acknowledgments - coachella valley association of … · 2015-07-20 · executive summary ......

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report was authorized by the Coachella Valley Association of Governments and prepared by Schiermeyer Consulting Services with assistance from Transportation Planning Services. Members of the Inter-City Rail Services Feasibility Study Project Development Team include: City of Indio, City of La Quinta, City of Palm Desert, City of Palm Springs, and SunLine Transit Agency. Further assistance was provided by the National Passenger Railroad Corporation (Amtrak).

PROJECT STAFFING

Allyn Waggle, Coachella Valley Association of Governments Carl Schiermeyer, Schiermeyer Consulting Services

Elaine Kuhnke, Transportation Planning Services Laura Ayala, Graphics

Ashley Hayward, Graphics

Table of Contents Chapter Page Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ i 1. Background and Study Approach

A. Introduction ................................................................................................................1 B. Goal and Approach of Current Study ........................................................................3

2. Evaluation of Service Options C. Service Description ....................................................................................................5 D. Service Options ..........................................................................................................9 E. Evaluation of Service Characteristics ........................................................................11 F. Recommended Service Option ..................................................................................14

3. Evaluation of Projected Operating Costs and Revenues G. Train Operating Costs by Option ................................................................................15 H. Discussion of Amtrak Operating Costs and Revenues ..............................................16 4. Projected Capital Costs I. Capital Improvements and Rolling Stock Costs ...........................................................20 J. Discussion of Rolling Stock Purchase Options ...........................................................25 5. Projected Service Operating Costs

K. Summary of Service Operating Costs ........................................................................27

6. Proposed Funding Plan L. Capital and Operating Costs .......................................................................................30 M. Potential Local Funding Sources ...............................................................................32 7. Study Findings and Recommendations

N. Summary of Study Findings ......................................................................................33 O. Key Study Recommendations ....................................................................................35

List of Figures Figure Page 1 - Rail Route to Coachella Valley ......................................................................................6 2 – Coachella Valley Station Map .......................................................................................8

List of Tables Table Page 1 - Miles Between Stations ..................................................................................................5 2 - Preliminary Train Schedules: Options A, B, & C ........................................................10 3 - Train Operating Costs and Revenues by Option ..........................................................15 4 - Railroad Facility and Station Capital Costs ..................................................................20 5 - Summary of Rolling Stock Costs .................................................................................24 6 - Summary of Capital Costs ............................................................................................26 7 - Service Operating Costs and Revenue Projections ($11 One-way Fare) .....................27 8 - Service Operating Costs and Revenue Projections ($18 One-Way Fare) ....................28 9 - Proposed Net Operating Funding Scenario (CA Car Purchase) ...................................31

10 - Proposed Net Operating Funding Scenario (Amtrak Horizon Lease) .........................31

List of Appendices

Appendix Number Amtrak Correspondence and Detailed Operating Costs ......................................................1 Detailed Indio Layover or Turnaround Facility Requirements ............................................2

Coachella Valley Passenger Rail Service Feasibility Study

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background of the Corridor The Los Angeles – Coachella Valley Intercity Rail Corridor has been the subject of intense interest during the past decade. In 1991, the Riverside County Transportation Commission (RCTC) undertook its first of two studies when it evaluated the feasibility of operating three daily roundtrip State-sponsored trains in the Corridor. The results of this effort led to a Caltrans Division of Rail license plate survey of travel patterns and behavior in the Corridor, which in turn led to a series of debates over projected ridership and revenues. In 1993, while awaiting the results of Caltrans’ ridership projections, the RCTC completed its second study. This study analyzed the option of implementing service as an extension of regular Metrolink commuter rail service on weekends only for a two-year demonstration period. Unfortunately, this concept also foundered due to an inability to reach agreement with the host railroad. Now, five years later, local Coachella Valley governmental agencies are still desirous of implementing service. And, as part of their effort to refocus attention towards the Corridor, the Coachella Valley Association of Governments (CVAG) commissioned this follow-up study. While many of its service attributes are similar to the original study, the single greatest difference distinguishing this study from its predecessors is the proposed Local/State funding plan recommended for the start-up years of service. Proposed Service Description As proposed, two daily roundtrip trains would operate from Los Angeles to the Coachella Valley using the Burlington Northern Santa Fe alignment between Los Angeles and Colton; trains would then turn eastward and continue to the Coachella Valley following the Union Pacific Railroad. Station stops would include Los Angeles Union Station, Fullerton Transportation Center, Riverside – Downtown, Palm Springs, and the former Amtrak Indio station. It is also proposed that a third station be located between Palm Springs and Indio in the vicinity of Palm Desert. Service would be operated by Amtrak as a three-year demonstration.

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Projected Railroad and Station Costs A total of $9.3 million is required to construct the proposed track and facility improvements. This includes $1.3 million for the construction of layover facilities near the Indio terminus station, $5 million for unspecified host railroad track and signal improvements, and $3 million for the proposed third Coachella Valley station in the vicinity of Palm Desert. Projected Rolling Stock Costs In addition to the track and facility improvements described above, rolling stock will either need to be purchased or leased. Based on the findings of this analysis, it is recommended that two additional California Car trainsets be purchased as part of Amtrak’s existing purchase option which expires on December 31, 1999. The total price for purchasing two additional 5-car trainsets and two F-59 locomotives is $28.6 million. Should a determination be made that equipment should be leased rather than purchased, the annual amount to lease two sets of Amtrak Horizon equipment is $1.46 million. Projected Net Operating Costs The estimated net annual cost for operating service ranges from $5.9 to $4.4 million depending on whether the rolling stock is purchased or leased. If the preferred option of purchasing new California Car equipment is ultimately selected, the annual net operating cost is significantly lower - $4.4 million. While selecting the lease option defers the large up-front capital expenditure, it also raises operating costs on an indefinite basis. Under both scenarios, however, it is firmly believed that these amounts represent “worst case” projections. As discussed in the full report, the estimated revenues and projections are based on the original Caltrans’ license plate survey which were the subject of intense debate and considered to be extremely conservative. Therefore, it is highly probable that actual net annual operating costs would be significantly less. Proposed Funding Plan – Capital Improvements and Rolling Stock A total of $37.9 million in capital funding is required to implement the proposed service. Under the proposed funding plan, $34.9 million would be fully financed by the State of California. The additional $3 million would be funded by local resources for the construction of the proposed third Coachella Valley station in the Palm Desert vicinity.

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Should it be determined that the host railroad infrastructure improvements are not required, total State funding would be reduced to $29.9 million. Proposed Funding Plan – Net Operating Costs In recognition of the strong interest in this service, it is proposed that local agencies contribute 25% of the anticipated net operating loss throughout the three-year demonstration period. At the conclusion of this time, should the service approximate the same performance standards of similar services during their start-up years, the State would assume complete funding responsibility. Assuming the selection of the preferred California Car purchase option, this amounts to $1.1 million annually and $3.3 million over the three-year period. Likewise, the State would be responsible for funding the remaining $3.3 million annually or $9.9 million over the three-year period. Should the lease option be pursued, local participation levels would increase to $4.4 million and State levels to $13.3 million. Key Study Findings The initiation of intercity passenger rail service in the Los Angeles – Coachella Valley corridor is technically feasible and highly desired by local Coachella Valley entities. Additional key findings are listed below. Local Agency Interest 1. Local Coachella Valley governmental agencies have given the proposed service a

high priority and have expressed interest in becoming a funding partner with the State of California to initiate service in the Corridor.

Host Railroads in the Corridor 2. The Union Pacific Railroad has indicated strong opposition towards the operation of

passenger rail service along its alignment in previous years and continues to be opposed at the time of this study. No opposition is anticipated from Burlington Northern Sante Fe.

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Alternative Service Options

3. While three different single roundtrip options were reviewed as part of this study, it was the opinion of Amtrak that these options failed to offer the level of flexibility required by the general public. A minimum of two roundtrip trains must be available before service should be initiated.

Station Assessment 4. The Palm Springs station is a modern intercity rail station with an enclosed building,

restrooms, and parking. The City of Indio has received a $1.5 million grant from the State to construct its new station and will match this amount with local resources. A third Coachella Valley station to be constructed in the vicinity of Palm Desert would provide optimal service to the Valley’s many resorts and facilities.

5. Due to the fluctuating climate conditions of the Coachella Valley, as well as its

appeal as a vacation and tourist resort, all stations should be constructed with climate-controlled, enclosed passenger facilities and strive to provide the same ground transportation services and facilities typically found at any airport.

Key Study Recommendations Based on the above study findings, it is recommended that the Coachella Valley Association of Governments (CVAG), and its elected officials, take the necessary steps to seek agreement with the State of California to implement a jointly funded, three-year demonstration of intercity passenger rail service in the Los Angeles – Coachella Valley Corridor. 1. The recommended service scenario includes the operation of two daily roundtrip

trains between Los Angeles and the Coachella Valley along the BNSF/UP alignments.

2. The State of California should ensure the availability of rolling stock by purchasing

two additional California Car trainsets as part of the existing Amtrak California Car purchase contract or assist in the lease of Amtrak Horizon cars.

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3. Coachella Valley governmental entities should enter into a partnership agreement with the State of California to share in the annual net operating costs during the three-year demonstration period.

4. Caltrans Division of Rail, along with Amtrak officials, should pursue further

discussions with Union Pacific for the use of its right-of-way. 5. Funding to construct a third Coachella Valley station in the vicinity of Palm Desert

should be actively pursued, although service could technically begin operating in advance of its opening.

6. Plans to provide adequate passenger waiting facilities and appropriate connecting

shuttle services at all Coachella Valley stations should be developed.

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A. Introduction The operation of intercity rail service between the Coachella Valley and Los Angeles and Orange Counties has been a long-term goal of both the Coachella Valley Association of Governments (CVAG) and the Riverside County Transportation Commission (RCTC). During the early 1990’s, when the RCTC was planning and beginning the operation of its commuter rail program as a member agency of the Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA), two distinctly different, but comprehensive studies of the corridor were prepared by Schiermeyer Consulting Services (SCS). A brief summary of these studies and their respective outcomes is provided below. Los Angeles-Coachella Valley-Imperial County Intercity Rail Feasibility Study (Dec. 1991) The purpose of this study was to complete a comprehensive assessment of the technical, operational, financial, and institutional issues associated with operating Caltrans State-sponsored/Amtrak intercity rail services in the corridor. Preliminary station sites were identified, and capital and operating budgets were prepared based on a full-service operating scenario of three daily roundtrip trains between Los Angeles and the Coachella Valley. The proposed routing assumed that trains would operate over the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) San Bernardino Subdivision via Fullerton from Los Angeles through Riverside to Colton, turn east onto the former Southern Pacific Yuma line (now owned and operated by Union Pacific), and continue to the Coachella Valley. An extension to the international United States/Mexico border was also considered as part of this service concept. The study was approved by CVAG and the RCTC Board and forwarded to Caltrans Division of Rail for review and action. While the feasibility study included a patronage forecast for the service based on standardized trip generation rates for intercity rail services, it was determined that additional travel data should be developed in order to better assess the corridor’s intercity rail ridership potential. In an effort to obtain this data, Caltrans commissioned a comprehensive license plate survey of the corridor. A license plate survey consists of videotaping all vehicles which pass through a given checkpoint in a corridor, identifying the owner of each vehicle through vehicle registration records, and then mailing surveys to each owner. In this instance, the survey questions focused on trip purpose, origin and destination points (zip codes), and the number of passengers traveling together during that specific trip. The license plate data was then coded into the newly developed (at that time) Caltrans origin-destination travel demand model. While the survey itself was highly successful, the ridership results produced from it were

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significantly lower than previous estimates, creating a less than satisfactory operating deficit and a significant barrier to further programming of the service. Discussions regarding the differences between the two forecasts were inconclusive, but in summary, it suffices to say that the most significant variable separating the two forecasts focused on the projected number of regional through-trips versus subregional or local trips. Los Angeles-Coachella Valley Weekend Demonstration Passenger Rail Service (Nov. 1993) In an effort to “jumpstart” operations in the corridor and piggyback on existing Metrolink commuter rail services within Riverside County while the previous study was under review by Caltrans Division of Rail, the RCTC developed an alternative service concept. This concept differed from the previous study in that the proposed service would operate as a demonstration for a two year period on weekends only as an extension of regular Metrolink commuter rail services. Under this scenario, service would be operated by contracted Metrolink crews, using Metrolink equipment during the peak visitor season of November through May. According to the Nov. 1993 study, “the primary purpose of the demonstration would be to test the market and demonstrate that ridership levels would be sufficient to maintain State minimum farebox requirements.” A total of ten one-way trips were proposed with one outbound Friday afternoon trip, two Saturday roundtrips, two Sunday roundtrips, and one Monday morning return trip. A fare structure which dovetailed with Metrolink’s zone system and corresponded with Amtrak fares for similar distances was developed, as well as a thorough examination of several ticketing and cash collection options. An analysis of projected ridership was also completed by applying a series of factors to the estimates prepared for the Dec. 1991 report. Alternate railroad alignments between Los Angeles and Riverside were also considered as part of this analysis, including the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) San Bernardino Subdivision described earlier and the Union Pacific Railroad upon which Metrolink currently operates its Riverside – Los Angeles via Ontario service. The primary advantage that the UP alignment had over the BNSF (at that time) was that it offered a quick start-up. Since Metrolink was already operating service in the corridor, it seemed that it would be a relatively easy step to simply extend the trains to the Coachella Valley. It was acknowledged and in fact reflected in the report that should it be determined that timing issues were not the most important issue that preliminary revenue and ridership estimates suggested that the BNSF alignment would be more productive due to its link to Orange County.



While the concept was given serious consideration by both Metrolink and RCTC staff, implementation of the proposed service was opposed by Union Pacific because of its reluctance to add increased passenger rail service on the Yuma mainline during weekends (a busy time for movement of freight trains). In addition to the railroad opposition, there were some secondary issues associated with keeping the Metrolink equipment overnight in the Coachella Valley, as well as the possible degradation of regular Monday morning commuter schedules should the train be delayed upon its return to Riverside. It is believed, however, that these secondary issues could have been eventually overcome. B. Goal and Approach of Current Study While the goal of this study is similar to the previous two feasibility studies – to develop a plan for operating passenger rail services in the Los Angeles – Coachella Valley Corridor – it is distinguished from its predecessors in at least three ways. First, this study recognizes the need for increased local participation at both the policy and financial levels. To this end, CVAG commissioned this study and created an Inter-City Rail Services Feasibility Study Project Development Team to support its efforts. Elected officials and executive management from the following jurisdictions are members of this initial advisory group: City of Indio, City of La Quinta, City of Palm Desert, City of Palm Springs, and SunLine Transit Through a series of discussions with this group, a total of three service options were reviewed, as well as alternative funding plans which include a local participation element. Secondly, this study recognizes the fact that Amtrak (the National Passenger Railroad Corporation) already has rights to operate in the corridor. As part of its original charter, Amtrak enjoys an “absolute right” to operate passenger trains virtually anywhere within the United States it wants, subject to schedule and infrastructure negotiations with the host railroad. While Metrolink also has the right to operate over either the BNSF or UP track between Los Angeles and Riverside/Colton, they have no operating rights between Colton and the Coachella Valley. Therefore, since Amtrak already has these rights, it is assumed that the proposed service would be operated by Amtrak and that negotiations with UP could be reached more quickly and with less of a financial penalty. Thirdly, at the time of the previous two studies, the only passenger rail stop located in the Coachella Valley was in Indio for the transcontinental Amtrak route known as the “Sunset Limited.” Now, a second modern station has been constructed as part of the State Transit Capital Improvement (TCI) funding cycle in the City of Palm Springs. While this station also serves the “Sunset Limited” during the early morning hours, more importantly it serves as a constant reminder of “what could be, but isn’t.” In addition, however, its presence



somewhat changes the playing field from earlier years and puts the Coachella Valley one step closer to realizing its long term goal. Finally, it should be pointed out what this study is not. This study is not a market research document; its objective is not to convince the reader how much passenger rail service is needed in the study corridor. In fact, after reading this report, one will not know how many tourists or seasonal residents visit the Coachella Valley on a daily basis, how many live within the catchment area of the corridor route, or what the various trip purposes might be. It assumes that there is a market for the service and uses as its base the most conservative of the three ridership forecasts completed to date, the Caltrans Division of Rail estimate prepared as part of the license plate survey described above. What this document will do, however, is provide the framework for further operational and funding discussions relative to implementing service in the corridor. Its objective is to lay out a recommended service plan which has been developed through coordination with local Coachella Valley agencies, as well as Amtrak, and provide a realistic hands-on assessment of the technical and funding issues associated with implementing service.



C. Service Description The proposed alignment is similar to that of the Dec. 1991 Intercity Rail Feasibility Study. Service would begin at Los Angeles Union Station in downtown Los Angeles and follow the BNSF San Bernardino Subdivision through Fullerton and Riverside. In Colton, at the junction of the BNSF and UP railroads, the alignment would turn eastward towards the Coachella Valley following the Union Pacific Railroad (Figure 1). Proposed Station Locations Between Los Angeles and Riverside, the proposed trains would be served by the following existing Amtrak and/or Metrolink stations: Los Angeles Union Station, Fullerton Transportation Center, and Riverside – Downtown. Within the Coachella Valley, a total of three stations are envisioned: the existing Palm Springs Amtrak station, a substantially improved Indio terminus located at the former Amtrak station stop, and a totally new mid-Coachella Valley station to be built between Palm Springs and the Indio terminus, in the vicinity of Palm Desert near Monterey Avenue. A third site was also previously recommended in the Dec. 1991 study in order to better serve its elongated geography. Table 1 provides a mileage chart based on these proposed stations.

Table 1

MILES BETWEEN STATIONS

Station Area Served Miles Los Angeles Los Angeles County - Fullerton Orange County 26 Riverside- Downtown Inland Empire 36

Subtotal 62 Palm Springs West Coachella Valley 56

Cumulative Subtotal 118 Palm Desert Vicinity Mid-Coachella Valley 11 Indio East Coachella Valley 12

Subtotal 23 TOTAL CORRIDOR DISTANCE 141



[INSERT FIGURE 1: RAIL ALIGNMENT]



Description of Coachella Valley Stations Situated at the head of the Coachella Valley and just south of the intersection of Indian Avenue and Interstate 10, the Palm Springs station is well-positioned to serve passengers with final destinations in West Coachella Valley. From this location, the many resorts and recreational attractions located both within the cities of Palm Springs and Desert Hot Springs (north of I-10) can be easily accessed (Figure 2). The Palm Springs Amtrak station is a modern, intercity rail facility situated on a 13 acre parcel. The facility includes a passenger loading platform, an enclosed 2,161 square foot building with restrooms and a vending area, lighting, landscaping, and parking for 40 automobiles, plus bus/RV parking and loading. Likewise, the former Indio Amtrak stop (located northeast of Jackson Street and Avenue 45) is also well-situated to serve passengers with final destinations in East Coachella Valley. It should be pointed out, however, that while the Indio site is well-positioned to serve east Coachella Valley, it will require significant improvements in order to bring it to modern intercity standards. To this end, the City of Indio has requested and received a State grant of $1.5 million to be matched with $1.5 million in City funds. Currently, the City is moving into the design phase of its station development plans. As previously discussed, a third site has always been recommended in order to adequately serve the resorts and residents of mid-Coachella Valley. As shown in Table 1, the distance between the Palm Springs station and Indio terminus is approximately 23 miles. If Palm Springs were the only station stop, passengers with a final destination in mid or east Coachella Valley would be forced to travel quite an additional distance before reaching their final destination. Vice versa, if only the Indio station were used, passengers would have to backtrack significantly. Between these two points, however, are a host of additional resorts located in the cities of Cathedral City, Rancho Mirage, Palm Desert, Thousand Palms, and Indian Wells. Furthermore, because the rail alignment is located as much as five miles north of the urbanized area, actual driving distances to these points are greater than those shown in Table 1. Therefore, in an effort to provide the most attractive intercity rail services possible to as many major resorts and desert communities as feasible, three stations continue to be recommended in this report. Alternative Service Scenario Nonetheless, should it not be possible to initiate service with three fully-operational stations, the location of the Palm Springs station would make it “technically feasible” to start service with only a single station. While such a service scenario is not optimum, nor is it



[INSERT FIGURE 2: MAP OF COACHELLA VALLEY STATIONS]



recommended, the location of the Palm Springs station at the far west end of the Valley would make such a scenario feasible. On the other hand, were, the only operational station located at the east end of the Valley in Indio, a single station scenario would not be practical as the majority of passengers would have to backtrack to reach their final destination. In addition, the Palm Springs station enjoys the added benefit of immediate access to I-10, which would make the prospect of operating continuing, connecting service more efficient and practical although still not as desirable as the recommended three-station scenario. D. Service Options In developing the alternative service scenarios to be further reviewed as part of this study, the key objective of the Project Development Team (PDT) was to develop a service option which would provide potential passengers with an attractive alternative for traveling to the Coachella Valley. Therefore, while it is acknowledged that operation of the service would ultimately have the added value of increased passenger rail service to various other destinations located along the corridor, its primary orientation would be to bring visitors and seasonal/part-time residents to the Coachella Valley. To this end, the PDT explored several preliminary service concepts and schedules. Based on discussions among the team members, however, a total of three service options were recommended for further review. These three options are described below. Option A – Daily Service with Equipment Layover Facility As the name implies, this option assumes the operation of a single, “daily” roundtrip train within the corridor. As envisioned, the train would depart Los Angeles Union Station each afternoon around 3:45 pm, remain overnight in the Coachella Valley, and depart the Indio/East Coachella Valley station each morning around 7:30 am. This option of course requires the construction of a secured, layover facility near the Indio terminus. A preliminary schedule showing intermediate stops is shown in Table 2. Option B – Weekend Service with Equipment Layover Facility Option B assumes that trains would operate on weekends throughout the entire year. Under this scenario, a train would depart Los Angeles Union Station around 3:45 pm each Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. As in Option A, these trains would layover in the Coachella Valley overnight and depart the Indio terminus at approximately 7:30 am each Saturday, Sunday,



and Monday. Again, the equipment would be stored at a secured facility near the Indio terminus.

Table 2

PRELIMINARY TRAIN SCHEDULES: OPTIONS A, B, & C

Options A & B:* (with layover facility)

Station Option C:** (no layover facility)

To Coachella Valley (read down): 3:45 pm Los Angeles 2:00 pm 4:25 pm Fullerton 2:40 pm 5:15 pm Riverside 3:30 pm 6:35 pm Palm Springs 4:50 pm 6:47 pm Palm Desert (Mid-Coachella Valley) 5:02 pm 7:00 pm Indio (East Coachella Valley) 5:15 pm

To Los Angeles (read down): 7:30 am Indio (East Coachella Valley) 6:30 pm 7:42 am Palm Desert (Mid-Coachella Valley) 6: 42 pm 7:55 am Palm Springs 6:55 pm 9:10 am Riverside 8:15 pm 10:05 am Fullerton 9:05 pm 10:45 am Los Angeles 9:45 pm

* Option A: Daily Service Schedules

Option B: Departures from Los Angeles on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday afternoons Departures from Indio on Saturday, Sunday, and Monday mornings

** Option C: Departures from Los Angeles on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday early afternoons Departures from Indio on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday evenings

Option C – Weekend Service with No Equipment Layover Facility Option C would also operate each weekend throughout the year. However, instead of laying over in the Coachella Valley each evening, the trains would return to Los Angeles that same day. Under this scenario, a train would depart Los Angeles around 2:00 pm each Friday, Saturday, and Sunday and return from Indio/East Coachella Valley at 6:30 pm of each corresponding day. No equipment layover facility is required for this option.



E. Evaluation of Service Characteristics Because each option provides distinctively different benefits, it is helpful to list their respective service characteristics before further analysis is undertaken. Option A: 1. Provides service every day of the week, with a mid-afternoon departure from

Los Angeles and an early morning return any given day 2. Requires potential passengers traveling to the Coachella Valley to spend the night 3. Same-day roundtrips to/from the Coachella Valley are not possible 4. Same-day roundtrips to destinations in the westbound direction are possible 5. Provides for weekday or weekend travel within the Corridor 6. Requires the construction of a layover facility Option B: 1. Provides weekend service only – with a mid-afternoon Friday departure from Los

Angeles, and early morning returns on Saturday, Sunday, and Monday morning 2. Designed specifically for weekend/weekly visits to the Coachella Valley, but requires

passengers to depart early Sunday or Monday mornings 3. Same-day roundtrips to/from the Coachella Valley are not possible 4. Same-day roundtrips to destinations in the westbound direction are possible 5. Requires the construction of a layover facility Option C: 1. Provides weekend service only – an early-afternoon Friday departure from Los Angeles,

with evening returns on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday 2. Designed specifically for weekends/weekly visits to the Coachella Valley, but allows

passengers to depart on Saturday or Sunday evenings 3. Same-day roundtrips to/from the Coachella Valley are not possible 4. Same-day roundtrips to destinations in the westbound direction are not possible 5. Does not require the construction of a layover facility



Discussion of Alternatives As the PDT considered these service characteristics, it became apparent that each option had its own specific benefits and constraints. Option A: Although this Option would provide daily service to and from the Coachella Valley at reasonable times, further analysis finds that it misses two important intercity corridor market segments. First, it does not allow for “same-day” roundtrip travel to and from the Coachella Valley – potential passengers must stay overnight. Second, it offers only early morning departures out of the Coachella Valley. While an evaluation of this situation from a tourism perspective might initially find such conditions to be economically favorable, in reality, such a schedule is very confining and will likely limit the overall market potential of the service. Additionally, given the typical trip purpose of most visitors to the Coachella Valley (leisure, recreational), it is questionable if such early departure times will prove attractive. Certainly, it would seem reasonable to assume that weekend visitors will be less than enthusiastic as they would be forced to either cut their trip short and depart early Sunday morning or extend their weekend to Monday morning and be late to work. On the other hand, the proposed schedule does offer some attractive options for travel in the westbound direction. As shown with the proposed schedule, almost a full day could be spent in Riverside or Fullerton any day of the week, as well as a much shorter day in Los Angeles. While it is unknown how big the market is for same-day roundtrip service in either direction, this additional pool of potential passengers is an important factor in considering the route’s overall revenue potential. Apart from these considerations and probably of greatest significance, however, is the fact that Amtrak considers the operation of one roundtrip in any given corridor to be insufficient. On several occasions throughout the course of this study, Amtrak staff emphasized their position that one roundtrip fails to offer the flexibility or attractiveness required to successfully stimulate the market potential of an intercity rail corridor. While it might be thought that a single roundtrip provides a starting point from which service could grow and expand, experience has found that it will fail before it is given this opportunity. Passengers expect a specific level of scheduling flexibility, even during the introduction of a new service, before considering it a viable transportation option. One roundtrip fails to meet this requirement and therefore provides little justification for further development of this Option.



Option B: This Option has many of the same problems associated with Option A – the need to construct a layover facility for what is essentially a single, daily one-way trip, with the added constraint of operating on weekends only. Based on the above discussion, therefore, it would initially appear that this Option would be even less attractive. However, in some ways, because of the weekend service schedule, the total impact of these constraints is less severe. Option B is designed to serve a specific market segment: the weekend Coachella Valley visitor or part-time/seasonal resident, as well as visitors who can stay a week at a time. Because of this specific market definition, the need or expectation for “same-day” roundtrip service or additional scheduling flexibility is greatly reduced. Since the schedules are designed to serve a specific market, it would seem reasonable to assume that as long as the service meets the travel needs of this market, the overall impact of operating only a single roundtrip train would be less severe than that described for Option A. In consideration of these points, Option B offers a fairly acceptable weekend schedule pattern. Option B also provides for same-day, roundtrip travel in the westbound direction on Saturdays and Sundays, as well as a Saturday overnight. As with Option A, however, it requires passengers to either depart the Coachella Valley early Sunday morning or extend their weekend visit to early Monday morning. Again, for reasons cited earlier, these schedules and service characteristics may prove problematic. Option C: The strength of Option C is that it can be fully operated without the need to construct any layover facilities in the Coachella Valley. It also appears to come closest to meeting the travel needs of Coachella Valley weekend visitors. Based on the proposed schedule in Table 2, it would be possible to spend Friday or Saturday evenings in the Coachella Valley, as well as both, and still return the following evening. The proposed schedule also eliminates the problems associated with the early Sunday or Monday morning departures, by providing a convenient 6:30 pm Sunday evening departure. While weekend travel in the westbound direction is also possible, the train does not arrive in Fullerton till 9:05 pm or in Los Angeles till 9:45 pm – somewhat late for an optimal weekend visit in Los Angeles, although not so late as to be considered totally unattractive. Unfortunately, because the train does not remain overnight in the Coachella Valley, same-day, roundtrip travel in either direction is eliminated in this Option.



F. Recommended Service Option Upon further discussion of each of the proposed options and their projected operating costs (presented in the following chapter), the PDT determined that each of the alternatives had significant constraints or deficiencies. Nonetheless, the most significant constraint associated with each of the options – a single roundtrip train - proved to be unacceptable. Therefore, after careful consideration and at the recommendation of Amtrak, the PDT decided to recommend a new alternative, Option D. As envisioned, Option D assumes the operation of two daily roundtrip trains with an overnight layover at both ends. By operating two roundtrip trains, many of the deficiencies described above would be reduced and passengers would be given more of the flexibility required to make the service attractive. While this recommendation will require greater resources from a capital and operating perspective, it was agreed that the single roundtrip service scenario underlying each of the preliminary options would ultimately fail to meet not only the needs of the Coachella Valley, but the Corridor as a whole.



G. Train Operating Costs by Option As part of the review process associated with evaluating each of the proposed service options, CVAG contacted Amtrak and requested their assistance in preparing a cost estimate for each option. In addition to the requested cost estimates, Amtrak graciously agreed to provide projected revenues based on their judgement of patronage and net operating costs. A copy of their correspondence, as well as their preliminary detailed estimates, is included in Appendix 1. These estimates are summarized below for discussion purposes.

Table 3

TRAIN OPERATING COSTS AND REVENUES BY OPTION

Option A (one daily

roundtrip with layover)

Option B (one roundtrip on

weekends with layover)

Option C (one roundtrip on weekends with no

layover)

Option D* (two daily

roundtrips with layover)

Annual Revenue** $ 471,859 $ 259,523 $ 235,930 $ 943,718 Annual Train Operating Cost

$ 2,599,387 $ 1,461,609 $1,064,322 $ 5,198,774

Annual Train Operating Loss

$ (2,127,527) $ (1,202,087) $ (828,392) $ (4,255,056)

Annual Passengers 38,677 21,272 19,339 77,354 Annual Passenger Miles

2,890,265 1,589,646 1,445,132 5,780,530

Farebox Recovery Ratio (revenue/costs)

18.15% 17.76% 22.16% 18.15%

* Revenue, costs, and passengers assumed to be twice that of Option A ** Includes food and beverages revenues



In reviewing Table 3, it should be noted that the projected train operating costs and revenues for Options A and D assume one daily roundtrip and two daily roundtrips respectively. Options B and C assume the operation of service on weekends only. The projected annual revenues are based on average revenues of $11.00 per passenger. Train operating costs include all Amtrak costs associated with crews, fuel, servicing and maintaining train, railroad payments, support and reservation functions, insurance, and general administration. They do not include additional costs associated with maintaining the Indio layover facility or leasing rolling stock. For a discussion of these expenses, please see Chapter 5. In reviewing the detailed Amtrak costs included in Appendix 1, it should be pointed out that food and beverage service is a potential line item cost which could be eliminated in order to reduce overall operating losses. According to Option A, food and beverage services are anticipated to generate an annual amount of $46,412. The cost of providing this on-board service is $181,856 ($149,831 for on-board service labor and $32,025 for on-board supplies), yielding a net loss of $135,444. Eliminating this service would reduce overall costs and produce the above estimated cost savings. However, food and beverage service is an amenity which intercity rail passengers have come to expect and appreciate. Therefore, given the relatively small cost of providing this service in comparison to the total operating budget, it is not recommended that it be eliminated. H. Discussion of Amtrak Operating Costs and Revenues As would be expected, the train operating costs associated with providing daily service are much greater than weekend service options due to the greater number of operating days. Between the two weekend options, however, Option C has a slightly lower operating cost. When a review of these cost estimates was completed, it was found that single largest cost difference related to train and engine crew expenses. Train and engine crew costs for Option B (with layover) are $312,481, while the costs for Option C are $152,897. Equipment maintenance costs are also significantly lower for Option C, $228,805 versus $305,073 for Option B. Since Option D was not one of the service scenarios discussed with Amtrak, a detailed cost estimate was not prepared for this option. However, based on follow-on conversations with Amtrak staff, it was agreed that a preliminary cost estimate could be developed by simply doubling the projected costs and revenues of Option A. While it is likely that the operation of two roundtrips would provide the opportunity for some economies and cost savings, it was agreed that the difference would not be significant and that doubling the figures would provide a conservative approach for preliminary cost comparisons.



While this methodology is acceptable for this preliminary analysis and was agreed upon, there are some additional considerations relative to projected revenues which must not be forgotten as part of the financial review of Option D. First of all, the operation of Option D will provide significantly more travel options to potential passengers, specifically same-day, roundtrip travel in either direction of the corridor each day of the week throughout the year. Because of these additional travel options, a strong case can be made that the projected number of passengers, passenger miles, and revenues shown in Table 3 will more than double. Should this occur, resulting annual operating losses will be reduced and farebox recovery ratios will increase accordingly. Further discussion on these points is provided below. Projected Passengers The estimates developed by Amtrak and presented in Table 3 were based on adjustments to the earlier Caltrans Division of Rail license plate survey projections. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Caltrans Division of Rail estimates were much lower than original projections developed for the Dec. 1991 study and were the subject of much controversy. However, since a detailed patronage assessment was outside the scope and purpose of this study, Amtrak had little choice upon which to base its projections. Nonetheless, this approach is a two-edged sword. While on the one hand, the use of conservative estimates allows for a “worst case” review of projected operating losses and farebox recovery rates, it can also jeopardize otherwise worthy projects by allowing them to be incorrectly characterized as financially unsound. This is especially true in this case where there are ample indicators supporting the use of higher revenue projections. Therefore, caution is strongly advised while considering all of the assumptions used in the Amtrak detailed cost estimates as further discussed below. Projected Passenger Miles The projected average trip length as calculated by Amtrak is 74.73 miles per passenger. Since the total corridor distance between Los Angeles and the Indio terminus is approximately 141 miles, this assumption implies that the average trip length will be only slightly greater than half the corridor distance. While the calculations which allowed Amtrak to reach this trip length may be methodologically correct, it seems too short when compared to the actual distances between stations. According to Table 1, the distance from Riverside to Palm Springs is 56 rail miles. However, because these two points are geographically relatively close to one another and are



within easy driving distance, it would seem reasonable to assume that the majority of intercity rail trips would be to and from locations west of Riverside, namely Fullerton or Los Angeles. The rail distance from Fullerton to the mid-Coachella Valley station at Palm Desert is 103 miles; the rail distance from Los Angeles to the mid-Coachella Valley station is 129 miles. Based on these actual distances, it would therefore appear reasonable to assume that the average trip length would be closer to 100 miles rather than the 75 miles assumed by Amtrak. By using the shorter trip length, Amtrak appears to be placing greater weight on the Riverside – Coachella Valley trip segment which is not anticipated to be the primary station pair of this corridor. And again, while use of the shorter trip length provides a “worst case” scenario, the question as to whether the analysis is too conservative cannot be overlooked. Using a longer trip length would result in increased revenues and reduced operating losses. For example, Amtrak’s typical revenue per mile on the San Diegan Line is $.18 per mile (based on a $23 one-way fare and a total corridor length of 128 miles). The proposed fare shown for the L.A. – Coachella Valley Corridor is $11.00 one-way or $.15 per mile. If the 100 mile average trip length were assumed as described above, as well as the Amtrak San Diegan per mile rate of $.18, the average revenue per passenger would increase to $18.00. Projected Farebox Recovery Rates According to Table 3, the projected farebox recovery ratios range from 18%-22% (projected revenues divided by train operating costs) assuming the $11.00 one-way fare and distance projected by Amtrak. This range is well within the limits of acceptability for the start-up years of a new service. In fact, these rates are comparable to those achieved in the early days of the Oakland-Bakersfield- San Joaquin rail service when it was operated with a single trip. Nonetheless, if the above referenced 74.73 distance was increased to 100 miles with an $18 average one-way fare, the estimated amounts would increase as indicated below. Revenue* Farebox Option D (with average revenue/passenger of $11): $ 943,718 18.15% Option D (with average revenue/passenger of $18): $ 1,545,533 29.73% * Includes food & beverage revenue calculated at 11% of transportation revenue Clearly, these calculations demonstrate the significant impact that these seemingly insignificant underlying assumptions can have on projected revenues and farebox recovery rates. And, since it is believed that the greatest number of riders will originate or terminate



in either Los Angeles or Fullerton, use of the longer trip length is well justified, as is the increased fare based on existing Amtrak San Diegan Line practices.



I. Capital Improvements and Rolling Stock Costs The capital elements required to implement the proposed service include three different cost categories as listed and described below: a) Layover facilities and host railroad track improvements, b) Station improvements, c) Rolling stock purchase or lease costs. a) Layover Facilities and Host Railroad Track Improvements As shown in Table 4, the estimated cost to construct the Indio Layover Facility is $968,000. While no specific location for this facility has been identified at this time, it would be situated as close to the Indio terminus as possible. In summary, a typical layover facility includes installation of the following items: service track, fencing, tanks for storage of non-potable water, lighting, and drip pans. For a more detailed line item budget, see Appendix 2. It is assumed that the layover facility will require an approximate 40 ft. by 1,000 ft strip of land. Since this can be totally accommodated in the railroad right-of-way, no land acquisition costs are included in the capital budget. However, an additional $300,000 is

Table 4

RAILROAD FACILITY AND STATION CAPITAL COSTS

Amount Indio Layover Facilities $ 968,000 Powered Switch for Maintenance Tracks $ 300,000 Host RR Track & Signal Improvements* $ 5,000,000

Subtotal $ 6,268,000 Station Construction $ 3,000,000

Subtotal $ 3,000,000 TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS $ 9,268,000

* May not be required by Union Pacific for only four daily train movements



shown for the installation of a powered switch which will allow the trains to automatically enter and exit the maintenance tracks. In addition, the facility will require some ongoing maintenance services. Typical services usually include water, electric, and trash collection. In sum these costs are estimated to total $191,900 annually. A total of $5 million has also been budgeted for unspecified track and signal improvements required by the host railroad to improve the overall railroad plant between Colton and Indio. While Union Pacific has not in any sense indicated approval for the proposed service, in fact they have frequently stated their opposition, a “placeholder” amount has been included in the budget in the event that UP requires a contribution to improve overall capacity. Although it would seem reasonable to assume that the proposed four train movements would not place an excessive burden on UP’s capacity requirements, in order to be prudent, $5 million as been set aside for possible signal and track improvements On the positive side, previous studies always identified another capital expense known as an interconnect track at Colton Crossing. This track was needed in order for the train to transition from the BNSF railroad to the UP railroad at Colton Crossing. This was a costly expenditure, requiring construction of new track, power switches, and signalization. Fortunately, as part of their own track plant improvements, Union Pacific has already made this improvement and therefore it is no longer included as part of the capital budget for this service. Station Improvements and Services Table 4 includes a total of $3 million for station improvements at the proposed Palm Desert station in mid-Coachella Valley. While a detailed station cost estimate was not prepared for this preliminary report, this amount has been budgeted based upon recent experience in constructing other stations. In terms of required parcel size, it is assumed that the proposed station would require a 4-5 acre parcel in order to accommodate approximately 300 parking spaces and the required bus turnaround/staging facilities. A summary of typical station costs is provided below for reference purposes only. Item Unit Cost Amount Platforms $ 500,000 each $ 500,000 Parking $ 1,500 per space @ 300 spaces $ 450,000 Climate-Controlled Building $ 125/sq ft @ 4,500 sq ft $ 562,500 Subtotal $ 1,512,500



In addition to this rough estimate of $1.5 million for these three major station elements, there are a number of other elements which are typically part of every station design: including lighting, overhead canopies and shelters on the platform, bus turnaround and staging facilities, landscaping, right-of-way purchase, and land acquisition, as well as the associated design and engineering costs. For these reasons, a lump sum of $3 million is a prudent assumption; yet depending on land costs, even $3 million may be too optimistic. In addition to considering the actual station design elements, however, there are several other environmental and service considerations unique to the development of intercity rail stations in the Coachella Valley. First of all, due to its desert climate, the Coachella Valley experiences dramatic temperature changes between the winter and summer months. The Coachella Valley also experiences high, gusty winds which blow tumbleweeds and sand on a regular basis. This is particularly true of the area located near the rail right-of-way as it is located north of much of the urbanized regions of the Valley in still undeveloped desert. In fact, anyone who has been to the Coachella Valley, knows that the wind velocities are high enough to justify the installation of a “field” of wind turbines at the head of the valley – almost within throwing distance of the Palm Springs station. Therefore, any low cost plan to construct a simple overhead canopy as is done for Metrolink stations and other intercity rail Amtrak stations elsewhere in California is totally inadequate for the requirements of the Coachella Valley. All future intercity stations built in the Coachella Valley must include a climate-controlled building where passengers may wait for their train or continuing connection. Secondly, the Coachella Valley visitor market is largely upscale. If the proposed service is to be viewed as a viable transportation alternative by its visitors, the services and amenities available at the Coachella Valley stations must also be representative of this market. The types of services and facilities which should be available are similar to those offered at any airport and include such things as hotel/resort directories, travel information, rental car services, vending facilities, restrooms, continuing connecting shuttle services, taxi cabs, telephones, and waiting room facilities. While the prospect of providing all of these services may appear difficult to achieve, all of these services are currently provided at the Palm Springs Regional Airport. Therefore, it may well be that many of the associated ground transportation services could be satisfied through closer coordination and tighter service links with the Palm Springs Regional Airport. However, since discussing the finer points associated with the provision of better services at intercity rail stations is not the primary objective of this report, it suffices to say that each of these items is critical to the success of any intercity rail station, but especially in the Coachella Valley where the majority of visitors are coming for vacation or leisure activities and are expecting a certain level of service from the moment they disembark the train.



Additionally, a related consideration is the fact that many Coachella Valley visitors return several times throughout the year. If they discover that the rail station is nothing more than a shelter in a sandy and windy parking lot, and that getting to their final resort destination takes considerable effort, it is likely that the next time they return it will not be by train. They may also make less than desirable comments to their friends which will further impact the potential of the proposed service. Therefore, it is critical that full attention be given to these expectations and that cost-effective solutions be developed to satisfy them. c) Rolling Stock Purchase or Lease Costs There are two approaches which can be used in acquiring the required rolling stock: purchase or lease. And, as with any purchase or lease option, the final decision is usually the result of how much capital can be identified in the available timeframe. The same is true in determining which approach should be followed in acquiring equipment for the proposed service. As part of the research effort associated with investigating the availability of passenger equipment, several options were reviewed. Options included Amtrak’s standard fleet of Amfleet and Horizon cars, Amtrak double-decker Superliner cars, as well as the new Talgo equipment currently being used in the Pacific Northwest. While intercity service does not require a specific type of equipment, it must be comfortable and well maintained. With respect to the possible use of Amtrak equipment, the outlook is not encouraging. The Superliner cars are not available as they are specifically dedicated to Amtrak’s long distance transcontinental routes. The single-level Amfleet cars are planned to be used primarily on the East Coast and will not be available on the West Coast, leaving only Amtrak Horizon cars which are also currently used in California. The single-level Horizon car is an intercity adaptation of a widely used commuter car on the East Coast. While it rides well and meets all performance objectives, it lacks the pizzazz typically associated with the double-decker trains. Nonethess, it appears this equipment is available and could be leased, presenting significant up-front capital savings. The cost to lease a 4-car Horizon set is $730,000 per year, plus $533,000 for equipment maintenance. In addition to the existing Amtrak Horizon fleet, Amtrak is purchasing eight new trainsets for its California services which might be available. A 5-car set of California equipment would provide seating capacity for 450 passengers and consists of three coaches, one food service car, and one Pacific Parlor car. As part of its equipment purchase contract, Amtrak has the right to purchase additional sets at these same prices through December 30, 1999. The



purchase price for a 5-car set is $12 million, plus an additional $2.3 million for an F-59 locomotive, for a total cost of $14.3 million. The Talgo equipment is a passive tilt train. When operating through a curve, Talgo cars automatically seek equilibrium by tilting. This “tilting” concept permits faster speed through curves and therefore greatly reduced travel times. The Talgo trainsets are currently being used on the Amtrak Cascades Line in the Pacific Northwest (Portland – Seattle) and have received enthusiastic customer response over the past two years. Nevertheless, the actual travel time benefits which a Talgo train could achieve in this corridor may not be significant enough to warrant the purchase of this specialized equipment. The cost to purchase a 12-car set which would provide seats for 320 people, including an F-59 locomotive, is $16 million. Since the recommended service option for the corridor assumes the operation of two roundtrips, it is assumed that two train sets would be required. A summary of these costs is provided in Table 5. While it would be technically possible to assume that the equipment could be shared as part of a larger equipment pool which would serve other routes, in reality it is likely that the equipment allocated to the Coachella Valley service would be dedicated to that route.

Table 5

SUMMARY OF ROLLING STOCK COSTS Amtrak

Horizon Annual Lease

Amtrak CA Car

Purchase

Talgo Purchase

Equipment Purchase (two sets) - $ 28,600,000 $ 32,000,000 Equipment Lease (two sets) $ 1,460,000 - - TOTAL $ 1,460,000 $ 28,600,000 $ 32,000,000 Annual Equipment Maintenance

$ 533,000 $ 533,000 $ 1,000,000

Notes: 1. Amtrak Annual Lease assumes two 4-car Amtrak Horizon sets ( 3 coaches, 1 dinette car), plus F-59

locomotive 2. Amtrak California Car purchase includes two 5-car sets (3 coaches, 1 food service, 1 Pacific Parlor), plus

F-59 locomotive 3. Talgo purchase includes two 12-car sets, plus F-59 locomotive



J. Discussion of Rolling Stock Purchase Options In considering the two purchase options (Talgo vs Amtrak California Car), the principal conflict primarily centers on the value of starting service with the attractive and flamboyant Talgo equipment versus the somewhat less expensive and more traditional, double-decker California Car. While the Talgo would offer a totally new concept in passenger rail to Southern Californians which could be a significant selling feature in future marketing and advertising campaigns, the fact that eight new California Car trainsets will soon be operated out of Los Angeles cannot be overlooked. From a train servicing and maintenance point of view, this is an important consideration since the new equipment could have an immediate use in the San Diegan corridor should the proposed service be terminated at some point in the future. Furthermore, while the Talgo equipment does offer the performance capabilities described earlier, the need for these added capabilities in the Los Angeles – Coachella Valley corridor is somewhat questionable. Additionally, the Talgo train physically carries fewer passengers. As pointed out above, a 12-car Talgo train seats 320 people while the 5-car California Car equipment seats 450. Based on this fact, the Talgo equipment clearly has a much higher capital cost per seat. While the popularity of its use in the Pacific Northwest cannot be overstated, it also cannot be concluded with any degree of certainty that its appeal would be sufficient enough to offset its higher cost per seat. Rolling Stock Recommendation Based on the above discussion, it is recommended that CVAG take immediate action in seeking State funds to acquire additional California Cars under the existing Amtrak purchase option (effective through the end of 1999). Should this not be possible, or in order to avoid possible service start-up delays while awaiting delivery of the California Cars, the second recommended option is to lease existing Horizon equipment from Amtrak. Furthermore, were the Horizon lease option ultimately selected, it is highly recommended that consideration be given to completing a full interior and exterior refurbishment of the Horizon equipment. As part of the equipment refurbishment design it is further recommended that a special “desert motif” be developed which would attract public attention and differentiate the trains from other Amtrak intercity rail services.



Summary of Estimated Capital Costs Assuming the California Car purchase option and construction of the new Palm Desert station, the total capital cost to provide the proposed service is $37.9 million (Table 6). Should Union Pacific not require the allotted $5 million in track and signal improvements, overall capital costs could be reduced to $32.9 million.

Table 6

SUMMARY OF CAPITAL COSTS

Amount Indio Layover Facilities $ 968,000 Powered Switch for Maintenance Tracks $ 300,000 Host RR Track & Signal Improvements* $ 5,000,000

Subtotal $ 6,268,000 Station Construction $ 3,000,000

Subtotal $ 3,000,000 CA Car Rolling Stock (2 5-car trainsets, plus locomotive)

$ 28,600,000

Subtotal $ 28,600,000 TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS $ 37,868,000

* May not be required by Union Pacific for only four daily train movements



K. Summary of Service Operating Costs The previous costs presented in Table 3 were based solely on the costs associated with train operations. As discussed, this included crew costs, fuel, equipment maintenance, railroad payments, and other support and administrative costs. What is not included in Table 3, however, are the costs associated with leasing the rolling stock (should this be required), as well as the costs for maintaining the Indio Layover Facility. While a case could be made that these are capital-related expenses which do not need to be included as part of an operating budget, in order to present a complete picture, they will be included in this final assessment of operating costs (Table 7).

Table 7

SERVICE OPERATING COSTS AND REVENUE PROJECTIONS (Based on $11 One-Way Fare)

Lease of Amtrak

Horizon Cars (One-Way)

(Revenue of $11)

State Purchase of CA Car

(One-Way) (Revenue of $11)

Annual Train Operating Cost $ 5,198,774 $ 5,198,774 Indio Layover Facility Maintenance $ 191,900 $ 191,900 Rolling Stock Maintenance Costs (Inc. in Line 1 costs) (Inc. in Line 1 costs) Annual Lease for Horizon Cars $ 1,460,000 -

Subtotal $ 6,850,674 $ 5,390,674 Annual Revenue* $ 943,718 $ 943,718 Annual Service Operating Loss $ (5,906,956) $ (4,446,956) Annual Passengers 77,354 77,354 Annual Passenger Miles 5,780,530 5,780,530 Farebox Recovery Ratio (annual revenue/costs)

13.77 % 17.51 %

Subsidy/Passenger $ 76.36 $ 57.49

* Includes food and beverages revenues



As shown, the final projected annual “service operating costs” range from $6.8 million for the Amtrak Horizon lease option to $5.3 million for the California Car purchase option. As depicted, the primary difference between the two costs is the annual $1.4 million lease payment required under the Amtrak Horizon lease option. Assuming the projected Amtrak per passenger fare of $11, annual final operating losses range from $5.9 million to $4.4 million respectively. Farebox recovery rates also range from 13.77% to 17.51%. However, relative to the projected revenues shown in Table 7 and as previously discussed in Chapter 3, there is justifiable reason to question the projected one-way passenger fare of $11 used to calculate total annual revenue. And, as was also pointed out, small changes to the revenue side can drastically change the overall cost-effectiveness of the service. Therefore, Table 8 assumes a one-way passenger fare of $18, instead of $11. As shown below, this change significantly reduces the previous operating loss ranges of $5.9 - $4.4 million to $5.3 - $3.8 million, a difference of approximately $600,000.

Table 8

SERVICE OPERATING COSTS AND REVENUE PROJECTIONS (Based on $18 One-Way Fare)

Lease of Amtrak

Horizon Cars (One-Way)

Revenue of $18)

State Purchase of CA Car

(One-Way) Revenue of $18)

Annual Train Operating Cost $ 5,198,774 $ 5,198,774 Indio Layover Facility Maintenance $ 191,900 $ 191,900 Rolling Stock Maintenance Costs (Inc. in Line 1 costs) (Inc. in Line 1 costs) Annual Lease for Horizon Cars $ 1,460,000 -

Total $ 6,850,674 $ 5,390,674 Annual Revenue* $ 1,545,533 $ 1,545,533 Annual Service Operating Loss $ (5,305,141) $ (3,845,141) Annual Passengers 77,354 77,354 Annual Passenger Miles 5,780,530 5,780,530 Farebox Recovery Ratio (revenue/costs) 22.56 % 28.67 % Subsidy/Passenger $ 68.58 $ 49.71

* Includes food and beverages revenues



While the range depicted in Table 7 will be formally used for the purposes of this report, it is very likely that actual operating losses could be closer to those presented in Table 8 were a higher one-way fare ultimately used. Nonetheless, both tables clearly show that annual lease payments significantly increase net operating losses and reduce farebox recovery rates. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, requesting State assistance in purchasing the rolling stock is the preferred option.



L. Capital and Operating Costs The Los Angeles – Coachella Valley Corridor has been the subject of intense interest during the past decade. As described in Chapter 1, the RCTC has already completed two extensive studies of the corridor, pursuing both a daily, State-sponsored full service proposal and a demonstration, weekend service option. Caltrans Division of Rail has also completed its own study of projected ridership in the Corridor. Now, five years later, local Coachella Valley governmental agencies are still desirous of implementing intercity rail service. As part of its plan to refocus attention towards the Corridor, CVAG commissioned this study. While many of the service attributes of this assessment are similar to the original RCTC study, its greatest difference stems from the fact that local governmental entities are now expressing a far greater willingness to support the start-up of service through local revenues. Therefore, the proposed funding plan combines an active local participation element in partnership with intercity rail State funds. Capital Improvements and Rolling Stock A total of $37.9 million in capital funds is required to implement the proposed service (Table 6). This includes costs associated with constructing the necessary Indio layover facilities, possible host railroad track and signal improvements, as well as construction of a station in the Palm Desert vicinity. This amount also assumes the purchase of two new 5-car California Car trainsets, including locomotives. Under the proposed funding plan, $34.9 million would be fully financed by the State of California. The additional $3 million required to construct the proposed new station in the Palm Desert vicinity would be financed through local resources. Should the host railroad track and signal improvements described earlier not be required, total State capital expenditures would be reduced to $29.9 million. Service Operating Costs The estimated net annual cost for operating two daily roundtrip trains in the Los Angeles – Coachella Valley Corridor ranges from $5.9 million to $4.4 million depending on whether rolling stock is purchased or leased (Table 7: worst case revenue of $11 per passenger). Under the proposed plan, service would be operated as a three-year demonstration. If the California Cars are purchased by the State as is recommended, the total net service operating cost would be $13.2 million ($4.4 million x 3 years). Based on these costs and the Coachella



Valley’s keen interest in initiating service as soon as possible, it is recommended that local public and private entities fund 25% of these costs. This equates to a total local commitment of $3.3 million for Coachella Valley entities over the three-year demonstration period and $9.9 million for the State of California as shown in Table 9.

Table 9

PROPOSED NET OPERATING FUNDING SCENARIO (Assumes Purchase of California Car)

Coachella State of Total Valley Local California Amount Year 1 $ 1.1 $ 3.3 $ 4.4 Year 2 $ 1.1 $ 3.3 $ 4.4 Year 3 $ 1.1 $ 3.3 $ 4.4 Total $ 3.3 million $ 9.9 million $ 13.2 million Although not recommended, were the Amtrak Horizon lease option pursued, the net service operating cost for the three-year period would be $17.7 million ($5.9 million x 3 years). Based on the same funding formula presented above, the 25% local Coachella Valley match would then total $4.4 million over the three demonstration years while the State amount would total $13.3 million (Table 10).

Table 10

PROPOSED NET OPERATING FUNDING SCENARIO (Assumes Amtrak Horizon Lease)

Coachella State of Total Valley Local California Amount Year 1 $ 1.5 $ 4.5 $ 6.0 Year 2 $ 1.5 $ 4.4 $ 5.9 Year 3 $ 1.4 $ 4.4 $ 5.8 Total $ 4.4 million $ 13.3 million $ 17.7 million



A comparison of these two tables shows that both State and local Coachella Valley entities would receive significant cost savings under the preferred California Car purchase option. On the State side, the total cost savings for the three-year demonstration would be $3.4 million; on the local side, total cost savings would equal $1.1 million. Additionally, in an effort to maintain a conservative approach in the development of this funding plan, the estimated net annual operating loss has been assumed to remain at a constant level throughout the three-year period. In reality, however, it is likely that overall revenues would increase during this period as ridership grows, thereby reducing annual amounts. M. Potential Local Funding Sources Coachella Valley entities have indicated several options for generating the recommended 25% funding commitment. One potential source is the Transient Occupancy Tax (TOT) generated by Coachella Valley visitors staying overnight in local hotels and motels. The underlying theory behind this concept is that the revenues generated from the TOT tax by overnight visitors would be used to generate more visitors by providing funds to operate the trains. In essence, Coachella Valley visitors would be assisting in paying for the trains’ operation. Ideally, the ultimate goal of this strategy would be to more than offset the local TOT contribution by new revenues which would be realized from its new intercity rail visitors. Other potential sources include direct city and/or local tribal contributions. At the conclusion of the three-year demonstration, if the proposed service has grown to the same approximate performance levels of other intercity routes during the same period of their development, the service would be transferred to the State for full operating support.



N. Summary of Study Findings The initiation of intercity passenger rail service in the Los Angeles – Coachella Valley corridor is technically feasible and greatly desired by local Coachella Valley entities. While this fact may not be surprising to the reader (based on the history of this corridor), it remains the single most significant finding of this study. Additional findings are listed below. Local Agency Interest 1. The Corridor has been the subject of extensive research and discussion over the past

decade by RCTC, CVAG, and Caltrans Division of Rail. 2. Local Coachella Valley governmental agencies have given the proposed service a high

priority and have expressed interest in becoming a funding partner with the State of California to initiate service in the Corridor.

Host Railroads in the Corridor 3. The proposed service would follow the BNSF alignment from downtown Los Angeles to

Colton. At Colton the alignment would turn eastward onto UP trackage and continue to the Coachella Valley.

4. The UP has indicated strong opposition towards the operation of passenger rail service

along its alignment in previous years and continues to be opposed at the time of this study. No opposition is anticipated from Burlington Northern Santa Fe.

Proposed Service Operator 5. The proposed service would be operated by Amtrak which enjoys an absolute right to

operate passenger trains virtually anywhere within the United States, subject to schedule negotiations and unique infrastructure improvements required by the host railroads.



Service Description 6. Proposed station stops include Los Angeles, Fullerton, Riverside-Downtown,

Palm Springs, a new station within the Palm Desert vicinity, and Indio, although service could technically begin operating with only the existing Palm Springs station.

7. While three different single roundtrip scenarios were reviewed as part of this study, it was the opinion of Amtrak that these options failed to offer the level of flexibility required by the general public. A minimum of two roundtrip trains must be available before service should be initiated.

Station Assessment 8. The Palm Springs station is a modern intercity rail station with an enclosed building,

restrooms, and parking. The City of Indio has received a $1.5 million grant from the State to construct its new station and will match this amount with local resources.

9. Due to the fluctuating climate conditions of the Coachella Valley, as well as its appeal as

a vacation and tourist resort, all stations should be constructed with climate-controlled, enclosed passenger facilities and strive to provide the same ground transportation services and facilities typically found at any airport.

Rolling Stock Availability 10. The availability of existing rolling stock is low, although it would be possible to lease

two existing Amtrak single-level Horizon car trainsets. Purchase options include piggybacking on Amtrak’s existing California Car trainset purchase agreement by ordering two new double-decker trainsets or buying two new Talgo “tilt” trainsets. Due to the added cost of the Talgo equipment and the annual lease payments associated with the Horizon option, the preferred choice is to purchase two new California Car trainsets.



O. Key Study Recommendations Based on the above study findings, it is recommended that CVAG, and its elected officials, take the necessary steps to seek agreement with the State of California to implement a jointly funded, three-year demonstration of intercity passenger rail service in the Los Angeles – Coachella Valley Corridor. 1. The recommended service scenario includes the operation of two daily roundtrip trains

between Los Angeles and the Coachella Valley along the BNSF/UP alignments. 2. The State of California should ensure the availability of rolling stock to operate the

proposed service by purchasing two additional California Car trainsets as part of the existing Amtrak California Car purchase contract or assist in the lease of Amtrak Horizon cars.

3. Coachella Valley governmental entities should enter into a partnership agreement with

the State of California to share in the annual net operating costs during the three year demonstration period.

4. Caltrans Division of Rail, along with Amtrak officials, should pursue further discussions

with Union Pacific for the use of its right-of-way. 5. Funding to construct a third Coachella Valley station in the vicinity of Palm Desert

should be actively pursued, although service could technically begin operating in advance of its opening.

6. Plans to provide adequate passenger waiting facilities and appropriate connecting shuttle

services at all Coachella Valley stations should be developed.


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