to understand hypostatic distinctnesswithin this sphere? If we return to Gregory’s Ad Petrum, he employsthe general principle of adding the particular to the common (�fiHŒ�Ø�fiH �e N�Ø�Ç��).38 The godhead is common, paternity is something

36 CE, GNO 2, 195; NPNF vol. 5, 203. 37 CE, GNO 1, 288.38 There is definitely something unsatisfactory about the idea of essence as com-

mon and hypostasis as what emerges if the particular is added to the common. I am


proper (Y�Ø��), and if we combine these we say ‘I believe in God theFather’. The notion of ‘paternity’ includes the notion of ‘being cause’.This is the distinctive hypostatic mark of the Father. The specialproperties of the other two hypostases are pointed out in accordancewith the same principle (adding the particular to the common), butwhat we gain from the text of the Ad Petrum is rather meagre if whatwe searched for are distinctive marks: both the Son and the Spirit arecaused by the Father and this is distinctive for them both, but whatelse could be said about them?Gregory says the Spirit is distinguishedby proceeding from the Father, being known after the Son and togetherwith the Son, and as having its subsistence from the Father—a sayingthat seems rather evasive. The Son is the only-begotten from theunbegotten light, which marks him off from the other two; but eventhis property, one could object, does not tell us much if the point isto distinguish between the Son and the Spirit. Of course, we have tounderstand the limitations and the motives under which Gregoryworks. In a radical sense this means that even the philosophical spec-ulation elucidated above is nothingmore than a way of speaking that iswithin the limited understanding of createdminds. He never intends tospeak in any other way. Gregory is well aware that the Gospel storygives us plenty of distinguishing marks for the hypostases of theTrinity: the Father is the one God that sent the Son into the world,and the relation indicated with the terms Father and Son is a psycho-logically and soteriologically potent metaphor of great practical sig-nificance for the message of salvation and for spiritual life. The Spirit isthe Comforter, sent by Christ to the Church, the Giver of divine gifts.On the other hand, when confronted with a theological challenge onehas to move into a philosophical exposition of the correct teachingabout God. In this regard one has to find illuminating strategies ofspeaking and arguing, even if the thing itself slips as a mystery beyondwhat we can master from our weak intellectual resources.In a discussion about the freedom of will we normally associate

the idea of freedom with choice between different options that weexperience in the sensible world. In the theology of Gregory this is arather vulgar conception of freedom. According to him, if human

sure the Cappadocians did not think that divine nature is common in the sense of anabstract universal. I think they employ this terminology not as a strict philosophicaldoctrine, but as a strategy of metaphor in order to create a glimpse of understandingfor what the thing itself is about.


activity is naturally directed towards what is good (or at least believedto be good), then, if God by nature possesses in Himself all that isgood, He must be free in the most sublime sense when His activity isdirected towards His own being. On this level, Gregory’s doctrineshares a striking resemblance with Plotinus’ doctrine of the will of theOne.39 Plotinus says that he must depart from correct thinking inorder that his discourse may be persuasive. Gregory, as we have seen,is always conscious of the fact that he has to reason analogically or byway of resemblance, reaching for what is worthy of God withoutbeing able to grasp what transcends knowledge. Plotinus, for thesake of persuasion, speaks of the will (� ��ıº��Ø�) of the One. TheOne has activities (K��æª�ØÆØ), but cannot act (K��æª�E) without will,and since the activities are the essence, the essence is identical withwill. The One is the Good and all things desire the Good. The soul, forinstance, has its true freedom when it is directed towards the Good.40

In this case it is not subject to another, but executes its self-determi-nation. The Good, for its part, is turned towards itself, and since itdoes not have its principle of movement in any other thing (there isnothing external for it to desire), it is free in the highest degree.Let us see what a comparison between Plotinus and Gregory might

give us. The similarities in the doctrine of divine will does not allow usto say that Gregory knew the Plotinian doctrine of double activity. Ifhe did, he should have to adapt the theory in order to illuminate twoChristian doctrines: firstly, the institution of a divine triad of con-substantial hypostases, and secondly, the creation of beings other thanGod. But why should Plotinian doctrine have to be adapted? Because,as we have seen, in the Plotinian version it suits the explanation ofhow hypostases are generated in a continuous system of subordina-tion. As such it could not be allowed within a Christian system. Withthese requirements in mind we could try to sum up the doctrine ofTrinitarian generation according to Gregory.The internal activity of the essence would thus be the internal

activity of the essence of the Father. This must be His knowingHimself as Good and His willing this Good. Now, to know and towill the Good must be one and the same simple act, and from thissimple act there occurs the immediate possession of the object, i.e.,the Good that is the second (and the third) hypostasis. This second

39 Enneads 6. 8.13. 40 Cf. Ennead 6.8.7.


hypostasis, however, could not be identical with an activity out ofthe essence if this is a transitive act in the Plotinian sense, i.e., an actnot directly willed by the cause and terminating at a secondary levelof being. The difference is that the willing itself as Good, according toGregory, means to will the second (and third) hypostasis. But inPlotinus’ scheme this willing of oneself is an intransitive act withthe transitive act occurring incidentally. This is not Christian doc-trine. The Plotinian One does not will the second (and the third)hypostases, and therefore these hypostases occur incidentally belowit. The Gregorian God wills the second (and the third) hypostases,and because of this direct act of will, the Son (and the Spirit) are onthe level of the Father. To Gregory, the second (and the third)hypostases are of the same essence, i.e. homoousion with the first.The concept of goodness, in the thought of late antiquity (as it is in

Plato’s Timaeus), is associated with generosity and communication ofgifts. God the Father, willing His own nature as Good (beyond thegood of external activity), immediately actualizes His being in hypo-static communion.41

In Gregory’s reflections the Father’s willing the Good plays thedecisive role. On the one hand, he emphasizes that willing the Goodimplies the immediate possession of the Son because the Son is thegood object willed. On the other hand, he tries to stress the imme-diacy even stronger, and says that the Son is the Willing itself. Ofcourse, one could question whether the latter is a stronger expressionthan the first. It could seem that the ‘willing the good’ states an objectbeyond the act of willing, in which case ‘willing the good’ would be anincomplete activity in the Aristotelian sense. I do not think, however,that Gregory sees it this way. Rather, I think he understands theact-of-willing-the-Good as a unitary and complete act, an actuality.Therefore the willing as such is the immediate possession. The activ-ities of generation and procession originate from the Father, andthese acts are complete energeiai in the Aristotelian sense becausethe ‘objects’ are immediately possessed with the activities themselves.To Gregory this is not a transformation of the divine being into a

41 This is not exactly in accordance with the ‘de Régnon thesis’ that Greek thoughtproceeds from person to nature, cf. Heart in Coakley ed. (2004), 111–12. It is not quitethe thesis of Zizioulas (1985), 17–18, either, since personhood is not arranged as amore primordial category than nature. It is rather because of the nature of thehypostasis of the Father that the Trinity is a primordial ontological fact. Communitystems from the capability of the nature of the hypostasis.


triadic activity. The triadic activity culminates immediately in a con-substantial being of three hypostases.We shall conclude this section with some comments on a question

that was posed earlier: if the Father acts in freedom, could Hehave chosen to remain single, i.e., without His Son and His Spirit?I suppose Gregory would have considered this question awkward. Ina rather vulgar way it seems to reckon with a kind of ‘time’ (or quasi-temporal extension) before the generation and procession. The ques-tion seems to amount to asking if the Father in His Godhead couldhave wanted not to be Himself. If one thinks that doing the goodfreely is the highest form of freedom, and that a perfect mind perfectlyknows itself as good, this mind would freely choose to remain byitself. The Father’s free choice of Himself is the choice of Himself asthe source of primordial acts of generation. There was no ‘before’ theTrinity, not in any sense of the term ‘before’. The question of whetherthe Father could have remained without the two other hypostasesamounts to asking if the eternal Principle of the eternal triune Godcould have chosen not to be itself. Gregory would have found this tobe absurd.

B. DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE ON TRINITARIANGENERATION

The pseudo-Dionysian corpus stems from the late fifth or the earlysixth century, and its author subscribes, as would be normal in his time,to a doctrine of the triune being of God. The Trinitarian controversiesof the fourth century are history in the central parts of the Empire.In the spiritual theology of Dionysius it seems that the Trinity iscontemplated in accordance with notions that are Neoplatonic. Ifthat should be the case, the problem is less in connection with Trini-tarian theology than in connection with, for instance, cosmology. Wereturn to Dionysian cosmology in the next chapter.In order to grasp Dionysius’ doctrine we must acquaint ourselves

with certain general terms and concepts that will be useful when wecome to the doctrines of creation and participation as well. A basicidea of the Dionysian system is the notion of union and distinction(��ø�Ø� and �Ø�ŒæØ�Ø�). There is union and distinction within God in


the created world, and in the relation between God and the world.42

Another idea, basic to Dionysius’ doctrine of creation, is the triadicscheme of causality: remaining, procession, and conversion ( ��,�æ��, K�Ø��æ�ç�). It is tempting to view these terms as derivedfrom the Neoplatonism of Proclus,43 who says the effect remains in itscause, proceeds from it, and converts to it. The remaining probablymeans that the quality of the effect is perfectly present in the cause.The procession accounts for the difference between cause and effect,while the conversion means that the effect is constituted as a newhypostasis with the reception of the quality remaining in the cause.44

Proclus’ causal scheme ismuch like the Plotinian conception of doubleactivity. A similar doctrine often occurs in Dionysius and is clearlybrought forward in De Divinus nominibus 4.10:45 ‘To put the matterbriefly, all being derives from, exists in, and is converted towards theBeautiful and the Good.’ Dionysius is, perhaps, the first Christianthinker to use this triadic scheme extensively. Later, amodified versionwas built into the system of St Maximus the Confessor.46

In De Divinis nominibus Dionysius says that ‘the Father is theoriginating source of the godhead (‹�Ø �� Ø �ÅªÆ�Æ Ł��Å� ›

�Æ��æ) and that the Son and the Spirit are, so to speak, divineoffshoots (Ł��çı��Ø) the flowering and transcendent lights of thedivinity’.47 The Father is the �ÅªÆ�Æ of the trinity of persons. How,we would like to know, does the Father act as such a source, and inwhat way do the other two persons emerge? Dionysius immediatelyanswers that ‘we can neither say nor understand how this could beso’. This remark is quite interesting, as we shall see below, but weshould first note that Dionysius actually alludes to a way in which thedivine causality may be understood.Before we dive into the intricacies of the divine causality again, we

should note that, according to Dionysius, the motive behind thegeneral dialectic of union and differentiation is the divine Goodness.He emphasizes this again and again. Two important examples shouldbe noted:

Now in order that our subject should be clearly defined beforehand, as Ihave already said, we say the divine differentiations are the benevolent

42 DN ch. 2, Suchla 122–37. 43 Elements of theology 35.44 Elements of theology 30–32. 45 DN 4.12, Suchla 154.46 Cf. Amb. 7, PG 91: 1081a–c. 47 DN 2.7, Suchla 132.


processions of the Godhead. This is granted as a gift to all beings and itflows over in shares of goodness to all, and it becomes differentiated in aunified way.[ . . . ] they [namely, the theologians] call the subsisting Godhead

Goodness, and because it is Good this essential Goodness extendsGoodness into all beings. And just as our sun, not by deliberation orintention, but rather by just being itself, enlightens all things thatparticipate in its light, in accordance with the principle of their owncapacity [to participate], so it is with the Good [ . . . ].48

We shall return to a problem contained in the second quotation laterin the section on Dionysius’ doctrine of creation. What I would like toemphasize now is this principle of Goodness: the Good is by naturesuch that it gives itself to other things, it distributes itself. This ideamay be traced to Plato’s Timaeus in which the cause of creation is thegoodness of the Demiurge.49 Dionysius speaks about the differentia-tions that are befitting the goodness of the godhead (�a� �ØÆŒæ��Ø� �b,�a� IªÆŁ��æ��E� �B� Ł�Ææå�Æ�).50 The primary instance of union anddifferentiation is the divinity itself. The union of God is preserved inthe one essential and good Godhead. Through the Father this God-head is differentiated into a triad of hypostases. Within this unifiedtriad each of the persons is preserved in an unmixed and unconfusedway in its own hypostatic characteristics.51 The reason behind themanifestation of the triad is probably that it befits the divinity quagood to communicate as internally related personal hypostases.Against this background we may move to the doctrine of divine

causality. Dionysius writes that those initiated into the theologicaltradition say that ‘the differentiations (�a� �ØÆŒæ��Ø�) within theGodhead have to do with the benign processions and revelations(�æ��ı� �� ŒÆd KŒç��Ø�) of God’.52 Although the meaning ofthis assertion is far from clear, I would suggest that the terms �æ��Øand KŒç��Ø� indicate a two-fold perspective: firstly, in this context,the processions refer to the ontology of the Trinitarian generation ofthe Son and procession of the Spirit, while secondly, the revelationsconcern the possibility for intelligent creatures to know this inner-Trinitarian life. In short, the first has to do with the mystery of thedivine being itself, while the second concerns what is revealed in the

48 DN 2.11 and 4.1, Suchla 135, 143–4. 49 Timaeus 29d f.50 DN 2.4, Suchla 126. 51 Cf. DN 2.5, Suchla 128.52 DN 2.4, Suchla 126.


economy, and has to do with our strategies of speaking of whatcannot be understood adequately.The Father is the origin of the Trinity, the Son and the Spirit are

processions from him. If this is interpreted according to the triadiccausal scheme the following picture emerges: the Father remains( ��Ø) in his essentially good nature. While remaining in a Goodnessthat by nature is distributive of itself, He gives rise to two processions,namely, of the Son and the Spirit. As they proceed they are hyposta-tically differentiated from the hypostasis of the Father. The causalprocess is fulfilled, however, at themoment (not in the temporal sense,of course) when the two proceeding hypostases convert (K�Ø��æ�ç�ı�Ø)to their source and are filled with it.What happens in the conversion isthat they are constituted in the same essentially good content as theirsource. They are hypostatically differentiated but essentially identicalto the Father.This description of the mystery of the Trinity is, of course, within

the dimension of what is revealed. How is that? The answer is that itborrows both its terms and its causal scheme from the created worldand applies them to the transcendent being of God. Such an explana-tion could never be adequate since the theological mystery alwayshas to be described from the point of view of the economy. As waspointed out earlier, Dionysius says ‘we can never understand how thiscould be so’.Despite the philosophical scheme of causality involved, the

description itself is full of metaphors. The Father is spoken of as asource. The hypostases of the Son and the Spirit are conceived ina scheme of movement or activity as proceeding and convertingin relation to the Father, almost as if these movements took placespatially. Is it possible to explain the process in a more conceptual,philosophical way? I believe so, even if the explanation is quitea hypothetical construction. However, even if the description froma philosophical point of view could be brought on to a more advancedlevel, it would still be within what is accessible to human reason andnot adequate to the divine mystery in itself.The triadic causal scheme of Proclus is historically connected with

the Plotinian doctrine of double activity. According to Plotinus,everything has its origin in the One. By just being itself, and withoutbeing active as a creator, the One is the source of the next hypostasis,the Mind. The One has an K��æª�ØÆ �B� �P��Æ�, which inevitably isaccompanied by an activity KŒ �B� �P��Æ�. As we have seen, this


activity ad extra culminates in the constitution of the Mind.53 If weelaborate a bit further on this doctrine, we could say that the Oneremains itself and its activity of essence is a kind of self-contempla-tion, i.e., its contemplation of itself as good. This contemplation isaccompanied by an activity out of the essence as a creative activity.This creative activity is established as the next level below, the level ofthe Mind, because the activity out of the essence, as a rationalprinciple (a logos), is turned as self-contemplation towards itself asa derivation from the higher level. Thus the activity out of the essenceof the One is identified as the activity of the essence of the Mind. Thisactivity of the essence of the Mind is not only its self-contemplation,but at the same time its self-constitution as a new hypostasis.54 Theprocess is repeated in the relation between the Mind and the Soul.In this way the Neoplatonic triad of primary hypostases is gener-

ated. It seems to me quite probable that a doctrine of double activity(much like Plotinus’) or of remaining–proceeding–converting (muchlike Proclus’) represents the causal scheme behind Dionysius’ allu-sions to the mystery of the establishment of the Christian Trinity. But,as we have seen, according to Dionysius we can neither say norunderstand how the divine processions actually take place.55 Eventhough it could seem conceptually clearer, it would not help much tosay that the Son and the Spirit are activities of the Father’s essence.From the point of view of the philosophical doctrine employed weknow now that there is an obvious problem involved: according to theNeoplatonic doctrine of causes, the effect, even if generated in the wayexplained above, is established on a metaphysically lower level ofreality than its cause. The movement from cause to effect is a ‘down-ward’movement from the more to the less real, from the more to theless unified, from unity to plurality. This is not difficult to understandsince while the activity of the first hypostasis is itself quite simple,the activity of the second hypostasis is of a more complex kind: thePlotinian Mind, for instance, contemplates itself both as derivingfrom the higher principle and as good, i.e., as a cause for whatcomes next.Dionysius, perhaps, sees this problem clearly when he says we

cannot understand the divine generation:56 ‘In reality there is noexact likeness between those things that are caused and the causes,

53 Plotinus: Ennead 5.4.2. 54 Cf. Ennead 3.8.1–4.55 DN 2.7, Suchla 132. 56 DN 2.8, Suchla 132.


for the things that are caused have within themselves only such imagesof their originating sources as are possible for them, while the causesthemselves transcend and exceed the caused, according to the princi-ple of their own origin.’ What Dionysius seems to find problematichere is that the Neoplatonic scheme of causality explains the genera-tion of hypostases on a descending scale of perfection. Like St Gregoryof Nyssa he seems to realize that such a causal scheme is not ableto explain how the first hypostasis may generate two more hypostaseson the same level of reality as the first, so as to constitute together aprimordial Triad of hypostases. This problem does not necessarilyrepresent a weakness in Dionysius’ Trinitarian doctrine, but ratherindicates that he perceives the philosophical theory used to elucidatethe doctrine as being inadequate for this purpose. If this interpretationis correct, Dionysius does not differ much from Gregory’s concerns,even if the terminology differs. Further, his acceptance of Neoplatonicterms does not commit him to follow Neoplatonic concepts strictly, atleast not in connection with divine generation.

C. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON THE INTERNALACTIVITY OF THE TRINITY

In the history of Christian doctrine St Maximus the Confessor isknown as the advocate of dyotheletism contra the heretical doctrinesof monenergism and monotheletism—we shall return to this inChapter 5 below. Maximus’ engagement in the Christological contro-versy stems fromhis philosophy.More precisely, his engagement couldbe taken to result from his basic idea of nature and its integrity. On theother hand, his starting point is not strictly anthropological and onto-logical; it is based on his view of the interaction between ontological,anthropological, and soteriological motifs. Basic to his whole theologi-cal vision is what he calls the mystery of Christ.57 This mystery bringsthe beginning, end, and ontological structure of the whole economy ofsalvation into the dynamic of the inner life of the triune Godhead. Thisdynamic is one of the main focuses of the present section.

57 Cf. Ad Thal. 60, CCSG 22, 73–81.


When we move to Maximus we arrive in a climate of controversywhere the focus has shifted from mainly Trinitarian problems tomainly Christological ones. He does not philosophize extensively onstrategies for speaking about the constitution of God’s triadic being inthe way that the Cappadocians do. Maximus’ idea of the mystery ofChrist provides a new angle from which to interpret the relationsbetween God’s inner and outer activities. Even if this does not shedmuch light on the ontological constitution of the Trinity as such, it isquite telling for an understanding of divine activity ad extra and for aChristian evaluation of the status and worth of created being.In the last part of the introduction to his Mystagogia, Maximus

develops some important theological ideas on the difference betweenGod and creatures.58 The line of thought is rather difficult and, itseems, full of paradox.Because of his ‘super-being’ (��æ�E�ÆØ)59 God is more fittingly

called non-being (�e c �r�ÆØ). I suppose it implies that God ismore fittingly called non-being than being. The difference betweenGod and His creatures requires us to understand that the ‘setting’(Ł��Ø�) of super-being is the ‘removal’ (IçÆ�æ��Ø�) of beings, and the‘setting’ of beings is the ‘removal’ of super-being.Now, what does this mean?Maximus plays on the three ontological

concepts of super-being, being, and non-being. It seems to indicatethat the ontological difference between God and creatures is of such akind that if we speak about being as a basic ontological fact of thecreated world, then we cannot speak about being in relation to God.The difference between God and the world, between Creator andcreation, between the all-perfect God and the things He made is soradical that we cannot make predications about them within the sameontological scheme. The following statement, of course, is proble-matic on this background, but it somehow has to be said: comparedwith creaturely being, God is non-being. However, there is no com-mon ground of ‘comparison’.To use the term super-being does not signify that God is the most

perfect, the most eminent, and exalted kind of being, as if predicationcould be helped by some doctrine of analogia entis. It is simplya negation. There are simply no common concepts that could be

58 Myst., PG 91: 664b–c.59 On ‘super-being’ or rather ‘trans-being’, cf. Tollefsen (2008), 165 n85.


predicated about both God and his creatures. In the Ambiguum 7,Maximus says of this:

For it is not so that what is infinite and what is delimited is present in asimultaneous way, nor could any demonstration show the possibility ofsimultaneous being (�r�ÆØ) of essence (�c� �P��Æ�) and what transcendsessence (�e ��æ��Ø��), nor is there any possibility of leading towardsthe same what is measurable and what is non-measurable, what isconditioned and what is non-conditioned, what is not pronounced inany categorical form and what is constituted by all of these.60

In his De charitate, we also find a rather strong expression of thesame: the divine �P��Æ has no contrary, but the �P��Æ of beings havetheir contrary in �e c Z�.61 This can only mean that since there is nocommon contrary, there cannot be any common point of reference atall between God’s being and the being of His creatures.If, on the other hand, the ‘setting’, i.e., the affirmation, is that God is

super-being, then beings are not—they suffer ‘removal’. Taken togetherthis tells us that if we say things have being, thenGodhas non-being. If wesay God has (or is) being, even super-being, then things have non-being.Further on in the introduction to Mystagogia, when Maximus says

that both names (being and non-being) may be applied to God, heimmediately states that they are not rightfully or fitfully put ( Å�� Æ�Œıæ�ø�). On the one hand, Maximus allows that to affirm being of Godis to say that He is the cause of beings. In other words, we speak of Godin relation to His creatures as the source of their being. On the otherhand, to deny being to Him amounts to saying that He is not to becharacterized by the terminology of the being of beings; but as cause hetranscends all created properties, and therefore all predicates given tocreated things. Maximus has stated here the Dionysian idea of apo-phatic and cataphatic theology. In both instances, however, one makesstatements of God inHis causal relationship to the world. If we speak ofGod in Himself, however, no concept drawn from created othernesswill apply, neither positively nor negatively. This is also in keeping withthe Dionysian doctrine because he says that God is not in the sphere ofassertion or denial (�P�� K��Ø� ÆP�B� ŒÆŁ�º�ı Ł��Ø�, �h�� IçÆ�æ��Ø�).62

Maximus repeats this idea when he says that God transcends allaffirmation and negation (��Å� ŒÆ�Æç�� ŒÆd I��ç��ø�

60 Amb. 7, PG 91: 1081b. 61 De char. 3.28, PG 90: 1025b–c.62 De mystica theologia, PG 3: 1048a–b.


�s�Æ� K��Œ�Ø�Æ). What we have here is a radical apophatisism and aradical notion of transcendence.Against this background, it comes as no surprise when Maximus

says in Ambiguum 23 that the divine is unmoved (IŒ��Å��) bynature and essence. The reason given is that the divine is infinite,unrelated, and indeterminate (¼��Øæ�� ŒÆd ¼�å�� ŒÆd I�æØ��).63 InAmbiguum 41 he says—referring to the Incarnation—that what istotally unmoved by nature moved (ŒØ��E�ÆØ) immovably (IŒØ��ø�)around that which by nature is moved.64 The predicate ‘unmoved’is known as a characteristic of Aristotle’s unmoved mover from theMetaphysics ¸. In Maximus it is reasonable to take this predicate as anegation, an apophatic predicate. In this sense, of course, it points tothe transcendent being of God, even though it still predicates some-thing of Him in (negative) relation to created being, and therefore isnot put in the most radical sense, as we saw in the introduction to theMystagogia that was commented on earlier.Does not this predicate of unmoved indicate that the being of

God is conceived of as quite non-dynamic and stiffened? Isn’t thisthe ‘God of the philosophers’ and not the living and acting God ofChristianity? In Ambiguum 10 Maximus says that man may learnfrom God’s goodness and love that God is moved (ŒØ�ÅŁ��Æ) to givebeing and well-being to created things; if, that is, it is permissible tospeak of movement (Œ��Å�Ø�) with regard to God, ‘the sole unmoved’(��F ��F IŒØ��ı). Rather we should speak of will (��ºÅ�Ø�) thatmoves the all, draws and holds it in being.65 Taken together all this israther telling. God is unmoved, but we may speak of him as moving,even if we more properly may speak of him as willing. At first we mayturn to the distinction made by Aristotle, namely between movementand activity.66 Movement is incomplete activity while activity properis the action that is complete in itself. With this in mind we mightinterpret Maximus to mean that God is unmoved in the sense thatHis being internally excludes the incomplete activity of movementproper. If we say He ‘moves’, it is in the sense of executing energeia inthe complete sense. Such kind of energeia is the actuality, the im-mediately realized all-perfect state of being without change. If we shiftour perspective to God’s creative ‘movement’, then this is an energeia

63 Amb. 23, PG 91: 1260b. Cf. Amb. 10, PG 91: 1184d–1185d.64 Amb. 41, PG 91: 1308c–d. 65 Amb. 10, PG 91: 1204d–1205a.66 Cf. chapter 1 above, on Aristotle’s conception of energeia.


that is, in the present case, the act of willing by which God gives beingand well-being. Something similar is found in Ambiguum 26, whenMaximus comments on an anti-Eunomian text from St GregoryNazianzen.67 Gregory criticizes the Anomoean idea of the Father asthe name of the divine energeia. Maximus distinguishes, interpretingGregory, between what we may understand to be an internal energeiathat is essential and, I suppose, an actuality, and an external energeia –an activity or a movement that makes, for instance, artefacts.While theAnomoeans take the Son as being produced by such an externalactivity, Maximus thinks that He is generated within the divine sphereitself by an internal paternal activity that generates externally withinits own unified ontological level, maybe much in the same way asdescribed by St Gregory of Nyssa in connection with the divine will,as we saw earlier.68

Now, willing is an activity of the divine nature. According toMaximus, natural energeia is generally an innate distinctive mark(� çı�� åÆæÆŒ��æ) that is naturally constitutive (�ı��Æ�ØŒ��) for anature.69 This sounds as if nature or essence is constituted by theproper energeia of a being; in other words, that essence is basicallyenergeia. In Ambiguum 5 Maximus says the definition of every natureis constituted by the logos of its essential energeia.70 I think it is properto translate the term as ‘actuality’ in these latter instances. In hisOpusculum 27 Maximus quotes several earlier Fathers about energeia,and I choose not to translate the term as yet. We shall look at someformulations.A. Maximus quotes St Justin the Philosopher (the Martyr) from a

book against Euphrasius the Sophist, saying:

1. The energeia of the whole essence is the quality naturally belongingto it. The natural and constitutive energeia is the defining differenceof the nature of the manifest thing [ . . . ].

2. The natural energeia is the essential and constitutive quality of thewhole essence, by the deprivation of which it is deprived as well ofthe whole essence.

3. Natural energeia is the unmixed power that by essential differentia-tion is preserving of all things in relation to all other things.71

67 Amb. 26, PG 91: 1265d–1268b.68 Cf. Gregory Nazianzus as well: Oration 39.6. 69 Pyrrh. PG 91: 348a.70 Amb. 5, PG 91: 1057a–b. 71 Th.Pol. 27, PG 91: 280c–d.


B. Maximus quotes St Alexander of Alexandria, from a Letter toAiglon, Bishop of Cynopolis, against the Arians:

Natural energeia is the innate movement of the total essence. Naturalenergeia is the essential and knowable logos of the whole nature. Naturalenergeia is the power revealing the whole nature.72

C. Then Maximus quotes St Gregory of Nyssa:

The energeia is the essential movement characteristic of nature, ofwhich it is instituted as a property, through which [energeia] it [i.e.,the nature] is known as essentially differentiated from other [natures].73

A final text that should be noted is from the Chapters on knowledge2.1, which concludes with the statement that the essence, power, andenergeia of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one and thesame ( �Æ ªaæ ŒÆd � ÆP�c �P��Æ ŒÆd ��Æ Ø� ŒÆd K��æª�ØÆ �Æ�æe� ŒÆd

ıƒ�ı ŒÆd ±ª��ı �� Æ��).How should this be understood? I’ll try to suggest some answers.

Firstly, one cannot argue from the texts in a florilegium to what wasMaximus’ own conviction. On the other hand, as far as I can see, themain sense of the quotations is consistent with citations from Max-imus above, and even seems to teach the same. Further, I think thethree points that follow are rather reasonable: the first point, like inPlotinus (see the section in chapter one), the internal activity is eachthing as its actuality. The ontological status of the external activity,therefore, must be distinguished from the internal activity in sucha way that it cannot as such be identified with what constitutes theessence of the substance. On the other hand as the second point, theexternal activity must, in a Christian system of thought, be dependenton the internal activity (as an actuality) and cannot be ‘of anothernature’ than it. Consequently it is not a creature, it is somehow divineor God. We shall return to this in the chapters on cosmology andsoteriology. The third point: we should remember that major Chris-tian thinkers, including the Cappadocian Fathers andMaximus, thinkthat God in Himself is beyond comprehension and that terminologi-cal and conceptual strategies—about which one has to be accurate, ofcourse—are adopted to the requirements of the topic one speaksof and the angle from which one addresses it. This means there arearenas in which one probably should have to distinguish between

72 Th. Pol. 27, PG 91: 280d. 73 Th. Pol. 27, PG 91: 281a.


essence, activity, and hypostasis, and arenas in which one might saythat the essence of God is His primary (internal) activity (as actu-ality), an activity that is the essential nature of God.As we saw earlier, Maximus says that the natural energeia is an

innate distinctive mark that constitutes an essence. What he has inmind could well be an activity in the proper sense (not what Aristotlewould have called a movement), namely an activity that is completein its execution. However, in this context the activity is not justcomplete, like an act of seeing or thinking, the activity perfects andconstitutes a being. For this reason we may translate energeia as‘actuality’. Several of the texts above seem to have this sense, namely,A. points 1, 2, and 3. Texts B. and C. have another kind of dynamiccharacter and seem to indicate external energeia: it is the powerrevealing the nature and the essential movement by which a natureis known. Energeia probably has this sense in Chapters on knowledge2.1 as well. The general principle of the Cappadocian Fathers says thatit is by observing and knowing the activities of a substance that wemay grasp its essence. In the case of God, it may well be that theinternal energeia (actuality) that is the essence of the divine naturedefines the being of God in itself. On the other hand, this internalenergeia is precisely beyond comprehension. The energeiai fromwhich God may be known—to the degree possible for creatures—are the external activities of the divine being.These points are illustrated in a text in which Maximus explicitly

addresses the topic of the movement that structures the one Godheadas a triad of hypostases. The text is the Ambiguum 1,74 in which hediscusses passages from two of St Gregory Nazianzen’s sermons. Bothtexts seem to speak about how the divine monad becomes the divinetriad:

Therefore the monad is eternally moved towards the dyad until itreaches the triad.The monad is moved because of its wealth and the dyad is superseded;for beyond matter and form, out of which bodies are made, the triad isdefined on account of its perfection.75

What is important now is not to askwhatGregory intended, but to geta hold of how this is understood by Maximus. It is possible, of course,

74 PG 91: 1033d–1036c. 75 Louth’s translation in Maximus (1996), 169.


that Maximus provides a good interpretation. Gregory speaks aboutmovement (Œ��Å�Ø�) from the monad through the dyad until it ends inthe perfected being of the triad. This Triad is the Holy Trinity of Father,Son, and Holy Spirit. Maximus accepts Gregory’s formulation of ‘theone outburst of radiance’ (�e £� ��Æº Æ �B� ºÆ �æ��Å��)76 and also ofa ‘flowing’ (å�� Å�). In this context both terms seem to denoteactivities within the being of the Godhead. However, according toMaximus’ interpretation,Gregory’s words do not concernwhat happenswithin the divine being. As we have seen, he firmly believes that we arenot able to know this. What he reckons is that it is all about how wecould think economically about the generation of the Triad. It is not,he says, an aetiology of the cause of beings, itself beyond being (�B��æ�ı��ı �H� Z�ø� ÆN��Æ�), but ‘a demonstration of its reverent glory’(Iºº �P��F� ��æd ÆP�B� ��Å� I��Ø�Ø�). Somehow, the explanationor description takes its stand within the created order and speaks not ofthe Trinity in itself, but of what concerns it. What should that mean?Maybe it is to be taken in the same sense as the ‘around him’ (��ædÆP��), known from Cappadocian thought? This could be interpretedas the created order, but normally it indicates something of a moredivine character.77 I shall comment on the notion of the ��æd ÆP�� inSt Gregory ofNyssa whenwe come to his doctrine of creation in the nextchapter. If what Gregory teaches holds for Maximus’ doctrine as well,the ‘what is around’ is the divine manifestation or activity that to somedegree is knowable and which should be distinguished from the essence(the ‘actuality’) of the divine being as such. Maximus thinks we may beable to say something about the Trinity that is meaningful for us if weconsider the way it manifests itself, obviously in some kind of discern-able activity.In this connection a difference between Maximus and Gregory

of Nyssa is worth noting. Gregory frequently uses the terminologyof causality in connection with Trinitarian generation. According toCappadocian thought in general, the Father is the cause of the Trinity.In his commentary on the Lord’s Prayer, Maximus says that theFather is the cause of creatures. On the contrary, the hypostases ofthe Son and the Spirit always coexisted with the Father. Maximussays that the relation (�å��Ø�) between the hypostases of the Trinityis characterized by �ı��Ø�. The terminology of causation is

76 Oration 40.5. 77 Cf. Bradshaw (2007), 166–9.


avoided:78 ‘[ . . . ] being by nature fromHim and in Him beyond cause(��bæ ÆN��Æ�) and understanding, but they are not after Him (Iºº �P

��’ ÆP�e�) as if they had come to be subsequently by being caused(ª�� Æ �Ø� ÆN��Æ� R��æ��).’ Some further remarks are appropriate.Maximus seems to say that whenever things are characterized by

�ı��Ø�, from the verb �ı��Œ�ı Ø, they are in relation to oneanother. These words mean that things indicate or point to oneanother. According to Aristotle and Aristotelian tradition, relativesare not relations as such, but rather things related.79 This is definitelythe sense of relation at work in the present context as well. ‘Father’indicates ‘Son’, and ‘Son’ indicates ‘Father’. It might be asked, how-ever, how ‘Father’ could indicate ‘Spirit’? The point is that it doesn’t.But the first hypostasis is ‘Father’ and ‘King’. King indicates kingdom,and kingdom King. The kingdom of the Father and King, accordingto Maximus’ argument in the commentary, is to be identified withthe Holy Spirit. One might wonder how this should be taken, andI suppose Maximus thinks of the Holy Spirit as establishing thecommunity of the Church. However that may be, Maximus concludesthat things related in this manner are certainly coexistent.Maximus’ conception of cause and causation in this connection

is that the effect is ‘after’ the cause, or ‘subsequent’ to it. This ‘after’and ‘subsequent’might indicate a temporal succession or maybe evena metaphysical or logical dependence of the lower on the higher.Together with the last possibility goes the notion of subordinationof the lower to the higher. Of course, with such a notion of causality inmind, the Father cannot be the cause of the Son. However, there is noreason to doubt that Maximus fully acknowledges the arguments ofthe Cappadocian fathers, and would have found a strategy to defendtheir points of view if needed.Even if we are not able to understand Trinitarian generation in

itself, but only get a glimpse of it through what ‘surrounds’ God, thereis one important theological matter that furnishes us with a glimpseinto the inner life of the Triad after all. This, according to Maximus, isthe doctrine of the divine economy of creation and salvation. Soter-iological motives, he believes, are fundamental to the entire economy.The divine acts towards created otherness are motivated by whatMaximus calls the mystery of Christ.

78 Expositio orationis dominicae, CCSG 23, 42.79 Cat. 6a36–7, 6b28–7a18.


A key text in this regard is found in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium60. Maximus comments on the text from 1 Pet 1:19–20, which statesthat Christ was known before the foundation of the world. Christ asforeknown is the same as ‘the mystery of Christ’, Maximus says. TheHoly Trinity itself holds this mystery, according to its essence (ŒÆ��P��Æ�).80 Maximus says it was foreknown (�æ��ª��ŁÅ) by theFather according to His approval (eudokia), to the Son according toHis self-work (autourgia), and to the Spirit according to His coopera-tion (synergia).81 Christ was foreknown (�æ�ªØ��Œ��ÆØ), not as God,but as man.82 ‘This is the mystery circumscribing all the ages revealingthe super-infinite, great council of God, which in a manner beyondreckoning infinitely pre-exists the ages [ . . . ]’, Maximus says.83

This theological vision, so striking when worked out philosophi-cally, is based on solid scriptural ground. Firstly, we have the Pauline‘metaphysics of propositions’, cf. Rom 11:36: ‘For of Him andthrough Him and to Him are all things, to whom be glory forever.Amen.’ (Cf. 1 Cor 8:6 and Col 1:16.) Secondly, we have the Paulinevision of the economy of salvation as founded on God’s eternalpurpose, cf. Ephesians chapter 1.Now, there are more challenging and interesting points to be found

here. Firstly, we find a discussion of divine ‘foreknowledge’; secondly,a discussion about the divine activities of approval, self-work andcooperation; and thirdly, we find a discussion about the mysteryas the eternal motif for God’s dealings with a created otherness. Theterm �æ�ªØ��Œø is used to accommodate to human weakness.The divine purpose ‘pre-exists’ the ages, and Maximus’ intention isto stress clearly that this is a mystery belonging to the sphere ofGod’s eternal self-contemplation, beyond the ‘before’ and ‘after’ ofthe temporality of the ages.Intuitively it seems reasonable that the Father eternally approved

the eternal purpose, but how could one say that the Son eternallyworked out His Incarnation, or the Spirit eternally cooperated in theeconomy of the Incarnation? I suppose the intention is to say that theSon eternally approved to work out the Incarnation, and the Spiriteternally approved to cooperate.As we have seen, we can distinguish between the essence of God as

internal energeia, an energeia that is a complete activity that is God in

80 Ad Thal, CCSG 22, 79. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid.83 Ad Thal, CCSG 22, 75.


Himself, and the actions of God as external activity.84 We havefurther seen that the essence, power, and activity of the three hypos-tases are one and the same. Soteriologically, this means that theactivities of approving, working, and cooperating are not separatedfrom one another. The eternal being of God is centred triadically onthis unified objective: to make a world and to glorify it. The threehypostases move eternally and unified towards one another. In Chap-ters on knowledge (2,1), Maximus dives into an exalted contemplationof how the three hypostases dynamically coinhere in and as thecomplete Godhead. The picture does not include, however, any con-sideration of generative activity, since the coinherence Maximusdescribes is the actualized condition in which God exists. The Chris-tian God is philanthropic in His innermost life and activity. This is animpressive and challenging picture of God. He is not beyond theconcerns of this world, but is in His own being provident. If Chris-tianity is scandalous, I believe it is to be found here rather than in theontology of the incarnation.

84 If one should indicate the full process, I suppose one should have to say that theinternal activity of God the Father manifests external activities within the sphere ofdivinity, and in this way He generates the Son and the Spirit. And this whole field ofactivity is the actualized triadic being of God. This is, however, not somethingMaximus actually says, only an attempt to reason further on theological principles.


4

The External Activity of the Godhead:Cosmology

A. ST GREGORY OF NYSSA ON CREATION ANDPARTICIPATION

As a preamble to this chapter Iwould like to reiterate the terminologicalpoint made in the Introduction. In St Gregory’s thought, we maydistinguish betweenGod’s internal and external energeia. Gregory thinksof the generation of the Holy Trinity as an internal activity that springsfrom the Father’s will. This will is immediately, beyond all createdcategories, constitutive of Trinitarian being. On the other hand, the actof creation can be described as an external activity, ‘external’ meaningthat this act makes and preserves beings that are other than God.Eunomius, for his part, thinks there is an internal activity within God,while the generation of the Triad itself is due to a purely external activity.This means, therefore, that the Son and the Spirit are created beings.According to Gregory, God the Father directs His will towards the

internalmanifestation of that which, strictly speaking, transcends thegood. In this way the Son and the Holy Spirit emerge as hypostases.This activity of will is not an act of choice, but the act of the personof the Father in the freedom of His nature. The will is completelytransparent to Him who acts. He knows in Himself those good thingstowards which He naturally moves in confirming their hypostaticcoming forth from eternity.The established Triad of persons communicate in the divine prop-

erties of goodness, incorruptibility, power, holiness, eternity, wisdom,righteousness, etc.1 Qua taking place in the dynamic field ‘between’

1 Cf. CE, GNO 2, 189 and Ad Eustathium, GNO 3.1, 8.

the persons—without any extension—I suppose we should considerthese basically as activities of divine nature. Such activities shouldprobably be understood as the movements of the hypostases towardsor their being towards one another. We should remember that thisdescription is from our point of view, because the reality itself trans-cends our grasp.We should first try to definemore clearly the relation between God’s

essence and His external activities according to Gregory. Gregory’scritique of Eunomius’ doctrine of activity is a convenient starting-point. In his Apologia apologiae, Eunomius stated that energeiai, i.e.,activities, ‘follow’ beings.2

Eunomius has an ontological gap to fill between the uncreated(ungenerated) God and the created (generated) Son. This gap is filledwith the activity of Fatherhood, of God being Father. In the first bookof his Contra Eunomium, Gregory takes the following quotationsfrom Eunomius’ Apologia apologiae:3 ‘[ . . . ] there must of course beincluded in this account the activities that accompany the essences(�H� �ÆE� �P��ÆØ� �Ææ�� ø� K��æª�ØH�) and the names clinging tothese.’ Eunomius speaks of ‘[ . . . ] the activities following each of theessences (�a� Œ��fi Å �H� �P�ØH� �� Æ� K��æª��Æ�) . . . ’. The keyterms (as we saw earlier in Chapter 2) are the verbs �Ææ�� ÆØ

(‘accompanies’) and �� ÆØ (‘comes after, follows’). In Chapter 2,I argue that according to Eunomius, the divine activity is establishedas a ‘something’ between the Unbegotten God and the Son. This‘between’, of course, is not a spatial extension, but indicates theessential separation of the two beings. I think we have here part ofthe background for Gregory’s frequent denial of any extensionbetween the divine persons.4

Gregory’s discussion of the Eunomian position is important.5 By‘activities’, he says, Eunomius understands the powers (�ı�� Ø�) bywhich the Son and the Holy Spirit are produced. In the Eunomiansystem these are activities ad extra. They have to be as such since thebeing of the Son and the Spirit is completely ‘outside’ the sphere of thefirst God. On the other hand, what does it mean that activities ‘follow’the essence? Are the activities something other, apart from theessences which they accompany, or are they a part of these essences,belonging to the nature of the essences (¼ºº� �Ø �Ææa �a� �P��Æ� Æx�

2 CE, GNO 1, 72–3. 3 CE, GNO 1, 72.4 Cf. CE, GNO 1, 79; NPNF 5, 52. 5 CE, GNO 1, 86–88; NPNF 5, 54–5.

84 The External Activity of the Godhead: Cosmology

�Ææ��ÆØ j �æ�� KŒ��ø� ŒÆd �B� ÆP�B� ç��ø�)? If activities areother than, how and from whence did they come into being? If theyare the same as the nature, how were they separated from the essencesand how did they come to ‘follow’ them as something external(��øŁ��), instead of co-existing with them? From Gregory’s point ofview, these are problems inherent in the Eunomian position.Gregory does not find Eunomius’ doctrine easy to understand, and

he comments on the interpretation that the activities emerge assomething other than the essences. As we saw in Chapter 2, if thisis Eunomius’ opinion, does it not imply that the divine activity isexpressed by a necessity of nature, without any divine purpose, as inthe case of heat and vapour that follow fire? According to my view,it is not unfair to ask this question. It is quite to the point. A studyof Eunomius’ extant works actually gives the impression that thefirst being is left in the condition of not being entangled with whatemerges ‘below’ it.6 For Gregory this implies that, according toEunomius, the activity occurs spontaneously, without God being inany sense engaged in the result. I have asked earlier if Eunomiusapplied a Plotinian scheme of double activity, but I found no reasonto believe this.However, the way Gregory handles his opponent couldseem to imply an accusation that Eunomius, if this should be hisposition, in practice adhered to a doctrine implying at least somethingsimilar to what we know as the Plotinian position: God is turnedtowards His own perfection, and what occurs as an external result ofthis internal activity (qua actuality) is, on the one hand, quite coin-cidental to the (self-centred) activity itself. On the other hand, theexternal activity is a necessary, unintended result.From Gregory’s point of view, this would be, for several reasons,

an inadmissible doctrine for anyone who considers himself to be aChristian. He does not find it reasonable that Eunomius would teachsuch a thing, and points to the fact that it turns God into a complex(��ØŒ�º��) and synthetic (��Ł��) being, namely an essence com-bined with or put together with an externally added activity. OnGregory’s view, Eunomius should have to agree that we must notthink of the divine activity as, he says, an accident contained in asubject (u� �Ø �ı ��ÅŒe� K� ��Œ�Ø ��øfi ). Gregory obviously thinksof an accident as an external addition, and not as something naturally

6 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 62–63.

The External Activity of the Godhead: Cosmology 85

integrated with the essence—which, logically, would be a quite nor-mal way to conceive it. Consequently, it is quite inadmissible to speakof the activity as if it was an accident ‘following’ the essence.

Gregory’s discussion of the Eunomian concept of activity is inter-esting, since what Gregory criticizes is an idea of real distinctionbetween essence and energeia. Some modern Orthodox theologians,however, have emphasized a real distinction in connection withSt Gregory Palamas’ theology of divine essence and energy. Theyhave also claimed that this distinction occurs in the major thinkersof mainstream Orthodox tradition, including St Gregory of Nyssa.7

We will return to this question in the last chapters, but some remarksare appropriate here. One might ask if the Eunomian real distinctionis the same as the alleged Palamite distinction—and with the ‘allegedPalamite distinction’ Imean what modern scholars have thought thatPalamas taught, not what he actually said. It strikes me that thedistinctions are similar enough that it is tempting to say they betraythe same ontological teaching.However, onemay notice one importantdifference, namely that modern scholars say the energeiai are GodHimself, even if under another aspect than His essence.8 Eunomiuscould not have said this. We are left with the question of the exactrelation between the essence, i.e., the actualized being of God, and theactivities when God acts ad extra.When we return to Gregory, the last question is precisely the one

we should address: what, then, is the correct understanding of therelationship between essence and activities? According to Gregory,Eunomius should admit that essences, moved in a deliberate andself-determined way, produce by themselves the expected result (�e��Œ�F�). We cannot separate the activity of a worker from the workerhimself. In the idea of activity we comprehend simultaneously the onewho is moved with the activity, and if we think of he who is active, weinclude the activity not expressed, Gregory says. He tries to make hispoint clearer by an example.9 If, for instance, we consider someonewho works in metal, we comprehend two aspects, namely the work(the activity) and the one who works (the artificer). This distinction isequivalent to Aristotle’s distinction between first and second energeia.

7 Cf. Lossky (1985), 45–69 and Meyendorff (1987), 186. The idea is quite commonamong Orthodox theologians and writers on the spiritual life.

8 Cf. For instance Meyendorff (1974), 214.9 CE, GNO 1, 88; NPNF 5, 55.


The artificer has a skill (first energeia), which he may execute (secondenergeia). The second is based on the first. If we remove the one, theother has no existence either. Take away the work (second energeia),and there is no worker (first energeia). This, however, is only true ifthere is no second potentiality = first energeia in the Aristoteliansense. So far, Gregory’s argument is weak. Take away the worker,and there is no work. From an Aristotelian point of view, this is true ifthe work is thought to be skilled, which Gregory obviously thinks it is.Both the activity and he who moves by it are thought of together sothat it is quite unreasonable to speak of the activity as ‘following’ theworker as some kind of ‘going between’ ( ��Ø��ı�Æ) the first being(the cause) and the second (the effect).From the analogy Gregory returns to the Eunomian argument

about natures, where the energeia neither coincides with (�ı �Æ��ı�Æ)the first nature nor combines with (�ı�Æ�� Å) the second. It isseparated from the first by not being its nature, and from the secondbecause the product is an active essence and not pure energeia (mean-ing activity) by itself, according to Gregory. In this instance one mightwonder if Gregory’s presentation is correct or if Eunomius is notactually able to make the philosophical distinction between posses-sing a skill (first energeia) and executing it (second energeia). Ofcourse, it is correct that an energeia does not necessarily belong tonature in the sense that it defines it, even if it is unreasonable to denythat some energeiai in fact do that, such as thinking and willing asfaculties belong to human nature and actualizing it. However, evenacquired powers (i.e., skills) or faculties normally require a nature of aspecific kind. It is, for instance, difficult to imagine a carpenter or apainter or a mathematician who is not a human being endowed withreason. This means that some energeiai are typical for a being andpresuppose an essence of a certain kind. It is difficult to conceive of adivine, creative activity that is not intimately connected with thebeing that executes the activity. The point of the last part of Euno-mius’ dictum is that the second being (the Son) is an essence that isthe external result of the activity of the first being (the Father). Thecause of this (second) active essence must be given in advance as anactivity that does not combine with the result. From an Aristotelianpoint of view, however, even if the activity (movement) in this caseterminates when the effect occurs, the activity of, let us say, housebuilding somehow resides in the finished product as the actualized


form (energeia as actuality) of the house.10 I think Gregory mainlyagrees with the Aristotelian principle, but he seems to argue thatEunomius does not. In De beatitudinibus there is an example whichshows that the Aristotelian idea is somehow accepted by Gregory:when we look at a work of art, we become aware of the presence of theartistic skill which the artist has left as an impression on his art.11

If this interpretation is correct, it shows some important aspectsof the Gregorian concept of energeia: firstly, the analogy of workerand work illustrates Gregory’s point. If it is correct to compare theanalogy with the Aristotelian doctrine, the worker, possessing hisskill, possesses the first energeia; the work, as an execution of activity,is second energeia. It is rather easy to see that the external activity isbased on the internal actuality (of a skill) and is an expression of it.The form that is left in the product, Gregory says in an obviousAristotelian vein, is the artistic skill of the artisan. The ontologicalconnection and even sameness between the skill as possessed and theskill as produced in the work of the worker seems to be present.Secondly, divine activity, consequently, is closely united with thebeing (essence or actuality) of the one who executes it. It somehowsprings from a certain inherent power of this being. Thirdly, theactivity is not a ‘going between’ or a kind of ‘being’ separately existingthat occurs between the cause and the effect. And finally, activity doesnot terminate completely at the moment of an accomplished externalresult, but somehow resides in the result. The latter point is veryimportant for both cosmology and deification. We shall see belowhow this understanding of activity is confirmed by several texts in theGregorian corpus. However, we have to make one important distinc-tion. Gregory does not think that the form (�r��) of a substance has adivine element in it. He thinks that created forms or essences exist bybeing brought from non-being to being by the act of creation. On theother hand, such forms carry the imprint of a wise cause, and exist bythe presence of certain divine activities that institute them and pre-serve them. The substance is created and the conditions of its beingand the perfections it may entail involve more than creatureliness.Now, Gregory’s arguments against the Anomoeans generally seem

quite reasonable, even though they sometimes create problems for hisown position. In his eagerness to ward off Eunomius he employs

10 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics ¨, 8: 1050a30–b3.11 De beatitudinibus Oratio 6, GNO 7.2, 141.


language that could be of good use when his own position should bedefined. Note the statement that the activity, according to Eunomius,is separated from the first essence because it is not its being, but,Gregory quotes, ‘the movement of the nature’ (ç��ø� Œ��Å�Ø�). Thecontext seems to indicate that Gregory has misgivings about the term‘movement of nature’. On the other hand, we should note thatEunomius denies that activity is the ‘movement of the nature’.12

Further, the example adduced above by Gregory (the metal-worker)indicates that, according to his own view, the activity is at least themovement of the artisan qua artisan. For this reason, when it comes toGod, should we not say that divine activity somehow is the movementof the nature? Some important distinctions have to be made here.In the first case, the activity as the movement of the artisan qua

artisan is not the movement of the artisan qua human essence—tobe a man and to be an artisan differs according to definition—eventhough it is the human essence that makes it possible for a humanbeing to acquire certain faculties. We must distinguish betweennatural activities such as thinking and willing, and acquired facultiesthat make it possible to execute certain activities. Certain such dis-tinctions have to be made concerning God as well. God, of course,does not acquire faculties. But if we look from Gregory’s angle, tothe internal activity of the Godhead, the generation of the Son is themovement of the natural will of the Father qua Father of the Son. Theexternal activity (that is the act out of the sphere of the Godhead), onthe other hand, has to be the movement of the Holy Trinity inrelation to creatures, and this activity cannot simply be the movementof the nature as such. If it was the movement of nature, it is difficult tosee how one should avoid thinking that creation follows naturallyfrom the being of God, and I am quite sure Gregory would avoid sucha consequence.13 The external activity, therefore, even if executedby God, and therefore based on the essence of what it is to be God,cannot be viewed as a pure movement of the essence. Now thequestion is how Gregory would anchor the creative activity in thebeing of God?In Chapter 2 we saw that, according to St Basil, we cannot know

the essence of God. We know God, however, because we knowcertain divine attributes, and knowledge of these are gained from an

12 Eunomius, Liber apologeticus, ed. Vaggione, 62/63.13 Cf. De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, 140–1.


observation of His activities. Gregory teaches the same. According tothe Contra Eunomium, the essence of God cannot be known: ‘If, then,the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcendshuman knowledge, how can He, who by His mere will made theworlds, be within the range of our apprehension?’14 In De vita Moysiswe learn that it is even a characteristic for the divine being to bebeyond all characteristics.15 The Ad Eustathium teaches the same:

But the divine nature itself, as it is, remains unsignified by all the namesthat are conceived for it, as our doctrine declares. For in learning thatHeis beneficent and a judge, good and just, and all else of the same kind, welearn the differences of His activities, but we are none the more able tolearn by our knowledge ofHis activities the nature ofHim who is active.16

The principle of knowing is the same as in Basil. We learn about God’sactivities (in Scripture and nature) and on the basis of themwe predicate certain properties of God, such as those just mentioned:He is a judge, He is beneficent, good, just, etc. The principle is statedclearly in several places in the second book of the Contra Eunomium:17

‘For it is clear that the divine being is named according to differentmeanings from the variety of His activities, so that we may think ofHim in the aspect so named.’ ‘[ . . . ] it is possible to find manyappellations for one and the same subject, according to the signifi-cances of its activities [ . . . ].’ What is important here is to establishGregory’s main principle. In addition to the possibility of framingnames from acquaintance with the activities, there is a further possi-bility given when we conceive of the idea of Divinity:18 ‘[ . . . ] whenonce our souls have grasped the notion of divine nature, by this namewe grasp by implication the perfection which in all concepts befitsGod.’ So, the names and terms we use for God are taken from what wemay learn of his activities and fromwhat we may conceive as proper tohim according to the notion of Divinity.These doctrines are illustrated, for example, in a passage from the

Homilies on the Beatitudes.19 He is commenting on the text fromMatthew 5:8: ‘Blessed are the pure in heart; for they shall see God.’Since God’s nature is incomprehensible, knowledge of Him must be

14 CE, GNO 1, 250; cf. 246. 15 De vita Moysis, GNO 7.1, 115, cf. 92.16 Ad Eustathium, GNO 3.1, 14.17 CE, GNO 1, 315 and 329. Cf. De an. et res. as well, PG 46: 40c.18 Adversus Macedonianos, GNO 3.1, 91.19 De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, 140–1.


reached by another method than a conceptual comprehension of Hisbeing. It is possible to ‘see’ Him who made all things in wisdom fromthe wisdom that occurs in all things. Gregory proposes an analogy: inman-made artefacts it is possible to perceive the maker of the thingwith the mind’s eye. What follows confirms what I said just above,even if only epistemologically: we do not really see the nature of theartisan, but only the skilful technique that he applied to his work.Similarly, if we look to the order of creation, we form a notion in ourminds, not of the essence of God, but of His wisdom. ‘He who isinvisible by nature becomes visible in His activities, being seen in thethings that are around Him (��E� ��æd ÆP�e�).’ In this same contextGregory also applies the principle of what is proper to God accordingto the notion of Divinity: we should not, as we might expect, thinkthat God made the world by any necessity, but rather by benevolentintention (�æ�Æ�æ��Ø�). We may therefore assume that goodnessshould be predicated of God. From His activities and from whatis proper, given the notion of Divinity, we may comprehend manysublime ideas within the Godhead: power, purity, immutability, beingunmixed by its contrary, etc. We may conclude that God’s wisdomand power issue in activities that are visible in His creatures, andthat the order of nature and the notion of Divinity bear witness toHis immutability. His works tell us that He is single-minded in Hisintention, and not mixed with any conflicting motifs as to what Hewants to accomplish.The predicates we may use of Him, whenever we learn from divine

activity or from what is proper to God, denote what is ��æd ÆP��, i.e.,‘around him’.20 Now, what does this teach us about the relationshipbetween God’s essence and His activities and attributes? It is notadmissible to think or say that the essence is one thing and theactivities are other things, if this means that there are two separaterealities, even though the second depends upon the first. The externalactivities, so it seems, are certain ways in which the essence moves in amodified sense in order to accomplish something externally. Whenwe consider a divine activity, we include a divine subject who does thework. The activity is ontologically dependent upon the being that isactive, but the activity must be a certain way in which this beingmodifies itself in order to accomplish external acts. If we know the

20 Cf. above and CE, GNO 2, 186.


activity, we do not know the essence of the God who is active, butonly get a glimpse that there is a sublime ontological foundation forbeing active in this way. To say that the activities are around Godcould not mean that they are an external reality in the way that acloak is wrapped around a human person. It just means that theactivity is not identical with the essence of the being that acts. If weconsider the activity of carpentry, we may discover that a person(a carpenter) is clever in his work. Even if we form the opinion thathis skill depends upon a well-suited, natural condition, we do not getan adequate grasp of the essence of humanity in general from theobservation of this activity. In this case, however, we are better offthan when it comes to God. From several observations of humanactivity, we may be able to gather what being human is, despiteGregory’s doubts about the possibility of understanding even createdessences. When it comes to God, on the other hand, even his activitiesare not adequately understood. Gregory quotes the Apostle who callsGod’s ways (understood as His acts) ‘unsearchable’ (Rom 11:33).21

The perfect essence, on which the activities depend, forever trans-cends what a created mind can comprehend.Before we can raise the question of the relation between divine

activity and created beings it is natural to ask how an eternal andperfect internal activity can be modified in order to accomplishtemporal effects. The divine being transcends all cosmic limitationsand is completely immutable. How could such a being act accordingto a temporal scheme? In his Liber apologeticus Eunomius says thatsince created things begin and end, the activity of God begins andends as well.22He also says, in hisApologia apologiae, that activities areof a higher and lower order, corresponding to the work that is made: itis not the same activity that makes the angels and stars, the heavensand man. He also claims that the activities of a worker are bound byhis works, and the works are commensurate with the activities.23 Thesedoctrines are part of Eunomius’ argument for the knowableness of thedivine nature, and do not occupy us in this context. There is, however,another side to these claims that presents a rather tough challenge tothe consistency of Eunomius’ thought. Eunomius admits that God is

21 De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, 140.22 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 62–5.23 Cf. CE, GNO 1, 72–3; NPNF 5, 50.


without beginning and end.24 In that case, one might expect him toaccept that God is beyond time as well. If that is so, how could hepossibly argue or explain that a plurality of divine activities come andgo in accordance with what begins and ends temporally in the createdcosmos?Gregory argues that no time extension can be conceived of inthe being of God.25 The problem now is the ‘how’ of creation, i.e., thequestion of the relation between the eternal being and activity of theinternal life of God, and the activity directed to make, preserve, andwork in the establishment and ordering of cosmic being.As far as I know, Gregory never discusses this problem, but he

definitely seems to be aware of it. This is indicated in his dialogue Deanima et resurrectione when the topic of the soul’s origin turns up.26

From our present point of view, the most important question posed isthe following: ‘How from the stationary nature does the moving onecome?’ However, this question of how (�H�) is denounced at theoutset of the discussion. Gregory’s sister St Macrina, his Teacher inthe dialogue, points to the Apostle who says (Heb 11:3): ‘Throughfaith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, sothat things which are seen were not made of things which doappear.’27 The fact that (‹�Ø) the world was created by divine will isaccepted in faith, the knowledge of the how of its making is beyondwhat might be reached by human beings. We shall find a similarrestriction in St Maximus, even though he explicitly enters somehowdeeper into the question. Macrina alludes in De anima et resurrec-tione to two positions that seem to offer a more plausible starting-point from a philosophical point of view, namely that the worldoriginated from the divine nature itself, or that the matter fromwhich it was fashioned had eternal existence as a reality simultaneouswith God. The first position is one that we now should expectGregory to comment on. It is not easy to say which philosophersMacrina (or Gregory) had in mind, but both allusions could point tosome knowledge of Platonic doctrines, for instance, Plotinus’ doctrineof creation and Plato’s Timaeus. I suppose the idea behind the firstposition, as understood by Macrina and Gregory, is that creation

24 Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 62–3.25 CE, GNO 1, 133–6; NPNF 5, 69.26 De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 121a–124a.27 The last part of this quotation is interesting in view of Gregory’s doctrine of

matter: �N� �e c K çÆØ�� ø� �a ›�� Æ ª�ª��ÆØ. Visible things, according toGregory, are made up of intelligible forms, cf. De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 124c.


from the divine nature would make the cosmos eternal and divine.The problem of adjusting an eternal, unchangeable divinity to tem-poral matters might then have been avoided. The second positionseeks to avoid the same but introduces matter as an independentcause besides God. Both doctrines are dismissed as absurd, however,because, from a Christian point of view, what is brought into beingis of a nature different from the divine, and beings have only oneprimary cause.Even if we are left with the problem of ‘how’, and, according to

Macrina, we have no means of providing a satisfactory answer, some-thing still seems to be gained from these reflections. It is quite obviousthat for Gregory creation as a divine activity is not an activity of thenature of God as such, but of the nature of God as modified intoknowing and willing something other than himself. Gregory says thatGod made the world because He wanted to do so, and the motion(›æ �) of divine intention, when it wills, becomes a fact (� ›æ c �B�

Ł��Æ� �æ�ÆØæ��ø�, ‹�Æ� KŁ�º�Ø, �æAª Æ ª��ÆØ).28 God contemplatedthe purpose and organization of the world eternally, but the plan wasrealized when God’s will was joined to it: ‘The existence of the will isessence.’‘When God wills.’ Gregory is so much of a philosopher that he, of

course, perceives this as the core of the problem. God, as we haveseen, is not under the condition of extension (�Ø��Å Æ) in any aspectofHis being. There will be no ‘before’ or ‘after’, no temporal ‘when’ inthe Divinity. As we have seen earlier, the operations of divine activityare basically manifestations of will, both in the generative processeswithin the godhead and in the activities ad extra, even if the twospheres differ radically.In his In hexaemeron Gregory brings the concepts of divine will,

wisdom, and power into connection with each other.29 Will andpower (��ºÅ�Ø� and ��Æ Ø�) coincide with each other in the divinenature, and the will (Ł�ºÅ Æ) is the measure of the power, whichmeans that God is able to do whatHe wants to do. The will is even thewisdom of God, Gregory says. In His wisdom God knew the thingsHe would make, i.e., He possessed the plans or Forms for all creation,and, as is now obvious, we must understand this to mean that Godknows and wills from eternity. The adaptation of the knowledge, will,

28 De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 124b.29 In hexaemeron, GNO 4.1, 14.


and power into the creative act brings about beings having a temporalbeginning: God sets his power to bring his ideas �N� K��æª�ØÆ� by hiswill. At this point exactly is the instant of the ‘how’ that Macrina andGregory believe is beyond comprehension.In the second book of Contra Eunomium, Gregory takes us a bit

further into the dynamics of the moment of creation.30 He says thatthe power of God runs together with or agrees with His will, which isthe same teaching as we met earlier. Further he speaks of ‘the incitingpower of the will’ (�c� ›æ Å�ØŒc� ��F Ł�º� Æ�� K��ı��Æ�) that im-mediately brings creatures forth as an accomplished fact. Wemet withthe term ›æ � above, and translated it as ‘motion’. It indicates a rapidmotion, an onrush, something happening in a certain immediacy.Gregory says that in the case of God there is no difference betweenwill and activity (��ºÅ�Ø� and K��æª�ØÆ), and the thought or idea(� ��Å�Ø�) of God commands (ŒÆŁÅª�E�ŁÆØ) the activity. Further, thewhat-results-of-the-activity, the work (�e K��æª�� ), occurs simu-ltaneously with (– Æ) the idea. There is nothing between the reason(logos) of the divine intention, and the divine action (�æ��Ø�). In short,the instantiation of creatures is a work (�æª��) of the divine will(Ł�ºÅ Æ) that does not come to be posterior to its design (��ºÅ Æ).Well then, where does this bring us? In fact, it brings us to a pointwhere one might ask Gregory why the world is not eternal in the sameway God is.However, we have to appreciate the context of what he hasjust said. He is arguing against Eunomius’ understanding of theologi-cal language, and what he says about creation is part of that argument.This means that he does not have in mind the problem of how theeternal being of God could be related to a cosmos that begins with theextension of temporality. On the other hand, it seems to me that wemay formulate an answer to the challenge with which we confrontGregory, an answer that he does not explicitly develop himself. Again,the problem is the ‘how’ of creation, namely how the eternal knowl-edge and will of God may be accommodated to temporal being. Theanswer has two aspects. Firstly, we should have to conceive of a certainmodification of divine will. The eternal will of God must be under-stood freely to include the provision that God may will the making ofwhat has a beginning for its own part. Gregory probably has some-thing like this in mind when he speaks of the divine will and activity

30 CE, GNO 1, 292; NPNF 5, 273.


that immediately has its work as a result. Secondly, the divine idea inaccordance with which God wills is an idea of a certain kind of work,namely the kind of work that is under the condition of extension intime and space.As we saw, God sets his ideas �N� K��æª�ØÆ�, and this may mean that

God brought his ideas into activity or that they were realized inactuality, or even both. To explain: God’s ideas (or thoughts) couldbe understood as a first energeia in the Aristotelian sense, i.e., as anactuality that is God’s capacity to create. When the ideas are brought�N� K��æª�ØÆ� , they are manifested in the creative act itself, namely asan expressed skill to actually make beings. This would be Aristotle’ssecond energeia. The bringing of ideas �N� K��æª�ØÆ� could furtherindicate not just the working as such (the second energeia), it couldeven indicate the emergence into presence of something, i.e., anessential manifestation of a created being. As we saw above, theform (�r��) or actuality (K��æª�ØÆ) resides in the thing made. Accord-ing to Gregory, God’s power brings the essences into actualization. Touse a familiar example, the art of weaving is in the thing woven. Thisstrikes me as especially important and we shall return to it soon.Herewe should remember the Aristotelian principle just commented onabove, namely if the result exists apart from the activity that broughtit forth, the energeia is in the thing made.If Gregorymay be interpreted along the above lines he comes close to

suggesting a philosophical solution to the problem of accommodatingthe eternity of God to the temporality of beings. JohnPhiloponus arguesin his critique of Proclus that the transition from first to second energeiais immediate, i.e., involves no time. (We return to comment on this inconnection with St Maximus’ doctrine of creation.) Certain terms usedby Gregory could suggest that he saw this possibility, namely terms thatindicate immediacy in action, such as ›æ �, but there are no explicitstatements on this. We may therefore conclude that Gregory does nottry to explain the ‘how’ of creation philosophically.The concept of divine power is important in Gregory’s philosophi-

cal theology. God sets His power to do what He knows and will. Thedivine power is the foundation of activity. In De oratio DominicaGregory says that every activity is the effect of power (�A�Æ ªaæ

K��æª�ØÆ �ı�� K��Ø� I��º�� Æ).31 In De beatitudinibus he

31 De oratione Dominica, Oratio 3, GNO 7.2, 41.


speaks of the high status of being called ‘sons of God’ and emphasizesthe divine transcendence. When the prophet asks ‘Who has measuredheaven with a span, and water in his hand, and all the earth in hispalm?’, he points, Gregory says, to just a part of the divine activity.Hedoes not mention the power itself, fromwhich the activity springs, nordoes he talk about the nature, from which the power comes.32 So, thedivine nature is the ontological ground of the power and the power isthe foundation of the activity. Behind the activity we find the powerand behind the power stands the mystery of the divine nature.33

I shall now try to interpret Gregory’s view of participation.34 The actof creation, as an external activity, is not separated from God. It is amovement of divine will with a view to a definite purpose, and thismovement is a communication of the condition on which creaturesexist. This condition is God qua Being. Creatures exist by participationin true Being (�B� ��ı��Æ� ��F Z��).35 How is this ‘participation’ tobe understood? Scattered around his texts Gregory speaks of God orHis power as pervading beings, as mixed with them, as being in andenveloping them and as fitting the whole together. I think it might befruitful first to refer to some of these texts.Gregory says that God pervades (�Ø�Œ�Ø�) each being and that this

mixing with ‘the all’ keeps beings in being (ŒÆd �Bfi �æe� �e �A�

I�ÆŒæ��Ø �ı��å�Ø� K� �fiH �r�ÆØ �a Z��Æ).36 In theAnima et resurrectionethe divine power (Ł��Æ ��Æ Ø�) is spoken of as skilful and wise.Gregory says it permeates all things, fits the parts together with thewhole, and fulfils the whole in the parts. The power maintains every-thing.37 In another text from the same work we hear of the ineffablewisdom of God, which appears in the cosmos and shows us that ‘thedivine nature and power is in every existing thing’ (�c� Ł��Æ� ç��Ø� ��

ŒÆd ��Æ Ø� K� �A�Ø ��E� �s�Ø� �r�ÆØ). Because of this presence all thingsremain in being (K� �fiH �r�ÆØ �a ��Æ ��Ø).38 From the Oratiocatechetica we gather that the divine is present in everything, it

32 De beatitudinibus Oratio 7, GNO 7.2, 150.33 Ayres, in Coakley ed. (2004), 27–9, argues for the importance of the triad

essence–power–activity in Gregory’s ontology. I agree.34 Cf. Balás, �¯ˇS�` Y¯ˇ (1966). See Tollefsen (2008), 152–6, 192, 224,

for some critical remarks.35 Cf. De vita Moysis 2.24–25.36 De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 73a.37 De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 28a.38 De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 44a–b.


penetrates, embraces, and is seated in it (ŒÆd K��ı� �� ŒÆd K ��æØ�å��

ŒÆd KªŒÆŁ� ��). All beings depend onHeWho Is, and nothing existswhich does not have its being in God (‘that which is’) (��F ªaæ Z��

K�B��ÆØ �a Z��Æ ŒÆd �PŒ ��Ø �r�ÆØ �Ø c K� �fiH Z��Ø �e �r�ÆØ �å��).39

This terminology has a certain pantheistic ring to it. There is adivine presence in the created cosmos, and this presence may bedescribed both as permeation and mixing, as envelopment or embra-cement. God, of course, is not a body and cannot physically permeateor embrace anything in that sense. Nor can He physically mix withanything. These terms are obviously applied metaphorically. Even so,there is no reason to weaken the realistic picture Gregory presents.Heobviously thinks that God is present in the whole of creation, notpresent by created replicas ofHis perfections, but rather really presentby His uncreated power. This presence is an active one, since, asGregory says, God fits parts together with the whole and fulfils thewhole by fulfilling the parts. Further, God keeps things in being andmaintains all there is. The divine presence ‘in all things’ or ‘every-where’ is, consequently, the presence of powerful activity:40 ‘[ . . . ]because to God’s power nothing has either gone by or is about tocome since even that which we expect is comprehended with what ispresent by the all-sustaining activity’ (‹�Ø �Bfi �ı�� Ø ��F Ł��F �h�� Ø

�Ææfi�åÅŒ��, �h�� ºº�Ø, Iººa ŒÆd �e �æ��Œ� �� K��Å� �fiH

�Ææ��Ø �Bfi ��æØ�Œ�ØŒBfi ��F �Æ��e� K��æª��Æfi ��æØŒæÆ��E�ÆØ).To sum up: the metaphors are meant to tell us that the divine

power or activity is present to all beings and to the whole cosmos, andthis is probably what Gregory means by participation. However,‘participation’ indicates that beings have qualities that do not stemfrom their own nature, qualities they derive from some other—in thiscase the divine—source. In this connection we should make animportant distinction between createdness or being created as such,and the conditions by which created entities have being and certainother qualities of a ‘higher’ kind. The entities that fill the wholecosmos are brought from non-being to being, and their natures oressences are of a created kind. On the other hand, beings have being,goodness, beauty, etc. from God by participation.41 Thus, Gregory

39 Oratio catechetica GNO 3.4, 63.40 De hominis opificio 16, PG 44: 185d.41 Cf. De vita Moysis 2.24-25; Oratio catechetica, GNO 3.4, 63; De hominis opificio

ch. 12, PG 44: 161c; Oratio catechetica, GNO 3.4, 21-2; De virginitate, GNO 8.1, 292.


thinks that the condition of being in the world is the activity of Godthat makes and preserves all things. There is no created being orgoodness or beauty in this regard. Such basic qualities are the pre-sence of God who is powerfully active. Participation, consequently, isthe presence of the divine energeia that endows created things withcertain perfections.Is there anything disturbing in this picture? I suppose someone

might fear that there is a kind of confusion between the uncreated andthe created spheres. In fact, however, even if Gregory states his point abit carelessly I don’t think there is any such confusion. Gregory doesnot think that divine and created nature are mixed together, rather hethinks that when something other than God is brought from non-being to being this other cannot exist or be good or beautiful by itself.It is not of a nature such that it can hold or generate such qualities orcapacities by its own power. This means that to be and to persevere inbeing and in other high qualities is due to God alone. The beginningand end of creatures is in God’s hands. The divine activity is not aproductive operation that begins and ends like human activities. It is adynamic, powerful presence, almost like a permanent, vibrating en-ergy present in things.At this stage we should turn to Balás’ conception of energeia and

participation in his important book �¯ˇ!�` ¨¯ˇ . Weshould ask: if the divine energeiai are manifested as perfections thatare participated in, why are they not ‘uncreated energies’ in thePalamitic sense? Balás says:42 ‘It would be wrong to understandthese texts in the sense of the later Palamitical real distinction inGod between Nature and K��æª�ØÆ: the repeated insistence of Gregoryon the simplicity of God would not allow this.’Of course, at this stageit is too early to make any claims concerning St Gregory Palamas’theology.However, Balás’ objection to a ‘Palamitic’ interpretation of StGregory of Nyssa sheds light on a major difference in the theologicalmentality between East and West concerning the topic of essence,energeia, and participation in general. According to Balás, God is theefficient cause of the perfection participated in by the creature, and thisperfection therefore, according to him, belongs to the created realm.43

Bradshaw has an interesting analysis of developments in Western

42 Balás (1966), 128. I criticized Balas in Tollefsen (2008) as well, but I have cometo the conclusion that the critique needs some further elaboration.

43 Balás (1966), 129–30 and 163.


theology.44 St Augustine had a strict notion of divine simplicity that,according to Bradshaw, was influenced by Neoplatonism.45 The Au-gustinian notion of simplicity excludes any distinctions in God, so thatany ‘divine’manifestations (such asOld Testament theophanies) eitherhave to be of a created nature or must be a direct appearance of thedivine being itself.46 Now, the Augustinian notion of beatitude is ratherintellectual. Augustine claims it is possible for themind to contemplateGod in a certain limited way.He makes the distinction between under-standing and comprehension (later well-known fromThomas Aquinasand other scholastic thinkers). Bradshaw puts it this way:47 ‘[ . . . ]although the mind can understand (intelligere) God, it cannot com-prehend (comprehendere) Him, in the sense that it cannot grasp Himall at once as a whole.’ If Bradshaw’s analysis is sound, and it seems soto me, some implications could be pointed out.In the City of GodAugustine argues that even if God is Trinity, God

is simple because of the one nature. Further, divine attributes areidentical with the divine being.48 According to St Basil, the divineenergeiai, which allows us to speak of divine perfections, cannot bereduced to one simple thing. He asks, for instance, if justice andcreative power are the same, which they obviously are not.49 As wehave seen, according to Basil and Gregory the essence of God isincomprehensible. I am convinced that the Greek Fathers generallythink of God’s essence as beyond the grasp of created intellects, notonly in this life, but in the realm of bliss as well. This is not alimitation that is due to some weakness on our part, it is due tothe nature of the divine being as such. One could just think of StMaximus’ dictum that God transcends being. Being would have beena basic condition if anything should possess any intelligibility at all.One might wonder if the notion of divine transcendence is notconceived in a much more radical sense in the Christian East thanin the West. The concept of divine simplicity in the East, of course, alsodepends on the idea of the unity of divine nature. But while what isbeyond nature preserves its unity, what comes down to us (in Basil’swords) or is around God (in Gregory’s words) is conceived in plurality:

44 Bradshaw (2007), chapter 9.45 Bradshaw (2007), 224. Cf. Augustine, City of God 8.6.46 Bradshaw (2007), 228. 47 Bradshaw (2007), 226.48 De civitate Dei 11.1049 St Basil, Letter 234, commented on in Chapter 2 above.


there are several energeiai, which is natural since the divine nature itselfis the perfect source of all good things. The difference between thetypically Western and the typically Eastern Christian ontology seemsto depend on this: for the Latins God’s attributes are reduced to theunity of nature; for the Greeks the energeiai are distinguished fromthe nature as such. On this background, one may understand Balás’opinion: what is not God’s nature must be a creature. Participatedperfections are created perfections. I see, however, no reason to fit StGregory of Nyssa into this Augustinian or scholastic pattern, but thinkwe have to acknowledge that there is a difference between certaintheological outlooks.What we have looked into above is a doctrine of causation. God, as

creative and preservative cause, by His activity, is accomplishing theconditions on which entities have being, goodness, beauty, etc. Even ifGregory doesn’t work out a sophisticated philosophical terminologyof participation, he obviously does not mean that an intelligibleprinciple is a quasi-material and extended substrate that is dividedand distributed to participants. He thinks rather that beings are madepresent by an activity that exists dynamically as the actuality of theiremerging into presence. We could liken this to the relationship of theradii to the centre of a circle: the radii, i.e. extended beings, arepresent throughout to the non-extended centre, i.e. the non-extendeddivine activity. The actuality itself of perfection is not a creature; it isthe stamp of the Artisan on his work. This is not a pantheisticdoctrine, because the distinction between the uncreated conditionand the contingent nature of creatures is not confused. In the cosmo-logical sense then, to be and to be actualized in certain perfections isnothing else than to participate in the divine energeia. The essentialcontent of beings, however, is created.

B. DIONYSIUS ON CREATION AND PARTICIPATION

When we talk of cosmology it is natural to include a discussion of theteaching on creation and world order found in Dionysius the Areo-pagite. Dionysius has a philosophically developed conceptual schemein which a lot of attention is given to the doctrine of divine energeia,and the energeiai of created being in relation to God. However, it is abit surprising that Dionysius, who wrote in the fifth or the beginning


of the sixth century, does not seem to teach that the world has abeginning. The Creed confesses the Father as Creator of heaven andearth, of all things both seen and unseen, and it professes that allthings came to be through the Son. These statements do not exp-licitly confess a beginning of the world, only that all things aremade by God. In this regard Dionysius is in agreement with theCreed, since he explicitly teaches that God ‘bestows being on theessences, and brings forth the totality of essences’.50 He also saysGod ‘makes all things, perfects all things, holds all things together,converts all things’.51 The last sentence, at least apparently, is ladenwith Neoplatonic terms and, perhaps, bears witness to a Neoplatonicinfluence. A third text of some interest tells us that the straightmotion of God is the procession (�æ��) of His activities and thecoming-to-be of all things from Him.52

The Creed, of course, is not a philosophical statement and does notdevelop a doctrine in all possible details.However, it is clear that fromthe beginning of the fourth century most major Christian scholarsthink that the Christian doctrine of creation encompasses morepoints than is stated rather sparsely in the Creed. These points are:firstly, that God created of His own free will; secondly, He did notcreate out of pre-existent matter, rather He created ex nihilo; andthirdly, the world was created with a temporal beginning. Theserequirements, in addition to what is stated in the Creed, were madeexplicit by Church Fathers such as Athanasius, Basil the Great,Ambrose, and Augustine. The teaching about a temporal beginningis put rather succinctly in some words from St Basil’s In hexaemeron:

It is possible for you to learn from which time the formation of thecosmos began if from the present you ascend into the past you endea-vour to discover the first day of the origin of the cosmos. You will thusdiscover from which time the first movement [came]; then too that theheaven and the earth first were laid down like the foundation and thegroundwork [ . . . ].53

Basil says that when it is written ‘In the beginning God created’, thismeans ‘in this beginning according to time (K� IæåBfi �Æ��fi Å �Bfi ŒÆ�a

50 DN 2.11, Suchla: 136. 51 DN 4.10, Suchla: 155.52 DN 9.9, Suchla: 213. 53 In hexaemeron 1.6, PG 29: 16b; NPNF 8, 55.


åæe��).’54 Basil says further that the world is perishable or transitory,because what begins with time shall end in time.55

This point concerning the corruptible nature of the cosmos, eventhough God may choose to sustain it eternally, emphasizes an im-portant difference between Christianity and Neoplatonism as we shallsee in the next section on St Maximus the Confessor.The reason behind the points enumerated above, of course, is the

conception of God as the transcendent, supreme cause of all being.However, it seems that Dionysius’ conception of God contains aspectsthat do not make such restrictions obvious to him. One might ask towhat degree the traditional Christian idea of the divine being inDionysius has suffered certain philosophical modifications that makeit different in comparison with mainstreamChristian thought. At leastit makes a difference in connection with the doctrine of creation, as weshall see.As far as I can see, there is no clear notion of divine will or freedom

(the requirement in the first point above, page 102) in the Dionysiancorpus. Rather, creation seems to follow somehow automatically fromthe being of God. On the other hand, there is no pre-existent stufffrom which God made the world (the second requirement above,page 102). However, this does not seem to mean that the world had atemporal beginning (the third requirement above).In the section on Trinitarian generation, we saw that a basic idea in

the Dionysian system is the notion of union and distinction (��ø�Ø�

and �Ø�ŒæØ�Ø�): union and distinction in God, in the created world,and in the relationship between God and the world.56 We also madeacquaintance with the triadic scheme of causality: remaining, proces-sion, and conversion ( ��, �æ��, K�Ø��æ�ç�). We should remem-ber what was said about this causal scheme in Proclus, and thepossibility that he influenced Dionysius. It is also important toremember the quotation from De Divinus nominibus 4.10 (Suchla:154): ‘To put the matter briefly, all being derives from, exists in, and isconverted towards the Beautiful and the Good.’ In this scheme,creatures are set within a provident arrangement of creation andsalvation in order to be perfected. Is this triadic scheme a piece ofNeoplatonic doctrine artificially fitted into a Christian conceptionof creation and causality? I suppose the ancient Christian thinkers

54 In hexaemeron 1.5, PG 29: 13c; NPNF 8, 55.55 In hexaemeron 1.3, PG 29: 9c-c; NPNF 8, 53. 56 DN ch. 2.


themselves would have objected to such a notion. They probablywould have retorted that this is a Scriptural notion, and in supportthey may have quoted St Paul (Rom 11:36 and Col 1:16–17):

For fromHim, and byHim, and toHim are all things: to whom be gloryfor ever. Amen.For in Him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are

in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, orprincipalities, or powers—all things were created by Him, and to Him.And He is before all things, and in Him all things consist.

These prepositional formulas suggest both that the created world iscontained somehow in God, and that creatures, when created, are‘moved’ from God, and that they are designed to move towards God.In this way a triadic scheme of remaining, procession, and conversionsuggests itself. A ‘metaphysics of prepositions’, however, is known fromMiddle Platonism,57 and is developed in the Neoplatonic systems oftriadic causation. I think this Neoplatonic doctrine was acceptable toChristian thinkers, at least in part, since they knew the rudimentaryPauline ‘metaphysics of propositions’.A triadic scheme of causality was used by Dionysius to explain the

generation of creatures from God. Dionysius interprets God’s restand movement in chapter 9.8–9 of the De Divinis nominibus. Rest isinterpreted as God’s remaining (�e ��Ø�) inHimself, while the move-ment is understood as His procession (�æ��). In 9.9 Dionysiusdistinguishes between God’s straight, spiral, and circular movements.The straight movement is the procession of His activities (�æ��H� K��æª�ØH�), and the coming-to-be of all things from Him. Thespiralmovement is also connected with procession, while the circularmotion means that God holds all things together and secures theconversion (K�Ø��æ�ç�) of all that has come forth from Him. In allof this we clearly see the triadic scheme of remaining–procession–conversion as applied to the causal relation between God and thecreated world.Before we proceed we should note an ambiguity in Dionysius’ use

of the terms ‘remaining’ and ‘procession’. As we just saw, God’sdwelling in Himself is the remaining. On the other hand, it meansthe remaining of the effect in its cause as well. However, as we shallsee below, these two aspects are somehow identical. Procession, on

57 Dillon (1977), 138.


the one hand, means that something, an effect, proceeds from itscause. On the other hand, Dionysius often tends to focus more on theprocess of procession than on its result. In this sense the processionitself is brought forward as a divine activity or power in which GodmanifestsHis being. We shall first focus on the moment of remaining.Dionysius first discusses how God remains in Himself in connec-

tion with the creative process. This divine condition of rest must beattributed to the Holy Trinity itself. God’s transcendent being existsin an immovable sameness, Dionysius says, and God acts (K��æª�E�)according to the same and around the same.58 Now, what are thecharacteristics of this divine sameness and action within the Trinity,i.e., the sameness and action characteristic of the condition ofremaining as relevant to the problematic issue of creation? Here itwill be useful to consider Dionysius’ conception of the differentnames we use to speak of God.In the second chapter of the De Divinis nominibus Dionysius

distinguishes between names expressive of unity and names expres-sive of distinctions. Names of the latter kind are those that are properto each divine hypostasis, such as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Suchnames express distinctions in God and function as predicates denot-ing certain hypostatic characteristics belonging to each of the persons.These names are not held in common and are not interchangeable.The ‘unified names’, on the other hand, are applied to the wholedivinity, i.e., they belong to the divine nature and not to any oneof the persons specifically. Of these there are two kinds: those thatexpress abstraction (IçÆ�æ��Ø�) and involve pre-eminence, and thosethat are aetiological (�a ÆN�Ø�º�ªØŒ�). These ‘aetiological terms’denote God as cause (ÆN��Æ) of the properties found in createdbeing. The first kind of terms is exemplified by the following: �e

��æ�ªÆŁ��, �e ��æŁ��, �e ��æ��Ø��, �e ��æÇø��, �e ��æ��ç��.Examples of aetiological terms are �e IªÆŁ��, �e ŒÆº��, �e Z�, �e

Çø�ª�ª��, �e ��ç��.Each of these ‘unified names’ denotes the whole simple being

of God. Further, they are processions befitting the goodness of thegodhead (�a� IªÆŁ��æ��E� �B� Ł�Ææ��Æ� �æ��ı�). As such they areways in which He differentiates Himself, i.e., they are the ‘divine

58 DN 9.8, Suchla: 212–13.


differentiation’ (�Ø�ŒæØ�Ø� Ł��Æ�).59 The predicate IªÆŁ��æ��

(‘befitting the good’) points to the basic characteristic of goodnessas that which by nature distributes itself, i.e., proceeds. Even thoughall the processions are divine differentiations befitting the goodness ofGod, in the text I am commenting on, they are primarily directed tothe creation of otherness, and do not characterize the hyper-essentialinternal life of God.60 These processions are also termed ‘powers’(�ı�� Ø�) and ‘activities’ (K��æª�ØÆØ).61 I believe that the abstractiveterms denote the divine being in its condition of remaining withinitself, a remaining that is characterized by the divine persons being ina certain way active or in processions towards each other. Dionysiussays that understanding the nature of the divine names for theseprocessions ad intra is beyond mind and knowledge.62 If my inter-pretation is correct, divine processions or activities are considered ontwo levels of reality: the abstractive terms denote them as belonging tothe intra-Trinitarian sphere, while the aetiological terms denote themas divine activities ad extra.In the ‘remaining’, understood in terms of their in dwelling,

the hypostases of the Holy Trinity proceed towards each other in away that is beyond knowledge. They are transcendentally perfectmanifestations of divine Goodness, Being, Life, Wisdom, etc. adintra. Considered ad extra we should note, however, that in actualitythere is no plurality of processions, because according to Dionysius,Goodness is not one thing, Being another, Life and Wisdom as yetother, etc. There is one God for all these good processions and theterm ‘Goodness’ denotes God’s universal providence, while the otherpredicates denote certain aspects of this one Goodness.63 In short, allprocessions ad extra are aspects of the one procession of Goodness.If this is so, much more should the activities ad intra constituteone divine activity. Divine Goodness and divine Love (eros) must beunderstood as basically the same. In his definition of eros Dionysiusshows the picture of well-ordered life that, I think, must be a char-acteristic of the inner life of the Holy Trinity of persons:

And this is a power of making unity, that conjoins, that producescommingling in the Beautiful and Good, that pre-exists through (�Øa)

59 DN 2.11, Suchla: 135. 60 Cf. DN 2.5 and 5.1.61 DN 2.7 and 9.9, Suchla: 131 and 213. 62 Cf. DN 2.7, Suchla: 131.63 DN 5.2, cf. 2.5, Suchla: 181 and 128–9.


the Beautiful and Good, and that is dealt out from the Beautiful and theGood through the Beautiful and the Good (ŒÆd KŒ ��F ŒÆº�F ŒÆd IªÆŁ�F

�Øa �e ŒÆºe� ŒÆd IªÆŁe� KŒ �Ø�� Å�), holding together things of thesame order in a mutual communion.64

The indwelling of theHoly Trinity in well-ordered activities (K��æª�ØÆØ)of Goodness and Love ad intra is the starting-point of creation. AsI said above, this condition of divine rest is somehow identicalwith thein dwelling of the effect in God. The effects, Dionysius says, pre-existmore truly in their causes.65 How, then, do God’s creatures pre-exist ordwell in Him and how do the plural ‘causes’ fit into the picture?

What we are confronted with now is a rather complex piece ofdoctrine in which the three properties of divine Goodness, knowledge,and will are intimately connected. There is an important section ondivine knowledge in the last part of theDe Divinis nominibus 7. 2.66 InHis capacity as the cause of all things, God knows all creatures. Thisknowledge, however, is not something different fromGod’s knowledgeof Himself. ‘By knowing itself, the divine Wisdom knows all things(" EÆı�c� �s� � ��ç�Æ ªØ��Œ�ı�Æ ª��ÆØ ��Æ)’, Dionysius says.What is it, exactly, that God knows, when knowingHimselfHe knowsall things?God knowsHimself as the One fromwhom all things deriveor proceed, i.e., He knows Himself as Good or in His Goodness. Thisknowledge of Himself as Good, i.e., as distributive, takes the form ofconceiving withinHimself all possible effects in their �ÆæÆ��ª Æ�Æ.67

These paradigms are pre-existing logoi that not only exist ‘in’God, butthey are identified with what He knows when knowing Himself asGood.68 Obviously, the logoi are the plurality of causes mentionedabove.Here we see that God’s remaining inHimself (as Good) and theremaining of the effect in Him (as a Form of what Goodness mayaccomplish) are identical.The paradigms or logoi are also called ‘predefining, divine, and

good acts of will’ (�æ��æØ� �f� [ . . . ] ŒÆd Ł�EÆ ŒÆd IªÆŁa Ł�º� Æ�Æ).69

I made the remark above that there is no clear notion of the divinewill or freedom in the Dionysian writings. The identification of thedivine Forms as Ł�º� Æ�Æ, however, indicates that the Areopagite hada notion of divine will, even if this notion is not explicitly developedin De Divinis nominibus. Here we meet the important question of the

64 DN 4.12, Suchla: 158. 65 DN 2.8, Suchla: 132–3.66 DN 7.2, Suchla: 196–7. 67 DN 7.3, Suchla: 197–8.68 DN 5.8, cf. 7.2, Suchla: 188 and 196–7. 69 DN 5.8, Suchla: 188.


character of theDionysian doctrine of creation: ‘emanationism’ (strictlyspeaking according to the Neoplatonic conception of causation) versuscreationism. We shall return to the Neoplatonic background before wediscuss Dionysius’ teaching.Spearritt, commenting on the Plotinian doctrine of double activity

in connection with Dionysius’ doctrine of creation, emphasizes thenecessity involved in the production of the effect according to Ploti-nus: (i) the cause produces necessarily the effect ad extra, and (ii) theeffect is a necessary result of the activity of the cause.70 I believe thatthis emphasis on necessity requires some further qualification. I dis-cussed this problem in the section on Plotinus above as well. Spearrittappeals to two texts from the Enneads. The first is from 5.1.6:

And all beings, as long as they remain in being (�ø� ��Ø), necessarily(I�ÆªŒÆ�Æ�) produce from their own essences, from their presentpower, a surrounding reality directed to what is outside of them, akind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced [ . . . ].

The second text, from 5.4.2, runs as follows:

[ . . . ] and the activity of the essence is the selfsame particular thing,while the other activity is from that one, and must in everything followit, being necessarily different from the thing itself [ . . . ] (ŒÆd � b� �B�

�P��Æ� ÆP�� K��Ø� K��æª�ØÆ �ŒÆ��, � �b I�’ KŒ��Å�, m� ��E �Æ��d

��ŁÆØ K� I��ªŒÅ� ��æÆ� �s�Æ� ÆP��F).

The conclusion Spearritt draws from these two texts (namely thatcreation is due to necessity) is, in my opinion, a bit short-sighted.Maybe the whole problem could be easier to understand if we use ananalogy.71 The will to walk and the act of walking could be seen as anexample of immanent activity. The leaving of footprints, on the otherhand, is an external activity. However, there seems to be but oneaction. The will to walk and the walking are intransitive descriptionsof aspects of this action; the leaving of footprints is a transitivedescription of what the walker does. Here we should listen to whatPlotinus says in the Ennead 6.1.22:

And one should not call all activities productions or say that theyproduce something. Producing is incidental. Well then, if someonewalking produces footprints, do we not say that he made them? Buthe did it out of being something else. Or [we may say] he produces

70 Spearritt (1968), 53 and 52. 71 Cf. Emilsson (1999).


incidentally and the activity is incidental, because he did not havethis in view.

We could say then, that the will to walk and the walking itself are in arestricted sense independent of the leaving of footprints, because inmost cases one does not walk with this purpose. Leaving footprints,therefore, is usually incidental to the will and the purpose. On theother hand, we should ask if the footprint-making is not a necessaryeffect of walking as a physical act. I should think the answer wouldhave to be positive.Let us return to the two texts from the Enneads appealed to by

Spearritt. The key to understanding the first quotation is the �ø� ��Ø

(‘as long as they remain in being’). We should ask what is character-istic of the remaining of the first principle, the One. The One,according to Plotinus, acts according to its will (��ºÅ�Ø�).72 Theremaining of the One in its activity of essence must, then, be con-nected with its will to be itself.73 On this background, the point is thatthe One wills to be itself as remaining in its activity, and becauseof this will to remain, the One necessarily produces an effect ad extra,as the citation from Ennead 5.1.6 teaches. The conclusion to be drawnfrom the second quotation is that if there is an activity of the essence,which, as we have seen, is willed by the One, then an external activitymust follow it. Further, this external activity is necessarily differentfrom the first activity.There is no external or internal constraint on the One; rather it is

free in its internal activity because it has willed to act according to itsown nature. Of course, from a modern point of view one could objectthat this is a strange notion of freedom, because it does not seem thatthe One has any alternative, i.e., acts from free choice. However, whatis expressed here is the idea that to be free is to live according to one’snature. The One wills to be itself, and this means that it wills itself asGood. Goodness has the essential feature that it is distributive of itself,but the One does not have this distributive aspect or the externaleffect in view. From this we may draw the conclusion that the internalactivity of the One as an act of will is independent of creatures; as anactivity of Goodness, however, it is the necessary and sufficientcondition for the existence of creatures. The existence of creatures

72 Ennead 6.8.13.73 This is the interpretation of John Rist (1967) 66–83. I believe he is right in this.


is incidental to the internal activity of the One as an act of will, butnecessitated by the resulting external activity.I believe these distinctions are important for evaluating the differ-

ence between an orthodox Christian doctrine of creation as comparedwith Neoplatonism. Spearritt seems to suffer from a rather commonerror regarding the evaluation of emanation versus creation: from aChristian point of view, emphasis is often placed on God’s free will asa characteristic ofChristian thought, while the Neoplatonist position isbranded with the necessity of an emanationist position.74 This, I think,is at least partlywrong. Fromboth aChristian and aNeoplatonist pointof view the creation of the world does not follow by necessity from thedivine nature in itself. God, further, knows Himself as Good (i.e., as aprinciple of distribution) andHe willsHimself as such. It is at this pointthat the difference between Christianity and Neoplatonism occurs. Ithas to do with two things: (i) the character of the divine knowledgeand (ii) themodus of the divine will. Even if the One of Plotinus knowsitself as Good, I doubt that it implicitly knows itself as a principle ofsomething possibly other than itself. When it wills to be itself, it doesnot will itself as an actual principle of such an otherness. Neither,a fortiori, does it will itself as a principle of an otherness with a temporalbeginning. The question now is to what degreeDionysius follows in thefootsteps of Neoplatonism or to what degree does he come close to anorthodox Christian approach.In what sense are we to take theDionysian pronouncement that the

Forms are acts of will? First we should note that the God of Dionysiusis the Christian God who contemplates Himself as a principle orcause of something possibly other than Himself. This God, in know-ing Himself as distributive of external effects, wills what He knows.But, if this is so, how should this will or these acts of will, be under-stood? Does the will include a decision to create an otherness with atemporal beginning? I cannot find any indications that point in thisdirection. As a matter of fact, I cannot find any texts in the Dionysianwritings that give clear information on the author’s concept of divinewill in creation at all. Rather it seems that according to Dionysius,what God knows from eternity, He wills from eternity, and, conse-quently, the effects of that will are manifested from eternity.75

74 Additionally, what strikes me as strange in Spearritt’s treatment is that he doesnot at all relate his discussion of Plotinus to the Dionysian doctrine of creation.

75 St Athanasius struggled to avoid this consequence, cf.Contra Arianos 1.29, PG26: 72.


This interpretation may be supported by several texts in whichDionysius speaks about the nature of God’s goodness. One text,which is especially telling, is found in the De Divinis nominibus 4.1:

As for our sun, it exercises no calculation, no deliberate choice (�Pº�ªØÇ� �� m �æ�ÆØæ�� )76, and yet by the very fact of its existenceit gives light to all things that is able to partake of its light, according tothe logos of each thing’s power; so it is with the Good, existing far abovethe sun, an archetype far superior to its dull image, it sends the rays of itswhole goodness upon all things according to their capacity to receive it.77

This, of course, is an image, an analogy, but even so it does not receiveany definite Christian qualification in the context. Now, the words arequite striking and seem indeed to teach that the creation of the worldfollows eternally from the natural Goodness of God. This indicatesthat Dionysius has adopted a kind of Neoplatonic concept of causa-tion. According to Plotinus, the emergence of the effect is the eternalresult of the eternal activity of the One’s being. According to Proclus,the eternally remaining cause has eternally proceeding and convert-ing effects. At this point, the Dionysian doctrine of creation, there-fore, seems to be more Neoplatonic than specifically Christian. Evenif the world is created ex nihilo, even if it is created by God’s will to beHimself as Good, and even if it is created by His will to be the causeof something other than Himself, it does not seem to be created byGod’s free decision to give it a temporal beginning. The Dionysiannotion of the divine will seems to lack something that was importantfor the great thinkers of the fourth century and which was repeated byFathers of the Church after Dionysius, for instance, by St Maximusthe Confessor: the divine will is such that God eternally could wantthat something other than God, i.e. the world, should have a temporalbeginning of its existence.78

This interpretation could be met with at least three objections.First, in The celestial hierarchies Dionysius states the freedom ofhuman beings.79 Is it not reasonable to believe a fortiori that God,

76 The sun does not execute any calculation, nor does God reason in this way. Thedivine knowledge should not be confused with calculation or with discursive reason-ing. It is more like a contemplative insight or understanding.

77 DN 4.1, Suchla: 144.78 Cf. Maximus the Confessor: Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081a–b. For a discussion of

the concept of God’s will in creation, cf. Tollefsen (2008).79 CH 9.3, PG 3: 260c–d.


as the supremely rational being, is eminently free as well? Could it notjust be a coincidence that Dionysius does not comment on the topicof divine freedom? I would answer that it is not impossible thatDionysius held an adequate doctrine of divine freedom, even thoughthe texts do not bear witness to it. But whatever his ideas on this,his usage of the causal scheme has not received sufficient Christianmodification and seems to point decisively in the direction of abeginningless world.Secondly, is it true that the texts bear no witness at all to a doctrine

of divine freedom? In theDe Divinis nominibus 13.2Dionysius says:80

‘Without the One there is no multiplicity, but there can still be theOne when there is no multiplicity, just as one precedes all multipliednumber.’ If it is possible for God to exist without the world, then theexistence of the world must depend not only on a causality stemmingfrom God’s eternal will to act in accordance with His nature, but alsoon the divine will to be the cause of an otherness with a temporalbeginning.Consequently, God could well have a will to decide that theworld should emerge from non-being in such a way that its temporalexistence had a starting-point. To this objection Iwould say that in theface of the evidence I have put forward, I would be very sceptical toconstruct a whole doctrine of divine will on the above citation. How-ever, whatever the exact meaning of these words, I admit they point tothe possibility that a specifically orthodox Christian doctrine of divinefreedom in the sense we speak about it now should perhaps not beexcluded. On the other hand, the weight of evidence leans against theattribution of this doctrine toDionysius, and I really doubt that he hadany such doctrine.Thirdly, does not the fact that St Maximus, whose orthodoxy on

the issue of creation is beyond doubt, never criticizes Dionysius,speak against my conclusion? Maximus is highly critical towards theNeoplatonic doctrine of creation and explicitly argues against the ideaof a beginningless world.81 This objection is interesting. I believeMaximus held the Dionysian writings in such high regard, stemming,as he believed they did, from a disciple of St Paul, that he would notadmit that they could contain any erroneous doctrines. Maximusinterpreted the writings in the light of Tradition and what was

80 DN 13.2, Suchla: 227–8.81 Cf. De charitate 4.1–13, PG 90: 1048b–1052a; Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081a–b;

Ambiguum 10: 1176d–1177b and 1181a–1188c.


seemingly lacking in them he would probably read into them. IfDionysius’ teaching is supplemented in regard to the divine will onecould argue that his Neoplatonic causal scheme actually could bemodified so that we would arrive at an orthodox result, perhapswithout any detriment to the Dionysian system. One way to modifyit would be to apply the Aristotelian distinction between first actuality= second potentiality and second actuality. See the section below on StMaximus’ doctrine of creation. Iwould not deny this possibility, but isit probable that the Areopagite himself would have accepted such anelaboration of his philosophy? As it is then, I will conclude thistreatment with the dictum that if the Dionysian corpus belongs tothe last decades of the fifth century, the author does not have anorthodox doctrine of creation.We shall now turn to the topic of participation. In the Dionysian

system, the created cosmos depends in a perspicuous way on God.Dionysius says God is that for the sake of which, because of which, andin which every source or beginning (Iæå�) exist, whether it is para-digmatic, final, efficient, formal, or elemental.82 This list of five causesis close to the standard Neoplatonic list of six that we find in Simpli-cius’ On Aristotle Physics 2.83 Dionysius’ list lacks the instrumentalcause, and his elemental (��Øå�Ø��Å�) cause is probably Simplicius’material cause. The first three kinds of causes could be justifiedtheologically by St Paul’s ‘by Him’ or ‘in Him’, ‘to Him’, and ‘fromHim’.84 The formal and elemental (material) belongs to the standardconception of causes harking back to Aristotle himself. TheDionysianvocabulary and the number of causes, however, are probably dueto some acquaintance with Neoplatonic material. All causes, in allregions of the cosmos, on all cosmic levels, are, Dionysius says,vertically dependent on God as the final (‘for the sake of which’),efficient (‘because of which’), and paradigmatic (‘in which’) principleor source.In some places in the texts Dionysius’ notions come quite close to

the way participation is sketched in Gregory of Nyssa: God,Dionysiussays, holds the world together and embraces it.85 However, he gen-erally moves far beyond what is said by Gregory in so many words.

82 DN 4.9, Suchla: 155. 83 On Aristotle Physics 2, 316, 23–6.84 Cf. St Paul Rom 11. 36 and DN 13.3, Suchla: 228. The texts are terminologically

quite close to one another.85 For Gregory, see above. DN 10.1, Suchla: 214.


On the other hand, it is important to note that theDionysian elabora-tions on the topic of how God works immanently, is not opposed toChristian concerns. It is a distinctive way to work out details of whatis a general Christian conception of created being: the created cosmosdepends radically on God for its being and preservation. Therecannot be any ontological or metaphysical feature or distinctionthat is independent of God’s power and activity.Dionysius adheres to the traditional notion that the motif behind

creation is the Goodness of God, God’s love for His creatures.86

Because of this love He is carried (becomes) outside of Himself(��ø Æı��F ª��ÆØ) in his care for all things.87 When He is carriedoutside ofHimself,He comes to be in all things even asHe remains inHimself. In other words, God’s presence in the things He makes doesnot indicate a complete immanence, becauseHe is still Himself inHistranscendent being. Even so, God, the essential Good, by the fact ofhis Being, extends (�ØÆ��Ø) Goodness into the whole encompass ofbeings.88 He is the Life of the living, and the Being of beings.89 ThatGod becomes ‘outside of himself’ in beings, and extends Himself, are,of course, images of the divine presence in created otherness. Exactlyhow should this presence be understood?First of all, we should notice that God is not stretched out like some

kind of body that is present everywhere. Even so, the Trinity is presentin all things.90 The differentiation into created multiplicity from theundifferentiated unity of GodHimself is due to the divine procession,in accordance with which the divinity dispenses itself outwards.91Godis the unparticipated cause (› I �Ł�Œ�� ÆY�Ø��), and the only possi-bility for participation in Him is if He acts ‘outside of ’ Himself.92

God’s remaining in Himself as Goodness is the internal condition forthe act ad extra that follows almost like a natural effect from the beingof God.93 One might get the impression that the internal activity ofGoodness, almost by some inherent constraint, results in externalactivity. However, this is very unlike Plotinus’ thinking becauseGod’s acts are motivated by love for creatures.

86 DN 4.9, Suchla: 155. 87 DN 4.13, Suchla: 159.88 DN 4.1, Suchla: 143–4. 89 DN 1.2, Suchla: 112.90 DN 3.1, Suchla: 138. 91 DN 2.5, Suchla: 128–9.92 DN 11.6 and 12.4, Suchla: 222–3 and 225. Cf. Tollefsen (2008), 198–200.93 DN 4.1, Suchla: 143–4.


Dionysius connects the divine procession with certain powers(�ı�� Ø�) that cause deification, being, life, and wisdom.94 Dionysiusalso says that processions and activities (�æ��Ø� ŒÆd K��æª��Æ�) comefrom God inHis creative and sustaining work, and that God’s straightmotion is the procession of His activities (�æ�� H� K��æª�ØH�) bywhich, we may gather, all things come to be.95 In short, beings resultfrom God’s procession (or processions), understood as a manifesta-tion of powers or activities to make, preserve, and direct the wholerhythmic movement of the cosmos.Exactly what does it mean to participate in God as a part of the

whole in this grand cosmic rhythm? We should turn to chapter 5of the De Divinis nominibus to get a grasp of the principles at workin theDionysian cosmology.Dionysius works out an analogy with thesun.96 The sun is one, but still acts in different ways on things inthe sensible world: renewing, nourishing, protecting, and perfectingthem. Further, the sun establishes differences between them andunifies them. The sun contains within its own unity the cause of allthe things that participate in it. However, this image seems to growout of proportion, because it is quite strange to predicate all theseactivities on the sun. On the other hand, that the sun establishesdifferences might just mean that the differences between sensiblethings become visible only in the sun’s light; and that this light unifies,since all visible things are unified in this one light. Now, it is obviousthat in this picture we think of the sun’s rays with their light andwarmth as executing all these operations. The first point of interesthere is the saying that the sun contains the causes of participatingthings in a unity within itself. The Godhead, Dionysius continues,contains the paradigms of all beings in a hyper-essential unity withinitself. These paradigms are essence-making logoi pre-existing in theGodhead. The logoi are divine acts of will (Ł�º� Æ�Æ) that predefineor predetermine beings. God made beings in accordance with these.97

The logoi or acts of will that become paradigmatic for creatures are aunity in God, since they are obviously different ways the one and thesame divine being may be mirrored in created beings.98

The logoi are the paradigmatic causes by which God institutes theessences of beings. Each creature, i.e., each created essence, has itsbeing and well-being in accordance with its logos (ŒÆ�a �e� ÆP�e�

94 DN 2.7, Suchla: 131. 95 DN 9.9, Suchla: 213.96 DN 5.8, Suchla: 187–8. 97 Ibid. 98 DN 5.9, Suchla: 188–9.


º�ª�� ŒÆd �e �r�ÆØ ŒÆd �e �s �r�ÆØ �å�Ø).99 Because God is the para-digmatic cause, created essences are made according to their logoiwith the limited potentiality of receiving a definite share of the divinequa what may be participated. As the efficient cause of beings, Godproceeds into the realm of instituted essences in order to be availablein His activities for reception by creatures. What is received arequalities such as goodness, being, beauty, life, etc., all of which arebasically God moving dynamically or inHis activities ad extra. Beingshave their being and their other qualities not as created gifts, but asparticipations in the divine power. This seems to be the main featureof Dionysius’ notion of participation.However, this picture raises some questions that need to be

answered. The first question is whether this idea brings us oncemore into the Platonic dilemma found in Parmenides, concerningthe ‘how’ of participation: is the intelligible again implicitly conceivedof as an extended body that may be divided and distributed? Theanswer is definitely no. Dionysius, in fact, has made some progresswhen it comes to the concept of participation, also in comparisonwith St Gregory of Nyssa. Somehow, his ideas are quite close toPlotinus’ ideas in the section on omnipresence in the Enneads, butDionysius seems to me to have improved on Plotinus’ doctrine.100

Dionysius does not view God in the simple or imaginative way as aquasi-extended body, but rather considers the Godhead as the onto-logical centre of the cosmos. All things are somehow projected outfrom God as from the centre of the circle, and consequently all things‘touch’—to use a sensible image—the divine, unextended point.101

He definitely proceeds to all things, as is said in different words inmany places in the corpus,102 but this procession does not indicate amovement over a distance, rather it means that God is active as thetranscendent centre of all being. The improvement, as compared withPlotinus, consists in the introduction and application of divine para-digms as logoi or acts of will that set the limits for the essentialcapacity or potentiality of created being. These limits make beingscapable of receiving the divine gifts into their own being to a certaindegree: beings participate in Being, Goodness, Life, Beauty, etc., to thedegree defined by their logoi.

99 DN 5.8, cf. 4.7, Suchla: 186 and 151–3.100 I discussed this passage above, in the section on Plotinus.101 DN 7.3, Suchla: 197–8. 102 Cf. for instance DN 5.10; Suchla: 189–90.


There is a further aspect to all this. It becomes evident throughoutchapter four in De Divinis nominibus. First, I think we should notethe circular character of the totality of created being. Dionysius saysthat all being comes from (KŒ) the Beautiful and the Good, is in (K�) it,and converts toward (�N�) it.103 This idea of circular movement isformulated in several ways in the text.104 There is a striking similaritybetween Dionysian thought in this regard and a common structurefound in Neoplatonic philosophy. A famous formula in Proclus saysthat an effect remains in its cause ( ��Ø K� �Bfi ÆP��F ÆN��Æfi ), proceedsfrom it (�æ��Ø�Ø� I�’ ÆP�B�), and converts to it (K�Ø��æ�ç�Ø �æe�

ÆP��).105 The three activities of remaining, proceeding, and convert-ing in Neoplatonism are constitutive for the being that emergesfrom the higher principles. As a matter of fact, it works the samein Dionysius. Beings are made in the creative procession, but areintended to convert to God as the final goal of their course. In theactivity of conversion, beings, especially intelligent ones, may parti-cipate even deeper and more fully in the divine source in accordancewith a capacity or fitness to receive the divine activity of Beauty andGoodness into themselves.106 There is a longing or love (�æø� andIª��Å) from ‘below’ that stretches forth to the divine activity man-ifested towards creatures.107 Beings move into or are active towardsthe divine sphere of activity. In this sphere they receive the divinemanifestation into themselves and are participants.There are some interesting points to take notice of in this picture.

Dionysius says that God causes love and is the thing loved. He movestowards love and He moves love. He moves in an endless circle(I��Ø�� Œ�Œº��) through, from, in, and to the Good.108 One gets theimpression that the cosmos is viewed as dynamically carried aroundin a great divine movement of love. Secondly—and this is especiallyrelevant in the present context—one gets the impression that thisendless circle is just that, namely endless or from eternity. If that is so,what we find concerning creation in Dionysius deviates, as we haveseen, from mainstream Christian thought at his time. One mightwonder about this: would it not be obvious for a Christian theologianafter the era of the Cappadocian Fathers to teach explicitly that the

103 DN 4.10, Suchla: 154. 104 For instance in DN 4.17, Suchla: 162.105 Elements of theology, prop. 35. 106 DN 4.4 and 4.5, Suchla: 147 and 149.107 DN 4.7, cf. 4.4 and 4.5, Suchla: 151–2, 148 and 149.108 DN 4.14, Suchla: 160.


cosmos has a beginning? It seems puzzling how someone who wantedto be taken seriously on the public theological scene could be—atbest—ambiguous in this regard.

C . ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON CREATIONAND PARTICIPATION

The author of the Dionysian corpus probably belonged to the latterpart of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century. Proclus, who onebelieves influenced the author, lived c.411–85. A pagan Neoplatonist,he argued for a beginningless and endless cosmos. Some Christianthinkers exposed to Neoplatonic views, seem to have acceptedsuch a doctrine despite the enormous influence of the CappadocianFathers.109 In 529 Justinian closed the Neoplatonist school of Athenswhere the famousNeoplatonist Simplicius worked. The same year JohnPhiloponus, an Alexandrian Christian and member of the Neoplato-nist school of Alexandria, responded to Proclus’ eighteen argumentsagainst a beginning of the cosmos (De aetnitate mundi contra chris-tianos, a lost work) with his De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum.110

All of this indicates that despite the grand effort of St Basil the Great, StAmbrose, and St Augustine, the temporal beginning of the world wasstill an issue for Christians engaged in classical learning; Philoponuswas first with a series of arguments based on the philosophical heritageof the schools that puts Christian thought on the offensive in thisregard.St Maximus the Confessor argues against the idea of a beginning-

less cosmos in a number of places in his writings.111 A major thinkerin spiritualmatters, Maximus still has a keen philosophicalmind, andshould be considered a first-rate philosopher. Since that is so, onemight wonder which of the pagan thinkers or Christian thinkers ofthe schools with whom he was acquainted. This question is hard to

109 Sorabji (1983), 196. 110 Sorabji (1983), 197–9.111 I treated Maximus’ doctrine of creation in Tollefsen (2008), 40–63, as well, but

the angle differs and some ideas are more developed in the present work. I know of noother treatment of Maximus’ doctrine of creation from a philosophical point of view.The possible connection between Maximus and Philoponus which I comment on inthis section, is, as far as I know, entirely my own hypothesis.


answer precisely. Christian authors often refer respectfully to theirChristian sources, but seldom make reference to those of ‘outsiders’.Even so, some small texts on logic are extant which, it may be argued,probably belonged to Maximus himself.112 However, it seems highlyprobable that Maximus knew more than that and was acquaintedwith the philosophy of the schools, especially with Neoplatonistdoctrines, possibly both through listening to lectures and readingcertain works. Could this be argued more specifically? I believe itcan. The key here may be the Christian Neoplatonist Stephanus.113

In my book on Maximus I argued hypothetically that if Stephanusmoved from Alexandria to Constantinople (at the invitation of theemperor) in AD 610, and if he brought with him his own book andbooks by other Christian members of the Alexandrian academy, if hegave lectures, and if Maximus was made head of the Imperial Chan-cellery about 610, then Maximus would be in a position to listento Stephanus’ lectures, enjoy his conversation, and read the booksStephanus brought with him.114 This hypothesis seems to me highlyprobable. One might wonder which books Stephanus would probablyhave brought with him? Here, of course, we are on much thinner ice.Even so, my guess is that he brought books by Philoponus, and if notso, that he probably lectured on Philoponus’ arguments againstProclus. Why? Stephanus came from a Neoplatonist school, andI believe he would not have avoided such an important issue incosmology that would be of interest to the learned representativesof the Church. Further, even if Maximus’ arguments do not repro-duce the arguments of Philoponus there are certain features of Max-imus cosmology that betray a similarity with arguments, concepts,and notions we find in the Contra Proclum.115 I think Philoponusactually brought impulses to Christian thinking about the cosmosthat left their mark on further developments, even if Maximus wasnot a school-philosopher, but rather a distinctive Christian philoso-pher or a philosopher of the Church.

112 Tollefsen (2008), 15.113 Cf. the introduction to ‘Philoponus’,OnAristotle On the Soul 3.1–8 (2000), 2–10.114 Tollefsen (2008), 16.115 For instance compare Ambiguum 7, PG 91:1081a–b; De char. 4,4, PG 90: 1048d

with Ioannis Philoponus, Contra Proclum 36 (Share 2004, 38–9), 74 (ibid., 61), 76(ibid., 62), 78 (ibid., 63), 79 (ibid., 64); Compare Cap. gnost. 1,10, PG 90: 1085d–1088awith Contra Proclum 88 (ibid., 69). The numbers in parenthesis point to translations,see bibliography.


We should appreciate the starting-point of Maximus’ cosmology. Itdoes not begin within a school discussion, but rather with a definitetheological insight. The cosmos, according to Maximus, exists forthe sake of the hypostatic union. The hypostatic union exists for thesake of the deification of creatures. The deification of creatures isbecause of divine goodness and love, but this motif has no furtherreason since it stems from the divine mystery of triune activity inGod.116

The divine acts towards a created otherness are motivated in whatMaximus calls ‘themystery ofChrist’. A key text in this regard is foundinQuaestiones ad Thalassium 60.Maximus comments on the text from1 Pet 1:19–20, in which it is stated that Christ was known before thefoundation of the world. Christ as foreknown is the same as themystery of Christ. The Holy Trinity itself, according to its essence(ŒÆ� �P��Æ�), holds this mystery.117 It was foreknown (�æ��ª��ŁÅ)by the Father according to his approval (eudokia), to the Son accordingto his self-work (autourgia), and to the Spirit according to his coopera-tion (synergia).118Christ was foreknown (�æ�ªØ��Œ��ÆØ), not as God,but asman.119 ‘This is themystery circumscribing all the ages revealingthe super-infinite, great council of God, which in a manner beyondreckoning infinitely pre-exist the ages [ . . . ]’, Maximus says.120

Maximus thinks, then, that what God contemplates beyond time,inHis eternal council, is executed by divine activity in such a way thatthe eternal plan achieves temporal actuality. The execution of thedivine plan requires the creation of a world, which could furnish ascene for temporal movement. Maximus does not speculate aboutwhy the creation came about so recently, i.e., why the world is notthat old. In De charitate 4.3, he says that God is Creator from eternity,and that He creates ‘when He wishes’. There is, in fact, no otheranswer to the question of why He created now (�F�), than to say Hiswisdom is inscrutable. On the other hand, one could know the reason(� ÆN��Æ) why God made the world, namely that He intends to realizethe mystery, but ‘how and why’ (�H� ŒÆd �Øa ��) He created recently(�æ��ç��ø�) is a subject impossible for a human mind to grasp.121

St Maximus obviously sees the philosophical problem of how toexplain the accommodation of an eternal purpose into the sphere of

116 Ad Thal. 60, CCSG 22, 73–81. 117 Ad Thal 60, CCSG 22, 79.118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Ad Thal 60, CCSG 22, 75.121 De char. 4,2–5, PG 90: 1048b–d.


the quite other.However, even if he does not speculate about the howand why, he indicates the lines along which he would like to think ofthe creation of the cosmos. In the 7th Ambiguum he states that beingsdid not come into being along with the divine knowledge of them, buteach being ‘gets actual being at the proper time in accordance with thewisdom of the Creator’.122 In De charitate 4, 3 Maximus speaks ofGod ‘existing eternally as Creator’, and in 4, 4 he says that in thecreative act God manifested His ‘eternally pre-existing knowledge ofbeings’.123

The problem of how one should reconcile God’s eternal knowledgeof beings with the act of creating a world with a temporal beginning,confronted Philoponus as well. In the Contra Proclum he solves theproblem by employing a set of Aristotelian concepts, namely thedistinction between (i) first actuality (energeia) = second potentiality,and (ii) second actuality. It is possible for someone to possessa capacity (i) without executing it (ii).124 The possession may beconsidered a first actuality that may be a potential for later activity.Philoponus further argues that the passing from a capacity intoproduction is instantaneous, i.e., without the passage of time, likewhen light emanates from a source of illumination. God bringscreation about just by willing it.125 What Philoponus means is thatthe cosmos originates with a sequence of temporality for its own part,and that God eternally knows and instantaneously wills this sequence.I am convinced that Maximus is in complete agreement with thisassertion. He does not ponder the questions any deeper than this,even though he was acquainted with the discussions of the eternity ofthe world and in some texts would like to argue philosophically thatthe world has a temporal beginning. There is, for instance, a verydense argument in several steps in Ambiguum 10.126

Even if there is no philosophical analysis of the divine activityof creation as such, it is obvious that the motif for the creation isto be sought in the internal life of the Holy Triad, and that this isthe necessary and sufficient condition for there being a world. Asin Aristotle, God is eternally active contemplating Himself. As inPlotinus, the internal activity beyond all characterization is the reason

122 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081a–b. 123 PG 90: 1048c–d.124 Contra Proclum 62–4 (Share 2004, 53–5).125 Contra Proclum 64–5 (Share 2004, 54–6).126 Ambiguum 10, PG 91: 1176d–1188d, cf. Tollefsen (2008), 40–63.


why other things exist. But unlike Aristotle, the divine contemplation,even if it is a contemplation of God’s own being, is a contemplation ofa triadic nature, and it has eternally conceived a mystery that is for thesake of others, i.e. for created beings. This God and His activity arenot the Aristotelian God and His activity. And unlike Plotinus, theexistence of creatures is not an incidental result of the divine activity.Within the eternal providential contemplation there occurs the wholeset of divine Forms (logoi) for a created otherness in all its richnessand its immanent purpose.127 In addition there occurs the divine planof salvation. This is not the God of Plotinus either.

The mystery of Christ is the mystery of incarnation. But this doesnot mean that it is exclusively the mystery of God becoming man asJesus Christ. The Maximian concept of incarnation or embodiment isbroader. ‘Always and in all God’s Logos and God wills to effect themystery of His own embodiment.’128 Always and in all, Maximussays. The Logos has a three-fold presence, embodiment, or incarna-tion in relation to created otherness: in the cosmos, the Scriptures,and in Jesus Christ.129 Now, to speak of ‘incarnation’ or ‘embodiment’in the cosmos and the Scriptures is, obviously, a metaphorical usageof terms. The Logos as a divine person did not move into the cosmosto make Himself present hypostatically in diverse beings, nor did Heliterally or ‘physically’ embody Himself in the Scriptures. Even soHe made Himself present. This presence was accomplished throughthe logoi, i.e., eternally wrought divine Forms by which the Logosmakes Himself present in the world.130 Why should we speak of theembodiment of divine Forms as an incarnation or embodiment of theLogos? According to Maximus we should understand it this waybecause the creation and salvation of the world is knit together inone single divine purpose, exclusively bound up with the great mys-tery. The creation of the world is the first step towards the fulfilmentof God’s plan.131 Even though the Logos Himself is not hypostaticallypresent in created essences or natures, the logoi defining them anddelimiting their natural capacity represent Him in relation to them.They are His patterns for creatures. The logos of being defines their

127 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1077c–1081b. 128 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1084c–d.129 Ambiguum 33, PG 91: 1285c–1288a.130 For the doctrine of logoi, see Tollefsen (2008).131 One should read the Ambiguum 41, which contains the whole Maximian

world-view in a nutshell.


nature, the logos of well-being defines the pattern according to whichthey should move, and the logos of eternal well-being defines their‘destination’, i.e. the final deified state into which they shouldmove.132 The historical Incarnation proper, i.e., the hypostaticunion between divine and human nature in Jesus Christ, is requiredif the second and third stage is to be achieved.Even if he doesn’t speculate about the how and why of creation,

Maximus offers a glimpse into the metaphysics of creation andsalvation, and in this connection we come into contact with patternsof thought we recognize as being similar with Neoplatonism. In the7th Ambiguum, for instance, he employs terminology that originatesfrom Neoplatonic sources.133 He speaks of a �ı��Œ�ØŒc �æ��,i.e., a ‘procession which keeps together’ and a K�Ø��æ��ØŒ�� [ . . . ]I�Æç�æ��, i.e., a ‘converting transference’. Now, the doctrine ofproodos and epistrofe is developed in later Neoplatonism, especiallyin the system of Proclus as a development of the Plotinian concept ofdouble activity. It is a doctrine of causation. I have pointed earlier tothe well-known words from Proclus: ‘every effect remains in itscause, proceeds from it, and converts to it’.134 The effect mustsomehow be connected with a certain internal activity of its cause.The remaining is the presence of the effect on the level of the firstprinciple. In his Elements of Theology Proclus teaches that causesgenerate because of their perfection in goodness, so that the ancientmotif of goodness that by nature distributes itself is an importantpremise for Proclus.135 There is, then, an internal activity of good-ness, and from this arises the effect. The effect proceeds from itscause according to an external activity, i.e., it differs from the cause.The effect is fulfilled as a new entity in its conversion to its cause,i.e., when the effect is perfected according to its own internal activity.I suppose these causal patterns are familiar now from what has beensaid earlier concerning Plotinus and Proclus.It is difficult to tell exactly from which source Maximus received

his terminology of remaining—procession—conversion. It seems quiteprobable, though, that a primary source must have been the pseudo-Dionysian writings. On the other hand, Maximus could have learnedabout the Neoplatonic triad by reading Neoplatonist works as well.

132 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1084b–1085a. 133 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081c.134 Dodds ed., The Elements of Theology, prop. 35.135 Cf. propositions 25–39.


However that may be, it is very important to see how he sets theterminology to use while making it a tool for his own concerns. Hedoes not transport a Neoplatonic theory into his Christian ‘system’,but finds the terminology useful.Maximus, then, has a doctrine of the procession and conversion of

the effect in relation to its cause, and he even has a theory of theeffect’s remaining in the cause. One could turn to the 7th Ambiguumfor one of his elaborations of this doctrine. All effects are originallypresent in God in their logoi. The effects do not have an originalexistence as particular spiritual beings in or around God,136 but Godknows in His logoi all the things He will make, intelligible as well assensible.137 So this at least is one aspect of the internal activity of thedivine being, its contemplation of the logoi of beings. We shouldremember, however, that to speak of God in this way is a concessionto our intellectual weakness, since God is not, according to Max-imus, intuitive thought (��Å�Ø�).138 On the other hand, we cannotavoid speaking of God as contemplating and as having knowledge orwisdom.139 In the De charitate Maximus says that ‘When He willedit, the Creator gave being to and put forward His eternally pre-existing knowledge of beings.’140 These metaphysical considerationsbring us back to the mystery of Christ. Because to know beings intheir logoi, ‘before’ the foundation of the cosmos, means to knowthem in the Logos or as related to the Logos. The Logos, according tosome important texts, is the centre of the logoi, and they are allcontemplated as belonging to Him.141 The point, as noted above, isthat creation and salvation both belong to one single divine purpose.The internal activity of God, then, is the activity of love, centred on

the knowledge of and will to execute the economy. Somehow, thewhole drama of creation and salvation is based on the internalrelationship between and activity of the persons in the Holy Trinity.The will of God is joined to His knowledge in such a way that what isconceived in the divine being as related to an economy of the Logos is

136 This is said against the so-called Origenists, cf. Sherwood (1955).137 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081a. 138 Cap. gnost. 2.2, PG 90: 1125c.139 In the section on Plotinus above, we saw that he also wanted to state that God is

beyond our concepts of intellection. Even so we have to speak of God this way in orderto talk of Him as the source or beginning of creatures.

140 De char. 4.4, PG 90: 1048d.141 Cf. Cap. gnost. 2.4, PG 90: 1125d–1128a, Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081c, Myst.

ch. 1, PG 91: 668a–b.


executed in a temporally structured world. The activity of will isjoined to the activity of knowledge that manifests the logoi in con-cretely existing beings in the creaturely realm. This is what I havecalled ‘the Christocentric cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor’.142

Maximus says the logoi are contemplated in God’s K��æª�ØÆØ

(K�Ł�øæH� K��æª��Æ� Ł��F).143 Knowledge and will are divine activ-ities, and the logoi occur in connection with these activities of knowl-edge and will. Actually, the logoi are conceived in the quite dynamicway as God’s ‘will’ or acts of will (Ł�º� Æ�Æ), an idea we found inDionysius as well.144 One cannot divide the simple divine being intoseveral different properties or activities as if it was composed ofdifferent powers. Even so, we shall have to talk of divine activitiesas ways in which God’s essence become active, even if in itself thisessence is completely simple. Being simple, however, it can execute allperfections, even if it is unfeasible to identify the nature of God, as it isin itself, with what it naturally may execute.So knowledge and will are activities, and the logoi occur as acts of will.

How are these logoi then to be understood? A logos, as an act of the willof God, could be understood as (i) a definition of essence which Godeternally wanted to contemplate as a possibility of making something inaccordance with this design, or as (ii) such a definition of essence whichGod chose to execute in actual existence.145 Whatever way it is under-stood, I believe that a distinction should be made between logoi andactivities (K��æª�ØÆØ) to the effect that all logoi are activities because theyare divine volitions, but not all activities are logoi.146

I think the text in The gnostic chapters 1, 47–50 is important whenone tries to understand Maximus’ teaching of divine activity oractivities. The first chapter runs:

The Sabbath rest of God is the full return of all creatures to Him,according to which He puts an end to their natural activity, ineffablyactivating His most divine activity. For God puts an end to the naturalactivity which happens to be in each being, according to which ina natural way each being naturally moves, whenever each being

142 In Tollefsen (2008), of the same title. 143 Ambiguum 22, PG 91: 1257a.144 Cf. Ad Thal. 13, CCSG 7, 95. On Dionysius, see above.145 This distinction is found in Thomas Aquinas as well, cf. Summa theologiae I,

q. 15, art. 3.146 Cf. Tollefsen (2008), 169–70. The interpretation that Maximus distinguishes

between logoi and energeiai is supported by Bradshaw (2007), 206, as well.


receives in due measure the divine activity, and fixes its proper naturalactivity around God Himself.

Before we start to interpret this chapter and its sequence, we shouldkeep in mind that the connection made by Maximus between cos-mology and soteriology again and again sets its stamp on the texts.This means that a given text may be both cosmologically and soter-iologically relevant. Cosmological and soteriologicalmatters will turnup intertwined with each other. If we turn to the present text, let usfirst notice that Maximus makes a distinction between the activity ofcreated being and the activity of God: created being has a naturalactivity, God has his most divine activity. Secondly, when a creaturedraws near to God, an end is gradually put to the proper activity thatstems from its essence or nature. The divine activity somehow takesover, and is received within each being as the mode under which thecreature fixes a certain activity ‘around’ God.

There is something here that is not easy to get a hold of. For a startwe have the distinction between creaturely and divine activity. Is thisdistinction still at play in the last part of the chapter? Maximus saysthat when a creature receives the divine activity, it fixes its propernatural activity around God. What could this mean? Are not crea-turely activities brought to an end? What is this ‘proper naturalactivity’? Could it be that some creaturely activities are brought toan end, while other activities are executed in the mode of divineactivity? Or could it mean that the divine activity that is receivedbecomes ‘the proper natural activity’ of the creature? (I shall try toanswer these questions, but for details relating to the topic of soter-iology proper one should consult Chapter 6 below.) This much is atleast obvious: a doctrine of participation lurks in the background, andthis, as a matter of fact, is what we find in the next chapters.The word energeia does not turn up in the next relevant chapters,

but another word plays a major role, namely �æªÆ, plural of �æª��. Aswe shall see, ergonmeans two things. I believe that one of these sensesis equivalent to energeia while the other is not. In The gnostic chapters1, 48 we read that we should distinguish between two kinds of divine‘works’ (erga), namely ‘the works which he began to do’ (�a �æªÆ z�

Xæ�Æ��) and ‘the works which he did not begin to do’ (z� �PŒ

Xæ�Æ��). The works that God began to do are obviously to be under-stood as created beings. This is stated explicitly in the text itself.Maximus is talking of beings with a temporal beginning, beings


differing essentially from each other. They are called ‘participatingbeings’ (�a Z��Æ ��å��Æ). In other words, he speaks of the resultsof divine creative activity ad extra. Now, ergon in this sense is ‘some-thing made’, an essence, and not an activity. Maybe ergon in this senseis dynamically understood as ‘that which originates within the scopeof an activity’. Such an understanding would knit the creature into anintimate relationship with the divine activity itself, something thatseems to be the concern of Maximus in this context.Further, the works which God did not begin doing, ‘the works that

did not happen to have a temporal beginning of their being’, to quotethe text, are called ‘participated beings’ (�a Z��Æ �Ł�Œ��), ‘in whichparticipating beings participate according to grace’. Maximus givesexamples of these kinds of works: Goodness (and all that Goodnessentails), Life, Immortality, Simplicity, Immutability, Infinity, and ‘allthat is contemplated as essentially around him (��æd ÆP��)’.In The gnostic chapters 1, 47 there is talk of the divine activity that

operates in created beings. In 1, 48 we hear of certain beginninglessdivine works that are objects of participation for creatures. What arethese ‘works’ and how are they related to the activity? The sequenceof the text seems to indicate that work and activity are in a way oneand the same thing. In 1, 47 we read that the creature, when it receivesthe divine activity, fixes its activity ‘around him’. In 1, 48 we find that theworks of the eternal divine are contemplated in this same sphere. Thiscould mean that the creature fixes its activity in the sphere where thedivine activity, manifested as beginningless works, naturally belongs (cf.�P�Øø�H�), i.e., ‘around God’. In 1, 47 we see divine activities playing animportant role in relation to the creature, taking over certain creaturelyactivities, and in 1, 48 we see that participating beings partake of theparticipated beings ‘according to grace’. Obviously, creatures are relatedin the same way to the divine activities and to the divine works.Consequently, activities and works are in this context ontologically thesame. There is, however, one rather curious thing to take notice of in thisconnection, namely, how are we to think of Goodness, Life, Immortality,Simplicity, Immutability, and Infinity as ‘works’ or as ‘activities’? Isuppose we can say that these terms that name divine perfections arenames we give to God’s being-giving, life-giving, immortality-giving,simplifying, immutability-making, and infinity-making activities.What emerges in the interpretation up till now indicates something

of the greatest importance for the relation between God’s essence(nature) and activity (energeia) in Maximus.He develops his teaching


in a way that will lend itself to the interpretation later offered bySt Gregory Palamas. It seems first of all obvious that when one speaksof ‘works’, one identifies something different from the one whomade the work. That is, God in Himself, according to what He is,differs from what He simply has made (creatures) and from whatHe manifests from His own being (beginningless works). It shouldalso be noted in 1, 49 that God, according to Maximus, infinitelytranscends all beings, both participating and participated. In a veinthat reminds one of the introduction to theMystagogia (the last part,interpreted earlier in Chapter 3, c.), he says that all that is categorizedby the term being, is a work of God, and belongs to the class of what istranscended by the Godhead.A work is generally not identified with the one working. The begin-

ningless works, further, do not seem to be just ‘work’ in the subjectivesense (‘doing something’), but is rather work as an ‘activity culminatingin “something” brought forward’. This would be analogous with theAristotelian idea that a form is settled in matter through the activity ofan artisan. When Maximus speaks of these works he calls them parti-cipated beings (Z��Æ); how is this to be understood? A being is a thing,an entity, a something, but it seems quite unfeasible that thereshould exist beginningless, eternal beings of this kind ‘around’ Godor ‘between’ God and creatures, as if Maximus wanted to put anintelligible hierarchy of lesser gods betweenGod and created otherness.I don’t think these works are called beings because of some establishedexistence as entities in their own right, which they cannot have, butrather because they are a real source of participation for created beings.In De charitate (3, 25) one finds a chapter that obviously speaks

of the same topic as the one we are discussing above. Four divineproperties are listed: Being, Eternal being, Goodness, and Wisdom.Note that they are not called activities or works, but ‘properties’(N�Ø� Æ�Æ). According to Porphyry’s Isagoge—a text that Maximusprobably knew; he was at least familiar with the kind of logicexpressed there—a property does not define the essence of something,but belongs to an entity in a more permanent manner than does anaccident.147 This then, adds to our understanding that there is a kindof distinction or difference between the divine essence and the divineproperties (activities or works). However, one should not press the

147 Porphyrii, Isagoge, 12, CAG 4.1 (Berlin 1887). Cf. Roueché (1980), 91–2, onproperty, in a handbook of logical terminology probably owned by Maximus himself.


term distinction too far, because Maximus obviously is not makingthe divine into two different ‘things’, an essence and a set of activities.I think he would have claimed to be in perfect agreement withSt Gregory of Nyssa on the teaching of the relation between God’sessence and energeia.As well, De charitate introduces the participation motif. When

God brought intelligent creatures into being, he communicated(KŒ�Ø��Ø��) to them the above-mentioned properties. This,I hold, does not mean anything other than that creatures receive thedivine activity (Cap. gnost. 1, 47) or that beginningless divine worksare to be participated in by creatures (ibid. 1, 48). In short, we arediscussing the same topic. What is especially telling in the passagefrom De charitate is the distribution of properties that is envisaged.Being and Eternal being are given to the essence of creatures, whileGoodness and Wisdom are given to the ‘gnomic fitness’ (ª�ø ØŒc

K�Ø�Å��Ø��Å�). What is this ‘gnomic fitness’? We shall have to returnto an interpretation of this term. Now we should note that it denotesan anthropological concept of relevance for the doctrines of Christol-ogy and soteriology. It points to the human will in the conditionof being prepared for the reception of God’s grace. According toMaximus then, in the creaturely order of being, rational entities receiveBeing and Eternal being. In the redemptive order they receive Good-ness and Wisdom. Expressing it this way, I, of course, do not intend toseparate the dimensions of creation and salvation, for they are twoaspects of the one and same divine purpose ormystery.Whatwe shouldnote here, however, is just that the activities, works, or properties aredistributed to creatures for their participation in accordance with adivine scheme for their creation and salvation. All properties are notreceived immediately or at the same time, even if the nature of intelli-gent creatures, i.e., man, is designed to be a natural ‘place’ for thepermanent presence of them all.The creation of the world, as we have seen, is bringing God’s

eternal knowledge of beings into a temporal dimension. Beings havetheir design in the logoi, and creation is precisely this, that entitiesare called into the temporal sphere (to be accurate: into the spheresof the ages) of participation in God’s activity in accordance withthese designs. There are logoi for individuals, species, and genera.148

148 Cf. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1080a, Ambiguum 41, 1312b–d.


Eventually, all logoi are reducible to the one Logos, which points to thefact that each logos represents the one Logos to the creature whosedesign it is.149 I suppose the logoi are both one and many because theone Logos by His will wishes to express Himself qua designing perfec-tion towards those beings that He creates. By an infused power(��Æ Ø�) God’s presence is proclaimed in all things.150 God is presentbyHis activity as an undivided whole in each thing in accordance withthe logos of the being of the thing.151 To bemore precise, by the activityGod is present as a whole in a common way (Œ�Ø�H�) andHe is presentas a whole in each creature in a special way (N�ØÆÇ��). God is,however, undivided and indivisible, He neither expands nor contractsHimself in accordance with His activity. How should this be under-stood? I believe that God’s presence as a whole in a common waymeans that all created beings (essences) have the basic ontologicalcharacter of being made participants in Being in common. Createdessences, generic, specific, and particular ones, are arranged accordingto the divine pattern for the cosmos. God, in short, keeps the world fastinHis grip. The manifold is unified in the one activity of communica-tion of Being from God. But God’s presence is not just a generalpresence. He is present to every created nature. There is a logos foreach individual, and in accordance with this logos God is present as awhole in the special way He has designed for this particular creature.From all of this we may gather that even if God’s essence could not beidentified with what God does, His doing—i.e., His activity or Hisworks—implies the presence of the one who acts, a presence that Heregulates in accordance with His logoi.Now, here we have something very similar to what we found in St

Gregory of Nyssa, where the artist left his stamp on his work.152 Likean artist, God has left His stamp on His work, the cosmos, and wemay observe the ineffable Wisdom of God in the orderly arrangementof the world.153 God manifests an all-sustaining activity, according to

149 Cf. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081b–c. The texts in which the one Logos representsthe centre of the circle while the logoi are the radii, points in the same direction, cf.Cap. gnost. 2.4, PG 90: 1125d–1128a, Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081c and Myst. ch. 1, PG91: 668a–b.

150 Cap. gnost. 1.49, PG 90: 1101a.151 To this and what follows, cf. Ambiguum 22, PG 91: 1256–1257.152 De beatitudinibus, Oratio 6, GNO 7.2, 141.153 De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 44a–b.


Gregory.154 It seems to me that both Gregory and Maximus think ofthe divine activity in a rather special way. While human acts startand terminate, God’s acts do not. The human activity of building(a movement, according to Aristotle) has no existence beyond thecompletion of the structure built. According to Aristotle it terminatesat the moment when the work is completed. The human activities ofthinking, of seeing, of committing virtuous acts, even if complete inthemselves as energeiai, also have their beginnings and endings,beyond which nothing remains of the activities themselves even ifcertain outcomes may still be present. God’s works neither begin norend, as we have seen in connection with Maximus’ thought. Even so,they are accommodated instantaneously into temporality, as we sawabove, in connection with the distinction between first and secondenergeia according to Aristotle and Philoponus. The Wisdom andGoodness observed in the cosmos is not just the stamp left by theartist. It is a witness to the permanent presence of God, because theworld of creatures cannot exist, nor can it be an ordered structurewithout God’s incessant presence that keeps what He has made inbeing, order, and goodness. This is one of the reasons why Maximusspeaks of God’s works without beginning and calls these worksparticipated beings. In a sense, these works or energeiai are similarto Aristotelian actualities, at least in the special sense of necessary andsufficient conditions for the being and perfection of beings. As I saidabove, it is quite out of the question to think that these works orbeings constitute an eternal assembly of entities ‘below’ or ‘around’God, something like a quasi-Origenian plethora of rational beings ora collection of energies in the Eunomian sense. Once more, however,like in St Gregory above, we meet the problem of simplicity andplurality in connection with the concept of God. We shall have todiscuss this problem in Chapter 8, in the Concluding Remarks. Whatis signaled with Maximus’ terminology, I think, is that God is a livingGod, acting internally and externally, not in the sense that His actsbegin and end, but in the sense that they are somehow—to use acouple of metaphors—like a field of energy, a radiance of light con-stantly accompanying the divine being.Divine acts are not like humanacts in the sense that they have a restricted existence. They are loadedwith creative force. They are always making, expanding, life-giving.

154 De hominis opificio 16, PG 44: 185d.


From the philosophical point of view, the concept of a divine activityseems to be reasonablywell defined: an activity is the eternalmovementof the Holy Triad, in virtuous, creative, sustaining, and deifying acts,based on the perfection of the transcendent nature and administeredtriadically in the internal and external spheres in accordance with theone divine will. It strikes me once more, like we saw in connection withSt Gregory and Dionysius, that the ontological content of essentialbeing (generic, specific, and particular) is created, but the ontologicalconditions on which beings exist (Being, Goodness, etc.) are theuncreated divine activities ad extra. We shall return to the questionof the relation between created essential activity and divine activitybelow.


5

The External Activity of theGodhead: Incarnation

A. ST GREGORY OF NYSSA ONTHE INCARNATION

It is tempting to assess St Gregory’s doctrine of the Incarnation inrelation to the council of Chalcedon (AD 451). Even if there are someinteresting terminological similarities between Gregory and laterChristology, this procedure, however, is anachronistic.1 What was atstake for the Cappadocian Fathers was the conception of divinity, notprimarily the doctrine of the Incarnation as such. Even so, these twoissues are related since they concern the Christian doctrine of salva-tion. They are thematically connected since the Son is the ‘captain of[ . . . ] salvation’ (Heb 2:10). One may ask about the reason for theCappadocian focus. At first, the answer is obvious—they were chal-lenged by the theology of the ‘Arians’ in the distinct form of theAnomoean doctrines. If the ‘Arian Christ’ was conceived as such inrelation to a doctrine of salvation, this distinctive view was present inCappadocian theology as well. Who is this Saviour who is able tobridge our way to God? The answer to such a question is connectedwith an understanding of what salvation really amounts to. How arewe saved, what are we saved from, and what is the content of salva-tion?Who is competent to achieve for us what we hope for?Whateverthe Arians and Anomoeans think of this, for the Cappadocian Fathers

1 Fr. Andrew Louth has pointed out to me the temptation to interpret Gregory’sChristology in relation to Chalcedon. I’ll try to keep clear of this in what follows. Seethe useful article by Daley in Coakley ed. (2004). I agree that Gregory’s formulationsare set within a theoretical frame worked out in a contemporary discussion that makesthem interesting in their own right.

the reason for our creation, the purpose of human existence, is toexperience communion with God, to share the divine life to such adegree that we are deified (John 1:12): ‘But as many as received Him,to themHe gave the K��ı��Æ� to become children of God . . . ’. St Basilspeaks of ‘becoming like God’ and ‘becoming God’.2 Who could grantthis power, this authority (K��ı��Æ) to become children of God in thisdistinctive fashion if not God Himself? The Christology of St Gregoryhas its character from this basic acknowledgement: the Son of God isfully divine. He condescended to save us by healing our nature andachieving for us the possibility of communion with God. As a firststep, He deified His own humanity and this is the angle from whichwe now shall address Gregory’s Christology.From the point of view of the doctrine of divine activity, what will

be discussed below is how St Gregory (and in the next two sections StMaximus) understands the deification of the human nature of Christ.In the next chapter we move further and focus on the deification ofhuman beings that is achieved as a result of Christ’s work for oursalvation. I think both of these phenomena are instances of participa-tion. And no doubt, this will be particularly relevant for the topic of‘uncreated energies’ in the Palamitic sense.In book 3, part 3 of the Contra Eunomium, St Gregory comments

on the saying of the Apostle Peter in Acts 2:36: ‘God hath made thatsame Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ.’ Accord-ing to Eunomius, this is spoken of the Logos, and not the man Jesus.Gregory, on the other hand, following his brother Basil, argues that itwas said ‘that inHim, which was human and was seen by all’. God theLogos assumed human nature. The assumed nature, being mixed withthe divine, became through this mixture (I�ÆŒæ��Ø�) what the assum-ing nature was.3 The humanity was exalted to the dignity of Lord andChrist:4 ‘It follows, then, that the Apostle says that His humanity wasexalted; exalted, that is, by becoming Lord and Christ. And this tookplace after the Passion. Of course, to Gregory this does not mean thatthe divine and human natures were not united during the earthly stayof the Logos. It is a plausible interpretation to take the saying in thesense that the deification of Christ’s humanity was completed and

2 De Spiritu Sancto, PG 32: 109c. Aspects of Gregory’s doctine of salvation arediscussed later in Chapter 6.

3 CE, GNO 2, 119.4 CE, GNO 2, 123.

134 The External Activity of the Godhead: Incarnation

fully manifested after the Passion in the resurrected Lord. Gregorysays further:

This [lowly human nature], by mixture [I�ÆŒæ��ø�] with the infiniteand boundless character of the good, remained no longer in its ownmeasures and properties, but was raised up by the Right Hand of Godtogether with Itself, and became Lord instead of servant, Christ the Kinginstead of subject, Highest instead of lowly, God instead of man.5

[ . . . ] the Logos is identical with the Logos, He who appeared in theflesh with Him who was with God. But the flesh was not identical withthe Godhead before it was transformed and made identical with theGodhead [� �b �aæ� �PŒ � ÆP�c �fi B Ł��Å�Ø �æd� ��Æ��ØÅŁB�ÆØ ŒÆd

�Æ��Å� �æe� �c� Ł��Å�Æ], so that one [thing] necessarily befits Godthe Logos, and another the form of the servant.[ . . . ] but when mixed [I�ÆŒæÆŁ�E�Æ] with the divine it no longer

remains in its own limits and properties, but is taken up to that which isoverwhelming and transcendent, the contemplation of the properties ofthe flesh and the Godhead remains unconfused [I��ªåı��], so long aseach of these is contemplated by itself.6

These quotations contain several challenging assertions. What doesGregory have in mind when he speaks of mixture here? What does itmean that the human nature of Christ no longer remains ‘in its ownmeasures and properties’ (K� ��E� �NŒ��Ø� ��æ�Ø� ŒÆd N�Ø� Æ�Ø�), ‘inits own limits and properties’ (K� ��E� Æı�B� ‹æ�Ø� �� ŒÆd N�Ø� Æ�Ø)?In what sense are we to take the phrase that the flesh is made identicalwith the Godhead (�Æ��Å� �æe� �c� Ł��Å�Æ)?What does it mean thatwe are still able to contemplate the properties of flesh and Godheadafter the assumption? Even if at first sight it is tempting to takeGregory’s words to mean that God and man merge together toform a new kind of entity, a third kind of nature that is a mixtureof the two, this is obviously not what he wants to say. Nor does hewant to say, even if the language is daring, that humanity is trans-formed into divinity by essence or nature. Still, the only thing heoffers in balance to avoid such doctrines are the words on contempla-tion: there is mixture, there is transformation and change; thereis identity, but humanity and divinity may still be contemplated inthe God-man.We shall first address a terminological point. Gregory’s terminol-

ogy of mixture includes the noun I�ÆŒæ��Ø� and the verbs

5 CE, GNO 2, 124. 6 CE, GNO 2, 130.

The External Activity of the Godhead: Incarnation 135

I�ÆŒ�æ��ı Ø and ŒÆ�Æ ��ª�ı Ø.7 I think it would be strange if athinker of the fourth century had no knowledge at all of the differ-ences in the terminology of mixture, since this had been an issue forthe philosophical schools. There are interesting pages on this topic inArius Didymus (first century BC) and Alexander of Aphrodisias(fl. early third century AD), both commenting on the Stoic Chrysip-pus, and in Porphyry’s Summikta Zetemata, preserved in Nemesius(late fourth century AD), a Christian bishop of Emesa in Syria.8

Gregory could probably not have known about mixtures from Ne-mesius, but he probably knew it from other sources. An indication ofthis is that he obviously distinguishes between I�ÆŒæ��Ø� and��ªåı�Ø�, as can be seen in the quotation above.9 According to allthree sources, ŒæA�Ø�, probably equivalent with I�ÆŒæ��Ø�, is a blend-ing in which the two (or more) substances that are mingled, aresomehow juxtaposed, i.e., the natural properties of each are presenteven if imperceptible in the blend. AriusDidymus and Porphyry evendescribe a technical device by which some liquids may be separated.10

��Ø� (cf. ŒÆ�Æ ��ª�ı Ø above) is also defined as basically juxtaposi-tion.11 All three sources understand ��ªåı�Ø� as a fusion in which theoriginal qualities are changed or perish in order that some new orthird thing occurs.12 The original substances cannot be separated anymore. If we may assume that Gregory knew these distinctions, hisview so far is not particularly obscure.13 The divine Logos assumedhuman nature and nature was mingled with nature, but not in themanner of fusion (��ªåı�Ø�). There is no reason to believe thatGregory, with his insistence on the distinction between uncreatedand created nature, should have confused the two realms in theSaviour. On the other hand, the two natures are present to oneanother in the most intimate way, with the effect that the human

7 CE, GNO 2, 119, 124, 126, 130.8 Relevant excerpts from all three are most conveniently available in Soabjii

(2004), 297 and 299–300.9 CE, GNO 2, 130.

10 It is interesting to note that Arius describes the mingling of fire and iron as amixis, where original properties of fire and iron are still preserved; cf. Sorabji (2004),300. Glowing iron is a favourite image for deified humanity among several ChurchFathers.

11 Sorabjii (2004), 300.12 For Nemesius one should now consult his De natura hominis chapter 3, PG 40:

593b, 596a–b.13 Daley in Coakley ed. (2004), 67–8.


nature is exposed to the transforming power of divinity throughoutits being.We shall turn to the topic of transformation. The first thing to be

noted is the identity of the Incarnate one. He who was incarnated isone subject, the subject of the Logos.14 The flesh was of anothernature, and it was not identical with the nature of the Logos beforeit was transformed (�æd� ��Æ��ØÅŁB�ÆØ). The transformation here isto be taken in the sense of deification of the flesh. The ‘before’ tells usthat the deification of the flesh was accomplished ‘afterwards’; but thequestion is after what? Somehow the text seems to indicate some sortof development. We saw above that the exaltation of the humannature of Christ took place after the Passion, and I suppose this hasto do with the resurrection, even though the process of deificationprobably is thought to go on from the moment of the conception bythe Holy Virgin. Now, Gregory obviously teaches that the fleshbecomes identical with the Godhead due to this transformation,and this seems to me a rather strong expression. ‘Identical’, onemay ask, in what sense? Gregory says that the contemplation of theproperties (N�Ø� Æ�Æ) of humanity and divinity remains unconfused.This must mean that in contemplating the God-man one is able todiscern two sets of properties. The human properties are still con-ceivable. They have not disappeared by being transformed into some-thing else. This indicates, I think, that a human nature still exists afterbeing assumed, so that humanity is not transformed into divinity,neither in its essence nor in its natural properties—at least not at themoment of the Incarnation. So, what does it mean then, to becomeidentical?The humanity is made anew by participating in the divine Power.15

Gregory uses a dramatic image for the glorified humanity of Christ:the drop of vinegar, mingled with the sea, is diluted to such a degreethat the natural property of the vinegar no longer remains in theinfinity of that which overwhelms it. Even if this indicates thathumanity is diluted to the degree of being almost unrecognizable, itstill could not mean, however, that human nature and its naturalproperties disappear completely in the Godhead. There would be nopoint in speaking of participation if that was the case, and, as we havejust seen, Gregory holds that the properties of humanity may still be

14 Cf. CE, GNO 2, 122. 15 CE, GNO 2, 132–133.


contemplated in the God-man. Humanity, Gregory says, is broughtinto such participation ( ��ı��Æ) in the Godhead that is signified bythe terms Christ and Lord.16 Participation presupposes that theparticipating entity still remains as an ontological fact, even if themode of its being is radically changed. I would hold then thataccording to Gregory, human nature, with its natural properties,still exists somehow.On the other hand, we saw earlier that humanity no longer remains

in its own measures and properties. This definitely seems to runcounter to the interpretation I have just offered. I would prefer,however, to take this in a sense that does not shake the solution Iam trying to work out, especially since I believe Gregory cannotnurture the teaching that humanity simply disappears in the Godheadwhen assumed. It seems to me definitely against sound ontologicalprinciples if Gregory should have taught the transformation of onenature into another nature without any natural or definitory marksleft. In short, when he says humanity can still be contemplated in thedeified God-man, I suppose this should be taken seriously. Then itbecomes urgent to try to figure out how these two notions may fittogether; that human properties are preserved, and that humanitydoes not remain in its own measures and properties.If human nature is still to be contemplated as human, it must be

preserved in accordance with the divine Form of this nature, i.e.,humanity and its properties must somehow be present in the glorifiedLord. According to Gregory, the natures are distinguishable inthought, which obviously means that the essential marks of Christ’shuman nature remain to be contemplated.17 So, what then could itmean for this nature not to remain in its own measures and proper-ties? There seems to be a contradiction here.The key, I think, must be in a conception of community of proper-

ties, communicatio idiomatum:18 ‘[ . . . ] so that by reason of junctionand natural combination that which belongs to each becomes of both[ . . . ].’ The meaning here must be that properties belonging to theGodhead become properties of manhood as well, and propertiesbelonging to manhood become properties of the Godhead. Thisdoes not, however, immediately solve the problem, rather it seemsto create a further difficulty: on the one hand, it is said that human

16 CE, GNO 2, 142. 17 Cf. CE, GNO 2, 139. 18 CE, GNO 2, 131.


nature no longer remains in its own measures and properties, and, onthe other hand, it is said that properties are exchanged. How couldthis fit together? If we keep to the idea of exchange, we must firstadmit that properties of humanity are different from divine proper-ties. Human beings are characterized by properties of finitude whilethe Godhead has properties of an infinite kind. We could say sets ofdifferent properties belong to the natures of man and God. Obviously,we should turn to the subject of the Incarnation, the hypostasis of theLogos. Somehow these sets of properties must be accommodated tothe mode of being of Christ. The incarnate God as a hypostasis is thesubject of properties of both limited and unlimited kinds. Christ mustbe conceived as both limited and unlimited at the same time, butaccording to different aspects of His composite being.What then of the human nature of Christ? Are we to imagine that

this human nature, deified nature itself, somehow exists in a kind ofstatus duplex, i.e., as both limited and unlimited? I think we have tosay that there is no such thing as deified human nature itself, but onlythe deified humanity of the Logos. In that case, its unlimited mode ofbeing is no longer within the original measures and properties: butwhen contemplated qua humanity, i.e., in abstraction from its modeof being, it is limited. If this is the case, it seems possible to hold thefollowing: (i) properties are exchanged, and, because of the exchange,(ii) certain human properties are overcome, but (iii) if the natures areconsidered in abstraction from their union, i.e., theoretically, two setsof properties are discernible.In the divine mode of being, human nature does not exist within its

own measures and properties. In the glorified Lord, human natureexists in the mode of divine measures and properties because of theexchange of properties.Human nature is somehow diluted like a dropof vinegar in the sea. In more ontological language, human nature isontologically expanded with regard to what it is capable of. In contactwith the divine nature of its subject it suffers a radical change. It isobvious that Gregory has to consider this change as something manoriginally was made for. The change cannot transform the being ofman into something that never was intended in God’s Form of what itshouldmean to be human. Maybe this kind of change looks strange tous, and maybe such manhood is unrecognizable. Still, this potentialmust be included in man who is made in God’s image and likeness.If this interpretation of Gregory’s doctrine is correct, then we could

at least say that humanity, as deified, is identical with the Godhead in


the communion of properties, not by transformation of creatednature into the uncreated. But what should be understood by ‘proper-ties’?We have seen that the divine properties are ‘around Him’. This,I think, is just to say that essence and properties are ontologicallydifferent moments. Such an idea is in accordance with Porphyry’sAristotelian logic, known from the Isagoge. I should think that severalof the learned ones of the fourth century would be acquainted withthis kind of thinking. According to Porphyry, it is the predicates ofgenus, species, and difference that define the essence of something.Predicates of property, on the other hand, do not define the essence,but denote certain characteristics of a being and these characteristicsdiffer from its essence. Such a conception of properties is obviouslythe background for the predication of ‘Lord and Christ’ on the oneand same Christ qua human. Being Lord and Christ are originalproperties of the Logos:19 ‘For Lordship is not a name of His essence,but of His authority, and the appellation of Christ indicates Hiskingdom, but the idea of His kingdom is one thing, and that of Hisnature is another.’ The same principle is clearly expressed elsewherein the Contra Eunomium:

As, then, we say ‘He is a judge’, we conceive concerning Him someactivity of judgement [�B� Œæ��ø� K��æª�Ø�� Ø�Æ], and by the ‘is’ carryour mind to the subject, being clearly taught by this not to consider theaccount of the activity to be identical with the being [ . . . ].For every name, which you may use, is about [��æ�] the Being, but is

not it: good, ungenerate, incorruptible; but to each of these ‘is’ does notfail to be allowed.20

The ‘is’ points to the subject, and the subject is God’s essence, butthe predicate itself denotes some activity or the name of a propertyderived from an activity. To be God, then, is not the same as to be inauthority or in kingship; it is not the same as to be a judge, to be good,ingenerate, incorruptible, etc. The humanity of Christ participates inthe qualifications of Lord and Christ by the exchange of properties.According to Gregory’s scheme, properties are predicates, and the

ontological reality behind the properties are the divine activities. Theactivities are expressions of divine Power, and the Power is foundedon the essence. The deification of Christ’s humanity is effected by amovement from the divine Power into the created human nature:21

19 CE, GNO 2, 157. 20 CE, GNO 2, 181 and 182. 21 CE, GNO 2, 126.


‘[ . . . ] He mingled [ŒÆ�Æ ��ÆØ] His life-giving Power with our mortaland perishable nature, and changed, by the mixture [I�ÆŒæ��ø�]with Himself, our deadness to living grace and power.’ This move-ment from the Power is a divine activity executed in the creature, andit effects a transformation that establishes a new mode of being forhumanity. ‘The flesh is of a passible nature, the Logos of an active(K��æªÅ�ØŒB�) nature’, Gregory says.22 What is gradually developed inhumanity by the divine activity is an actualized condition of existencein divine attributes. Human nature becomes a participant in divinecharacteristics. The humanity of Christ is moved beyond what isgiven to it in its natural condition.Because of the emphasis Gregory places on the passibility of

human nature, it would be expected that the change is one-sidedonly: humanity receives divine attributes, while the divine nature doesnot admit any human activity into Its being.However, in some places,the activity is thought to be effective both ways, i.e., from the divinetowards the human, and from the human towards the divine. Thegeneral principle is clearly formulated:23 ‘[ . . . ] so that by reason ofjunction and natural combination that which belongs to each be-comes of both [ . . . ].’ The Incarnation, then, includes a humanizationof the Godhead. This humanization is usually interpreted in the sensethat Logos is the sole subject of the suffering of Christ. The idea of thismutual interpenetration is further developed by St Maximus theConfessor, as we shall see in the next section.I will end this section with some considerations on the problem of

the gradual deification of Christ’s humanity. I suppose Gregory hasno doubts as to the unity of Christ, even if it is tempting to ask aboutthe exact character of this oneness. The idea of a gradual deificationcould foster the impression that the Christ we are talking about is nota real unity. In all stages of His life until the resurrection there couldseem to be something in Him not yet belonging to Him as an integralpart, i.e., a human nature on its way to being somehow ‘absorbed’ inthe divine subject of the Incarnation.If it should be taken seriously that God became man, one has to

think of the God-man as a unitary being. The idea of union is basic tothe whole soteriological scheme of Cappadocian thought, as it cameto be for mainstream Eastern theology until the present. Gregory,

22 CE, GNO 2, 130. 23 CE, GNO 2, 131.


I think, takes for granted that Christ is one. His concern was not withontological categories for the Incarnation, but with the Trinitarianidea of the Godhead. To say this is not to diminish his Christologicalinsights, but just to put the balance in the right place.He did not workout ontological categories with the purpose of highlighting the unityof the God-man. As a matter of fact, that would have been beyond thescope of the controversy he was engaged in. The problem is not,however, trivial. It is interconnected with the basic soteriologicalscheme as conceived by the Greek and Oriental Fathers. The nextphase of controversy showed this to the highest degree. What I amthinking of is the clash between the strong personalities of Nestorius,patriarch of Constantinople (patriarch 428–31), and St Cyril of Alex-andria (patriarch 412–44). As a matter of fact, the title of one ofCyril’s books is just That Christ is One (c.438). From the point of viewof Cyril and his followers, the Nestorian Christ looks like a dual being,both on the level of nature and hypostasis. The conflict culminated inthe Council of Ephesus (AD 431) when Theotokos became an impor-tant Christological term, used for Mary, to imply the unity of Christ.As we know, this did not end the controversy. The theology andChristology of St Maximus the Confessor, about two centuries later, ispartly developed to address the Christological problem as it evolvedbeyond Ephesus.

B. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ’S ONTOLOGICALANALYSIS OF ESSENCE AND ACTIVITY

By the time of St Maximus, the theological controversy had long sinceturned into a Christological controversy. With the sophistication ofChristian philosophical capacity and discussion in the fourth century,what else could be expected? The major figures of the Church nolonger disagreed terminologically on the burning issue of the conceptof God.However, one soon discovered that the conception of the wayof the Logos into the human condition was ripe with unclarifiedaspects. Chalcedon (AD 451) marks a dividing line in the history ofChristian thought, but did not, as we all know, solve the problems.Even if one could agree on the full divinity and humanity of theSaviour, and that the two natures were united in the one hypostasis of


the Logos, the controversy continued with the issue of the character ofthe union in the God-man. By the time of Maximus, the issues of theday concerned the energeia and will of Christ. The heresies ofthe seventh century are often called ‘monenergism’ and ‘monothe-letism’. Terminologically this indicates doctrines that confessed oneenergeia and one will in Christ. However, it is not as simple as that.24

According to Bathrellos, the monothelites were a group of ratheramateur theologians. They were probably primarily concerned withmatters of ecclesiastic policy. It seems, however, that there weregenuine monothelites who took for granted that two wills in Christ,a divine and a human, would necessarily be in conflict, somethingthat could not be accepted. On the other hand, it seems that their so-called monenergist position was not really monenergist after all. Oneusually accepted one theandric (i.e., divine–human) energeia, i.e., anenergeia of a dual kind, with the divine aspect of the energeia asprominent. One tended to subordinate the human energeia and makeit almost a passive instrument of Christ’s divinity. Whatever the exactcharacter of the divine–human energeia, St Maximus has passed intohistory as the theological architect of the orthodox position.In order to get a clearer view both of Maximus’ Christology and his

soteriology, I shall first discuss some important ontological structuresthat he developed. As we have seen, he has a vision of a theology ofthe Triune life of the one God where the motif of the economy ofcreation and salvation was conceived as an eternal project of love for apossible creaturely otherness. Beings were made for a purpose. Thepurpose is defined through the divine will expressed in the logoi ofindividuals, species, and genera of creatures. The logoi are not justdefinitions of creatures. At the appropriate time they became acts ofmaking and through them God established the final end towardswhich creatures should move. The end is glorification or deificationor union with God—to make use of all three supplementary terms forthe one and same eschatological condition. In order to understandMaximus’ redemptive scheme, we have to dive into an ontologicalanalysis of man, the creature that was made a microcosm for the sakeof the union between God and creatures (cf. Ambiguum 41).Maximus makes an important distinction between the logos and

the tropos of a thing. The logos defines the essence or nature, the

24 For a recent discussion of the controversy, cf. Bathrellos (2004), chapter 2.


tropos describes possible modes under which the nature might exist.25

According to Maximus, the logos of man defines a creature madeup of a body and an intellectual soul.26 The mode, on the other hand,‘is the scheme in which it naturally (çı�ØŒH�) acts (K��æª�E�) and isacted upon (K��æª�E�ŁÆØ), which can frequently change and undergoalteration without changing at all the nature along with it’.27

Obviously, this is about the concretization of nature, the particularways beings act or are acted upon on the foundation of their nature.An example of natural acting, according to Maximus, could be avirtuous deed. An example of being acted upon could be to beexposed to external influences, for instance, to divine love or tophysical conditions, to temptations and passions, but especially, aswe shall see, exposed to the transforming divine influence. An im-portant Maximian idea is that man could be subject to innovation(ŒÆØ�� Æ) in his modes, but not according to the logos of hisnature. This is relevant for the deification of man: ‘[ . . . ] the modethus innovated, while the natural logos is preserved, displays a mir-aculous power, insofar as the nature appears to be acted upon, and toact, clearly beyond its normal scope.’28 Three things should be notedhere, (i) the preservation of human nature throughout changes inthe modes, (ii) the working of divine energeia, i.e., activity, into thenatural conditions of the nature, something that modifies the con-creteness of nature into a divine mode, and (iii) the resultant modifiedhuman activity (‘beyond its normal scope’). On the basis of theessence (with its natural activity), the divine activity modifies, andthe human activity is modified.In daily (‘secular’) instances of acting, the activities, according

to Maximus, are natural, i.e., within the limits of what is given aspotentialities of nature. On the other hand, the ‘beyond nature’, isan important theological idea and plays a central role in Maximus’thought, as we shall soon see. To fill in the picture of the ontolog-ical structure of created being we turn to Maximus’ Chapters onknowledge.In the Chapters on knowledge (2,1) we find that the essence, power,

and activity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one andthe same. We have already seen this triad in St Gregory of Nyssa. Thepower comes from the nature (or essence), the activity springs from

25 Cf. Ambiguum 42, PG 91: 1341d. 26 Ibid.27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.


the power, Gregory says.29 Maximus accepts this quite general triad,and he uses it primarily as an ontological tool for the analysis ofcreated being. The first century of texts in the Chapters on knowledgeopens with an interesting ontological reflection in which this triad isquite central. Maximus says that God, by Himself, is neither thebeginning (or origin, Iæå�), middle, or end. This rather obscurestatement is explained when he connects it with a second triad: Godis infinitely beyond all essence, power, and activity (1,2). We havenow two triads that Maximus joins together: beginning–middle–end(Iæå�- ��Å�-��º��) and essence–power–activity (�P��Æ-��Æ Ø�-K��æª�ØÆ). Both triads are put forward in relation to God, but thebeing of God cannot be defined by such concepts: in short, they aremore adequate to the analysis of ‘what is aroundHim’, and are in thiscontext applied to the description of creaturely being.It will be much easier to follow Maximus’ line of thought if we put

the two triads together in a diagram:

Iæå�— ��Å�—��º��

�P��Æ—��Æ Ø�—K��æª�ØÆ

This is presented as the basic ontological structure of created being,especially of rational beings. Maximus says that a created being has initself a certain ‹æ��. This means, I suppose, that included in its defini-tion is a limited set of properties to the exclusion of other properties.For this reason it has a delimited capacity: there are certain things itcan do, certain activities it can execute in accordance with its capacityand there are certain acts that are beyond its capacity.A created essence, Maximus says (1,3), is the beginning (or origin,

Iæå�) of a movement (Œ��Å�Ø�) that is contemplated within it accord-ing to its power. It is not immediately easy to say where this ‘move-ment’ belongs in the picture. However, it seems that we shall grasp itin the following way: a being is something (i.e., a unity of essentialproperties), and has as such the power to do something. Its doings areconsidered to be all its movements, all its activities, that take place‘between’ what it is from the beginning, and what it shall be in the endwhen it has fulfilled its course and has achieved its energeia in acertain special, soteriological sense. In Maximus’ train of thought thebeginning (i.e., the essence) has an ontological priority because it is

29 De beatitudinibus Oratio 7, GNO 7.2, 150.


the basis of a power that is, he says, a ‘middle’ (in the ontologicalsense). The movement Maximus speaks of belongs in the ontologicalscheme to the power. It looks as if we shall think of something like ‘apower or potential to move naturally’. This power to move, for itspart, is the presupposition for the resultant energeia as the final telosof this power, and such energeiamay be natural or it may even, whenit comes to the soteriological scheme, be beyond nature.We should first note that in the Chapters on knowledge as well as in

other texts, ‘movement’ seems to be a general term for what Aristotledistinguishes as actions and motions. Secondly, movement is the‘middle’, not in the sense of being a separate something ‘between’essence and activity, but in the sense of being conceived after theessence and before the activity in an ontological analysis. The power(�� Æ�Ø�) of movement should not be taken exclusively in the Aris-totelian sense of potentiality, nor is it to be identified as a naturalfaculty. Rather, power seems to contain two aspects, firstly the po-tentiality for movements of the essence, secondly in the sense of theexecution of what the essence is capable of according to its logos. Boththese aspects seem to belong to the ontologically contemplated mid-dle of Maximus’ scheme. This leaves us with a possible interpretationof the term energeia in the Maximian triad above. The energeia turnsup as the final result beyond the actualization of power in move-ments. Here we may point back to Aristotle’s idea of energeia ascomplete activity including its end. In this sense a virtue is an activity,i.e., as a habit that is present in the soul in a complete way. This wouldbring us close to what I believe Maximus intended. Energeia here isthe fulfilment of essence, its perfection or actuality, not in the sense ofmaking it present, which it already is, but in the sense of expanding incomplete activity what the essence is capable of.Now we could ask, what is the connection between the middle

movement of power and the final actuality? Is the final actuality initiallypresent in the movement? If I correctly grasp Maximus’ meaning, thiswould imply that to do righteous acts (movement of power) initializesthe state of being righteous (actuality), and to do good generally (move-ment of power) initializes the state of being good (actuality). Further,what so far is spoken of by Maximus is a kind of natural fulfilment ofcreated, rational beings. In his Opusculum 14, Maximus says:30 ‘Power

30 Th.pol. 14, PG 91: 153a.


[or potentiality] is enmattered energeia; energeia is immaterial power[or potentiality]. Or again, energeia is the completion of naturalpower [or potentiality].’ I take this to suggest two senses of energeia:(a) the first sentence states what Aristotle would have called firstactuality = second potentiality. One aspect of this is power or potenti-ality understood as a realized (or ‘materialized’) actuality at rest (one isperhaps sleeping). The other aspect is that this enmattered energeia is initself the presence of immaterial capacity about to be activated. I thinkthis describes well the ‘middle’ of the scheme presented above. (b) Thesecond sentence states what Aristotle would have called second actu-ality, i.e., the final activity or actuality achieved, which here belongs tothe end or purpose of human existence. I think this confirms theinterpretation of movement given above, and shows explicitly thatone aspect of fulfilment is the completion (I��º�� Æ) of naturalpower. However, even when there is talk of the completion of naturalpowers, there remains the possibility that something from beyondcreated nature could enter the scene at this point. The conceptualscheme is developed in order to also describe what happens whenwhat transcends nature makes itself active in the creature. But this is atopic that should be developed below. It is quite obvious that accordingtoMaximus’ ontological anthropology human beings generally, accord-ing to their nature, have their own distinct power (potentiality) andcapacity for kinds of activities. There is not only a human essence; thereis also the human power to act. Without this power, the essence ofhumanity would be curtailed.

C . ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON THEINCARNATION

According to Maximus, the mystery of Christ is the mystery of divinelove. God’s will to incarnateHimself in the person of the Son issues inthe concrete manifestation of this mystery. In Maximus’ scheme, thedivine economy, however, is a rather complex matter. It includesthree steps, all three of them said to be embodiments or incarna-tions:31 (i) God’s creation of the world in accordance with the logoi

31 Cf. Ambiguum 33, PG 91: 1285c–1288a.


conceived eternally in Him, (ii) God’s revelation of Himself in theHoly Scriptures, and (iii) the Logos’ becoming man as Jesus Christ. Aspointed out already, the historical Incarnation is God’s eternal pur-pose, not conditioned by human sin, but motivated by the divine willto communion. Because of sin, however, the Incarnation gained acertain character, i.e., it was executed in such a way that it became theremedy for sin, corruption, and death. Below I focus on those aspectsof Maximus’ Christology that relate to the present topic of divineenergeia in connection with the soteriological motif.

The Ambiguum 41 contains Maximus’ ‘system’ in a nutshell. Hethinks that man was created as a microcosm with a definite taskwithin God’s plan. Man should act in accordance with his logos insuch a way that the whole cosmic building would end up in acommunion of peace and love across the whole spectrum of createdessential differences, to culminate in God’s self-communicationwhich effects the glorification of created otherness. Man abused hisnatural potential, however, and moved in discord with his divinepattern. The result of sin was cosmic disintegration, corruption, anddeath. The Incarnation of the Logos was accomplished for the salva-tion of man, and for the renewal of the cosmic building. Through theincarnate Logos the regenerative powers and activities of God becameavailable for the reversion of the consequences of the fall, and throughHim all things should be united in accordance with God’s intention.32

God became a human being. What does this mean for Maximus,and why does he think it necessary to have a correct conception of theIncarnation? The basic point is that the Incarnation is the unificationof two ontologically absolutely distinct realms, the uncreated with thecreated. Further, according to Maximus’ ontology, each existing beinghas a certain ontological integrity, and this integrity is constitutive onthe level of the particular, the species, and the genus.33 In Opusculum14, Maximus defines the so-called essential difference as ‘a logos bywhich the essence, that is to say nature, remains both undiminishedand unchanged, unmixed and unconfused’.34 This definition fits welltogether with the four famous adverbs of the Chalcedonian formula(AD 451), confessing Christ as ‘one and the same’, out of two natures,with no confusion, no change, no division, and no separation

32 Cf. Ambiguum 41, PG 91: 1308c–d.33 Cf. Tollefsen (2008), 100, 205–6.34 Th. pol. 14, PG 91: 149d.


(I�ıªå��ø�, I�æ��ø�, I�ØÆØæ��ø�, Iåøæ��ø�). Maximus under-stands this one hypostasis as the eternal hypostasis of the Logos.Central to this view is the teaching that all ontological dimensionswithin the being of the God-man are related in a unified way to theone hypostasis. The problem with monothelitism and so-calledmonenergism is, if we look beyond all the political intricacies ofthe conflict, that certain ontological and concretely ontical featuresof the created human being would be suppressed. Why did Maximussee this as problematic and heretical?The Incarnation is the condition of salvation as deification. Max-

imus, as a conscious metaphysician, sees clearly that the preservationof nature in its integrity means that natures cannot be melted togetherin such a way so that what results is some new or third thing, beingneither one thing nor the other.35 If God became man, both must bepreserved, both divinity and humanity. The two natures must equallyexist without violation of natural or essential properties. The furtherchallenge comes, however, in connection with the dynamism ofnatures, i.e., when natures are considered in their activities, andespecially when the divine activity is held to effect the deification ofthe created nature. If man is to be deified by divine activity, and manhere is first the humanity of Christ, secondly our humanity as in-dividual human beings, how are we to conceive of the deified condi-tion of humanity? The topic we move into below has two aspects:(i) the divine and the human activities within the God-man as thecondition of human deification, and (ii) the actual condition ofdeification as an act of participation. I am not going to separatethese two aspects in any strict sense in the discussion.According to Maximus, when Adam fell, two things occurred in his

humanity: because of his deliberate choice (�æ�Æ�æ��Ø�) human nat-ure (a) suffered transformation from incorruption to corruption; and(b) he lost the grace of impassibility (I��Ł�ØÆ).36 The first is anontological consequence, and the second is a moral consequence ofthe fall. Both are seen by Maximus as ± Ææ��Æ. This obviously means‘sin’ in the literal sense of forfeiting the purpose, missing the mark.The one missing the mark (the moral) is culpable, sinful; the other(the ontological loss) is innocent: man did not want to put off hisincorruption.37 As a consequence of this, the humanity assumed by

35 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1056d–1057b.36 Ad Thal. 42, CCSG 7, 285. 37 Ibid.


the Logos was ontologically marked by both these weaknesses, i.e., itwas liable to passion and exposed to corruption. This means thatChrist’s humanity was in such a condition that it was exposed to thepsychical and physical influences of human existence.However, beingGod, He reversed the processes that made human nature exposed tosuch influences, and this reversal has to do with the way He wasdivinely active in relation to His humanity. There is one point in thisconnection that should be stressed, namely that Maximus did notthink Christ was born with any culpability. The Pauline ‘He madeHim who knew no sin to be sin for us’ (2 Cor 5:21) does not meanthat Christ had any sinful human passions, which He graduallyovercame. Rather, when Christ assumed human nature, its naturalwill was immediately deified.38 Such a doctrine would be suspect for amonothelite. One of the things they were eager to escape was thenotion of a natural human will in the God-man, since this, theythought, would imply that Christ was susceptible to a conflict ofwills. However, Maximus claims, what seems reasonable, that a nat-ural will belongs to human nature, and that Christ necessarily hadsuch a will if He assumed human nature in the complete sense.Maximus even dares to claim that the assumed humanity is markedwith the weaknesses of the fall. One should admit a certain degree ofexposure of Christ qua human to the weaknesses of fallen humanity,but, of course, without any culpability at any stage of the process offormation in Mary’s womb or at any stage inHis life as an infant or asan adult. This can be explained one-sidedly: as God Christ reversedthe (negative) processes sinceHe was divinely active in relation toHishumanity. If this is allMaximus has to say about the matter, one getsthe impression that despite his dyothelite position, he is not able to letthe humanity of Christ play any decisive role in the act of salvation.However, as Bathrellos has shown, ‘it is not necessarily problematic tosay that the Logos moves his humanity, in so far as the reality and theauthenticity of the will and the energy of his humanity are notundermined’.39 The question is how the human nature of Christworks or executes activities within the hypostatic union. We shallscrutinize this below.

38 Cf. Ad Thal. 42, CCSG 7, 285–7. Cf. St Maximus the Confessor, On the CosmicMystery of Jesus Christ (2003), 120, note 1, with an important comment on thedevelopment of Maximus’ conception of will.

39 Bathrellos (2004), 93.


Christ gradually caused an ontological change in human naturefrom corruptibility to incorruptibility.40 By His divine power Heactively cut off the temptation, and by the resurrection He trans-formed His human nature into impassibility, incorruptibility, andimmortality.41 What we should like to get a clearer view of is how,according to Maximus, the natural activity or activities in the God-man work. By this Imean both sets of activities; the human as well asthe divine.Maximus says in Ambiguum 5 that God became truly man in the

whole ofHis essence.42 A demonstration of this, he says further, is theconstitutive power according to the nature of the essence (� ŒÆ�a

ç��Ø� ÆP�B� �ı��Æ�ØŒc ��Æ Ø�). This constitutive power couldbe called a natural activity (K��æª�ØÆ) that is a primary characteristicof the power. This activity is further qualified as a form-makingmovement containing all natural properties. These sayings are ratherdense. What do they mean? The ontology Maximus sketches broadlycorresponds with the ontological structures discussed in section Babove. Maximus has in mind the triad essence–power–activity, atriad that is, obviously, a conceptual tool for analysis. The term ‘con-stitutive’ (�ı��Æ�ØŒ�) turns up several times throughout theAmbiguum 5. We read of the constitutive activity and the constitutivemovement.43 We should ask what these are, and how they fit intothe triad essence–power–activity.When one says in connection with an ontological problem that

something is constitutive for a being, like in this case for the humanityof Christ, one makes the impression that one says something essentialabout the entity in question. We should therefore ask if Maximus saysthat power and activity and movement are constitutive for man, i.e.,for the human essence, in the sense that these define what it is to behuman? Before I attempt to answer, I should like to mention anotherstatement from Ambiguum 5: Maximus says that the definition ofevery nature (i.e., essence) is given with the logos of its essentialactivity, which seems to suggest a positive answer to my question.44

What is an essence or a nature? It is generally held to be ‘that without

40 Ad Thal 42, CCSG 7, 285–9.41 Ad Thal 42, CCSG 7, 297.42 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048a.43 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1049d–1052a, 1052a–b.44 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1057b.


which an entity is not conceived to be the same thing’. This could betaken to suggest that within a being there is stored up a set of primaryproperties that are this being, and it has to have these properties if it isgoing to answer to the definition of what it is. This could very well bethe case, but according to the Cappadocian Fathers, and according toMaximus as well, an essence, as the basic ontological layer in anentity, is not something we may know immediately or adequately.In Ambiguum 5 Maximus says that without properties associatedwith activity, there is only non-being, only that which is not is withoutmovement.45 Negative statements of this sort are easily passed un-noticed, but Maximus repeats the point later on: there is no naturewithout movement.46 Maximus’ idea is obviously that what we ob-serve of some entity is activities and movements. Activities andmovements indicate strongly a power of execution of such activitiesand movements, and the presence of a power indicates an essencefrom which it springs. Activities and movements are what we observe,the power is intuitively grasped, and the essence is our concept ofwhat the entity at hand is according to definition. Here we have thetriad essence–power–activity, which, as I said above, is presupposedin what Maximus says in the fifth Ambiguum.Human activities may be of various kinds: walking, building,

teaching, doing mathematics, sensing, desiring, willing, thinking,etc. Some are directly observable, others are not. When we define ahuman being, we define it, as Maximus indicates, by referring to itsessential activity, i.e., that activity or those activities that it has to havein order to be recognized as belonging to the human species. As wehave seen above, this species is an expression of a divine logos.According to the theology of the Incarnation, Christ is the Logos of

God who assumed human nature. The person or hypostasis of theGod-man is the hypostasis of the Logos. There is no human hypos-tasis in the being of Christ. The so-called hypostatic union is theunion between the human and divine nature in the hypostasis of theLogos.47 These are the points to be reckoned with in an orthodoxontology of the Incarnation.All of this emerges in a rather sophisticated way in Maximus’

scheme. There are two ontological levels to take into account—thelevel of essence and the level of hypostasis. Union and distinction are

45 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048a–b. 46 Ambiguum 5, PG 1048b.47 Cf. Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048d, 1052a–b.


observed on both levels. Maximus says there is a difference (�ØÆç�æ�)between natural activities beheld ‘without division’ (I�ØÆØæ��ø�) inthe natural logos of what has been united (the level of essence), andthere is a union (��ø�Ø�) of natural activities beheld ‘without confu-sion’ (I�ıªå��ø�) ‘in the monadic mode of what has come to pass’(the level of hypostasis).48He further says that one should confess thetwo natures of which Christ, the Logos, is the hypostasis, and two setsof natural activities of which He is the union with respect to bothnatures, since ‘He acts by Himself’ ( Æı�fiH [ . . . ] K��æªH�).49 The actscommitted are qualified as executed jointly, monadically, and uni-formly (�æ��çıH�, ��Æ�ØŒH�, ��Ø�H�). The activities of the fleshtogether with His own divine power are displayed ‘without separa-tion’ (Iåøæ��ø�).These statements are rather dense, and I’ll try to interpret them. On

the level of essence there is a difference between the natural activitiesof the two natures of Christ. However, in the God-man, this differ-ence cannot amount to a division. The two sets of activities areontologically different, but cannot be divided in Him. Somehowthey act in a harmonious parallelism, since they co-exist or co-inhabitone and the same entity. When Maximus says in this context that adifference between activities is beheld without division in the naturallogos of what has been united, I think that he is speaking, not of thelogos of a nature, but of the special logos or ‘principle’ of the union ofnatures in Christ. On the other hand, quite generally, a logos of beingdefines the essence of a thing. And quite obviously, there is a mostradical difference between the logoi of the two natures of Christ.Maximus states this in the most emphatic language when he speaksof affirmation and negation. What is ontologically affirmed in rela-tion to us is ontologically negated when it comes to God: natures thatare as different as the divine and the human cannot be subsumedunder a common set of ontological categories. We are allowed to statethat man is a being, so and so qualified, so and so quantified etc.,because of a set of categories. On the other hand, we have to negatesuch statements in relation to divine nature. Since Christ comprisestwo such natures, the affirmation of certain properties and the nega-tion of these same properties meet somehow in the God-man,and every mode of activity carries with it the human affirmation

48 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1052b. 49 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1052c.


(i.e., a certain set of categories and concepts may be applied) and themode beyond nature (i.e., when what is affirmed about created beingis denied about divine being).50 If we move on to the level of hypos-tasis, the natural differences between the activities of the essences,considered without division, enters a unified mode of concrete ex-istence that is not the confused state of two things melted togetherinto a third strange thing. The two spheres of uncreated divinity andcreated humanity are kept in the closest possible union, but withoutbeing mingled together into some creature of fantasy.Is it possible to get a clearer view of themode of hypostatic existence

and of how the two sets of activities operate within its union? Howshould this be described ontologically?As stated above, the hypostasisof the Logos is the unity of the two sets of natural activity. He acts byHimself, i.e.,He is the one agent of the two sets of activity.He does notact in one moment as man, in another as God. All His acts have themost uniform character, but even so there is a certain integratedparallelism of activity. Since, however, the two aspects of the inte-grated activity differ so radically, we shall dwell a bit more on how theyare related in the acts of Christ, but this double scheme of activity isalso something I would like to discuss in Chapter 8.First we should note that, according to Maximus, the Logos does

not change anything that naturally belongs to the essence of man inthe assumption of human nature.51 On the other hand, on the hypo-static level the assumed nature is not ‘self-moving’ (ÆP��Œ��Å��), it israther moved by the Godhead, but not in the sense that the humannature lacks the constitutive power, movement, or activity belongingto its essence.52 If this is to be consistent, we must assume that theagent of the hypostatic union (the hypostasis of the Logos) is the onewho defines the direction of the movements based on the doublenature. The essence keeps its basic properties according to the logos ofnature, but in the tropos (i.e. modification of natural properties inconcreto) the acting self is—as we saw above—the hypostasis. What ismost interesting when it comes to the play of activities in the God-man concerns the hypostatic level.As we have learned, Maximus claims that the Logos does not

change anything human in the Incarnation. He does not diminish

50 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1053c–d.51 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048c, 1049c, 1049d–1052a.52 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1052a–b.


human nature. On the other hand, the Logos does not become subjectto nature either,He rather raises nature up toHimself.53 The questionnow is what it means ‘to raise nature up to Himself’, as balancedagainst the claim that human nature is not changed or diminished.Once again: Maximus claims that the point is not that human natureis diminished and divine nature is enhanced within the hypostaticunion, but that Christ acts humanely beyond the human (��bæ¼�Łæø�� K��æª�Ø �a I�Łæ��ı).54 The example adduced by Maximusis Christ walking on the water. What is shown in His walking onwater is that the natural activity of his flesh is inseparable from thepower of divinity, and He walks supported by His trans-naturalpower (��æçı�E ��Æ Ø�).55 The point is that it is the Logos who isthe subject of the human activity, and He executes what is in ournatural capability to do, namely walking, but He does it in the uni-form and conjoined divine-human mode of the act, i.e., He walks onwater. Walking is a natural human activity, and this activity is con-joined with the power beyond nature that makes possible the extra-ordinary walking on water.56

Maximus’ idea is that two activities occur together or jointly. Thehuman activity is by nature limited by time and space, and is deter-mined by all the laws governing the present cosmos. The divineactivity, however, transcends such limits, and performs whatever itperforms beyond all created limitations. We may say that human actsare performed in a divine mode. The whole picture suggests that whatthe Logos does in His humanity is to develop its total potential untilperfection. All human powers, all that is included in the essentialproperties of man reaches the fulfilment eternally defined by God inhis logos for human nature.Before we come to the concluding paragraphs of the present sec-

tion, I feel there is still a question that lurks in the background: isMaximus able to let the humanity of Christ play any decisive role inthe Economy? Is Bathrellos correct when he says it is not necessarilyproblematic to state that the LogosmovesHis humanity given that thereality and authenticity of the will and energy of His humanity is notundermined?57 Is the reality and authenticity of Christ’s humanitypreserved in its integrity? It is tempting to say that the humanity of

53 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048c–1049a. 54 Ambiguum 5, 1049b.55 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1049c. 56 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1049c.57 Bathrellos (2004), 93.


Christ does not play any decisive role, since it is directed by andtransformed in its relation to the Logos. On the other hand, here weshould apply an important piece of Maximian anthropology. It is inprinciple possible to maintain that Christ assumed a human natureliable to passion, but that He never gave in to any sinful passion.Why? Was it because His humanity immediately was ruled anddirected by His divinity? According to Maximus, that is not a preciseanswer or at least not the whole answer. The answer is thatHis divineperson directed a natural humanity with a natural human will. Thisnatural will being already designed eternally by God in the logos forhuman nature, a nature conceived as naturally directed towards thegood. For this reason, the hypostasis of the Logos had no need tocompel a disobedient impulse or tendency of will, He rather found inHimself a created nature naturally activated in the harmonious re-sponse to the divine initiative. I suppose if one looks at human naturethis way, one might say that the Logos preservedHis human nature inits integrity. In Him man became what man originally was designedto be. There is, however, a further question: the Logos assumedhuman nature, not a human hypostasis. Is the nature He assumedsufficiently ‘human’ to have the required sameness or identity withour being as humans? Would He not need a human hypostasis inorder to be human the way we are human? I suppose we could saythat it is not necessary to have a human hypostasis in order to be fullyhuman, if the hypostasis does not add anything extra that should beincluded in the definition of man. As a matter of fact, from the pointof view of ancient thought, it does not. Individuation does not add tothe nature of the thing, nor does hypostatization. I think even Aris-totle would have conceded that. Further, it is obvious that Christ doesnot exist as human in a ‘universal way’, i.e., as if what He carried wascertain general idioms of humanity abstract from concrete existence.Rather, His humanity was given concrete and individualized exis-tence in the hypostasis of the Logos, and from Maximus’ point ofview, this was as concrete a presence in the world as any human beingcould have. There is nothing seemingly (docetic) with the humanityof Christ. Despite what is said above, one last thing should be saidconcerning the difference and unity of essences and activities inChrist. It is easy to understand that created and uncreated beingshould be kept apart. However, Maximus’ emphasis on the unity,‘without division’ and ‘without confusion’, is hard to penetrate. Weshall return to this below, especially in the last chapter. I would like to


make a preliminary remark here as well: is there any real union whenmixture is restricted this way? I suppose the most available solution isto say that created properties may be brought to exist in a divinemode. If this is to be a solution, if we are going to recognize this as asolution, we must be able to conceive this humanity-in-the-mode-of-divine-existence as something sufficiently integrated within the beingof the Logos made flesh. We shall now turn to the deification ofChrist’s humanity.Maximus again and again uses the terminology that something

‘new’ happens in Christ. What is this newness? It has to do with howactivities penetrate the natural being of an entity in such a way that anature could be said to participate in some property that does notbelong to it naturally or originally. In a way some change occurs inman, how is this to be understood?Maximus says that the Incarnation is accomplished in order to

confirm human nature in new modes of being, without change in thenatural logos.58 It is a matter of circumscribing our nature by newmodes of being that are not ours, but rather transcends our nature.59

In this connection Maximus speaks of a new theandric activity, withthe well-known term from Dionysius.60 This newness is connectedwith a most challenging conception of an exchange between the twonatures of Christ. The mode (tropos) of this exchange consists in thatwhatever belongs by nature to each part of Christ becomes inter-changeable with each other.61 In Ambiguum 7, Maximus speaks of theblessed inversion that man is made God by deification and God ismade man by humanization.62 In short, the human nature of Christreceives the influence of divine activity into its creaturely sphere, andthe divine nature of Christ receives the influence of human activitiesinto the uncreated sphere. This means that the person of Christexecutes His activities in the conjoined and uniform way we havetried to grasp above. In this way we may say that the humanity ofChrist participates in divine activity and therefore in the propertiesthat characterize that activity as well, while his Godhead participatesin human activity and the properties that belong to it.

58 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1053b–c. 59 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1056a.60 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1056b. Cf. some important remarks in Bathrellos (2004),

63, cf. his note 6.61 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1057d.62 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1084c–d.


The psychic powers of Christ’s humanity are deified in the assump-tion of humanity from the start.63 The deification of His physicalpowers, however, is gradual. It is seen in His mighty works andgenerally in His performing human acts beyond natural humancapacity. However, it is after the Resurrection that this (physical)part of human nature was transformed fully from corruption toincorruption.64 Human nature in Him, therefore, eventually becomesfully circumscribed by new modes of being that are not ours.65 Weshall dwell further on the character of this transformation in thesection below on Maximus’ soteriology. On the other hand, whatcould be meant with the humanization of God? This seems to be evenmore of a mystery. One of the things the Godhead ‘suffers’ in theexchange of the assumption is the human birth.66 And in general, thehumanization of God is the ‘inverse’ of the deification of man, in thefollowing sense: on the one hand, the perfect and limitless propertiesof God are received into Christ’s humanity, and, on the other, ourhuman activities of thinking, willing, sensing, imagining, walking,talking, eating, sleeping, crying, suffering, etc. are received into thedivinity of Christ.67 Every mighty act and every lowly human act havethe other dimension added to it. The strangest thing about themystery is that it is God the Logos who is the subject of such proper-ties. He integrates them into His own hypostasis. God the Logos,consequently, became man in the whole of His being.68

63 Cf. Ad Thal 21, CCSG 7: 127–133. 64 Ad Thal 42, CCSG 7: 287.65 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1056a. 66 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1052c–1053a.67 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1049c–d. 68 Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048a.


6

The Road to Salvation

A. ST GREGORY OF NYSSA ON DEIFICATION

According to St Gregory, the deification of Christ’s human nature iscompleted with the Resurrection and Assumption. The redemptivework of Christ and the deification of his own humanity are theconditions for the salvation or deification of human beings in general.In fact, when Gregory speaks of Christ’s humanity, he speaks of thehuman nature that is common to all. What happened to Christ’shumanity, therefore, concerns all human beings:1 ‘That which hap-pened to the man according to Christ, is a grace common to thenature of men.’ But what does this mean? In book 3.1 of the ContraEunomium, Gregory says that the first way to God was destroyed byman’s disobedience, and therefore Christ came as the new way.2 Hishumanity was created as this new way, and the humanity of Christbecame ‘the garment of salvation’ (�e �ø��æØ�� ı Æ). Gregorymakes two citations from St Paul (Rom 13:14, Eph 4:24): ‘But putye on the Lord Jesus Christ’ and ‘put on the new man, which afterGod is created’. Gregory comments that in a strange and special waycreation in Christ’s case alone was instituted anew.3 Man becamewhat he was meant to be according to God’s purpose. So to say thatthe grace is common to the nature of men must mean that all humanbeings may put on this ‘garment of salvation’ and receive its effects.How does this come about?I think we can point to two things that, according to Gregory, make

this effective in human existence, namely the mysteries (i.e., the

1 CE, GNO 2, 294.2 CE, GNO 2, 21–2.3 CE, GNO 2, 22. Cf. St. Gregory the Theologian, Oratio 39.13, PG 36: 348d.

sacraments) and the spiritual life. The life in Christ has the mysteriesas its foundation. Now, in the mysteries, certain material elements areused, such as water in Baptism and bread in the Eucharist. Themystical effects wrought by these means presuppose a twofold activ-ity, one human and one divine. In Baptism, the candidate is immersedthree times in the water in imitation of Christ’s burial, and words arespoken by the priest, according to the Gospel (Matt 28:19): ‘Baptizingthem in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.’ Thisexecution of the rite is accompanied by the activity of the Spirit, whoblesses the body that is baptized and the water that baptizes.4 ‘For thatwhich is active [�e K��æª�F�] is great, and what results from it iswonderful.’ The mystery effects purification from sin, and is the causeof renewal and regeneration (I�ÆŒÆØ�Ø� �F ŒÆd I�Æª��ø� ÆN��Æ).5

The Holy Spirit is one with the Father and the Son in essence, power,and activity.6 It is not only the essence of God that is beyondapprehension, his power and activity are, to some degree, incompre-hensible as well:7 ‘And to speak concisely, everywhere the power andactivity of God are incomprehensible and without artifice, easilyproducing whatever He wills, while concealing from us the minuteknowledge of His activity.’ I do not think this runs counter to thegeneral Cappadocian principle that activities are known, and are thatby which we know God. But, on the other hand, the activities arebased on the incomprehensible divine Power that is based on anincomprehensible divine nature. It seems quite reasonable that acreated intellect is not able to know the activity of God in great detailor in depth. Exactly how the Holy Spirit works in the mysteries andaccomplishes the purification, renewal, and regeneration, is beyondwhat we can understand. We only know that this is the divine‘method’ of working these things.It is the Holy Spirit who makes the results of the Incarnation

effective in human life through the Church. According to the Oratiocatechetica (chapter 40), humanity itself, its intellectual faculties andits other peculiar characteristics, do not admit of any change( ��Æ��º�) in Baptism. It is man’s will that is cleansed from evil, if

4 In diem luminum sive in baptismum Christi, GNO 9.1, 229 and 225.5 In diem luminum, GNO 9.1, 224.6 Cf. Ad Eustathium, GNO 3.1, 10–12,De oratione Dominica, Oratio 3, GNO 7.2, 41.7 In diem luminum, GNO 9.1, 227.

160 The Road to Salvation

that will turns towards God. The renewal requires human coopera-tion, and man may now journey along the path of the spiritual life.

Man is put in the position that the original character of the divineimage may function the way God intended, and as a consequence ofthis the likeness with God is gradually established. To put it in animage dear to Gregory: the soul once more becomes a mirror of divineperfections.8 However, man is not immediately perfected or deified;rather, a new life is made possible after baptism, a life in which manhas received the task of adjusting himself to live in accordance withdivine realities. The point is that man should be open to divine powerand influence.The central idea of participation could be defined thus: it is a

movement of the divine towards the human, and of the humantowards the divine. The condition of being, or of being anythingspecific, is given in the divine movement that the creature admitsinto itself. Somehow, this runs parallel with what happened inChrist’s humanity according to the principle of the communicatioidiomatum. There is, though, one difference. This difference has to dowith the fact that while Christ assumed a human nature, man doesnot receive the divine nature into his own hypostasis. Christ has adouble consubstantiality, i.e., He is consubstantial with the Fatherand with us, but we neither are nor become identical ( c �ÆP��) withthe divine, we become like (‹ �Ø��) it.9 We shall return to this below.Despite this, there is a twofold movement.However, since the creatednature in itself has no capacity to effect its own salvation and deifica-tion, the initiative was God’s.10 This initiative was manifested in theoriginal condition when man had the divine likeness before the fall,and it is renewed and strengthened with baptismal grace. All dependsupon how man traces his steps further. If he moves in accordancewith his nature and the grace he has received, then he presentshimself in openness to God. On the other hand, God is, in thesimplicity of His nature, completely present to the creature throughthe activity ofHis Power. The creaturely openness admits this activityinto itself and man adjusts his existence more and more in accor-dance with the riches of the infinite presence of God’s activity.

8 De virginitate, GNO 8.1, 296. cf. De hominis opificio ch. 2–5, PG 44: 132d–137c,De anima et resurrectione PG 46: 41b–44a.

9 Cf. De anima et resurrectione ibid.10 De virginitate, GNO 8.1, 300.

The Road to Salvation 161

To exist this way, to an eternally increasing degree according to thedivine mode of being, is the fact of participation.Human nature was originally invested with the virtues.11 The path

to deification consists in the reintroduction of these virtues. Whatexactly is a virtue according to Gregory? In his sixth Homily on theBeatitudes, he comments on ‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for theyshall see God’. He points to certain texts in the Scriptures that state itis impossible to see God.12 However, ‘to see’ (N��E�) in the Scripturesmay mean the same as ‘to have’ (�å�E�): ‘[ . . . ] the Lord does not saythat knowing something about God is blessed, but to possess God inoneself. [ . . . ] so that we might learn that the person who has purgedhis own heart of every tendency to passion perceives in his ownbeauty the reflection of the divine nature.’13 The pure of heart areblessed because they have God in their hearts. We could think, then,that virtue is such a ‘having’ or ‘habit’ (��Ø�), which is held as a divinegift of the pure heart. On the other hand, we should be careful not tounderstand this ‘habit’ as a kind of static presence of a created gift.Gregory seems to think of virtue as a work (�æª��) or an activity(K��æª�ØÆ), which is dependent on God as a working or activePower.14 We shall take a closer look at this.

In his De professione christiana, when speaking about imitation,Gregory states that the Gospel does not order nature to be combinedwith (�ıªŒæ��ŁÆØ) nature, i.e., the human with the divine, but ratherit orders that God’s good activities (�a� IªÆŁa� K��æª��Æ�) should beimitated ( Ø �E�ŁÆØ) by man.15 But which activities of ours could belikened to the divine activities? Gregory answers that it is those thatare free from all evil, which as far as possible are purified fromdefilement. Obviously, he is thinking of the virtues. The virtues,then, are primarily mimetic activities. The same doctrine is foundin De beatitudinibus.16 He asks who the peacemakers are, and

11 De hominis opificio ch. 4, PG 44: 136b–d.12 De beatitudinibis, GNO 7.2, 136–8.13 De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, 138 and 142. Translated by Hall in Drobner and

Viciano (2000).14 If my interpretation of Balás (1966) above (cf. 94-6) is correct, he denies the

participation in uncreated activity in the created order. I argue that virtues are theresult of cooperation between the presence of divine activity and human activity inman.

15 De professione christiana, GNO 8.1, 138.16 De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, p. 159–160.


answers: ‘The imitators of the divine love of men, who show forth intheir own life what is proper to the divine activity (�e Y�Ø�� B� ��F Ł��F

K��æª��Æ�).’ God ordains, Gregory continues, this activity for man aswell, to expel hatred, to resolve conflict, to get rid of envy, to banishfighting, to destroy hypocrisy, to quench the grudge which smouldersin the heart. These should be replaced with their opposites, which arethe fruits of the Spirit: love, joy, peace, goodness, patience, and all thegood things enumerated by St Paul (Gal 5:22–23). Consequently, tohave God in the heart means to execute the mimetic activity ofvirtuous behaviour, which is a gift communicated by the Holy Spirit.God is glorified in man by virtue, and, according to De orationeDominica, the divine Power (��Æ Ø�) is the cause (� ÆN��Æ) of thegood things in man.17 It is the proper power and activity (��Æ Ø� andK��æª�ØÆ) of the Spirit to purify from sin.18 Purification is the work (�e�æª��) of both the Son and the Spirit, Gregory says, and he seems toindicate that the good effects of the redemptive work of Christ areadministered by the Holy Spirit, as we have seen above as well.19

However, what, exactly, is the ontological structure of imitation( � Å�Ø�)? Gregory’s works abound in the terminology of imitation.When he speaks of likeness and archetype, the likeness is an imitationor reflection of this archetype. In De institutio christianaGregory saysthat if anyone desires close connection with another, it is necessary totake on his mode through imitation. Therefore, if one longs to be thebride of Christ, one must be like Christ in beauty through virtueaccording to one’s ability.20 I think this is just another way to expressthe central idea of participation. To imitate God is to participate inGod. In principle, the logic is the same. This is also confirmed whenGregory in De beatitudinibus considers the virtues as a kind of‘incarnation’ of Christ in the believer.21 When he says that this is a‘bolder account’, I suppose it is because of the incarnational motif:virtue is the Lord offering Himself to the desire of His hearers.Gregory refers to several texts from the Scriptures, for instance StPaul’s saying that Christ became for us wisdom from God, justice,sanctification, and redemption (1 Cor 1:30); and St John’s saying that

17 De oratione Dominica, GNO 7.2, 37.18 De or. Dom., GNO 7.2, p. 40–1, De instituto christiana, GNO 8.1, 44.19 Cf. De instituto christiana, GNO 8.1, 85 as well.20 De instituto christiana, GNO 8.1, 50.21 De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, 122.


Christ is bread coming down from heaven and living water (Jn 6:50and 4:10). Gregory refers to the Psalm (Ps 41:3) saying that ‘My soulthirsted for God the mighty, the living one; when shall I come and beseen by the face of God?’ The point is that the one who has tasted theLord has received God into himself (K� Æı�fiH), and he is filled withthe one for whom he has thirsted. This is in accordance with thepromise of Christ (cf. John 14:23): ‘I and my Father will come and willmake our abode with him.’ The Holy Spirit, Gregory remarks, has, ofcourse, made His home there first, a saying that once again makesexplicit that the redemptive economy is mediated by God the HolySpirit. The whole sequence culminates in St Paul’s words that ‘Christliveth in me’ (Gal 2:20).In De institutio christiana we find that participation in the Spirit is

interpreted by aid of a phrase of St Paul’s (Eph 1:19): ‘The activity ofHis Power’. St Paul, Gregory says, points to the participation in theSpirit and the activity (K��æª�ØÆ) of the Spirit with respect to those incommunion with Him, who works a certain mode (�æ��) of beingin the believer.22 The indwelling of the Holy Spirit makes a newcreature.23 The activity and the grace of the Spirit are the acknowl-edged basis for virtuous acts. The grace of the Holy Spirit possessesthe entire soul and fills it with gladness and power.24 God furnishesthe ability to do good, but Gregory emphasizes the importance ofcooperation as well when he says that (good) human activities are theflowers of labours and the fruits of the Spirit.25

All this makes it clear that virtue, as mimetic activity, should not beunderstood as an imitation of an external model, but as an adjust-ment to the presence of a divine activity of grace and goodness in thebeliever.This conclusion may be bolstered by something Gregory says in De

perfectione as well.26 Christ is the Sun of Justice, and His rays streamforth for our illumination. These rays are the virtues, and by doing allthings in the light, we become light (çH� ª��ŁÆØ), so that it shinesbefore others (cf. Matt 5:15–16). The light, that is, metaphoricallyshines through our actions. Christ is our sanctification (once more cf.

22 De instituto christiana, GNO 8.1, 58–9.23 De instituto christiana, GNO 8.1, 61.24 De instituto christiana, GNO 8.1, 86.25 De instituto christiana, GNO 8.1, 84.26 De perfectione, GNO 8.1, 184–5.


1. Cor 1:30) and we prove ourselves to be true sharers of His namewhen we identify with the Power ofHis sanctification in work (�æª��)and not in word. Human activity should be harmonized with thedivine activity, and should be conducted in the mode of light or themode of God’s Power.It is further interesting to see that virtue, in the same text from the

Beatitudinibus, which I commented on above, is connected withhappiness:27 ‘For such is the nature of this good not only to besweet to the one enjoying it at the present, but in every period oftime to give actual joy’. Virtue, Gregory states, is both work andreward (�æª�� [ . . . ] ª�æÆ�). When a just act (�æª��) and the graceof the Spirit coincide, the soul is filled with a blessed life (ÇøB�

ÆŒÆæ�Æ�).28 Somehow, this echoes the Aristotelian idea that thevirtuous action is the possession of �P�ÆØ ��Æ:29 ‘The human goodturns out to be the activity (K��æª�ØÆ) of the soul according to virtue’.Now, the (virtuous) action, according to Aristotle, has a certaincompleteness or perfection. This quality of completeness, conse-quently, belongs to happiness as well.30 Gregory thinks that in thevirtuous action man spiritually possesses the presence of Christ, andChrist is always complete or perfect. On the other hand, this condi-tion of possession, as said above, is not static, because man is acreature who gradually is transformed into a divine mode ofbeing:31 ‘To achieve likeness with God is the end of the life accordingto virtue’. ‘Christianity is the imitation of the divine nature.’ God hasno limit, and the divine nature is an infinite source of goodness. Eventhough the virtuous action obviously includes a certain perfect joy,this can only be a motivation for further movement into the divinesphere.32 Gregory says:

For it is a property of the Godhead to lack no conceivable thing which isregarded as good, while the creation comes into excellence by partakingin [KŒ ��åB�] that which is better. Further, not only has it a beginning

27 De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, 121.28 De instituto christiana, GNO 8.1, 47.29 Ethica Nicomachea 1098a16–17.30 Ethica Nicomachea 1097a25–1097b6, 1176b3–6.31 De beat., GNO 7.2, 82; De prof., GNO 8.1, 136.32 I wonder if the term ‘happiness’ is appropriate in connection with Gregory (and

other Christian thinkers). Maybe happiness is the proper ‘Greek’ term, while blessed-ness is the proper Christian term; or, if not term, at least concept. Unfortunately, it isnot possible to investigate this in any depth here.


of its being, but also is found to be constantly in a state of beginning tobe in excellence, by its continual advance in improvement, since it neverhalts at what it has reached, but all that it has acquired becomes byparticipation [�Øa �B� ��ı��Æ�] a beginning of its ascent to somethingstill greater, and it never ceases, in Paul’s phrase, ‘reaching forth to thethings that are before’, and ‘forgetting the things that are behind’. Since,then, the Godhead is life itself, and the Only-begotten God is God andlife and truth and all conceptions that are lofty and befitting of God,while creation takes from Him its supply of good, it may be evidentfrom this that if it is in life by partaking of [ ��å�ı�Æ] life, it will, if itceases from the participation [�B� ��ı��Æ�], cease totally from beingin life.33

Participation in divine goodness and life, as emphasized in thistext, requires a movement of the creature in accordance with thenatural inclination to the good. The creature, then, must prepareitself, make itself fit for the reception of God’s gifts. The divinePower and activity transforms what it touches and brings it furtherinto communion with God.At this point I find it necessary to ask if there is not a difference

between what happened to the human nature of Christ, and whathappens to the being of other humans. It somehow seems that thedeification of Christ’s humanity is completed in the Ascension. In thecitation from Contra Eunomium above, we find the idea of contin-uous advancement towards the good. This teaching is found in manytexts. For instance, some passages from De vita Moysis conform tothis picture:34 the man who is filled constantly thirsts for more. Hewants to partake, not according to what he is capable of, but accord-ing to what God is like. The human person forever stretches out formore. No limit interrupts the ascent to God, because there is no limitto the Good. This is the famous doctrine of the epektasis, the constantreaching out for more.35 As a consequence, could we say that Christ’shumanity experiences the fullness of the gift at the moment Hetransposes human nature to the eternal sphere, while our transforma-tion within the same sphere is gradual to eternity? I really don’t knowwhether Gregory provides a definite answer to this question any-where, but to me at least it seems like a reasonable interpretation.

33 Contra Eunomium, GNO 2, 212.34 De vita Moysis, GNO 7.1, 113–14, 116, cf. 118.35 Cf. Louth (1992), 89, and von Balthasar (1995) part 1, ch. 2.


What happens to human nature in its constant advancement indeification? Into which divine qualities does the presence of the divineactivity transpose the being of human persons? I suppose man devel-ops towards what is characteristic of Christ’s deified humanity. Wehave seen that man participates in the Good and in Life. I think thismeans that when the divine power is actively present, it makes thereceptive humanity exist in the modes of divine Goodness and Life.According to De beatitudinibusman goes out of or travels beyond hisown nature (KŒ�Æ��Ø �c� Æı��F ç��Ø� › ¼�Łæø��). From mortal hebecomes immortal, from being transient he becomes eternal, fromman he becomes God.36 God brings man into near-equality (�e› ��Ø ��) with Himself. He bestows on human beings what is Hisaccording to nature, and this amounts to a kind of equality of rank bykinship (› ��Ø �Æ� �Ø�a �B� �ıªª��Æ�). These are strong words, andwitness to the realism of Gregory’s doctrine of deification. ‘To becomeGod’ is not a metaphor, but should be taken in the literal sense. Inthat case, however, it requires that certain limits must be drawn.Man becomes God, but not by being fused with the divine nature.

I have already mentioned a text in De anima et resurrectione in whichGregory says that man does not become identical ( c �ÆP��) withthe divine, he becomes like (‹ �Ø��) it.37 In the In canticum canti-corum Gregory speaks about being transformed ( ��Æ��ØÅŁB�ÆØ)naturally by the teaching of the Lord into the more divine.38 Man iscreated for the purpose of being saved, and therefore his transforma-tion is ‘natural’. But he is not made God by nature, he achieves arelative divinity (cf. �e Ł�Ø��æ��), not the absolute divine essence. Weshould also remember what he said in De professione christiana:39 toattain likeness by imitation does not mean that the Gospel ordersnature to be compounded with nature. In addition, all talk of ‘parti-cipation’ would be pointless if man was transformed into the divinenature. Somehow, participation presupposes a more and less completeidentity, therefore, is excluded.God accomplishes deification. It is the Holy Spirit who mediates to

man what Christ accomplished through His assumed humanity.More precisely, deification is experienced in the ecclesial existence

36 De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, 151.37 De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 41b–44a.38 In canticum canticorum, GNO 6, 29.39 De professione christiana, GNO 8.1, 138.


through the Spirit’s economical adaptation of these gifts as the pre-sence of divine activity in the believer. There is never an end to thespiritual development of man.His deification goes on forever becauseGod, who is present for man to enjoy, is infinite. The infinite progressis the mark of creatureliness. Only a being who has temporal exten-sion as a characteristic of its being may make progress. However, itseems a bit difficult to think of an infinite progress, because we shouldrather think that the ideas of progress and of divine infinitude weremutually exclusive. Progress includes a before and after; divine in-finitude must be immediately complete. If something participates inwhat is immediately complete, I should think it rather difficult not topossess it totally at once. If, on the other hand, we think of deificationfrom the creature’s point of view, we could probably say that what iscomplete in itself is gradually admitted into what is finite and diaste-matic, because the latter is only gradually made fit for the reception ofthe gift. Even if man is transported into the sphere of God, he is stilllimited except for what he has received. I suppose we must say thatthe receptiveness of human nature expands gradually even whenhumanity is elevated beyond time and space in the ordinary sense.We should say, then, that man is deified by participation, not in the

essence of God, but in His activity. Participation means that manreceives more and more of God’s activity into his being. It seems quiteobvious that Gregory operates with the idea of an ontological dis-tinction between essence and activity in God. The tri-hypostatic beingof God is one thing; the activity by which the Trinity relates to createdotherness has its source in the essence, but is not identical with thisessence. In the immanent activity of God the divine persons commu-nicate with each other; in the external activity God communicateswith creatures. Such a distinction between essence and activity mustbe observable in created beings as well. There is a difference betweenbeing human and doing human things, even though the seconddepends upon the first.On the other hand, the activity could never be considered an entity

or a subsistent being in its own right, even if it is, i.e., exists. Thedivine activity should not be understood as a lower divinity, a fourthhypostasis or something of that kind. It is rather to be compared witha field of energy that is manifested from the divine being. But this isan image, because the divine activity, in the precise sense, is the divinenature or essence qua being active. The activities are ‘around’ God,and are a movement of His nature. If we say that the distinction


between essence and activity (to be God and to be active as God) is areal distinction, all these qualifications must be included. However, Ido not feel quite comfortable with the term ‘real distinction’, since itseems to make a sharper division between essence and energeia thanadmitted by the doctrines I have examined. Whenever something hasbeing or achieves deification, it participates in the divine activity insuch a way that it begins to exist in a graciously instituted mode. Increation an entity is moved into the mode of being, in deification thecreature is moved into the mode of likeness and near-equality withGod. From being man, a human being becomes God by the never-ending movement in accordance with a divine mode of being in theHoly Spirit. Whether this is Palamism or not, we shall have to seewhen we discuss the doctrine of St Gregory Palamas in Chapter 7.

B. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ONSALVATION AND DEIFICATION

In St Maximus, as in St Gregory of Nyssa, the economical activities ofChrist, including the deification of His humanity, are the conditionsfor salvation and for the realization of the final end of humanexistence, deification. We shall try to figure out by what means thistakes place; and how man achieves this divine purpose, how thedivine activity enters into his life, and how it cooperates with thenatural activity of human beings. St Maximus’ conception of partici-pation belongs in this picture as well.Maximus dwells on the idea of the Church as the image of God in

the first chapter of the Mystagogia. God is the universal cause thatmade the cosmos and keeps it together in a well-ordered system ofunity in diversity. Likewise, the Church is the principle of unity indiversity among the great multitude of human beings, men, women,and children—different in many respects—who are born into theChurch, and thereby are, as he says, reborn and recreated in theSpirit.40 In this way it, i.e., the Church, graciously bestows (åÆæ�Ç��ÆØ)one divine form and designation, namely, to belong to Christ andcarry His name. This, obviously, means that the faithful carry the

40 Myst. 1, PG 91: 665c–d.


name of Christians. The personification, when the Church is actinglike an agent, is, of course, connected with the Pauline idea that theChurch is the body of Christ, and Christ Himself is the head of thisbody (1 Cor 12:12–27). Maximus returns several times to this idea intheMystagogia, and develops it into a teaching on how human beings,through a path of spiritual development, finally are unified withChrist, the head of the Church, as their condition of deification.

Maximus speaks of being born into the Church and then adds thatone is reborn and recreated in the Spirit. The first ‘birth’, obviously,points to baptism; while the ‘reborn and recreated’ could point bothto baptism and to the path of spiritual development. Even thoughMaximus is a monk and in his writings mainly dwells on the spiri-tuality of the monastic life, the Mystagogia seems to indicate a moregeneral soteriological scheme.The distinction between the first ‘birth’ and the further recreation

may be highlighted from the Ad Thalassium 6, in which Maximuscomments on the grace of baptism.41 The question put to Maximusby Thalassius sets his answer in a certain perspective: in 1 John 3:9 itis said that he who is born of God does not sin, because God’s seedremains in him. However, how is it possible that people born of Godthrough baptism are still able to sin?Maximus answers that the divinebirth is twofold. (i) On the one hand, it bestows the grace of adoption,and this grace (å�æØ�) is ‘entirely present potentially’ (�A�Æ� �ı�� Ø

�Ææ�F�Æ�). (ii) On the other hand, the grace bestowed gets activatedor is exhibited in activity (ŒÆ�� K��æª�ØÆ�) when human intention(�æ�Æ�æ��Ø�) is deliberately directed towards God.42 The redemptivework of Christ is available for a human being through baptism, and inbaptism one is born into the ecclesial condition. One possesses thegrace of God potentially, and in the ecclesial existence this gracebecomes active when man directs his deliberate course of actiontowards God. This distinction, between potentiality and activity, issimilar to the Aristotelian distinction between first energeia = secondpotentiality and second energeia: second potentiality is the possessionof a capacity, which may be executed in actual activity.

When the Christian acts in accordance with the divine logos of hisbeing, his natural potential for movement is brought into the sphereof activity in a duplicated mode: natural human activity is executed in

41 Ad Thal 6, CCSG 7, 69–71.42 —æ�Æ�æ��Ø� = resolution, purpose, deliberate course of action.


cooperation with the activity of divine grace, i.e., in cooperation withthe Holy Spirit. In Mystagogia chapter 4, this ecclesial existence isexplained as a development in three stages—known from manyMaximian texts. In this chapter Maximus speaks of the Church animage of man, and man as an image of the Church. Man is composedof body, soul, and mind;43 the Church consists of nave, sanctuary, andthe divine altar. Body and nave, soul and sanctuary, mind and thedivine altar mutually mirror one another. These three pairs arerespectively connected with the three stages of development, namelythe first pair with ethical philosophy, the second with natural con-templation ‘spiritually interpreted’, and the third pair is connectedwith mystical theology. This may be summarized in a table:

One may intuitively grasp why these elements are arranged thus. Thenave is the place of the faithful, and in the nave the evangelicalteachings about how one should live the Christian life are proclaimed.This focuses on how one directs one’s bodily existence in accordancewith the commandments. The sanctuary is the place of the clergy, andin the architectural structure of the building it could be conceived insuch a way that it psychologically gathers attention that is scattered inworldly cares into a unified perspective, namely the worship of God. Ifthe mind is purified from distracting thoughts, logismoi, it may directits attention towards the final purpose of human existence.44 With theholy altar, where the mystery of the Eucharist is manifested, the mindis summoned in silence to the sphere of the divine presence as such.I should like to make one further comment on the stage of natural

contemplation. Natural contemplation is connected with the sanctu-ary, and man is led towards it by his reason (logos).45 Maximus doesnot develop his concept of natural contemplation in this connection,

Holy altar Mystical theology MindSanctuary Natural contemplation SoulNave Ethical philosophy Body

43 According to Thunberg (1995) 107–113, this triad seems to have replaced thePauline triad of spirit, soul, and body in Church Fathers after Evagrius Ponticus.

44 In Tollefsen (2008), 176–8, I argue that man participates in divine simplicity,which is an aspect of God’s energeia, when he moves according to natural contempla-tion. The simplifying of the intention is not just due to human effort, it rather includesthe presence of divine workings by grace.

45 Myst. 4, PG 91: 672b–c.


but in his other writings he says much about this.46 In contemplationone dwells on the logoi of creatures and conceives how these convergeand become a unity in the Logos.47 Man discovers the metaphysicalstructure and ontological constitution of beings and how these arebased in God. In the present text it is said that man, through thesanctuary of the soul, conveys to God the sensible logoi, in a purelyspiritual way that is cut off from matter. As we saw above, Maximusspeaks of contemplation as being ‘spiritually interpreted’ (��ı Æ�ØŒH�

K�Åª�ı ��Å�). It is obvious that this is not the kind of natural philoso-phy we would find in the philosophical schools.48 What is suggestedis not a theoretical pursuit, but a spiritual one. Even so, it is connectedwith what I called earlier the metaphysical structure and ontologicalconstitution of beings; namely, in the sense that what is understoodis the divine ordering of things in terms of the divine plan for thecosmos, namely that it is all designed in terms of their beginning andending in God.49

Ethical philosophy or asceticism, along with natural contempla-tion, purifies the soul in its relation to created beings, and changesman’s relations to things from a passionate one into a non-passionateand loving one.50 One easily thinks that the three stages of spiritualdevelopment are successive, so that the second follows upon the first,the third upon the second. This, however, is not exactly the case. Inthe difficult, but highly interesting fifth chapter of the Mystagogia,Maximus shows how he thinks of the first two stages as somehowrunning parallel.51

I am not going to interpret all the details of the whole chapter, butI will try to describe the main features of Maximus’ view of the well-ordered soul. The soul has two aspects, namely a contemplativeaspect called mind (��F�), and an active (‘practical’) aspect (�e�æÆŒ�ØŒ��) called reason (º�ª��), which are the primary powers ofthe soul.52 The primary activity (K��æª�ØÆ) of the mind is wisdom,

46 Cf. his Cap. gnost.47 Cf. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1077c.48 Cf. Cap. gnost. 1,22.49 Cf. the Ambiguum 41, which presents the cosmic drama or plan in a nutshell.50 If one reads the first ‘century’ of theDe char. from the beginning, one clearly sees

that in the condition of love as the peak of the virtues, one not only loves God, butloves all men equally and distributes with equity and without passion.

51 Cf. Cooper (2005), 63–4.52 Cf. to this and what follows Myst. 5, PG 91: 673c–676c.


while the primary activity (K��æª�ØÆ) of the reason is prudence. Afterhaving said this, Maximus builds up two columns of properties ar-ranged according to each power of the soul. (i) Through the mind, thefollowing belong to the soul: wisdom (the primary activity of mind),contemplation (Ł�øæ�Æ), knowledge and unforgettable knowledge(� ¼ºÅ�� ª�H�Ø�). The purpose of all this, or the goal towardswhich it is directed, is truth. (ii) Through the reason, the followingbelong to the soul: prudence (the primary activity of reason), action(�æA�Ø�), virtue, and faith. The good is the goal towards which all thisis directed. Truth reveals the divine ‘from its essence’, while the goodreveals the divine ‘from its activity’.

What does this mean? Firstly, according to Maximus the differentelements he has enumerated inhere in a certain sequence:53 the mindmoved by wisdom attains to contemplation; the mind moved bycontemplation attains to knowledge; the mind moved by knowledgeattains to unforgettable knowledge; and the mind moved by unfor-gettable knowledge comes to truth. Likewise, the reason moved byprudence attains to action; the reason moved by action comes tovirtue; the reason moved by virtue attains to faith; and the reasonmoved by faith comes to the good. What Maximus has in mind isobviously a development of the activities of the soul in the direction ofperfection, which means that for him the higher levels are moreperfect and desirable than the lower. We must think then, that forMaximus wisdom is the condition of contemplation: in order tocontemplate correctly, one must be wise, and in order to attainknowledge one must contemplate. Beyond knowledge there is aneven more advanced stage, namely the so-called unforgettable knowl-edge in which the mind perceives divine truth ‘from the divineessence’. This cannot mean to know the essence itself, since in thefinal part of the introduction to the Mystagogia Maximus teaches aradical apophatisism. It probably means to achieve the highest formof spiritual knowledge of the divinity from God Himself.54

This interpretation is at least confirmed in part by what Maximussays, even if his words give us more points to interpret: the mind, asan essence, is potentially wisdom, contemplation is a habit, knowl-edge is energeia, and unforgettable knowledge is the unceasing move-ment (I�ØŒØ�Å��Æ) of wisdom, contemplation, and knowledge, that is

53 Myst. 5, PG 91: 676c–680b. 54 Cf. De char. 1,77–8; 1,100; 4,47.


of the potency, habit and act of the mind—I think. As far as I canunderstand, what Maximus is saying is something like the following:the mind is potentially wisdom, and the first step beyond this potencyis realized when the mind wisely enters contemplation and fulfilsitself in contemplation as an actualization, i.e., enters the habit ofcontemplation. This fulfilment of contemplation is knowledge, andknowledge is, therefore, the mind in actuality or activity. I showedabove that the sanctuary is a metaphor for natural contemplation‘spiritually interpreted’. I suppose this means that this knowledge, asthe fulfilment of contemplation and as the actualization of the po-tential of the mind, should be conceived of as a spiritual knowledge,i.e., as knowledge in the Holy Spirit. This knowledge is a distinctivekind of conception of the cosmos, based on the Logos–logoi structure,with its beginning and end determined by the divine scheme ofsalvation. The unforgettable knowledge, I suppose, is the conditionin which the mind is elevated towards divine truth in perpetualmovement. If the first kind of knowledge may be compared withthe original condition of minds according to Origen—a conditionwhich did not protect them from falling from God—unforgettableknowledge is more advanced: at this stage one meets the divine insuch a manner that one cannot fall back.55 Further, Maximus seemsto indicate that at this stage, the natural capacity of the mind reachesits end—we shall return to this below.56

We find a similar sequential development in connection withreason: reason moved by prudence arrives at action, through actionthe soul arrives at virtue, through virtue it arrives at faith, which is asecure conviction of divine things. Reason possesses this convictionby potentially being prudence. The first step beyond this potency isthe habit that makes action a reality. The fulfilment of such a habit isactualized virtue, which, analogous with the former sequence, meansthat virtue is the actualized condition or the energeia of reason. Faith,further, is beyond this, the summit, the full realization of prudence,action, and virtue. This means that faith is the condition of reasonbased on a potential that became habit, a habit that became actualityor activity. By faith reason arrives in the good, and at this stage reasonends its proper activities, since its created capacity has reached its

55 On Maximus’ understanding of the Origenist myth, cf. Ambiguum 7. Cf. Dechar. 1,46.

56 Myst. 5, PG 91: 677a.


limit and cannot move any further.57 One wonders about the conceptof faith in this sequence. Is this the faith that is required at baptism, or is itamore advanced level of faith? I suppose it has to be the latter.However, itstrikes me as a bit difficult to understand exactly what character this kindof faith has. Maximus is so sparse with his words on this point that I feelone has to make a qualified guess. I think the faith he speaks of is a kindof advanced trust in God’s goodness, some mental condition of rest,comparable with unforgettable knowledge in the parallel column.

There are three important matters that require some further com-ment here, namely (i) the parallelism between the two columns builtrespectively on mind and reason, (ii) the relation between human anddivine power, or activity, in the developments as they are described,and (iii) the sayings that there is an end to both kinds of activity.

(i) I interpret the developments respectively from reason andmind as short and highly condensed descriptions of the spiri-tual stages of ethical philosophy and natural contemplation.I believe this is confirmed by one of the ways Maximussummarizes his teaching that these stages run parallel and,I suppose, mutually condition or stimulate one another: hespeaks of joining reason together with mind, prudence withwisdom, action with contemplation, virtue with knowledge,faith with unforgettable knowledge; and none of these is inferiorin comparison with the others.58 Maximus does not think thereis a division in the psychological makeup and development ofman. Rather, he sees the intellectual and emotional aspects ofthe soul, i.e., the theoretical powers and the practical powers,which suffer a split in a disintegrated human life, in their devel-opment towards the direction of human reintegration throughthe ecclesial life in Christ.

(ii) Is this double activation or development of the potential ofhuman nature a purely human pursuit, or is there any kind ofdivine intervention or help in the process? There is definitelydivine help at hand. Maximus says that every soul, by the graceof the Holy Spirit and by his own diligence and serious work,can unite them with one another, i.e., unite the pairs men-tioned in (i) above.59 If we compare this with what we found in

57 Myst. 5, PG 91: 677b. 58 Myst. 5, PG 91: 677c–d.59 Myst. 5, PG 91: 677c–d.


Ad Thalassium 6, on baptism, we can understand the grace oftheHoly Spirit as the kind of activation of baptismal grace thattakes place when man moves in accordance with his logos ofbeing and his logos of well-being. The last logos, at least, is theprinciple in accordance with which man participates in divineactivity on the levels of practical and contemplative philoso-phy.60 The grace of the Spirit works on man when man runshis course as he is designed to do.

I think this may be made even more specific. If we turn to a passage inAmbiguum 7,61 Maximus endorses a topic we found in St Gregory ofNyssa as well, even if treated rather cautiously by Gregory, namelythat the virtues are somehow an incarnation of Christ in the believer.To be more precise, Maximus says Christ is the essence of virtue ineach person. Could this point be developed a bit more? I think it can.There are two elements here that need to be accommodated to oneanother: on the one hand, Christ as the essence of the virtues is afigure that may be expressed in another way. In the Gnostic chaptersMaximus says that the beginningless works of God are participated inaccording to grace. One such work is Goodness and what is includedin Goodness, among other things, is Virtue itself.62 This is an infusedpower in human beings or, in other words, the divine activity workingin man.63 The other element is the activity of man, when it isnatural.64 The virtues, Maximus says in his disputation with Pyrrhus,are natural for man.65Now, from these two points we may gather thatthere are two activities that come together in the ethical field, namelythe divine Goodness working in man, and the human potential forvirtue being activated when man moves as he should. We find some-thing similar when it comes to contemplation. Maximus says in Dechar. that when the sun of righteousness—an image of Christ, theLogos—rises in the pure mind, he reveals both Himself and the logoiof what He has made and will make.66 According to the Chapters onknowledge, neither the soul by its own powers alone, nor the mind by

60 On this cf. Tollefsen (2008), chapter 4, III–IV.61 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081c–1084b.62 Cap. gnost. 1,48–50, PG 90: 1100c–1101b.63 Cf. Cap. gnost. 1, 49 and 47, PG 90: 1101a and 1100b–c.64 Cap. gnost. 1, 47, PG 90: 1100b-c; cf. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081d–1084a.65 Pyrrh., PG 91: 309b–c.66 De char. 1,95: PG 90: 981c.


its strength alone can attain divine knowledge and illumination. Godmust condescend. He lifts man up to Himself and illuminates thesoul’s faculties if this is to be achieved.67

The presence of the grace of the Spirit, as divine activity activatedin cooperation with human capacity, is the presence of participa-tion.68 How should this be understood? It obviously means that manbecomes able to perceive and know more than he could have by hisown powers alone. Man perceives and knows things that are invisibleand unknowable from the point of view of man’s nature in the fallencondition. Structures of being and divine aspects of being are graspedthat are not normally seen. This is highly interesting in connectionwith St Gregory Palamas’ doctrine of light, which we shall turn to inthe next chapter.

(iii) We should now be in a position to comment on the final point,namely the sayings that there is an end to the activities of mindand reason. The ontological structure of human beings is suchthat they are designed for a certain God-willed activity. Thisactivity may be executed and expanded up to a certain point,namely to the uttermost limit of creaturely capacity. I think thismust be the meaning of the saying that there is an end to theactivities of mind and reason. In the Gnostic chapters it is saidthat God suspends the natural activity of created beings byactualizing his own divine activity in them.69 The text seemsto indicate that the process is a gradual one. To the degree thatman establishes his natural activity within the limits of thedivine activity, i.e., participates in it, the natural activity ofman is suspended. I think this is also confirmed by what Max-imus says inAdThalassium 22, when he speaks of the active andpassive principle in human life. The execution of the activeprinciple belongs to this age; in the future ageman is transposedinto the condition of passivity, because he suffers transforma-tion by grace into deification.70

At the uttermost peak, when having completed the course of ethicaland contemplative philosophy in cooperation with the activity of

67 Cap. gnost. 1,31, PG 90: 1093d–1096a.68 Cf. once more the sequence in Cap. gnost. 1, 47–50.69 Cap. gnost. 1,47, PG 90: 1100b–c.70 Ad Thal. 22, CCSG 7, 140–1.


divine grace, man enters the third level of spiritual development. Buthere he reaches a limit: his natural powers cannot bring him into thecompleted state of deification. Man transcends his capacities, what-ever his natural endowments, and receives from God the grace tomove beyond himself into the realm of God.71 At this level, Maximussays, one is made god by God.72

What this actually means is a critical question. The whole drive ofMaximus’ thinking, his basic ontological and metaphysical convic-tions, makes it unthinkable that any creature should be transformedcompletely into something that it is not. There would be no realsalvation for human beings if they were to become what they arenot—in that case they would disappear, and no continuity would anylonger exist between what man is and what he becomes. Still, it isobvious that Maximus has a realistic view of salvation. Man isdestined to be moved into the divine realm, to be transformed byGod’s grace, and in effect to be deified. In Ambiguum 41 Maximussays about created being that ‘the whole [shall be] wholly interpene-trated by God, and become all that God is, except for identity ofessence’ (‹º�� ‹ºøfi ��æØåøæ��Æ� ›ºØŒH� �fiH Ł�fiH, ŒÆd ª�� A� �Y

�� æ K��Ø� › Ł��, åøæd� �B� ŒÆ�� P��Æ� �Æı��Å��).73 In Ambi-guum 10 Maximus views deified man as being beyond temporalexistence, possessing the divine life of the Logos, and having achievedthe divine properties of being without beginning and end—a trulyparadoxical saying.74

We shall investigate the deified condition a bit closer: (i) is itpossible to define more precisely the ontological relation betweenuncreated and created being within the condition of deification? (ii)Exactly how should we define Maximus’ conception of participation?

(i) What is the relation between uncreated and created beingwithin the condition of deification? As far as I can see, Max-imus counts the four adverbs in the definition of faith fromChalcedon (AD 451) as a basic logical tool for describing therelation between uncreated and created being: without confu-sion, without change, without division, and without separation

71 Cf. Cap. gnost. 1, 39 and 47, PG 90: 1097c and 1100b–c; Ambiguum 10, PG 91:1153b-c; Ambiguum 20, PG 91: 1237a–b.

72 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1084a.73 Ambiguum 41, PG 91: 1308b.74 Ambiguum 10, PG 91: 1144c. Cf. Tollefsen (2008), 212–13.


(I�ıªå��ø�, I�æ��ø�, I�ØÆØæ��ø�, Iåøæ��ø�). Ambiguum 5confirms this, since he uses this kind of terminology severaltimes when he describes the relationship between uncreatedand created being in Christ, and his whole argumentation inthe text reflects this kind of logic.75 According to the argumentof the text, the logic of the four adverbs regulates the ontologyof essence and activity in Christ, the God-man, and, by im-plication, in the process of our deification.

As far as I can judge, the union of God and man in Christ, and theunion of man and God in deification are two different kinds of union,even if there are similarities. In the first kind of union the hypostaticprinciple is the Logos of God, and the humanity of Christ is thehuman nature of the Logos, regulated by the Logos as the sole subjector concrete principle of agency—even if it is the natural powers of thenatures that are given direction in the hypostasis. In the second kindof union, the hypostatic principle is the human hypostasis, and un-created being enters into this hypostasized human nature as divineactivity (not nature) transforming the human being, its nature andhypostasis. It seems to me, however, in connection with both in-stances, that the relation between the two spheres may be comparedwith oil and water; they are in close proximity to one another in anintimate union, but are never mixed together. In this regard, StGregory of Nyssa’s terminology of mixture could be a challengingoption. They have some kind of intimate, but parallel existence. Thefirst kind of union, perhaps, is to be considered as the more close-knitone. The union itself is strictly regulated in accordance with thehypostatic principle. In the second kind of union, the union is, in amore precarious sense, based on the condition of cooperation: fallenman has to open up to the activity of God—something he accom-plishes by moving along the road of spiritual development—and towork with God in the union. Man must be in the condition ofreceptivity.76

75 Ambiguum 5, CCSG 48: 23, 25, 31. Cf. Tollefsen (2008) 200–214. At this point Istill disagree with Törönen (2007) who, in the introduction to his book, complainsabout the pan-Chalcedonianism making these adverbs basic logical concepts inMaximus, cf. Tollefsen (2008), 10. I agree with Törönen that union and distinctionare basic logical concepts in Maximus’ thinking, but is not the so-called Chalcedonianlogic a special application of these concepts? I think they are.

76 Cf. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1080b and Tollefsen (2008), 185–6.


Deification obviously does not mean that man is transformed intoanother kind of essential being. He either cooperates, or—at the levelof deification proper—he executes his natural activity by resting inthe mode of the divine activity: the divine activity carries the humanactivity. We have to think, however, that the natural properties thatman is created with, his mind, soul, and body, together with all of hisfaculties, are originally designed by God to develop into this perfectcondition beyond what we may imagine in our post-lapsarian condi-tion of limitations, illness, weakness, moral and physical corruption,and death. In short, spiritual development and deification is a reinte-gration of man and a restoration of his being for the development intothe divine pattern of the logos of eternal well-being.77 We couldimagine, then, that the natural endowment of man is developed andexpanded qualitatively by the divine activity into something trans-cending what we may be able to conceive. Man is made in such a waythat the presence of divine activity expands his powers infinitely. Inthe tenth Ambiguum Maximus indicates what this should be like,when he says that such a person in such a condition has no experienceof what is present to it, and has become beginningless and endless.Hetranscends the limits of temporal existence and movement circum-scribed by beginning and end. He is not disturbed by passions andpossesses the divine and eternal life of God, the Logos.78 At a certainlevel of this development into deification a self-transcending move-ment takes place in which man, in ecstasy, goes beyond himself. Thisis, I suppose, the sense of the words in Mystagogia chapter 5, whereMaximus says that Christ restores me to myself—which could pointto the levels of asceticism and contemplation—or rather to Himself—which points beyond the human constitution as such.79 In De char-itate we find that the mind moves out of itself in love; that it is liftedtowards God and beyond the realm of created things.80 According tothe terminology of Ad Thalassium 60, man, in the deified condition,enjoys God beyond rational and conceptual knowledge, in experienceand sensation (��EæÆ and ÆY�Ł��Ø�).81 This must be the condition inwhich man no longer conceives of God as an object of reason or

77 Cf. Myst. 5, PG 91: 676b.78 Ambiguum 10, PG 91: 1144c.79 Myst 5, PG 91: 676b.80 De char. 1,10–11, PG 90: 964a, cf. Cap.gnost. 1,39, PG 90: 1097c.81 Ad Thal. 60, CCSG 22: 77.


mind, but rather enters the union of love with the one that is loved.Maximus defines this sensation as ‘the experience through participa-tion of the good things beyond nature’.82 This leads us to the final topicin the present section: some words should be said on participation.

(ii) In the Chapters on knowledge there is a sequence of thought(1,37–9, cf. 44 and 47) that indicates what Maximus has inmind when talking about participation.83 Maximus interpretsthe terms Sabbath, Sabbaths, and Sabbaths of Sabbaths. Thefirst two denote respectively the practical and contemplativelevels (1,37 and 1,38). The third denotes the level of theology(1,39). A human being is brought into the sphere of divineinfluence in an increasingly higher fashion. God’s activity inman expands both quantitatively and qualitatively, i.e., manparticipates in even more aspects of the divine activity, and heachieves what he achieves in a more intensified way.84

According to Maximus there are three logoi that describe a humanindividual’s lifespan, namely the logos of being, the logos of well-being, and the logos of eternal well-being.85 One might ask if thereis a real triad of logoi for every human being, or if the three are aspectsof one logos only. I think we shall conceive of this as a triadic pattern,i.e., a unity in distinction, indicating that man is created as an imageof the divine being (the Trinity). The three logoi then belong togetherand they constitute a single triadic conception in God. In practicallife, however, a human being may live in a disorderly fashion withregard to this triadic ideal, thereby causing a split in its own relationto its triad.86 Man participates in God in accordance with this triadof logoi, but not in all three immediately. Participation takes place ifman moves in accordance with the threefold pattern of spiritualdevelopment. In this connection we should look to a text in De

82 Ibid.83 Cap. gnost. 1,37–50, PG 90: 1097c–1101b. In Tollefsen (2008), chapter 5, I tried

to define Maximus’ concept of participation. What I say here could be considered assupplementary to the claims Imade there. However, I think I have moved some stepsin the direction of a more simplified and dynamic concept of participation. It isbasically the presence of divine activity in created being. Cf. The discussion in Chapter8 below.

84 On this, cf. Tollefsen (2008), chapter 4, part IV.85 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1084b–c.86 Cf. Ambiguum 22, PG 91: 1348d, 1349a.


charitate (3,25).87 When God created intelligent creatures he com-municated (KŒ�Ø��Å��) four of the divine properties, namelyBeing, Eternal Being, Goodness, and Wisdom. Being and EternalBeing are given to the essence, and Goodness and Wisdom aregiven to the ‘gnomic fitness’ (� ª�ø ØŒc K�Ø�Å��Ø��Å�). The lastterm denotes the volitive faculty in man’s concrete (i.e., hypostatic)existence, when man is challenged to arrange his life in accordancewith or discordant with his logos. These divine properties, withoutdoubt, belong to the so-called beginningless divine works discussed inChapter 4 earlier, in the section on Maximus. In Chapters on knowl-edge 1,47–50 Maximus shows that the divine activity (K��æª�ØÆ) adextra is manifested in ‘works without beginning’, and these areparticipated beings (Z��Æ �Ł�Œ��). If we fit these bits of ideastogether, we get the following picture: man is made in accordancewith his logos of being, and he receives God’s activity as Being andEternal Being into his created essence. If he lives according to thislogos of being, man naturally practises the virtues of his nature andenters into a life in accordance with his logos of well-being. Thismovement expands man’s receptive capacity and the divine activitybecomes present from above as Goodness and Virtue.88 As manmoves on in accordance with his logos of eternal well-being, hisreceptive capacity is further expanded by divine grace, and thehuman being becomes a recipient of deification. At the highest level(the Sabbaths of Sabbaths, cf. Cap. gnost. 1,39) one finds the spiritualstillness, or rest (Mæ� �Æ ��ı Æ�ØŒc) of the rational soul, the mindbeing withdrawn even from the more divine logoi of higher contem-plation. The soul dwells wholly in God alone in loving ecstasy, and ithas become unmoved (IŒ��Å��) in God by mystical theology. Inshort, man exists with his powers transformed not in the mode of hiscreated activity, but in the mode of divine activity, expanded inaccordance with the purpose of his Maker into the kind of being hewas destined to become.Participation, then, is the presence of divine activity in the creature,

a presence that may be developed if man acts according to his divine

87 De char. 3,25, PG 90: 1024b–c.88 Cf. the texts Cap. gnost. 1.48–50, PG 90: 1100c–1101b, De char. 1.100, PG 90:

981d–984a, De char. 3,25, cf. 3.27: 1024b–c and 1025a, De char. 2.52: 1001b. Cf.Tollefsen (2008), Chapter 4.


purpose. The point is that the creaturely essence exists in a modegiven by God or executed by God.At this point one last question arises: a similar question to one we

had to face in connection with St Gregory of Nyssa above. If createdbeing exists in the mode of divine activity, how are we to defend sucha theology from the accusations of pantheism? Firstly, created sub-stances, created essences, are by nature such, namely created. Theirstatus as created otherness cannot be otherwise. But there is noautonomous creation, nothing that exists on its own power. Weshould ask, therefore, what are the conditions on which beings havebeing?What is it that makes beings both to be and to be preserved inbeing? Obviously, from a Christian point of view, the only conditionor conditions of being is found in God. Therefore, if God’s activity ispresent, beings have being; if absent, then beings do not have being.In short, beings have being and, according to Maximus, goodness,virtue, holiness, life, immortality, infinity, simplicity, and such quali-ties or properties in a mode of cooperation with the divine. But thereis no confusion between the spheres of the uncreated and the created,since the Chalcedonian logic we commented upon above shows theontological principles by which the relationship is divinely regulated.The created cosmos is not dependent upon itself for its being. Itdepends on God’s continuous presence. If this gives a correct pictureof the ontology of Greek, patristic thought, I admit that there isprobably no general agreement on this ontology. As far as I can see,scholastic theology would disagree: beings exist by created being, notby the presence of divine energeia that empowers them to be. We shalldiscuss this a bit further in Chapter 8.


7

The Theology of St Gregory Palamas

It might be considered desirable to close the gap of more than sixcenturies between St Maximus the Confessor and St Gregory Palamaswith investigations into the developments in theology and spiritualitythat went on in between. However, I do not think that is necessarysince I am not writing a history of Byzantine thought. Rather, I amtrying to make sense of some basic ideas of Eastern Christian think-ing, and part of my project is, as stated in the Introduction, to figureout if the theology of Gregory Palamas is in accordance with majorformative representatives of the Byzantine theological tradition. Myaim in this chapter, therefore, is to discuss whether Palamas thinksalong the same philosophical lines as St Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysiusthe Areopagite, and St Maximus. We have followed the developmentof ideas of essence, activity, and participation in connection withdivine generation, the external activity of creation, the Incarnationof the Logos, and the salvation of man. In connection with GregoryPalamas the scope is narrowed down. I shall treat some of the topicsI have dwelt on earlier, but in a more summary fashion. To put theconclusion first: I think there is no breach with the legacy of Greek–Byzantine theology, and my aim is to show that this is the case.Rather, Palamas employs the traditional terminology and from thispoint of view he tries to highlight a certain conception of spirituality.Almost all discussions of Palamas’ thought somehow take the Hesy-chast controversy as a framework. Since I shall try to make sense ofPalamas’ positive theology in accordance with the traditional wayof thinking, I shall not start within this frame of reference. However,I will return to the topic of Hesychast spirituality below, since part ofmy aim is to interpret the Palamite doctrine of the experience of lightaccording to the principles of the ontology I have tried to outline inthe foregoing chapters.

A. ST GREGORY PALAMAS ON ENERGEIAAND PARTICIPATION

First I shall make a short note on the translation of the notorious keyterm of Palamite theology, namely K��æª�ØÆ. The dominating moderntranslation, as pointed out in the Introduction, is ‘energy’. However,I am not going to shift from the terminology I have employed so far inthe present book, and therefore I continue to translate it primarily as‘activity’. Custom is hard to change, and I do not believe my choicewill achieve a universal following. I don’t think it matters that mucheither, even if I believe activity—and related terminology, cf. theIntroduction—is better than energy. A terminological shift may alsobe helpful if one should want to break free from the modern quagmireof discussion for and against Palamism. I admit, on the other hand,that there are instances in which energy could be useful as a sugges-tive alternative to activity. It is in line with my project, though, mainlyto retain a terminology that makes comparative shifts from paganto Christian philosophy easier, and I believe activity is better inthat regard.We shall start with St Gregory’s doctrine of God. Gregory speaks of

�æØH� Z�� F Ł��F.1 I fear such an expression may be misunder-stood. It is, it seems, tempting to understand him as saying that thereare three realities or even entities to be considered concerning God, asif the three were some sort of ‘thing’. This, however, is not the case.I am quite sure that what is intended is that there are three ontologicalaspects to be considered concerning the divine being, namely theessence, the activity, and the triad of divine hypostases. In thisinstance I feel it could give the wrong signal to speak of energy,since that could indicate something quite foreign to Palmas’ mind,namely a kind of entity in addition to the divine essence. There is aninternal dynamic of the divine being in which it is active in relation toitself. The supreme Goodness, Palamas says, is the Trinity flowingwithout change from itself into itself and standing with itselfbefore the ages.2 These words remind one of the famous saying bySt Gregory the Theologian: ‘therefore the monad is from the

1 Capita 150.75. We saw above that St Maximus also used this terminology of ‘being’or ‘beings’. There is no reason to think that these thinkers gave in to some kind ofpolytheistic conception.

2 Capita 150.37.

186 The Theology of St Gregory Palamas

beginning moved towards the dyad until it reaches the triad, that isfor us the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.’3

In the image Palamas gives of the Trinity he tries to secure a unifieddynamic according to which the three hypostases eternally move outfrom and into one another in a perfect communion of goodness andlove. Even so he follows the mainstream tradition from the Cappa-docian Fathers in which the origin of the Trinity is the Father. Helikens the Father with mind, and ‘what else could ever go forth frommind than a word as from a source’, he says.4 This word is not to becompared with a word that is expressed orally, nor is it like a wordwithin us that is not yet said, nor is it like a word within the thinkingprocess, but rather it is like the immediate act of knowing of the mind.These sayings, I assume, indicate that the word is temporally orontologically coextensive with the mind. This word illustrates theLogos of God, who is also the Son of God. He is from the Father(KŒ ��F �Æ�æe� Z��Æ) and in no sense inferior to, but rather identicalwith the Father’s essence. Hypostatically he differs, of course, beingsubject to generation in a way befitting the Godhead.The next move in Gregory’s analogy takes into consideration that a

word does not flow from the mind without spirit.5 This spirit is notbreath, nor is it spirit in the sense of what accompanies an immanentand discursive word within us, Palamas says. It might be a bit difficultto figure out what exactly is meant by this last point. It seems thatPalamas thinks of a certain sensible quality that accompanies a wordin the temporally extended discursive ‘movement’ or activity withinthemind,maybe a sense of force or inspiration. This conceptionmightbe considered an elevated one, but Palamas still wants to bring usbeyond this level.However, at this step he leaves the image. Even so wemay gather from what follows that the spirit he speaks of is theimmediate love of the mind for the immediate word or knowledge ithas brought forth. Then follows the theological lesson: theHoly Spiritis like the ineffable love of the Begetter for the ineffably begotten Logos.At this point Palamasmakes an interestingmove: the Logos lovesHis

Father and Begetter, of course. The conclusion he draws from this is not,however, that the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son,even if with the Spirit some kind of natural bond between the other twohypostases is established. The Son possesses his love for the Father, this

3 Oration 29, Third theological oration 2.4 Capita 150.35. 5 Capita 150.36.

The Theology of St Gregory Palamas 187

love being the Spirit, as the Spirit proceeds from the Father togetherwith him. This is relevant for the discussion of the Filioque, a majortopic that is not within our concern in the present context. On the otherhand, there is a strikingly Augustinian note to the idea of theHoly Spiritas the mutual love of the Father and the Son.6

With all this said, there could seem to be a difference between thethinkers we have discussed in earlier chapters and Gregory Palamasin connection with divine generation. In Capita 150.96 he quotes StCyril of Alexandria, who says that begetting is of the divine nature,while creating is of the divine activity.7 On the other hand, in Capita150.113 Palamas indicates that the divine hypostases share or com-municate in movements or activities of power and life that belong tothe divine nature. This could be taken to move in another directionthan the adherence to St Cyril seems to indicate: the energeia plays animportant role in the internal life of the Godhead. There is obviouslyan internal activity that consists in the powerful movement of thehypostases towards one another in communion of divine life. WhenPalamas accepts (with St Cyril) that generation is of the nature, thereis perhaps not that much of a difference between him and St Gregoryof Nyssa and St Maximus the Confessor. In the case of Palamas itcould just be a question of terminology. He may choose not to talk ofdivine generation in terms of internal activity, even if such generationdefinitely may be characterized as a special kind of such activity, as inthe theologies of other thinkers.If we leave the subject of the Trinity behind, we come to the more

challenging topic of the divine activity ad extra, i.e., in relation tocreated otherness. Palamas adheres to a radical apophatisism. InCapita 150, in language that reminds one of St Maximus in theintroduction to the Mystagogia, Palamas says:8 ‘If God is nature,otherness is not nature, and if each of the other things is nature, Heis not nature; just as He is not being, if others are beings, and if He isbeing, the others are not beings.’ This amounts to a rather clear-cutnotion of divine transcendence, and as such it seems philosophically

6 This is seen by Flogaus (1998), 22, as well. Flogaus points to a possible influenceon Palamas from the Greek translation of the De Trinitate. I am not in the positionnow to evaluate this possible influence extensively, but have noted another saying inthe Capita 150.54 that resounds of the felix culpa in the midst of a rather Augustinianreflection. However, differences between the two thinkers abound.

7 Cf. Capita 150.143 as well.8 Capita 150.78.


sound to me. There is no common set of categories between God andcreated otherness. At this point Palamas’ thought comes close toMaximus’ teaching in Ambiguum 7, when the latter denies simulta-neous existence between the infinite and the finite, and denies anycommon ground between that which is beyond all categories and thatwhich is constituted by them all.9 However, the next step Palamasmakes in the text I am commenting on, comes as a surprise: ‘If youaccept this as true also for Wisdom and Goodness and simply for allof what is around God or said ofHim, then you theologize well and inaccordance with the saints’. If I understand him correctly, he ex-presses here the thought that divine properties that are basicallydivine activities, also belong to the sphere of transcendence.10

I suppose the point is that divine activities or properties are not, assuch, related to anything ‘outside’ the divine sphere. They are simplywhat the divine nature or essence eternally manifests within itseternal Triadic dynamics, and that is independent of any divinerelatedness to something other than God. God is dynamicallyHimselfeternally, and only relates to otherness when He wills otherness toexist. To me this seems to be a sound philosophical principle.

Palamas has a second surprise in store for us in the third step of thesame text (Capita 150.78). Despite what is just said about the divineessence and activity, God is and is said to be the Nature of all beings,the Being of beings, and the Form in forms as the primal Form, theWisdom of the wise, and simply all for all things. How could this be?As I said in connection with St Gregory of Nyssa, this soundsstrangely pantheistic to be the words of an Orthodox Father. How-ever, in similarity with Gregory of Nyssa, this has to do with partici-pation. Palamas says that all things participate in God, and they areconstituted by this participation (‰� ÆP��F ��ø� ��å��ø� ŒÆd �fi B

�Ł��Ø ��ı �ı��ø�), they do not, however, participate in Hisnature, but in His activity (�P �fi B �Ł��Ø �B� ÆP��F ç��ø�, ¼�Æª�,Iººa �fi B �Ł��Ø �B� ÆP��F K��æª��Æ�).In all of this, in his teaching on the divine essence and activity, and

participation, Palamas so far says nothing that is especially discordantwith the lines of thought we have found in earlier thinkers. Of course,

9 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081b.10 We found this idea above in St Gregory of Nyssa as well: the activity depends on

the Power of God, and the Power of God depends on the essence of God, and for thisreason activity basically transcends the limits of our reason.


it is philosophically sound to say that the divine activity as such, in itsimmediate dependence on God’s nature, is beyond created being. Stillwe have to find out how Palamas thinks that such a transcendentactivity is accommodated to created otherness. I think his seeminglypantheistic pronouncements are a natural consequence of the radicaldoctrine of transcendence: if there is a created cosmos, all of itsconditions are in God. There cannot be anything in existence thatdoes not depend on God for its being and its preservation. To talkof such conditions as being achieved through participation is aconsequence of the basic conceptions of uncreated and created nat-ure. It does not mean, however, that the divine and the createdspheres are mixed together. It only means that beings have being,goodness, etc., from God. They should need to have it from God insome qualified way, since the divine essence itself is imparticipatable(I �Ł�Œ��).11 This obviously indicates that participation means thatGod is actively working in what He has made, a notion we havemet before. It seems to me to be a quite reasonable way to expresswhat participation is in the mainstream Greek–Byzantine traditionof theological thought.What does it mean that God is the Form in forms as the primal

Form? It is rather tempting to suppose that it indicates a doctrine ofdivine Forms in the mind of God, i.e., something like St Maximus’doctrine of logoi of beings. However, things are not that clear. Wecould first note that, whatever the precise nature of Palamas’ teaching,God cannot be the Form in forms in the sense that creatures aredivine by nature. He can only be the Form in forms as the one whoeternally contains formal knowledge of creatures. This is much likewhat we found in St Maximus the Confessor. Maximus also says thatGod in this way is the Iº�Ł�ØÆ of things; meaning, I suppose, thatHe is the reality of beings, i.e., the secure foundation of their naturalbeing.12 The basic idea of all this is that the true essential contentof all things is preserved in God Himself. Even if this could seem tobe a reasonable interpretation, it may still be difficult to substantiateany detailed teaching on this in the works of Palamas. We shallinvestigate this a bit further.The Capita 150.87 is highly relevant in this connection. It is

important to note, however, that Palamas builds on Dionysius in

11 Capita 150.75. 12 Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081a.


this context, and we have to ask if he also accepts his teaching.13 FirstI think we should note the terminology. He treats processions andactivities (�æ��ı� ŒÆ� K��æª��Æ�) synonymously, which he shouldsince he comments on Dionysius. Dionysius calls these processionsand activities ��åa� ŒÆd ÆP�� å��. The term ��å� means aparticipation, a sharing, a partaking. We have here a word with thesame sense as St Maximus’ �Ł�Œ�� in the term �a Z��Æ �Ł�Œ��,‘participated beings’.14 Palamas’—or Dionysius’—‘participation’ isexactly this, something that is participated. What strikes me imme-diately as a bit disappointing in the present chapter is that Palamasdoes not seem to distinguish between logoi and activities. Such adistinction was made by St Maximus, and applied systematically byhim.15 On the other hand, logoi are, as we shall see, activities, even ifactivities of a certain kind. However, in Capita 150 Palamas does notseem to feel the need to make any distinction in principle betweenlogoi as activities and other kinds of activities.Palamas follows Dionysius further when he says that the activities

are paradigms or exemplars (�ÆæÆ��ª Æ�Æ) of beings, and exist in aunified manner in God. Palamas quotes Dionysius who says thatthese paradigms are logoi of beings that bring forth the essences ofbeings. The logoi are further described as predefinitions (�æ��æØ� ��)and divine and good acts of will (Ł�º� Æ�Æ) in accordance with whichGod determines and makes beings. The divine activity understoodas logoi of this kind, is essence-making, life-making, and wisdom-making. By this activity beings are made and preserved. All of thisseems to make quite good sense, and is so far in accordance withSt Maximus’ doctrine of logoi. In Palamas’ cosmology, the activity, ascreative activity, brings beings forth and preserves them, constitutesthem in their essential characteristics, gives them life, and bestowswisdom on created minds—if these minds move in accordance withtheir divine purpose, I imagine. What might be considered somehowstrange in this context is that the creative activity as essence-making isa so-called ‘participation’, since beings do not hold their essences byparticipation, or do they? I think the most obvious interpretation isthe following: since the paradigm of a being is in the divine logos in

13 The relevant text from Dionysius is DN, chapter 5.14 Cap. gnost. 1.48, PG 90: 1100c.15 Cf. Tollefsen (2008), chapter 4, part IV.


God, a created being could be said to participate in the creativeactivity that makes and preserves it.Palamas asks twice in the brief chapter I am commenting on

how one could consider such activities, exemplars, predefinitions, ordivine acts of will to be creations. These questions are rhetoricalquestions directed to his opponents in the contemporary controversy.Philosophically speaking it is obvious that activities of this kindcannot be created, but spring from the eternal divine being itself. Inthis regard Palamas relies upon the whole tradition of mainstreamGreek–Christian thought, and if anyone should feel tempted to denyhis conclusion, he would have to reject this tradition.There is one question that poses itself on the background of the

Capita 150.87: can we draw any definite conclusions regarding adoctrine of logoi in Palamas? Perhaps not. The motif for his appeal toDionysius is primarily to secure traditional authority for his own doc-trine of divine, uncreated energeia, not to develop a philosophicalcosmology. He accepts Dionysius as a witness. Maybe he adheres tothe details, but we cannot know for sure. It may a fortiori be doubtedthat Palamas has worked out for himself anything like the metaphysicsand cosmology of StMaximus. Even so, I also doubt thatPalamaswouldhave denied any of Maximus’ teachings, even if he did not consciouslyintegrate them into his own theological system. It cannot, therefore, betaken for granted that he had a sophisticated doctrine of logoi.Palamas thinks the divine activities or participations are naturally

arranged in their dependence on the divine being. He does not makemuch of this idea, which indeed stems from Dionysius, but only saysthat other activities, such as Providence, Life, and Goodness arebeings (Z��Æ) and participate in Being.16 The idea is not, as we shallsoon see, that there is a hierarchy of entities arranged with Being atthe top of it. Rather, what Palamas has in mind is some sort of logicalsequence within the field of the active divine manifestation: the divineactivity is manifested as a power of Being that is diversified intoaspects such as Goodness, etc. To speak of the activity or activitiesas ‘being’ or ‘beings’ could be misunderstood—we should rememberthis was St Maximus’ terminology as well—into making them intokinds of entities. However, Palamas’ examples clear the fog. Activity,

16 Capita 150.88. However, Palamas deviates from Dionysius when he considersBeing as more fundamental than Goodness. In this Palamas follows Maximus, cf.Tollefsen (2008), 163–4, and Dionysius, DN 5.2 and 11.6, Suchla: 183–4, 221–3.


he says, is the essential movement of nature (� �P�Ø��Å� �B� ç��ø�

Œ��Å�Ø�).17 A couple of other texts bear witness to the same dynamiccharacter of the activity: according to Capita 150.137 God foreknowsand provides for beings; He creates, preserves, rules, and transformsthem (�æ�ªØ��Œ�Ø, �æ��E�ÆØ, �Å Ø�ıæª�E, �ı��Åæ�E, ��Ç�Ø, ��Æ�Œ�ı�Ç�Ø). According to the Triads (3.2.11.), Palamas says—quot-ing Dionysius—that the activities are certain powers (�ı�� Ø�) whichare deifying, essence-making, life-making, and giving wisdom(KŒŁ�ø�ØŒa� j �P�Ø��Ø�f� j Çø�ª��ı� j ��ç��æ�ı�). The activities,as we can see, are not at all beings in the sense of ‘things’ that myster-iously emanate from God’s essence, rather they are God-in-activity.

There are two questions that are rather urgent in connection withPalamas’ theology, namely the topic of the relation between God’sessence and activity, and the topic of the unity and diversity of theactivity, cf. the terminology of activity and activities.

(i) The first topic is nowadays mainly presented in the terminol-ogy of a real distinction between essence and energy. Accordingto Meyendorff, since Orthodox theology teaches a doctrine ofdeification, which implies a participation of created man in theuncreated life of God, a real distinction between God’s essenceand energy is unavoidable.18 One might immediately wonder ifthis is a proper way to state the matter. As we saw already inPlotinus, an essence has two K��æª�ØÆØ, i.e., activities, namely aninternal and an external one. In Christian philosophy it seemsto be commonplace that there is no essence without an activityand no activity without an essence.19 Whenever a completeessential being occurs, it occurs as active. On the other hand, tobe something and to act in accordance with what one is, is notthe same. For instance, to be human and to execute activitieslike building, doing mathematics, or going for a walk, are notthe same. One could say there is a difference between thedefinition of man and the definition of a certain human opera-tion like building something. However, the activity proper to abeing is not something totally different from what it is

17 Capita 150.143. This is presented as a quotation from St John of Damascus.However, St Maximus quotes what he identifies as a saying by St Gregory of Nyssa tothe same effect and in very similar words, cf. Th. pol. 27, PG 91: 281a.

18 Meyendorff (1987), 186.19 Cf. Palamas, Capita 150.136.


essentially, and when Palamas says the activity is the essentialmovement of nature, this precisely demonstrates that point. Sobeing God and executing the capacities of what it is to be God,even if different or distinct, is not separated into two differentor distinct realms of being. In his third letter to Akindynus,Palamas used a phrase that disturbed his addressee, speaking ofthe activity as a ‘lower divinity’ (Ł��Å� �ç�Ø ��Å).20 Palamashimself, in a second version of the letter, appealing to theauthority of Dionysius, specified the term to indicate the giftof deification received as such from God’s transcendent es-sence. Whatever he originally had in mind with this term, Ithink it is an unfortunate way to formulate what he felt neededto be put into words, namely the unity and distinction betweenessence and activity of God. Because of this terminology, Akin-dynus accused Palamas of ditheism.21 Palamas retorts in Capita150, where he accuses the ‘Akindynists’ of imitating Euno-mius:22 while Eunomius held that every predicate we useabout God is of the essence, in order to degrade the Son (ifGod is unbegotten He cannot be begotten as well), Palamas’opponents also think that all predicates are of the essence inorder to degrade the activity to a creaturely status. How, onemight wonder, is the activity thus degraded? It is degraded ifthe Akindynists distinguish between divine predicates and thedivine activity. The predicates reveal properties that somehoware identical with the divine essence, and the essence cannot bean object of participation. If, according to the Akindynists,beings exist by participation, they participate in somethingother than God, namely in a created activity or some suchsort of condition. Logically Palamas’ argument seems fair tome, but if this is what his opponents teach, in my opinion, it isboth a breach with tradition—since both Gregory of Nyssa andMaximus the Confessor teach otherwise—and quite meaning-less: if the world exists because of a created activity, this must bemade by another activity, and ultimately—in order to avoid aninfinite regress—we have to accept an activity that stems di-rectly from God’s essence.23 This final activity must somehowbe distinct from that essence if we are to avoid a direct

20 Hero (1983), xv, note 44–xvi. 21 Capita 150.147.22 Capita 150.126. 23 Cf. Capita 150.73.


participation of creatures in the essence itself—somethingevery Christian thinker will avoid. Palamas says that the activ-ity is not separate, but still differs from the essence of God,since it is from this essence (¥ �Æ �c� c åøæØÇ� ��Å�,�ØÆç�æ�ı�Æ� �b �c� �P��Æ� ��F Ł��F K��æª�ØÆ�, ‰� K� KŒ��Å�

�s�Æ�).24

I think it is wise to remember that Palamas was the first Christianthinker who was forced because of controversy into the extremelydifficult task of exhibiting in precise, philosophical languagewhat earlierthinkers could allow themselves to sketch in much broader terms.What terms does Palamas use in order to keep the balance between

unity and distinction with regard to essence and activity? In Capita150.128 he starts from an argument made by St Gregory the Theolo-gian about the Holy Spirit, and draws the lesson that the divineactivity is contemplated in God (K�Ł�øæ�E�ÆØ �fiH Ł�fiH), but this doesnot mean that there is any composition in God. The question thateventually arises, of course, is how composition is avoided if theactivity is contemplated in God. Does not this formula tell us that‘God’ is one thing; ‘what is in him’ is another? Palamas answers thatcomposition is avoided because God is active, and, if I understandhim correctly, this activity is not something received or acquired, itstems naturally from God’s being. In the next chapter (129) the topicis developed further. Once more he points to St Gregory the Theolo-gian as an authority who says that the activity is the movement ofGod (Œ��Å�Ø� Ł��F). Then St John of Damascus is brought forth as awitness, and Palamas quotes him:

Activity is the efficient (�æÆ��ØŒc) and essential movement of nature.The nature from which the activity proceeds possesses the capacity forbeing active. The result (I��º�� Æ = completion) of the activity is thatwhich is effected by the activity. And the agent of the activity is thehypostasis that is active.25

This quotationmakes use of familiar Aristotelian distinctions betweena nature’s acquired capacity (i.e., second potentiality = first energeia)and the activity that may be executed from it (i.e., second energeia).26

24 Capita 150.127. 25 John of Damascus, Expositio fidei 59.7–9 (Kotter).26 We have touched upon this several times, but see especially the presentation in

the section on Aristotle in Chapter 1 above.


In chapter 131 Palamas states once more that the activity is theefficient and essential movement of nature, and in 143 the sameis repeated. There is no doubt that he wants to emphasize the non-composite nature of the Godhead that executes an activity natural forit. We still wonder, though, how the balance is to be kept on the otherside of the scale: there is not just sameness, one has to make somekind of distinction as well, ‘the activity differs from the essence’,Palamas says,27 but how?

Palamas tries to indicate what he has in mind by introducingcertain philosophical conceptions, which he then submits to exam-ination. He raises the question if the activity is not an accident(�ı ��ÅŒ��).28 However, it is characteristic of accidents—includinginseparable accidents and natural attributes—that they come to beand pass away, and that some of them increase and decrease (‘likeknowledge in the rational soul’). None of this can be the case withwhat belongs to God. God does not acquire nor lose properties,neither does he suffer increase or decrease in properties. Palamastreats of accident in the normal way according to traditional Aristo-telian–Neoplatonist logic. He says, however, that some theologianshave called the activity a �ı ��ÅŒ�� ø�, a ‘kind of accident’. Butthis is only a provisional strategy to indicate that the activity is in Godeven if it is not His essence. The ontological bond between essenceand accident is too loose to have any relevance for a theologicalunderstanding or discourse on divine essence and activity.Palamas makes some further remarks on the so-called ‘kind of

accident’.29 Since hypostatic properties and hypostasis are neither theessence of God nor certain accidents, does it follow that they do notexist? The answer is obviously no. Further, if the divine activity isneither essence nor accident, does it follow that it does not exist? Ofcourse not, Palamas says. Then follows an interesting, though difficultpoint: if, according to the theologians, God creates not simply bynature, but by will, then nature is one thing and willing another.Palamas concludes that even if nature is one thing and will another itdoes not follow that will does not exist, consequently God possessesboth essence and activity. The problem here is the relation betweenessence and will. Is it not a traditional theological doctrine that thereis a natural will, i.e., a will that belongs essentially to rational nature?

27 Capita 150. 126. 28 Capita 150.127. 29 Capita 150.135.


Isn’t this the orthodox legacy of St Maximus and the Constantino-politan council of 680–81? I don’t think there is any need to make thisinto a major problem. As far as I can understand, it is not discordantwith Maximian theology to say that will is an activity of the nature.Rather I think this is Maximus’ point, not that essence and will areidentical, but rather that having the capacity of willing belongs to arational being’s nature. And ifMaximus’ radical apophatisism should betaken seriously, this is all that we can say: the divine essence, beyond allbeing and all properties, executes will as one of its activities.Another kind of terminology that Palamas tries out is the termi-

nology of properties, that which is added to or belongs to something(�a �æ��Æ from �æ��Ø Ø).30 With ‘that which belongs’, he says,one necessarily seeks what they belong to. From this he constructs anargument against his opponents: if ‘attribute’ belongs to an essence,and if the essence does not differ from the attribute, then, if there aremany attributes, the one essence is split into many essences. What-ever one should think of this argument, the lesson for us in thepresent context is the terminology of �æ��Æ. With this termPalamas says that the divine activities are what belong to an essence.They are not the essence itself, but closely related to it. I suppose thisterminology fits well into the sayings that the activity is the essentialmovement of nature.What then are we to make of all this? As I said above, Palamas was

challenged to say something about a traditional pair of concepts thatearlier thinkers could apply without being bothered too much toprecisely define the ontological connection and distinction betweenthem. Further, pagan and Christian thought, Plotinus and the Neo-platonists, the Cappadocian Fathers and St Maximus, acknowledgedthe concepts of divine activity, internal as well as external, as if theywere quite meaningful notions. In its contents there is not anyperspicuous deviation between the doctrines of earlier Christianthinkers and Gregory Palamas. Even if the different strategies Pala-mas suggests for the clarification of the relation and distinction maynot be absolutely satisfactory, I cannot see that his philosophical pointis unsound. In any case, if it is unsound, then both the Neoplatonistand the Christian traditions suffer the same blow.

30 Capita 150.119, cf the sequence 117–119.


Meyendorff is correct that there is a distinction between God’sessence and his activities. The activities, however, are closely con-nected with what the divine being is essentially. I somehow sense thatthe term ‘real’ distinction may suggest too much of a diversity, and Iwonder if the whole question and perhaps problem of divine activityand creaturely participation could not be viewed in a slightly differentmanner. I shall return to this in the last chapter below.

(ii) We turn now to the terminology of activity–activities, i.e., to thetopic of unity and diversity in connection with the activity. Inthe Capita 150 Palamas says the essence of God is one and totallyindivisible.31 Another place in the same work he repeats that theessence is indivisible, and therefore also totally imparticipatable.32

Creatures participate therefore in the divine activity, with theimplication that God’s dynamic presence is somehow dispersedthroughout the whole range of created being by specified divineactivities. Palamas has a favourite notion he constantly returns to,namely ‘indivisibly divided’. The terminology varies, but turns onexpressions like �æ�Ç��ÆØ I �æ��ø�, I�ØÆØæ��ø� �ØÆØæ�E�ÆØ, or,stated more positively, ‘divided union’ (�Øfi ÅæÅ ��Å� ��ø�Ø�).33

This notion obviously concerns the topic of participation. How,according to Palamas, is the one activity pluralized in relation tothe participants?

On the one hand the divine activity is one, but on the other handPalamas argues that activities have to be distinct in relation to oneanother.34 If creating is not distinct from foreknowing, then God’sforeknowledge would also have a beginning once He began to create,a notion which is untenable. This seems to indicate a split in the onedivine activity itself, part of it being without beginning and part of ithaving a beginning. Could this really be so? As we have seen, throughHis activity God performs different operations, such as foreknowing,creating, preserving, ruling, and transforming.35 The problem concern-ing activities that are without beginning and with beginning is partlysolved by identifying activities with divine acts of will.36 Since these actsof will spring from God’s unitary eternalwill, one may say that creation

31 Capita 150.65. 32 Capita 150.110.33 Capita 150.69, 74, 81, 91, 110; Homily 35.16–17.34 Capita 150.138, 101, 103. 35 Capita 150.137.36 Capita 150.87.


is God’s instantaneous activity of making a world with a definitetemporal beginning. In the section on St Maximus’ doctrine of creationabove, we saw that John Philoponus argued for the immediate transi-tion from capacity to activity based on Aristotelian principles. Further,in at least one place in the Capita 150 Palamas indicates that thediversification of the activity is related to or depends on the partici-pants.37 He uses an analogy: the sun’s rays have two inseparable quali-ties: light and heat. Creatures without eyes can feel the heat, but cannotparticipate in light. On the other hand, creatures cannot be consideredto give an independent contribution to the diversification. If diversitydepends on creatures, it must depend on them not as they occur bythemselves, but in accordance with designs in the divine mind. This isthe way St Maximus the Confessor explains the range and intensity ofparticipation. As we have seen, the divine logoi set the limit to which acreature may participate in God’s beginningless works. There is oneproblem with this interpretation, however. A key text in this regard isthe Capita 150.87 in which Palamas, unfortunately, does not seem todistinguish between logoi or paradigms on the one hand, and the divineactivity as to what is participated in on the other. Of course, logoi aresomehow activities of the divine mind, but in St Maximus they areGod’s own activity of defining or planning or conceiving of what Hewants to create. On the other hand, we cannot say for sure that Palamasexcludes such a distinction. Still we cannot argue his case as if he had adefinite doctrine in this regard.In Capita 150.78—a text I commented on above—Palamas says

that God is the Being of beings, the Form of forms, the Wisdom of thewise, and generally all for all things. It may be a bit speculative, butcould not this indicate three different relations, namely that God isthe paradigmatic cause (‘Form of forms’, i.e., of Maximian logoi), thatthere is a natural and universal participation in being (‘the Being ofbeings’), and that there is participation in Wisdom for those rationalbeings who move in accordance with the divine will? The text tells usfurther that there is a natural participation in the activity common toall, but then there are creatures who participate in accordance withtheir own choice (�æ�Æ�æ��Ø�) of being near to or far from God. InCapita 150.69 Palamas explicitly says that the activity is bestowedI�Æº�ªø�, proportionately, upon participants according to the fitness

37 Capita 150.94.


of those who receive it (ŒÆ�a �c� K�Ø�Å��Ø��Å�Æ �H� ��å� ��ø�),and the activity gives the deifying radiance to a greater or lesserdegree. This is probably the context for Palamas’ saying (in Capita150.78) that God is ‘the Wisdom of the wise’, i.e., as a graciousgift to those who move in accordance with the divine purpose ofhuman life.This leaves us to make the following, even if hypothetical, con-

struction: beings are conceived in God’s eternal thought in such a waythat they may be participants in divine activity to the degree that theirnatures are fit for such a reception, and some creatures may evenmake themselves fit for the reception of a more intense presence ofdivine activity when they move in accordance with the divine will. Inthis way the terminology of activity–activities can be explained. Theone activity is pluralized in accordance with the divinely predefinedreceptive potentiality and capacity of creatures.38

I leave it at that. One problem remains, though, namely the generalphilosophical problem of the simplicity of God. Even if we may beable to argue for a hypothesis concerning the unity and plurality ofthe energeiai in Palamas, the more basic question of the energeiai inrelation to divine simplicity should be discussed further. I return tothis in the next chapter, and then in relation to the whole Greektheological tradition I have investigated above.It strikes me that we find philosophical ideas of essence, activity,

and participation in Gregory Palamas’ thinking that are primarily inaccordance with what we have already seen in Gregory of Nyssa,Dionysius, and Maximus the Confessor. The only major point thatmakes Palamas’ thought different, is that he attempts to use a voca-bulary that highlights the difference between essence and activity.Now the time has come to dive into the dimension of his doctrinethat, in the strict sense, gave him his doctrinal adversaries, namely thetopic of the uncreated light.

38 Flogaus (1998), 15, says that, according to Palamas, participation necessarilyintroduces a division in that which is participated. I cannot agree. As I have argued,participation can only allow division or plurality if based on pre-established divineprinciples, not by the relation to creatures as such. Flogaus argues from Capita150.109, but I don’t think this text supports his point.


B. THE LIGHT OF MOUNT TABOR

St Gregory Palamas defended the experience of light by theHesychastmonks, first against Barlaam of Calabria, then against Akindynus andthose who shared his or similar views. Barlaam denied that theexperience of light by the Hesychasts could be an experience ofuncreated light, the light of the divinity, or what Palamas called thedivine energeia. Akindynus feared—as we have seen—that Palamas’teaching about divine energeia implied a doctrine of two—or more—gods. This is about all we need to know about his adversaries inthe present context, since my intention is to discuss Palamas’ positivedoctrine on the background of the traditional philosophy of essence,activity, and participation that I have developed throughout thisbook.39

Palamas claims that the light experienced by theHesychast monks isthe light of Mount Tabor, i.e., the light that shone from Christ at HisTransfiguration. The first question, therefore, is what is this light? It isnot difficult to establish a traditional ontological context for addressingthis question. We have seen that, according to St Maximus, naturalactivity is an innate distinctive mark that is naturally constitutive for anature.40 Both Maximus and Gregory of Nyssa teach that within theconstitution of theGod-man there is amutual activity going on betweenthe two united natures.How is this piece of Orthodox doctrine relevantfor the interpretation of the light? It is a common idea within theByzantine tradition that the essence of God transcends created minds.God is known because of His activity in created beings. According toPalamas, the light of Mount Tabor is this divine energeia.41

39 There is comprehensive literature available in regard to the Hesychast contro-versy. It is difficult to even recommend some writings in order not to appear biased.However, Meyendorff (1974), A Study of Gregory Palamas (first published in English1964, French original 1959) is a pioneering work. Mantzaridis (1984), The Deificationof Man, is a stimulating study of Palamite theology. There are several articles bySinkewics inMediaeval Studies (1981, 1982 on Barlaam; 1986 on Palamas’ Capita 150,cf. the introduction to his edition (1988) of the same work) related to the controversy.Gunnarson (2002), Mystical Realism in the Early Theology of Gregory Palamas, is arecent Scandinavian contribution that investigates the earliest encounters betweenBarlaam and Palamas.

40 Pyrrh. PG 91: 348a, cf. Chapter 3 above, the section ‘St Maximus the Confessoron the Internal Activity of the Trinity’.

41 Capita 150.150.


On this background some questions arise. If the light ofMountTaboris the divine activity, by what faculty of the soul do the apostles perceiveit? Inwhat way is the experience of light adapted to a scheme of spiritualdevelopment? What is the role of the Holy Spirit in the experience oflight?What does the activity as light accomplish in the beholder?

The Gospel text gives no clue to determine the exact ontologicalcharacter of the light the apostles perceived. It is open to interpreta-tion. Even so, taking the text by itself gives the impression that theapostles had the immediate experience of seeing light streaming forthfrom the person of Christ. If ontological categories are consideredthere are two possibilities. The light was either created or uncreated.Palamas thinks it was uncreated. The question, however, is how coulduncreated light be perceived by created beings? Like St Maximusbefore him, Palamas believes a change was made in the power ofperception.42 In his Homily 34 he speaks about a transformation ofthe apostles’ senses.43 The light is obviously not perceptible to thefaculty of sight in its natural condition, but the disciples passed ‘fromflesh to spirit’ and the Holy Spirit wrought a transformation of theirpower of sensation to a certain degree. If we turn to the Triads, we getthe impression that the perception of light is made possible when ahuman being has reached a certain level in the spiritual life. Theterminology is interesting. Palamas speaks of sensation, intellection,and knowledge, but obviously the terms are given a new contentwithin the conception of spiritual life as he describes it.A closer description of the epistemic character of the experience of

light should be given in connection with the idea of spiritual devel-opment. According to Palamas, apophatic theology by itself is anintellectual pursuit that does not necessarily effect a change in the onewho pursues it. The experience of light takes place after a certaindevelopment that involves a purification of the passionate soul.Palamas speaks of the heart as the seat of the rational faculty (�e

º�ªØ��ØŒ��).44 Not that this faculty is located either in the heart oroutside the body as in a place, since the rational faculty is incorporeal.Even so it is in the heart, in the sense that the rational faculty uses it asan instrument. Palamas refers to Macarius who says the heart directs

42 Maximus, Ambiguum 10, PG 91: 1128a; Palamas, Homily 34.8. I have usedthe English translation of Veniamin (2004), and the Greek text of the PG 151.

43 Ibid.44 Triads 1.2.3.


the whole organism.45 One might ask what heart and organism meanhere. It strikes me as the most reasonable interpretation that the heartis conceived as the spiritual centre of man. I interpret the organism asthe totality of man’s spiritual being or makeup that includes thepowers of the soul and its organs. This includes the psychophysicaltotality investigated in natural science, but makes sense of this totalityin a quite different context.Since the heart is the centre of the rational faculty, the mind, which

is dispersed by the senses, has to be led back into the heart. Only thusis it possible that the mind keeps watch (��łØ�) over the thoughts ofthe heart. At this point Palamas introduces divine grace into thepicture: grace must rule from the heart by inscribing the laws of theSpirit. This last probably refers to St Paul’s words in Romans 8:1–11,from which we gather that the law of the Spirit of life is ‘fulfilled in uswho do not walk according to the flesh but according to the Spirit’.The point of this, I think, is that the ascetical concentration of themind, watching over the desires and impulses of man’s interior, isgraciously met with the active presence of the Spirit that strengthensand guides man’s steps. TheHoly Spirit rules from the heart, i.e. fromthe centre of man’s being.The purification separates the mind from all things through

impassibility or detachment (I��Ł�ØÆ).46 This description indicatessomething similar to St Maximus’ practical or ascetical philosophy, inwhich the development of virtues may be described as culminatingin detachment as the condition of love for God.47 Palamas’ concep-tion of virtue could seem to be quite similar to the views we foundboth in St Gregory of Nyssa and St Maximus: virtue, Palamas says inhis third homily, is ancient, since it was with God eternally. It wasinstilled in our soul from the beginning by the grace of God.48 InPalamas, like in Maximus, the virtue of detachment separates the souland its powers from attachment to sensible things that distract itsspiritual concentration.Palamas seems to move one step further when he says that through

prayer the mind is united with the grace of the Holy Spirit. Throughthis grace the mind arrives at the enjoyment of the divine effulgencesor flashings of divine light (�H� Ł�ØH� Ææ ÆæıªH�), and the mind

45 Ibid. 46 Triads 1.3.21.47 Maximus, De char. 1,1–3, PG 90: 961a–b. 48 Homily 3.10, PG 151: 37a.


acquires an angelic form and a deiform character (Iªª�º��Ø�� ŒÆd

Ł��Ø�c�).49

There are several things to be noted here. The Holy Spirit plays acentral role in this spirituality. It is the Spirit who makes divine graceavailable in practical matters as well as in the mind’s ascent towardsGod in prayer. This grace brings the mind into the condition in whicha radical change takes place, so that the mind receives a new char-acter. The centrality of grace transmitted by the Holy Spirit is ob-viously of great importance in the soteriology and spirituality ofPalamas, as may be gathered from his homilies as well.50 Thehuman being, gathered together from its dispersal in sensible things,concentrates on God in prayer, and by grace from above the divineactivity enters into the natural constitution of man and transformsman in the direction of deification. In Triads 3.2.11 Palamas refers toDionysius and says that if we call the transessential mystery of divinebeing ‘God’, ‘Life’, ‘Essence’, ‘Light’, or ‘Word’, we in fact refer topowers that come from Him to us: deifying, making being and life,and giving wisdom.This deifying power or activity brings man into a new epistemic

condition. In several instances Palamas comments on this. He usesthe terminology of perceiving, knowing, and contemplating. If wecompare this with St Maximus’ threefold development, in whichcontemplation and knowledge primarily belong to the second stage,all this talk of perceiving and contemplating the mystery could im-mediately strike one as a bit surprising. However, in this regardPalamas does not teach something essentially different fromMaximus.Before I comment on the terminology of contemplation, I should liketo discuss some aspects of Palamas’ terminology of sensation.

If we look into the texts, Palamas employs his terminology in arather careful way. He speaks of a ‘vision’ that is neither sensible norintellectual from the point of view of man’s natural endowment.Palamas tries out terms like intellectual and divine sensation(ÆY�Ł��Ø� ��æa ŒÆd Ł��Æ), intellectual sensation (��æa ÆY�Ł��Ø�),and spiritual sensation (ÆY�Ł��Ø� ��ı Æ�ØŒc).51 The background

49 Triads 1.3.20.50 Cf. for instance homilies 2 and 3, PG 151.51 Triads 1.3.20–21. This terminology and its context in this kind of spirituality

should be of interest for those who investigate the notion of spiritual sensation. SarahCoakley gave an interesting talk on this topic in Gregory of Nyssa at a colloquium inLund in 2009. I hope her paper will be published soon.


here is that the Gospel story tells us that the disciples perceived light.The Hesychast experience, as known to Palamas, includes a percep-tion of light as if somehow ‘seen’. Palamas is well aware that theterminology of intellectual sensation is paradoxical: the activity of themind is not sensation, nor is the activity of sense an intellection. Theexperience, therefore, is neither sensation nor intellection. He refersto Dionysius and says it is rather a union, i.e., a union with God bygrace in the Holy Spirit. What happens to man then? The humanmind transcends (��æÆ�Æ�Æ��Ø) itself and acquires the angelic formmentioned above.52 The saints contemplate (Ł�øæH�Ø) the divinelight within themselves (K� Æı��E�).53 The term spiritual sensationis used to express that the contemplation is neither by mind norby body. The point is that one receives this experience by the HolySpirit and sees (›æ~Æfi ) supernaturally a light beyond light.54 Thosewho see and hear are initiated into knowledge of the future, andhave science (K�Ø�� Å) of eternal being. They receive all of this fromthe incomprehensibleHoly Spirit, ‘by whom they see’ (�Ø’ �y ›æH�Ø).55

God, Palamas says, remains entirely in Himself, and also dwellsentirely in us. He does not communicate His nature to us, ratherHis own glory and splendour.56 This presence of God in us is thepresence of the divine energeia, i.e., of His activity.What about the terminology of contemplation and vision? Nor-

mally one would think that contemplating something implies that asubject stands in an epistemic relation to an object about which thesubject gains some sort of knowledge. This is not the way contempla-tion is conceived by Palamas in this connection. God is beyondknowledge and even beyond unknowing.57 Intellectual activity isbrought to a halt.58 Contemplation is here a union with God anddeification. It seems obvious that in this condition God no longer isconstituted an object of knowledge, but is met in the mystery of love.If anything results from this that could be termed knowledge, asindeed it does according to Palamas, it is knowledge of a rather specialkind. The mind becomes supercelestial (��æ�ıæ��Ø��) and receivessupernatural and ineffable visions.59 More precisely one does notconceive of the mystery by the mind, but rather, one hears, sees,and comprehends—to the degree that is possible—by the Spirit.60

52 Triads 1.3.4. 53 Triads 1.3.5. 54 Triads 1.3.21.55 Triads 1.3.17. 56 Triads 1.3.23. 57 Triads 1.3.4.58 Triads 1.3.17. 59 Triads 1.3.5. 60 Triads 1.3.18.


St Maximus the Confessor says in the Gnostic chapters that Godsuspends the natural activity of created beings by actualizingHis owndivine activity in them.61 This comes rather close to the teachings ofPalamas as we have met them here. If the divine activity can beperceived at all, it seems reasonable that it is perceived as light. Onecould claim the support of the New Testament, for instance, theGospel of John, and St Paul when he says God is ‘dwelling inunapproachable light’ (1 Tim 6:16). Palamas is not willing to explainaway the realism of the narrative of the Transfiguration of Christ.There is, therefore, a kind of perception by the senses, even if thisperception is of an extraordinary kind. To employ another Maximianidea: the perceiving is in a mode that is different from the creaturelyone. The mind is the centre of man’s psychophysical constitution as aspiritual being. If divine grace allows the presence of the activity of theSpirit in and from this centre, man may be illuminated from the mindto the faculty of sensation so as to see, hear, and in general perceivesomething ‘other’ than what is perceived quite naturally. The powersof the mind and the senses are expanded by the new mode of beingand this mode in itself is not creaturely, it is divine. The new mode ofthe mind, in the words of Palamas himself, is of an angelic or divineform (Iªª�º��Ø�� ŒÆd Ł��Ø�c�). In this divine mode he mayperceive divine things, such as the activity of the Spirit itself asdeifying light. I cannot understand that St Gregory Palamas, in thissense, does anything other than bring out the implications alreadyprepared in the doctrines of the spiritual life and deification that wefind in St Gregory of Nyssa and St Maximus the Confessor.

61 Maximus, Cap. gnost. 1,47, PG 90: 1100b–c.


8

Concluding Remarks

In these concluding remarks I shall return to some of the main topicsabove and discuss a few important implications. I’ll start with theconcept of the dynamic being of theChristian God andmove on to theconcept of participation. Next follows a treatment of essence, hypos-tasis, and energeia, in which I offer some critical remarks on Meyen-dorff and Zizioulas. Then I treat divine simplicity, in connection withwhich I comment on certain issues raised by Bradshaw and Balás. Thisis, finally, followed by a section on uncreated and created being.

THE LIVING GOD

Christian theology naturally claims that God is transcendent. God isnot subject to conditions ‘below’Him.He is the Creator of the cosmosand the Lord of history. These claims are easy to declare but difficultto understand. The notion of transcendence is basic to the Christianphilosophy of late antiquity and Byzantium. In a special sense Max-imus the Confessor conceived of the notion of transcendence in sucha radical fashion that what he says is difficult to appreciate fully, evenif I believe what he says is philosophically sound. Maximus says thatGod in Himself is beyond all categories that we use when talking ofcreated being (page 72–4 above), an idea repeated by Gregory Pala-mas (page 188–9 above). It is not possible to speak adequately of areality of that kind in any set of concepts framed by a created mind. Inthis regard there is only room for a theology of complete silence. InChristian thought, however, GodHimself breaks the silence by estab-lishing an economy of complete otherness with regard toHimself. Alltalk of God, philosophical as well as metaphorical, moves within the

sphere of otherness and can only count as different strategies fortalking about what cannot be grasped in itself. The criteria forcorrecting concepts and images cannot be found in any other sourcethan in ‘what comes after God’. ‘What comes after God’ is in thisregard His revelation, and this revelation is an activity executed increated being.Neoplatonists and Christians, when talking philosophically of God,

have no other option than to apply terms we are acquainted withfrom a philosophical analysis of beings in the world. Neoplatonistsand Christians try to figure out how one could speak of God as asource of created otherness. It is impossible to avoid the notions of�P��Æ and K��æª�ØÆ in such discourse. Even if Plotinus does not find itadequate to speak of God as willing and contemplating, he allowssuch terminology (page 23 above) in order to explain how othernessis a result of the first principle. The internal activity of the One is thecondition for all other levels of being resulting from an externalactivity of the same One. However, Plotinus is not willing to involvehis first principle in what comes after it, since that would threaten theunity of the One. For this reason there is no divine economy in theChristian sense. The Christian Godhead executes internal activity inthe triadic constitution of itself. Even if God, strictly speaking, is notintuitive thought (Maximus, page 124 above), but transcends suchcategories, He is still said to contemplate eternally the plan of thecosmos with a view to the mystery of Christ (page 120 above). TheChristian God, therefore, is conceived of as being turned eternally andtriadically towards Himself in the activity of knowing and willingcreated otherness. This ‘knowing’ and ‘willing’, however, transcendsour grasp of such processes.Meyendorff claims there is a difference between the Neoplatonist

and the Christian conceptions of divine transcendence.1 Neoplato-nists claim, he says, that the unknowability of God is due to limita-tions of the created mind. If one is detached from other beings andmoves beyond oneself one accedes to knowledge of the divine being.I believe this is wrong. As I showed above (page 22–3), according toPlotinus, mind has no access to what is beyond mind. The One isdefinitely beyond mind. If not, it would have been Mind and not theOne. If the One is conceived as being intelligible, it is not such in

1 Meyendorff (1974), 203.

208 Concluding Remarks

itself: its intelligibility, to use a Christian term, is economical. It ismanifested as intelligible in the mind’s conversion, but it is notintelligible in itself. To use Meyendorff’s term, transcendence is aproperty of God and not something that created minds can overcome.There are differences between the Neoplatonist and the Christianconceptions of God, but this is not the place to specify them.How does creation come to be?We should remember the distinctive

mark of Christian thought that the cosmos has a certain age, andtherefore began a definite number of time units ago. According toGregory of Nyssa, God instantaneously broughtHis Forms into activ-ity by His will, and made the world (page 94–6 above). According toMaximus, God made the world recently, and even if Maximus doesnot explicitly adopt and adapt the arguments of Philoponus (page 119above), he seems to have tried to develop a prolonged argument to thesame effect: the world was made instantaneously and with a temporalbeginning.2 It is interesting to note that Dionysius deviates from thisunderstanding of creation, and rather seems to view the cosmos as aresult of God’s eternal external activity (page 110–11 above). In thisregard he is not within the mainstream of Christian thought.The heading of this sub-section is ‘The living God’. The point of

this is to emphasize that the God of Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius,Maximus, and Gregory Palamas is not just a cosmic principle or aprinciple of being, but the God who lives, loves, and cares for Hiscreatures. The triadic conception of the Godhead adds to this notion,since the divine being itself exists in an eternal community of lovethat eventually is given by grace to beings other than God. In Chris-tian discourse the internal and external activity of God, therefore, isconceived of economically, i.e., with a view to the purpose of createdbeing. Even if beyond the capacity of the human intellect, God isbelieved to nurture love as a primary dimension of Himself.It is worthwhile to be precise about this: the concept of providence

was much discussed in the philosophical schools of late antiquity.Alexander of Aphrodisias denies that God knows individuals andclaims that it is below the dignity of God to attend to individuals.3

The divine activity that maintains the cosmos is evenly distributed inthe orderly arrangement and movement of the heavenly bodies; andparticular beings exist solely for the purpose of maintaining the

2 Cf. the long argument in Ambiguum 10, PG 91: 1176d–1188d.3 Sorabji (2004), 70.

Concluding Remarks 209

species.4 Plotinus, however, thinks that providence extends to indivi-duals, and Proclus believes that it comprises everything.5 On theother hand, this does not mean that God has any primary concernwith what is ‘below’, i.e., in the created world. To speak of God’s carefor creatures must be a metaphorical use of terms, since there isnothing like the Maximian or Christian ‘mystery of Christ’ in thesesystems. It seems fair to claim that the concept of God in the schoolsamounts to a notion of a rather remote, divine principle. There is notmuch of the living and loving God of the Christians to be found.

PARTICIPATION

The act of creation is a divine activity ad extra. In relation to the conceptof transcendence thismeans thatGod establishes something new, some-thing that was not before, and, so to speak, makes room for what is notHimself. It is obvious that such an otherness cannot be or exist by anypower inherent in it, since it has no such power, but depends in allrespects on God. This total dependence is expressed in the terminologyof participation. I admit that I have always found this notion ratherobscure. Many of us first met this term in the philosophy of Plato, andreading the introduction to his Parmenides one easily gets entangled inthe problem of how to conceive of it (page 15 above). On the otherhand, it now seems to me that the notion is not that difficult. Imay bewrong, but after having studiedGregory of Nyssa,Dionysius, Maximus,and Gregory Palamas with respect to their notion of participation,I have come to the conclusion that participation is mainly used inChristian thought to denote God’s activity in what is not God. Beingsare said to participate inGod becauseHe is present in creatures by beingactive in them, by operating in them. This way of understanding isrelevant in cosmology, incarnational theology, and soteriology.Human activities, and the activities of created being in general, are

limited in space and time. They begin and end, even if some go on forsome time. Divine activity is not such. Based on God’s inexhaustiblePower it is not limited, but goes on dynamically and invisibly, creating,preserving, and perfecting creatures. With such a difference in mind it

4 Sorabji (2004), 80. 5 Sorabji (2004), 84.


may even be tempting to use the term energy to describe this activity.Gregory ofNyssa speaks of this activity in terms of God pervading thingsandmixingwith the cosmos.He also speaks of it asfitting things togetherand maintaining everything (page 97 above). Maximus says that Godlets beings participate in His ‘beginningless works’, which, as we haveseen, is another term for the divine activity (page 126–7 above). Tome allof this seems tomean that the divine activity, in different ways, is presentin created being, working actively in particulars and in the totality, inaccordance with divine paradigms and the divine scheme of salvation(pages 97–8, 114–15, 129–30 above). This understanding of participa-tion probably does not run into the problems thatPlato had to face in theParmenides.Divided Forms and divided activities seem to me to presentrather different kinds of problems. Forms are in some sense ‘beings’,while activities are acts. An agentmay distribute his activities to differentthings successively, but even so it is not reasonable to say that any splitoccurs in the acts due to the difference of objects he attends to.When hedoes one thing, his activity is complete; when he turns to another thing,his activity is still complete, and has not lost some ‘part’ of itself. Thedivine activity, however, is permanently present. It is at least present aslong as something is kept in being. It seems reasonable to me that Godmay keep beings in being by one simple act of being, if this act of being isreceived into different creatures as a power to be in accordance with thecapacity given to these creatures by God. Beings do not participate insome part of God’s activity, but in the whole according to principleslimiting their receptive capacity (page 122, 129 above). Of course, wemay remember Maximus’ terminology, in which divine works are saidto be ‘beings’ (page 126–7 above). I do not think, however, thatMaximususes this term in the static sense of something substantial, he rathermakes the claim that acts, works, or activities are realities manifested byGod in the world of being. Platonic Forms are not active, something thatmakes it difficult for them to be distributed to participants. Nor is there adivine Mind that brings the Forms into activity; if not, the Demiurge ofthe Timaeus could do the job.

ESSENCE, HYPOSTASIS, AND ENERGEIA

Meyendorff was a pioneer in the scholarly work on Palamas. I think,with due respect, that it is about time to look critically at some of the


claims he makes in his research. The term ‘real distinction’ is the mostnotorious. We shall return to that in the next section. We shall discussanother matter first. Meyendorff says that Palamas’ opponents sharedan essentialist philosophy as well as certain philosophical notions thatwere borrowed from Aristotelian and Neoplatonist sources and givenvalidity by the authority of Dionysius the Areopagite.6 The philoso-phy of Palamas’ adversaries is obviously seen as being rather differentfrom that of Palamas, and as characterized by a technical vocabularyand stiffened thought-forms not quite able to grasp the dynamics ofByzantine spirituality. However, we have seen that Christian philo-sophy and theology developed throughout the centuries, bringingwith it not only a terminology that is similar to the schools, buteven addressing similar challenges in ways that are both similar anddifferent from the Neoplatonists. I do not make any strong claimshere as to Neoplatonism’s influence on Christian thinking. This is aquite intricate matter, and I am rather critical about assertions ofinfluence and dependence. I make the claim, however, that the two‘movements’ coped with problems of a similar kind. It strikes me thatancient Christian thought in some regards has more in common withNeoplatonism than Meyendorff admits. Meyendorff seems to have anegative attitude towards what he calls ‘essentialism’. Now, what isessentialism? Is it the tendency to hold essential being as the mostbasic ontological feature or level of reality? Meyendorff’s words onpersonalism seem to indicate that.7 I suppose this is a version of the‘de Regnon thesis’, which was put forward in 1892: Latin thinkingabout the Trinity begins with divine unity and proceeds from natureto person, while Greek thinking proceeds from person to nature.8 InHart’s words, ‘many of us have come to believe that we must choosebetween “Greek” personalism and “Latin” essentialism’.9 It is inkeeping with this that Meyendorff says that ‘Maximus affirmed,following the Cappadocians and in the terms used by Leontius ofByzantium, the autonomous existence of the divine person, sourceand not product of nature’.10 Zizioulas claims in accordance with thesame way of thinking that ‘the ultimate ontological category whichmakes something really be, is neither an impersonal and incommu-nicable “substance”, nor a structure of communion existing by itself

6 Meyendorff (1974), 204. 7 Meyendorff (1974), 212–13.8 Hart in Coakley (2004), 111–12. 9 Ibid.10 Meyendorff (1974), 212.


or imposed by necessity, but rather the person’.11 He even claims thatGod’s being is the consequence of a free person, and that ‘God’ has noontological content, no true being, apart from communion: ‘In thisway, communion becomes an ontological concept in patristicthought.’ The claims made by Meyendorff and Zizioulas make me abit uneasy. If representatives of Greek patristic thought start withsomething other than the notion of essence, they start with the notionof hypostasis, but that is not exactly the same as Meyendorff’s orZizioulas’ person.However, do they really start with that? The pictureI have discovered and presented above points rather to a constantlypresent dialectical shift between the notion of essence and the notionof hypostasis. In one way it seems as if hypostasis is a mode ofessential existence in concreto. On the other hand one should becareful not to take what, for instance, the Cappadocians say in thisregard as an ontological doctrine. When Gregory of Nyssa uses thelanguage of essence and hypostasis in connection with God, what hehas in mind is not a set of philosophical concepts applied to the beingof God, but rather a qualified strategy to speak of what is revealed. Hemakes no claims as to what comes first and what comes second.Rather he applies the terms pragmatically. Of course, all three Cap-padocian Fathers agree that the hypostasis of the Father is the sourceof the hypostases of the Son and the Spirit. This, somehow, identifiesa hypostatic source of the being of the two generated hypostases. Onthe other hand, it is a primary concern that the generations commu-nicate hypostases of the same nature. Further, when one comes to aphilosopher of the format of Maximus, one finds that the content ofthe hypostasis is markedly natural. While Zizioulas thinks that com-munion is a personal property, Maximus obviously thinks that com-munion is a natural or essential property. That a particular entity iscommunicative in its very being is not due to the characteristics of thehypostasis, it is rather given in the essential constitution as such.12 Onthe other hand, it is in the mode of hypostatic being that essentialcontents are individualized. I think it is quite difficult if not impos-sible to separate a concept of person from a concept of individual inGreek patristic thought. If one emphasizes too strongly that theperson is the source of the nature or essence, one risks falling into anominalist position: what really exists are individuals, not natures.

11 Zizioulas (1985), 17–18.12 See Ambiguum 41, cf. Tollefsen (2008), chapter 3.


How should we then avoid tritheism? I think it is important to see thevirtues of Maximus’ essentialist position: individual human beings areinstantiations of structures of being that put every single individual inrelationship with every other individual. This is not even limited tohuman individuals, but comprises the whole of being. In the hypo-static mode, however, lies the possibility of living in accordance withor discordant with nature, i.e., to live in virtuous communion withGod and His creatures, or to live in enmity with them.

Even if this had to be said, the concept of hypostasis withinChristian theology and Christian anthropology represents an inter-esting step beyond Neoplatonism. If one considers the primaryhypostases of the Plotinian system, one gets the impression thatthey are rather impersonal principles or entities. There is no com-munion of love, no ‘personal’ relatedness between the hypostases. Atthis point I think Bradshaw is correct when he says that ‘Plotinianhypostases are not persons, however, so that the external energeia isnot yet a truly personal act’.13 It seems quite obvious that in Christiantheology another kind of hypostasis turns up than what is found inNeoplatonism. This is a kind of hypostasis in which natural energeiai,the energeiai of the essence, become modified into personal acts. Thisis a distinctive Christian conception of God’s providence. God desirescommunion with His creatures. He acts to share His own good withthem. But to conceive of it in this way is not to oppose essence andhypostasis, it is rather to acknowledge the dialectical shift between thetwo in the ontological description of beings.What shall we think, further, of Meyendorff’s real distinction? I am

not very fond of the term. I feel it somehow makes the distinctionbetween essence and activity too radical. Palamas tried to clear thefield, exploring different possible ways of formulating how activity isrelated to essence (page 196–8 above). God acts by the powers of Hisnature and is active in creatures to the degree they are able to receiveHis influence into their ontological constitution. I cannot see thereare any major philosophical problems with this idea. Because of God’swork in them, human beings receive characteristics that are divine.This is a claim made by Eastern Christian tradition. It is substantiatedin different ways in major thinkers like Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysiusthe Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory Palamas.

13 Bradshaw (2007), 267.


DIVINE SIMPLICITY

It is rather easy to understand Meyendorff’s concerns about the so-called real distinction: if the purpose of beings is to achieve deifica-tion, and if we do not consider it possible for creatures to becomedivine by nature, how are we to think of this deification? Is it just ametaphor? For anyone acquainted with the Greek Christian, Byzan-tine, and Orthodox tradition, it should be obvious that it is not just ametaphor. In this regard there seems to be no room for a created giftthat could be termed ‘deifying grace’. If that is the case, we are leftwith the notion of divine energeia. Bradshaw claims that Augustinenurtured a doctrine of divine simplicity that implies freedom from alldistinctions (page 100 above). Divine properties are basically one andthe same thing. They are all telescoped into the concept of the simpledivine essence.14 Whether or not this interpretation of Augustine iscorrect, it definitely makes good sense. There is not much if anythingto be found in Augustine about divine energeia that is comparable tothe doctrines of the Greeks. Thomas Aquinas is an heir to theAugustinian legacy even if this Augustinianism is interpreted withinthe quite different context of scholasticism, and under the consciousreception of Aristotelian categories. Thomas argues that God is sim-ple, in the sense namely thatHe is neither a body, nor isHe composedof matter and form.15God is the same asHis essence or nature, and inGod essence and existence or being (esse) is one and the same.Thomas takes up the question of whether there are accidents inGod.16 The answer, as may be expected, is no. We may rememberthat one of the strategies tried out by Palamas to explain the divineenergeiai was to interpret them as accidents (page 196–7 above). Thisdid not, however, turn out to be satisfactory. As a matter of fact, thereis something that Thomas says in the present context that seemsrelevant for us:

Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothingaccidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capabil-ity of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidentsare caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be

14 Bradshaw (2007), 224–5. 15 Cf. Summa theologiae I, question 3.16 Summa theologiae I, question 3, article 6.


nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows thatthere is no accident in God.17

This is a striking paragraph. Thomas denies constituent accidents,and even if these are not exactly what the Greeks understand bydivine energeiai, we surely have moved a bit closer to the real issue.When it comes to properties, such as goodness, God is good essen-tially, which means that such properties are identicalwith the essence,i.e., the being of God.18 There is something rather curious in thequotation above, namely Thomas’ argument that there can be noth-ing caused in God since He is the first cause. Nothing that is in Godcan be caused by anything external toHis being. This is quite obvious.But does Thomas at the same time deny that God may cause some-thing within His own sphere of uncreated being? The Cappadociansapplied the concept of causality to Trinitarian generation (page 48–9above), even if Maximus seems to have been more restrictive in thisregard (page 78–9 above). Thomas’ denial of essential properties isalso strange on the basis of the Aristotelian distinction between firstactuality = second potentiality = capacity and second actuality oractivity. Whatever we think of all this, the main point is the notion ofdivine simplicity, which probably excludes the patristic concept ofdivine energeia. Balás appeals explicitly to the concept of divinesimplicity when he denies that Gregory of Nyssa’s divine attributesare uncreated energies in the Palamitic sense (page 99 above). Thisimplies, of course, that Balás thinks there is a violation of thisprinciple in Palamas’ thought. Palamas speaks of three aspects ofGod, essence, hypostases, and activities (page 186 above). Where,one may wonder, do the ways part? The Greeks as well would insistupon divine simplicity; even Palamas does so, quoting Maximus.19

All Christians would have to distinguish between the one essence andthe three hypostases or persons in God. Quite generally one shouldexpect, as in Augustine, a claim that divine simplicity is an essentialfeature of God. Even so, the Augustinian and the Thomistic Godseems locked up inHis perfect simplicity and the only wayHe reachesbeyondHis sphere is when byHis will aloneHe acts as efficient cause.Logically this makes all kinds of communication of being, grace, andperfection into created effects of His will. I am sure this corollary is

17 Ibid. 18 Cf. Summa theologiae I, question 6.19 Triads 3.3.10.


open to criticism, and maybe deservedly so. It is, however, importantto get hold of the principal features of the two sets of ontologies thatseem to make a dividing line.The God of the Greek Fathers we have considered above reaches

forth into the sphere of created beings in a quite dynamic manner.I do not think the charge of violation of the attribute of simplicitywould have bothered the Greeks much. Maximus and Palamas whoquotes him, think that all the causes of things are a unity in God. Thisidea is put forward in the Mystagogia (chapter 1) in the image of thecircle, its radii, and its centre. Basically all logoi are expressions of theone Logos, and all activities are basically one divine activity. Is thisreasonable?One might at least say that the one Logosmay conceive inHis unitary wisdom all logoi as different ways for created otherness toreflect the divine Source. They are a unity since they are conceived inHis eternal contemplation of Himself, even if, strictly speaking, Godtranscends even contemplative thought, as we have seen (page 124above). One might also conceive of the different activities as beingdistinct in relation to creatures, but unified in their source since theyissue from one and the same divine power (page 130, 198, 200 above).

Even if it is not quite comme il faut to say so in these days ofecumenical efforts, it strikes me that Greek and Latin Christianthought represent two different kinds of ontologies. However,I cannot see that the ancient Greek Christian thought lacks in philo-sophical virtues compared with its alternative.

CREATED AND UNCREATED BEING

The final topic involves the relation between uncreated and createdbeing in the cosmos at large, in the being of Christ as incarnated, andin the process of deification.How are we to avoid mixing together theuncreated being of God with created being in connection with thecosmos? It all depends on what we understand with mixture (page134–7 above). As a matter of fact, Gregory of Nyssa’s terminology ofmixture may be a daring but rather refreshing way to consider themystery of communion between uncreated and created being. I haveshown that beings are created out of nothing, and according toMaximus, there are divine logoi for particulars, species and genera(page 129–30 above). However, even if beings are by nature created,


the conditions by which they exist cannot be created. I suppose this isa bit surprising. However, if beings exist on the basis of other condi-tions, what should these conditions be? Perhaps one might say thatthe condition of created essential being is a kind of created being. Ifso, one might ask by what condition created being exists as such acondition. The answer may involve an infinite regress, so that even-tually one has to admit that creatures exist on the condition of thedivine activity of being itself. Beings are essentially created, but theconditions on which they exist are the creative and preservativeactivity of God. According to Maximus, beings receive the divineactivity of being to the degree defined by God in the logoi of theirmaking (page 129 above). All of this is quite natural, since the radicaltranscendence of God and God’s total mastery of otherness cannotmake room for any other source of being and preservation anddeification than God Himself by His activity.A problem we ran into above becomes important in connection

with this. What about deification? If all reality exists by participationin divine activity, is not all reality deified already? Not at all. On theone hand, from a purely philosophical angle, what keeps beings inbeing becomes a riddle given the present conditions initiated by theFall. From a non-religious thinker’s point of view, God cannot be saidto be the source of that which keeps beings in being. To employ asaying of Søren Kierkegaard, there is not anything incommensurablewith the being of beings even if corruptibility takes its toll and createsanguish. It is obvious that created being does not possess the condi-tion of deified existence. And if such a condition of being bearswitness to a divine source, it is in the sophisticated manner of thefragile dialectic between life and death. On the other hand, from aChristian point of view, the true nature of created being is not to bejudged on the basis of the present conditions of corruptibility andlimitation. Even if limitation and corruptibility are definite character-istics of beings in the present condition, such properties do not haveto be features of the nature of beings from the perspective of thebeginning and end of the created cosmos. In the Christology ofGregory of Nyssa one gets the impression that the humanity of Christis diluted to such a degree that almost nothing remains of humannature as such (page 137 above). In Maximus’ and Palamas’ doctrineof the deification of human beings we generally hear about becomingall that God is, except for identity of essence, and also of becomingwithout beginning and end (pages 180, 200). Even if divine and


human nature are not mixed together, human nature is ontologicallyopened up for an existence in a divine mode of being. In our dailyexperience this is rather beyond human nature, it is super-human.How can a being that suffers such things be human any more? This isa challenging question, especially since Maximus has committedhimself philosophically to the idea of the integrity of nature: Christiandoctrine does not teach mythological transformations from one nat-ure into another or of two natures melting together to make up a new,third kind of nature (page 148–9 above). How is this problem to besolved?According to the Cappadocian Fathers it is not possible for created

minds to know the essence of any nature (page 52 above). Only Godknows the nature of beings. When beings are made in accordancewith the divine pattern, their paradigms, Forms, or logoi, this meansthat only God knows the real definitions of beings, their potentialities,and possible activities. Only God knows how essences are designedwith regard to an expansion of their being in accordance with thedivine purpose. I would also like to emphasize once again thatGregory of Nyssa’s discussion of a mixture between the divine andthe human in Christ is a rather challenging way of conceiving of theprospects of man’s final destiny. At least according to the kind ofthinking we find in Greek Christian and Byzantine thought, man’sdestiny is beyond his present condition, and he is made such as he iswith the potentiality of a development beyond imagination.


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Index

activity 198–200accident 85–6accompany essence 40as Father 42–3beginning/end of 41–2double 21–2, 48, 69–70follows essence 43, 84internal/external 5, 47–8knowledge 36–7motion of essence 40logoi and activities 125

analogy/analogies 52, 55, 57analogia entis 72Anomoean controversy 34apophatic theology 72–4‘around it/him/God/them’ 24, 78, 91,

127, 140, 168, 189Augustine, St 100, 215, 216

Balás, David 99–101, 216Barnes, Jonathan 52Bathrellos, Demetrios 143, 150being, created and uncreated

217–19Bradshaw, David 48–9, 58, 99–100,

214, 215

cataphatic theology 72–4Catholic Encyclopedia 10causality:exitus-reditus scheme 33–4divine 19, 68–9efficient/final, Aristotle 20list of causes 113proodos, epistrofe 123triadic scheme 67, 69, 103

cause, Father as 78–9cause, unparticipated 114Chalcedonian adverbs 148–9,

178–9communicatio idiomatum

138–40, 161creation, Christian doctrine of 102emanationism 107–8experience and sensation 180–1

deification 134, 137, 178–81Dionysius:

acts of will 107capacity to receive 117causes 113divine causality 68–9divine freedom 111–12divine knowledge 107God as unparticipated 114names, unity and distinction 105–6union and distinction 66–7, 103paradigmatic cause 116paradigms/logoi/acts of will 107participation 113–16providence 106remaining, procession, conversion

104–5, 106will, divine 107–8, 109–10, 111

distinction:between essence and activities/energeiai 35, 128–9, 198

ontological 43, 48, 168–9real 2, 86, 99, 169, 193, 198, 214, 215union and distinction/differentiation 66–7, 67–8

energeia:as actuality 16–17complete/incomplete 18first/second actuality 86–7, 96, 121,131, 170, 195

in translation 4–5energy:

essence and 1–2uncreated 58, 99, 134

extension 84, 93, 94, 96, 168Eunomius:

activity of Fatherhood 84ingenerateness, divine 37–8knowledge of divine essence 38on names 37–8

essence and hypostasis 49–51

Forms:and contemplation 122

Forms: (cont.)for creation 94Platonic doctrine of 14

Gregory Nazianzen, St 77–8Gregory of Nyssa, St:community of properties 138–40concept of energeia 88–9contemplation of properties 137–9creation 93–4epektasis 166freedom of the Father 66generation, analysis of 54–7happiness/blessed life 165imitation 163, 164, 165, 167mimetic activities, the virtues 162–3,165

mixing 98, 134–7, 140–1, 219mysteries, the 159–61names of God 53–4participation 97–101, 137–8, 161–4,166–8

power, divine 94–5, 96–8, 140–1, 163presence in everything, divine 97–9unity of Christ 141–2will, human 160–1wisdom, power 94–5

Gregory Palamas, St 2, 99activity/activities 198–200activity defined 192–3apophatisism 188–9forms/logoi 190–2distinction, real 193–8Filioque 188Holy Spirit, the 187–8, 202, 203, 204paradigms/exemplars 191–2participation 189–91, 198–200sensation 204–5the Trinity 186–8transcendence 188–9will, God’s 196

happiness/blessed life 165hesychasm 2Hesychast experience 205Hesychasts 201hypostatic union, the 120

identity/likeness 161, 167imitation 16, 163, 164, 165, 167

John Chrysostom, St 38–9John Philoponus 118–19, 121

Maximus the Confessor:affirmation and negation 153–4cause, Father as 78–9Church, the 171deification 144, 157, 178–81development, three stages 171–2energeia 145–7�æªÆ/works, divine 126–9essence as energeia 75–7experience and sensation 180–1foreknowledge 80, 120± Ææ��Æ 149–50humanization, divine 157–8humanity of Christ 155–6hypostatic union 120, 152–4incarnation 122innovation of modes 144logos 122–4, 125, 129–30, 143, 147–8logos and contemplation 124logos of being 122–3, 182microcosm 148mode, divine 126, 155Mystagogia chapter 5 172–6mystery of Christ 78–9, 120, 122�P��Æ-��Æ Ø�-K��æª�ØÆ/essence-power-activity 145, 151–2

participation 126–32, 181–3proodos/epistrofe 123remaining-procession-conversion123–4

soul, well-ordered 172–3tropos 143–4, 154union and distinction152–3, 181

virtue 176will, divine 125will in Christ 156

metaphor 39, 54, 55, 56metaphysics of prepositions 104Meyendorff, John 193, 198, 208–9,

211–13, 214, 215mixture 134–7, 179, 219motion, incomplete energeia 18mysteries, the 159–61

names 50non-being 72–3

228 Index

Origen 33ousia, translation of 4

Palamism 2participation:Aristotle 15–16as imitation 16concluding remarks on 210–11Dionysius 113–16Gregory of Nyssa 97–101Gregory Palamas 189–91, 198–200Maximus the Confessor 126–32, 181–3Plato 14–15Plotinus 27–9, 30–1

Paul, St:Col 1: 16–17 104Rom 11: 36 33, 80, 104

Plotinus:double activity 21, 69–70emanation 21generation, divine 22–3internal/external activity 22, 26–7Mind, the generation of 24–5necessity 26–7omnipresence, divine 28–9participation 27–9, 30–1

power 29–30principle of limitation 30procession/conversion 24–5, 67, 115remaining 23remaining-proceeding-converting 70will, divine 64, 109

predication, God as subject of 39, 53–4Proclus 67, 69, 103, 117, 123progress, infinite 168

simplicity, divine 36–7, 99–100, 215–17sun, analogy of 115super-being 72

theandric energeia 143, 157Thomas Aquinas 100, 215–16three men, analogy of 50–2tritheist 50

virtue 162–3, 164–5, 176

will, divine 20, 59–62, 63–4, 75, 95,107–8, 109–10, 125, 196–7

will, human 160–1

Zizioulas, John 212–13

Index 229

activity and participation in late antique and early christian thought

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