11 Research & Evaluation 11

Achieving Sustainable Development: Scientific Uncertainty and Policy Innovation in Tasmanian Regional Development

Bruce Davis Institute of Antartic and Southern Ocean Studies and Antarctic Collaborative Research Centre University of Tasmania

Following the UNCED Conference of 1992, most nations have committed themselves to sustainable development. But what does this phrase mean in practice and how is it being implemented in federal countries such as Australia? In particular, what are the implications for peripheral regional economies such as Tasmania? This article examines the establishment and initial operations of the Sustainable Development Advisory Council (SDAC) in Tasmania and actions taken with respect to two major projects: development and ratification of a State Coastal Policy and redevelopment of the Mt Lye11 copper mine in western Tasmania, designated a Project of State Significance (POSS). Both involve a perplexing conjunction of scientific uncertainty, economic significance and innovative policy-making. Do they indicate a need to reinvent policy process? What are the broader implications fo r public policy?

The concept of sustainable development was first broadly promulgated in the World Conservation Strategy jointly prepared by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 1981. The need for sustainable development and debate about its meaning and implications were further discussed in the Brundtland Report (1987). The concept gained full international endorsement at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, June 1992. Australia was a signatory to the UNCED outcomes, but had already prepared a Draft National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) in mid-1992 and it was clear that Commonwealth, state and territory governments would consider themselves bound in principle to this objective. But there was a conceptual and practical problem: what did the phrase really mean in practice and what policy instruments should be adopted to bring it into effective implementation?

As Eckersley (1991) points out, there is no universally agreed meaning of the term ‘sustainable development’, although most commentators agree the primary aim is to ensure long-term viability in natural resources management, while attempting to meet the needs of current and future generations (Pearce et al. 1989). But this has induced an ideological rift between those who view sustainable development as little more than economic growth with some attention to conservation values and those who argue environmental imperatives necessitate a radical restructuring of market force prescriptions in favour of ecological viability and social justice (Weiss 1989; Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992). Indeed, many environmental economists argue for new forms of valuation of natural resources (Pearce and Moran 1994). In recent times this has resulted in new doctrines, such as the precautionary principle, user pays and inter- generational equity (Cameron 1993; Young 1993).

But perhaps the greatest challenge to ESD lies in its implementation, which constitutes a direct challenge to existing vested interests and necessitates new modes of governance and social action, cutting across functionally specialised bureaucratic fiefdoms and corporate power. Put bluntly, immediate adoption of sustainable development practice does not appear feasible in many jurisdictions, where massive disruption of

Airstruliaii Jounial of Public Adriiinistration - 55(Q lOtrlO8, Deceniber 1996

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existing operations would cause havoc. The search is on for transition strategies, especially as we do not yet possess appropriate baseline information upon which to make appropriate choices. Risk and uncertainty are inescapable, but this does not mean idleness will suffice; without a rapid readjustment of natural resources policy, major social and economic disruptions will occur and lack of environmental security will increase the prospect of civil unrest and regional warfare (Renner 1989; Fairclough 1991). The current approach in Western nations appears to be the establishment of new government units charged with monitoring and reporting upon sustainable development, the enshrining of certain ecological and economic principles i n resource decision-making and the application of fiscal and other instruments to move towards more sustainable practice. The two case studies described below are some of the earliest applications in Australia.

Tasmania’s Sustainable Development Strategy and Planning Framework After two decades of highly conflictive natural resource controversies (Davis 1984; Chapman 1989; Tighe 1992; Crowley 1993), the Tasmanian government introduced a comprehensive reform package of land-use planning and resource manage- ment legislation in 1993. This was largely based upon New Zealand’s Resource Management Act 1991, which purported to provide a holistic and integrated basis for decision-making about major conservation and development projects, as well as binding all Crown agencies to more sustainable resource practices via formally agreed national policies (Rennie 1993; Rosier and Hastie 1996). Without canvassing all details of the Tasmanian Resource Management and Planning System, the principal elements are as follows:

a State Policies and Project Act 1993, setting out prescribed procedures for developing binding state policies and dealing with Projects of State Significance (POSS); planning legislation which provides for establishment and operation of a Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal, a Land Use Planning and Review Panel and a Public Land Use Commission; an Environmental Management and Pollution

Control Act 1994, with an associated Environmental Management and Pollution Control Board; a number of associated pieces of legislation amending existing statutes to conform with the above and reinforcing the intention to move towards sustainable development practices as soon as feasible.

The State Polices and Projects Act 1993 also provides for establishment of a Sustainable Development Advisory Council (SDAC) to maintain overview of the above, deal with written references by the minister and cabinet, and prepare periodic state of the environment reports. In carrying out such work ‘sustainable development’ is defined as (SPP Act 1993, Schedule 1):

managing the use, development and protection of natural and physical resources in such a way, or at a rate, which enables people and com- munities to provide for their social, economic and cultural well-being and for their health and safety while: a) sustaining the potential of natural and

physical resources to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations;

b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil and ecosystems; and

c) avoiding, remedying or mitigating any adverse effects on the environment.

Any public sector agency may propose draft state policies consistent with these aims, and if adopted by government the Crown is bound, that is, state and local authorities must give effect to such policies. No state policy may be inconsistent with the Act, indeed all draft policies must run this gauntlet through public hearings, cabinet and parliamentary scrutiny. Where major development projects are intended to be fast-tracked by government, they may be designated POSS and referred to the Sustainable Development Advisory Council (SDAC) for investigation and report. The executive can avoid such a route and move to project approval direct, but if so cabinet must carry full responsibility for the outcome. Given the earlier Wesley Vale pulpmill debacle (Chapman 1992), Tasmanian politicians appear likely to use the SDAC process in future, to keep environmental evaluation at arm’s length and under independent assessment.

SDAC commenced operations i n August 1994

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(the author of this paper being a member) and was immediately given two difficult and time- constrained assignments, namely the review of a draft State Coastal Policy prepared by the Department of Environment and Land Management (DELM) and proposed redevelopment of the Mt Lyell coppermine on Tasmania’s west coast. The latter was contentious, given 100 years of environmental degradation by previous mining operations. These were interesting test cases, being the first attempts to implement the new legislation, but also involved scientific uncertainty, given the complexity of ecological factors involved and the limited availability of baseline data.

The Draft State Coastal Policy Coastal management has proven a fairly intractable problem in most parts of the world, since it involves multiple-issue, multiple-jurisdiction-type situations, with a variety of stakeholders and vested interests (Kenchington 1994). Integrated coastal zone management strategies (ICZM) can be devised, but generally there is a lack of political will to enforce regulation, local government often has a stake in coastal development and ad hoc planning decisions lead to gradual attrition of amenity (DELM 1994). In general, therefore, there is an implementation problem, even if statutory planning is supposed to exist. Yet public concern about coastal areas has now reached the stage where political imperatives operate and attempts are being made to move beyond formal inquiries into positive action (Birrell 1994; SDAC 1995b; Tarte 1995). In other words ICZM is an idea whose time has come and many individuals and groups are willing to facilitate reform, provided governments are serious about the matter. The central problem for government is that calls for a new policy direction are occurring at a time of fiscal constraint and an enormous and increasing environmental agenda (Toyne 1995).

At the national level there have been a plethora of coastal inquiries during the past decade, hence cynicism was apparent when the Hawke Labor government announced in mid- 1989 that a further investigation would be conducted by the Resource Assessment Commission (RAC), which did not commence its inquiry until late 1991 (Haward 1994). It must be said that the final report released in November 1993 was a disappointing document, calling for a predictable top-down approach,

including a Coastal Resources Management Act and a National Coastal Action Program with federal finance as fiscal lever to force the states into line. The latter were already initiating their own reforms and willing to cooperate with the commonwealth, but on a negotiated basis. The federal response was a long time coming, the ministerial document titled Living on the Coast only being released in May 1995, but amounting to a $53 million package based upon Commonwealth-state cooperation. Few details were available at the time SDAC was reviewing the draft State Coastal Policy for Tasmania, but most of the principles enunciated in the Tasmanian document were already in conformity with Commonwealth intentions (Haward 1995).

Biogeographically, Tasmania possesses many stretches of near pristine and relatively uninhabited coastline, but some ‘hotspots’ of untidy coastal development, vehicle-impacted sand dunes and water quality problems arising from river and estuarine pollution are evident (DELM 1994). The fact that nearly 70 per cent of the coast is Crown land is no salvation either, given that ‘turf wars’ rather than cooperation have often determined policy outcomes (Kriwoken 1992). Neither local government nor state agencies possess adequate coastal management expertise and information about coastal and offshore ecosystems is sparse. Two further complications at the time of the SDAC review of the draft coastal policy were proposed statutes dealing with marine fisheries and aquaculture being promoted by a highly aggressive Minister for Primary Industries and Fisheries, which threatened to cut across the coastal policy.

When the draft State Coastal Policy was referred to the SDAC in August 1994, a timebound and statutorily prescribed procedure was set in train, involving the following steps: 1. a written direction from the Minister for

Environment to SDAC to prepare a report and any proposed modifications to the draft policy;

2. SDAC to advise all state agencies and local government within 14 days that they had 28 days to respond to the draft policy;

3. ensure public exhibition for a period of two months and seek public submissions within that period;

4. SDAC to consider all representations, decide whether further hearings were required, frame any modifications proposed and transmit its

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report and recommendations to the minister; 5 . publish notice of the submitted report and make

it publicly available; 6 . the minister to then recommend to the governor

(via cabinet) the making of a Tasmanian Sustainable Development Policy;

7. the policy to be tabled in both Houses of Parliament within 10 sitting days and unless disallowed within a further 15 sitting days, then taking effect.

The State Policies and Projects Act also has supplementary provisions about ministerial power to recommend interim state policies, subsequent amendment of planning schemes and interim orders, penalties for contravention and the regular periodic updating and review of state policies.

There is little point in detailing here the entire sequence of events involved in review of the draft State Coastal Policy, but a number of learning experiences can be related. Overall the review procedure operated smoothly, albeit with more meetings and attention to detail than perhaps the SDAC had anticipated, especially as considerable care was expended to ensure the evaluation process and outcomes were not open to subsequent legal challenge. The participatory process was warmly embraced by the general public and most Crown agencies and it was interesting to observe the depth of local knowledge and community concern for coastal management in all areas of the state. Most submissions recognised the need for integrated action, but were resistant to a formal State Coastal Council while favouring more regionalised and community-based action. Many doubted the ability of local authorities to deal with coastal issues, but nonetheless argued local government must remain involved. Few individuals exhibited any sub- stantial appreciation of the concept of sustainable development and widely divergent views existed as to how the coastal zone should be defined.

As far as the SDAC itself was concerned, two quandaries became apparent. DELM was lead agent and proponent of the draft Coastal Policy, yet the department was also being called upon for data and expertise in carrying out aspects of the assessment; i n future the SDAC would have to seek budgetary resources to bolster its own internal expertise with some consultancy reports. Second, it was apparent that although the state legislation provided a mechanism for the review and legitimation of draft policies, i t singularly failed to address many

aspects of implementation. The SDAC therefore prepared an ‘implementation package’, identifying prospective roles and responsibilities in outline, identifying existing policy and statutory instruments which could be used to administer and enforce policies, and suggesting the need for some new programs and codes of practice. SDAC members were aware this was on the edge of their brief, but considered state cabinet would probably welcome such advice, given that the State Coastal Policy was likely to set precedents about guiding principles and types of action for the future.

After preliminary scrutiny to ensure the modified State Coastal Policy was i n accordance with the minister’s initial direction and legally acceptable, the final report (Under Consideration) was transmitted to the Minister for Environment in late October 1995. The policy was approved by cabinet in mid-December 1995.

The CMT Project Redevelopment of the Mount Lyell Coppermine Those who have read Blainey’s fascinating account of mining operations on the West Coast of Tasmania (1954) will be aware that copper mining at Queenstown has been operating for more than a century, and as a result of smelter fumes and waste disposal the hills around the town are largely devoid of vegetation and the Queen and King River systems are virtually ecologically destroyed. Successive governments have regarded this process as ‘inevitable’ and i t is only in recent times that concern about heavy metals pollution and visual ugliness has caused some reconsideration of environmental protection, although the potential costs of remediation have virtually precluded action. Very little long-term monitoring has been carried out, thus there does not exist an adequate baseline against which to measure change.

When the Mt Lyell operations became uneconomic in the 1970s, a series of government support packages were introduced to prop up the venture, but in December 1994 mining ceased when the operator, the Mt Lyell Mining and Railway Co. (MLMRC), a subsidiary of Renison Goldfields Consolidated, withdrew from the site. Following calls by the Tasmanian government for expressions of interest in redeveloping the mine, Copper Mines of Tasmania (CMT), a fully owned subsidiary of Gold Mines of Australia, was granted a mining lease and indemnity from actions

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concerning pollution from previous occupation and use of leased land. The CMT project was desig- nated a POSS under the State Policies and Projects Act 1993 and an agreement between CMT and the government committed $5m expenditure on a detailed feasibility and evaluation program to devise a redevelopment strategy and prepare an appropriate environmental management plan. The SDAC was called upon to carry out an independent evaluation and report to cabinet. The study was to be fully integrated, covering social, economic and ecological aspects of the project, including the regional and state significance of the proposal.

At the outset it was clear that the SDAC faced an extremely formidable task. First, both the formal project of state significance procedure and CMT’s own market-driven priorities meant that a short time frame was available to deal with an extremely complex analysis. Second, the limited nature of prior monitoring and diverse sources of acid mine water, dumpsites and heavily worked ground meant that isolating geo-chemical characteristics and sources of pollution would not prove simple. Third, given the indemnity granted against earlier pollution, it would be difficult to separate CMT impacts from other factors. Fourth, there was a query about the scope of the invcstigation, which was nominally about the leased mine site itself, but could not really be considered in isolation from impacts on river systems extending as far as Macquarie Harbour, where tourism activities and aquaculture had to be considered. Fifth, under the Act the SDAC was required to reach a ‘formulated position’, which would identify key issues and indicate whether the project should proceed and under what conditions.

A CMT (Agreement) Act was passed in late 1994, setting out terms of agreement between the company and government, identifying the project as of state significance and requiring the SDAC to prepare guidelines for the environmental management plan. Given the part-time nature of the Advisory Council, it was necessary to call upon some resources of DELM and the Department of Resources and Development for supplementary expertise and assistance. There was some concern

comprehensive and independent. A further complication was CMT’s desire to

build a small tailings dam early in the feasibility testing, so as to deal with any acid mine water or other materials arising from test drilling and other investigations. Some environmentalists were opposed to any action prior to completion of the entire environmental management plan, the government and CMT were anxious that site investigations should proceed rapidly and smoothly, while the SDAC was prepared to contemplate a limited tailings dam, provided environmental safeguards were assured. Eventually the CMT (Agreement) A c t was amended in February 1995 and the small tailings dam construction went ahead.

In terms of statutory requirement, the key elements of a POSS evaluation are as follows: I .

2.

3 .

4.

5.

6 .

Initially the Minister for Environment must publish guidelines setting out the development approval process, the guidelines being tabled within five sitting days, and an order must be made by the governor, designating the project of state significance. The order must be gazetted and laid before both Houses of Parliament and unless disallowed within 15 days becomes operational. The minister then directs the SDAC to carry out an integrated assessment, specifying matters to be addressed, processes involved and time frame. Following integrated assessment by the SDAC, including prescribed notification of local councils and state agencies, as well as public exhibition and consideration of submissions, a report is submitted to the minister, indicating whether the POSS should proceed and, if so, under what conditions and which agencies should be responsible. The report must be made public and a final determination made by the minister and cabinet, acting through an order made by the governor. Licences and approvals must be specified in detail; there is no right of public appeal but action can be taken to enforce a condition.

within the SDAC about partial reliance upon In practice, once the evaluation was in the departments actively involved in their portfolio hands of the SDAC, a number of parallel courses responsibilities relative to the project, so a limited of action were set in train. SDAC continued to number of external consultants and advisers were provide overview of the analysis, while used later in the evaluation, to ensure it was maintaining liaison with CMT over development

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of plans and capacity to meet environmental safeguards, while subcommittees of SDAC members and relevant government agencies considered i n detail various social, economic, technical, scientific and eco-logical aspects of the project. Site inspections, discussions with stakeholders and public hearings were also initiated, along with the commissioning of some consult- ancy studies. Everybody was under substantial time pressure, given that the evaluation did not get under way until February 1995. yet CMT were expecting to make an investment decision concerning approximately $90 million by May 1995 and wanted the mine in initial operation by November 1995. While the SDAC and the government noted these desires, i t was essential this initial POSS should be carefully and compre- hensively considered. This meant some civil servants were literally working double their hours.

It soon became apparent that the key environmental considerations were the siting of the substantial tailings dam required and the ambiguous question of acid mine drainage. Earlier mine discharges had virtually destroyed the ecology of the King and Queen River systems draining into Macquarie Harbour, with an estimated 100 million tonnes of sludge deposited along the banks. CMT was indemnified against this earlier pollution and despite its intention to use ‘best practice’ environ- mental management, the SDAC had to determine (on the basis of limited monitoring evidence) whether or not new mining operations would add to or diminish the acid mine drainage problem. Siting of the tailings dam was equally crucial, since the most promising site appeared to be the relatively undisturbed Princess Creek, a tributary of the Queen River and, fortunately, not very visitile from roads or the township. None of this planning was made easier by the discovery that mine water discharge was occurring from various locations and at various levels, rendering it difficult to determine what was potentially ‘CMT water’ as against seasonal and ‘earlier’ mine discharge.

There is little point in recounting here full details of the SDAC evaluation apart from noting

to threaten tourist and aquaculture ventures in Macquarie Harbour, but with little evidence to support this proposition. Despite good liaison between CMT and the SDAC in addressing CMT’s proposed environmental management plan, it was late in the evaluation before the SDAC could finalise its ‘formulated position’ with regard to key ecological variables and proposed operational criteria.

Given the complex geo-chemical characteristics of the site, the need for CMT to be indemnified against earlier pollution and the government’s need to be satisfied ‘best practice’ would prevail and i t would not be saddled with further environmental disaster, even if CMT withdrew at a later stage, the ‘formulated position’ had to be extremely carefully worded, cater for some unknowns, but be practicable in implementation. CMT gave every appearance of a progressive and careful corporation, but they would have to live with whatever conditions were imposed, in what was still a bold investment decision.

The principal parameters of the ‘formulated position’ eventually took the following form:

In respect of environmental factors not affected by existing and ongoing contamination and pollution, the environmental assessment criteria should apply as if the CMT project was a ‘stand alone’ project at this or an alternative site. In respect of environmental factors which a r e affected by pre-existing and ongoing con- tamination and pollution caused by prior operations, the criteria should be varied from those which would otherwise be required by best practice environmental management to the degree that CMT is indemnified against pre- existing and ongoing pollution (a matter requiring interpretation and assessment). In respect of pre-existing and ongoing acid mine drainage, environmental assessment criteria must take into account an agreed methodology quantifying the amount of acid drainage arising from the Prince Lyell dewatering operations CMT was legally responsible for.

that social and economic analyses favoured the redevelopment project in what was a depressed employment region of the state, The environ- mental issue was much more sensitive, given past conservation controversies and the tendency of critics in Strahan to argue that the mine was likely

A number of other conditions were laid down with respect to waste water emissions, viability of Princess Creek ecosystems, use of tailings, waste rock dumps and land rehabilitation.

The final environmental management plan submitted by CMT was approved subject to

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various modifications, but in its final report to government the SDAC drew attention to the long- term and sustained effort which would be required to ensure effective environmental remediation was achieved. It would be necessary for CMT and the Tasmanian government to establish comprehensive monitoring programs and perhaps adjust licence conditions on the basis of accumulated experience. To deal with a variety of social, economic and ecological issues, especially aspects of pollution control and remediation, an advisory committee might also be required. This would complement a joint Commonwealth-state initiative, operating through the Office of Supervising Scientist, aimed at a more regional research, remediation and demonstration program for the Queen and King Rivers and various Macquarie Harbour issues.

The final assessment report of the SDAC was dated August 1995 and received government approval in September 1995. The mine com- menced production in November 1995. It will be two years before target outputs are fully achieved.

Scientific Uncertainty and Sustainable Development A substantial literature now exists concerning the nexus between scientific information and policy process; in the main it demonstrates that political factors tend to override scientific advice, but with the proviso that the latter is not so monolithic as lay persons assume (Roynane 1984; Cullen 1990, Elzinga and Bohlin 1993). The reality is that so- called scientific ‘facts’ are in many cases either professional opinion or the most recent interpre- tation which may be overturned by new research (Bahm 1971; Fieveson et al. 1976). But to ignore scientific evidence is to take an unqualified risk, so the real question is whether scientists are able to provide reassurance to decision-makers about options and implications and whether decision processes are structured to receive and utilise scientific advice without taking all evidence literally. This calls for fine judgment of which not all governments are capable.

In terms of the Tasmanian State Coastal Policy, the principal coastal problems were well identitjed, but more information will be required in order to translate general policy prescriptions into effective management in regional and local circum- stances. In particular the tendency towards piece- meal attrition of foreshore land areas, coupled with

considerable ignorance of offshore situations, will need to be rectified.

The CMT project is a demanding one, in scientific terms, given the need to decide both the short- and long-term implications of treating mine waste and water discharge into streams already environmentally degraded but subject to inputs from diverse sources and with seasonal variation. Probabilities can be assigned, but there are no guarantees about outcome; the new project is likely to be beneficial in treating some earlier unregulated discharges, ensuring effective treatment of new discharges, in a situation where environmental disaster already exists and any prospect of beneficiation should be grasped. Experts were not entirely in agreement about the prospects, but overall agreed the project should be welcomed. Here scientific evidence was taken seriously in all of the negotiations and decisions between CMT and the government.

So what does this add to sustainable develop- ment in Tasmania? The State Coastal Policy should be welcomed on the grounds that it will:

safeguard coastal ecosystems and ensure that natural and cultural values of the coast will be protected; ensure orderly development is permitted to occur, recognising the economic and social values of coastal areas and the legitimate aspirations of communities to engage in a diversity of coastal activities; ensure that management responsibility is shared by all spheres of government and the broader community; ensure that planning schemes take due account of the needs of both current and future generations in conservation and development decision-making ; ensure, insofar as is feasible, that coastal scenic amenity is conserved and that public access is maintained subject to safeguards to environ- mental quality; enable action to be taken to avoid, minimise or mitigate any adverse effects on the environment; be a policy open to review and amendment in the light of future environmental requirements and community need; enable integration with future state policies that may apply to specific issues in the coastal zone.

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Compatibility with national sustainable develop- ment principles and practice has also been sought.

With regard to the CMT project, the SDAC couched its report on sustainable development aspects in a different manner. After noting the ‘best practice’ approach and detailed nature of the environmental management plan and licence conditions, the SDAC indicated its conclusion that the proposed mining venture was generally in accordance with sustainable development principles, having regard to the kinds of impacts in major mining operations. With regard to the latter, reference was made to relevant guidelines in the National Strategy on Ecologically Sustainable Development (NSED), December 1992, and CMT’s decision to formally adopt an environ- mental management system based on BS7550 or an equivalent Australian Standard. In general, therefore, appropriate safeguards were in place, but could be amended as ‘best practice’ was improved.

Implications for Public Policy Attempts at making the transition towards sustainable development practice are in their infancy as yet; these two case studies have shed some light on the planning processes involved, but it is obviously too early to say what will happen when they are translated into practice. Briefly summarised, what are some of the lessons of experience to date?

The concept of sustainable development is as yet little known to decision-makers or the general public. A considerable education program is required to explain why the concept is needed, as much as how it might be operationalised. It is clearly difficult to move the mindset of many people away from the notion of functionally specialised bureaucratic fiefdoms or free market corporate aspirations towards a more holistic and integrated perspective of natural resources policy. Stakeholder values should be legitimised, but processes are needed which give more accurate perspectives of options and implications, as well as resource valuations.

It may appear time consuming to go through the detailed referral process of state policies and POSS, but on past evidence this is a lot faster and more acceptable to the community than attempts at ministerial authority or ‘fast-tracking’ that lead to major development controversies. In public inquiries of this kind, part-time advisory bodies

such as the SDAC, even though they possess considerable internal expertise, must rely upon a variety of other sources of information, arising from consultancy briefs, the input of various public sector agencies and a variety of submissions from diverse community interests. While utilising such assistance, the determining body must ensure transparency of process, independence of thought and action and a commitment to the principles of sustainable development, even in a cynical and pragmatic world.

There will never be enough information and much of it is usually inappropriate for planning purposes. Decisions must be based on informed judgement, with considerable care taken to ensure no hidden dangers lurk and with some recognition that adaptation will be essential. The process of debate is almost more important than the outcome in reaching a mutually acceptable position within the community.

If we are serious about sustainable development i t will necessitate adjustment of the status quo and represent a threat to existing interests in favour of tenuous and long-term aspirations. Bureaucracies exist to serve governments, but also the public interest; there are times when the civil service must demonstrate sufficient adherence to policy objectives to stiffen the political will of ‘recalcitrant’ politicians. Transparency of action brings community allies.

In summary, it is far too early to say whether the Resource Management and Planning System will prove successful in fostering sustainable development, but an appropriate framework now exists and there appears to be community pressure to take innovative and positive action as soon as feasible.

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